QP PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND SAFETY

DOC. No. QP-PHL-S-001 Rev. 3

6.4 TOXIC GAS

6.4.1 TheTLV for H2S is 10 ppm in air. This figure represents the maximum allowable
concentration for continuous exposure during an eight hours period. The maximum
allowable STEL is 15 ppm in air. The plant general alarm shall be initiated on detection
of gas concentrations at or above 10 ppm.
6.4.2 Hydrogen Sulphide is an extremely toxic gas and concentrations above 500 ppm are
potentially fatal. In order to provide an effective protection system to plant personnel in
case of toxic gas release, QP‟s philosophy is to initiate a general alarm on detection of
gas levels at or above 10 ppm. On hearing this alarm, plant personnel are required to
use the provided breathing apparatus and make their way to the designated muster
areas.
6.4.3 Wind socks shall be provided at such locations to ensure that all plant personnel who
may be at risk from exposure to toxic gas concentrations can readily identify the wind
direction and therefore evacuate the area by the most appropriate route, cross wind
whenever possible.
6.4.4 In general, toxic gas detectors distributed within the plant area is only to protect
personnel from getting exposed to toxic level of H2S and not to protect the equipment
or the assets; therefore, the execution actions for confirmed toxic gas detector in the
plant will initiates a general alarm and alarm in the control room with no shutdown
actions. However; some plants may require shutdown action from confirmed H2S e.g.
Sulphur Recovery Plant.
6.5 FIRE
6.5.1 The philosophy caters for only one major fire incident at a time on an operational site.
Fire can occur at any location from a variety of fuel sources. The protection philosophy
is rapid detection, elimination of the fuel sources and automatic or manual
extinguishing of the fire.
6.5.2 In evaluating potential risk to personnel and property, the characteristics of the
materials being handled, pressures and temperatures, as well as the types of
equipment being used, must be studied with regard to equipment spacing, proximity to
other process facilities, safe mechanical design and types and capacities of fire
prevention and fire protection equipment required.
6.5.3 Passive structural fire proofing, blast walls and thermal barriers to mitigate effects of
fire and explosion shall be utilised where necessary in accordance with approved
Codes and Standards.
6.5.4 Adequate fire fighting equipment and systems shall be provided, in accordance with
appropriate Codes and Standards, to enable quick and effective response to fires;
without exposing personnel to unacceptable levels of hazard.
6.6 SAFETY ANALYSIS/REVIEWS
6.6.1 A number of safety studies and reviews shall be undertaken in order to identify, qualify
and where necessary quantify the risks and establish that design and installed safety
systems provide adequate protection.
6.6.2 The safety studies shall consider single and simultaneous phases of operations such
as:-
a) Drilling and Production
b) Work-over and production
c) Wire-line operations and production
d) Partial shutdown and maintenance and production

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6.6.3 The safety studies/reviews shall identify possible areas of equipment failure and
process upset and ensures that levels of protection are provided in accordance with
appropriate Codes and Standards. The safety studies/reviews place emphasis on the
consequences of change to operating variables; i.e. of high and low pressure,
temperatures, flow rates, level and leakage both between systems and into the
environment. The provision of protection systems to eliminate or minimise incidents
shall be studied to determine their adequacy.
6.6.4 Engineering shall undertake Hazops/ Safety studies/ reviews with representation from
Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering Loss Prevention Engineer.
6.6.5 The aim of the safety studies/reviews is to establish that an adequate level of safety is
achieved against the risk of fire or explosion and other design accident events.
6.6.6 Specific project fire and safety philosophy shall be detailed for each project.
6.6.7 For safety studies through out the project phases, refer to; Philosophy for Health and
Safety Activities In Projects (QP-PHL-S-038).
6.7 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION
6.7.1 The reasons for classifying the installation into hazardous areas are as follows:
a) To allow for appropriate material/ equipment selection.
b) To ensure that sources of ignition are segregated from potential sources of
flammable gas.
c) To assist in the location of clean air inlets (taken from non-hazardous area) for
ventilation systems or combustion equipment.
d) To assist in the location of flammable gas detectors.
6.7.2 The overall design philosophy should be to make the installation as safe as possible by
minimising the sources of release of flammable gas/liquid to the atmosphere.
6.7.3 The area classification will be in accordance with the IP Model Code of Safe Practice:
Part 15; latest edition.
6.7.4 The above Code involves classifying the various areas of the installation into zones
and grades the source of releases. Refer to IP 15 for definitions.
6.7.5 The extent of the hazardous zones is defined by the above mentioned code and is
dependent on the source of the hazard, the physical properties of the material released
and the ventilation of the area. These points are discussed below.
6.7.6 The various sources of release are determined from the PFD‟s and P&ID‟s and their
location on the installation from the equipment layout drawings. Continuous grades of
release giving rise to a Zone 0 area should be eliminated from installations.
6.7.7 The number of primary sources of hazard should be strictly limited. These are restricted
to continuous or frequent operations and to poorly ventilated areas where gas may
accumulate. The hazards of venting flammable gas must be appreciated and the vent
designed accordingly. The accumulation of pockets of gas should be eliminated by
efficient ventilation whether natural or mechanical.
6.7.8 Secondary sources of release occur infrequently and are typically caused by the failure
of a flanged joint or the infrequent venting of equipment to atmosphere. A fully welded
section of pipeline would not normally be considered to be a source of release. Further
items, which give rise to a secondary source of release, include filter covers and sphere
launcher doors, which are infrequently opened.
6.7.9 The extent of the hazardous area resulting from a source of release is governed by the
physical properties of the material. For most sources (except large vents) the distance
is defined in the IP Code.

