Court of Appeal, First Appellate District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District

Charles D. Johnson, Clerk/Executive Officer Charles D. Johnson, Clerk/Executive Officer

Electronically RECEIVED on 9/26/2021 at 12:58:43 AM Electronically FILED on 9/27/2021 by M. Garcia, Deputy Clerk

A161993

In the Court of Appeal

of the State of California
First Appellate District, Division Four
=======================
KAILIN WANG
Appellant
v.
CHRISTOFFER STANFORD THYGESEN
Respondent

=========================

Appeal from the Superior Court, County of San Francisco

Case No. FDV-19-814465
The Honorable Monica F. Wiley, Presiding

Amended Appellant’s
Reply Brief

Kailin Wang
2481 Fairway Dr.,
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 645-1060
kaywg2372@gmail.com
Appellant in Pro Per

1
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.208)

The Respondent, Christoffer S. Thygesen is the son of Allan

Thygesen, the President of Google Americas, (Alphabet, Inc.),
who is financing this litigation for his son.

Dated: September 26, 2021

Kailin Wang, Appellant

** Amends ARB filed on September 23, 2021. I was notified on

September 24, 2021, that Thygesen had all my exhibits, and court
documents taken down from document sharing site Scribd.com,
therefore, I had to re-hyperlink many of the links in my reply brief.
Everything is referenced to the record which is all filed with the trial
court.

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2
CASES 2
SUMMARY OF REPLY 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW 7
ARGUMENT 9

I. THIS CASE SCREAMS OUT FOR AN AWARD OF NEED-BASED

ATTORNEYS FEES 9

A. The Disparities Between the Wang’s and Thygesen’s Income and

Assets are Unfathomable. 9

B. Disparity of Legal Representation 10

C. Thygesen’s Wealthy Parents are Financing All of the Parties
gmCivil and Criminal Proceedings 12
D. Thygesen Has Never Denied Disparity. 15
E. Thygesen Even Argues That Wang Needs a Competent Attorney
Because Wang Misunderstands the Law. 16

F. Alternative Resources are not available. (8 AA 2862) 17

II. THE AWARD OF NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES IS
MANDATORY, “NOT” DISCRETIONARY, WITH THE TRIAL
COURT JUDGE. 17

A. The Purpose of a “Needs-Based” Attorneys Fees Award is to

Provide One of the Parties With an Amount to Properly Litigate the
Controversy. 17

B. Family Code §7605 Absolutely Applies to this Case 18

III. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO RETAIN AN ATTORNEY AND
PROVIDE SOME OF THE INFORMATION THAT THYGESEN

3
 ASSERTS WANG MUST PROVIDE BEFORE WANG CAN BE
GRANTED NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES. 26

A. Alleged Procedural Irregularities 26

B. Information About an Attorney. 28
IV. THERE IS NO PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST AWARDING
NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES IN A DVRO CASE 31

V. OTHER SECTIONS OF THE LAW: (SEE AOB) DUE TO SPACE

LIMITATIONS, PLEASE SEE MY “OPENING BRIEF,” WHICH INCLUDES MY
ARGUMENTS RELATING TO FAMILY CODE § 271, § 128.5, § 2107, § 3121,
§3027.1(A), § 3412(C), § 3428(C), AND § 3452. 32

VI. JUDGE WILEY IS BIASED AND IF THIS CASE IS REMANDED

MUST BE ASSIGNED TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE. 32

CONCLUSION 35

APPENDIX 40

PROOF OF SERVICE 50

4
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Adams v. Murakam Wang (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 120 (pp. 3-6, 3-7) 25
Alan S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 251, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 27
Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 CA4th 942, 28 CR2d 284 4, 20
Banning v. Newdow, 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 451-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 3
Contra: Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1957) 155 Cal.App. 2d 715 20
Crook v. Crook (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 745, 7 Cal.Rptr.892 20
Evilsizor v. Sweeney, A143054 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2016) 29
Guardianship of Paduano, (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 346, 350-352 20
Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App. 3d 1044, 1061 (dis. opn. of Liu,
Acting P.J.). 25
In re Angelia P, 28 Cal.3d 908 (Cal. 1981). 7
In re Catherine S., 230 Cal.App.3d 1253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 7
In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 722–723, 89
Cal.Rptr.3d 849 12
In re Marriage of Barth, 210 Cal.App.4th 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) 7
In re Marriage of Cauley, 138 Cal.App.4th 1100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), 28
In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 19 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056, 131
Cal.Rptr.3d 424 27
In re Marriage of Green (1992) 6 CA4th 584, 590-591, 7 CR2d 872, 875
20
In re Marriage of Morton, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 5
In re Marriage of Munguia (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 853, 195 Cal.Rptr.
1990. 28
In re Marriage of Priem, 214 Cal.App.4th 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 29
In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991) 1 CA4th 1489, 1497, 2
CR2d 690, 695 20
th
In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991) 1 Cal.App.4 1492, …22, 27
In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 167 24
In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 231 Cal.Rptr. 757 26
In re Marriage of Smith, 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 533-34 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015) 12
In re Marriage of Terry, 80 Cal.App.4th 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 6

