June 21, 2017

G.R. No. 218242

PAULINO M. ALDABA, Petitioner
vs.
CAREER PHILIPPINES, SHIP-MANAGEMENT, INC., COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., and/or VERLOU
CARMELINO, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated
June 4, 2015 of petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November
19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127057 reversing the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and
Resolution dated August 3 1, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 2nd Division granting
petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00.

The facts follow.

Petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba was hired by respondents Career Philippines Shipmanagement Incorporated, and
Verlou Carmelina, in behalf of their foreign principal, petitioner Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd., as Bosun for
work on board the vessel M/V Cape Frio with a basic monthly salary of US$564.00.

In the course of the performance of his duties, on April 4, 2011, petitioner was accidentally hit by twisted
chains made of heavy metal causing him to fall and eventually resulted to a back injury.

Thus, on April 7, 2011, when the vessel was at the Port of Hongkong, petitioner was examined at the Quality
Health Care Medical Center by Dr. Thomas Wong, with the examination showing that petitioner suffered a
fractured back and was declared unfit to work. As such, he was immediately repatriated.

On April 11, 2011, upon his arrival in Manila, petitioner was referred by respondents to the company-
designated physician at NGC Medical Specialist, Inc. for treatment and rehabilitation. The x-ray examination
on his back showed a "misalignment of distal sacrum that may suggest fracture." In addition, the x-ray
examination on his thoracic spine revealed an "anterior wedging deformity, T11 Osteopenia and early
degenerative osseus changes."

The company-designated physician, after the continuing evaluation and medical treatment for 163 days,
issued a Medical Report dated September 29, 2011 that reads as follows:

1. The patient has reached maximum medical cure.

2. The final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities is Grade 8 - moderate rigidity or two
thirds (2/3) loss of Thereafter, (sic) motion or lifting power of the trunk.

Petitioner, on the other hand, consulted Dr. Misael Jonathan A. Tieman, an Orthopedic Surgeon and
Diplomate, Philippine Board of Orthopedics, for an independent assessment of his medical condition and
came out with findings showing that petitioner's injury resulted to his permanent disability, thus, making him
unfit to work as a seafarer in any capacity.

As a result, petitioner demanded for total disability compensation, but respondents did not heed such
demand. Respondents, however, expressed willingness to compensate petitioner the amount corresponding
to Grade 8 disability rating based on the medical findings of the company-designated physician.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, as well as
medical expenses, with prayer for damages and attorney's fees against respondents with the Arbitration Board
of the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter, on April 27, 2012, decided in favor of respondents in a Decision2 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to jointly and severally
pay complainant Paulino M. Aldaba disability benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00 which is equivalent to
Grade 8 disability under the POEA Contract, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision3 dated July 16, 2012 reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled
that petitioner is entitled to a permanent total disability compensation, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 27, 2012 of Labor Arbiter Pablo A. Gajardo is hereby reversed.
Respondents, jointly and severally, are hereby ordered to pay Complainant-Appellant, by way of permanent
and total disability compensation, the amount of US$60,000.00, pursuant to the POEA Standard Contract and
to pay attorney's fees of 10% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

After respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, they elevated the case to the CA. On
November 19, 2014, the CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated July 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)-2nd Division in LAC NO. 05-000486-12 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated April
27, 2012 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-OFW (M) 12-19022-11 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.4

Hence, the present petition wherein the petitioner assigns the following errors:

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed REVERSIBLE ERROR CONTRARY TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE in
promulgating the assailed decision and resolution

I.

WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS

II.

WHEN IT SOLELY GAVE CREDENCE TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE COMPANY PHYSICIAN WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE FINDINGS OF PETITIONER'S DOCTOR OF CHOICE.5

Petitioner insists that he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because of his inability to
perform his job for more than 120 days, citing a litany of cases decided by this Court. He further argues that
the fact that he had been evaluated by respondents' company physicians is substantial c9mpliance with the
provision of the "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels" imposed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and does not
preclude him from seeking medical attention to a physician of his own choice, more so, if the purpose of which
is to provide an independent medical assessment of his true condition. According to him, the law does not
exclusively vest to the company-designated physician the sole authority to assess and certify the extent of the
injury/sickness for purposes of payment of compensation and disability benefits. Lastly, petitioner asserts that
he is entitled to the award of damages because the act of respondents in failing to pay what is due him shows
utter disregard for public policy to protect labor, which is a clear indication of bad faith and attorney's fees as
respondents' act has compelled him to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Respondents, on the other hand, in their Comment dated September 3, 2015, contend that the 240-day rule
enunciated in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. and Atlantic Marine Ltd.,6 and subsequent rulings
of this Court, should govern, considering that the complaint of petitioner was filed on December 28, 2011. In
the said decision of this Court, it was ruled that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so
declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of
a permanent disability. They also aver that the failure of petitioner to follow the procedure of submitting
conflicting assessments to the opinion of an independent third doctor bars his claim for disability benefits.
Finally, they insist that the claim for damages and attorney's fees is bereft of any factual and legal basis as
there can be no malice, bad faith or ill-motive that can be imputed against petitioner.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court7 are
reviewable by this Court.8 Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals,
are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their
jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial evidence.9 However, a relaxation of this rule is
made permissible by this Court whenever any of the following circumstances is present:

1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;

8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not
disputed by the respondent;'

10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; [and]

11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 10

Whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable as total and permanent disability is essentially a factual
issue, however, the present case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the CA differ with
that of the NLRC. Thus, this Court shall now proceed to resolve the issue raised in the petition for review.

The petition is meritorious.

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena,  11 the Court summarized the applicable provisions that govern a seafarer's
disability claim, thus:

The entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is governed by the law, the employment contract
and the medical findings. 12

By law, the seafarer's disability benefits claim is governed by Articles 191 to 193, Chapter VI (Disability
benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation to Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.
By contract, it is governed by the employment contract which the seafarer and his employer/local manning
agency executes prior to employment, and the applicable POEA-SEC that is deemed incorporated in the
employment contract. 13

Lastly, the medical findings of the company-designated physician, the seafarer's personal physician, and those
of the mutually-agreed third physician, pursuant to the POEA-SEC, govern.

Pertinent to the resolution of this petition's factual issues of compensability (of ampullary cancer) and
compliance (with the POEASEC prescribed procedures for disability determination) is Section 20-B of the 2000
POEA-SEC14 (the governing POEA-SEC at the time the petitioners employed Ravena in 2006). It reads in part:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be
liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and
lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or repatriated

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he
shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has
been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work by the company-designated physician or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall it
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure
of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

4. Those illness not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.

xxxx

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused either by injury or illness, the seafarer
shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be
governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted.

xxx

As we pointed out above, Section 20-B of the PO EA-SEC governs the compensation and benefits for the work-
related injury or illness that a seafarer on board sea-going vessels may have suffered during the term of his
employment contract. This section should be read together with Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC that
enumerates the various diseases deemed occupational and therefore compensable. Thus, for a seafarer to be
entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-B, the disability causing illness or injury must be
one of those listed under Section 32-A.
Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances, certain diseases not otherwise considered as
an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the
seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the
difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be
associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits that Section 20-B grants
to him, the law requires the seafarer to prove that: (I) he suffered an illness; (2) he suffered this illness during
the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4)
his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related;
and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a
disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable. 15

It is beyond dispute that petitioner suffered an illness that is work-related during the term of his employment
contract and such is compensable. The issue now is whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits because of his inability to perform his job for more than 120 days, which respondents
counter as not being the case since the 240-day rule should govern.

This Court, in Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias,  16 thoroughly discussed the120-day and 240-day
periods, thus:

As early as 1972, the Court has defined the term permanent and total disability in the case of Marcelino v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Phil,  17 in this wise: "[permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could
do." 18

The present controversy involves the permanent and total disability claim of a specific type of laborer-a
seafarer. The substantial rise in the demand for seafarers in the international labor market led to an increase
of labor standards and relations issues, including claims for permanent and total disability benefits. To
elucidate on the subject, particularly on the propriety and timeliness of a seafarer's entitlement to permanent
and total disability benefits, a review of the relevant laws and recent jurisprudence is in order.