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6.7.10 A liquid will only give rise to a flammable vapour if it is at a temperature above its flash
point. Fluids with a flash point below 55°C or at a temperature above their flash point
are considered to be hazardous.
6.7.11 Sumps and pits shall be avoided or eleminated. If not possible then they shall be
classified for Zone 1.
6.7.12 Many items of equipment are potential sources of ignition. Electrical systems which
could produce a spark of sufficient energy to ignite the flammable gas must be
protected in accordance with recognised standards such as IEC 60079. Surface
temperatures of other equipment should be treated in the same way and may be
reduced by insulation or by cooling the contents of the system.
6.7.13 The temperature classification of electrical equipment shall be “T3” (IEC 60079),
corresponding to surface temperature not exceeding 200°C.
6.7.14 For exhausts and air intakes the following shall be obtained:
 Sparks from the exhausts from combustion equipment may also provide a source
of ignition. These are caused by glowing particles of carbon and to eliminate this
problem, all exhausts are to be taken to the edge of a Non-Hazardous area and
extended into this Non-Hazardous area by minimum of three metres.
 The air intakes for combustion engines, air compressors and the ventilation
systems shall be located in non-hazardous areas and as remote from the process
areas and other sources of gas release as practical.
 The air exhausts from non-hazardous areas and combustion engines shall be
terminated in non-hazardous areas at a minimum of 4.5 m from the air intakes to
avoid cross flow between extract and intake. All combustion exhausts shall be
fitted with a spark arrestor
6.7.15 Other ignition sources may comprise fixed equipment such as fired heaters or mobile
equipment such as plant traffic.
6.7.16 Fired equipment shall be located in non-hazardous areas. Within a hazardous area, the
maximum external surface temperature of equipment and piping systems will be limited
to 200°C. Plant roads that are around the perimeter of plots will be in non-hazardous
areas and only authorised traffic will be allowed to enter the plant location.
6.7.17 Other potential sources of ignition which may be present in hazardous areas during
operations or maintenance, such as welding or gas cutting, will be controlled by the
permit to work system. The plant area will be a “no-smoking” zone, and will be noted
as such by work instructions and by safety signs.
6.7.18 Where non-hazardous areas are located within hazardous areas, airlocks or gas tight,
self-closing doors shall be provided as necessary together with sufficient mechanical
ventilation to achieve a minimum level of pressurisation of 50 Pa above the adjacent
hazardous area.
6.7.19 The HVAC system where provided to maintain pressure differential within the lower
hazard rated area should be capable of ensuring a continuous air flow from the lower
hazard rated area to the higher hazard area when doors are open. This may be
achieved by the provision of a standby system capable of maintaining the required
pressure differential.
6.7.20 Construction of enclosures required to be pressurised shall ensure low leakage of
pressurisation air; adequate pipe or cable seals and airtight construction are essential.
6.7.21 Access openings between hazardous and non-hazardous enclosures shall be avoided;
where this is not possible the opening shall be protected by an airlock or gas tight door.

