ON PLAGIARISM : BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD,

SCHOPENHAUER
NICHOLAS PASTORE

Queens College of the City University of New York

When a boy of 13 years was recently asked to define plagiarism, he replied,

“My teacher said plagiarism is when you quote somebody without using quotation
marks.” Although limited in scope, this serves as a useful definition of much that
will be discussed in this paper. Plagiarism includes other types of unacknowledged
borrowed content, The borrowed content may be partly a literal transcription and
partly a paraphrase of the original, or it may be a literal transcription with minor
alterations. The scholarly apparatus, references and page citations, may be taken
over by one author from another, and perhaps also the accompanying content in
the running text. The borrowing of this type of content becomes conspicuous when
the original author may have some errors in his references and these are repeated,
or when the original author has knowledge of languages not possessed by a later
author. This borrowed content can be a useful and simple marker for tracing the
transmission of ideas. The borrowing of the conceptual structure constitutes another
type of plagiarism. The first author may have formulated and introduced this
structure for the purpose of organizing a subject matter which, had it not been for
his work, would have appeared chaotic. Such content also can be useful in tracing
the transmission of ideas, even when it has entered the public domain and acknowl-
edgement or citation of the original author no longer is an obligation. Still another
type is the borrowing of an original conception, regardless of whether it has been
improved upon or further developed.
Although plagiarism usually is considered as a form of corruption, therefore
suggesting spuriousness of the product, yet it may have a constructive outcome.
For instance, an author can assemble the contents borrowed from others so well that
his work becomes a useful contribution.
Plagiarism, even if proved, raises the important question which may be difficult
to resolve, namely, that of proving intention to plagiarize. An author may plagiarize
and not know it. Thus, at a time when he does not have the thought of publication,
he is so impressed with a concept and its statement that he writes it down for his
personal use without quotation marks and without noting the source. Later, having
decided to write, he comes across this earlier statement in his notes, believes that
it is his own because he has forgotten its origin, and includes it in his published work.
Boring has discussed an interesting instance similar to this which he called “un-
conscious plagiarism” (4, 318-23). The absence of intention can be accounted for in
other ways. For instance, suppose an author has the services of a research assistant
and requests him to find examples to illustrate some idea and to include the refer-
ences. The assistant locates an unfamiliar source and simply copies both the content
and its references without any citation of the author copied. The author may be so
impressed with his assistant’s ‘research’ that he decides to include it without change,
but with no acknowledgment of the assistant because he was paid. Unwittingly, he

378
 ON PLAGIARISM : BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENH-4UER 379

has plagiarized, and may be justly charged notwithstanding the mediation of another
party.
Although conscious intention may be difficult to establish, its role cannot be
set aside. To be glorified as the originator of B momentous conception in the history
of thought, or even t o be known as a published author, represents a strong motive for
plagiarism. And, especially at the present time, the powerful pressures brought to
bear on academicians for productivity measured in terms of number of publications
cannot be dismissed. The pressure may be so strong that a professor, rather than
perish, decides t o copy and publish. But whatever role is t o be assigned to intention,
a preliminary task is that of establishing parallelism in conception and verbal con-
tent between one work and a later one. Almost needless t o say, this procedure has a
drawback. Part of the content in one work may in fact be identical to the correspond-
ing content of an earlier work, but this does not necessarily imply that the later
author has copied the earlier author. Both authors could have copied a still earlier
author. Thus another criterion is essential. If the earlier and presumably original
author presents the first-time publication of certain content, then by definition, his
role as a possible plagiarist is excluded, and the later author is his plagiarist.’
In this paper, the two principal texts whose contents were borrowed and which
form the basis of the discussion of Buffon, Condillac, and Porterfield, are Male-
branche’s 1712 edition of Recherche de la vbritc? and the Taylor 1700 English transla-
tion of an earlier edition of this work, and Smith’s 1738 Compleat system of opticks.
Malebranche’s work, generally not familiar t o American psychologists, had a signifi-
cant impact on the history of thought. For instance, it was a strong iduence in the
development of Berkeley’s metaphysics and theory of vision (by way of Taylor’s
translation ) (Cf. 26; 27). Malebranche enters our discussion mainly through his
concise presentation and illustrations of what he termed “six means” for “judging
of the distance of objects.”2
The work of Smith appeared in two volumes. The second volume includes a set
of over 700 Remarks, principally by himself and Jurin, and Jurin’s Essay upon
distinct and indistinct vision. The running text and many of the Remarks primarily
concern the mathematics and physics of optical instruments and other related phe-
nomena; only relatively small portions deal with matters of exclusive psychological
interest, these being contained in Chapter 5 of Vol. 1 and some of the Remarks as
well. It became a widely cited text, partly because of its translation into German
(1755) and also into French (1767). It was a basic source for Priestley’s History
and present state of discoveries relating to vision, light and colours (1772).
I n Chapter 5, Smith develops his empiristic theory of visual perception in the
context of Locke, Molyneux, and Berkeley. As corroboration of it, he presents a
complete transcription of the famous Cheselden case, the first appearance in a pub-
lication of general scientific interest subsequent to its original publication in 1728.
He describes and interprets many examples of visual illusions, termed by him
“fallacies of vision.” These and other illusions introduced in the Remarks have
become part of the basic literature of perception. Almost all the fallacies of vision
1See Lindey’s book (24) for interestingdiscussion of plagiarism and illustrationsof it by illustrious
people.
*Inour paper, Malebrancheis regarded rn a primary source althoughhis discussion of the“means”
WBS influenced by previous theorisits, such as DctscarteR. See editor’s annot.ationsfor Chpter 9 of
Malebranche’s Bk. 1 (29).
380 NICHOLAS PASTORE