Article 192(c) (1) of the Labor Code, which defines permanent and total disability of laborers, provides that:

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability.

xxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules; [Emphasis supplied]

The rule referred to is Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, implementing
Book IV of the Labor Code (IRR), which states:

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability.
If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such
injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset
of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may
declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as
may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by
the System. [Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

These provisions should be read in relation to the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)19 whose Section 20 (B) (3) states:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent
to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
[Emphasis Supplied]

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,20 (Crystal Shipping) the Court ruled that "[permanent disability is the
inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use
of any part of his body."21 Thereafter, litigant-seafarers started citing Crystal Shipping to demand permanent
and total disability benefits simply because they were incapacitated to work for more than 120 days.

The Court in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.  22 (Vergara), however, noted that the doctrine
expressed in Crystal Shipping - that inability to perform customary work for more than 120 days constitutes
permanent total disability - should not be applied in all situations. The specific context of the application
should be considered in light of the application of all rulings, laws and implementing regulations. It was
provided therein that:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon signoff from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable
to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability
is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under
the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the
employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In effect, by considering the law, the POEA-SEC, and especially the IRR, Vergara extended the period within
which the company-designated physician could declare a seafarer's fitness or disability to 240 days. Moreover,
in that case, the disability grading provided by the company-designated physician was given more weight
compared to the mere incapacity of the seafarer therein for a period of more than 120 days.

The apparent conflict between the 120-day period under Crystal Shipping and the 240-day period
under Vergara was observed in the case of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel).  23 In the said case, the
Court recognized that Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping. A
seafarer's inability to work despite the lapse of 120 days would not automatically bring about a total and
permanent disability, considering that the treatment of the company-designated physician may be extended
up to a maximum of 240 days. In Kestrel, however, as the complaint was filed two years before the Court
promulgated Vergara on October 6, 2008, then the seafarer therein was not stripped of his cause of action.

To further clarify the conflict between Crystal Shipping and Vergara, the Court in Montierro v. Rickmers

Marine Agency Phils., Inc.  24 stated that "[i]f the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October
6, 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008
onwards, the 240-day rule applies."

Then came Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils., Inc. (Carcedo).  25 Although the said case recognized the 240-day
rule in Vergara, it was pronounced therein that "[t]he determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is
the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law." Carcedo further
emphasized that "[t]he company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to
do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled."26

Finally, in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr,  27 (Elburg), it was affirmed that the Crystal
Shipping doctrine was not binding because a seafarer's disability should not be simply determined by the
number of days that he could not work. Nevertheless, the pronouncement in Carcedo was reiterated - that
the determination of the fitness of a seafarer by the company-designated physician should be subject to the
periods prescribed by law. Elburg provided a summation of periods when the company-designated physician
must assess the seafarer, to wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then
the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove
that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240
days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In essence, the Court in Elburg no longer agreed that the 240-day period provided by Vergara, which was
sourced from the IRR, should be an absolute rule. The company-designated physician would still be obligated
to assess the seafarer within the original 120-day period from the date of medical repatriation and only with
sufficient justification may the company-designated physician be allowed to extend the period of medical
treatment to 240 days. The Court reasoned that:

Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some significant act before he can invoke the
exceptional 240-day period under the IRR. It is only fitting that the company-designated physician must
provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period. Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer
must be granted the relief of permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.

On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract
and apply the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR unconditionally, then the IRR becomes absolute and it
will render the law forever inoperable. Such interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.

xxx

Thus, to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests of the seafarer and its employer, the rules
methodically took into consideration the applicability of both the 120-day period under the Labor Code and
the 240-day period under the IRR. The medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not the
alpha and the omega of the seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. To become effective, such
assessment must be issued within the bounds of the authorized 120- day period or the properly extended 240-
day period.

Hence, as it stands, the current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does
not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness of
a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods
prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial 120 days to determine the
fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if
a sufficientjustification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is
uncooperative.

For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the
IRR co-exist, the Court must bend over backwards to harmoniously interpret and give life to both of the stated
periods. Ultimately, the intent of our labor laws and regulations is to strive for social justice over the diverging
interests of the employer and the employee.

In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.,  28 this Court set forth the following guidelines, to wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability
grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
 2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of
240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In the present case, the company-designated physician was only able to issue a certification declaring
respondent to be entitled to a disability rating of Grade 8 on the 163rd day that petitioner was undergoing
continuous medical treatment, which is beyond the period of 120 days, without justifiable reason. It must be
remembered that the employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period. In this case, the respondents failed to do so. Therefore, the company-
designated physician, failing to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without justifiable reason,
makes the disability of petitioner permanent and total.

As such, the issue as to whether or not the company-designated physician be the sole authority to assess and
certify the extent of the injury/sickness for purposes of payment of compensation and disability benefits is
now rendered moot.

This Court, however, does not see the need to award petit10ner damages and attorney's fees because
petitioner has not given us any proof or valid reason upon which to grant such award.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated June 4, 2015 of
petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba is GRANTED and the Decision dated November 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 127057 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and
Resolution dated August 31, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission, 2nd Division, granting
petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00
is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be omitted.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Wellness Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 On wellness leave.
**
 Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.
***
 On leave. Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 12, Sec. 4. - Leaving a vote. -- A Member who
goes on leave or is unable to attend the voting on any decision, resolution, or matter may leave his or
her vote in writing, addressed to the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be
counted, provided that he or she took part in the deliberation.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Melchor
Quirino C. Sadang and Pedro B. Corales.
2
 CA ratio, pp. 67-79.
3
 Id. at 50-60.
4
 Rollo, p. 41. (Emphasis in the original)
5
 Id. at 10.
6
 588 Phil. 895 (2008).
7
 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other com1s, whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Com1 a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time
during its pendency.
8
 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino, G.R. No. 188638, December 9, 2015, 777 SCRA 114,
127, citing Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Spouses A bay-A bay, 687 Phil. 584, 590 (2012).
9
 Id.,citing Merck Sharp and Dohme (Phils.), et al. v. Robles, et al., 620 Phil. 505, 512 (2009).
10
 Id. at 127-128, citing Co v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011).
11
 G.R. No. 200566, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 494, 507-510. (Emphasis in the original).
 12
 Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., supra note 6, at 908; CF. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc., et al. v. Taok, 691 Phil. 521, 533 (2012); Jebsen Maritime, Inc. and/or Alliance
Marine Services, Ltd. v. Undag, 678 Phil. 938, 944 (2011).
13
 Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., supra note 6.
14
 POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000. Note that per the POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 10, Series of 2010, the POEA omended omending foe the purpose the 2000 POEA.
15
 Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, supra note 11, at 511-512.
16
 G .R. No. 2154 71, November 23, 20 15, 775 SCRA 342, 352-359. (Emphasis ours).
17
 150-C Phil. 133 (1972).
18
 Id. at 139.
19
 Note that there is already a 2010 POEA-SEC. The present case, however, is still governed by the 2000
POEA-SEC as the employment contract was entered into before 2010.
20
 510 Phil. 332 (2005).
21
 Id. at 340. The respondent therein was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at
the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment.

February 8, 2017

G.R. No. 215293

LAMBERTO M. DE LEON, Petitioner
vs.
MAUNLAD TRANS, INC., SEACREST ASSOCIATES, ET AL., Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November
26, 2014, of petitioner Lamberto M. De Leon that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated October
9, 2013 and the Resolution2 dated November 5, 2014, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) and prays for the
reinstatement of the Decision3 dated December 15, 2011 and Resolution4 dated February 15, 2012 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) granting petitioner disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent.

The facts follow.

Petitioner was hired by respondent Maunlad Trans, Inc. as Team Headwaiter for M/S Carnival Liberty, a vessel
operated by Seachest Associates/Carnival Corporation through a POEA-approved employment contract and
assumed his duties for two years during which he averaged ten to twelve hours of work daily. Petitioner, on
certain occasions, was also assigned as a "fire watch" while the vessel was repaired or dry-docked, exposing
himself to extreme heat from welding works and unusual amount of toxic fumes from alcohol and thinner
mixed with paint to be used after welding.

