Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The 4th Scs Workshop Booket - Final
The 4th Scs Workshop Booket - Final
Diplomatic Academy 18-21 November, 2012 - Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam Vietnam Lawyers’
of Vietnam Association
CONTENTS
1
WORKSHOP BACKGROUND
The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association (VLA) are
pleased to announce our Fourth International Workshop entitled “The South China Sea:
Cooperation for Regional Security and Development” on 18-21 November 2012 in Ho Chi
Minh City, Viet Nam.
As did our three previous International Workshops on Security and Development in the
South China Sea, this fourth gathering aims to provide scholars, policymakers and other
stakeholders a special opportunity to assess the current situation in the South China Sea
from an interdisciplinary perspective and to consider and discuss measures to maintain
peace and stability in the area while promoting regional cooperation.
TOPIC 3 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the South China Sea
TOPIC 5 Interests and Policy of Extra-regional Parties in the South China Sea
TOPIC 8 Cooperation in the South China Sea: Looking Back and Looking Forward
2
PROGRAMME
Venue: Sheraton Hotel Saigon, 88 Dong Khoi Street, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam
Arrivals of Participants
18.30 – 21.00 Welcome dinner (for International Participants), hosted by Mr. Pham Quoc
Anh, President of the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association.
Location: Signature Restaurant, 23rd floor, Sheraton Hotel Saigon.
3
Prof. Ngo Vinh Long, Faculty of History, University of Maine, USA.
Charm and Harm Offensives: Impacts of Geopolitical Considerations
by China and the United States on the South China Sea Region
Luncheon
12.00 – 13.00
Location: Restaurants at 23rd Floor, Sheraton Hotel Saigon
Gen. (Rtd) Daniel Schaeffer, Member of the French think tank Asie 21,
France.
China’s seizure process of the South China Sea through the
materialisation of the 9 dotted line
Mr. Ha Anh Tuan, PhD Candidate (Politics and IR), School of Social
Sciences, The University of New South Wales, Australia.
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Tension Or Less?
Discussion
4
15.30 – 17.00 PANEL 3: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA
(Key themes: Decision Making Mechanism; Role of National Stakeholders
(Navy, Paramilitary, Oil and Gas Groups, Fishermen, etc.); Policy Formulation
and Implementation).
Moderator: Prof. Geoffrey Till, Professor of Maritime Studies, King’s College
London and RSIS, Singapore.
Discussion
5
Mr. Christian Le Mière, Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime
Security at the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS), UK.
Anti-access/Area denial and the South China Sea
Discussion
Dr. (Navy Captain) Sukjoon Yoon, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute
for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), Korea.
Sino-American Rivalry in the South China Sea: Time for the ROK to
Project its Middle-Power Role
Discussion
13.30 – 15.30 PANEL 6: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN US - ASEAN - CHINA RELATIONS
Moderator: Amb. Rodolfo C. Severino, Head of ASEAN Studies Center,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair China Studies, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, US.
Understanding Recent Developments in US-China-ASEAN Relations: A
US Perspective
6
Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Visiting Research Fellow at the ASEAN
Studies Centre of ISEAS in Singapore.
ASEAN, China, the US and the South China Sea: Opportunities for
Cooperation
Dr. Tran Truong Thuy, Institute for East Sea Studies, Diplomatic Academy
of Vietnam
China, ASEAN, US in the South China Sea: Rebalancing the Triangle
Discussion
Amb. Hasjim Djalal, Director, Centre for South East Asian Studies,
Indonesia.
The South China Sea in Legal Perspective
Assoc. Prof. Robert Beckman, Director, Centre for International Law (CIL),
National University of Singapore.
Rights and Jurisdiction over Resources in the South China Sea: the
Significance of the Status of Geographic Features
Capt (N) Azhari Abdul Aziz, Director of Legal Service, Royal Malaysian
Navy.
Deciding Sovereignty Disputes: Ownership Claims Over “Land
Features” In South China Sea
7
Dr. Nguyen Thi Lan Anh, Vice Dean of International Law Department,
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
Why was “historical rights” historicized by UNCLOS?
Discussion
10.45 – 12.30 PANEL 8: COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: LOOKING BACK AND
LOOKING FORWARD
(Key themes: Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation; Non-Traditional
Maritime Security Cooperation; Joint Development; International
Experiences).
Moderator: Prof. Alex Tan, Asia New Zealand Foundation and University of
Canterbury, New Zealand.
Prof. Yao Huang, Vice Dean of the School of Law, Sun Yat-sen University,
Guangzhou city, China.
Implementation of the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement: Mainly
Chinese Perspective
8
Mr. Henry S. Bensurto, Jr., Senior Special Assistant, Office of the
Undersecretary for Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs of Philippines.
Path to Peace: Conflict Avoidance through Dispute Settlement
Ms. Theresa Fallon, Senior Associate, European Institute for Asian Studies
(EIAS) ASBL, Belgium.
What role for Europe? Can they contribute to the promotion of
cooperation and dispute settlement in the South China Sea
15.15 – 16.30 PANEL 10: FREE DISCUSSION, WRAP-UP AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Moderator: Amb. Dang Dinh Quy, President of the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam
19.00 – 21.00 Farewell Dinner (for international participants), hosted by Amb. Dang Dinh
Quy, President of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
(Please be at the Hotel Lobby at 18.45).
9
MEETING GUIDELINES
Venue: Sheraton Hotel Saigon, 88 Dong Khoi Street, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam
10
Dress code
Internet
Wireless Internet is available at the Conference Hall.
Rules of Proceedings
Other participants have 3 minutes each to make comments, raise questions during
Q&A section.
11
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS
- in alphabetical order of first names -
1 Mr. Ahmad Afifi Hussain Malaysia Assistant Director, Research Division, Prime
Minister’s Department, Malaysia.
2 Prof. Aileen San Pablo Philippines Professor, Asian Center, University Of The
Baviera Philippines.
3 Ms. Aileen Mendiola-Rau Philippines Director, North Asia Division, Office of Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Department of Foreign
Affairs, Philippines.
4 Prof. Alex Tan New Zealand Professor, Asia New Zealand Foundation and
University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
6 Ms. Ana Placida D. Espina Philippines Project Development Officer III, Office of the
Undersecretary for Policy, Department of
Foreign Affairs, Philippines.
9 Dr. Benoit de Tréglodé France Head of the Asia Bureau, Department for
Regional Issues (Directorate for Strategic
Affairs), Ministry of Defense, France.
11 Ms. Bonnie Glaser USA Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair China Studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
US.
12
12 Mr. Bounpan Laos Deputy Director General of the Institute of
Kongnhinsayaseng Foreign Affairs, Laos
16 Dr. Christopher Roberts Australia Senior Lecturer in Asian Politics and Security;
Acting Deputy Director (Academic and
Research), National Security College,
Australian National University
17 Gen. (Rtd) Daniel Schaeffer France Member of the French think tank Asie 21,
France.
20 Prof. Dmitry Valentinovich Russia Chief of the Center of the South East Asian
Mosyakov countries, Australia and Oceania in the
Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences, Russia.
13
Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.
24 Dr. Evgeny Kanaev Russia Leading Research Fellow, Center for Asia-
Pacific Studies, Institute of World Economy
and International Relations, Russia.
27 Dr. Grigory Lokshin Russia Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Far East
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
28 Mr. Ha Anh Tuan Australia Ph.D. Candidate (Politics and IR), School of
Social Sciences, University of New South
Wales, Australia
31 Amb. Hasjim Djalal Indonesia Director, Centre for South East Asian Studies,
Indonesia.
34 VADM (ret.) Hideaki Kaneda Japan Director of the Okazaki Institute, Japan.
14
36 Dr. James Manicom Canada Fellow, Balsillie School of International Affairs
37 Ms. Jennifer Alison Bauer Australia Exploration Manager, The Operating Office Of
Origin Energy (Song Hong)-Block 121.
38 H.E. Mr. John Langtry Australia Assistant Secretary, East Asia Branch,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
15
49 Mr. Meor Syahrisal Asryl Malaysia Principle Assistant Director, Research
Division, Prime Minister’s Department,
Malaysia.