most probably represent the first-time publication of them. Thus Smith may write,
“Dr. Jurin tells me,” or “Martin Folkes informs me.” This language suggests the
personal communication of content to Smith. Smith, who gives scrupulous attention
to documentation and citation, surely would have cited the fact of previous publica-
tion if this had been the case. But this he does not do.

G. L. L. BUFFON (1707-1788)
Buffon was the prime mover and a principal co-author of the encyclopedic and
popular Histoire naturelle which, beginning with the publication of three volumes in
1749, was to appear in 44 volumes in over three decades. The first three volumes of
1749 became a best-seller in that period, the first printing was exhausted in six weeks
with another appearing shortly afterwards. Translations of these volumes into
English, Dutch, and German were brought out in the same year (6, viii). Buffon was
familiar with the Smith text, the comparison text in this discussion, for he cites it in
various ways but not in relation to the contents t o be compared.
Buffon’s own contribution to the third volume which deals with the senses is
the source of our discussion. Here he elaborates his theory of visual perception, the
main features of which are: the human infant sees double because there are two
retinal images in looking a t a single object; the human infant sees upside down be-
cause the images are inverted; the human infant will experience visual sensations
inside the eyes because that is where the images are located; the sense of touch is the
important sense at the basis of the acquisition of perceptions (5,306-26). A dramatic
expression of these assumptions, almost an after-thought for Buffon, concerns the
way perceptions are supposed to develop in a fictional “perfectly formed” man by
means of touch (5, 364-70). This fiction will be noted in the following section on
Condillac.
Smith opens Chapter 5 in this way: “In order to account for several appear-
ances in vision, it is necessary t o consider the manner of acquiring our ideas of things
by sight.” Having noted that both Molyneux and Locke gave a negative answer
to the Molyneux problem, Smith continues: “And this opinion has since been con-
firmed by the experience of several persons, who receiving their sight from the
operation of couching, could not know any one thing from another, however different
in shape and magnitude. Mr. Chesselden having given us a very curious account of
some observations made by a young gentleman who was couched by him in the
thirteenth year of age, I will here insert it in his own words.” This statement has
the footnote: “Phil. Trans. No. 402. See another account in the 55th Tatler.” In
the next section (Section 133), Smith accurately reproduces the case reported by
Cheselden except for the substitution of one word for another. In Section 134, which
immediately follows the account of Cheselden, he writes:
134. Mr. Chesselden adds in another paper printed by it self, that he has
brought to sight several others who had no remembrance of ever having seen;
and that they all gave the same account of their learning to see, as they called it,
with the young gentleman above mentioned, though not in so many particulars;
and that they all had this in common, that having never had occasion to move
their eyes they knew not how to do it; and at first, could not at all direct them
to a particular object; but in time they acquired that faculty, though by slow
degrees (39,Vol. 1,44).
 ON PLAGIARISM: BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 381

The footnote referring to the 55th Tatler might be misinterpreted, as indeed it was
by Buffon. “See another account” could be taken to mean, (see another account by
Cheselden,’ when considered in the context of Cheselden’s other “paper printed by
it self” in the first line of Section 134. Smith’s failure to reference this other paper
by Cheselden also might contribute to the misinterpretation. However, by “see
another account” Smith meant to say ‘see another account in Tatler No. 55 authored
by someone other than Cheselden.’ It will be observed that he speaks of “several
persons” who had received their sight operatively, and then refers to only a single
case by Cheselden (first paragraph above). Furthermore, Tatler No. 55 is irrelevant
to Cheselden, for it contains an anonymous account of the Grant case.3
The content of Section 134 hinges on Cheselden’s other paper. But as far as can
be judged, this other paper is nonexistent. To be sure, Cheselden did have another
paper which bears on the topic of vision. However, this paper is an explanation of his
“new operation” for giving sight to a blind person (one who was not born blind), and
immediately followed his famous account in the same number of the Philosophical
Transactions (12; 13). But it it is irrelevant to the content of Smith’s Section 134.*
Cope’s biography of Cheselden and the notice about him in Bibliotheca Britannica
do not mention the paper to which Smith referred. There is the possibility that the
content of Section 134 was published by Cheselden in the third edition of his text
on anatomy, and that Smith, who had cited this edition elsewhere in his text, had
meant to refer to it rather than to a paper. However, this edition, which appeared
in 1726 (before the publication of the famous case in 1728), contains no information
of the kind mentioned by Smith. In later editions, Cheselden republished his 1728
case, though without citing its previous publication in the Philosophical Transac-
tions. He included the following paragraph, which actually is not in the original
account.
I have couched several others who were born blind, whose observations were
of the same kind; but they being younger, none of them gave so full an account
as this gentleman (14, 304).6
Cheselden does not discuss the implications of his case for a theory of vision, nor
does he have any materia’l that could pertain to the content of Smith’s Section 134.
One may observe some afinity between the Smith extract and the quotation from
Cheselden. Perhaps the content of Section 134 represents Smith’s elaboration of
that Cheselden paragraph.6
-_-
8For reprint of the Grant case, Ref. 1,41-6. Grant was a quack and the authenticityof the case
was disputed in his own time (1,4211;2, 6111,17311,23011, 37211;31,388; 49). For current acceptance
of the case, Ref. 38.
*For facsimiles of the original Cheselden report and description of the operation, Ref. 31, Ap-
pendix A.
6The quotation is from Cheselden’s 6th edition, the la+ published during his lifetime. The 4th
and 5th editions were not examined. In regard to the critical points, most probably the 6th edition
does not differ from the other two editions.
6Smith’s “elaboration” may be explainable in this way. Cheselden, in the 2nd edition of his
anatomical text, acknowledges the help of Martin Folkes and Jurin “in revising these sheets” (10,
vii). (Acknowledgemnt dropped from later editions.) Folkes and Jurin were Smith’s friends (39,
Remarks, No. 159, 194), and probably also Cheselden’s. Cheselden might have told Folkes or Jurin
about his other supposed paper and its contents, and, his word being accepted because of his eminence,
the oral communication was related to Smith.
::S? NICHOLAS PASTORE