5
In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1315-1316 3,6
In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313–1314,
172 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 12
Jones v. Union Bank of California, 127 Cal.App.4th 542 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) 7
th
Kevin Q v. Lauren W (2011), 195 Cal.App.4 633, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 67613
Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 642 3, 6, 13, 16, 27
Locatelli v. Locatelli (In re Marriage of Locatelli), B267653 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 31, 2016) 29
Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.App.3d 590, 598 6
Marriage of Dupre (2005) 127 CA4th 1517, 1526, 26 CR3d 328, 335 6
Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 CA4th 529, 533-535, 195 CR3d 162,
165-167— 13
N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 CA5th 1040, 1045, 231 CR3d 67,…..6,13,15,20,22
People vs. Gulbrandsen (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1562. 30
Robert J. v. Catherine D., 171 Cal.App.4th 1500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)‐
5,15
Sangha v. Sangha (In re Marriage of Sangha), D077062 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 22, 2021) 29
Simon v. City & County of San Francisco (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 590, 600
25
U.S. v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965) 12
United States v. Tison, 780 F.2d 1569, 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) 12
Yurasek v. Kesala, A158859 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020) 20, 29
Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter
Group 2020) 4
Judge Lewis CFLR Family Law Bench Blotters (2021) 5

6
Statutes

Fam.C.
§ 271...................................................................................................................8, 33
§ 2030.............................................................8, 9, 22, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 50
§ 2040[a][1] ........................................................................................................... 41
§ 2107.....................................................................................................8, 22, 37, 38
§ 2330.1..................................................................................................................25
§ 3021[e] .......................................................................................................... 24, 25
§ 3027.1[a] ................................................................................................... 8, 22, 33
§ 3063...............................................................................................................41, 42
§ 3064.....................................................................................................................25
§ 3121.............................................................................................................8, 9, 37
§ 3412 (c). .......................................................................................................... 8, 35
§ 3428(c). ............................................................................................................... 35
§ 3452(a). ........................................................................................................... 8,34
§ 6323[a][2]. .................................................................................................... 24, 25
§ 7551..................................................................................................................... 25
§ 7605................................................................8,9,10, 11, 21, 22, 24, 26-31, 37, 50
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 128.5................................................................................................................8, 33
§170.6...................................................................................................12, 47, 49, 50
§ 632...........................................................................................................10, 22, 24

7
 SUMMARY OF REPLY

Respondent Christoffer Thygesen’s erroneous construction of

Family Code § 2030, § 3121, § 7605, -----if accepted, would constitute
an unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the statute that would
frustrate the Legislature's intent.
Section 7605 applicable to UPA cases and the amended section
2030 applying to marital dissolution proceedings, both . . . provide in
relevant part: '[T]he court shall ensure that each party has access to
legal representation to preserve each party's rights by ordering, if
necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to
pay to the other party, or to the other party's attorney, whatever
amount is reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of
maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the
proceeding.' (§ 7605, subd. (a) . . . ; see § 2030, subd. (a)(1).)" (Kevin Q.
v. Lauren W., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 640, fn. omitted.)
The goal of assuring each parent has comparable access to
appropriate legal representation and expertise is to make sure that
each parent's views are equally represented to the court so that the
court's decisions will be in the best interest of the child. (In re Marriage
of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1315-1316). Here, it’s evident
the parties have significant disparity in access to competent legal
representation.1 [6 AA 1613-1637]

1
Thygesen's Legal Team: [6 AA 1613-1637]

8
Thygesen: “Attorney Fees only Apply to the Prevailing Party in a
DVRO.”
Attorney fees/costs in a DVPA proceeding “may” (discretionary)
be made in favor of the prevailing party. [Fam.C. § 6344(a)], however
“need based attorney fees” require a mandatory fee recovery if those
factors show a financial disparity or inability to pay.
In re Marriage of Morton, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407 (Cal. Ct. App.
2018): Concluded that amendments to Family Code section 2030, the
“needs-based” fee provision, requires the lower court to make explicit
findings on the need factors set forth in section 2030(a)(2) and then
require a mandatory fee recovery if those factors show a
financial disparity or inability to pay by the moving dissolution
litigant. The findings can be in writing or made orally on the record. In
this instance, the findings were not made, so that left the remedy on
appeal—either a remand to make the findings or remand to determine
the amount of fees to be awarded to the ex-wife. The Court of Appeal
concluded that the record clearly showed disparity/lack of an ability to
pay, so that the remand was made to determine the amount of fees to
ex-wife plus any fees for winning the appeal as determined in the
discretion of the lower court.