52 Ms. Nur Herzazzila Ghazali Malaysia Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia.
54 Dr. Phan Duy Hao Singapore Fellow, Center for International Law (CIL),
National University of Singapore
60 Assoc. Prof. Robert Singapore Director, Centre for International Law (CIL),
Beckman National University of Singapore, Singapore
16
62 Prof. Robert Lihtorng Chen Chinese International Law of the Sea Institute,
Taipei National Taiwan Ocean University.
70 Dr. Sukjoon Yoon Korea Captain (Ret.), Senior Research Fellow, Korea
Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), Korea.
71 Prof. Sum Chhum Bun Cambodia Vice President, Royal Academy of Cambodia.
75 Ms. Theresa Fallon Belgium Senior Associate, European Institute for Asian
Studies (EIAS) ASBL.
17
76 Ms. Thi Thi Myint Myanmar Deputy Director, Attorney General Office
79 Dr. Vladimir Mazyrin Russia Leading Research Fellow, Institute for Far
Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Science
82 Prof. Yao Huang China Vice Dean of the School of Law, Sun Yat-sen
University, Guangzhou city, China.
LOCAL PARTICIPANTS
- in alphabetical order of first names -
1 Ms. Nguyen Thi Van Anh Lecturer, Ton Duc Thang University
18
3 Dr. Do Hoa Binh Deputy Head of Commission’s Office, State
Commission on the East Sea and Islands
11 Dr. Trinh Duc Hai Director General, Center for Maritime Policy
Studies, National Border Committee
19
16 Col. Dao Kim Long Director General, Department of National
Defence and Security
Ministry of Planning and Investment
26 Ms. Ton Nu Thi Ninh Director, Tri Viet Center for Education
Research & Development, Ton Duc Thang
University
20
Capture Fisheries and Resource Protection
Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development
29 Dr. Mai Hong Quy Rector of the Ho Chi Minh City University of
Law
30 Assoc. Prof. Dang Tien Sam Director General, Institute for Chinese Studies
35 Sen. Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Thach Vietnam Border Defense Force
Ministry of Defence
21
42 Mr. Nguyen Quoc Toan Ministry of Public Security
22
3 Ms. Ayesha Rekhi Canada Counsellor (Political & Public Affairs)
Embassy of Canada
12 Mr. Fabio Schina Italy First Secretary & Head of Political and
Cultural Section
Embassy of Italy
23
16 Mr. Alistair Crozier New Deputy Head of Mission
Zealand New Zealand Embassy
22 Mr. David Åhlén Sweden Second Secretary Political and Trade Section
Embassy of Sweden
24
29 Mr. Nicolas Snyder US Political Officer
U.S. Consulate General
25
DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY OF VIETNAM
2 Dr. Nguyen Thi Lan Anh Research Fellow, Institute for East Sea Studies
& Vice Dean, Faculty of International Law
3 Dr. Do Thi Thanh Binh Researcher, Institute for East Sea Studies
7 Ms. Hoang Thi Phuong Mai Researcher, Institute for East Sea Studies
8 Ms. Nguyen Minh Ngoc Researcher, Institute for East Sea Studies
9 Mr. Nguyen Hung Son Deputy Director General, Institute for Foreign
Policy and Strategic Studies
10 Dr. Tran Truong Thuy Researcher, Institute for East Sea Studies
11 Mr. Dao Tuan Viet Researcher, Institute for East Sea Studies
Others
26
BIOGRAPHY OF ROLE PLAYERS
Prof. Alice Ba
Associate Professor, University of Delaware, US.
Email: aliceba@udel.edu
27
Current and on-going research projects focus on the processes
of institutional change and regional integration, regional
leadership, and comparative engagement processes. She is
also author of a number of chapters in edited books, as well as
co-editor of Contending Perspectives on Global Governance:
Coherence and Contestation (Routledge). A list of her
publications can be found at:
http://www.udel.edu/poscir/profiles/ABa.shtml. A 2006/7
Fulbright Research fellow in Beijing, she also serves as Director
of Asian Studies at the University of Delaware.
Capt Azhari Abdul Aziz RMN joined the Royal Malaysian Navy
as a line officer on 6 Jan 1979 and is currently the Director of
Legal Service at the Naval Head Quarters. Prior to his current
appointment he was among others the Staff Officer 1 at the
Naval HQ, Convening Staff and prosecutor at the Fleet
Command and Legal Advisor to the Malaysian Contingent
(SFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina. He has took up appointment as
executive officer of KD SERAMPANG (petrol craft) and as
Supply and Finance officer of the Central Naval Depot,
Commander of the Naval Area 1 and KD Sri Tawau before
receiving the call to read law at MARA INSTITUTE of
TECHNOLOGY. He further advance his knowledge in Maritime
Law after graduating from Cardiff University in 2005 holding a
LLM in Legal Aspect of Maritime Affairs under the Chevening
Scholarship granted by the Foreign Commonwealth Office
United Kingdom. Capt. Azhari also holds a Msc in Business
Engineering Management from the University of Warwick, UK.
Capt. Azhari was a former teaching staff of the Institute of
Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy before being appointed
as a lecturer and teaching staff of the Senior Workshop on
International Rules governing Military Operations, hosted by
ICRC since its inception in 2007. Capt Azhari is instrumental in
creating the Malaysian National Committee for Humanitarian
Law and a member of two of its sub-committee. He is also a
resource person for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National
Security Council and the Attorney General Chambers of
Malaysia.
28
Ms. Bonnie Glaser
Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair China Studies, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, US.
Email: BGlaser@csis.org
29
Prof. Carlyle Thayer
Emeritus Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence
Force Academy
Email: carlthayer@webone.com.au
30
Science at Yale. In 2005, he was the C. V. Starr Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C. During 2006-07 Carl directed
the Regional Security Studies module at the Australian
Command and Staff College, Weston Creek. In 2008, he spent
the first half of the year as the inaugural Frances M. and
Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Center
of Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University in the United
States and the second half of the year as Visiting Fellow at the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.
31
Department of Economic Affairs, including Deputy Director,
Assistant Director General and Head of Division. He also
worked for the Department of Middle East and Africa as a
Middle East Desk Officer from 1991 to 1995. He has written
extensively on foreign policy and international relations in
Asia-Pacific.
32
In 1993 defended doctoral thesis on "Socio-political
development of Cambodia in the XX century" In 1998 became
chef of the department of South East Asia countries in the
Institute of Oriental Studies. In 2009 was appointed chef of the
centre of South East Asia countries, Australia and Oceania.
Chief Editor of the scientific magazine ―South East Asia
politics, economy culture‖, head of the department of regional
problems on the faculty of international relations in Moscow
Humanitarian University.
33
delimitation to the International Hydrographic Organization
(IHO).
Prof. Geoffrey Till
Professor of Maritime Studies, King’s College London and RSIS,
Singapore.
Email: Geofftill45@gmail.com
34
Southeast Asia, China‘s foreign policy, and Sino-US relations.
He is the author of two book chapters: ―Balance of Power of
Southeast Asian Countries: The Origin of Peace and Autonomy
in the Region in the Post Cold War Era‖ in Sustaining a Resilient
Asia Pacific Community, edited by WilmarSalim and
KiranSagoo, Cambridge Scholars Press, Cambridge, 2008; and
―The Changing Nature of Conflicts in Southeast Asia and the
Role of INGOs in Peace Building: A Theoretical Approach‖, in
Peace Building in Asia Pacific: The Role of Third Parties, edited
by SuwitLaohasiriwong and Ming-CheeAng, Institute for
Dispute Resolution - KhonKaen University, KhonKaen, 2007. He
also had a journal article ―Economic interdependence and the
shaping of Sino-US relations in the 21st century‖ published in
International Studies (an English academic journal of the
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam), No.20, 2007. Tuan also
writes extensively in Vietnamese and teaches undergraduate
students in international relations.
Prof. Dr. Hasjim Djalal was born on February 25, 1934, in West
Sumatra, obtained a BA degree from Indonesian Academy for
Foreign Service in Jakarta (1956), M.A (1959) and Ph.D (1961),
both from the University of Virginia. He graduated from the
Indonesian National Defense Institute (LEMHANNAS) in 1971.