While on board the vessel, petitioner experienced uncontrollable blinking, shaking and difficulty in speaking
and breathing for three weeks. As such, he was referred to a neurologist in Belize and underwent Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) and CT Scan. He was then diagnosed with "cerebral atrophy" and was advised to
seek a neurologist in Miami, Florida where the vessel was headed. Upon reaching Florida, he was confined in
South Miami Hospital but due to the severity of his condition, he was advised to be repatriated.
When he arrived in the Philippines, he reported to his agency and was referred to the Metropolitan Medical
Services, Inc. for treatment and when his condition did not improve, he sought treatment from Dr. May
Donato-Tan, a specialist in internal medicine-cardiology who diagnosed his illness as T/C Parkinson's Disease;
hypertensive atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease and declared him unfit for duty in whatever capacity as a
seaman.

Respondents acknowledged that petitioner was diagnosed with Parkinson's Disease and that he underwent
several medical treatments including blood count, Erythrocye Sedimentation Rate (ESR), Blood Ureas
Nitrogen (BUN), Serum Glutamic Pyruvate Transaminase (SGPT), Creatinine, Serum Glutamic Oxaloacetic
Transaminase (SGOT), Thyroid function test (FT4), Thyroid Stimulating and Serum Ceruplasmine. After the
filing of the complaint, petitioner received the medical opinion of their company-designated physician stating
the following:

The specialist opines that condition can be secondary to genetics, immunologic or use of anti-psychotics (non-
work related) or heavy metal exposure. Unless patient has history of heavy metal exposure on board, the
specialist opines that the condition does not appear to be work-related or work-aggravated.

Thus, respondents refused to give petitioner full compensability based on the above finding that the latter's
illness is not work-related.

In her Decision dated September 26, 2011, Labor Arbiter Michelle Pagtalunan found petitioner's claim
meritorious, thus:

WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant Lamberto M. De Leon, disability benefit in
the amount of US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment and ten percent (10%)
attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.5

According to the Labor Arbiter, those illness not listed under Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) are disputably presumed as work-related; thus, the burden is on the respondents to
present substantial evidence or such relevant evidence that there is no causal connection between the nature
of the seafarer's work and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was not increased by his
working condition. The Labor Arbiter further stated that she is not bound by the assessment of the company-
designated physician because no such qualifying terms as "only" and "exclusively" in the POEA-SEC limit her
judgment and that a contrary interpretation would lead to the absurdity of petitioner's disability being
decided by the designated physician and not by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. Thus, in view of the uncertainty
of the diseases' development, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner's work as team headwaiter cannot be
discounted as contributory, even to a small degree, in the development of his condition.

The NLRC, in its Decision dated December 15, 2012, affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment on appeal is AFFIRMED in toto.6

It held that the nature of the petitioner's employment is presumed to be the cause of the illness because it
occurred during his stint with respondents and that his employment need not be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of his illness as it is enough that it contributed to the development thereof.

After respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, they filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA and in its Decision dated October 9, 2013, the latter granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the Decision of the NLRC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision

and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated December 15, 2011 and February
15, 2012, respectively, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.7
According to the CA, while degenerative, Parkinson's Disease is neither listed as a disability under Sec. 32 of
the POEA-SEC, nor is it considered an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A thereof. Thus, the CA held that it is
imperative that petitioner establish the existence of a causal connection between his illness and the work for
which he was contracted for and petitioner fell short of the standards imposed upon him by law.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution dated November 5, 2014.

Thus, the present petition with the following grounds:

I. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE PETITIONER'S ILLNESS IS NOT
WORK RELATED; and

II. THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DENYING TO PETITIONER THE PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY COMPENSATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

It is petitioner's contention that his illness is work-related and insists that he was exposed to the harsh
conditions of the elements, the perils at sea, severe stress while being away from his family and fatigue due to
long hours of work on board the vessel, 10-12 hours daily. Petitioner further argues that due to his not being
able to return to the seafaring occupation because of his illness, he is entitled to permanent total disability as
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC determined.

In their Comment8 dated March 20, 2015, respondents reiterated the Decision of the CA.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court9 are
reviewable by this Court.10

Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect
by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these
are supported by substantial evidence.11 However, a relaxation of this rule is made permissible by this Court
whenever any of the following circumstances is present:

1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;

8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not
disputed by the respondent;'

10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; [or]

11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.12

Whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable is essentially a factual issue. Yet, this Court can and will be
justified in looking into it considering the conflicting views of the NLRC and the CA.13
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the
injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the
term of the seafarer's employment contract.14

The POEA-SEC defines a work-related injury as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in
the course of employment," and a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied."15 For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in
favor of the seafarer that these illnesses are work-related.16 Notwithstanding the presumption, We have held
that on due process grounds, the claimant-seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease.17 This is because awards of
compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions.18 In order to establish compensability
of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient-direct causal relation is not
required.19 Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings.20

A careful review of the findings of the NLRC and the LA show that petitioner was able to meet the required
degree of proof that his illness is compensable as it is work-connected. The NLRC correctly ruled that his work
conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease, thus:

Parkinson's disease is a degenerative disorder of the central nervous system. The motor symptoms of
Parkinson's disease result from the death of dopamine-degenerating cells in the substantianegra, a region of
the mid brain; the cause of this cell death is unknown. Early, in the course of the disease, the most obvious
symptoms are movement-related, these include shaking, rigidity, slowness of movement and difficulty with
walking and gait. Later, cognitive and behavioural problems may arise, with dementia; commonly occurring in
the advanced stages of the disease. xxx

Many risk and protective factors have been investigated; the clearest evidence is for an increased risk of PD in
people exposed to certain pesticides and a reduced risk in tobacco smokers.

It has to be noted that as Team Waiter and as a seaman, complainant was prone to smoking and to a bit of
drinking to beat the cold weather they encounter in the high seas.

Further, as seaman, he, by the very nature of his work, cannot just leave his post and duty just to discharge his
urine.1âwphi1 In multiple system atrophy, the most common first sign of MSA is the appearance of an
akenetic rigid syndrome. x x x Other common signs at onset include problems with balance (cerebellar ataxia)
found in 22% of first presentation, followed by genito-urinary problems (9%). For men, the first sign can be
erective dysfunction. Both men and women often experience problems with their bladders including urgency,
frequency, incomplete bladder emptying or an inability to pass urine (reduction). About 1 in 5 MSA patients
will suffer a fall in their first year of disease.

By the very nature of his work, therefore, where there is incomplete bladder emptying or inability to pass
urine, has likewise contributed to complainant's present medical ailment.

As ruled in More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC x x x it is not required that the employment be the sole
factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits
provided therefore.

It is enough that the employment had contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of the disease
and in bringing about his death.

x x xx

Moreover, it cannot be denied that there was at least a reasonable connection between the job of a seaman
and his lung infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and ultimately caused his death. As a utility
man on board the vessel, he was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which
invariably contributed to his illness.
In the same vein, complainant was likewise exposed to harsh weather condition, chemical irritants as his job
as a head waiter often led him to the kitchen where chemicals are found to keep the odor from spreading; to
keep the cockroaches and other insects from spreading within the vessel, to make the mess hall a sanitary
place for eating; and exposure to dust and other toxic substances though invisible to the naked eye are all
contributory to the aggravation of his illness.21

In reversing the NLRC's decision, the CA is of the opinion that petitioner was never exposed to any toxic
elements on board because the vessel was a cruise ship akin to a five star restaurant and could not have been
exposed to any harsh condition thereof. Furthermore, according to the CA, no other guests or employees
suffered any illness being exposed to the same work condition as petitioner, hence, his condition cannot be
deemed to be work-related. Those findings, however, are flawed.

Working on any vessel, whether it be a cruise ship or not, can still expose any employee to harsh
conditions.1âwphi1 In this case, aside from the usual conditions experienced by seafarers, such as the harsh
conditions of the sea, long hours of work, stress brought about by being away from their families, petitioner, a
team head waiter, also performed the duties of a "fire watch" and assigned to welding works, all of which
contributed to petitioner's stress, fatigue and extreme exhaustion. To presume, therefore, that employees of a
cruise ship do not experience the usual perils encountered by those working on a different vessel is utterly
wrong.