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6.7.22 Access openings into or between Zone 1 or Zone 2 hazardous areas shall be protected
by an appropriate airlock(s) or gas tight door(s). Three alternative situations are
possible:
(i) Zone 1 area opening into a Zone 2 area;
(ii) Zone 2 area opening into a non-hazardous area;
(iii) Zone I area opening into a non-hazardous area.
6.7.23 Preference shall be given to using an airlock for each of the three alternative situations
referred to above. However, when an airlock is not practicable, gas-tight self-closing
doors may be used for situations (i) and (ii).Situation (iii) should be fitted with a double
door airlock whenever possible, but if this is not practicable the HVAC system provided
to maintain pressure differential should be upgraded. from a single fan normally used
for arrangements (i) and (ii), to include two 100% duty fans, one running and one
standby. Controls should automatically start the standby fan on failure of the duty fan or
upon prolonged loss of pressure differential, when both would run simultaneously.
6.7.24 Where practicable doors shall be positioned so that they do not face a source of
hazard.
6.7.25 The area of lower hazard rating shall be maintained at a minimum pressure differential
of 50 Pa above that of the connected higher hazard rated area.
6.7.26 Loss of pressure differential shall initiate an audible/visual alarm at a normally manned
station after a delay period not exceeding 30 seconds.
6.7.27 Loss of pressure differential in a non-hazardous space coincident with the detection of
gas at any location, shall initiate automatic disconnection and de-energising of all
electrical equipment that is not certified for operation in a hazardous atmosphere.
6.7.28 All electric equipment located within an airlock shall be certified as suitable for use in a
hazardous area of equal or greater hazard rating than that external to the airlock.
6.7.29 Should pressurisation be lost, an alarm shall annunciate in the Control Rooms. If gas is
simultaneously detected on the platform then executive action (electrical isolation) shall
be taken.
6.7.30 Hinged doors for normal access between hazardous and non-hazardous areas shall
open into the non-hazardous area: emergency hinged doors shall open in the direction
of escape. The exception to this guidance is sliding doors when fitted.
6.7.31 By design, the following areas shall be defined as “non-hazardous” by location:
a) Control rooms
b) Living quarters / offices
c) UPS Switch room/instrumentation/electrical equipment rooms
d) Telecommunications equipment room
e) Fire pump rooms
f) Emergency power generation areas
6.7.32 Battery rooms (Special considerations shall apply owing to battery venting and possible
H2 generation). If mechanical pressurisation is adopted then the room should be
negatively pressurised with respect to adjoining non-hazardous areas but positively
pressurised with respect to the external environment.).
6.7.33 All outdoor field equipment that may be required to operate under emergency
conditions shall be suitable for use within a Zone 1 area. This equipment includes all
items from the following list :-
a) Emergency shutdown system
b) Fire and gas detection system

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c) Fire protection system

d) Emergency Escape lighting
e) General alarm and emergency communication system(s).
6.7.35 All electrical equipment which are located in Hazaradous area shall be certified for
ATEX approval.
6.7.36 During the course of area classification, particular attention shall be given to the
following:-
a) Fuel lines in non-hazardous areas
b) Chemical storage
c) Battery storage
d) Isolated flanges on hydrocarbon lines
e) Ventilation and pressurisation
f) Active or partially active drilling mud systems
g) Open tanks and containers
h) Glands of pumps
i) Sample points
j) Process vents
6.7.37 Electrical equipment installed in a hazardous area shall be certified for use in the
appropriate zone classification and comply with the requirement of IEC 60079 .
6.7.38 For consistancy the equipment shall be certified with a minimum temperature
classification of T3 (200°C maximum surface temperature).
6.7.39 The electrical equipment shall be classified for use in the presence of appropriate
group gases.
6.7.40 Inherent non-sparking motors cannot be assumed to be safe for use within a
hazardous area, this also applies to equipment which operates at less than 3.3KV. In
the event that Ex „e‟, „n‟, or „p‟ classified equipment is utilised then safety precautions
shall be required prior to energising.
6.7.41 Any electrical field equipment that is required to operate under emergency conditions
shall be Ex‟d‟ rated as a minimum.
6.7.42 All mechanical equipment installed in hazardous areas shall be manufactured to
ensure that rotating parts are non sparking and adequately protected against the
generation of a static charge. Surface temperatures shall not exceed 200°C.
6.7.43 Should pressurisation be lost, an alarm shall annunciate in the Control Rooms. If gas is
simultaneously detected then executive action (electrical isolation) shall be taken.
6.7.44 In enclosed or semi-enclosed hazardous areas a minimum of 12 air changes per hour
shall be provided either from natural or mechanical ventilation. Special attention shall
be paid to void areas formed by overhead structural beams. In naturally ventilated or
sheltered areas additional mechanical ventilation may be necessary to achieve
adequate ventilation.
6.7.45 Hazardous area classification drawings showing the plan view and elevations shall be
prepared and include the following information:-
a) Identification of sources of release.
b) All ventilation inlets and outlets
c) Air intakes and exhausts of all internal combustion machinery