He was Director of Treaty and Legal Affairs of the Indonesian
Department of Foreign Affairs (1976-1979) and Director
General for Policy Planning (1985-1990). He has served at
various Indonesian Embassies, such as in Belgrade, Conakry,
Singapore, Washington DC, including as Ambassador to the
United Nations in New York, Canada, Germany and
Ambassador at large for law of the Sea and Maritime issues.
He participated fully in the Third UN Law of the Sea
Conference (1973-1982) and in its implementation thereafter,
as well as in other maritime activities, nationally, regionally
and internationally until now.
He was President of the International Seabed Authority (ISBA)
in Jamaica (1995, 1996), and currently serves as Chairman of
the Finance Committee of the ISBA. Since 1989 he has been
the initiator and convener of the Workshop Process on
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, and has
been involved in development of maritime cooperation in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
35
Currently, he is a member of Indonesian Maritime Council,
Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries, to the Indonesian Minister of Transport, and to
Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff, and a Member of Legal Experts
Team of the Indonesian Minister of Defense, and lectures at
universities and other high learning institutions in Indonesia.
36
Law, implications of US Reconnaissance within the Chinese
200-mile EEZ”; Criminal Jurisdiction under the RP-US Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA)”; “The Concept of Self-Defense under
International Law”; “Trends on International Law on
Recognition of States”; “Cooperative Architecture in the South
China Sea. ASEAN-China Zone of Peace, Freedom, and
Cooperation”; and "Archipelagic Philippines: A Question of
Policy and Law, Maritime Border Diplomacy”, published by
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012.
37
Dr. Ian Storey
Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS),
Singapore
Email: ijstorey@iseas.edu.sg
Dr. Li Mingjiang
Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Email: ismjli@ntu.edu.sg
38
Global Governance, Cold War History, Journal of
Contemporary China, The Chinese Journal of International
Politics, China: An International Journal, China Security,
Security Challenges, the International Spectator, and
Panorama (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). He frequently
participates in various track-two forums in East Asia.
39
Regional Project on Offshore Prospecting based in Bangkok. He
has a Ph.D in Oceanography from the University of Hawaii and
a M.A. in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island.
Dr. Valencia has published some 15 books and more than 150
articles and is a frequent contributor to the public media such
as the Far Eastern Economic Review, International Herald
Tribune, Asia Wall Street Journal, Japan Times and Washington
Times. Selected major policy relevant works include The
Proliferation Security Initiative : Making Waves in Asia (Adelphi
Paper 376, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
October 2005), Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in
the Exclusive Economic Zone :Consensus and Disagreement (co-
editor, Marine Policy Special Issues, March 2005 and January
2004); Maritime Regime Building: Lessons Learned and Their
Relevance for Northeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002); Sharing
the Resources of the South China Sea (with Jon Van Dyke and
Noel Ludwig, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); A Maritime Regime for
Northeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 1996); China and the
South China Sea Disputes (Adelphi Paper 298, Institute for
International and Strategic Studies, 1995); Atlas for Marine
Policy in East Asian Seas (with Joseph Morgan, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1992); and Pacific Ocean Boundary
Problems: Status and Solutions (with Douglas Johnston,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
Dr. Valencia has been a Fulbright Fellow to Australia (2007)
and to Malaysia (1985), an Abe Fellow, a DAAD (German
Government) Fellow, an International Institute for Asian
Studies ( Leiden University) Visiting Fellow, and a U.S. State
Department –sponsored international speaker. He has also
been a consultant to international organizations (e.g., IMO,
UNDP, UNU, PEMSEA); government institutions and agencies (
in, e.g., Canada, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Viet Nam and the USA); and numerous
private entities (e.g. Shell ,CONOCO, and legal firms handling
maritime issues).
40
Scholars (now known as Critical Asian Studies). He is also a
Board member of the Center for National Culture Studies of
Vietnam.
He was an advisor to Oxfam America from 1973 to 1998 and a
member of the Asia Panel of the American Friends Service
Committee, International Division from 1992 to 1998.
41
Dr. Nguyen Thi Lan Anh
Vice Dean, International Law Faculty, Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam
42
2011. Her presentations and papers for workshops have been
published in compendium and uploaded on the websites of
the organizers post seminars. She also published other writing
on South China Sea issues in Vietnamese.
43
capability, and Missile Defence (BMD).
44
Pacific (ASPI, December 2006), and “Military Modernization in
the Asia-Pacific: Assessing New Capabilities,” Asia’s Rising
Power (NBR, 2010). He is also the editor of The Modern
Defense Industry: Political, Economic and Technological Issues
(Praeger, 2009). Mr. Bitzinger was previously an Associate
Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii, and has also worked for the RAND
Corporation, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Affairs,
and the U.S. Government. In 1999-2000, he was a Senior
Fellow with the Atlantic Council of the United States. He holds
a Masters degree from the Monterey Institute of International
Affairs and has pursued additional postgraduate studies at the
University of California, Los Angeles.
45
Assoc. Prof. Robert Beckman
Director, Centre for International Law (CIL), National University
of Singapore
Email: cildir@nus.edu.sg
46
Era, which is intended for pre-university students. He writes
articles for journals and for the press. Before being ASEAN
Secretary-General, Severino was Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Philippines, the culmination of 32 years in the
Philippine Foreign Service. He twice served as ASEAN Senior
Official for the Philippines. Severino has a Bachelor of Arts
degree in the humanities from the Ateneo de Manila and a
Master of Arts degree from the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies.
47
Prof. Su Hao
Professor, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China.
Email: Suhao_us@yahoo.com
48
Dr. (Navy Captain) Sukjoon Yoon
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
(KIMS), Korea.
Email: sjyoon6680@hanmail.net
Dr Sukjoon Yoon is currently senior research fellow of the
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS) and visiting
professor of the department of the defense system
engineering, Sejong University, Seoul, Korea and is retired
Navy Captain. At present, he is a member of execute
committee of the SLOC Study Group-Korea and a member of
advisory committee of the Korea National Diplomatic
Academy. Dr Yoon’s more than thirty years of commissioned
service included thirteen years at sea as surface warfare officer
and several command and staff appointments. He has been
director of maritime strategy studies at the Naval War College,
senior lecture, Naval Academy, commanding officer of the
ROKS WONSAN, director of policy division, ROKN Headquarters
and adjunct professor of the Center for Chinese Studies, IFANS,
MOFAT, Seoul, Korea.
He is graduated of the Naval Academy class of 1976 and of the
commander’s course of the Naval War College in Korea. He
holds a MA in Chinese politics from Fu Hsing Kang Institute of
the National Defense University, Taiwan and a Ph. D in
international politics from Bristol University United
Kingdom(where he was a Navy Oversea Student-Officer). He
has written on a broad range of Asian Maritime Security issues.
His recent works include “The Chinese Version of the Monroe
Doctrine and Regional Maritime Security (2012)”, “North
Korea’s Military Threats in 2010 and Its Implications for the
Sino-Korean Relation(In Korean) (2011); “ROK-US Alliance and
Interoperability (2010)”; “The PLAN’s Modernization and Its
Impact on the ROKN” (2009)”; “China’s Energy Security and
Development of the PLAN(In Korean) (2005)”; “After the War
on Terrorism : What a Relevance for Navy? (2004)”. His most
recent book is “Maritime Strategy and Development of the
Nation-State” (In Korean) (2010), “The Korean Maritime
Strategy: Issues and Challenges” (In English) (2011) (co-editor
with Dr Geoffrey Till), “The Dilemma of Naval Modernization in
East Asia” RSIS Commentaries in Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore(August 2012), and “The Chinese
Version Monroe Doctrine and Regional Maritime Security” (US
Naval Institute Proceedings, forthcoming) & “The Chinese
Aircraft Carrier: It’s relevance to their A2/AD Strategy” RSIS
Commentaries in Nanyang Technological University in
Singapore(Forthcoming, 2012).
49
Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap
Visiting Research Fellow, ASEAN Studies Centre of ISEAS,
Singapore.