As aptly observed by the Labor Arbiter, petitioner's work as Team Headwaiter cannot be discounted as
contributory factor, even to a small degree in the development of his illness, thus:

In fine, it can be properly said that complainant's work as Team Headwaiter cannot be discounted as
contributory factor, even to a small degree in the development of the illness of the complainant. As a matter
of fact, the contributory factor of complainant's work was strengthened by the fact that he already
experienced in a milder state the symptoms of the disease, such as, difficulty in speaking, right hand tremor,
frequent blinking and shuffling gait during his employment contract with respondents principal prior to his last
employment contract with them. That he was then seen at Cozumel and Belize and was able to recover and
finish his contract.22

Anent the CA's opinion that no other guests or employees suffered any illness being exposed to the same
conditions as petitioner, and thus, his illness cannot be considered as work-related, such is completely
erroneous because not all persons have the same health condition, stamina and physical capability to fight an
illness.

In view of the above disquisitions, this Court therefore affirms the compensability of petitioner's permanent
disability. The US$60,000.00 (the equivalent of 120o/o of US$50,000.00) disability allowance is justified under
Section 32 of the POEA Contract as petitioner suffered from permanent total disability. The grant of attorney's
fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in accordance with Article 2208(2)23 of the Civil Code, since
petitioner was compelled to litigate to satisfy his claim for disability benefits.24

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated November 26,
2014 of petitioner Lamberto M. De Leon is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 9, 2013 and
the Resolution dated November 5, 2014, both of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated December 15, 2011 and Resolution dated February 15, 2012 of the National Labor Relations
Commission, granting petitioner disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso
equivalent and the award of attorney's fees, are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA*
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2416, dated January 4, 2017.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal
M. De Leon and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, rollo, pp. 25-32.
2
 Id. at 23-24.
3
 Id. at 35-44
4
 Id. at 33-34.
5
 Id. at 55.
6
 Id. at 44.
7
 Id. at 31-32.
8
 Id. at 62-76.
9
 Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time
during its pendency.
 10
 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al. v. Joselito A. Cristino, G.R. No. 188638, December 9, 2015,
citing Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Abay-Abay, 687 Phil. 584, 590 (2012).
11
 Merck Sharp and Dohme (Phils.), et al. v. Robles, et al., 620 Phil. 505, 512 (2009).
12
 Co v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011).
13
 Bandila Shipping, Inc., et al. v. Marcos C. Abalos, 627 Phil. 152, 156 (2010), citing Masangcay v.
Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., 590 Phi. 611, 625 (2008).
14
 Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. v. Eduardo C. Obrero, et al., G.R. No. 192754, September 7, 2016,
citing Tagle v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 209302, July 9, 2014, 729 SCRA
677, 694-695.
15
 POEA-SEC (2000), Definition of Terms.
16
 POEA-SEC (2000), Sec. 20(B)(4).
17
 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Aligway, G.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015, 770 SCRA
609; Dahle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres G. Gazzingan, G.R. No. 199568, June 17,
2015, 759 SCRA 209, 226; Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
(Second Division), 630 Phil. 352, 365 (2010).
18
 Casomo v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., 692 Phil. 326, 334 (2012). The prevailing rule is
analogous to the rule under the old Workmen's Compensation Act that a preliminary link between the
illness and the employment must first be shown before the presumption of work-relation can attach.
19
 Grace Marine Shipping Corporation v. Alarcon, G.R. No. 201536, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA 259,
279-280.
20
 Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., 653 Phil. 457, 468 (2010); NFD International
Manning Agents, Inc. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 466, 474 (1997).
21
 Rollo, pp. 40-42.
22
 Id. at 52.
23
 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation. attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

Supreme Court rules that failure to prove how injury/illness was suffered during employment is ground for
denial of claim for disability benefits; seafarer must submit proof of work-relation
Philippine Shipping Update – Manning Industry

By: Ruben Del Rosario, President, Del Rosario Pandiphil Inc., November 18, 2016 (Issue 2016/13)

Del Rosario & Del Rosario is listed No. 1 shipping firm in the Philippines, The Legal 500, Asia-Pacific, 2015, p.
523

Supreme Court rules that failure to prove how injury/illness was suffered during employment is ground for
denial of claim for disability benefits; seafarer must submit proof of work-relation

The seafarer was engaged as Chief Cook. He claims that during his employment, he lost his balance and fell
while doing his chores. His chest hit a trash can but he ignored the pain. Another incident allegedly happened
when he slipped from the ladder and his hip hitting the deck. He claimed that the incident was reported to
the Master and he requested for medical check-up which was not given.

The seafarer finished his contract and before repatriation while he was in Australia, he sought medical
consultation with a doctor. He alleged that the Australian doctor found him to be asymptomatic from the
pain that was caused by his accident but his blood pressure was elevated. He was given maintenance
medications.

Upon repatriation, the seafarer alleged that he requested for a medical referral from the manning agents but
was not provided any since his termination of employment was due to finished contract.

About 7 months thereafter, he filed a claim for disability benefits with the NLRC. He also sought consult with
his chosen doctor who diagnosed him with diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, and rib fracture with a
grade 7 disability. He was also declared permanently unfit for sea service.

The company denied the claim as there was no reported incident on-board and that no request for medical
assistance was ever forwarded by the seafarer.

The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals all awarded the seafarer with full disability benefits based
on the findings of his chosen doctor. They found the fact that the seafarer was diagnosed in Australia with a
medical condition and was certified by his chosen doctor to be unfit substantial evidence to his entitlement to
disability benefits.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court found the claim to be wanting in merit.

Work-relation must be established

The Court held that one important doctrine that should be considered in this case is the element of work
relatedness between an illness or disability and the seafarer's duties -a relation that is explicitly required
under the POEA-SEC.

Here, the seafarer failed to submit proof that his illness was work ¬related. In other words, the evidence on
record misses essential facts on how he contracted or developed his illness, and how and why his working
conditions aggravated this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, one cannot just presume that
seafarer's job caused his injury or aggravated any pre¬existing condition he might have had.

Substantial evidence to prove accident was not presented

While the seafarer alleged that he met two (2) accidents on board the vessel, these allegations remain
unsubstantiated by sufficient evidence. He failed to show that these incidents happened because he did not
present any kind of evidence to prove that the accidents occurred at all. There was no record of any medical
complaint lodged by the seafarer during his employment on board the vessel. He even claimed that his fellow
crewmembers noticed him limping, yet the records do not show any testimony, affidavit, or document that
they, indeed, had witnessed such fact.

The only documents on record about the alleged accident were post-medical reports of the seafarer’s rib
fracture and the foreign doctor’s initial report when the seafarer came to him for a medical checkup in
Australia. These documents only prove the fact that the seafarer told the foreign doctor that his ribs have
been hurting for two (2) weeks before he visited him, and that he has an existing rib fracture when he
underwent medical examinations in the Philippines. These two facts, taken together are not enough to prove
that seafarer met an accident on board the vessel.

Heart ailment not proven to be caused or aggravated by work

As for seafarer’s heart condition, no evidence was presented to show that the condition worsened during his
employment. Again, what he presented were post-medical reports about the tests he underwent, the heart
medications he was prescribed, and diagnosis of diabetes and hypertension. These reports, however, were
issued long after the seafarer had disembarked the vessel. Although he alleged that it was the working
conditions he had to undergo ¬i.e., stressful work on board the ship, harsh sea weather conditions, and
constant exposure to harmful chemicals and varying changes in temperature -that aggravated his heart
condition, seafarer failed to adduce any kind of evidence proving that he was indeed subject to these working
conditions.

He also failed to satisfy by substantial evidence the condition laid down in the contract that if the heart
disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation
was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain brought about by the nature of his work

Seafarer finished his contract

The labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that seafarer was not repatriated for
medical reasons. The Court had frequently recognized the fact of a "finished contract" as the reason for a
seafarer's repatriation. In fact, this circumstance had been used as an indication that the injury or Illness is not
work-related.

Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. Stealth Maritime Corporation and Carlos Salinas vs. Casiano Saladas, Jr.,
G.R. No. 208089, September 28, 2016; Second Division, Associate Justice Arturo Brion, ponente (Atty. Charles
Dela Cruz of Del Rosario & Del Rosario handled for vessels interests)

Away from his family and working on board vessels sailing non-stop for weeks or months the world’s oceans,
he is mentally and emotionally stressed.
Constantly exposed to fluctuating temperatures caused by variant weather changes of extreme hot and cold
as the ships cross ocean boundaries, not to mention harsh weather conditions, the risks of his getting killed,
injured or ill are high.
Every labor dispute is a David and Goliath battle as it involves two opposing parties: the worker on one side
and the management on the other, for monetary claims for disability and death benefits, illegal dismissal as
well as unpaid or underpayment of salaries and wages.
Labor litigation takes years before it reaches the Supreme Court. In most cases, the elevation of the records
alone from the NLRC/NCMB to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court will take several years. The proceedings in the appellate court will entail further delay.
In cases of seafarers with medical conditions, some incur huge debts to sustain their medication while others
die before the decision by the Supreme Court is released forcing the seafarers into accepting an ex-gratia,
miniscule amount Companies have the legal remedies to prolong the case, but one cannot reclaim the life of
the deceased claimant.
Companies usually utilize the phrase “ benefits even beyond the claims they are actually entitled ” to sanitize
the problematic legal battle for seafarer’s compensation.
Valid claims, employers argue, necessarily must follow what the POEA contract dictates: a contract that
contains terms and conditions formulated more favorable to his employer and is littered with ambiguous
provisions, generalizations, technicalities that he does not understand.
Under the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC), for disability or death to be compensable, it was
sufficient that the seafarer suffered injury or illness during the term of his employment. The cause of illness or
death is immaterial.
However, through the lobbying of the principals and their manning agencies, the restrictive clause “work-
related” was added under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA SEC to limit their liabilities. The 2000 POEA SEC
defined “work-related injury” as “injury (ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment” and “work-related illness” as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the contract”.
Being included in the list is not enough, since all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) the seafarer’s
work must involve the risks described; (b) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to
the described risks; (c). the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and (d) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
These same definitions were reiterated in the 2010 POEA SEC.
Two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be
work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer’s employment contract.
The first requirement appeared in the 2000 and 2010 POEA SEC but is absent in the 1996 version.
Through such restrictive provisions of the POEA SEC, claims for disability compensation became a legal
battleground, especially in instances when seafarers do not receive full compensation that are legally entitled
to have.
Such emergence of cases is attributable to the fact that the seafarer’s employer does not hesitate to harness
its immense resources to limit its liability.
In denying, if not limiting, the seafarer’s claims, the employer usually raise the misleading argument that the
POEA mandated that disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician based on the
disability grading system considering that the latter had the time and the opportunity to constantly monitor
the health and physical condition of the seafarer.
However, the Supreme Court stressed that their medical assessment “is not the alpha and the omega of the
seafarer’s claim for permanent and total disability.” (Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. vs. Quiogue, Jr,
G.R.No.211882 July 29, 2015).
The problem can be partly attributed to the Supreme Court’s observation on the proliferation of obviously
biased company doctor whose “findings cannot be taken as gospel truth” and “are palpably self-serving and
certainly could not be considered independent” as their “loyalty rests completely upon the company they
serve” (UPL/HAL vs . Beseril, 487 SCRA 249).
Thus, the POEA contract does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion as to his condition for
purposes of claiming disability benefits.
In reality, the grading system assessment under the POEA Contract is not reflective of the benefits that should
be given to the seafarer.
There are medical conditions that are classified as partial disability (between Grade 2 to 14) but in essence
should have been considered as total permanent (Grade 1).
Employers will never hire a seafarer who suffered complete loss of the sense of hearing on both ears (Grade
3), loss of speech due to injury to the vocal cord (Grade 9), total loss of a leg or amputation at or above the
knee (Grade 3), paralysis of one upper extremity (Grade3) , or loss of one foot at ankle joint or above (Grade
6), loss of ten fingers of both hands (Grade 3) or amputation between wrist and elbow joint (Grade 5), or total
blindness of one eye and fifty percent (50%) loss of vision of the other eye will never be employed due to
visual impairments. (Grade 5).
Fit-To Work certifications are given even to seafarers who are still not cured or in essence can no longer be
employed such as those who suffered from heart attacks, aneurism or stroke.
From the business point of view, it will be risky for the employers to let the seafarer be re-employed since the
harsh working environment might only aggravate his fragile condition and in the end expose the company to
more serious insurance liabilities.
Thus, Supreme Court’s consistently ruled that “it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. Disability need not render the
seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it means disablement of an employee to earn wages
in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. (Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping
Corporation, 659 SCRA 642)
Unless their definition of “valid claims” is changed, through the deletion of the “work-related” clause, and
through the reversion to the old 1996 POEA Contract , the denials of seafarers’ claims will continue.
The compensation scheme should be less restrictive and more realistic, Otherwise, their only recourse is to
seek legal assistance from lawyers of their own choosing.
Conversely speaking, give the seafarers what they should receive, and employers will not be hounded by legal
cases.

Read more: https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/172068/david-goliath-battle-seafarers-claims#ixzz65KjcvZY7
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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 219123, September 11, 2017

DESIDERIO C. CUTANDA, Petitioner, v. MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., AND/OR MARLOW NAVIGATION

CO. LTD. AND/OR ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., Respondents.

DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated
August 26, 2015 of petitioner Desiderio C. Cutanda that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
March 19, 2015 and Resolution2 dated July 1, 2015, both of the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing the Decision
dated April 16, 2014 and Resolution dated May 23, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
4th Division granting petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00;
attorney's fees in the amount of US$6,000.00; and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

The facts follow.

Petitioner was hired by respondent Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. (MNPI) to work as a Key Able Seaman on
board vessel MV "Malte Rambow" for a period often (10) months and with a basic monthly salary of
US$680.00. Prior to his employment, he underwent a medical examination and was declared "fit to work" by
the company-designated physicians. Incidentally, he was previously employed by respondents on different
employment contracts for a period of fifteen (15) years.3

On April 3, 2012, petitioner departed from the Philippines to join the vessel earlier mentioned in which his
duties included planning, controlling, executing and reporting all maintenance and repair works on deck, in
close coordination and under the supervision of the Chief Officer of the vessel. He was also in charge of
supervising the safety of the crew during working hours; taking charge of the tugboat line during mooring and
unmooring operation; watching the bow of the vessel to avoid accidents and collisions; supervising the junior
ratings; steering the ship manually or automatically or with the use of emergency steering apparatus as
directed by the navigating officer, Chief Mate, or the Ship Captain; breaking out rigs; overhauling and stowing
of cargo-handling gears, stationary riggings and running gears; overhauling lifeboats, winches and falls;
manually greasing the wire of the crane; chipping off rust; and painting the deck and superstructure of the
ship, as well as other duties as may be assigned by his superiors.4

Thereafter, on October 8, 2012, petitioner had an accident aboard the vessel while performing his duties at
the Port of Tanjung, Pelepas, Malaysia wherein his left index and middle fingers were severely injured and also
suffered laceration wounds, when his left hand was caught and crushed by the tug's line (rope) when the
tugboat started pulling the line while the tug's line was not yet free from the ship. After the accident, he was
immediately brought to Puteri Specialist Hospital (Johor) SDN BHD in Malaysia for emergency medical
treatment.5

The day after the accident, on October 9, 2012, petitioner was medically repatriated and arrived in the
Philippines on that same day. He immediately reported to the respondent MNPI's office and was referred to
Notre Dame Medical Clinic where he was diagnosed with "Lacerated Wounds 2nd& 3rd digits, Left Hand."
Petitioner was then treated and later referred for rehabilitation/physical therapy. The said accident was
supported by official records of the Social Security System (SSS). Petitioner then underwent continuous
physical therapy until April 3, 2013, or for a period of six (6) months from the time of the occurrence of the
accident on October 8, 2012 and was still found to be unfit to work, as shown by medical certificates dated
January 4, 2013, April 2, 2013, and April 3, 2013, all issued by the Panay Orthopaedic and Rehabilitation
Institute (PORI) in Iloilo City. However, despite medical intervention and months of therapy, petitioner's
condition did not improve and he could not return to his work as Key Able Seaman because of the said
injuries.6

Eventually, petitioner demanded from the respondents that he be paid his disability benefits, but to no avail.
Respondents even stopped providing medical attention to petitioner after the lapse of 120 days despite the
recommendation of PORI that the latter undergo further physical therapy. Respondents also refused to
shoulder the expenses incurred for the medicine of petitioner.7

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of total disability benefits, reimbursement of medical
expenses, sick allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.8

Petitioner alleged that his injuries are work-related resulting to a loss of his earning capacity, and rendering
him unfit to return to work for more than 240 days and that his continuing inability to pursue his usual work
and earn therefrom constitutes permanent and total disability. According to him, he is entitled to the
maximum or "Grade 1" disability compensation under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)
corresponding to US$60,000.00 under Sec. 20 (B) (6) thereof, and is also entitled to the payment of his
medical expenses and sickness allowance. He also argued that respondents' actions in denying to pay him
disability benefits is a gross violation of the POEA-SEC and that respondents acted in bad faith and in an
oppressive manner and as such, petitioner must be awarded moral damages and attorney's fees.