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d) Location of all equipment units.

e) Points of air transfer from Modules which may affect classification, sealing gaps on
external module walls.
f) Tank or process vents
g) The classification and extent of all hazardous zones.
h) Ventilation type.
6.7.46 A hazardous area schedule shall be produced identifying as a minimum; the source of
emission, the process material its operating conditions and flash point, containment
category and fluid category, hazardous area boundary dimensions from source, source
of release grading and zone reference number.
6.8 PLANT LAYOUT
6.8.1 QP plants handle hydrocarbon vapours and liquids such as flammable and toxic gas,
NGL, LNG Crude oil etc., which if ignited following a release, have the potential to
cause a major fire or explosion. It is essential that the plant layout is configured to
minimise the possibility of an undesired event occurring. Careful attention to
equipment location improves the safety, accessibility and efficiency of a plant.
6.8.2 Land use planning for buildings and new equipments location selection shall be based
on the LSIR and the minimum separation distances mentioned in clause 6.8.18.
6.8.3 The first approach to layout is to grade each system according to the nature of the
hazard and then categorise the systems of similar grading as follows:
a) Systems which have the potential to emit flammable materials
b) Systems which may emit toxic gases
c) Systems which must be located in a Non-Hazardous area
d) Systems which are considered safe.
6.8.4 The layout of the plant or installation shall be developed to achieve the following safety
features:-
a) Maximum separation between flammable hydrocarbons and ignition sources.
b) Maximum separation between hydrocarbon and hazardous material handling areas
and emergency services, main safety equipment, accommodation areas and
means of escape.
c) Sufficient means of escape to enable efficient and protected evacuation from all
areas to designated muster and abandonment stations, under a hazard condition.
d) Maximum availability of essential services and the main safety equipment under all
foreseeable hazardous conditions.
e) Minimal risk to third parties.
f) Minimal risk of fire spread between plots, so that a fire or other emergency will be
contained in the plot of origin. This will also allow for the safe and effective isolation
of a unit from its operating neighbours when shut down for maintenance. Division
into plots will also optimise on the need for fire protection systems because the
possibility of fire spread is less.
g) Separation between hazardous and non-hazardous areas, for hazardous area
classification purposes and control of potential ignition sources.
h) Appropriate and safe access for construction, operations and maintenance.
i) Adequate access during emergency for means of escape, for emergency vehicles
and for fire fighting.
j) The location of roads that carry general traffic in non-hazardous areas, so that
vehicles are unlikely to ignite a potential hydrocarbon leak.

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k) Fencing requirements and control of visitors.

6.8.5 Consideration shall be given to drainage from all areas taking into account the firewater
discharge rates that would be encountered.
6.8.6 Large vessels may contain high inventories of flammable material which pose a hazard
to the plant. Where possible, the capacity shall be minimised and the vessels
segregated from Non-Hazardous areas.
6.8.7 Consideration shall be given to the location and height of flares and cold vent stacks
which discharge flammable and toxic hydrocarbon materials and combustion products
to the atmosphere.
6.8.8 Arrangement of flares, vents, drains and exhausts shall be in accordance with QP
environmental standards.
6.8.9 The separation distances for offshore plant layout shall be determined on a case by
case basis and in accordance with the relevant Codes and Standards.
6.8.10 The installation shall be orientated as far as is practicable to ensure that:
a) Prevailing winds direct any fire, smoke and/or escaping hydrocarbon gas/vapour
clouds away from the installation generally and the accommodation/ temporary
refuge in particular;
b) Support vessels can operate adequately in an emergency;
c) Helicopter approach flight paths conform to the regulations and are free of
interference from cranes, flare tower, drilling derrick, and hazardous vents;
d) Stationing/mooring of supply boats, and the launching of survival crafts has the
lowest possible risk of collision with any part of the installations.
6.8.11 It is normal for an offshore installation to be designed to withstand extreme 100 year
environmental conditions such as wind, current and waves, air and sea temperature
extremes, seabed characteristics and marine growth.
6.8.12 The structure should be designed to withstand all foreseeable combinations of forces
arising from environmentally imposed forces, helicopter landing and take-off, erection,
alteration, dismantling and removal of secondary structure or equipment.
6.8.13 Any structures located in the wave/splash zone should be capable of withstanding the
forces imposed by wave impact.
6.8.14 The minimum jacket impact absorption criteria should be not less than 4 MJ.
6.8.15 Preference shall be given to the use of inherently corrosion resistant material. Any
material not inherently corrosion resistant or adequately protected be of sufficient mass
to allow for corrosion losses during the service life of the installation. Noting that a
Service life of 30 years is a quite normal requirement for both the structure and
topsides equipment.
6.8.16 The use of aluminium or aluminium alloys shall be restricted; particularly in hazardous
areas due to the possibility of generation of incentive sparks.
6.8.17 Where the use of aluminium is unavoidable, the material may be allowed following
approval from QP Materials and Loss Prevention engineers. Where zinc is used in
proximity to stainless steels there is a risk of metal embrittlement and in such cases
precautions must be taken to protect against the surface of the stainless steel from
contact with flaking or molten zinc.