E-mail: termsak@iseas.edu.sg
50
Ms. Theresa Fallon
Senior Associate, European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)
ASBL, Belgium
Email: theresafallon1@yahoo.com
51
in Vietnamese), editor of The South China Sea: Cooperation for
Regional Security and Development (Hanoi, Thegioi Publisher,
2010, in English) and The South China Sea: Towards a Region of
Peace, Security and Cooperation (Hanoi, Thegioi Publisher,
2011, in English).
52
Prof. Yao Huang
Vice Dean of the School of Law, Sun Yat-sen University,
Guangzhou city, China.
Email: lpshyao@mail.sysu.edu.cn
53
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF PAPERS
PANEL 1
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN TRANSITION: GEOPOLITICS
2. Significance of the South China Sea; Strategic Values of Maritime Domain and SLOC
- Japanese View
VADM (Ret.) Hideaki Kaneda
Under the current security situation, there are some notable instability factors that
threaten Asia Pacific regional security. Those can be classified into two major
categories of traditional and non-traditional factors.
For traditional factors, first of all, there are some confrontational structures as the
remnants of the Cold War era, such as those in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan
Strait, which still cast the shadows of instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in
the region. The second factor is the rapid build-ups of Chinese military power mostly
in their naval and air forces, which have the potentials of disrupting regional military
power balance, as well as military use of space and cyber domain. The third factor
involves territorial, religious and ethnic disputes founded on historical controversies.
Especially, the territorial disputes over islands have the potential to develop into
54
armed clashes. The fourth factor is the confrontational structures over marine
interests, which are closely related to the territorial disputes over islands. All these
factors are likely to present serious effects over the security and stability of the
region as a whole, as they can obstruct the security of SLOCs.
Non-traditional factors, on the other hand, are those new factors that become
apparent after the end of the Cold War. The fifth factor is the proliferation of; the
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from the Northeast Asia to
Pakistan, Iran and other regions mainly through regional SLOCs. The sixth factor is
the increased vigor of terrorist activities such as bomb attacks, as international
terrorist groups’ strengthened ties with other relevant groups in and out of the
region, mainly targeting the nations with weaker governance, islandal seas and
remote islands. This becomes especially apparent after 9.11 terrorist attacks. The
seventh factor is the trend of globalization and reorganizing of unlawful crime
activities through oceans, such as piracy, narcotic trades, and human trafficking in
the region. The eighth factor is, from the long term perspective, China’s ambition to
secure maritime hegemony, as demonstrated in their efforts to build so-called the
“string of pearls”, a series of strategic (political, economic and militarily) bases, along
the vast major SLOCs connecting the Middle-East and the Northeast Asia.
Upon examining these instability factors, we find some key words common to them.
Among of them, the “Maritime Security” and “China Risks” are the most important
keywords for the stabilization of the Asia Pacific region as a whole.
55
this change in the U.S. constrainment strategy vis-à-vis China, the Southeast Asian
countries now face one of these three worst case scenarios: an Asian balance of
power in which the great and small powers are locked in a constant competition
creating the risk of alliance-formation, realignment, arms-build-up, aggression and
conflict; or a regional order managed by a condominium of two great powers--China
and the U.S.; or a Sino-centric Asia where China exercises preponderant power to
preserve the order and shape the region according to its preferences.
56
PANEL 2
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
6. The Choice of Fundamental National Interests and the Position of South China Sea
Issues
Prof. Su Hao & Dr. Ren Yuan Zhe
The choice of a country’s grand strategy needs to correspond with the national
fundamental interests. Taking the minor interests as the basis of strategic decision-
making will lead to mistakes in strategic choices, which might result in great losses in
national development and national comprehensive capacity building. When dealing
with territorial and maritime disputes with each other, the claimant states and other
parties around the South China Sea should evaluate the position of these issues in
their national interest framework. After the end of Cold War, countries around the
South China Sea have “shelved disputes, and sought cooperation”, thus pursuing the
intensive “10+1” cooperation process between China and ASEAN. This proved that
the South China Sea issues are definitely not a fundamental interest of the countries
involved. However, recently the some countries around the South China Sea have
strengthened their claims over South China Sea, pursued their absolute individual
national sovereign security, and taken a series of actions that have destroyed stable
situation in the South China Sea area. This has caused oppositions between
countries, and worsened the security tension in the region. The hostile situation has
also jeopardized the existing economic cooperative relationship between these
countries, and economic development of the countries involved. The consequence is
that it has resulted in the loss of direction in their national development, and great
uncertainty in regional peace and stability. This is exactly the consequence of putting
minor national interest over fundamental national interest. Therefore, after a round
of gaming on the South China Sea, the parties involved should realize their
fundamental national interest is to guarantee their national economic development
and social stability and to further maintain regional peace and development.
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7. China’s seizure process of the South China Sea through the materialization of the 9
dotted line
Gen. (Rtd) Daniel Schaeffer
This year 2011 – 2012 has been witness of a new step and a further hardening of the
Chinese claim over the South China Sea according to the 9-dotted line. The last
incidents: stand off on Scarborough reef with Philippines, calls for bidding by CNOOC
to operate on nine blocks that are overlapping the Vietnamese EEZ, are made to
start building the materialization of the limits of the maritime area that China
considers as its sovereign maritime territory. More than for economical reasons, this
Chinese behaviour is resting on deep strategic reasons. That means that the situation
will continue festering in the near future through new Chinese initiatives. Are there
possible solutions to extract the whole area from that nightmare?
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PANEL 3
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
10. “You Kick Me Once, I Will Kick You Twice”: China’s New South China Sea Policy and
the Changing Domestic Context
Dr. Li Mingjiang
The past few years have been an eventful period for the South China Sea dispute,
which has always been a crucial issue for peace and stability in East Asia. As a result
of tensions and disputes in the South China Sea, the relations between China and
some ASEAN claimant countries have worsened and external major powers are
getting increasingly involved in the South China Sea issue.
Being the most powerful country and having engaged in three military conflicts in the
territorial dispute, China’s policy is critical in shaping the future developments of the
dispute and also the dynamics of regional security. This paper examines China’s new
policy in the South China Sea issue. Furthermore, this paper attempts to explore
changes in the domestic context in China regarding the South China Sea dispute. It
seeks to provide a comprehensive explanation of how various domestic factors have
helped shape China’s new policy in the South China Sea issue in the past few years. I
will discuss and analyze these domestic factors in the context of the upcoming
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leadership reshuffle and explore the possible impact on China’s policy in the South
China Sea dispute.
11. The Role of Mass Media and Public Opinion in Philippine Discourses on the South
China Sea
Prof. Aileen Baviera
Mass media can play a very important role in shaping how the public perceives any
question of public interest. In the Philippines, where most of the established media
organizations are privately owned and therefore profit-oriented, there has been a
need to balance between the goals of selling the news or increasing one’s ratings on
the one hand, and educating or raising awareness among the public on the other
hand. Traditionally, Philippine media has also played the role of a watchdog, taking
government to task for its perceived shortcomings and mistakes.
In the treatment of sensitive foreign policy questions such as the territorial and
maritime disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, mass
media can be instrumental either in educating the public so that they may develop
objective and informed opinion, or fuelling nationalist sentiment by demonizing the
adversary. Other than editorials, opinion columnists and journalists writing about the
disputes, government officials have had a critical role in providing media selective
information and key messages.
This exploratory study examines how selected major Philippine newspapers and
television networks have reported on the brewing tensions between Manila and
Beijing in the period 2011-2012. Specifically it looks at the questions: (1) How have
media fared in terms of helping educate the public on the facts surrounding the
disputes? (2) What are the key messages about Philippines and China’s positions on
the disputes? (3) What have been the public response and the range of opinion on
this issue? (4) To what extent and for what ends has the Philippine government-
employed media to shape public opinion or send messages?
For further interest, the role of Chinese media reporting in shaping Philippine
opinion will also be addressed.