The statutes set forth in this case under (§§ 7600 — 7606)
requiring the wealthier party to pay fees even though he prevails, is the
best way of making sure that opposing points of view may be heard, so
that the best interests of the child are vindicated, regardless of which
parent wins or loses. Banning v. Newdow, 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 451-52
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004)

9
 The provisions of the Parentage Act apply to all proceedings to
determine paternity regardless of whether they are brought under
that statute

This is a custody and visitation proceeding initiated in

conjunction with a request for a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO). Put otherwise, ----Thygesen’s Opposition Brief utterly
ignores that custody is involved in this proceeding—put there by
Thygesen himself back on February 15, 2019.
On March 6, 2019, Thygesen represented to Judge Darwin
that L.A. County v. Thygesen (18CWCS16140), [7 AA 2115-2157] was
a pending related action and argued that based thereon this court
had jurisdiction to make custody and visitation orders. [7 AA 2115-
2157] [8 AA 2849, 2855-2861] [03/06/19 RT 7: 12-28, 8:1]
Section 7605(a) specifically states that “need-based” attorney
fees apply in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related
judgment. The related judgment is a prior paternity judgment
between the parties, i.e., Los Angeles County v. Thygesen
(18CWCS16140) paternity judgment entered on May 30, 2019. [7 AA
2115- 2157]
Consolidation not prerequisite: A “related thereto” finding
may be made even though a motion to consolidate the actions was
denied.2

2
Despite common questions of law or fact, consolidation is discretionary
with the court (CCP § 1048). “Therefore it is possible that actions may
be thoroughly ‘related’ in the sense of having common questions of law
or fact, and still not be ‘consolidated,’ if the trial court, in the sound
exercise of its discretion, chooses not to do so.” [Askew v. Askew, supra,
22 CA4th at 964, 28 CR2d at 297-298] (“Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ (c) [14:17.2]
Consolidation not prerequisite (CAFAMILY Ch. Ch. 14-A)”) (Hogoboom)

10
 The trial court’s ignorance of how [l]opsided legal representation
can effectively deny the court access to all necessary information about
the child's wellbeing and needs and thereby affect the court's ability to
order what is best for the child is an abuse of discretion.

All Proceedings since March 6, 2019 have been on Issues of

Custody/Visitation

Currently, the DVRO portion of what is a child custody

and visitation case has been stayed. [12/19/19 RT pp. 3-5] [Vol. 1
AA 9-11]. However, there have been ongoing proceedings on issues of
custody and visitation, which constitutes proceedings subsequent to the
paternity related judgment requiring “need-based” attorneys fees.

Thygesen needs to be held Accountable for the Heinous Crime of

False Child Abuse Allegations [6 AA 1730-1776] :

Family Code § 3027.1(a) Under § 3027.1(a), the trial court may

impose sanctions against a parent or other person who makes
knowingly false allegations of abuse. [A161993 Vol. 6, 1730-1775]. See
Robert J. v. Catherine D., 171 Cal.App.4th 1500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)‐
(sanctions may be obtained against party or counsel). An exonerating
order may include a DCFS reversal. See Judge Lewis CFLR Family
Law Bench Blotters (2021). The finding of falsity need not be made in
the underlying custody proceeding (Marriage of Dupre (2005) 127
CA4th 1517, 1526, 26 CR3d 328, 335).