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6.8.18 Onshore Plant Minimum Separation Distances

Factor Minimum Separation
(metres)
Between process equipment / piping systems and 7.5
edge of plant road.
Between process equipment / piping systems and 15.0
fired heater
Between process equipment/ piping systems and 100.0
control room (Note: Refer further to sections 8.10)
Between process equipment/ piping system and 250.0
normally manned utility buildings such as workshop,
office, laboratory and gate house. Note: Refer further
to sections 8.10.3)
Between process equipment/ piping system and 30.0
unmanned electrical utilities such as substations,
transformers.
Between process equipment /piping system and 30.0
boundary fence
Between two main process units on the same plot 20.0
Between air cooled heat exchangers and fired heaters 20.0
(to minimise the possibility of circulation of hot air).
Notes: Other than all welded pipe work (welded pipe will be reviewed in case by case
basis).
6.8.19 Separation distances for vents and flares need to be calculated, using internationally
accepted and validated methodology, when the vent and flare flow rates are known.
6.8.20 Separation distance from any bulk storage of hydrocarbon material shall be in
accordance with IP3 and IP19.
6.8.21 Separation distance from any open separator ponds (if there are any) needs to be
calculated.
6.8.22 Dedicated access ways within each plant unit will be provided for operations,
emergency escape and fire fighting. These access ways will run to the plant roads.
6.8.23 Roads and access ways will be arranged so as to avoid 'dead ends'. To allow for the
possibility of one road or access way being blocked e.g. by an accident, there will
generally be at least two separate routes to any location on the site.
6.8.24 The site will itself be accessed by a 'normal' and an 'emergency' road.
6.8.25 Roads will as far as practicable be located in non-hazardous areas so that vehicles are
unlikely to be a source of ignition.
6.8.26 The minimum width of roads will allow for access by plant vehicles such as cranes, and
emergency vehicles such as fire tenders. The width of major roads will allow two
vehicles to pass each other.

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6.8.27 The minimum width of access ways and roads will be as follows:

Minimum width of access ways and roads width

a. Major roads around each plot 6.0 m
b. All other roads 4.0 m
c. Pedestrian access within plot limits 1.0 m
d. Stairways on tanks 750 mm
e. Pedestrian access receiving traffic from two or more routes 1.2 m
f. Maintenance access around individual items of equipment 1.0 m
6.8.28 The required headroom over the full width of roads will be 5.5 metres minimum to allow
the passage of emergency vehicles, cranes and other tall vehicles.
6.8.29 All areas of the plant, where emergency vehicles may require access, shall be provided
with roadways of six metres width. This is to permit two large vehicles to pass each
other in safety and to deploy to affected areas.
6.8.30 There will be two means of escape to safety from any normal working area of the site,
except for small platforms or rooms where the distance of a single means of escape is
less than five meter nominal.
6.8.31 Emergency entrances/exits will be located in perimeter fencing as needed to ensure
the minimum two routes to safety. Consideration will be given to the escape
requirements from any platforms on the process columns.
6.8.32 Escape routes will be directed away from possible hazards and will terminate at a
designated muster area that will be in a safe location by the site entrance.
6.8.33 Emergency escape lightning shall be provided with a proper signage.
6.8.34 Where practical, two or more means of escape from raised platforms shall be provided.
Interconnections between overhead platforms shall be provided where reasonable.
6.8.35 Escape route philosophy for buildings shall be in accordance with NFPA 101.Tank
bund walls shall be provided with steps cast into the walls at pre-determined intervals.

