Turkish Studies, 2013

Vol. 14, No. 2, 256 –271, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2013.802925

Turkey and Turkic Nations: A Post-Cold

War Analysis of Relations
KÜRŞAT ÇINAR

Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

ABSTRACT Turkish foreign policy has experienced massive alterations after the end of Cold
War. This has been most evident in Turkey’s relations with Turkic nations in Central Asia and
the Caucasus, all of which gained independence from the USSR. This article aims to provide a
thorough analysis on this issue. First, the article explores the ethnicity concept and applies it to
the relations between Turkey and Turkic nations. Then, it examines Turkey’s relations with
other regional and international powers, namely Russia, the USA, and Iran, through the
lenses of Central Asia and the Caucasia. Finally, the article questions the often monolithic
view of Turkic nations in the eyes of the Turkish public and delves into the rich yet diverse bilat-
eral relations between Turkey and each Turkic state. To this end, it analyzes Turkey’s political,
economic, and cultural ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. Carefully going over all of these subjects, the article intends to illustrate the multi-
faceted nature of Turkey’s relations with Turkic nations and the prospects and obstacles
ahead.

Introduction
The end of the Cold War altered Turkish foreign policy drastically and Central Asia
and the Caucasus, after the demise of the USSR, have been one of the focal points for
Turkish foreign policy-makers. “The emergence of eight independent states in
Central Asia and the Caucasus after the end of the Cold War presented challenges
to Turkey, while enlarging its role in the world.”1 This article analyzes the contem-
porary challenges and opportunities that Central Asia and the Caucasus offer for
Turkey.
The current state of literature about this topic can be defined as a motley body of
research, each part of which focusing on different subtopics such as energy, economic
relations, diplomacy, etc. This article intends to cover the relations between Turkey
and Turkic nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus from various angles and hope-
fully come up with some elaborations to the literature. The first section of the research

Correspondence Address: Kürşat Çınar, Department of Political Sciences, Ohio State University, 2140
Derby Hall, 154 N Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1373, USA. Email: cinar.3@osu.edu

# 2013 Taylor & Francis

 Turkey and Turkic Nations 257

assesses the ties between Turkey and Turkic nations through the discussion of the
term “ethnicity” and its relevant expansion on the topic. In the second section, the
variables that are consequential on influencing Turkey’s policies regarding the
region, specifically focusing on regional and international powers, are explored.
Finally, the third section examines the bilateral relations between Turkey and
Turkic nations. As asserted above, a well-rounded literature survey on the topic, as
well as finding genuine areas to open up new avenues of research are the primary con-
cerns of this article.

“Ethnicity” and Elaborations on the Topic

As stated earlier, Turkey has been deeply influenced by the developments in Central
Asia and Caucasia after the end of the Cold War. The newly independent Turkic
states constituted 85 percent of the former Soviet Union’s Muslim population,
which is predominantly Sunni, as in the case of Turkey. “The main Turkic groups
in these states are Uzbeks, Kazaks, Tatars, Azeris, Turkomans, Kyrgyz, Chivash,
Bashkirs, Karakalpaks, Kumyks, Uighurs, Karachias, Turks, Balkars, and Nogais,”
all of which are linked to Turkey in many ways, like linguistic ties of various dialects
of Turkish language.2 The state building processes in these Turkic nations after the
collapse of Soviet Union transformed Turkish foreign policy to a great extent. In
this regard, Graham E. Fuller aptly asserts that “indeed, the very foundations and
primal assumptions of the Turkish world view have been shaken, perhaps bringing
about a fundamental shift in the character of Ankara’s modern policy.”3 Turkish
state’s stance about the region was dominated by the policies that once refrained
from forming an ethnocentric bridge between Turkey and Turkic states under the
USSR so as to avoid any clashes in international arena, which continued for
decades.4 However, although reluctantly at first, Turkish leaders started to undertake
presidential and prime ministerial visits to newly established states and look for ways
of developing economic, political, cultural, and even military relationships with
them.5 On the other hand, the newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasia,
in general, started to look first to Turkey as an external ally.6 Yet, are the links
between Turkey and Turkic nations in Central Asia and Caucasia clear enough to
get into the details of the relations? To this end, it would be wise to clarify the ethni-
city-related topics first so as to be able to come up with a thorough analysis of the
issues at hand.
In this part of the study, the definition of “ethnicity” is covered. In light of Donald
Horowitz’s typology, ethnicity refers to a highly inclusive group identity based on
some notion of common origin, recruited primarily through kinship and typically
manifesting some cultural distinctiveness. Therefore, ethnicity embraces groups dif-
ferentiated by language, religion, races, nationalities, and castes.7 Similarly, an ethnic
group can be defined as a subgroup within a larger community that has real or puta-
tive common ancestry, memories, and a common cultural focus such as language,
religion, kinship, or physical appearance.8
258 K. Çınar