Buffon also discusses the Cheselden case, but this feature in itself is unimportant
because his knowledge of i t could have becn based on his own reading of the original
in English. Previous to his citation of the case, Buffon had developed the principal
features of his empiristic theory of perception, then he presented it as confirmation
of the theory. I n introducing his account of the case, he wrote:

M. Cheselden, famous surgeon of London, having performed the cataract

operation on a young man of thirteen years, blind from birth, and in having
succeeded in giving him the sense of sight, observed the way in which this young
man began to see, and afterwards published the remarks he made on this sub-
ject in the Philosophical Transactions, No. 402, and in the 55th article of the
Tatler (5, 314).
Then Buffon, having given an account of the case, altering some details and omitting
others, concludes with the following paragraph.
M. Cheselden reports a few other instances of blind people who did not
remember ever having seen, and on whom he had performed the same opera-
tion, and he affirms th at when they began to learn to see, they had said the same
things as the young men of whom we have just spoken, but in truth with less
detail. And he reports that he had observed on all, that, a s they never had the
need t o make their eyes move during the period of blindness, they were at first
quite perplexed in imparting motion to their eyes and to direct them to a
particular object. It was only gradually, by degrees and with time, th a t they
learned t o guide their eyes and to direct them to objects they desired to look
a t (5, 318).
When the quotations from Buffon arc compared with those from Smith, also recalling
our comments on Smith, it seems most probable th a t Buffon borrowed from Smith.
Also, i t shoiild be noted that Buffon obviously did not read the 55th article of the
Taller
It could be t h at Buffon, notwithstanding the dependence on Smith for the
inaterial thus far discussed, translated directly from the original Cheselden case when
dealing with its substance. But this does not seem probable. Smith changed Ches-
elden’s “sight” t o “light” (39, Vol. 1, 44).7 Buffon also has “light” (5, 317).
Another sort of dependency of Buffon on the Smith text concerns the “fallacies
of vision”; one such fnllacy-the “fly-bird” illusion-will be discussed in the section
on Condillac.
The article Aveugle (attributed author, D’Alembert) in Vol. 1, 1751, of the
lliderot Enyclopddie, cites Buffon’s account of the Cheselden case and reproduces
it with some changes. Thus the reader of th at period who utilized the Encyclopddie
as a source of authoritative knowledge is one step further removed from the original
data. Moreover, the content of Buffon’s introduction to and conclusion of his dis-
cussion of the case is partly quoted and partly paraphrased but without citing
Buffon as the source. That is, this content is given a factual status, including the
error concerning Tatler NO.55.
7Although Smith‘s change might be an improvement of Cheselden (39, Vol. 1,44), he promised a
verbatim report,.Cheselden retained the word “sight” in the republicationof the case in his anatomical
text (14, 303).
 ON PLAGIARISM : RUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 38.3