7.0 FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

7.1 The protection of personnel, the plant and the environment from the effects of toxic
gas, fire and explosion is prime objective to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is
achieved.
7.2 The basic requirements of the fire and gas detection systems are as follows:
Rapid detection of the undesired event; toxic or flammable gas release and fire
On confirmed detection, simultaneously:
Raise Alarm
Isolate the source of fuel/gas
Isolate sources of ignition
Exclude air where possible
Apply extinguishant where appropriate
Protect adjacent equipment to prevent escalation of the incident

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7.3 ESSENTIAL FEATURES

7.3.1 All outdoor field equipment associated with fire and gas detection/control shall be
suitable for operation within a Zone 1 hazardous area and the environmental conditions
prevailing.
7.3.2 All components shall be accessible for maintenance and testing without disruption to
routine operation of the plant, interruption of overall protection monitoring or undue
degradation of the system (Including sensors, through logic and annunciation to
activation).
7.3.3 Upon detection of an alarm condition, suitable audible and visual alarms shall be initiated
at the Fire and Gas Panel.
7.3.4 Identify the type and location of the detection device activated at the main fire and gas
panel and at any other defined control point or repeater station.
7.3.5 Visual alarms at the alarm panel and any annunciation panels shall meet the approved
colour coding as identified below.
7.3.6 Minimum SIL requirement for F&G panel shall be SIL-2.
7.3.7 Typical loops of F&G system shall be assessed in the SIL study.
7.3.8 All F&G system shall be FM approved UL listed or equivalent.
7.3.9 Video display colours adopted in QP Status Display Systems
GRAPHIC ELEMENT ASSOCIATED COLOURS
Any Inhibit Brown
Any Fault White
Any Fire Alarm Red
Flammable Gas Symbol Magenta
High Alarm(1ooN) Alarm lists will be White Text on Magenta background
Flammable Gas Border turns Magenta.
High Alarm (2ooN) Alarm lists will be Black Text on Magenta background.
(Confirmed gas)
Flammable Gas symbol Orange.
Low Alarm (1ooN) Alarm lists will be white text on orange background.
Flammable gas Border turns orange.
Low alarm (2ooN) Alarm lists will be black text on orange background.
(Confirmed Gas)
Toxic gas alarm Yellow.
symbol(1ooN) Alarm lists will be white text on yellow background.
Toxic gas (2ooN) Border turns yellow.
Alarm lists will be black text on yellow background.
Detector Tag nos. Normal Light Grey
condition
System Status Area/Zone Green
identifiers
Symbols Normal condition Black
Graphic display Back cloth Black
General symbols Dark grey
Graphic titles, page No. Green text
System date and time Cyan text.

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7.3.10 All information from sub-systems shall be available to the operator in the master CCR.
Any sub-system providing information at other plant locations shall be for indication only.
Thus while the master CCR maintains the control functions, slave information systems
on the same plant provide information only with no executive control features on
associated distributed plants (e.g. gas distribution system) with designated secondary
control centres, control facilities may be enabled either by cascade or password control.
7.3.11 The following essential aspects of Human Machine Interface (HMI) for control systems
shall be considered in design:
a) Construction and hierarchy of graphics
b) Definition and operation of major graphics
c) Adopted colour representations
d) Alarm processing and reporting
e) Matrix and Mimic panels including indications and controls
7.3.12 The system shall be self-monitoring to detect faults that may affect the operation of the
system. Detection of a fault shall register an appropriate signal at the alarm panel and
any annunciation panels or system displays.
7.3.13 Signals from the fire and gas detection system may be used to initiate operation of fire
fighting equipment or systems, and initiate plant shutdown and blowdown systems.
7.3.14 The alarm system shall be supplied power from the essential power supply and shall
include battery back-up with a dedicated battery charger. The back-up battery capacity
shall not be less than 60 minutes maximum load.
7.3.15 The fire and gas system shall be based on the provision of suitable field detector
devices, which alarm to the fire and gas control panel.
7.3.16 The fire and gas detection system shall be physically arranged so that a single failure in
it is unlikely to cause critical impairment of the system‟s safety function.
7.3.17 Cables to field detectors shall be fire resistant to IEC 60331.
7.3.18 Detection modes that are arranged to cause plant shutdown shall be generally on a two
out of N voting arrangement to reduce the possibility of spurious shutdowns; where N is
a minimum of three detectors.
A revealed fault condition shall be arranged to vote as an alarm condition; in the other
hand, it shall not cause tripping the plant. For example, one detector in fault mode and
another detector in confirmed mode shall trip the plant; but, two detectors in fault
condition shall not trip the plant.
Nevertheless, any one pneumatic detection system will each operate as a single loop.
7.3.19 Field detector types shall be selected on the basis of the following:
a) The type which gives the earliest detection of the event
b) Freedom from spurious operation
c) Suitability for the ambient environmental conditions
d) An optimum design and limitation of the number of detectors
e) Proven operation in similar situations
f) Inherent reliability
g) Low maintenance requirements