In the ethnicity literature, two strands constitute the main pillars of analysis,
namely primordialism and constructivism. According to primordialism, identities
are fixed and linked to the birth of individuals and they are impervious to socializa-
tion. In other words, primordialism assumes single fixed identities for individuals,
who belong to particularistic ethnic groups.9 On the other hand, constructivism con-
tends that identities are fluid, which can be redefined through political and social pro-
cesses. According to constructivist scholars, ethnic identities are the product of
modernization.10 Constructivists see ethnicity as a permeable phenomenon, in
which ethnic identities can change vis-à-vis altering social and political circum-
stances.11 Finally, some constructivists maintain that ethnicity and ethnic identity
are outcomes of rational calculations of individuals, who aim to secure benefits in
a state structure such as jobs, lands, and markets.12
Be it analyzed via a primordialist or a constructivist point of view, the discussion of
ethnicity is illuminating while researching topics like the one at hand.13 The Soviet
nationalist policy during the USSR regime led to the formation of relatively cohesive
national communities in the Union republics.14 It was long before the revolts of the
late 1980s that non-Russian Soviet peoples in general, and Turkic peoples in particu-
lar had gained a much more articulated conception about their ethnicities than most
had possessed before 1917. This phenomenon persisted despite mass dispersions and
migrations, Russification and Sovietization of culture, and severe restrictions on
the expressions of nationalism under Stalin government and the post-Stalin
governments.15
After the demise of the Soviet Union, however, the ethnic issues in the region have
grown as an intriguing matter. During this period, the nation making processes in
Central Asia and the Caucasia launched as a top-down, state-generated project,
rather than a natural evolution from language or culture. Language has not
matched up with nation in the region as various Turkic languages of the region are
closely related.16 “Classifying Central Asian Turkic languages/dialects is rather
like cutting soup,” asserts one specialist.17 Those Western analysts who avow that
the linguistic ties among the Turkic-speaking peoples might unify the Central
Asian communities or create an affinity with the Turks of Anatolia failed to note
that most of the languages of Central Asia are different enough from Anatolian
Turkish that such identification remains an intellectual conceit.18 It is sometimes sur-
prisingly hard to come up with linguistic homogeneity even within the boundaries of
Central Asian states. For instance, Uzbeks in the west of Uzbekistan speak a dialect
close to that of Turkmen, while those in the east are easily understood by Kazakhs or
Kyrgyz.19 It is evident that linguistic differences within and beyond the boundaries of
Turkic states do not act as a catalyst for enhancing primordial identities in the region.
Getting into the specifics about the national identities of Turkic communities, one
can critically approach whether these identities can be seen as primordial or con-
structed. For instance, as for the case of Uzbekistan, contrary to what was claimed
by Soviet Uzbek scholars that asserted that the Uzbek “nation” reached back to the
first millennium BCE and perhaps even earlier, most analysts contend that
“Uzbek” is a quintessentially modern identity and should properly be associated
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 259

