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Credit Suisse Global Investment Yearbook Feb 2012
Credit Suisse Global Investment Yearbook Feb 2012
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CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 5
With international efforts to avert recession, fears have grown about the brunt of
monetary policy and debt overhang. Sentiment fluctuates between deflationary
concerns and inflationary fears, and the demand for safe-haven assets has
surged. This article examines the dynamics and impact of inflation, and investi-
gates how equities and bonds have performed under different inflationary condi-
tions. We search for hedges against inflation and deflation, and draw a compari-
son with other assets that may provide protection against changes in the real
value of money.
Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, London Business School
As 2012 dawned, inflation-linked bonds issued by fall in the general price level, so that the real value
Britain, the USA, Canada and several other low-risk of money rises. For those who are worried about
sovereigns sold at a real yield that was negative or this scenario ȍ perhaps a replay of the Japanese
at best less than 1%. Investors had become so experience over the last two decades ȍ which
keen on safe-haven securities that they had bid investments might offer some protection against
low-risk bonds up to a level at which their real the turbulence of deflation?
return was close to zero. We examine how equities and bonds have per-
formed under different inflation regimes over 112
Inflation and deflation years and in 19 different countries. We investigate
the extent to which excessively low or high rates of
Inflation refers to a rise in the general price level, so inflation are harmful. We ask whether equities
that the real value of money ȍ its purchasing power should now be regarded as under threat from infla-
ȍ falls. In the recent global turmoil, investors have tion, or whether they are a hedge against inflation.
asked whether unconventional monetary policy and We compare equities and bonds with gold, prop-
attempts at solving the euro crisis might create erty, and housing as potential providers of more
inflationary pressures. At the same time, there is stable real returns.
the worry that some emerging markets will experi- We conclude that while equities may offer limited
ence overheating, with the accompanying danger of protection against inflation, they are most influ-
inflation. If inflation is the primary concern, which enced by other sources of volatility. Second, bonds
assets can provide some expectation of a favorable have a special role as a hedge against deflation.
real return, even in inflationary times? Third, commercial real estate has been a somewhat
Yet, in an economic environment that may be disappointing hedge, inferior to domestic housing.
worse than anything the developed world has seen Last, we note that inflation-hedging strategies can
since the 1930s, investors are also asking whether be unreliable out of sample.
an extended recession might lead to depression
and deflation in major markets. Deflation refers to a
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 6
Today and yesterday 1920s. By the end of 1920, the price level had
risen to 2.64 from its start-1900 level of 1.0. Dur-
Investors care about what the dollars they earn ing the subsequent deflation, the price level fell to
from an investment will buy. Figure 1 gives a dec- 1.78 in 1933, a third lower than in 1920, and it
ade-by-decade snapshot of US price levels. It then took until 1947 for prices to rise back to their
shows that a dollar in 1900 had the same purchas- end-1920 level.
ing power as USD 26.3 today. The bars portray the Was the US deflation of the early 20th century
corresponding decline in purchasing power: one an anomaly in economic history? As noted by
dollar today represents the same real value as 3.8 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the long-term histori-
cents in 1900. cal record, spanning multiple centuries, is in fact
The chart also shows that there were periods of one of inflation alternating with deflation, but with
deflation, with purchasing power rising during the no more than a slight inflationary bias until the 20th
century.
Figure 1
In Figure 2, we display annual changes in British
price levels since 1265. While pre-1900 inflation
Consumer price inflation in the United States, 1900–2012 indexes are admittedly poor in quality and narrow in
coverage, Britain’s comparatively low long-term
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists; authors’ updates rate of inflation, punctuated with deflations, re-
minds us that sustained high rates of inflation are
US cents US price level
largely a 20th century phenomenon. Towards the
100 26.3 right of the chart, note the frequency of upward
100
91
25 (inflationary) and absence of downward (deflation-
25.2
ary) observations for the United Kingdom. Sus-
80 20
tained price increases were not prevalent until the
19.6 1900s.
61
60
14.7
15 Around the world
50
45
36 For each of the 19 Yearbook countries, Figure 3
40 10
29 9.0 displays annualized inflation rates over
23 1900−2011. Annual inflation hit a maximum of
20
2.8 3.4
11.2
5 361% in Japan (1946), 344% in Italy (1944);
2.2 2.0 1.6 4.4
1.0 1.1 6.8 5.1 4.0 3.8 241% in Finland (1918), and 65% in France
0 0
(1946). For display purposes, the chart omits
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012 1922−23 for Germany, where annual inflation
reached 209 billion percent (1923), and where
Purchasing power in cents of an investment in 1900 of 1 USD Rising prices in the USA
monthly inflation reached 30 thousand percent
(October 1923).
Hyperinflations are often defined as a price-level
Figure 2 increase of at least 50% in a month. Mostly, they
occurred during the monetary chaos that followed
Annual inflation rates in the United Kingdom, 1265–2011 the two world wars and the collapse of commu-
Source: Officer and Williamson (2011)
nism. Looking beyond the Yearbook countries,
Hanke and Kwok (2009) report that monthly infla-
Rate of inflation (%)
tion peaked in Yugoslavia at 313 million per-cent
(January 1994), in Zimbabwe at 80 billion percent
(November 2008), and in Hungary at 42 quintillion
percent (July 1946). Prior to the 20th century,
40
there was one hyperinflation; during the 20th cen-
tury there were 28; and in the 21st century, just
one (Zimbabwe).
20
Apart from a few exceptional episodes, inflation
rates were not high in the 19 Yearbook countries.
The median annual inflation rate across all countries
0 and all years was just 2.8%, and the mean (ex-
Germany 1922–23) was 5.3%. Nevertheless, in
one quarter of all observations, the inflation rate
-20 was at least 6.4%, and during 22 individual years
(1915–20, 1940–42, 1951, and 1972–83) a
majority of the 19 economies experienced inflation
-40 of at least 6.4%. More details on inflation in our 19
1265 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 nations are included in the 2012 Sourcebook.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 7
10.8
10.3
High and accelerating rates of inflation are typically
10 9.0 20
associated with poor conditions in the real econ- 7.8
omy, and jumps in inflation are likely to have an 15
6.0
adverse impact on stock market investments. Disin- 5.6 5.2 5.7 12
4.5
flation − a slowdown in the inflation rate during 5 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.2 9
10
3.0 3.1 3.1 7 7 7
2.4 7 7
which inflation declined to lower levels − has 5 5 5 5 5
5
6 7
tended to coincide with favorable economic growth. 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.8 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.9 7.2 7.3 8.4
But while disinflation after a previous period of high 0 0
Swi Net US Can Swe Nor NZ Aus Den UK Ire Ger SAf Bel Spa Jap Fra Fin Ita
inflation is a good thing, deflationary conditions – in
which the level of consumer prices falls – are asso- Arithmetic mean (LHS, %) Geometric mean (LHS, %) Standard deviation (RHS, %)
P hi
Ta i
N ig
S vl n
Le b
Ve n
Ec u
Ic e
Ma u
Hu n
In d
I re
Tu n
Mor
Bra
Pa k
Sp a
It a
Th a
Oma
Es t
La t
B ot
N et
Qat
Ne w
K uw
Ru s
Mly s
Au s
Me x
Egy
Lu x
CdI
US
C ol
S ri
Tri
Bel
Ma l
Sw i
Zim
Ro m
Ja m
Nam
Ar g
C ro
B an
Ind o
Ke n
Ira n
Cze
Sau
G re
C hn
Sin
Ba h
J ap
Hon
So u
Fin
Cyp
De n
Sw e
Ca n
U kr
Pe r
Isr
Tu r
Po r
K or
Jo r
No r
Ge r
G ha
Slvk
Fra
Lit
Au t
UK
Highest annual inflation 1970–2011 (LHS) Lowest annual deflation 1970–2011 (RHS)
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 8
Investors do not like to be exposed to volatility, tenth of historical outcomes, to most investors such
and the persistence of volatility makes this all the acute scenarios seem exceptionally improbable in
more undesirable. As we show later, they can the foreseeable future. However, the extremes of
therefore be expected to pay less for securities at history do help us to understand how financial
times of high inflation, which should enhance the assets have responded to large shifts in the general
rewards from investing undertaken at such times. level of prices.
In the 2011 edition of the Yearbook, we showed
that, though risky, buying bonds after years of Returns in differing conditions
extreme realized rates of inflation was in fact re-
warded by higher long-run real rates of return. The bars in Figure 5 are the average real returns
Chapter 2 of this year’s publication reveals a similar on bonds and on equities in each of these groups.
pattern in relation to investing after a period of For example, the first bar indicates that, during
currency turmoil. years in which a country suffered deflation more
To gain insight into the impact of inflation, in extreme than ȍ3.5%, the real return on bonds
Figure 5 we study the full range of 19 countries for averaged +20.2%. All returns include reinvested
which we have a complete 112-year investment income and are adjusted for local inflation.
history. We compare investment returns with infla- As one would expect, and as documented in
tion in the same year. last year’s Yearbook, the average real return from
Out of 2,128 country-year observations, we bonds varies inversely with contemporaneous
identify those with the lowest 5% of inflation rates inflation. In fact, in the lowest 1% of years in our
(that is, with very marked deflation), the next lowest sample, when deflation was between –26% and
15% (which experienced limited deflation or stable ȍ11.8%, bonds provided an average real return of
prices), the next 15% (which had inflation of up to +36% (not shown in the chart). Needless to say,
1.9%), and the following 15%; these four groups in periods of high inflation, real bond returns were
represent half of our observations, all of which particularly poor. As an asset class, bonds suffer
experienced inflation of 2.8% or less. in inflation, but they provide a hedge against de-
At the other extreme, we identify the country- flation.
year observations with the top 5% of inflation rates, During marked deflation (in the chart, rates of
the next highest 15% (which still experienced infla- deflation more extreme than –3.5%), equities
tion above 8%), the next 15% (which had rates of gave a real return of 11.2%, dramatically under-
inflation of 4.5%ȍ8%), and the remaining 15%; performing the real return on bonds of 20.2%
these four groups represent the other half of our (see the left of Figure 5). Over all other intervals
observations, all of which experienced inflation portrayed in the chart, equities gave a higher real
above 2.8%. In Figure 5, we plot the lowest infla- return than bonds, averaging a premium relative to
tion rate of each group as a light blue square. bonds of more than 5%. During marked inflation,
Note that in 5% of cases, deflation was more equities gave a real return of ȍ12.0%, dramati-
severe than ȍ3.5% and in 5% of cases inflation cally outperforming the bond return of ȍ23.2%
exceeded +18.3%. Although they represent a (see the right of the chart). Though harmed by
inflation, equities were resilient compared to
Figure 5 bonds.