E. B. CONDILLAC (1715-1780)
Condillac’s Trait6 des sensations, 1754, receives considerable discussion in rc-
lation to the development of the eighteenth century movement known as the
“Philosophy of the Enlightenment” (8). The principal assumption of Condillac
concerning the nature of sensations is that they are mere modifications of the mind.
He also assumed that the sense of touch was the only basis for the acquisition of
every perception asd cognition. His entire procedure depends on the conception of
a fictional “statue” that receives sensations from each sense individually, and then in
various combinations. He says that his development of theory is based on the
works of Locke, Molyneux, and Berkeley, and he cites the Cheselden case as the
decisive experimental proof .8
In his own period, Condillac was accused of plagiarism of Buffon, and apparent-
ly he felt this accusation so deeply that he had to explicitly disavow it.9 It was-
believed at the time (and in the present) that Condillac had derived his idea of the
“statue” from Buffon’s hypothetical “perfectly formed” man, and also the exclusive
importance he attributed to the sense of touch. In our account, his affinities to
Buffon on material other than the “statue” and sense of touch will be stressed,
The first question to be decided is the source of Condillac’s account of the
Cheselden case. He accurately refers to the original report (“Philos. Transactions,
No. 402, 1728”), thus giving the impression that his knowledge of the case was based
on his own reading of it (15, 289). But according to Le Roy, editor and annotator
of Condillac’s works, Condillac did not know English (18, Vol. 1, 289, note 37).
Since, as far as is known, no complete French translation of the case appeared be-
tween 1728 and 1754, Buffon’s slightly abbreviated account is indicated as the prob-
able source of Condillac’s knowledge.lo Textual analysis shows that this conjecture
is partly confirmed. In the following comparisons of Buffon and Condillac, first the
similarities will be discussed and then, the dissimilarities.
Condillac’s introduction to, and conclusion of, his account of the Cheselden
case is similar to the two corresponding quotations from Buffon. He carries along
Smith’s errors, and he omits the citation of TatEer No. 55. Condillac writes (Chesel-
den’s name is misspelled) ;
Monsieur Chezelden, famous surgeon of London, had the opportunity several
times for observing born-blind persons, whose cataracts he couched. As he
noticed that all told him nearly the same things, he limited himself to giving an
account of the one from whom he elicited the greatest detail (15, 289).
Chezelden remarks that the thing that perplexed the born-blind, whose
cataracts he couched, was that of directing their eyes to objects they wished to
look at. This must be: not having had until then the need to move them, they
had been unable to develop the habit of directing them (15, 291).
In regard to the details of Buffon’s and Condillac’s accounts of the Cheselden
case, Condillac follows Buffon. This becomes obvious when Buffon alters t h e
8Fordiscussion of Condillac’s theory of perception,
- - Ref. 31..
QCondillac’salleged plagiarism is discussed in Ref 6, xxvi; 18, Vol. 1, 222, note 4, 318, note a,
350. note 9: 18. Vol. 2, 539; 35.
’ 1OLe Roy (18, Vol.’ 1, 289, note 38)says Condillac borrowed the details of the Cheselden case from
Voltsire, 1738,hut appropriate textual comparisons readily demonstrate he is in error.
384 NICHOLAS PASTORE

Cheselden text and the same alterations are found in Condillac. The Cheselden text
will be quoted from the original even though Smith’s reproduction is accurate.
Cheselden: “. . . but upon being told what things were, whose form he before
knew from feeling . . . (12, 448)
Buffon: “. . . when things were shown to him that he knew before from feeling
. . . (5, 315)
Condillac: “. . . when objects were shown to him, that he knew by feeling . . .
(15, 290)
Buffon changes “told” to “shown” and omits the word “form.” Condillac follows
suit.
Two further alterations by Buffon concern the translation of Cheselden’s phrase
“to learn” and the insertion of the phrase “learn to see.” In view of the possibility
of a distortion in Cheselden’s meaning, the context will be supplied. For point of
emphasis, the critical words will be italicized, though they are not in the texts under
comparison. One may observe a divergence, shortly to be discussed, of Condillac
from Buffon.
Cheselden: “but having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of
them; and (as he said) at first he learned to know, and again forgot a thousand
things in a day” (12,448). Buffon: “but as he had too many objects to remember
at once, he forgot the greatest part of them, and in the beginning when he
learned (as he said) to see and to know objects, he forgot a thousand things for
one that he remembered” (5, 316)
Condillac: “but he had so many things to remember, that he forgot the way of
seeing some objects in proportion that he learned to see others. I learn, he said, a
thousand things in one day, and I forget just as many” (15,290).
Buffon’s two alterations are carried over into Condillac’s text. The insertion of
“learned to see” (a phrase or its variant that does not appear anywhere in the original
case report,) may have altered Cheselden’s meaning. CheseIden in fact might have
meant ‘(learned to know” in contrast to the phenomenal change suggested by
“learned to see.” Even the shift from Cheselden’s “to learn” t o Buffon’s “to re-
member” may represent a change in meaning. Thus, Cheselden might have meant
to impIy that the boy suffered from an initial incapacity to learn, not that he had the
capacity and then failed to remember what he had learned.“
The possibility that Condillac’s account has information to be found in the
Cheselden case but not in Buffon’s account must be considered. Appropriate textual
comparisons indicate two significant divergences. The content in Cheselden (here in
italics) “forgot a thousand things in a day” is in Condillac’s account and not in
Buffon’s. Cheselden said his patient had a negative reaction to the color black and
that later, when he saw a “Negroe woman,” he was “struck with great horror at the
sight” (12, 448). Condillac reports this content, although mistranslating “Negro
woman” as “Negro man” (un ndgre) (15, 291). Buffon says nothing at all about this
matter.

11Passage containing “sight” or “light” omitted by Condillac.