only with the twentieth-century Soviet and post-Soviet republics.20 In Turkic states,
where many ethnicities come across each other, the governments strived to resolve
problems of national and political identity through various provisional solutions. In
this regard, Kazakhstan stands as a proper example. The Kazakhs have hardly
been the majority in their own republic. What is remarkable related to this nation
is that northern parts of the republic bordering with Russia have 80 percent of the
population in the region who are non-Kazakh.21 To balance this multinational iden-
tity, Nursultan Nazarbaev, President of Kazakhstan, envisioned Kazakhstan both as
the homeland of the Kazakhs via promoting the Kazakh language and a more national
version of Kazakh history, and at the same time a multinational state in which all
“Kazakhstanis” would have equal rights and opportunities.22 Related to the latter
attempt, Russian was recognized as the second official language in 1995, an
obvious reversal of the 1989 law that established Kazakh as the only official
language.23
References to other ethnic groups in Turkic states are plentiful. In these examples,
the ethnicity rhetoric in these Turkic states is not as homogenous and—more strik-
ingly—not as Turkic as some sources in Turkey claim. To quote an example,

Since a linguistically Turkic presence in Transcaucasia is generally believed to

have arisen only in the eleventh century, the Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis
argue that linguistic continuity was not as decisive a factor as biological inheri-
tance, claiming that the Azerbaijanis are the descendants of the Caucasian
Albanians, the third great Christian power in the Caucasus (along with
Armenia and Georgia) in whose domain Karabakh once lay.24

As evident in these cases, the “ethnicity” in Turkic states is constructed, rather than
being a primordial identity. Of course, one can come across many ostensibly primor-
dial claims both in the academia and politics (especially at the state level). Yet, it is
crucial to discern whether these claims are working along with a fixed and monolithic
identity (Turkic identity in our case) or they are changing over time through political
processes as alleged by constructivists. After a thorough analysis of various sorts, a
neutral observer would probably claim the latter case, i.e. the ethnicity rhetoric is
constructed.

Other Variables in the Game: Big Players on the Scene

It is obvious that Turkey’s foreign policy behavior has changed within the nascent
conditions of post-Cold War era. Turkish official stance on the Caucasia and
Central Asia has changed considerably as “Turkey broke several of its long-standing
taboos”25 by putting her isolationist policies aside and becoming more active in the
region.26 Of course, it is essential to underline that the assertiveness of Turkish
foreign policy partly depends on domestic politics with an emphasis on the nature
of political regime in Turkey, the economic conditions, the foreign policy-making
structure, and partly on the changes in the regional and international structures.27
260 K. Çınar

However, it should be highlighted that the self-perception of the public in Turkey (at
least in part) has been influenced by the establishment of Turkic states in the Caucasia
and Central Asia. As the threat of “antagonizing and provoking the Soviet Union”
faded away,

. . . feelings of kinship with Turks living outside the boundaries of the Turkish
state were proved to exist well beyond the small circles of active Pan-Turkists
or the associations of exiles from different Turkish communities. [Instead] they
[have become] widespread among the population, brought up to be aware of
and glorify Turkish history, [which in turn] had a strong impact on politicians
and were translated into action by Turkish governments,28

as can be seen in the educational policies of the Turkish government in Eurasia.29

To sum up, the post-Cold War developments in the Caucasia and Central Asia have
been consequential on shaping Turkish foreign policy into a more active standing
point.
The paradigmatic shift of Turkish foreign policy, as discussed up to now, undoubt-
edly has had its repercussions on the policies of regional and international powers.
The most significant powers in the region besides Turkey are Russia, the USA,
and Iran. In this study, the power dynamics between these states and Turkey will
be explored.

Russia
The rising power of Turkey in the region most of the times becomes conflicting,
rather than cooperative, with Russia. “During the Yeltsin era, Russian interest in
Central Asia lapsed. [However] under Vladimir Putin, Russia has moved to
strengthen its role in the region” via usually relying upon local authoritarian
leaders for influence.30 Although the Cold War is over, one cannot come up with
same conclusion for the aspirations of Russia. “In the Caucasus and Central Asia,
Russia [still] attempts to establish a sphere of influence that generally coincided
with the domains of the Tsarist and Soviet states.”31 As Andrei Kozyrev, then the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, publicly stated in 1992, “the country will
not cease to be a great power” in the region.32
Russian ambitions related to the region have found their reflections at the leader-
ship level of some countries in the region. Central Asian and Caucasian ex-Soviet
leaders,33 after the independence movements of their nations understood how
closely their economic prosperity was linked to that of the USSR. This explains
why there were no indigenous independence movements, no national liberators
active in the region with the sole exception of Uzbekistan’s Erk (Independence)
movement. The governing elite in these countries wanted the terms of the center-per-
iphery relationship redefined yet none of these republics planned or supported a
formal break with Moscow.34 This demonstrates the persistent power of Russia on
Turkic states.
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 261