Perhaps surprisingly, during severe deflation
Real bond and equity returns vs. inflation rates, 1900–2011 real equity returns were only a little lower than at
times of slight deflation or stable prices. The ex-
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton
planation lies in the clustering of dates in the tails
of the distribution of inflation. Of the 1% of years
Rate of return/inflation (%) that were the most deflationary, all but three oc-
20 curred in 1921 or 1922. In those observations,
18
20.2 the average equity return was ȍ2% nominal,
equating to +19% real. Omitting those ultra-
10 11.9
11.2 11.4 10.8 8 .0 deflationary years from the lowest 5% of observa-
6.8
5.2
7.0
2.9
4.5
5.2
tions, the real equity return during serious defla-
3.4 1.9 2.8
0 0.6 1.8 tion would have averaged +9%.
-4.6
-3.5
Overall, it is clear that equities performed espe-
-10 -12.0 cially well in real terms when inflation ran at a low
level. High inflation impaired real equity perform-
ance, and deflation was associated with deep
-20 -23.2 disappointment compared to government bonds.
-2 6 Historically, when inflation has been low, the
-30 average realized real equity returns have been
Low 5% Next 15% Next 15% Next 15% Next 15% Next 15% Next 15% Top 5% high, greater than on government bonds, and very
Percentiles of inflation across 2128 country-years
similar across the different low inflation groupings
Rea l bond returns (%) Real equity returns (%) Inflat io n rate of at least (%)
shown in Figure 5.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 9
Inflation-beating versus inflation-hedging been a leap in inflation equities have performed less
well in real terms. These sharp jumps in inflation are
We draw a distinction between an inflation-beating dangerous for investors.
strategy and an inflation-hedging strategy. The To provide a perspective on the negative relation
former is a strategy which achieved (or, depending between inflation and stock prices, Figure 6 shows
on the context, is expected to achieve) a return in the annual inflation rate for the United States ac-
excess of inflation. This superior performance may companied by the real capital value of the US eq-
be a reward for exposure to risk that has little or uity index from 1900 to date. Inflationary conditions
nothing to do with inflation. were associated with relatively low stock prices
An inflation-hedging strategy is one that provides during World War I and World War II and their af-
higher nominal returns when inflation is high. Con- termaths, and the 1970s energy crisis. The decline
ditional on high inflation, the realized nominal re- in inflation during the 1990s coincided with a sharp
turns of an inflation-hedging strategy should be rise in the real equity index. Nevertheless, the cor-
larger than in periods during which inflation runs at relation between the series is only mildly negative
a more moderate level. However, the long-run and so this relationship must be interpreted with
performance of an inflation-hedging strategy may caution.
nevertheless be low.
The distinction is between a high ex-post return Equities and inflation
and a high ex-ante correlation between nominal
returns and inflation. This difference is often mis- There is in fact an extensive literature which indi-
understood. For example, it is widely believed that cates that equities are not particularly good inflation
common stocks must be a good hedge against hedges. Fama and Schwert (1977), Fama (1981),
inflation to the extent that they have had long-run and Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) are three
returns that were ahead of inflation. But their high classic papers, and Tatom (2011) is a useful review
ex-post return is better explained as a large equity article. The negative correlation between inflation
risk premium. The magnitude of the equity risk and stock prices is cited by Tatom as one of the
premium tells us nothing about the correlation most commonly accepted empirical facts in financial
between equity returns and inflation. and monetary economics.
On the other hand, gold might be proposed as a Figure 7 is an example of the underlying rela-
hedge against inflation, insofar as it is believed to tionship between the equity market and contempo-
appreciate when inflation is rampant. Yet, as we raneous inflation. The chart pools all 19 countries
shall see, gold has given a far lower long-term and all 112 years in one scatterplot (omitting from
return than equities, and for that reason it is unlikely the chart a handful of observations that are too
that institutions seeking a worthwhile long-term real extreme to plot). Charts for bonds and variations
return will invest heavily in gold. based on other investment horizons are omitted to
conserve space.
Inflation hedging
entire 112 years, however, the annualized real that should be initiated because of a new concern
return on gold (1.07% from a GBP perspective) about inflation risk.
was of a similar magnitude to the capital apprecia- An appropriate role for commercial property in an
tion ȍ excluding dividend income ȍ achieved by institutional portfolio is as a diversifier and source of
equity markets around the world. returns, forming part of the core long-term holdings
Gold is the only asset that does not have its of the investor. It is not possible for smaller institu-
real value reduced by inflation (see Table 1). It has tions to gain exposure through direct investment to
a potential role in the portfolio of a risk-averse the diversified portfolio represented by a property
investor concerned about inflation. However, this index. While direct investment in this asset class is
asset does not provide an income flow and has impractical for smaller investors, there are opportu-
generated low real returns over the long term. nities for participating through pooled vehicles.
Gold can fail to provide a positive real return over
extended periods. Holdings in gold should there- Housing
fore reflect the risk appetite and tastes of the
investor. Gold is an individual investor’s asset; it For individual investors, the most prevalent direct
sits less easily in institutional portfolios. holding of real estate is their own home, so we turn
now to personal investment in housing. We investi-
Real estate gate the behavior of house prices in the Yearbook
countries, using an OECD dataset that covers 18
For investors concerned about the purchasing of the 19 Yearbook countries, the exception being
power of their investments, a natural alternative to South Africa (see Bracke, 2011). The underlying
publicly traded assets is a direct holding of real data is quarterly and, for consistency with our other
estate. Commercial property is a claim on assets research, we aggregate this to annual observations
that might be expected to rise in monetary value of capital appreciation or depreciation. The indexes
during periods of general inflation. If real estate is for each country run from 1970 to 2010. Indexes
an effective hedge against inflation, we would ex- for 2011 have not yet been released.
pect the relationship between real returns and In contrast to the commercial property studied
inflation to be represented by a flat line. Needless above, the housing series measure capital values
to say, there would still be substantial scatter since, with no adjustment for the rental value that might
as noted by Case and Wachter (2011), there are be imputed to domestic housing. In any given year,
many factors beside inflation that influence the only a tiny proportion of the housing stock is trans-
performance of a real estate portfolio. acted, indexes can be unrepresentative, and, as
We examine the annual investment performance Monnery (2011) explains, there are many other
of commercial real estate using index series from problems with house price indexes. Our pooled
the Investment Property Databank (IPD). Country regressions relate real house-price movements to
coverage within IPD is not identical to the Year- local inflation, again using country fixed-effects.
book, so we use all of the IPD index series except
Portugal (not one of our 19 countries) and Central
Europe (not one of our 3 regions). For each country
in IPD’s annual dataset, we use unleveraged total Figure 11
returns to directly held standing property invest-
ments from one open market valuation to the next. Real price of domestic housing in six countries, 1900–2011
The all-property total return, including income, is
Sources: Eichholtz (1997), Eitrheim & Erlandsen (2004), Friggit (2010), Monnery (2011), Shiller (2011), Stapledon (2011)
converted to real terms using the local inflation
index. Countries have between 7 and 41 years of
House prices (inflation adjusted; log scale)
data. Data for the most recent year is based on the
1000
IPD monthly property index. 927
We analyze this dataset by running a regression
436
of inflation-adjusted property returns on inflation,
366
again with country fixed-effects. As reported in 286
280
Table 1, we find that after controlling for country
specific factors, the coefficient of real property
returns on inflation is –0.33. Real property returns 100 110
appear to be hurt less by inflation than stocks,
bonds, or bills. However, it is well known that real
Average
estate values can lag traded assets, and Table 2
of all 6
indicates that a rise in consumer prices is associ- series
ated with a delayed decline in real property values
that exceeds other assets. So, on balance, and
given its relative illiquidity, commercial real estate 10
has to be considered as a long-term commitment. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
In contrast to traded assets, it is not an investment Netherla nds France Australia Norway USA UK
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 14
Currency matters
Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, London Business School
Currency concerns are center stage today, but Turkish equities gave a lira return of 310%, a USD
currency volatility is not new. We define currency return of 18%, and a Swiss franc return of ȍ31%.
volatility as the cross-sectional variation in ex-
Figure 1
change rates against the US dollar. Figure 1 plots
monthly volatility since 1972, when floating ex- Currency volatility over time, 1972–2011
change rates largely replaced the old Bretton
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton; Global Financial Data
Woods regime. The light blue area shows volatility
of developed-market currencies, and the dark blue Monthly cross-sectional dispersion (SD %) of currency movements versus the US dollar
line plot shows that of major emerging markets.
Currency volatility has been the norm, and 2011
was not exceptional. Volatility in developed markets
20
was highest around the Lehman bankruptcy and
the 1992 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis.
Emerging market currencies have been more vola-
15
tile, especially during the 1973 oil crisis, Latin
American debt crisis, Asian financial crisis, and
Russian default. After 2000, they were more stable
10
and more like developed-market currencies.
Figure 2 shows the US dollar’s change in value
since 2000 against the world’s 20 next most fre-
5
quently traded currencies. The USD fell against
most developed countries and China, and rose
against sterling and most emerging markets. The 0
range ran from +248% versus the Turkish lira to 1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
ȍ42% versus the Swiss franc. Over this period,
Developed country currencies Major emerging market country currencies
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 18
While foreign investment offers diversification and a Invest after currency strength or weakness?
wider opportunity set, it introduces exchange rate
risk. We therefore look at currency risk; ask Investors enjoy gains from investments in coun-
whether currencies are predictable; and later in this tries whose currencies appreciate and suffer
article, examine the benefits from hedging currency losses when currencies depreciate, so they often
exposure. argue that it is better to invest in countries with
strong currencies. But this is true only if one can
successfully predict which currencies will be
strong in the future. All we know for sure is which
ones have been strong in the past. So we begin
by asking whether past currency movements are
related to the future returns on equities and
bonds. Put simply, is it better to invest after peri-
ods of currency strength or weakness?
Figure 2
We interrogate the Dimson-Marsh-Staunton
Changes in value of US dollar (%), 2000–2011 (DMS) database of 19 countries since 1900. For
equities, we add total returns for 64 other countries
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton; DMS dataset and Thomson Datastream (mostly emerging markets). So for 43 stock mar-
kets we have at least 25 years of data, and for all
248
83 we have at least 12 years of data.
50 We follow a global market-rotation strategy.
47 Each New Year, we rank countries by their ex-
40
change-rate change over the preceding 1ȍ5 years,
30 and assign them to one of five quintiles from the
31
weakest currency to the strongest. Quintiles 1, 2,
20 22 4, and 5 have an equal number of constituents;
10
17
quintile 3 may have marginally fewer. We invest on
4 4
2 0 an equal-weighted basis in the markets of each
0
quintile, reinvesting all proceeds including income.
-10 Countries are re-ranked annually, and the strategy
-17
-20 is followed for 112 years. We look separately at
-20 -22 -23 -24 -25 -26 equities and bonds; returns are in USD.