 ON PLABIABISM : BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 385

The dissimilarities, and discussion of them, render it highly probable that Con-
dillac was textually dependent on Buffon. On the other hand, the dissimilarities
show that this dependence was not total. Perhaps the following hypothesis can
explain both dependence and independence. Condillac followed Buffon’s text in
writing his 1754 work. Then someone, familiar with the Smith text, related the
content of the Cheselden case and the matter preceding and following it. Upon
learning of some additional detail, Condillac revised his account, but still retaining
the material from Buffon. This hypothesis may partly account for the widely dis-
cussed and embarrassing misspelling of “Cheselden” by Condillac. Occasionally it
is spelled (correctly) as “Cheselden,” and occasionally as “Chezelden.” Smith spells
the name as “Chesselden” and Buffon as “Cheselden.” I n a sense both Smith and
Buffon are correct. Smith’s spelling is exactly the way it is found in the authorship
line of Cheselden’s original report in the Philosophical Transactions. The spelling
with the single s, as Buffon has it, is the spelling to be found on the title page of
various editions of Cheselden’s text on anatomy. If Condillac had learned English,
a possibility though there is no evidence for it, and had himself read the Smith text
but still under the influence of Buffon for details of translation, most likely he would
have spelled it as “Chesselden,” the way Smith has it. But if the spelling came from
Buffon, he would have the single s in the name. “Chezelden” would merely be a
variant of “Cheselden” based on French pronunciation. Whoever might have read
the Smith text to Condillac, could have pronounced the name as though having a
single s (a z sound) instead of a double s (a sibilant sound).12
Apart from the Cheselden material, Condillac’s discussion of the “fly-bird”
illusion indicates the direct dependence on Buffon, and indirectly on the Smith text.
The illusion was noticed by Jurin, who communicated it to Smith along with his
interpretation. One day, while shaving, Jurin saw a bird flying at a rapid velocity
in the distance. But it turned out that it was a fly “creeping along” on a window
pane, somewhat to the side of his line of direct vision. Jurin cited two important
conditions for the illusion: the accommodation of the eyes to a point beyond the
window pane, and the blurred retinal image of the fly (39, Remarks, No. 312). Con-
dillac’s discussion of this illusion (15, 286) contributes nothing further than can be
found in Buffon (5, 319). Furthermore, Condillac repeats the ambiguities and an
error in Buffon’s account. Both Buffon and Condillac say the fly is moving quickly
but Jurin actually says the fly is “creeping along.”
Another significant correspondence between Condillac and Buffon that we have
already noted and which is independent of Cheselden or Smith, concerns Condillac’s
alleged plagiarization of Buffon. Buffon had made his feelings known on this issue in
the presence of Condillac. Condillac defended himself against the accusation in two
tracts published in 1755 (16; 17). As a general statement of position, he succinctly
asserts, “it is not possible that I have taken anything from those [works] of M. de
Buffon” (17, 339). Space does not allow for detailed analysis of either Condillac’s
defense or the opinions of the respective partisans of Buffon and Condillac. Piveteau
Wondillac consistently misspelled Berkeley as “Bmclai”. Other names were spelled correctly.
That he might have had a recurrent visual defect should be considered in the interpretation of all
misspellings. In a 1752 letter to Maupertuis, he says a painful inflammation of the eyes made it im-
possible for him to read or write for 8 months, and having anticipated completion of his book on
sensationswithin a year, he does not know when it will be finished (18, Vol. 2,535).
3% NICHOLAS PASTOBE

believes that plagiarism is “untenable” (6, xxvi), whereas Rogers questions the
“good faith” of Condillac in his reply to Buffon (35, 229). That Condillac borrowed
details about Cheselden from Buffon, as well as other material, apparently has been
overlooked. This borrowing would have to be taken into account in the evaluation
of Condillac’s disavowal of plagiarism in respect to any other issue.

W. PORTEXFIELD
(1698?-17681)
Apparently not much is known about the life of Porterfield, even his dates of
birth and death are not certain (9). Priestley indicates he was born about 1698 and
died about 1768.13 According to Chance, he received a degree in medicine at Rheims,
Prance, in 1717, subsequently becoming a professor of this subject in Edinburgh (9).
His best known work is Treatise on the eye, 1759, 2 Vols.; this was another basic
source for Priestley’s historical work, and was often cited in eighteenth and nine-
teenth century discussions of vision. Says Boring of this text: “This book was the
standard and most complete work on the physiology and psychology of vision in the
eighteenth century” (3, 122).14 Helmholtz mentions him for the construction of the
first optometer (23, 133), and philosophers have favorably discussed his criticisms of
Berkeley’s theory of vision (Cf.28, Vol. 1, 154). Only his textual dependence on
Malebranche and Smith will be discussed in our account. However, in passing, we
may note that he was also textually dependent on Berkeley and Synge. For instance,
he copied a portion of Synge’s solution of the Molyneux problem.16 Curiously, in a
recent history of this problem, this portion was quoted, represented as that of
Porterfield, and admiration for the “clarity” of his solution was expressed (22).
Much of Malebranche’s discussion of the “six means” for distance-judgments
was borrowed by Porterfield, and this will be illustrated by only two comparison
extracts. The extract contains Malebranche’s experiment concerning the “stick”
and “hoop” that was to become widely cited in the literature on perception.
Malebranche:
The first, the niost universal, and sometimes the safest way we have, whereby
LO judge of the distance of objects, is the angle made by the rays of our eyes,
whereof the object is the vertical point, that is, the object is the point, where
the two rays meet. When this angle is very large, the object appears near at
hand, on the contrary when it is very acute, we see the object a great way off.
And the change which happens in the situation of the eyes, according to the
changes of this angle, is the means the soul employs to judge concerning the
distance or nighness of objects. . . . A man would easily be convinced of what I
say, if he would be at the trouble of making a very easy experiment: As, let him
hang a ring at the end of a thread, SO placed that the hoop being turned directly
towards him, the aperture of it may not appear; or if he please let him drive a
stick in the ground, and take another in his hand, that is curved at the end; let
him retreat three or four steps from the ring or the stick, and shutting one eye
---
‘aFor Priestley’s approximate dates of birth and death, see his biographical chart before the title
page of Vol. 1 and its index (unnumberedpage) toward the end of Vol. 2 (34).
14Boring summarizes Porterfield’s “psychophysiology,” including the six means shortly to be
discussed above (3, 122-3).
Wornpare Porterfield (33, Vol. 2, 415) with S p g e (a5, 371-3).
 ON PLAGIARISM: BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 387