The aforementioned negative sides should not completely overshadow the positive
ones between Turkey and Russia related to the region. Both countries’ long-run
socio-economic strategies directed toward the West at certain instances strengthened
the bonds between these states. For instance, “Turkey was the first among all
Moscow’s neighbors in the Near East and Southwest Asia, with which Russia
signed a Treaty on Fundamentals of Relations in May 1992.”35 Moreover,
Turkey’s secularist model of market economy may stand as a decent alternative
against Islamic fundamentalism for Russia in predominantly Muslim Central
Asia.36 Also, both countries may find ways of cooperation related to transfer of
natural resources from Turkic states, which would undoubtedly foster the bilateral
relations.
Yet, as a whole, Turkey and Russia will most probably compete, rather than
cooperate on the region as their stakes conflict on various grounds, be it based on
politics, economics, or culture. Russia is still an influential player in the region and
Russian politicians would not let Turkey assert its policies liberally in the region
that may clash with their priorities. Likewise, Turkish foreign policy-makers would
not be willing to experience the resurrection of Russian dominance in the region if
there were ways to surpass it.

USA
The American approach as a representative Western power for this issue has been
usually sympathetic to Turkish policies as the Americans fear that “radical Islam
might fill up the power vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR.”37 Therefore,

In these new countries, where authoritarian leaders and centralized economic

and political control are still the norm, US policy makers must balance the
goal of maintaining stability with that of promoting measures for democratic
reform that are likely to bring instability in their wake.38

Turkey, having a primarily Muslim population with a secular state can and does help
American policies in the region. Furthermore, the ongoing influence of Russia, even
after the demise of the Soviet Union, appears as an obstacle for these policies. It is
also in this concern that the USA has been by and large lenient on Turkey’s assertive-
ness in the region. For instance, the USA supports “East-West corridor,” a dense
energy transportation network from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe in order
to bolster Azerbaijan’s economic development and independence from Russia’s
sphere of influence.39 This energy network surely increases Turkey’s importance
in the region, which is welcome on the US side so as to counterbalance Russia.
It is noteworthy that the American existence in the region is, of course, not depen-
dent on Turkey’s role. The US opened embassies in each of the new republics soon
after their declarations of independence.40 A number of trade agreements and bilateral
assistance programs between all of the Turkic nations and the USA have been com-
pleted in various parts of Central Asia and the Caucasia. Moreover, agreements with
262 K. Çınar

lending institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and US

Eximbank aim to develop the economies of these countries.41 One can also come
across with the US presence in the media of the Turkic states. For instance, Radio
Liberty’s service, a US-backed radio in the region, broadcasts in Turkic languages
that attract a large public and its reporting is relied upon heavily.42 However, all of
these developments on the American side are typically welcome on Turkish side.
As allies with the USA in the region, Turkey would not want to see Turkic states drift-
ing to Iranian or Russian influence and these developments counterbalance such
drifts. Overall, the policies of both countries most of the times have gone hand in
hand and thus Turkish – American relations related to Turkic states have been
cooperative.

Iran
The Turco – Iranian relations in the context of Turkic states are complex in nature, i.e.
they are cooperative at some grounds and competitive at others. John Calabrese aptly
summarizes the situation, which is as follows:

The independence of the predominantly Turkic, Muslim-populated states of

Central Asia and the Caucasus . . . provided Iran and Turkey with opportunities
to renew cultural and religious contacts with the area’s peoples; and to establish
political and economic links with newly formed governments. Turkey’s
location on Europe’s eastern periphery and Iran’s direct access to the Persian
Gulf-given their contiguity with the southern belt of the former Soviet
Union-also suggested possible enhanced geo-economic roles for the two
countries. Thus, Central Asia and the Caucasus have emerged as theatres of
Turco-Iranian cooperation and competition, in geopolitical as well as in econ-
omic terms.43