-30
-30 -33 Figure 3 summarizes our findings. There are six
-36
-42
groups of bars. The two on the left are for equities
-40
for the 19 countries; the center two are for equities
-50 for all 83 countries; and the two on the right relate
TRY MXN ZAR INR RUB BRL GBP KRW HKD PLN SEK SGD EUR CNY JPY NOK CAD NZD AUD CHF to bonds. Within these three pairings, the left-hand
group relates to the years 1900ȍ2011, while the
right-hand group is the post Bretton Woods period
Figure 3 1972ȍ2011. Within each of the six groupings,
there are two trios of bars, representing quintiles
Bond and equity returns and prior exchange-rate changes
based on 1-year and on 5-year exchange-rate
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton
changes.
Annualized USD returns (%) Equities did better after currency weakness
30
Figure 3 shows that equities performed best after
25
currency weakness, not strength. Outperformance
is greater if (a) exchange rate changes are meas-
20
ured over five years, not just one; (b) we focus on
the post Bretton Woods period; and (c) we look at
all 83 countries. This last observation should be
15
treated with caution as the extra countries are
mostly smaller emerging markets with more volatile
10
currencies. It can be hard to trade in them at the
best of times, but our rotation strategy may target
5
currencies just when trading is most costly.
For bonds, the picture is less clear. The right-
0 most grouping of bars shows that over the last 40
1 yr 5 yrs 1 yr 5 yrs 1 yr 5 yrs 1 yr 5 yrs 1 yr 5 yrs 1 yr 5 yrs
years of (mainly) floating exchange rates, bonds,
1900–2011 1972–2011 1900–2011 1972–2011 1900–2011 1972–2011
Equities: 19 Yearbook countries Equities: all 83 countries Bonds: 19 Yearbook countries
like equities, showed a tendency to perform best
after periods of currency weakness, although the
Weakest currencies over 1 or 5 years Middling currencies Strongest currencies over 1 or 5 years
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 19
relationship is weaker than for equities, and is not strength. For bonds, post-event returns are close to
apparent over the full 1900ȍ2011 period. neutral, consistent with our earlier finding that for
This is attributable to the world wars and ultra- bonds, the 20th century was a game of two halves.
high inflations of the first half of the 20th century
making bond returns very sensitive to outliers. For
example, the German bond return of –100% in
1923 wiped a quarter off the four-country portfolio
value. Omitting Germany’s hyperinflations from
Figure 3 would reverse the 1900ȍ2011 ranking.
With the exception of bonds in the first half of
the 20th century, both equities and bonds per-
formed best after currency weakness. This might
be due to risk, as volatility was appreciably higher
for both equities and bonds in the weakest currency Figure 4
quintiles. However, the Sharpe ratios that corre-
spond to the above returns confirm clear outper- Sharpe ratios for equity and bond quintiles
formance after currency weakness (except, again, Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton
for bonds during 1900ȍ49); see Figure 4.
We also computed the betas of the quintile port- Sharpe ratios
equity returns experience a sharp reversal, perform- Equities: weakest currencies past 5 years Equities: strongest currencies past 5 years
ing best after currency weakness and worst after Bonds: weakest currencies past 5 years Bonds: strongest currencies past 5 years
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 20
The right hand side of Figure 5 shows the same Our event study naturally has some limitations.
analysis over the 40-year post Bretton Woods The quintiles are poorly diversified and outliers can
period. Here, bonds show the same post-event have a distorting impact; the market rotation strat-
pattern as equities, but with less extreme perform- egy would sometimes have been infeasible (e.g. in
ance. While there are reasons why currency weak- wartime); and we ignore constraints on capital
ness can boost equity values, two puzzles remain. flows, dealing costs, taxes, risk adjustment, illiquid-
First, the impact of currency weakness should be ity, and the impact of non-market weights in quin-
impounded immediately into equity values. Yet tiles and the benchmark. Still, our analysis offers
there is a persistent, year-on-year, post-event drift. challenges to the “stick-to-strong-currency” school
Second, we find the same pattern for bonds after of thought, and provides some support for those
1972, yet bond cash flows are fixed in nominal who favor “buy-on-weakness” strategies.
terms and the same arguments do not apply.
It seems more likely that the post-event abnor- Should we hedge exchange rate risk?
mal returns reflect a risk premium for which we
have not adjusted. Weak currency countries are Exchange rates are volatile and impactful; so should
often distressed and higher-risk. So investors de- investors hedge currency risk? To a large extent,
mand a higher risk premium and real interest rate, this depends on the investor’s horizon. We there-
and prices fall accordingly in the pre-event period. fore start by analyzing how exchange rates affect
The higher returns in the post-event period then long-run returns. In Figure 6, the dark blue bars
reflect the risk premium that was built in at the time show exchange rate changes against the US dollar
of distress. But, as noted above, while there is clear since 1900. Over the long haul, only two currencies
evidence of higher risk from the weakest currency were stronger than the US dollar. The barely visible
countries, the outperformance persists even after light blue bar for the Swiss franc, the strongest
standard risk adjustments. currency, shows that by start-2012, just 0.17 times
as many francs were needed to buy one dollar as in
1900. But to buy a dollar today one needs 38
times more Japanese yen, 264 times more Italian
currency units (lira, then euro), or many billions
more of German currency (marks, then euro), as
compared to 1900.
Consider the USD/GBP exchange rate which
went from five dollars to the pound in 1900 to 1.55
today, an annualized depreciation of 1.01%. This
coincided with, consumer prices rising by 0.96%
per year more in the UK than in the USA. Almost all
the exchange rate change was attributable to rela-
tive inflation. The real (inflation adjusted) fall in the
exchange rate was only 0.05%. The light bars in
Figure 6 show that, for every one of our 19 coun-
Figure 6 tries, the annualized exchange rate change ȍ
whether positive or negative ȍ was below 1% when
Nominal and real exchange rates, 1900–2011 measured in real terms. Given that, in earlier years,
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton; Triumph of the Optimists; authors’ updates
inflation indexes were narrow and unrepresentative,
it is likely that the true linkage between currencies
Units of local currency per dollar; start-2012 relative to start-1900 and inflation is even closer than this.
353bn
264
Figure 7 corroborates this for a large sample of
83 countries from 1970 to 2011. It shows the
100
relationship between nominal exchange rate
changes and inflation rates relative to the USA.
80 Nearly all the long-term variation in nominal ex-
change rates is attributable to relative inflation. This
has been confirmed in many studies, Taylor and
60 Taylor (2004) being an example.
annualized real return to an American who held We start in the upper half of Table 1 with an
US stocks from 1900 to 2011 was 6.2%, and to analysis of the impact of hedging on a US based
a British investor who held UK equities it was equity investor whose reference currency is the
5.12%. If, instead, an American buys UK equities US dollar. We assume she follows one of two
and a British investor buys US stocks, both now strategies. First, she may invest internationally, in
have two exposures to foreign equities and foreign which case she divides her assets equally be-
currency. tween the 19 markets (of which one is the United
Instead of comparing domestic returns, we can States). At the end of each year, we compute the
convert to a common reference currency. For return she has received on her investment in each
example, switching from real local-currency to real country, converted to US dollars and adjusted for
USD returns just involves (geometric) addition of US inflation. For each of the 19 countries, we
the real exchange rate change. Nominal and real therefore have a 40-year history of real, USD
exchange rate changes are listed in the Credit returns. We use that to calculate the mean returns
Suisse Global Investment Returns Sourcebook for and standard deviation for each country.
recent and longer term periods. Averaged across the 19 countries, the 40-year
Sometimes, currency misalignments seem to real return is 6.1% unhedged or 4.7% hedged.
persist for years. However, with floating exchange The hedge reduces volatility by 2.7%, but at the
rates and liquid forex markets, it is unlikely that cost of a 1.4% reduction in the annualized real
currencies can deviate for long from fair value. USD return. Why is hedging apparently so costly?
Other factors are probably at work, such as differ- The investor reallocated exposure from a basket
ent weightings in non-traded goods and services of currencies back to the dollar, which was weak
(education, healthcare, defense); wealth effects in real terms, relative to (the equally weighted
like natural resource discoveries (Norway); im- average of) other markets.
provements in productivity (post-war Japan); and
shorter term factors (real interest rates, capital
flows). Shorter-term deviations can be large, and
currencies volatile. So by how much does cur-
rency risk amplify the risks of foreign investment?
The investor’s alternative strategy is to invest all 19 markets is very close to that observed previ-
her money in the 19-country, weighted world ously for the US based investor: standard devia-
equity index. Her annualized real return is 4.9% tions of 30.0% unhedged and 27.4% hedged.
unhedged or 4.2% hedged. Historically, around (The volatility of a portfolio invested equally in
half the value of the world equity index was on each of the 19 equity markets would be 22.4%
average in the US market, and hence the US unhedged and 20.4% hedged ȍ a similar level of
dollar. Consistent with this, the return reduction risk reduction.)
from hedging is around half that of the previous While the volatility story resembles the US
example (it is 0.7%). But why does the currency based evidence, the returns story presents a con-
hedge reduce volatility by only 0.7%? This is trast. The annualized returns on the unhedged and
because much of the world‘s stock market risk is hedged strategies are virtually identical. In a cur-
already diversified away in a global, market value- rency hedge, one party’s profit is a counterparty’s
weighted equity portfolio. loss. Consequently, and on average across all
In the lower half of Table 1, we undertake the parties, hedging makes essentially no difference
same analysis of hedging, but now for a US based to investment returns.
bond investor whose reference currency is still the Far too many investors form a judgment reflect-
US dollar. We assume she also follows one of the ing just their own country’s past experience. They
two strategies outlined above. Averaged across erroneously extrapolate into the future the gains or
19 bonds markets, the annualized real USD return losses that resulted from hedging back to their
is 4.6% unhedged or 3.1% hedged. However, the home currency. Hedging foreign exchange expo-
hedge reduces volatility by 15.9% to 9.9%. On sure reduces risk. However, averaged across all
average, eliminating currency risk has a big impact parties, it cannot enhance or impair returns for
on volatility as viewed by a US based, dollar de- everyone.
nominated bond investor. When we look in Table 2 at the experience of
investors who buy the world equity index, we see
Table 1
now that the unhedged investor has underper-
US based investor, 1972ȍ2011 formed the hedged strategy by 0.7%. The reduc-
GM = Geometric mean. AM = Arithmetic mean. SD = Standard
tion in return from hedging in Table 1 has become
deviation. All returns include reinvested income, and are expressed in
real USD terms. a profit in Table 2. We see in Table 2 that, over
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton. the post Bretton Woods period, investors who are
Asset Exposure GM AM SD concerned with the purchasing power of their
Equities % % % investments on average benefitted from avoiding
Average of No hedge 6.1 10.1 29.8 US dollar exposure. But that of course relates to
19 markets Hedged 4.7 8.1 27.1 the past; we cannot foretell the dollar’s future.