with one hand, let him try t o hit the aperture of the ring, or with the bent end
of the stick in his hand to touch the other across, a t a n height th a t is much upoii
a level with the eye; and he will be surprised to find himself incapable of doing
it a t a n hundred trials, though nothing in the world seems easier. . . .
But it ought to be well observed th at I have said, a man should endeavour
t o hit the aperture of the ring, or to touch the stick cross-wise, and not by way
of a right line from our eye to the ring; for so indeed there would be no difiiiculty
a t all: so far from it, th at i t would be much easier to effect it, with one eye shut,,
than with both of them open, since th at would be a rule 1.0 direct him.
Now it may be said, th at the difficulty, which is found, when a man tries to
direct t.he end of the stick through the ring cross-wise, with only one eye open,
proceeds from this, namely, th at one eye being shut, the angle I have mentioned
is unknown. For to know the magnitude of an angle, it is not enough to know
the length of its base, and the bigness of the angle made by one of its sides up011
the base; for this is known in the foregoing experiment: B u t it is yet farther
necessary t o know the other angle, which is made by the other side upon the
base, or the length of one of the sides. Which cannot be exactly known without
opening the other eye. And thus the soul cannot make use of her natural
geometry t o judge of the distance of the ring (30, 22).16
Porterfield :
There are six means which concur for our judging of the distance of objects,
of all which the most universal and, frequently, the most sure, is the angle which
the rays of light make a t the object in coming thence to our eyes: When this
angle is very great, we see the object very near; and on the contrary, when it is
very small, we see it at a great distance; and the change which happens in thc
situation of our eyes, according to the change of this angle, is a mean which
our mind makes use of for judging of the distance and proximity of objects. To
be persuaded of the truth of this, suspend by a thread a ring, so as its side ma)
be towards you, and its hole look right and left, and taking a small rod, crooked
at the end, in your hand, retire from the ring two or three paces, and having
with one hand covered one of your eyes, endeavour with the other to pass the
crooked end of your rod through the ring. This appears very easy, and yet, upon
trial, perhaps once in a hundred times, you shall not succeed, especially if you
move the rod a little quickly. This surprising difficulty, which is found in pass-
ing the rod arises, because when one eye is shut, the angle which the rays of
light make at the object, in coming thence, to both eyes, is not known; for in
any triangle, t o know the bigness of an angle, it is not sufficient to linow thca
length of the base subtending th at angle, and the magnitude of 1he angle which
one of its sides makes with th at base, as is known to mathematicians; but i t is
also necessary to know the other angle which the other side makes with thc
base: But this can never be known but in opening both eyes, and directing
them to the object; and therefore the mind can never make use of its natural
geometry, for judging of th e distance of the ring, while one of the eyes is shut
(33, Vol. 1, 104-6).
16Although Porterfield surely must have relied on the 1712 edition of Malebrtmche, Taylor's
trenslation is given here in order to avoid the possibility of conforming Porterfield to Malebrmche
tbrough retranslation.
388 NICHOLAS PASTORE