Both countries have tried their best to emphasize the cooperation aspect of the
relations. Swietochowski maintains that:

The two powers officially denied that they were rivals for influence in the
Muslim republics of the former USSR; they were . . . willing to cooperate on
particular issues and projects. The most notable example of this cooperation
was the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a group which originally
had included Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and in 1992 invited the six Muslim
republics, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan, to join.44

The “zero conflict with neighbors policy” of the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government in Turkey has recently brought about a
milder climate and rapprochement between Turkey and Iran.45 In the future, these
developments will undoubtedly have their repercussions on bilateral relations as
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 263

far as Turkic republics are concerned. Yet, there are still some potential areas of con-
tention among Turkey and Iran. For instance, Iranian Azerbaijan may turn out to be
such an area since Turkey is sympathetic to the claims on Azeri side related to the
issue, i.e. uniting Northern Azerbaijan with what some Azeris refer to as Southern
Azerbaijan.46 Furthermore, Turkey and Iran may clash on economic terms, specifi-
cally related to energy resources of Turkic states. Transmission of these resources
to other parts of the world may create a competing environment between two
countries. As stated above, Turco – Iranian relations are intricate related to Central
Asia and the Caucasia and these two nations may go hand in hand at some topics
while conflicting at others.
Overall, as it can be seen clearly, Turkish foreign policy related to the region is not
immune from the existence of other major powers in the region, namely Russia, the
USA, and Iran. There are areas of cooperation and competition regarding the vast
resources and potential of Central Asia and the Caucasia. In this section, the relations
between Turkey and other influential players in Central Asia and the Caucasus have
been discussed. Of course, there are other areas and regions that bind these nations’
bilateral foreign policies. For instance, Turkey’s inclusion to the NATO’s missile
defense system seems to infuriate Iran and Russia.47 Despite being out of the
scope of this research, these instances clearly show that bilateral relations of countries
are multifaceted. The analysis under this section, to this end, aims to clarify an impor-
tant aspect of Turkey’s relations with major regional and international powers
through the prism of Central Asia and the Caucasia.

Bilateral Relations Between Turkey and Turkic Nations

This study would have lacked depth if it missed the bilateral perspective of relations
between Turkey and each Turkic state.

Many Turks have had a monolithic image of the ethnic and national compo-
sition of the Turkic republics and were bewildered when violent conflicts
erupted between different Turkic ethnic groups such as the Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks in the oblast of Osh in 1990.48

This monolithic way of looking to the region would have left us with an incomplete
analysis. Thus, at this final section of the paper, the details about the state relations in
the bilateral level, i.e. Turkey and each Turkic state in Central Asia and Caucasia will
be discussed.

Turkey – Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan, the most proximate country to Turkey geographically, linguistically, and
culturally among all Turkic states has unsurprisingly one of the closest relations with
Turkey. These close relations had their roots back in Ottoman times, specifically after
the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876 – 1909).49 However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the
264 K. Çınar

founder of the Turkish Republic, refrained from direct and assertive policies related to
Azerbaijan (and the Caucasus in general), aiming to prevent any clashes with Bolshe-
vik Russia.50 This stance has been carried on the Turkish side until the end of the
Cold War, notwithstanding the extremist pan-Turkist movements in Republican
history. After the demise of the USSR, however, the bilateral relations entered into
a new stage. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbai-
jan.51 Effusive statements have also been made about the Turkish role on the Azer-
baijani side. Typical was the remark by Azerbaijan’s then Foreign Minister, Tofik
Gasymov, in Ankara in August 1992 that “Turkey is our greatest helper. We want
Turkey’s aid in establishing links with the world.”52 Materials steps were also
made related to civic life in Azerbaijan. “With respect to easier contacts with
Turkey and the West,” Azerbaijan adopted Latin in January 1993.53 In total,
Turkey – Azerbaijani relations have been close in political, economic, and cultural
terms. Politically, Turkey ardently defends Azeri position regarding Azeri’s
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Economically, both countries have
growing trade volume and more importantly linkages for energy transmission
routes such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project.54 Moreover, “for Turkey,
Azerbaijan [is] the linguistically closest nation, the linchpin of the old Oghusianism,
the stepping-stone in any commercial and cultural expansion in Central Asia, a
country with a solidly pro-Turkish following the politically articulate”55 and thus
acts as a very vital country for Turkey’s prospects. Likewise, Turkey acts as a
sturdy bridge for Azerbaijan to the West in various grounds. Therefore, strong
Turkish – Azerbaijani relations are likely to be sustained in the upcoming future
even though issues such as a potential, yet currently distant Turkish– Armenian rap-
prochement (especially without any resolution for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan) may occasionally strain these well-built relations.