World No hedge 4.9 6.6 18.2
equity index Hedged 4.2 5.8 17.5 Table 2
Bonds Investors around the world, 1972ȍ2011
Average of No hedge 4.6 5.8 15.9 GM = Geometric mean. AM = Arithmetic mean. SD = Standard
19 markets Hedged 3.1 3.6 9.9 deviation. All returns include reinvested income, and are in real terms in
the reference currency. This is an average of 19 exhibits like Table 1,
World No hedge 5.0 5.5 10.1
each for a different reference currency.
bond index Hedged 4.3 4.7 8.9 Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton.
Asset Exposure GM AM SD
Equities % % %
In the final part of Table 1 we examine the
Average of No hedge 5.5 9.5 30.0
GDP weighted world bond index, from a real USD
19 markets Hedged 5.5 8.9 27.4
viewpoint. Hedging reduces real return, but the
World No hedge 4.3 6.4 20.6
risk reduction for this index is more modest.
equity index Hedged 5.0 6.6 17.8
Hedging by non-US as well as US investors Bonds
Average of No hedge 3.9 5.1 15.6
The American investor who buys stocks or bonds 19 markets Hedged 3.9 4.5 10.5
internationally has counterparts in each of the World No hedge 4.3 5.2 13.5
other 18 countries in our study. We therefore bond index Hedged 5.1 5.5 9.3
repeat the study described in Table 1 a further 18
times, so that we have the perspective of a British
The equity investor’s experience is followed in
investor concerned about real GBP returns, a
the lower half of Table 2 by the bond investor’s
Swiss investor concerned about real CHF returns,
experience. In the bond market, currency hedging
and so on. As a summary, Table 2 presents the
reduces volatility dramatically for the average
average of all 19 tables.
market from 15.6% to 10.5%. (The respective
There are some similarities and some striking
volatilities for a portfolio invested equally in each
differences between the two tables. Look first at
of the 19 bond markets would be 11.4% and
the experience of our equity investors in the top
8.1% respectively.) As noted above, the average
panel of Table 2. The average volatility across the
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 23
level of annualized returns is unaffected by hedg- the difference between the forward and spot
ing. It is 3.9% for the average bond market. exchange rates.
Finally, we see that the reduction in geometric Hedging can reduce, but cannot eliminate, risk
mean return for a US investor who hedged cur- because future returns are uncertain and we
rency exposure becomes a gain for non-US inves- therefore do not know in advance what quantum
tors. Meanwhile, currency hedging reduces risk on to hedge. Most strategies involve hedging the
average. initial capital over the period until the hedge is
rebalanced. Our research uses annual data and
Local versus dollar-based investors annual rebalancing. To ensure our findings are
independent of the choice of currency, we exam-
Figure 8 extends the record to the full 112-year ine all 19 reference currencies/countries. For
sample period, and draws comparison with the last each, we look at both a hedged and unhedged
40 years. It takes the perspective of a US citizen investment in the other 18 countries.
investing in the other 18 Yearbook countries. The As noted above, the impact of hedging on re-
light blue bars show real exchange rate risk, aver- turns (as opposed to risk) is a zero sum game.
aged across countries. The height of the dark blue The profit a German investor makes on Swiss
bars shows the average risk faced by local inves- assets if the franc appreciates is offset by the loss
tors who bought equities (middle bars) or bonds the Swiss investor incurs on German assets. Jen-
(right-hand bars). The full height of the bars sen’s inequality states that the profit from an
shows the average risk for a US investor buying appreciating currency always exceeds the loss in a
these same assets. The gray portion of the bars depreciating currency, but in practical terms, this
thus shows the average contribution of currency effect is insignificant. Averaged over all reference
risk to total risk. The left hand bar in each set currencies and countries, the mean return advan-
relates to 1900–2011, and the right hand bar to tage to hedging both equities and bonds was zero,
1972–2011 (post Bretton Woods). both over 1900ȍ2011 and 1972ȍ2011.
Over 1900–2011, real exchange rate changes
had about the same average volatility (22%) as
local currency real equity returns (23%). Yet the
gray-shaded areas show that currency risk added
only 6% to total risk. Although investors are taking
a stake in two assets ȍ a country’s equity or bond
market and its currency – total risk is less than the
sum of the parts, as the returns tend to move
independently and, in the long run, to act as a
natural built-in hedge. The average correlation
between the two during 1900ȍ2011 was –0.09
for equities and ȍ0.12 for bonds, while post Bret-
ton Woods, the figures were –0.07 and –0.09.
Thus over the long run, currency risk has added
only modestly to the total risk of foreign invest- Figure 8
ment. In the short run, of course, the natural built-
in hedge can fail just when you need it most. Risks to local versus dollar-based investors
Hedging currency exposure Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton; Triumph of the Optimists; authors’ updates
Average standard deviation of real returns (% per year) across 18 foreign countries
While currency risk is mitigated by its low correla-
tion with real asset returns, it still adds to overall 29.8
29.3
risk, with a higher proportionate increase for 2.8
6.0
bonds than equities. If hedging reduces risk with-
25 27.0
out harming returns, this would be a “free lunch.”
Prior research findings on hedging are often 23.4
22.2 18.9
period-dependent. To avoid this, we examine the 20
Ita
Fra
Spa
NZ
Bel
Swi
Fra
Ita
Spa
Bel
Swi
UK
UK
Aus
Aus
Can
Swe
Nor
US
Avg
Fin
Ire
Den
Net
Ger
Jap
SAf
Den
Ire
Net
Ger
Fin
Avg
Swe
Nor
Jap
US
Can
SAf
Country of reference investor zon, as in Figure 9) show that hedging benefits are
Equities Bonds lower for the equally weighted world index (E) than
1900-2011 1972-2011 the average country (C). The world index is diversi-
fied across countries and currencies, so there is
less currency risk left to hedge. The equally
Figure 10 weighted index also offers lower hedging benefits
than our world index, W, because the latter has
Risk reduction from hedging over different time horizons
concentrated weightings that provide less diversifi-
C is the risk reduction for the average country; W is the risk reduction for the weighted world index; E is the risk
reduction for an equally weighted world index. All estimates are averaged across reference currencies. cation. The US weighting in the world equity index
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton
peaked at 73% in 1967, and is still 45% today. In
the 1980s, Japan, and hence the yen, also had a
Reduction in volatility from hedging (%) averaged across reference currencies
heavy weight, peaking at 42% in 1988, when
40 Japan had the world’s largest equity market, but
C = Average country; W = World index; E= EW World index this since fallen to just 8% today.
30 So far, we have looked at hedging over a one-
year horizon. But longer-term currency fluctuations
are less marked than we might expect due to a
20
tendency to converge towards PPP. Also, hedging
involves taking a short position in foreign interest
10 rates and a long position in the investor’s domestic
interest rate. While helping to hedge short term
0 currency risk, this introduces a new form of risk
and source of volatility, namely a bet on real inter-
est rates at home versus abroad; see Smithers and
-10
C W E C W E C W E C W E
Wright (2011). Hedging thus exposes investors to
Equities Bonds Equities Bonds rapid, unexpected inflation in their home country.
19 00–2011 1972–2011 In addition to the one-year horizon (dark blue
1 year horiz on 2 years 4 years 8 years
bars) in Figure 10, we also show the gains from
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 25
hedging over two years (gray bars), four years (light The carry trade
blue), and eight years (purple). Typically, the bene-
fits fall the longer the horizon, and rapidly turn The third factor is the carry trade. The carry trade
negative. Rather than lowering risk, hedging by strategy entails buying higher-yielding currencies
longer term investors raises risk. The exception is for their income, while also seeking capital appre-
the world equity index in the post Bretton Woods ciation. Basic economics (the theory that there are
period, where the high US and Japanese weight- no free lunches) tells us that this should not work:
ings had a big influence. we should expect higher-yielding currencies to
depreciate against lower yielders, thereby offset-
Are currencies predictable? ting their initial income advantage.
The success of the popular carry trade strat-
If currencies are predictable, then targeted expo- egy, which involves borrowing in low-interest-rate
sure, rather than hedging could be appropriate, currencies and lending in high, violates economic
perhaps via a currency overlay. But predicting cur- theory. Like momentum, the carry trade is a puz-
rencies is difficult. This is not surprising, given the zle and embarrassment to believers in market
size and liquidity of the markets and the intense rationality. It is so naïve that it should not work.
competition between traders. In the 1980s, Ken- Yet many studies, such as Fama (1984), have
neth Rogoff showed that economic models of ex- found forward rate bias. After initiating the trade,
change rates fail to predict, or even explain, when the subsequent depreciation (or even apprecia-
used over a period other than the one used to tion) fails to offset the interest differential, making
calibrate them. Revisiting his work, Rogoff (2002) the carry trade profitable. Lustig and Verdelhan
concludes, “Explaining the yen, dollar or euro … is (2007) look back to 1953 and show that the carry
still a very difficult task, even ex post.” trade worked even in the Bretton Woods era.
Richard Levich, a veteran currency researcher,
analyzed the Barclays Currency Traders’ index and
some of its 106 constituent funds. In Pojarliev and
Levich (2008), he reports that this index gave an
excess return of 0.25% per month over the risk
free rate, albeit with much higher volatility. Like
other hedge fund indices, it includes only those
managers who survived and continued to offer their
data, so index performance is almost certainly
overstated. Furthermore, after adjusting for style
factors, proxied by the returns from well-known and
easily implementable trading styles, the alpha (the
return from skill) became negative (–0.09% per
month) and was not statistically significant. Their
findings were not cheering news for currency man-
agers.