12. Domestic Politics: the "Under-current" that decides the South China Sea
Mr. Nguyen Hung Son
The South China Sea was most often discussed at the state level, i.e. how states
interact and respond to one another's policies towards the South China Sea, given
their perceived national interests. At sub-state level, however, it could be argued
that there are equally rich dynamics that influence how countries behave on this
complex issue. The paper discusses critical domestic developments in some key
actors in the South China Sea, namely China, ASEAN (as an organisation), and
Vietnam, in order to shed some light on how these "under-currents" influence the
actors' policies in the South China Sea. The paper will look at the gradual shift of
visions and perceptions of the various groups in China on their identity and values in
the changing regional and international order, how that affected China's
understanding of "western" concepts like sovereignty in general and Chinese policies
in the South China Sea in particular. The paper will examine the struggle within
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ASEAN between national and group interests, between informality and
institutionalisation, and between economic and security interest in the process of
building the ASEAN Community in order to understand ASEAN's position on the
South China Sea. With regards to Vietnam, the paper will discuss the latest
developments on Vietnam's thinking on the regional and international outlook, her
strengthened self-identification as a key ASEAN member state, and efforts to
become a "normal citizen" of the global community to examine how these
developments have affected Vietnam's policies towards the South China Sea. It could
be drawn from the discussions that as the regional order is going through critical
changes with de-stabilizing effects on inter-state relations, sub-state level analysis
could be a fertile ground to seek explanations and solutions to issues in the South
China Sea.
PANEL 4
MILITARIZATION AND IMPLICATIONS
13. China’s Naval Modernization and U.S. Strategic Rebalancing: Implications for
Stability in the South China Sea
Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer
This paper examines whether or not China’s naval modernization and U.S. strategic
rebalancing in East Asia will lead to conflict in the South China Sea. This paper is
divided into six parts. Part 1 discusses China’s maritime objectives. Part 2 analyses
China’s force capability development with a specific focus on the East Sea Fleet and
the development of military infrastructure on Hainan Island and the Paracel and
Spratly islands. Part 3 discusses the U.S. strategy of rebalancing its military forces in
the Asia-Pacific. Part 4 focuses on specific U.S. initiatives with Southeast Asia’s
maritime states including the Philippines and Singapore. Part five offers a net
assessment of future force modernization trends and their impact on regional
stability. Part 6, the conclusion, evaluates the prospects for cooperation for regional
development by reviewing (a) China-U.S. bilateral strategic dialogues and (b) current
multilateral initiatives by the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus, ASEAN Maritime Forum and the East Asia Summit.
14. The Growth Of Chinese Military Power And Its Implications For Military
Modernization In Southeast Asia
Mr. Richard A. Bitzinger
As China emerges as a leading, modern military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the
countries of Southeast Asia are increasingly hedging against possible Chinese military
adventurism by rearming themselves. At the same time, China is hardly the only
reason for the ASEAN states’ current military modernization efforts. Other external
and internal factors – such as new regional security requirements, changing military
doctrines, lingering regional suspicions, domestic politics, and supply-side economics
in the international arms trade – have played much more important roles as drivers
of this process. Nevertheless, as China’s military presence in the South China Sea
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increases – coupled with a growing assertiveness on the part of Beijing to press its
claims in the region – any actual or potential “China threat” to Southeast Asia will
only grow as the principle driver behind regional military in Southeast Asia.
15. Anti-access/Area denial and the South China Sea
Mr. Christian Le Mière
Much of the confrontational activity in the South China Sea has been undertaken by
unarmed or lightly armed maritime paramilitary forces. There are various reasons
why this has been the case: a desire to avoid military escalation; an assertion or
demonstration of de facto sovereignty; and the less ambiguous legality of
paramilitary operations in disputed waters. However, the threat of coercion posed
by these maritime paramilitaries has been sharpened by rapid military expansion in
littoral states around the South China Sea.
One defining aspect of much regional military procurement has been in the realm of
anti-access/area denial capabilities. While a relatively new term, it is an old idea that
is being embraced by various navies through the purchase and development of
advanced submarines, anti-ship missiles and asymmetric naval capabilities. The
coincidence of these various purchases hints at the action-reaction dynamics now in
play among the regional countries, but also highlights the complex series of discrete
bilateral competitions that exist, for a variety of reasons. This undermines the theory
of a regional arms race but underlines the danger of military procurement
competition.
The effects of the A2AD development, though, have been to shift the defence
postures of a number of states and, perhaps most significantly, lead to a
development in US defence planning through the Joint Operational Access Concept
and Air-Sea Battle Concept. These concepts, in combination with the rebalance to
and within Asia, are driving a new dynamic of strategic competition between the US
(and its allies) and China, even while US forces are withdrawing from China’s near-
seas and affording the country more strategic space. The result is a series of mixed
messages that increase the possibility of miscalculation.
PANEL 5
INTERESTS AND POLICY OF THE EXTRA-REGIONAL PARTIES
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
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China Sea (SCS) comparing with those in the East China Sea. There are many similar
elements between the two seas while some important differences exist. So, first, I
will explain the problems we are facing in the ECS, discussing the similarities to and
differences from the situations in the SCS. I have to touch upon the conflicts
between Japan and Taiwan and China over Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao or Tiaoyu Tai
in China). It is to be done to provide the legal aspects as fairly as possible. By doing
so, the interests of Japan in the SCS can be well understood by concerned countries,
in particular those bordering the SCS. On the other hand Japan can consider well and
appropriately the problems in the ECS compared with those in the SCS.
Second, Japan has interests in the SCS as one of the major maritime states, indeed a
big marine power. Japan has crucial national interests in securing sea lines of
communication, marine resources, maritime security and establishing the ocean
governance. We cannot overlook the disputes in the SCS as if they have nothing to
do with Japan. This point of relevancy is another aspect of the interests of Japan in
the SCS.
2
Maritimes security issues in the ECS and the bordering waters include those involving
territorial claims, maritime delimitation, exploitation of seabed and fishery
resources, securing of sea lines of communication, navigation in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, the Taiwan Strait and power shift paradigm.
With regard to territorial issues, Japan and China, China and Korea, and Korea and
Japan have critical problems, in other words, disputes or conflicts. As a footnote
Japan has a territorial dispute with Russia also over the Northern Territories.
Taiwan and China have claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands ( Tiaoyu Tai or
Diaoyu Dao in China ) since 1970, over which Japan has continuously exercised its
effective control since more than a century ago. Korea is now controlling Takeshima (
Dokto in Korea ) to which Japan has claimed sovereignty since half a century ago.
Between Korea and China some rocks or reefs have caused territorial issues. These
territorial issues have recently become harsh and sensitive matters between the two
states.
Among Japan, China and Korea, delimitation of EEZ and continental shelves in ECS
has not yet been resolved except for some special arrangements. In 1974, Japan and
Korea concluded an agreement for joint development of continental shelf in an area
where the claims of both states overlap. In addition, Japan and Korea, and Japan and
China, reached agreements to set up provisional zones for joint fishery management
in the areas where the EEZ claims of the two respective states overlap. The Japan-
China agreement carefully avoided drawing any line or setting up a provisional zone
near the Senkaku Islands. More recently, in 2008, Japan and China reached an
“understanding” on joint development of oil and gas in the sea bed of the ECS.
However, no further progress has been made in the talks for more detailed
arrangements, while China has continued its gas exploitation in a field which is very
close to the median line of the EEZ of the two countries. Japan has yet to negotiate
on the delimitations of EEZs and continental shelves with 8 neighboring states.
The sea lines of communication in the ECS have faced sometimes difficulties with
missile tests and actions close to a blockade against North Korea. Activities
63
conducted by a non-coastal state’s military ships in an EEZ have brought tensions to
the coastal state. Taiwan Strait related issues and the power shift paradigm are also
realized as threats to the stability in the area.
3
Among Japanese interests in the SCS, securing sea lines of communication is not so
big an issue in a peace time if we can set aside the question of interpretation of
freedom of navigation. The interpretation itself, however, is a big issue if we think
about the activities of non-coastal state’s military ships in an EEZ and their freedom
of use of ocean. With regard to such military activities in the EEZ, a set of guidelines
or principles should be elaborated based upon the provisions and spirits of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Securing marine resources and
maritime security, and establishing the ocean governance are also critical matters for
maritime states.