Turkey – Kazakhstan
As stated in earlier parts of this research, large numbers of Russian settlers (i.e. six
million inhabitants) dominate the north, with 38 percent of this huge republic’s
total population in Kazakhstan.56 Moreover, Kazakhstan forms the most striking
example of European settlement in Central Asia, with many of its towns and cities
that have large numbers of Europeans. However, starting in the early 1980s, the
departure of the Europeans—including not only Russians and Ukrainians, but also
Volga Germans, Jews, and Greeks—began.57 The talent vacuum that is created by
these departures is aimed to be filled by Kazakh officials. Turkey to this end seems
to be of help. There are officially 27 Kazakh – Turkish high schools and two
Kazakh – Turkish universities in Kazakhstan. Moreover, 4000 Kazakh students
were educated in Turkish universities between 1992 and 2007.58 All of these attempts
target to provide Kazakhstan with necessary and qualified workforce in the long run.
Turkey helps Kazakhstan in other cultural areas too. For instance, the enormously
important Yassaui mausoleum in the city of Turkestan (South Kazakhstan oblast)
was finished in 2000, thanks to the massive financial assistance from Turkey.59
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 265

There is also cooperation between these two nations related to energy issues. For
example, the Trans-Caspian pipeline deriving from Aktau, Kazakhstan that would
go through Azerbaijan and reach the Mediterranean at Ceyhan is currently under con-
struction.60 Overall, Turkish – Kazakhstani relations are at a very decent level bilater-
ally and they seem to be expanding on various grounds.

Turkey – Kyrgyzstan
Turkey – Kyrgyz relations followed similar tracks like the cases analyzed so far.
Kyrgyz officials made laudatory speeches regarding Turkey. For instance, “in an
enthusiastic speech, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev called Turkey a ‘North Star,’
to be looked for guidance.”61 To be culturally more aligned with the West, which
undoubtedly includes Turkey, Kyrgyzstan adopted Latin script in recent years.62
Both countries also strive to enhance their relations in education. Almost 4000
Kyrgyz students came for scholarly purposes to Turkey just between 1997 and
2002. Moreover, International Atatürk-Alatoo University was opened in 199663
and the Turk-Kyrgyz Manas University was established in 1998, both with the sup-
ports of the Turkish government.64 There is economic cooperation among these
nations too. To give concrete figures in a nutshell, more than 600 Turkish business
enterprises operate in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, trade volume between two nations
reached 160 million US dollars in recent years.65 To sum up, Turkish– Kyrgyz
relations are in very good terms with a potential of further development over time.

Turkey – Turkmenistan
The bilateral relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have been smooth and
strong since the declaration of independence by Turkmenistan. In fact, Turkey was
the first country to recognize the independence of Turkmenistan. Thanks to the
growing relations, the trade volume among these countries reached 528 million US
dollars in the first nine months of 2007.66 The investment volume by Turkish firms
in Turkmenistan surpassed 1 billion 250 million US dollars in 2007.67 Moreover,
the two countries signed the Trans-Caspian natural gas project in 1998.68 The elab-
oration of the relations between these two states is not confined to economic terms.
For instance, almost 6000 students arrived from Turkmenistan to Turkey for edu-
cational purposes between 1997 and 2002.69 Taken as a whole, Turkish – Turkmen
relations have the prospective of developing more in the future.