The currency style factors are themselves of in- Figure 11
terest as they imply some level of predictability. The
first was a strategy involving long and short posi- Annualized long-short returns from the carry trade
tions in currencies that seem cheap or dear relative
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton
to their value in terms of Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP). This is akin to a value strategy in equity Real annualized returns (%)
markets, and relies on real exchange rates tending
to revert to the mean. The risks are that exchange 3
3.1
rates diverge further from PPP, that the PPP ex- 2.8
change rate may have fundamentally changed, or
that the adjustment takes place via relative prices, 2.3 2. 3
2
and not the exchange rate. But the greatest prob-
1.8
lem is that deviations from PPP tend to dissipate 1.7
slowly, with much noise, and with a half-life gener-
ally reckoned to be some three to four years. 1 1.1
The second factor is momentum. There is evi-
dence that momentum generates excess returns in
currency markets, for example, White and Okunev
(2003). Despite much research into explanations, 0
-0.4
momentum in currencies remains as big a puzzle as
in equities. But, as with equities, the risks are obvi- Ranking based on nominal interest rates Ranking based on real interest rates……
..
ous, namely, sudden reversals, false signals, high
-1
volatility, and large transactions costs. 1900–2011 1900–1950 1950–1971 1972–2011
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 26
PHOTO: ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/MIKDAM
Our long-run DMS database lets us look back interest rates may look alluring through the auto-
even further. Carry trades are normally short-term matic lens of the carry trade, yet prove disastrous.
strategies, with frequent rebalancing, whereas our We repeated the analysis, ranking countries by
database comprises annual data. However, if the their realized real, rather than nominal, bill returns.
strategy works with annual rebalancing, it should Figure 11 shows that the carry trade now worked in
work even better with higher frequency data. We every period, with the first half of the 20th century
simulate the carry trade over four periods: the entire giving the highest returns. Typically, high inflation
1900ȍ2011 dataset; the first half of the 20th countries now showed as having low real interest
century, 1900ȍ50; the subsequent period when rates, rather than high nominal interest rates. But
Bretton Woods was in effect, 1950ȍ71; and the note that carry trades could not have been imple-
post Bretton Woods period, 1972ȍ2011. mented during some of this period, especially dur-
At the start of each year, we rank our 19 coun- ing wars. Also note that in the post Bretton Woods
tries by the previous year’s realized bill return, and period since 1972, the carry trade worked better
select the highest and lowest quintiles (four coun- when based on nominal, rather than real, rates.
tries in each). Our perspective is that of a US inves- Other researchers have found the same, serving to
tor, borrowing in the lowest-interest-rate countries deepen the carry trade puzzle.
and lending in the highest, holding these long-short The carry trade appears more profitable with
positions for a year, then closing them out at the more frequent rebalancing. Antti Ilmanen (2011)
prevailing exchange rates. examines weekly rebalancing among the G10
The results are shown in the left-hand panel of countries from 1983 to 2009. His strategy is to
Figure 11. Over the full period, the carry trade gave buy the top three interest-rate currencies, funding
a modest annualized return of 1.1%. But over the this by borrowing in the bottom three, using weights
hitherto unexplored 1900ȍ50 period, the annual- of 50%, 30% and 20%. This gives an annual
ized return was ȍ0.3%. From 1950 to 71, a rela- excess return of 6.1%, a volatility of 10.5%, and a
tively stable period of fixed exchange rates with Sharpe ratio of 0.61. Returns were spread quite
occasional devaluations, the annualized return was evenly over time with occasional deep drawdowns:
2.8%, while post Bretton Woods, it fell to 2.3%. ȍ36% in 2008, ȍ28% in 1993, and ȍ26% in
The failure of the carry trade in the first half of 1986.
the 20th century stems from periods of high and In trying to explain carry trade profits, risk is the
hyperinflation, most of which occurred in the wake main suspect, but researchers have struggled to
of the world wars. At such times, high nominal explain why it merits a risk premium. A suggestion
by Cochrane (1999) seems plausible. He conjec-
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 27
tures it may be like catastrophe insurance. Most of cause currencies tend to converge towards re-
the time, carry traders earn a small premium. On flecting relative inflation rates. It is also because
rare occasions, they lose a great deal, and they hedging introduces a new form of risk, namely, a
lose it in times of financial catastrophe, just when bet on real interest rates at home versus abroad.
they can least afford to and when risk premia are Even over relatively brief multi-year horizons, we
highest. The fact that carry-trade drawdowns have have seen that hedging on average leads to an
been highest during “flights to safety” is consistent increase in the volatility of real returns, and is on
with this notion of a catastrophe risk premium. average counterproductive.
Finally, we looked at whether currencies are
Conclusions predictable. After adjusting for style factors, there
is little evidence that currency managers generate
Currency risk abounds, but history reveals this is abnormal performance. While, over the long run,
the norm. Changes in exchange rates can boost currencies do tend to converge to PPP, this is of
the return from what might otherwise have been a limited usefulness for short-term predictions.
disappointing exposure to foreign assets. But ex- Carry trades, in contrast, have proved profitable,
change rate movements can also erode or reverse and they may form part of the toolkit for those
the profits from investing in foreign markets that, in who undertake dynamic hedging strategies.
local currency terms, performed well. Note that, even if investors can forecast cur-
We examined whether past currency movements rencies, tilting asset allocations towards countries
are related to subsequent asset returns and found expected to have strong currencies and away from
that equities performed best after currency weak- those expected to weaken is not the best way to
ness. The same was true for bonds over the last 40 exploit it. Instead, it is better to trade directly in
years. The most likely explanation is that this is a the currency markets. By using a currency over-
risk premium. But, whatever the reason, our analy- lay, the desired allocation across assets and coun-
sis provides some comfort for “buy-on-weakness” tries can be left intact.
investors, and offers no support for “stick-to-
strong-currency” strategies.
There is compelling evidence that, over the long
haul, currencies reflect relative inflation rates. For
long-term investors who are concerned about the
purchasing power of their investments, this is moti-
vation enough to regard the currency exposure of
foreign equities as a valuable benefit.
It follows that currency risk should not deter in-
vestors from diversifying internationally: the bene-
fits outweigh the attendant currency risk. Fur-
thermore, for global equity and bond investors,
currency risk has less impact than might be ex-
pected. While currencies are volatile when looked
at in isolation, currency risk is mitigated by its low,
and slightly negative, correlation with asset re-
turns.
So how much currency risk is desirable? Inves-
tors who are concerned about short-term volatility
may wish to hedge. They may include investors
who do not care about real returns, but are con-
cerned largely or wholly about nominal returns.
Examples might be insurance companies with
monetary liabilities, non-indexed pension provid-
ers, or those who are investing to generate a fixed
nominal sum at a future date. For such investors,
swapping foreign currency exposure for local
currency exposure is very attractive. For real-
return investors, the decision on hedging is more
nuanced.
Hedging can enhance or harm returns, but
while it does reduce short-term volatility, its gen-
eral risk reduction benefits have shrunk in more
recent periods. The risk reduction from hedging
equities is less that half of that obtainable from
global diversification.
For longer-term investors, the risk reduction
benefits of hedging rapidly decline. This is be-
3+272)272/,$&20)52*
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 29
Investor behavior is a highly social phenomenon, and attitudes towards risk os-
cillate periodically from over-exuberance to excessive pessimism and back
again. In February 1998, Credit Suisse launched the Global Risk Appetite Index
(GRAI) to try and objectively measure these collective swings in risk preference.
One key feature of the index is that it is usually closely related to shifts in global
growth momentum. It can be used in conjunction with other indicators to im-
prove market timing and asset allocation decisions, helping to offset the emo-
tional and social bias common at times of euphoria or panic.
The Credit Suisse Global Risk Appetite Index (“CS the standard alternatives. But first we should ask
GRAI”) was launched in February 1998, partly in why this pattern of exuberance and pessimism
response to the Asian Crisis of 1997, with the aim exists at all, and why we might expect it to persist.
of quantifying a global “sentiment factor,” which And here too the answer is simple: because inves-
appeared to have contributed to inter-country con- tors are human.
tagion. Since then, perhaps the most compelling And it is well known that humans as a species
support for the index comes from its continued suffer from many perceptual biases, particularly in
relevance over time. As other approaches have assessing risk, low probability events and appropri-
broken down under the extreme events of the past ate weighting of recent versus distant experience.
few years, the CS GRAI has continued to provide Additionally, herd-like behavior and “social conta-
plausible signals relevant to the full range of inves- gion” seems to overwhelm cold blooded calculation
tors, including central banks and international insti- at times, further increasing the likelihood of what
tutions. are often called manias and panics.
The rationale behind the index is straightforward: That in turn gave us two criteria for judging dif-
investor behavior appears to oscillate from over- ferent approaches to measuring risk appetite. First,
exuberance to excessive pessimism and back we hoped to find a statistically robust method that
again, a phenomenon often associated with “over- passed the intuition test: were extreme values of
shooting” fundamental or long-term trends. These the index associated with past shocks and manias?
extremes are strongly correlated across countries Less obviously, was the pattern of investor risk
and asset classes. One intuitive way to measure appetite closely connected to fundamental drivers
these fluctuations in market sentiment is to track such as global growth?
the change in the relative performance of safe
assets versus more volatile assets, e.g. government
bonds and equities. This is the basic methodology
behind the CS GRAI. The appendix explains the
technical reasons why we chose this approach over
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 30
Figure 1
10
Fall of
Berlin Wall
Oil plummets, EM euphoria
8 equities rally Nikkei 1st Greek
Loose downgrade
peaks liquidity US housing
Asian Tech bubble
Saddam bubble bursts Jackson Hole,
6 Continental invades financial
Illinois run Mexican crisis QE2
Kuwait crisis
4
Japan
earthquake
2
-2
Société
-4 1981 Operation ERM Générale Debt ceiling,
recession crisis, Russia 9/11,
Black Monday Desert Storm European Enron, S&P
defaults, Bear downgrade
recession LTCM fails WorldCom Stearns
-6 Mexico Surprise
defaults Oil Italian
peaks Lehman downgrade
default
-8
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Figure 1 shows the entire available history of CS unprecedented combination of tight money and
GRAI, (daily from 1981 where the period up to loose fiscal policy, pushing up real bond yields and
1998 was reconstructed post facto), with many of attracting massive capital inflows – most notably
the biggest market events of the last 30 years from Japan, where liberalization of capital outflows
shown. It is worth pausing to examine the chart in had just taken place. Both the US dollar and the
detail, but even a quick glance shows how low US trade deficit soared, leading ultimately to rising
values of the CS GRAI have been associated with protectionist sentiment and the Plaza (1985) and
significant negative shocks and high values with Louvre accords (1987).
periods of very strong markets. Yet the early 1980s recovery was also associ-
Overall, “euphorias” seem to be associated with ated with surging supplies of non-OPEC oil output
sharp growth recoveries or late-cycle booms and – following the dramatic spike in real oil prices over
asset bubbles, though occasionally with low growth the previous decade. In late 1985, chronic cheating
and super-abundant liquidity. Panic signals appear within OPEC had reduced Saudi Arabia’s oil output
to be associated with oil shocks, financial crises to four million barrels a day and the Kingdom took
and cyclical troughs or recessions. drastic action to restore its market share. By early
In many ways, the initial and final periods of the 1986, oil prices had plunged to USD 10 per barrel,
chart are the most interesting, since they are par- a massive tax cut for oil consumers that helped
ticularly rich with shocks and secular policy shifts push inflation towards multi-decadal lows and risk
(though some of the cleanest risk appetite invest- appetite to an all time record high.
ment signals come in the intervening period). This favorable income and supply shock saw
Our data set begins in the turbulent aftermath of bond and equity prices surge simultaneously, but
the 1970s oil shocks and stagflation, when Paul the subsequent correction was quite mild and it was
Volcker committed the Fed to beating inflation. By not until early 1987 that global growth surged
1982, the US (and global) economy were in deep again. At that point, bond yields spiked and equity
recession and the Latin American debt crisis in full markets rallied strongly again, pushing valuations
swing. And the CS GRAI was in deep panic. versus bonds to highly overvalued territory and risk
Meanwhile, reflecting a decade or more of eco- appetite back into euphoria. Several weeks later,
nomic turbulence, political upheaval and disappoint- we had the 1987 equity market crash (Black Mon-
ing real returns, equity valuations were very cheap. day) and a dramatic plunge into risk appetite panic.