Multilateral discussions to establish more effective rules on the various issues in the
SCS must be promoted and focused on not only by concerned countries bordering
the Sea but also by the non-coastal maritime states so that an appropriate and
effective ocean governance is formulated.
17. Flashpoint South China Sea: Policy options and Implications for India
Dr. Probal Ghosh
The South China seas region has emerged as one of the areas of intense global focus
with claims and counter claims put forward in an atmosphere of animosity and
mistrust . In a paradigm shift of sorts, the age-old Chinese dictum of hiding one’s
capabilities and strategically biding time for an opportune moment seems to have
been overturned giving way to aggressive posturing by the Chinese especially in the
South China seas. The Chinese claim about 80% of the Sea, has led to increasing
faceoffs and classical brinkmanship with countries contesting the claim. The growing
regional instability is in direct dissonance with India’s interest in the region as Delhi
seeks stability in the region and is keen to ensure the freedom of navigation and
SLOC movement through this trade busy route which sees the transportation of
nearly 50% of Indian trade in the region. Additionally ONGC Videsh has been
prospecting for energy in Vietnam’s EEZ after winning in international bidding
processes. Surprisingly an overlapping area has been offered internationally for
exploration by the Chinese (CNOOC) raising tensions in the region!
18. Policy of the Soviet Union/ Russia in Asia Pacific and in the conflict over the islands
of the South China Sea in the past and present
Prof. Dmitry Mosyakov
The role of the Soviet Union/ Russia in conflicts, occurring in Southeast Asia and the
Pacific, including the South China Sea over the past decades has changed quite
significantly. The Soviet Union has long acted as one of the main sponsors of the
communist guerrilla struggle, together with the PRC supported local communists.
After the Soviet - Chinese break, USSR became the military and political partner, and
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then the main political ally of Vietnam. The most striking example of this alliance and
the role played by the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, were the events associated
with the invasion of the Chinese troops to Vietnam, which began on February 17,
1979.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the new Russian state,
Russia was actually outside of the region, as invisible political and economic partner
of almost all key regional countries. The fact was that new people in the Kremlin had
no government experience and tried to build its foreign policy diametrically opposed
to the policy of the Soviet Union. They believed that Russia should go to Europe,
where will be the future of the country, and close relations with Viet Nam and
countries of Indochina considered that as purely ideological communists friendship,
which was to be discontinued.
Apparent return of Russia to Southeast Asia has caused quite frank irritation in
Beijing. Chinese authorities are closely monitoring the growing weight of Russian
participation, particularly for strengthening ties with Viet Nam and through it more
involvement in the situation in the South China Sea.
Russia is determined to continue its policy “turning to the East” and will play more
important role in international affairs in the Asia Pacific and in the South China Sea.
19. Sino-American Rivalry in the South China Sea: Time for the ROK to Project its
Middle-Power Role
Dr. Sukjoon Yoon
This is just the right moment for impartial outsiders to become involved in the
management of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). To be
effective, legal and systematic mechanisms are required; ideally through the
establishment of a middle-power league, in which the Republic of Korea (ROK) is very
well placed to play a leading role. Within the foreseeable future, such concepts and
structures can make a useful contribution to alleviating the current tension in the
SCS which has recently generated much Sino-American rivalry. In particular, the
Korean perspective on the SCS issues will be central in establishing the necessary
management mechanisms to stop the situation worsening and to work toward
lasting solutions. Only with a more cooperative and cohesive approach, mediated
through the influence of the middle-power nations of the region, is there any
realistic prospect of success. Several issues are addressed: the East Asian view on
Sino-American competition, especially in the SCS; how the concept of states
cooperating in a middle-power league can improve the existing situation; and the
significance of the ROK as a role-model, with its strong support of major regional
institutions and the prevailing Asian values and norms, from which it has benefited
through regional peace and stability. There is some space available to move toward
peaceful solutions based around legal frameworks; so the ROK can contribute in this
way to help deter the parties from resorting to more destructive political or military
means. Some specific suggestions are offered: First, the US Senate should ratify the
United Nations Convention Law of Sea. Second, China should moderate its assertive
stance. Third, the region should recognize the importance of middle-power nations,
leading ultimately to the formulation of a middle-power league to promote bilateral
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and multilateral cooperation. Fourth, a new “code of cooperation” is needed in the
SCS to mitigate the deficits in trust, to avoid contamination from Sino-American
rivalry, and to bridge disparities and differences among the nations of the region.
Such a code of cooperation, by encouraging a “trust-building strategy”, would do
much to lessen the current East Asian pessimism. This paper concludes that the
successful creation of a regional middle-power league would be a significant step
toward the establishment of more stable and enduring regional regulatory norms;
and that the ROK can and should work toward this end.
PANEL 6
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IN US - ASEAN - CHINA RELATIONS
21. ASEAN, China, the US and the South China Sea: Opportunities for Cooperation
Mr. Termsak Chalermpalanupap
From the ASEAN perspective as a promoter of dialogue and cooperation, the South
China Sea provides good opportunities for China and the U.S. to cooperate with
ASEAN in maintaining peace, stability and security. The most important cooperation
is in ensuring non-use of threat or use of force, and in settling disputes in the South
China Sea by concerned claimant States through peaceful means. China and ASEAN
have written commitments on these principles. China and the four claimant States in
ASEAN are also legally bound under the TAC not to use force, and to settle their
differences or disputes by peaceful means. Maritime security is a broad area for
ASEAN, China and the U.S. to engage in dialogue and cooperation. Doing so needs
not necessarily mean “internationalizing” any South China Sea disputes. ASEAN has
been pursuing dialogue and cooperation on maritime security through ASEAN+1 with
China and with the U.S., ASEAN Plus Three, the ARF, the ADMM-Plus, the EAS, and
the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum. However, there is an urgent need to reach a
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common understanding on how to peacefully and safely exercise the freedom of
navigation, especially in the disputed areas in the South China Sea and when it
involves freedom of foreign warships undertaking military activities. One additional
area of cooperation that can indirectly contribute to confidence building in the South
China Sea is in the support of China and the U.S. for ASEAN’s Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone.
23. China, ASEAN and the US in the South China Sea: Rebalancing the Triangle
Dr. Tran Truong Thuy
China, ASEAN and the US remain the most significant players in the South China Sea.
Relationships among the triangle set the tone for the situation in the South China
Sea. In recent years, action-reaction cycle in the South China Sea has increased
tension in the region, deteriorated relations between China and its neighboring
countries, posed challenges for ASEAN in maintaining centrality in the regional
security structure, and strengthened US determination to “rebalance” toward Asia.
The South China Sea issue has become the bellwether for how China will rise
peacefully and play by established rules, a test case for the US in sustaining its
supremacy in the region and a challenger for ASEAN unity. This paper will explore the
interests and policy of China, ASEAN and the US in the South China Sea, analyze the
interrelationships within the triangle in recent years and envisage its implications for
regional stability.
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PANEL 7
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUES
24. The “Duty” to Cooperate for States Bordering Enclosed or Semi-enclosed Seas.
Prof. Erik Franckx & Marco Benatar
The focal point of our inquiry is Article 123 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (hereinafter 1982 Convention) concerning cooperation amongst
states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. An often-encountered submission
in the specialized literature is the so-called duty to cooperate for states bordering
such seas. In the specific context of the South China Sea, as defined in the
nomenclature given to this area by the International Hydro graphic Organization, this
submission is of special importance because all states bordering the area, with the
exception of Taiwan which is excluded from doing so, are a party to this convention
and consequently each and every one of them is legally bound by Article 123. A
closer reading of the provision, however, casts doubt about the correctness of the
assumption that Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Viet Nam are today under a legal obligation to cooperate with one another. Leaving
aside for a moment the present-day tensions in the region, which seem to call into
question the validity of this claim in practice, the present paper first intends to assess
whether these states incur such a legal obligation on the basis of Art.123 of the 1982
Convention. Having come to a negative conclusion, we will subsequently investigate
whether international law imposes other cooperative obligations on states that find
application in the South China Sea context. The duties to cooperate incumbent upon
the aforementioned coastal states emanate from diverse legal fields, for instance
environmental law and the international legal rules applicable to marine living
resources and marine scientific research, and have reached different stages of
development. Not being strictly tied to countries surrounding enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas, it nevertheless seems logical that the raison d’être of these
requirements of contemporary international law will find an a fortiori application in
the constricted marine areas of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Our conclusion is
that, although a number of obligations to cooperate certainly apply to the South
China Sea states, the much acclaimed legal source of collaboration, Art. 123, is
unfounded if one is looking for legal obligations incumbent on coastal states
surrounding enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.