Turkey – Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is undergoing an important shift from Russian influence to its Islamic and
Turkic symbols. Uzbek is a Turkic language approximately as distant from Turkish as
Portuguese is from Spanish. Moreover, Uzbekistan seems to be pursuing Turkish ties
aggressively so as to counterbalance, although not replace, Russian ones. Strikingly
enough, Uzbek president Islam Karimov publicized that “[Uzbeks] regard Turkey as
266 K. Çınar

an elder brother.”70 The interest about Turkey is not only confined to the upper eche-
lons of Uzbek nation. Overall Uzbek populace has come to realize the ties between
the Turks and Uzbeks. Turkey, as a country that has close linguistic, historical,
and cultural linkages with Uzbekistan caught the interest of Uzbek population in
general and served as a model, thanks to her relatively prosperous, Western-oriented,
traditionally Islamic country with a secular state.71 Although hampered by some
shortcomings (Turkey’s own economic shortcomings, etc.) and limitations (still
extant Russian power on Uzbekistan), the bilateral relations have a promise for
further expansion in upcoming years.

Overall Assessment of Bilateral Relations

As observed throughout this research, especially under the last section, there is room
for improvement for the bilateral relations between Turkey and Turkic states in the
future. Specifically, the relations in economic terms may flourish even more via effi-
cient use of already existing energy routes and establishment of new energy routes,
and expanding trade and investments bilaterally. However, the education aspect of
the bilateral relations seems to be deteriorating in recent years. Although the quantity
of the students coming from Turkic states to Turkey is quite high, the numbers have
started to decrease in years. Moreover, inadequacy of economic resources on the
Turkish side limits the scholarships offered to these students.72
Finally,

There were criticisms that the Turkish authorities were not paying serious atten-
tion to the selection of students coming from the Turkic Republics and other
Turkish and Turkic communities elsewhere. Turkey, according to this line of
argument, has chosen quantity over quality, i.e. has opted for bringing the
average student rather than the best and the brightest.73

The progress of economic relations is quite consequential yet it does not suffice. Edu-
cational and cultural links between Turkey and Turkic nations in the bilateral level are
crucial if Turkey targets to strengthen its bonds with these nations.

Conclusion
This article has analyzed the relations between Turkey and Turkic nations after the
end of the Cold War era. To do this, various dynamics of the relations have been
explored. First, the “ethnicity” concept has been clarified and then investigated
through the lenses of this study. Second, Turkey’s policies with regional and inter-
national powers, i.e. Russia, the USA, and Iran have been discussed with regard to
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Third, the bilateral relations between Turkey and
each Turkic state have been examined. All in all, this article intends to bridge differ-
ent strands of literature about the political and socio-economic relations between
Turkey and Turkic nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 267

It is evident that the “big brother” approach of initial Turkish foreign policy with
an overarching strategy to “enlighten” the populace in Turkic states created some
problems on developing the relations with these countries. The prior Turkish
experience with Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, or Iraq are
clearly not comparable to the cases that Turkey faces in Turkic states,74 which
lived under Soviet control that affected every tiers of the society in these countries.
A potential subjugation by another power is not an appealing vision to the leaders
and intelligentsia of Central Asia. “They wish to become citizens of the world, after
a long period of what they see as neo-colonial rule and harsh exploitation by
Russia.”75 Moreover, neutral observers should concede that these newly established
states have many other options besides Turkey related to their development paths
both politically and economically and Turkey serves only as an alternative
(although a strong one) among many others. Yet, in general, a sympathetic and sup-
portive approach by Turkey will be most probably welcome on the side of Turkic
states for their integration to the liberal world. By this way, all sides will benefit
through various angles and this will strengthen all parties’ hands in international
political arena in the future.

Notes
1. Aydın, “Foucault’s Pendulum,” 1 –22.
2. Sayarı, “Turkey, Caucasus,” 175–196.
3. Fuller, “The New Geopolitical Order,” 19–43.
4. I disregard any extremist exceptions under the umbrella of pan-Turkic ideology throughout Turkish
Republican history.
5. Fuller, “The New Geopolitical Order.”
6. Ibid.
7. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
8. Bulmer, “Race and Ethnicity,”.
9. Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” 259.
10. See Anderson, Imagined Communities; Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Poli-
tics,”; Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism.
11. Laitin, Identity in Formation.
12. Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition”; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.
13. Please see, Beller-Hann, “The Turkic Peoples of the World”; Beeley, “The Turkic Peoples of the
World,” 369– 370.
14. Suny, The Revenge of the Past.
15. Suny, “Provisional Stabilities,” 139 –178.
16. Ibid.
17. Schoeberlein-Engel, “Identity in Central Asia,” 58.
18. Suny, Provisional Stabilities.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Olcott, “Kazakhstan,” 554–555.
22. Suny, “Provisional Stabilities.”
23. Ibid.
24. Hewitt, “The Value of the Past,” 96– 98; Also see Suny, “Constructing Primordialism,” 862–896; and
Brook, “Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Structure of the World Population,” 505–534.
268 K. Çınar

25. Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 92– 113.
26. Aral, “Dispensing with the Tradition?”, 72–88.
27. Özkeçeci-Taner, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” 259 –263.
28. Kushner, “Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey,” 219–233.
29. Yanık, “The Politics of Educational Exchange,” 293–307.
30. Buszynski, “Russia’s New Role in Central Asia,” 546 –565.
31. Barylski, “The Russian Federation and Eurasia’s Islamic Crescent,” 389– 416.
32. Kozyrev, “Russia: Chance for Survival,” 12.
33. They are usually referred as nomenklatura, former functionaries of the Communist Party.
34. Olcott, “Emerging Political Elites,” 44–67.
35. Konarovsky, “Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia,” 235– 260.
36. Ibid.
37. Aydın, “Foucault’s Pendulum.”
38. Lubin, “Central Asia,” 261– 272.
39. Aras and Fidan, “Turkey and Eurasia,” 203. Also see Cutler, “US –Russian Strategic Relations and the
Structuration of Central Asia,” 109–125.
40. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit,” 289 –304.
41. Lubin, “Central Asia,” 261– 272.
42. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit.”
43. Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran,” 75– 94.
44. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship,” 118–135.
45. Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 945– 964.
46. Sajjadpour, “Turkey, Caucasus, and Central Asia,” 197–215.
47. New York Times, “U.S. Hails Deal With Turkey on Missile Shield.” See http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missile-radar-for-nato-defense-against-iran.html
48. Sayarı, “Turkey, Caucasus.”
49. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship.”
50. See Khalid, “Central Asia Between the Ottoman and the Soviet Worlds”; and Pasha, “Turkey and the
Republics of Central Asia,” 343–357.
51. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship.”
52. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit.”
53. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship.”
54. Saivetz, “Tangled Pipelines,” 95– 108.
55. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship.”
56. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit.”
57. Ibid.
58. Eurasian Research Center, Okan University, “Kazakhstan” http://avrasyamerkezi.okan.edu.tr/node/15.
59. Schatz “The Politics of Multiple Identities,” 489–506.
60. Pomfret “Kazakhstan’s Economy since Independence,” 859– 876.
61. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship.”
62. Samii, “Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia,” 160– 163.
63. Eurasian Research Center, Okan University, “Kyrgyzstan” http://avrasyamerkezi.okan.edu.tr/node/16.
64. Yanık, “The Politics of Educational Exchange.”
65. Eurasian Research Center, Okan University, “Kyrgyzstan” http://avrasyamerkezi.okan.edu.tr/node/16.
66. Eurasian Research Center, Okan University, “Turkmenistan” http://avrasyamerkezi.okan.edu.tr/node/21.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Yanık, “The Politics of Educational Exchange.”
70. Hale, “Islam, State-Building and Uzbekistan Foreign Policy,” 136–172.
71. Ibid.
72. Yanık, “The Politics of Educational Exchange.”
73. Ibid.
 Turkey and Turkic Nations 269

74. Sayarı, “Turkey, Caucasus.”

75. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit.”

Notes on Contributors
Kürşat Çınar is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Ohio State University (OSU). He has a
Master’s degree in Economics from New York University, which he completed as a Fulbright scholar.
He also holds a Master’s degree in Political Science from the OSU. Kursat Cinar is interested in conducting
research on Comparative Political Economy and Development. His area foci are Europe (specifically
Southern European countries) and Latin America. His articles will be published in Political Studies and
Journal of Development Studies. He is also a referee in the International Political Science Review.

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