Respondents, on the other hand, contended, among other things that when petitioner was eventually
repatriated in the Philippines, he was referred to Dr. Orlino Hosaka, Jr. for medical care and treatment on
October 10, 2012 and that the latter referred petitioner to an orthopaedic surgeon and rehabilitation
specialist in which the treatment under the company-designated physician and specialist lasted for months.
They also claimed that petitioner was regularly examined to check his recovery and that on February 11, 2013,
under Dr. Hosaka's medical report, a conclusion was made that petitioner was suffering from a disability
"Grade 10" based on POEA-SEC Schedule of Disability Gradings where it is specified that the loss of grasping
power of small objects between the fold of the finger of one hand corresponds to a Grade 10 disability
grading. Thus, according to respondents, since Dr. Hosaka is the company-designated physician, his finding of
Grade 10 disability should prevail. They also insisted that they are not guilty of bad faith since petitioner was
immediately given medical attention and care and never faltered in fulfilling their responsibilities.

The Labor Arbiter, on January 14, 2014, decided in favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondent Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc. and/or Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. are hereby
ordered to pay the complainant the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of the actual payment of the
awards denominated in foreign currency:

1. US$60,000.00 representing permanent and total disability benefit;

2. US$6,000.00 representing attorney's fees; and
3. P50,000.00 representing moral damages.

The liability of the respondents for the judgment awards is joint and several.

SO ORDERED.9

According to the Labor Arbiter, the respondents were mistaken in their notion that in determining the
disability benefits due a seafarer, only the POEA SEC, specially its schedule of benefits, must be considered.
Such is governed not only by medical findings but by contract and law. The Labor Arbiter found that the
conflicting diagnoses were rendered, not by the company physician and the physician chosen by the
petitioner, but by the company physician and his "Iloilo coordinating physician and surgeon." It must be noted
that the company physician declared that the complainant suffered a Grade 10 disability 126 days after
petitioner signed-off from the vessel, while the "Iloilo coordinating physician" declared him to be unfit to work
exactly 240 days after sign-off.

Thus, according to the Labor Arbiter, petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits of
US$60,0000.00. The Labor Arbiter further ruled that respondents' refusal to pay petitioner's just claim smacks
of bad faith and calls for an award of moral damages and attorney's fees.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 16, 2014 affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by respondents is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of Labor Arbiter
Cheryl M. Ampil dated January 14, 2014 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

After respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, they elevated the case to the CA and
on March 19, 2015, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated April 16, 2014 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2014 of the NLRC, Fourth Division in NLRC LAC
OFW Case No. (M) 03-000230-14, NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 02-02505-13 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioners are hereby ORDERED to pay private respondent Cutanda the amount of USD10,075.00 in disability
benefits, to be paid in Philippine currency equivalent at the exchange rate during the time of payment. The
award of moral damages and attorney's fees are ordered DELETED.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA ruled that the company-designated physician, Dr. Hosaka, was able to make a determination that
petitioner has a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day period from the time he suffered his injury, thus, such
declaration effectively prevented petitioner's temporary disability from becoming permanent. It also held that
based on the POEA-SEC, disability payments are compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
enumerated under Section 32 thereof. Furthermore, the CA ruled that without successfully refuting the
medical assessment of Dr. Hosaka by making use of the option provided for under Section 20 (A) (3) of the
POEA-SEC, petitioner's claim must necessarily fail. As such, the CA opined that since the POEA-SEC expressly
states that any item in the schedule of disabilities under section 32 with a classification Grade 1 shall be
considered and shall constitute total and permanent disability, then all other grades, including the diagnosis of
Dr. Hosaka that petitioner is suffering from Grade 10 disability cannot be considered total and permanent. It
then added that injuries classified under Grade 1 disabilities are more severe and traumatic, and more
pervasive in its effects and that needless to state, the severity of the injuries classified under Grade 1 will
indubitably and completely render the worker incapable of earning livelihood from a job he is accustomed to
is trained to perform, thus, the CA is not prepared to put in equal footing petitioner with those who suffered
far worse, and to award him the same amount of benefits intended to those who are clearly and irrefutably,
totally and permanently disabled. As to deletion of moral damages and attorney's fees, the CA ruled that there
is a lack of factual and legal bases to award such.

Hence, the present petition after the denial petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner assigns the
following grounds/reasons for the allowance of his petition:

(1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN HOLDING THAT SEAMAN CUTANDA DID NOT SUFFER PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RETURN TO HIS WORK AS SEAMAN FOR MORE
THAN 240 DAYS BECAUSE OF HIS WORK-RELATED INJURY.

(2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION OF PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY ENUNCIATED IN THE CASE OF ALPHA SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS. CALO (G.R. NO.
192034, JANUARY 13, 2014)

(3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING ONLY SEC. 32 OF THE POEA
STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN MEASURING THE DEGREE OF SEAMAN CUTANDA'S DISABILITY
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE LABOR CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO SEAFARERS.

(4) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPELAS ERRED IN NOT APPYING THE LABOR CODE CONCEPT OF PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY TO THE CASE AT BAR.

(5) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE IN NOT FINDING THAT
THERE IS NO NEED FOR SEAMAN CUTANDA TO SEEK THE OPINION OF HIS OWN DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN SINCE
THE COMPANY- DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN ALREADY DECLARED HIM UNFIT TO WORK.

(6) THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN REVERSING THE
NLRC'S FINDINGS AFFIRMING THOSE OF THE LABOR ARBITER, WHICH ARE ENTITLED TO RESPECT AND
FINALITY, BEING SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

(7) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER AND
THE NLRC THAT SEAMAN CUTANDA IS ENTITLED TO THE MAXIMUM OR "GRADE 1" DISABILITY
COMPENSATION UNDER THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

(8) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER AND
THE NLRC THAT TFIE RESPONDENTS ARE LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.12
In their Comment13 dated November 23, 2015, the respondents insist that the CA did not err in ruling that
petitioner is only entitled to the benefits under the classification of Grade 10 and that the arguments the latter
presented in his petition are factual and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court14 are reviewable by this Court.15 Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including
labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to rule on matters falling
within their jurisdiction especially when these are supported by substantial evidence.16 However, a relaxation
of this rule is made permissible by this Court whenever any of the following circumstances is present:

1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not
disputed by the respondent;'
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; [and]
11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.17

While the issue as to whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable as total and permanent disability is
essentially a factual issue, the present case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the CA
differ with that of the NLRC. Hence, a resolution of the issues presented before this Court is necessary.

This Court finds this present petition meritorious.

The following are the applicable provisions of laws that govern a seafarer's disability claim as summarized
in Jebsen Maritime, Inc., et al. v. Ravena:18

The entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is governed by the law, the employment contract
and the medical findings.

By law, the seafarer's disability benefits claim is governed by Articles 191 to 193, Chapter VI (Disability
benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation to Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.

By contract, it is governed by the employment contract which the seafarer and his employer/local manning
agency executes prior to employment, and the applicable POEA-SEC that is deemed incorporated in the
employment contract.