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26. Rights and Jurisdiction over Resources in the South China Sea: the Significance of
the Status of Geographic Features
Assoc. Prof. Robert Beckman
The status of the various offshore geographic features in the South China Sea is very
important in determining rights and jurisdiction over resources in the South China
Sea. The paper will first discuss the principle that “the land dominates the sea” and
that maritime zones can only be claimed from land territory or islands. It will then
examine the definition of an “island” in article 121 and the maritime zones that can
generally be claimed from islands. It will then discuss the difficulties in interpreting
the phrase “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own”, and significance of this phrase to claims to rights and jurisdiction over
resources. It will then discuss the significance of low-tide elevations, reefs, artificial
islands and submerged features to the claims to maritime zones. Finally, it will
discuss the rules on baselines, which apply to the various geographic features and
the significance of baselines in determining maritime zones. Finally, it will examine
how international courts and arbitral tribunals have dealt with small offshore islands
and low-tide elevations when delimiting maritime boundaries between opposite or
adjacent States.
27. Deciding Sovereignty Disputes: Ownership Claims Over “Land Features” In South
China Sea
Capt. (N) Azhari Abdul Aziz
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea have long been seen as a national and
regional security problem. By themselves, they are not serious enough reasons for
states to go to war with each other. They are, nevertheless, a source of insecurity in
the region, especially for the smaller claimant countries. The strategic significance of
the disputes has been raised by the fact that rising China is a major claimant. Its
behaviour is viewed as a gauge of how a strong China may behave in the future. In a
legal dispute concerning the status of an island or sub-aerial features the question
first to be determine is who owns or held sovereign over the island. Secondly, should
the island be entitled to generate continental shelves and exclusive economic zone
and finally, what effect should they have on maritime boundaries delimitations
between adjacent and opposite States. This paper discusses the jurisprudence
developed over eight decades as to the guiding principles on sovereignty over “land
features” in South China Sea especially Malaysia’s contribution to this jurisprudence
by way of the two cases to the International Court of Justice namely the Sipadan-
Ligitan case (2002) and Pedra Branca (2008). This paper seeks to share the
experience that it is less important on how or on what basis ownership over the
island is claimed. Rather, it is more crucial for States to demonstrate that it has
effective control over the island and has peacefully and continuously exercised
sovereignty in form of positive affirmation, be it in the form of administrative,
regulatory and judicial acts over the island over a period of time or commonly known
now as effectivity.
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28. Why was “historical rights” historicized by UNCLOS?
Dr. Nguyen Thi Lan Anh
Ocean accounts for approximately 2/3 of the earth's surface and since ancient time,
residents of many coastal states had made use of the vast ocean surface for
navigation and fisheries. In order to preserve these traditional activities and
maximize national interests at sea, some countries, including those in the South
China Sea, have used historical rights to expand their maritime claims. From the
handful state practices and cases law concerning historic rights, it can be concluded
that historical rights were only established under strict requirements of long-lasting
practices of coastal states and the recognition of others. It is also noted that under
such strict conditions, historical rights have only been limited to fishing rights. Along
with the development of the international law of the sea, historic rights have now
been well replaced by the sovereign and jurisdictional rights of the coastal State in
the exclusive economic zones. Hence, the claim based on historical rights covering
more than 80% of the area of the South China Sea which is not based on any legal
basis, not received recognition from other states and overlapping with the exclusive
economic zones of other littoral states goes against international law.
PANEL 8
COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD
29. The South China Sea Imbroglio: Looking Backward, Looking Forward
Dr. Mark J. Valencia
This ‘clash of the titans’ is not a new phenomenon. In classic realist theory,
established powers strive to preserve the status quo that assures their position at
the top of the hierarchy and view emerging powers as potential threats. Rising
powers feel constrained by the status quo and naturally strive to stretch the sinews
of the international system. They fear that the dominant power will try to snuff them
out before they become an existential threat. Thucydides described this ‘natural’
process regarding Athens and Sparta as a combination of ‘rise’ and fear - which
inevitably leads to war. Today this is known as the ‘Thucydides trap.’ Can China and
the U.S. escape it? Or will China behave like the U.S. during its ‘rise’? In the twentieth
century there have been many instances in which the U.S. intervened militarily to
alter political conditions in its favor—in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan and
more than 25 other independent states It is therefore quite, ‘normal’ and it is to be
expected that as China rises it will want --and try-- to do the same.
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30. The South China Sea: Ten Myths and Ten Realities
Amb. Rodolfo C. Severino
All too often, the public discourse on the conflicting claims to territorial sovereignty
and maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea renders an already complex subject
even more complicated. The mass media and some academic commentators, who
should know better, help this trend along by perpetuating, in the face of the facts
and realities, certain myths related to the disputes. Some of these myths reflect
nationalist sentiments in their purveyors’ respective countries, expressed in public
demonstrations and in traditional and non-traditional channels of communication.
Indeed, some of them may have their roots in nationalist motivations.
32. Joint Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources in the South China Sea:
Existing Institutions, State Practices, and Past Proposals for Cooperation
Prof. Yann-huei Song
This paper studies the possibility of setting up a regional organization in charge of
managing and conserving fisheries resources in the South China Sea as a way to
promote maritime cooperation and help manage potential conflicts in the area. It
begins with a general discussion of current status of fish stocks and fishing activities
in the South China Sea in Part I. This is followed by an explanation for the need to
jointly manage and conserve fisheries resources in the South China Sea in Part II. The
third part of the paper examines the legal and political bases for pursuing maritime
cooperation in the South China Sea. Part IV reviews the existing state and regional
practices in relation to joint conservation and management of fisheries resources in
the South China Sea. Part V looks into the proposals that are related to the idea of
establishing a regional fishery management organization, fisheries cooperative
institutions, or joint fisheries conservation and management mechanism to help
manage conflicts in the South China Sea. The possibility for and obstacles to the idea
of setting up such a joint fishery conservation and management organization are
discussed in Part VI.
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PANEL 9
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
AND WAYS TO RESOLUTION
34. Beijing as an Emerging Power in the South China Sea: Issues for the U.S. and
ASEAN.
Dr. Richard P. Cronin
China’s rise and its ambitions to make up for past centuries of humiliation and
become the dominant power in East and Southeast Asia is unavoidably the most
important geostrategic issue facing the United States in the 21 st Century. The South
China Sea has globally important fisheries and undersea oil and gas deposits which
are still largely unexplored but are already vital to the energy needs and economies
of five other coastal and archipelagic neighbours—Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Brunei and the Philippines.
For the United States as well as China’s neighbours in ASEAN, the most challenging
aspect of its rise is a lack of commitment to a rules-based international system
except as it serves its perceived national interests. Of particular concern to the
United States, which maintains a significant military presence in the region, is the
fact that China is seeking to redefine the very definition of international waters by to
asserting rights of sovereignty where none exist. The U.S. also has a strong interest in
regional peace and stability and a “rules-based” international system.
Although the United States has long stated that it takes no position on the conflicting
claims, Beijing has interpreted statements by US officials in support of UNCLOS
principles for determining maritime territorial claims, calls for restraint by all parties,
and recent naval exercises with the Vietnamese and Philippines navies as
unmistakably “taking sides.”
The actual resolution or cooperative management of the South China maritime
disputes is a long term proposition. For the near term, the United States can best
contribute to peace and multilateral cooperation for sustainable resources
management and development by maintaining the wherewithal to carry out a
carefully modulated policy of insisting on US maritime rights, supporting multilateral
regional institutions – especially ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – and
pursuing positive engagement with both China and its neighbours.