Rapid monetary easing and the Reagan tax cuts So within the space of five years or so, we ex-
and deregulation agenda promoted a powerful perienced an extended 3½ year up cycle in risk
economic upswing in 1983/4, helping to spark off appetite, with one major dip as global growth
a secular bull market in equities that ran through to slowed and the sixth largest bank in the USA (Con-
the peak of the tech bubble in March 2000, 17½ tinental Illinois) failed, followed by a correction and
years later! new euphoria that directly preceded a dramatic
The first third of that bull run was especially crash. This illustrates the interaction between risk
eventful. The powerful US recovery soon led to an appetite and growth (see next section), as well as
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 31
the influence of valuation and economic shocks. It just exited “panic,” after reaching the lowest re-
also shows how risk appetite signals need to be corded levels of CS GRAI (–6.61) during October
combined with other levels of analysis for the pur- at the peak of the Eurozone crisis.
poses of investment.
Another extended upcycle in risk appetite began Global growth and risk appetite
in October 2002 – immediately after the Enron and
Worldcom scandals had helped drive risk appetite Despite the social and emotional bias common
into deep panic once again, following the tech among investors, sentiment and fundamentals are
crash and recession of 2000 to 2001. Here it was seldom completely disconnected. This is evident
the heady cocktail of easy money, a boom in China from Figure 2, which plots risk appetite against
and the emerging markets, and the US housing growth momentum, measured using global indus-
bubble that drove the buoyant performance of trial production. The growth momentum statistic
equity, credit and commodity markets. But it also shown is an annualized 3-month on 3-month rate
set up – with a considerable lag – the subsequent of change. The chart shows how CS GRAI tends to
period of poor performance and rolling financial and trough slightly ahead or at the same time as global
economic shocks. growth momentum. The relationship at peaks in
Indeed, there has been no euphoria signal for growth momentum is slightly more complex, but
several years now, following those in 2005 and similar. Intuitively one should expect equities to
2006. The latter was extended (nearly six months outperform bonds during periods when global
in length) and, with hindsight, foreshadowed the growth is accelerating, and thus for risk appetite to
volatile period we are still in today. be rising – and vice versa.
2008 was a particularly active year, and while It is also evident that risk appetite more often
there was no recovery in CS GRAI during the year, than not “overshoots” the global growth cycle in
there were four separate and timely signals. Panic both directions: investors tend to overweight more
was indicated in the week before Société Générale recent experiences and exhibit herd-like behavior.
announced the liquidation of a rogue trader's port- So it turns out that – most of the time – cycles in
folio. Again, panic was indicated in the week lead- the CS GRAI are closely related to cycles in global
ing up to the purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Mor- growth momentum, and thus that sentiment is
gan. The third event occurred the day before AIG related to fundamentals, but with a tendency to
was supported by the US government. Soon after, overshoot at peaks and troughs in the cycle. This is
for a fourth time, the index tipped into the longest a highly desirable characteristic for a measure of
and deepest panic yet recorded, lasting about six risk appetite, and makes it potentially more useful
months. both as a macro-indicator and as an asset alloca-
At the moment, CS GRAI is in the process of re- tion tool. Even the occasional episodes of diver-
covering from the second-longest period of panic in gence between growth and risk appetite are in-
the historical record. The index entered “panic” structive. The more extreme examples happen in
soon after the market fall in August and has only the wake of financial shocks, when risk appetite
falls more sharply than growth.
Figure 2
20% 8
7
16% 6
12% 5
4
8% 3
2
4%
1
0% 0
-1
-4% -2
-3
-8%
-4
-12% -5
-6
-16% -7
-20% -8
-9
-24% -10
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Black Monday (1987), the Mexico Crisis (1994), utility of CS GRAI as a timing indicator of turning
the Asian and Russian crises of 1998, the World- points in the relative performance of some equities
Com and Enron bankruptcies (2002), the European and bond indexes. To be explicit, periods of eupho-
sovereign debt crises (2010 and 2011) are all ria precede the relative underperformance of MSCI
examples of this, and are illustrated in Figure 3. EM, while periods of panic precede periods of
The European Crisis of 2011 is particularly inter- outperformance.
esting in that it helped to create the deepest panic The signals are neither perfect nor uniform: for
recorded in the 31 years covered by our data sam- example, some signals last several months before
ple, worse even than 2008. The fear of a disorderly the turning point occurs, some merely signal a
and deeply dangerous break-up of the euro led to short-term correction in a larger trend, while others
extreme out performance by the (shrinking) number are associated with major turning points. As one
of “safe” assets in the system, and to a sharp rise might expect, risk appetite extremes cannot be
in “tail risk” hedging. used simplistically to time asset allocation deci-
This occurred despite the fact that global growth sions: rather they need to be incorporated into a
was recovering from the Japanese earthquake broader analytical framework and investment sys-
shock at the time, and was nowhere near the ex- tem.
treme recession readings of 2008/9. Typically, in At the highest level, risk appetite signals are po-
the wake of large financial shocks there is an tentially most useful when euphoria or panic epi-
equally – and if needed progressively large – policy sodes are combined with (secular) valuation ex-
response designed to neutralize any danger of tremes and cyclical turning points in global growth.
systemic breakdown. Since most large shocks have Notable examples of this are the deep panics of
negative short-term effects on growth the typical August 1982 and 2008/9, as well as the euphoria
pattern is that risk appetite and growth re-converge that accompanied the peak of the tech bubble in
via some combination of slower growth and recov- March 2000, when equities were arguably even
ering risk appetite, a pattern that has also been more overvalued than in 1929 (it is worth noting
observed since October 2011. that real returns for US equities between March
2000 and March 2009 were worse than in any
Using CS GRAI as an investment tool: other 9-year period, including the nine years from
A contrarian indicator June 1923 to June 1932).
But experience since the index was first pub-
Figure 4 shows a very simple and compelling chart lished in 1998 has shown that the CS GRAI and its
of CS GRAI panics and euphorias marked upon a relationship to the economic cycle is a useful tool
chart of the ratio of two total return indexes, namely for macro-analysis and investment decisions, when
MSCI EM and a US 7ȍ10Y bond index. These used within a disciplined framework.
assets are chosen to represent the two ends of the
spectrum of risk in the assets underlying CS GRAI.
This striking chart demonstrates effectively the
Figure 3
3
Black Monday Mexico Crisis Enron / Worldcom Greece
-1
-2
-3
-4
81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 33
Conclusion Figure 4
Risk appetite measures should never be used Ratio of MSCI EM to US 7ȍ10Y Index with CS GRAI highlights
blindly or in isolation, but the Credit Suisse method-
Source: Credit Suisse, DataStream: MSEMKF$(MSRI) & AUSGVG4(RI)
ology has proved to be robust, is consistently linked
to global growth and widely followed by investors
and policymakers. Used appropriately, it can be a
valuable resource for identifying potential turning
5
Normalized Ratio of Indices
points in financial markets and improving asset
allocation decisions.
4
Note: The Global Strategy team within the CS
Investment Bank calculates the CS GRAI on a daily
basis, and makes it available to selected clients.
3
Other risk appetite measures using similar method-
ology are also calculated for global equities, US and
European investment grade credit, and for some
government bond markets (duration risk appetite).
2
Figure 5
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Year
CBOE VIX VSTOXX
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012_ 34
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
3+272)272/,$&20720
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_37
Individual
comprise two North American nations (Canada and the USA), eight
euro-currency area states (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain), five European markets that are
outside the euro area (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
markets
UK), three Asia-Pacific countries (Australia, Japan, and New Zealand),
and one African market (South Africa). These countries covered 89% of
the global stock market in 1900, and 85% of its market capitalization
by the start of 2012.
Figure 1
The Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook
Relative sizes of world stock markets, end-1899
covers 19 countries and three regions, all with index France 14.3%
series that start in 1900. Figure 1 shows the relative
sizes of world equity markets at our base date of end- USA 19.3%
1899. Figure 2 shows how they had changed by end- Germany 6.9%
2011. Markets that are not included in the Yearbook
Japan 4.0%
dataset are colored in black. As these pie charts show,
the Yearbook covered 89% of the world equity market in Russia 3.9%
Austria-Hungary 3.5%
UK 30.5%
In the country pages that follow, there are three charts Canada 1.8%
for each country or region. The upper chart reports, for Netherlands 1.6%
the last 112 years, the real value of an initial investment Italy 1.6%
Other 3.6%
in equities, long-term government bonds, and Treasury Other Yearbook 5.1%
The country pages provide data for 19 countries, listed Australia 3.2%
three broad regional groupings. The latter are a 19- USA 44.9% Germany 2.9%
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Extensive additional information is available in the Credit Returns Sourcebook 2012.
Suisse Global Investment Returns Sourcebook 2012.
This 200-page reference book, which is available
Data sources
through London Business School, also contains
bibliographic information on the data sources for each 1. Dimson, E., P. R. Marsh and M. Staunton, 2002, Triumph of the
Optimists, NJ: Princeton University Press
country. The underlying data are available through
2. Dimson, E., P. R. Marsh and M. Staunton, 2007, The worldwide equity
Morningstar Inc.
premium: a smaller puzzle, R Mehra (Ed.) The Handbook of the Equity
Risk Premium, Amsterdam: Elsevier
3. Dimson, E., P. R. Marsh and M. Staunton, 2012, Credit Suisse Global
Investment Returns Sourcebook 2012, Zurich: Credit Suisse Research
Institute
4. Dimson, E., P. R. Marsh and M. Staunton, 2012, The Dimson-Marsh-
Staunton Global Investment Returns Database, Morningstar Inc. (the
“DMS” data module)
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_38
country
2,459
1,000
100
10
5.7
2.2
Australia is often described as “The Lucky Country” with 1
Figure 3
Australia also has a significant government and Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
corporate bond market, and is home to the largest
financial futures and options exchange in the Asia-
Pacific region. Sydney is a major global financial center. 25
20
18.2
15
10 13.2
11.3
5 7.2
1.6 5.5 4.6 5.4
0.7
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_39
of Europe 10
1
14
0.9
0.7
Belgium lies at the crossroads of Europe’s economic
backbone and its key transport and trade corridors, and
0
is the headquarters of the European Union. In 2011, 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
Belgium was ranked the most globalized of the 208
countries that are evaluated by the KOF Index of Equities Bonds Bills
Globalization.