The close correspondence of the two extracts is obvious, notwithstanding Porter-

field’s deletion of some material. One should observe that lbalebranche has a clearer
account of the experiment. For instance, in the second paragraph (omitted by
Porterfield), he explains why the ring should be in an end-wise position to the line
of sight.
Porterfield borrowed from Malebranche much other content that does not
pertain to the means.” Furthermore, he adopted the structure of Malebranche’s
theory of sensation and perception, sometimes in the same words, and sometimes
with substitutions, such as “nature” and “mind” for Malebranche’s “God.)7 Male-
branche’s occasionalism, doctrine of “modification of the ~ 0 ~ 1concepts
,~’ of “natural
judgment” and “natural connection,” and stress on individual differences in vision,
are integral features of Porterfield’s own theory. In short, Porterfield’s theory can be
considered as a somewhat up-dated restatement of Malebranche’s. Needless to
say, Porterfield does not acknowledge any intellectual debt to Malebranche for
either concepts or words. He mentions Malebranche and the title of his work,
Recherche de la vdritd only once in his two volumes.l* There is a second mention on
another topic and in reference to an earlier work.
Porterfield also borrowed heavily from the Smith text, not only the textual
content but sometimes even the diagrams. Several times he properly quotes from
Jurin’s contribution to the Smith text, and mentions him by name. Other times
Jurin is mentioned though without (apparently) being quoted. No quotation is
ever attributed to Smith. He is cited by name once, the title (incomplete) of his
text being given. Much of the borrowed content pertains to Smith’s “fallacies of
vision,” Porterfield also adopting this phrase. He interspersed this content in his
discussion of the six means, possibly for the purpose of providing additional illustra-
tive examples. Only one pair of extracts will be given.
Smith :
We are frequently deceived in our estimates of distance by any extraordinary
magnitudes of objects seen at the end of it: as in travelling towards a large city
or a castle or a cathedral church or a mountain larger than ordinary, we think
they are much nearer than we find them to be upon trial . . . . Animals and all
small objects seen in valleys, contiguous to large mountains, appear extra-
ordinary small; because we think the mountain is nearer to us than if it was
smaller, and we should not be surprized at the smallness of the neighouring
animals if we thought them farther off. In like manner when they are placed
upon the top of the mountain or upon a large building and are viewed from
below, we think they are extraordinary small for the same reason, and also be-
cause we judge the mountain or the building to be lower in proportion tha.n if
it was smaller; both because of its extraordinary magnitude and greater ob-
liquity of its higher parts to the visual rays (39, Vol. 1, 61).19
_-
17Much of the content of Malebranche’s Bk. 1, Chapters 6-8 is to be found in Porterfield’s Vol. 2,
pages 345-407. For recent discussion of Malebranche’stheory of perception, Ref. 31.
‘*Although not indicated by Porterfield (33, Vol. 2, 367), even here he is copying.
Wmith has the following erratum (critical phrase italicized): For “mountain is nearer to us than
i f it was m l l e r ” read “mountain is nearer to US than we should do if it were smaller.” Inciden-
tally, Porterfield does not mention the Cheselden case.
 ON PLAGIAHISM : BUFFON, CONDILLAC, POBTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 389

Porterfield :
From this we may see, why we are so frequently deceived in our estimates of
distance, by an extraordinary magnitudes of objects seen at the end of it; as in
travelling towards a large city, or a castle, or a cathedral church, or a mountain
larger than ordinary, we think they are nearer than we find them to be upon
trial. . . . And this also is the reason why animals, and all small objects seen in
valleys contiguous to large mountains appear extraordinary small: For we
think the mountain is nearer to us than if it was smaller; and we should not be
surprised at the smallness of the neighbouring animals, if we thought them
farther off. And for the same reason we think they are extraordinary small,
when they are placed upon the top of the mountain, or upon a large building,
which appear nearer to us than they truly are, because of their extraordinary
magnitude (33, Vol. 2, 395-6).
A comparison of the two extracts shows that Porterfield, though modifying and
condensing the last sentence of the Smith extract, is textually dependent on Smith.
The deleted portion of the Porterfield extract which is about 12 lines of text, except
for two word substitutions, corresponds literally to the deleted portion of the Smith
extract. The following is a flagrant example of Porterfield’s borrowing. In his
Remarks, Smith condensed and translated a discussion of the French scientist
Bouguer, and referred to it properly (39, Remarks, No. 95). Porterfield copied this
verbatim, including the reference (33, Vol. 2, 402). 2O
Porterfield’s failure to acknowledge any debt to either hfalebranche or Smith
has contributed to a continuing distortion of the historical record. The discussion of
“means” in the article (by Formey), Distance, in the Diderot Encyclopkdie (1754),
is based on Porterfield, who is cited instead of Malebranche.21 The transmission of
Malebranche’s “means,” and Smith’s “fallacies of vision,” by way of Porterfield,
occurs in an unusual way in Priestley’s 1772 historical work. Priestley discusses the
‘six means for judging of distance’ which, as he himself says, is based on Porterfield,
and copies, sometimes condensing, Porterfield’s text. For instance, he reproduces,
partly paraphrasing and partly condensing, the Porterfield extract in the above con-
cerning the “means” (34, 695). Priestley also acknowledges Porterfield, partly
copying him, as the source for his own discussion of the “fallacies of vision.” Thus,
the above extract on distance-estimation from Smith finds its way with minor altera
tions by way of Porterfield into Priestley’s text (34, 696). Apparently Priestley did
not realize that Porterfield borrowed from Malebranche and Smith.22 Priestley has
long discussions and frequent citations of the Smith text and perhaps he should have
observed that this text was the source and, where appropriate, acknowledged it.