Lastly, the medical findings of the company-designated physician, the seafarer's personal physician, and those
of the mutually-agreed third physician, pursuant to the POEA-SEC, govern.

Pertinent to the resolution of this petition's factual issues of compensability (of ampullarycancer) and
compliance (with the POEA-SEC prescribed procedures for disability determination) is Section 20-B of the 2000
POEA-SEC (the governing POEA-SEC at the time the petitioners employed Ravena in 2006). It reads in part:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

xxxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be
liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and
lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or repatriated However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still
requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer
until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-
designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work by the company-designated physician or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall
it exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as
compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

4. Those illness not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.

xxxx

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused either by injury or illness, the seafarer
shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be
governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

As we pointed out above, Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC governs the compensation and benefits for the work-
related injury or illness that a seafarer on board sea-going vessels may have suffered during the term of his
employment contract. This section should be read together with Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC that
enumerates the various diseases deemed occupational and therefore compensable. Thus, for a seafarer to be
entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-B, the disability causing illness or injury must be
one of those listed under Section 32-A.

Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances, certain diseases not otherwise considered as
an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the
seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the
difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be
associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions.19

Thus, in situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits that Section 20-B grants
to him, the law requires the seafarer to prove that: (1) he suffered an illness; (2) he suffered this illness during
the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4)
his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related;
and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a
disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable.20

This Court finds that the facts as found by the NLRC are accurate, indisputable and based on the evidence
presented, thus:
Here, it is undisputed that on October 8, 2012, complainant had an accident on board respondents' vessel
while in the performance of his duties as Key Able Seaman. Complainant's left had was caught and crushed by
the tug's line (rope). He sustained laceration wound on his left index and middle fingers which required toilet,
debridement and suturing of wounds, and some medications at the Puteri Specialist Hospital (Johor) in
Malaysia. The attending medications thereat found complainant unfit for sea duty, resulting to the latter's
repatriation the following day, October 9, 2012, for further medical treatment and management. Complainant
was examined by respondents' company-designated physician at the Notre Dame Medico Dental Clinics, Inc.,
who recommended him for physical therapy at the Panay Orthopaedic & Rehabilitation Institute in Iloilo City.
Complainant underwent physical therapy sessions thereat from November 7, 2012 to March 1, 2013. On
February 11, 2013, while complainant finished only 4 sessions out of the 12 sessions prescribed by the Rahab
Medicine Specialist, the company-designated physician already assessed complainant's disability as Grade 10.

As such, it was duly proven that petitioner can claim the compensation and benefits that Section 20-B of the
POEA-SEC provides. The issue then arises as to whether he is entitled to a permanent and total disability
compensation or not. The CA, in ruling that he is not entitled, stated that the company-designated physician,
Dr. Hosaka, was able to make a determination that petitioner has a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day
period from the time he suffered his injury, thus, such declaration effectively prevented petitioner's temporary
disability from becoming permanent.

In Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias21 this Court expounded on thel20-day and 240-day periods,
thus:

As early as 1972, the Court has defined the term permanent and total disability in the case of Marcelino v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Phil, in this wise: "[permanent total disability means disablement of an employee
to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do."

The present controversy involves the permanent and total disability claim of a specific type of labourer - a
seafarer. The substantial rise in the demand for seafarers in the international labor market led to an increase
of labor standards and relations issues, including claims for permanent and total disability benefits. To
elucidate on the subject, particularly on the propriety and timeliness of a seafarer's entitlement to permanent
and total disability benefits, a review of the relevant laws and recent jurisprudence is in order.

Article 192(c) (1) of the Labor Code, which defines permanent and total disability of laborers, provides that:

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability.

xxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules; [emphasis supplied]

The rule referred to is Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, implementing
Book IV of the Labor Code (IRR), which states:

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability.
If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such
injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset
of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may
declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as
may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by
the System. [Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

These provisions should be read in relation to the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) whose Section 20 (B) (3) states:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent
to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days. [Emphasis Supplied]

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, (Crystal Shipping) the Court ruled that "[permanent disability is the
inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use
of any part of his body." Thereafter, litigant-seafarers started citing Crystal Shipping to demand permanent
and total disability benefits simply because they were incapacitated to work for more than 120 days.

The Court in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara), however, noted that the doctrine
expressed in Crystal Shipping - that inability to perform customary work for more than 120 days constitutes
permanent total disability — should not be applied in all situations. The specific context of the application
should be considered in light of the application of all rulings, laws and implementing regulations. It was
provided therein that:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable
to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability
is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under
the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the
employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In effect, by considering the law, the POEA-SEC, and especially the IRR, Vergara extended the period within
which the company-designated physician could declare a seafarer's fitness or disability to 240 days. Moreover,
in that case, the disability grading provided by the company-designated physician was given more weight
compared to the mere incapacity of the seafarer therein for a period of more than 120 days.

The apparent conflict between the 120-day period under Crystal Shipping and the 240-day period
under Vergara was observed in the case of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel). In the said case, the
Court recognized that Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping. A
seafarer's inability to work despite the lapse of 120 days would not automatically bring about a total and
permanent disability, considering that the treatment of the company-designated physician may be extended
up to a maximum of 240 days. In Kestrel, however, as the complaint was filed two years before the Court
promulgated Vergara on October 6, 2008, then the seafarer therein was not stripped of his cause of action.

To further clarify the conflict between Crystal Shipping and Vergara, the Court in Montierro v. Rickmers
Marine Agency Phils., Inc. stated that "[i]f the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6,
2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards,
the 240-day rule applies."

Then came Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils., Inc. (Carcedo). Although the said case recognized the 240-day rule
in Vergara, it was pronounced therein that "[t]he determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the
province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law." Carcedo further
emphasized that "[t]he company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to
do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled."

Finally, in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr, (Elburg), it was affirmed that the Crystal Shipping
doctrine was not binding because a seafarer's disability should not be simply determined by the number of
days that he could not work. Nevertheless, the pronouncement in Carcedo was reiterated - that the
determination of the fitness of a seafarer by the company-designated physician should be subject to the
periods prescribed by law. Elburg provided a summation of periods when the company-designated physician
must assess the seafarer, to wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days
with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period
of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.

In essence, the Court in Elburg no longer agreed that the 240-day period provided by Vergara, which was
sourced from the IRR, should be an absolute rule. The company-designated physician would still be obligated
to assess the seafarer within the original 120-day period from the date of medical repatriation and only with
sufficient justification may the company-designated physician be allowed to extend the period of medical
treatment to 240 days. The Court reasoned that:

Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some significant act before he can invoke the
exceptional 240-day period under the IRR. It is only fitting that the company-designated physician must
provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period. Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer
must be granted the relief of permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.

On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract
and apply the exceptional 240-day period under the IRR unconditionally, then the IRR becomes absolute and it
will render the law forever inoperable. Such interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.

xxx

Thus, to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests of the seafarer and its employer, the rules
methodically took into consideration the applicability of both the 120-day period under the Labor Code and
the 240-day period under the IRR. The medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not the
alpha and the omega of the seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. To become effective, such
assessment must be issued within the bounds of the authorized 120-day period or the properly extended 240-
day period.

Hence, as it stands, the current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days docs
not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness of
a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the periods
prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial 120 days to determine the
fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if
a sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is
uncooperative.

For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the
IRR co-exist, the Court must bend over backwards to harmoniously interpret and give life to both of the stated
periods. Ultimately, the intent of our labor laws and regulations is to strive for social justice over the diverging
interests of the employer and the employee.22

In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. et al. v. Quiogue, Jr.23 this Court set forth the following guidelines, to
wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative),
then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to
prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240
days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In the present case, the conflict arises in the findings of the company-designated physician and that of the
"Iloilo coordinating physician and surgeon." Although the company-designated physician, Dr. Hosaka, was able
to make a determination that petitioner has a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day period or on February 11,
2013, the attending physician at the company-designated Panay Orthopaedic & Rehabilitation Institute, Iloilo
City, issued a Medical Certificate on April 2, 2013 or on the 174th day, stating that complainant is "not fit to
work" as of that date, and recommended that he undergo rehabilitation treatment for another 3 to 6 months.
As correctly observed by the NLRC, neither of the two, the company-designated physician and the
coordinating physician and surgeon declared petitioner fit to work or has already regained full use of his
injured fingers, thus:

However, the company-designated physician at the Notre Dame Medico Dental Clinic, Inc. never issued any
certification declaring that complainant is already fit for sea duties as of February 11, 2012, when he issued
the Grade 10 disability grading for complainant. Also, the company-designated physician thereat never lifted
the finding of the company-designated physician in Puteri Specialist Hospital (Johor), Malaysia, that
complainant is unfit for sea duty, which required his repatriation for further medical treatment and
management. Hence, such finding of unfitness for sea duty remains.