Figure 2
Belgium’s strategic location has been a mixed Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
blessing, making it a major battleground in two world
wars. The ravages of war and attendant high inflation 10
rates are an important contributory factor to its poor
long-run investment returns – Belgium has been one of 5
the two worst-performing equity markets and the sixth
worst performing bond market. 1.6 0.6 1.6 2.5 2.8
0
-2.3
-1.2
The Brussels stock exchange was established in 1801 -5.4
-5
under French Napoleonic rule. Brussels rapidly grew
into a major financial center, specializing during the
early 20th century in tramways and urban transport. -10
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
Its importance has gradually declined, and Euronext Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
10 11.9
5 7.8 8.0
5.2 4.9
2.4
0
-0.1 -0.4
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_40
Resourceful 1,000
492
country
100
10 11.7
5.6
1
Canada is the world’s second-largest country by land
mass (after Russia), and its economy is the tenth-largest.
0
As a brand, it is rated number one out of 110 countries 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
monitored in the latest Country Brand Index. It is blessed
with natural resources, having the world’s second-largest Equities Bonds Bills
oil reserves, while its mines are leading producers of
nickel, gold, diamonds, uranium and lead. It is also a Figure 2
major exporter of soft commodities, especially grains and Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
wheat, as well as lumber, pulp and paper.
10
The Canadian equity market dates back to the opening of
the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1861 and is the world’s 5
4.6
fourth-largest, accounting for 4.0% of world capitalization. 4.1
3.0 0.8 3.4
Canada also has the world’s eighth-largest bond market. 2.4
0
-1.8 -1.5
Canadian equities have performed well over the long run, Figure 3
with a real return of 5.7% per year. The real return on Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
bonds has been 2.2% per year. These figures are close to
those for the United States.
25
20
15 17.2
10
10.4
8.9
5
5.7 1.6 5.3 4.9
4.6
2.2
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_41
Happiest 1,000
nation
202
100
33.2
10 11.4
1
In a 2011 meta-survey published by the National Bureau
of Economic Research, Denmark was ranked the
0
happiest nation on earth, closely followed by Sweden, 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
Switzerland, and Norway.
Equities Bonds Bills
Whatever the source of Danish happiness, it does not
appear to spring from outstanding equity returns. Since Figure 2
1900, Danish equities have given an annualized real Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
return of 4.9%, which, while respectable, is below the
world return of 5.4%. 10
The Copenhagen Stock Exchange was formally Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
established in 1808, but can trace its roots back to the Figure 3
late 17th century. The Danish equity market is relatively Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
small. It has a high weighting in healthcare (61%) and
industrials (19%), and the largest stocks listed in
Copenhagen are Novo-Nordisk, Danske Bank, and AP 25
Moller-Maersk. 20 20.9
15
10 11.7
8.9
5 7.2
6.2 6.0
4.9 3.2 2.2
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_42
West
237
100
10
1 0.8
With its proximity to the Baltic and Russia, Finland is a 0.6
meeting place for Eastern and Western European
0
cultures. This country of snow, swamps and forests – 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
one of Europe’s most sparsely populated nations – was
part of the Kingdom of Sweden until sovereignty Equities Bonds Bills
transferred in 1809 to the Russian Empire. In 1917,
Finland became an independent country. Figure 2
Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
Newsweek magazine ranks Finland as the best country
to live in the whole world in its August 2010 survey of 10
education, health, quality of life, economic
competitiveness, and political environment of 100 5
5.2 5.5
countries. A member of the European Union since 3.9 3.8
4.6
-5
The Finns have transformed their country from a farm -7.4
and forest-based community to a diversified industrial
-10
economy operating on free-market principles. The
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
OECD ranks Finnish schooling as the best in the world.
Per capita income is among the highest in Western Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
Europe. Figure 3
Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
Finland excels in high-tech exports. It is home to Nokia,
the world’s largest manufacturer of mobile telephones, 30
30.4
which has been rated the most valuable global brand 25
outside the USA. Forestry, an important export earner,
20
provides a secondary occupation for the rural population.
15
13.6
Finnish securities were initially traded over-the-counter 10 12.6 11.8
or overseas, and trading began at the Helsinki Stock 5 7.1 6.7
Exchange in 1912. Since 2003, the Helsinki exchange 5.0
-0.2
0
has been part of the OMX family of Nordic markets. At -0.5
-5
its peak, Nokia represented 72% of the value-weighted
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
HEX All Shares Index, and Finland is a highly
concentrated stock market. The largest Finnish Equities Bonds Bills
European 100
center
24
10
1 .89
0.1
Paris and London competed vigorously as financial
.04
centers in the 19th century. After the Franco-Prussian
0.01
War in 1870, London achieved domination. But Paris 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
remained important, especially, to its later disadvantage,
in loans to Russia and the Mediterranean region, Equities Bonds Bills
including the Ottoman Empire. As Kindelberger, the
economic historian put it, “London was a world financial Figure 2
center; Paris was a European financial center.” Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
-10
Long-run French asset returns have been disappointing.
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
France ranks 16th out of the 19 Yearbook countries for
equity performance, 15th for bonds and 18th for bills. It Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
has had the third-highest inflation, hence the poor fixed Figure 3
income returns. However, the inflationary episodes and Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
poor performance date back to the first half of the 20th
century and are linked to the world wars. Since 1950,
French equities have achieved mid-ranking returns. 25
23.5
20
15
10 13.0
10.2 9.5
5 7.1
2.9 4.1
0
-0.1 -2.8
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_44
Locomotive 100
of Europe
24
10
.14
0.1
German capital market history changed radically after .07
World War II. In the first half of the 20th century,
0.01
German equities lost two-thirds of their value in World 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
War I. In the hyperinflation of 1922–23, inflation hit 209
billion percent, and holders of fixed income securities Equities Bonds Bills
were wiped out. In World War II and its immediate
aftermath, equities fell by 88% in real terms, while Figure 2
bonds fell by 91%. Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
-10
Today, Germany is Europe’s largest economy. Formerly
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
the world’s top exporter, it has now been overtaken by
China. Its stock market, which dates back to 1685, Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
ranks eight in the world by size, while its bond market is Figure 3
the world’s sixth-largest. Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
5 8.1
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_45
100
60
10
2.8
2.1
1
Ireland was born as an independent country in 1922 as
the Irish Free State, free at last after 700 years of
0
Norman and later British involvement and control. By the 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
1990s and early 2000s, Ireland experienced great
economic success and became known as the Celtic Equities Bonds Bills
Tiger. The financial crisis changed that, and the country
is now facing hardship. Just as the Born Free Figure 2
Foundation aims to free tigers from being held captive in Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
zoos, Ireland now needs to be saved from being a
captive of the economic system. 10
Banking 100
innovators
10
6
.14
0.1
While banking can trace its roots back to Biblical times,
Italy can claim a key role in the early development of
0.01 .02
modern banking. North Italian bankers, including the 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
Medici, dominated lending and trade financing
throughout Europe in the Middle Ages. These bankers Equities Bonds Bills
were known as Lombards, a name that was then
synonymous with Italians. Indeed, banking takes its Figure 2
name from the Italian word “banca," the bench on which Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
the Lombards used to sit to transact their business.
10
Italy retains a large banking sector to this day, with
financials still accounting for 28% of the Italian equity 5
5.5
market. Oil and gas accounts for a further 28%, and the
3.5
largest stocks traded on the Milan Stock Exchange are
0
Eni, Enel, and Generali. -2.5 -0.4
-1.3
-5.0 -5.2
-5 -6.3
Sadly, Italy has experienced some of the poorest asset
returns of any Yearbook country. Since 1900, the
-10
annualized real return from equities has been 1.7%, the
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
lowest return out of 19 countries. Apart from Germany,
with its post-World War I and post-World War II Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_47
Birthplace 1000
of futures
100
53
10
1
.30
Japan has a long heritage in financial markets. Trading 0.1 .12
in rice futures had been initiated around 1730 in Osaka,
0.01
which created its stock exchange in 1878. Osaka was to 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
become the leading derivatives exchange in Japan (and
the world’s largest futures market in 1990 and 1991) Equities Bonds Bills
while the Tokyo stock exchange, also founded in 1878,
was to become the leading market for spot trading. Figure 2
Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
From 1900 to 1939, Japan was the world’s second-
best equity performer. But World War II was disastrous 10
and Japanese stocks lost 96% of their real value. From
1949 to 1959, Japan’s “economic miracle” began and 5
5.6
equities gave a real return of 1,565%. With one or two 4.7
the world index versus 32% for the USA. Real estate
-10
values were also riding high and it was alleged that the
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
grounds of the Imperial palace in Tokyo were worth
more than the entire State of California. Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
Figure 3
Then the bubble burst. From 1990 to the start of 2009, Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
Japan was the worst-performing stock market. At the
start of 2012 its capital value is still only one-third of its 29.8
value at the beginning of the 1990s. Its weighting in the 25
world index fell from 40% to 8%. Meanwhile, Japan 20
suffered a prolonged period of stagnation, banking 20.0
15
crises and deflation. Hopefully, this will not form the
13.9
blueprint for other countries that are hoping to emerge 10
10.8
from their own financial crises. 5
5.8 4.9
3.6
0
Despite the fallout from the bursting of the asset -1.1 -1.9
-5
bubble, Japan remains a major economic power. It has
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
the world’s third-largest equity market as well as its
second-biggest bond market. It is a world leader in Equities Bonds Bills
Exchange
Annualized performance from 1900 to 2011
1,000
pioneer
193
100
10
5.4
2.1
Although some forms of stock trading occurred in 1
among the Yearbook countries (after Switzerland). Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
Figure 3
The Netherlands has a prosperous open economy. The
Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
largest energy company in the world, Royal Dutch Shell,
now has its primary listing in London and a secondary
listing in Amsterdam. But the Amsterdam Exchange still
25
hosts more than its share of major multinationals,
20 21.8
including Unilever, ArcelorMittal, ING Group, and
Phillips. 15
10
9.4
5 7.9
4.8 1.5 0.7 4.5 3.6 4.9
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_49
integrity
100
10 10.5
6.4
1
For a decade, New Zealand has been promoting itself
to the world as “100% pure” and Forbes calls this
0
marketing drive one of the world's top ten travel 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
campaigns. But the country also prides itself on
honesty, openness, good governance, and freedom to Equities Bonds Bills
run businesses. According to Transparency
International, in 2010 New Zealand was perceived as Figure 2
the least corrupt country in the world. The Wall Street Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
Journal ranks New Zealand as the best in the world for
business freedom. The Global Peace Index for 2011 10
rates the country as the most peaceful in the world.