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7.4 FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION

7.4.1 All areas containing potential sources of gas emission shall be monitored for ambient
flammable gas.
7.4.2 Within process areas the gas detectors will be arranged so that detection is based on a
nominal five metre two-dimensional staggered matrix. This dimension is based on
consideration by QP that at least three detectors are within the detectable range of a gas
release within a plant area. Detailed detector locations will be based on relative
buoyancy of the gas or vapour to be detected. 3D model review to be used in order to
indentify leak sources and thereby deciding suitable distribution of gas detectors.
7.4.3 Gas detector selection (Depending upon the area being protected) shall be IR point / IR
Open path/ Ultrasonic gas detectors.
7.4.4 The detector alarm settings will be:
a) Point type :
 20% LEL (low level alarm) and 50% LEL (high level alarm) of methane in air.
 Areas where flammable gas has been excluded under normal operating
conditions; 10% LEL (low level alarm) and 20% LEL (high level alarm) of
methane in air.
 HVAC intake for buildings in safe area; 10% (low level alarm) and 20% (high
level alarm).
 Ventilation air intakes to gas turbine enclosures; 15% LEL (low level alarm)
and 25% LEL (high level alarm)
b) Beam type :
One LEL metre (low level alarm) and 2.5 LEL metres (high level alarm)
Note: Executive control action shall be taken on confirmed high level alarm.
7.5 TOXIC GAS DETECTION
7.5.1 On plants producing, treating or using hydrocarbons contain toxic gas, a fixed automatic
toxic gas detection system shall be provided. The system will monitor those parts of the
plant where a toxic gas (H2S) hazard may arise. On detection a general alarm shall be
raised and plant control room personnel automatically alerted to the existence and
location of the condition. Detector locations shall be determined by means of case by
case examination of the plant layout and may be placed either peripherally around the
plot, at suitable intervals or placed to cover areas with a leak potential, or both.
7.5.2 Activation of one detector at 10 ppm will raise an alarm. Further executive actions (if
needed) shall be detailed in the project specific philosophy and identified on the plant
cause and effect chart.
7.5.3 Within process areas the toxic gas detectors will be arranged so that detection is based
on a nominal 10 metre two-dimensional staggered matrix. This dimension is based on
consideration by QP that at least three detectors are within the detectable range of a gas
release within a plant area. Detailed detector locations will be based on relative
buoyancy of the gas or vapour to be detected. 3D model review to be used in order to
indentify leak sources and thereby deciding suitable distribution of gas detectors.
7.6 FIRE DETECTION
7.6.1 Fires within the hydrocarbon plants predominantly involve:
 Leaking hydrocarbon material; from a failure of the process equipment; OR

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 Electrical and instrument equipment and cabling such as that contained in the switch
room or local equipment room: OR
 Other combustible material such as paper, rag, lubricating oil and grease that may
be contained in a workshop or materials store.
7.6.2 Detector types shall be selected to detect the predominant characteristics of the fire
behaviour, and shall be provided in sufficient numbers and suitably located to provide
effective monitoring.
7.6.3 Due consideration shall be given to the specification and design of fire detection systems
to minimise the incidence of false or spurious alarms.
7.6.4 Fire detector selection shall be from the following types (Depending upon the area being
protected):
a) Smoke detection - Ionisation, Optical and Air sampling (HSSD)
b) Heat detection - Pneumatic (frangible bulb / fusible plug / fusible tube)
Electrical (rate of rise / rate compensated / fixed temp).
c) Flame detection - IR.
7.6.5 Linear Heat Detector Cable for fire detection in the cable trenches and cable cellars shall
be provided
7.7 SMOKE DETECTION
7.7.1 Smoke detectors sense combustion products and should be used within enclosed
spaces that are not subject to extremes of temperature, humidity, dust or wind.
7.7.2 Detection is achieved in the smouldering stage before flames and high temperature
occurs. Areas of selection include accommodation, ceiling void spaces, auxiliary and
switch gear rooms with false floors and ceilings, where high density of electrical cables
are installed.
7.7.3 Where detection is required in false floors and ceilings, remote indicating lamps shall be
provided.
7.7.4 Detection in areas of electrical risk, where historically gaseous fire protection systems
have been employed, and detection in not normally manned buildings on remote not
normally manned plants shall be by HSSD which is likely to give an alarm of a fire at an
early stage.
7.7.5 Consideration should also be given to using HSSD systems in not normally manned
buildings on manned plants; where the risk and consequential loss deems it appropriate.
7.7.6 Point type, optical smoke detectors may only be used in accommodation type risk areas
where there is minimal air movement.
7.7.7 Point type, ionisation smoke detectors may be installed, if the Authority having
jurisdiction, permits their use in any appropriate enclosed space that does not require to
be provided with an HSSD system.
7.8 HEAT AND FLAME DETECTION
7.8.1 Heat detection shall be used when it is not practical to utilise smoke detection i.e. high
temperature, high humidity, dust etc.
7.8.2 In areas protected by sprinkler or deluge system fusible plugs or frangible quartzoid will
generally be chosen for heat detection/activation with the system being designed in
accordance with NFPA Code 13 for sprinkler system and NFPA 15 for deluge system. In