ZoPorterfield (33, Vol. 2, 3923) copied Jurin’s lengthy discussion of the “fly-bird” illusion (39,
Remarks, No. 311, 312). This waa not discussed in our paper because he had said he was going to
“mention” another illusion, and cited Jurin’s name. However, since he did not use quotation marks,
“mention” is hardly accurate.
21Formey cites Porterfield’s previous publication (32), where the means are discussed without
citation of Malebranche.
22Priestley catalogs the works in his personal library which he consulted in writing his text in the
unnumbered pages following the index in Vol. 2 (34). Though the works of Smith and Porterfield are
listed, Malebranche’s is not. Because h~ copying of texts seemed so extensive, he, too, was going to
be included in our paper even though he provided references, until, upon reading the preface, it was
noted that he just about said he would copy.
 390 NICHOLAS PASTOBE

Thus the reader at the present time who should rely on PriestIey’s historical ac-
counts, as sometimes happens, would credit Porterfield for certain ideas instead of
either Malebranche or Smith. Boring’s historical notice on the windmill illusion
apparently gives credit to Porterfield for the firsl scientific discussion of it (3, 304),
but this illusion had already been discussed by Smith (one of his “fallacies”), whose
text and diagram Porterfield copied.2a

A. SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860)
Campbell and Tauscher have called attention to Schopenhauer’s claim to
priority in the statement of what came to be known as Emmert’s Law, and evaluated
Schopenhauer’s implicit contention that he had been plagiarized by SBguin (7). Ac-
cording to them, the first record of Schopenhauer’s publication of the law was 1864,
though written by him in 1858 or later. Says Schopenhauer of Sbguin: “This
phenomenon (which I distinctly remember to have been first to notice, in 1815) forms
the theme of an essay by SBguin in the ‘Comptes rendus’ of the 2nd August, 1858,
where it is served up as a new discovery . . .” (37, 79). He seems to suggest that this
discovery had been stated by him in 1815. The German editor of one of his works,
who apparently was on friendly terms with him, lends support to an early statement.
In alluding to the law, he writes: “Thus we find him . . . quoting an interesting fact
he had himself observed in 1815” (37, xxi). Campbell and Tauscher upon researching
Schopenhauer’s writings were unable to find any early statement of the law, and
expressed doubt that he had ever published it. Schopenhauer’s claim that he was the
“first t o notice” it in 1815 is ambiguous. Perhaps “notice” does not imply publica-
tion. If this is the case, it would be rather odd for him to say that SBguin “served
[it] up as a new discovery,” since SBguin could not have known what Schopenhauer
had been thinking about in 1815, or any other time. What is even more unusual is
that he would be asserting the claim of priority for something he had not published
before SBguin. On the other hand, it is possible, notwithstanding the careful re-
search of Campbell and Tauscher, that Schopenhauer did publish in 1815, and that
the publication has not yet been located. Whatever may be the case, there is some
evidence that Schopenhauer had plagiarized a paper by R. W. Darwin first published
in 1786 and republished a few years later in his father’s book (20). Darwin’s long
paper deals mainly with the color changes of after-images. Though the discussion
of the size changes in after-images is relatively short, he was obviously astonished
by this phenomenon. Schopenhauer was familiar with this paper in his own early
work on after-images (1816), for he has a reference to both its original publication
and republication (36, 4 n).
Darwin:
In viewing the spectra of bright objects, as of an area of red silk of half an
inch diameter on white paper, it is easy to magnify it to tenfold its size: for if,
when the spectrum is formed, you still keep your eye fixed on the silk area, and
remove it a few inches further from you, a green circle is seen round the red silk:
for the angle now subtended by the silk is less that it was when the spectrum was
”Compare Smith’s text and diagram (39, VOI.1, 61, Fig.269) with those of Porterfield’s (33, Vol.
2,384, Fig. 23). Smith’s diagram is reproduced and text quoted in Ref. 31, 172.
 ON PLAGIAEIMM : BUFFON, CONDILLAC, PORTERFIELD, SCHOPENHAUER 391

formed, but that of the spectrum continues the same, and our imagination
places them at the same distance. Thus when you view a spectrum on a sheet
of white paper, if you approach the paper to the eye, you may diminish it to a
point; and if the paper is made to recede from the eye, the spectrum will ap-
pear magnified in proportion to the distance (3 t, 346). 24
Schopenhauer :
When I have looked steadily at a coloured object with sharply defined out-
lines-say a red cross-long enough for the physiological image to form in my
eye as a green cross, the further the surface on to which I project it, the larger
it will appear to me: and vice versa. For the image itself occupies an unvarying
portion of my retina, i.e. the portion originally affected by the red cross; there-
fore when referred outwards, or, in other words, recognised as the effect of an
external object, it forms an unchanging visual angle, say of 2’. Now if, in this
case, where all commentary to the visual angle is wanting, I remove it to a dis-
tant surface, with which I necessarily identify it as belonging to its effect, the
cross will occupy 2’ of a distant and therefore larger sphere, and is consequently
large. If, on the other hand, I project the image on to a nearer object, it will
occupy 2’ of a smaller sphere, and is therefore small (37, 78-9).
Schopenhauer regards the phenomenon as corroborating one of his basic themes,
“perception is not only a thing of the senses, but of the intellect also” (37, 78). Sup-
posing he plagiarized Darwin, he changed Darwin’s example (red cross for red
circle), expanded Darwin’s comment concerning the visual angle, and added material
so as to coordinate it to his previous discussion of “spheres.” The role he ascribed
to the intellect is not too dissimilar from Darwin’s comment on the “imagination”. 25

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