5
The British colony of New Zealand became an 4.0
3.6
independent dominion in 1907. Traditionally, New 0.6 2.0 2.5
0
Zealand's economy was built upon on a few primary -2.0
-4.2
products, notably wool, meat, and dairy products. It
-5
was dependent on concessionary access to British -7.1
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_50
kingdom
100 88
10 7.5
3.7
1
Norway is a very small country (ranked 115th by
population and 61st by land area) surrounded by large
0
natural resources that make it the world’s fourth-largest 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
oil exporter and the second-largest exporter of fish.
Equities Bonds Bills
The population of 4.8 million enjoys the second-largest
GDP per capita in the world and lives under a Figure 2
constitutional monarchy outside the Eurozone (a Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
distinction shared with the UK). The United Nations,
through its Human Development Index, ranks Norway 10
the best country in the world for life expectancy,
education and standard of living. 5
7.0
4.3
0.8 3.1 2.9
The Oslo stock exchange (OSE) was founded as 2.5 2.2 2.2
0
Christiania Bors in 1819 for auctioning ships,
commodities and currencies. Later, this extended to
-5
trading in stocks and shares. The exchange now forms
part of the OMX grouping of Scandinavian exchanges.
-10
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
In the 1990s, the Government established its petroleum
fund to invest the surplus wealth from oil revenues. This Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
has grown to become the largest fund in Europe and the Figure 3
second-largest in the world, with a market value above Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
USD 0.5 trillion. The fund invests predominantly in
equities and, on average, it owns more than one percent
of every listed company in the world. 25 27.3
20
The largest OSE stocks are Statoil, Telenor, andDnB
15
NOR.
10 12.2
5 7.9 7.1
1.8 1.2 5.6 4.9
4.1
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_51
Golden 10,000
opportunity
2,440
1,000
100
10 7.2
3.0
The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870 and the 1
10 12.5
10.3
5 7.2 6.8
1.8 6.0 6.2
1.0
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_52
America
43
10
4.3
1 1.4
The Madrid Stock Exchange was founded in 1831 and it Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
15
10 11.7
9.4
5 7.2
1.3 6.1 5.8
3.4 0.3
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_53
returns
100
17.0
10
7.8
1
Alfred Nobel bequeathed 94% of his total assets to
establish and endow the five Nobel Prizes (first awarded
0
in 1901), instructing that the capital be invested in safe 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
securities. Were Sweden to win a Nobel prize for its
investment returns, it would be for its achievement as Equities Bonds Bills
the only country to have real returns for equities, bonds
and bills all ranked in the top four. Figure 2
Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
Real Swedish equity returns have been supported by a
policy of neutrality through two world wars, and the 10
benefits of resource wealth and the development, in the
1980s, of industrial holding companies. Overall, they 5 5.9
have returned 6.1% per year, behind the three highest- 3.6
5.0
4.1 4.2
0.9 3.5
ranked countries, Australia, South Africa and the USA.
0
-1.1
The Stockholm stock exchange was founded in 1863
-5
and is the primary securities exchange of the Nordic
countries. Since 1998, has been part of the OMX
-10
grouping. The largest SSE stocks are Nordea Bank,
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
Ericsson, and Svenska Handelsbank.
Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
Despite the high rankings for real bond and bill returns, Figure 3
current Nobel prize winners will rue the instruction to Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
invest in safe securities as the real return on bonds was
only 2.6% per year, and that on bills only 1.8% per
year. Had the capital been invested in domestic equities, 25
the winners would have enjoyed immense fortune as 20
22.9
well as fame.
15
10 12.4
9.9
5 6.8
6.1 6.2 5.5
2.6 1.8
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_54
Traditional 1,000
safe haven
100 93
10 11.4
2.5
1
For a small country with just 0.1% of the world’s
population and 0.008% of its land mass, Switzerland
0
punches well above its weight financially and wins 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
several gold medals in the global financial stakes. In the
Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, Switzerland Equities Bonds Bills
is top ranked in the world.
Figure 2
The Swiss stock market traces its origins to exchanges Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
in Geneva (1850), Zurich (1873) and Basel (1876). It is
now the world’s seventh-largest equity market, 10
accounting for 3.2% of total world value.
5
Since 1900, Swiss equities have achieved a mid-ranking 3.9 1.0 3.0 3.3
real return of 4.1%, while Switzerland has been one of 0.9 1.5 1.9
0
the world’s four best-performing government bond -3.3
markets, with an annualized real return of 2.2%.
-5
Switzerland has also enjoyed the world’s lowest inflation
rate: just 2.3% per year since 1900. Meanwhile, the
-10
Swiss franc has been the world’s strongest currency.
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
Switzerland is, of course, one of the world’s most Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_55
Global 1,000
center
291
100
10
5.4
2.9
1
Organized stock trading in the UK dates from 1698.
This mostly took place in City of London coffee houses
0
until the London Stock Exchange was formally 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
established in 1801. By 1900, the UK equity market
was the largest in the world, and London was the Equities Bonds Bills
world’s leading financial center, specializing in global
and cross-border finance. Figure 2
Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
Early in the 20th century, the US equity market overtook
the UK, and nowadays, both New York and Tokyo are 10
larger than London as financial centers. What continues
to set London apart, and justifies its claim to be the 5
world’s leading international financial center, is the 4.3 4.2
3.6
global, cross-border nature of much of its business. 1.3
2.6 2.7
0
-2.4 -0.6
market is the largest in the world, and London has the Figure 3
world’s second-largest stock market, third-largest Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
insurance market, and seventh-largest bond market.
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_56
superpower
100
10 9.3
2.8
1
In the 20th century, the United States rapidly became
the world’s foremost political, military, and economic
0
power. After the fall of communism, it became the 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
world’s sole superpower.
Equities Bonds Bills
The USA is also a financial superpower. It has the
world’s largest economy, and the dollar is the world’s Figure 2
reserve currency. Its stock market accounts for 45% of Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
total world value, which is over five times as large as the
UK, its closest rival. The USA also has the world’s 10
largest bond market.
5
5.2 5.2
US financial markets are also the best documented in 3.9 4.1
the world and, until recently, most of the long-run 2.0 0.2 1.7
0
evidence cited on historical asset returns drew almost
exclusively on the US experience. Since 1900, US -4.7
-5
equities and US bonds have given real returns of 6.2%
and 2.0%, respectively.
-10
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
There is an obvious danger of placing too much reliance
on the excellent long run past performance of US Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs Bills (% p.a.)
stocks. The New York Stock Exchange traces its origins Figure 3
back to 1792. At that time, the Dutch and UK stock Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
markets were already nearly 200 and 100 years old,
respectively. Thus, in just a little over 200 years, the
USA has gone from zero to a 45% share of the world’s 25
equity markets. 20
20.2
15
Extrapolating from such a successful market can lead to
“success” bias. Investors can gain a misleading view of 10
10.3
9.3
equity returns elsewhere, or of future equity returns for 5
6.2
5.0
the USA itself. That is why this Yearbook focuses on 2.0
0.9 3.9 4.7
0
global returns, rather than just those from the USA.
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_57
Globally 1,000
344
diversified
100
10
7.0
2.8
1
It is interesting to see how the 19 Yearbook countries
have performed in aggregate over the long run. We have
0
therefore created a 19-country world equity index 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
denominated in a common currency, in which each
country is weighted by its starting-year equity market Equities Bonds US Bills
capitalization, or in years before capitalizations were
available, by its GDP. We also compute a 19-country Figure 2
world bond index, with each country weighted by GDP. Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
17.7% per year. This compares with 23.4% per year for Figure 3
the average country and 19.9% per year for the USA. Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
The risk reduction achieved through global diversification
remains one of the last “free lunches” available to
investors. 25
20
17.7
15
10
10.4
8.5
5
5.4 0.9 4.8 3.9 4.7
0 1.7
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_58
world
200
100
10
4.1
2.8
1
In addition to the two world indexes, we also construct
two world indexes that exclude the USA, using exactly
0
the same principles. Although we are excluding just one 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
out of 19 countries, the USA accounts for roughly half
the total equity market capitalization of our 19 countries, Equities Bonds US Bills
so the 18-country world ex-US equity index represents
approximately half the total value of the world index. Figure 2
Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
We noted above that, until recently, most of the long-
run evidence cited on historical asset returns drew 10
almost exclusively on the US experience. We argued
that focusing on such a successful economy can lead to 5
“success” bias. Investors can gain a misleading view of 4.5
3.9
3.7 3.5
equity returns elsewhere, or of future equity returns for 1.9
0
the USA itself. -3.5 -3.1 -0.1
-5
The charts opposite confirm this concern. They show
that, from the perspective of a US-based international
-10
investor, the real return on the world ex-US equity index
2002–2011 1987–2011 1962–2011 1900–2011
was 4.8% per year, which is 1.4% per year below that
for the USA. This suggests that, although the USA has Premium vs Bonds (% p.a.) Premium vs US Bills (% p.a.)
25
20
20.4
15
14.2
10
5 8.0
4.8 1.3 0.9 4.3 3.9 4.7
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 Country profiles_59
World
150
100
10
2.8
2.6
1
The Yearbook documents investment returns for 13
European countries. They comprise eight euro currency
0
area states (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 2000 10
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) and five
European markets that are outside the euro area Equities Bonds US Bills
(Denmark, Sweden and the UK; and from outside the
EU, Norway and Switzerland). Loosely, we might argue Figure 2
that these 13 countries represent the Old World. Equity risk premium over 10 to 112 years
for the world index, indicating that the Old World Figure 3
countries have underperformed. This may relate to the Returns and risk of major asset classes since 1900
destruction from the two world wars, where Europe was
at the epicenter; or to the fact that many of the New
World countries were resource-rich; or perhaps to the 25
greater vibrancy of New World economies. 20 21.5
15
15.3
10
5 7.7
4.6 0.9 0.9 3.9 3.9 4.7
0
-5
Real return (%) Nominal return (%) Standard deviation
Source: Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, Credit Suisse Global Investment
Returns Sourcebook 2012.
CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 _60
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CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2012 _61
Mike Staunton
Mike Staunton is Director of the London Share Price Database, a
research resource of London Business School, where he
produces the London Business School Risk Measurement
Service. He has taught at universities in the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong and Switzerland. Dr Staunton is co-author with Mary
Jackson of Advanced Modelling in Finance Using Excel and VBA,
published by Wiley and writes a regular column for Wilmott
magazine. He has had articles published in Journal of Banking &
Finance, Financial Analysts Journal, Journal of the Operations
Research Society, and Quantitative Finance. With Elroy Dimson
and Paul Marsh, he co-authored the influential investment book
Triumph of the Optimists, published by Princeton University Press,
which underpins this Yearbook and the accompanying Credit
Suisse Global Investment Returns Sourcebook 2012. His PhD in
Finance is from London Business School.
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Printed Matter
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No. 01-11-473570 – www.myclimate.org
© myclimate – The Climate Protection Partnership