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35. Cooperation in the South China Sea: from Dispute Management to Ocean
Governance.
Mr. Nguyen Dang Thang
The South China Sea has long been of interest to scholars of international law and
international relations. But attention has been paid almost exclusively to the
simmering territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While this is justified by the
concern that such disputes pose a threat to regional peace and stability, that the
management of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea dominates existing
literature may belie the fact that the South China Sea is a large semi-enclosed sea
and boasts crucial sea lines of communication. This paper canvasses for a more
comprehensive approach to cooperation in the South China Sea through the prism of
ocean governance. In this vein, the management of territorial disputes is but an
important element of cooperation in the South China Sea.
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INDEX I: INFORMATION ABOUT VIETNAM
Climate
Viet Nam has a tropical climate with lots of sunshine, high rainfall and high humidity.
There are two distinguished seasons in general: the winter or dry season from
November to April and the summer or wet one from May to October. Annual
average temperature is usually high and ranging from 210C to 280C (69.80F to 84.20F).
However, this may varies from the North to the South of Vietnam.
Currency
The currency is the Vietnamese Dong (VND). Foreign currencies can be exchanged at
the banks, exchange bureaus or hotel reception desks. Travellers’ cheque and most
of Credit Cards are widely accepted in major cities.
Time
Time zone: GMT/UTC + 7.
Business days: Monday to Friday.
Business hours: Mornings: 08.00 – 12.00; Afternoon: 13.00 – 17.00.
Public Holidays
January 01: New Year’s Day.
Late January to mid – February: Vietnamese Lunar New Year (04 days off).
April 30: Re-unification Day.
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May 01: International Workers’ Day.
September 02: National Day.
Emergency numbers
Police: 113.
Fire Brigade: 114.
First Aid: 115.
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HO CHI MINH CITY
Overview
Ho Chi Minh City, previously named
Sai Gon, is largest city of Viet Nam in
term of metropolitan area. It is also
the most populous city in the country
with a population of nearly 7.4 million
in 2010.
HCMC is the biggest centre for finance
and economics in Vietnam.
History
Founded during the years of 1623 to
1698, with thousands of Vietnamese
families migrated from the Centre (the
Inner Section) and the North (the
Outer Section) to settle in the plains of
the Dong Nai and the Mekong rivers,
Saigon was already booming with
agricultural production, trading
businesses, and handicrafts. Conquered by France in 1859, the city was influenced by the
French during their colonial occupation of Vietnam. It was the capital of the State of Viet
Nam in 1949. At the end of the Viet Nam War on 30 April 1975, the city came under control
of the Vietnamese People’s Army and was later renamed Ho Chi Minh City in 1976.
Climate
The year is divided into 2 distinct seasons – the wet and the dry seasons. The wet season,
which comes with lots of rain lasts from May to November, while the other season, the dry
one, starts in December and ends in April. The average temperature is 28 oC (82oF).
Places of Interest
- Independence Palace, War Remnants Museum.
- Municipal Theatre, Notre – Dame Cathedral.
- Ben Thanh Market, Diamond Plaza, Bitexco Financial Tower, etc.
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INDEX II: ORGANISING INSTITUTIONS
Human Resources
The Academy has 211 researchers, faculty members and staff and is expected to have 350
personnel when it is in full service. The majority of researchers and faculty members hold
master or doctor degrees and has received overseas training. Among them are 11 associate
professors, 19 doctors, 59 masters currently lecturing and conducting research in
international politics, international law, international economics, foreign languages, and
media and cross-culture communication.
Training
The Academy offers training at undergraduate and graduate levels in international relations,
international law, international economics, foreign languages, and media and cross-culture
communication. Each year, the Academy takes in 60 graduate and 450 undergraduate
students in six disciplines of International Relations, International Law, International
Economics, International Communication, English and French; 100 college students and 150
on-the-job students. Different training units form an establishment similar to a university
with its own faculties and departments.
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The Academy has cooperated with overseas universities to offer joint courses, invited
foreign trainers to teach foreign languages and European studies and US foreign policies etc.
By 2010, the Academy has trained 5000 students for 37 formal university enrolments, 2500
students in 23 secondary enrolments, 369 students in 10 master enrolments and 10
students in 1 doctor enrolment. It has also held 12 on-the-job and 5 second-degree training
enrolments.
Research
The Academy carries out strategic research and forecasts on world affairs, international
relations, political and economic affairs, security, national defense, law, culture and foreign
policies of different nations and regions. The Academy serves as “Think Tank” for the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Party and the State in foreign policies as well as history and
theories of international relations.
Besides, it serves as the coordinator in the management of research projects of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. It has carried out 250 studies in international relations at both state and
grassroots levels. In the organizational set up of the Academy, the Institute for Foreign
Policy and Strategic Studies is an affiliate of the Academy and has three centers, namely the
Center for Political and Security Studies, the Centre for Development and Economic
Integration and the Centre for Regional and Foreign Policy Studies.
On September 1st, 2012, the Centre for East Sea Studies, originally belonged to the Institute
for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, was upgraded to the Institute for East Sea Studies.
The institute has four centers: Center for Policy Studies, Center for External Cooperation,
Center for Legal Studies and Center for Information and Documentation.
International Cooperation
The Academy is an active member of many regional and world research networks such as
ASEAN-ISIS, NEAS, NEAT, and CSCAP etc. Researchers and faculty members of the Academy
regularly attend international colloquiums, seminars and conferences held overseas. Every
year, the Academy hosts 60 groups of scholars, international politicians for 60 international
seminars. The Department of External Cooperation within the Office of Administration of
the Academy acts as the focal point for all cooperation in training, academic research and
scholar exchange with overseas universities, academies, institutes, research centers,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
In-service training
The Centre for Continuing Education carries out training and convenes refreshment courses
in international relations, foreign policy, diplomatic studies and foreign languages for mid-
level officials, public servants and employees in the diplomatic service as well as other
officials engaged in diplomatic activities from various ministries, agencies and localities.
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information resources for use in Viet Nam and overseas. It has at its disposal 35.000 books
and document titles in service of teaching and research of the Academy and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
MISSIONS
Decision 82/QD-TTg dated June 23, 2008 by the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam defined the status and functions, duties and powers of the Diplomatic Academy of
Vietnam as follows:
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foreign service, officials working at external relations departments of different
ministries and localities; carrying out examination in professional diplomatic
skills, foreign languages of relevant officials in accordance with regulations and
assigned authority;
c) Undertake joint training at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, cooperative
mid-career training in professional diplomatic training and foreign language
studies with local or foreign institutes and organizations.
3. Edit and publish scientific works, studies, textbooks, teaching materials and other
publications on external affairs, diplomatic history of Viet Nam and the world,
international relations and other related fields.
4. Participate in the dissemination of foreign policies and lines of the State.
5. Manage officials, employees, facilities of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in
accordance with provisions of the law and decentralization of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
6. Perform other duties as assigned or authorized by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
CONTACTS
DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY OF VIETNAM
Address: 69 Chua Lang Street,
Dong Da, Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Telephone number: (84-4) 3834 4540
Fax number: (84-4) 3834 3543
Email: bbtwebsite_dav@mofa.gov.vn
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THE VIETNAM LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION
In accordance with the Viet Nam Communist Party’s guidelines and policies on enhancing
the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association’s role and activities as well as the Decree No 88/2003/ND-
CP, in its Congress in 2004, the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association passed its new Statutes which
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then was approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Decision No. 37/2004/AD-BNV
of 19 May 2004. The Statutes clearly identifies the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association as a
professional socio – political organization. This legal status shall create favorable conditions
for the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association to facilitate its activities and enhance its role. As a
professional socio – political organization, the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association can widely
unties and gathers many Vietnamese lawyers who work in different fields, in the offices of
the State and social organizations as well as from different sectors of the economy. Scope of
activities and the roles of the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, therefore, shall be legally
broadened.
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31,000 to 36,000 members who work in legal field such as judges, prosecutors, policemen,
legal experts and lawyers.
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