In fact, the attending physician at the company-designated Panay Orthopaedic & Rehabilitation Institute, Iloilo
City, issued a Medical Certificate on April 2, 2013, stating that complainant is "not fit to work" as of that date,
and recommended that he undergo rehabilitation treatment for another 3 to 6 months. Unfortunately, there
is no showing in the records that respondents heeded said recommendation. There is no showing in the
records that respondents directed complainant to undergo further much needed rehabilitation treatment
after his last physical therapy session of March 1, 2013.

Notably,, from October 9, 2012 when complainant was disembarked from the vessel for further medical
treatment and management, up to this writing, which is more that eighteen (18) months, and obviously more
than 240 days, there is no showing in the records that he was able to earn wages in the same kind of work or
work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, any kind of work which a person of
his mentality and attainment could do, much less, as a seaman. Indeed, no profit-oriented employer would
ever employ as Key Able Seaman or Able Seaman in an ocean-going vessel, a person, like complainant, who
has "limitation in motion of digits 2-3 (L) hand with poor grip."24

The very purpose of those periods is the proper determination as to whether the injured seafarer categorized
as Grade 2 to 14 can, in legal contemplation, be considered as totally and permanently disabled. Indeed, under
Section 3225 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be
considered as total and permanent.26 However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2
to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under
legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.27 In other words, an impediment should be
characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the
POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on
Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code.28 That while the seafarer is
partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or
disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do.29 Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from
engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally
and permanently disabled.30 Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240
days.31 That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall
be deemed totally and permanently disabled.32

In this case, although petitioner has been assessed to fall under the category of Grade 10 within the period
provided by law, such was not a definite assessment as to his fitness to work as shown by the medical
certificates issued by the company-designated physician and the coordinating physician and surgeon. The
findings of the Labor Arbiter accurately show such conclusion, thus:

x x x Based on the Accident Report dated October 8, 2012 rendered by the Master, it appears that the
complainant's left hand was accidentally crushed while he was performing his duties on the date in question.
Consequently, he was signed off from the vessel and was back in the Philippines on October 9, 2012. On the
following day, he was seen by the company physician who rendered a report with the following remarks:
debridement and suturing of the complainant's left index and middle fingers were done in Malaysia; x-ray was
done and showed fracture. In his report dated January 9, 2013, the company physician stated that the
complainant had "completed 24 sessions of physical therapy" and that he was recommending the
continuation of his physical therapy for another month. The last reports rendered by the company physician
are both dated February 11, 2013. The following contents thereof are noteworthy:

Report dated February 11, 2013:

• In the month of February, the complainant was seen by the Iloilo coordinating physician and surgeon.
• The complainant finished four (not 24) sessions of physical therapy.
• Findings: lacks full flexion of the index finger but has a good grip strength.
• Diagnosis: lacerated wounds, w2nd and 3rd digits, left hand.
• Recommendation: refer back to Rehab Medicine

Specialist on February 14, 2013

Report dated February 11, 2013

• Estimated length of further medical treatment: another one month of physical therapy which he needs to
fully recover.
• Diagnosis and chances of returning to work: Good chance of returning to work.

At this point we are recommending him for disability grading 10 under hands: loss of grasping power for small
object between the fold of the finger of one hand."

The complainant submitted four (4) medical certificates issued by physicians of the Panay Orthopedic &
Rehabilitation Institute in Iloilo City, who are apparently the "Iloilo coordinating physician and surgeon"
referred to by the company physician in his report dated February 11, 2013. The following contents of the
above mentioned medical certificates are noteworthy:

Medical Certificate dated January 4, 2013:

• Complainant was first examined on January 4, 2013.

• Complainant's condition: limited full extension flexion of 2nd& 3d digits.
• Recommendation: continuation of rehab for another 2-3 months.

Medical Certificate dated April 2, 3013

• Complainant was seen on April 2, 2013.

• Remarks: patient is not fit to work, still has limitation in motion of digits 2-3 left hand with poor grip;
continued rehab treatment for another 3-6 months recommended.

Medical Certificate dated April 3, 2013

• The complainant underwent 24 treatment sessions from November 7, 2012 to February 26, 2013 and one
such session in March 2013.
Medical Certificate dated June 5, 2013

• The complainant was seen on June 5, 2013. The complainant was declared unfit to work.33

From the above findings, it appears that petitioner had been unfit to work way beyond the 240 days provided
by law, hence, petitioner can be legally considered as totally and permanently disabled and is entitled to
permanent total compensation of US$60,000.00 under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC.

In finding otherwise, the CA ruled that it is not prepared to put in equal footing petitioner with those who
suffered far worse or those classified under Grade 1. This is a wrong sentiment and interpretation of the law.
As stated earlier, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and
permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120
or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation,
totally and permanently disabled.

As to the award of moral damages and attorney's fees, this Court, also finds it appropriate to sustain the ruling
of the NLRC. As correctly ruled by the NLRC:

Anent the claim for moral damages, We find that respondents, in evident bad faith, discontinued
complainant's much need rehabilitation treatment for three (3) to six (6) months more, as recommended on
April 2, 2013 by the attending physician at the company-designated Panay Orthopaedic & Rehabilitation
Institute, Iloilo City. Hence, his award for moral damages must be sustained.

Complainant's award for attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award must also
be affirmed. This is pursuant to Article 2208 (8) of the Civil Code, which states that the award of attorney's
fees is justified for indemnity under the workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated August 26, 2015
of petitioner Desiderio C. Cutanda isGRANTED and the Decision dated March 19, 2015 and Resolution dated
July 1, 2015, both of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated
April 16, 2014 and Resolution dated May 23, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission, 4th Division
granting petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00, attorney's fees in
the amount of US$6,000.00, and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
are AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED

The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) thru the Social Security System (SSS) recently granted
compensation benefits to a chief steward who suffered from injuries on left elbow while onboard a seafaring
vessel.

The seaman was employed by Knutsen Philippines Inc. and Knot Management, and served as chief steward on
board M/T Carmen Knutsen under a 6-month employment contract.

On August 15, 2016, while cleaning, arranging, and taking out frozen food at the meat room, he fell from the
plastic tray that he was standing on and, as a result, he sustained injuries on his left elbow.

Accordingly, he filed a claim for disability benefits at the SSS and was denied because he lacked the
documentary requirement to support the compensability of his injury. According to the seaman, he was
unable to secure any of these documents – Master’s Report, Records of Consultations done abroad, Pre-
employment Physical Exam, and Job description – due to a case that he filed against his shipping agency at the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

In light of his case, the NLRC found credence that the seaman actually sustained the compensable injury
onboard as he presented pieces of evidence which consisted of electronic communication via Facebook
addressed to his son, who was a licensed physical therapist like photos of his injured elbow and their
succeeding dialogues which were consistent with that of a patient-father, consulting his therapist son. His
action is consistent with human nature and human experience according to NLRC.
The ECC, upon review, ruled in favor of the seaman. Records revealed that he filed a case before the NLRC and
consequently, obtained a favorable decision. The judgment from the said coequal, quasi judicial body could be
used as evidence to support his claim for EC benefits. ECC’s judgment was rendered after taking into
consideration the medical findings of several physicians who examined the said seaman, including the photos
and series of electronic communications between the seaman and his son, who is a licensed physical therapist,
were considered substantial evidence to grant the case of the seaman. Thus, the ECC, like the NLRC, found
credence in these pieces of evidence.

Thus, the SSS was ordered to award the seaman’s claim for disability benefit plus reimbursement of medical
expenses he incurred due to his injury.