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certain areas protected such as floating tank roofs, plastic tube may be considered as an
option.
7.8.3 In open areas, such as process area, fires may show heat radiation and flames.
Therefore appropriate detector types shall be selected using a case by case examination
of the plant equipment and plant layout. This will be detailed in the specific plant project.
3D model review to be used for location of flame detectors in order to identify possible
obstruction and to ensure clear line of sight.
Note: Operating efficiency of the detection system shall remain at a maximum at all
times. Prevailing environmental conditions shall be taken into account in establishing the
locations of detectors with attention paid to detrimental vibration effects and moist salt-
laden air. The detectors shall be protected against accidental damage or tampering
where necessary.
7.9 MANUAL ALARM CALL POINTS
7.9.1 Onshore plants shall be provided with a manual alarm call point system throughout the
plant area. At the entry/exit points to buildings and along escape routes such that the
distance from any part of the process or utilities plant areas to the nearest call point shall
not exceed 30 metres.
7.9.2 Offshore plants shall be provided with a manual emergency alarm call point system
throughout the plant area and at the entry/exit points, at bridge access points and
stairways.
7.9.3 Call points shall be double action type e.g. lift flap “break-glass”.
7.9.4 Manual alarm call points shall activate audible and visual alarms on the central and local
fire and gas panels, start the firewater pumps and operate the general plant alarm and
plant status lights.
7.10 PRE-DISCHARGE AUDIBLE ALARMS
Enclosed areas protected by fixed gaseous fire protection shall be provided with a pre-
discharge alarm within the protected space, operating in conjunction with the status light.
This is to warn personnel of the imminent discharge of gaseous extinguishant into the
area. Duration of the alarm shall be 30 seconds.
7.11 EXECUTIVE ACTION
7.11.1 Executive action of the fire and gas systems shall be determined on a case by case
basis and shall be detailed in the cause and effect of the specific plant project.
However, in general, the executive action philosophy is as outlined below.
7.11.2 The fire and gas detection system shall automatically initiate executive actions as
follows:
a) FIRE DETECTED
Air sampling type high sensitivity smoke detection
Fire detected (level 1) ALERT 1
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate local panel alarm
Fire detected (level 2) ALERT 2
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate local panel alarm

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 Initiate plant general alarm

Fire detected (level 3) FIRE 1
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate local fire panel alarm
 Initiate plant general alarm
 Fire pump start ( where applicable)
 Alarm to fire station /security office
Fire detected (level 4) FIRE 2
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate local fire panel alarm
 Initiate plant general alarm
 Fire pump start ( where applicable)
 Alarm to fire station /security office
 Shutdown ventilation
 Close fire dampers
 Isolate power feeder supply to affected area.
Operation of a single point type smoke detector:
Because of the sensitivity of point type smoke detectors and the potential for false
alarms, activation of a single detector shall
 Alarm to Control Room
 Start fire pumps
 Initiate local alarm
Operation of two point type smoke detectors.
 Alarm to Control Room
 Start fire pumps
 Initiate local alarm
 Initiate plant General Alarm
 Isolate power feeder supply to affected area
 Shutdown ventilation system to affected area
 Close fire dampers if provided
 Release fixed extinguishing system (if provided)
Operation of a single flame detector or electrical heat detector:
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate plant General Alarm
 Start duty firewater pump
Operation of two flame or two electrical heat detectors:
 Alarm to Control Room
 Initiate plant general alarm
 Shutdown ventilation system
 Close fire dampers (if provided)
 Isolate power feeder supply to affected area.
 Start fire pumps
 Initiate the shutdown and blowdown systems
 Release fixed extinguishing system

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