11
 STANDARD OF REVIEW

Need-based attorney fees/costs orders—mandatory

“disparity” findings: When a party requests Fam.C. § 2030, 3121,
7605 need-based attorney fees and costs, the court “shall make” the
mandated findings under (Fam.C. § 2030(a)(2)), failure to do so
constitutes reversible error.
Judge Wiley’s findings, or -----lack thereof, were not based on
substantial evidence, thus, must be reversed. [01/12/21 RT 243-247,
252-260]. This Court is free to determine the proper interpretation of §
7605 de novo. N.S. v. D.M., 21 Cal.App.5th 1040 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
(“The propriety of that ruling [denial of attorney's fees] turns on the
proper interpretation of section 7605, subdivision (a)—namely that the
Illinois action was a ‘proceeding subsequent to entry of a related
judgment’ under section 7605, subdivision (a). We apply de novo review
to determine the scope of the statute Kevin Q. v. Lauren W., 195
Cal.App.4th 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). The application of legal
principles are reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Terry, 80
Cal.App.4th 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) The generally accepted test of
abuse of discretion is "whether or not the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered."
See also Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.App.3d 590, 598
(Connolly).)
On the other hand, it is a per se abuse of discretion if the trial
court failed to exercise the discretion vested in it by law. In re
Marriage of Tharp, 188 Cal.App.4th 1295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
An abuse of discretion is shown where an attorney fees award
shocks the conscience or is not supported by the evidence. Jones v.

12
Union Bank of California, 127 Cal.App.4th 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
Application of the “abuse of discretion standard” is whether the trial
court had any substantial evidence (whether or not contradicted) to
support its conclusions.
In re Marriage of Barth, 210 Cal.App.4th 363 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) "Substantial evidence" does not mean "any" evidence; rather, it
is generally said to be that amount of relevant evidence which
reasonable persons would accept as adequate to support the
conclusion reached. In re Angelia P, 28 Cal.3d 908 (Cal. 1981). If a
judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, the error is
"necessarily reversible" In re Catherine S., 230 Cal.App.3d 1253
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("the concept of harmless error plays no
role in an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a ruling.")
Here, the record shows, Judge Wiley abused her discretion by
refusing, and failing to correctly interpret and apply the law.
[1/12/21 RT pp. 259-260]
ARGUMENT
I. THIS CASE SCREAMS OUT FOR AN AWARD OF NEED-BASED
ATTORNEYS FEES

A. The Disparities Between the Wang’s and Thygesen’s

Income and Assets are Unfathomable.

Thygesen is using at least 10 attorneys and expert witnesses, 6 in

California and 4 attorneys in Utah [6 AA 1613-1637]. Although
[Thygesen] could have pursued custody by the way of a regular
petition/motion, however, he instead chose to expedite the process by

13
making false child abuse allegations, and picked the heavy-handed
tactic of obtaining custody through an ex parte restraining order.3
[Thygesen's] strategy gained him advantage of an immediate
change from 0% to full custody,------ without having to prove what is in
the best interests of the child, -----nor could he prove anything, as he’s
never met the child.
Thygesen was able to execute this legal abduction through
attorneys Darrick Chase, Erica T. Johnstone, Michelene Insalaco, Janet
Simmonds, Douglas Rappaport and expert witness, Erik Rasmussen.
And with the assistance of Thygesen’s Utah legal team represented by
Martin Olsen, Beau Olsen, Mitchell Olsen, and Bryant J. McConkie,
Thygesen was able to abscond with the child from Utah to California in
less than 24 hours. This list of attorneys does not even begin to touch
the staggering number of private investigators, security personnel, (6
AA 1843-1848) who stalk, harass, the Wang family at every in-person
supervised visitation, waiting, surveillancing, altering, and defrauding
law enforcement with their false abduction allegations and
misrepresentations. [6 AA 1506, 1548-1552, 1560-1566, 1613-1637] [8
AA 2585, 2722-2735] [A163278 filed on 08/31/2021 “Exhibits to
Misleading Statements'' (pp. 55-70)]
B. Disparity of Legal Representation
Based on their billing rates, the incredible number of hours they
have spent attacking me, and how quickly legal fees were used up in

3
3/8/19 UTAH DCFS Report: On March 8, 2019, Terry Thygesen (Christoffer’s
Mother) Asserted: "I don't fear the longer-term custody process either given the facts
in the case and also given that San Francisco PD expects the DA will be pressing
felony charges against Ms. Wang very soon. I expect that Christoffer will retain
sole physical and legal custody of his son forever.” [6 AA 1765]

14
my case even with attorneys that cost considerably less than
Thygesen’s. I estimate that Thygesen’s parents have paid over $1.5
million in the past 2.5 years. [6 AA 1391, 1494, 1545]. See List of
Christoffer Thygesen’s Current Attorneys [6AA 1613-1637]
Thygesen has appeared with at least 2 up to 5 attorneys for the
30 or so hearings in San Francisco Superior Court, where Wang is
almost always in Pro Per. This is undisputed, however, the court can
refer to these appearances in the Reporter’s Transcripts, in Case no.
(A158691), (A161992), (A161993), (A163278). Although Thygesen has 4
Utah attorneys retained, he still flies in his California counsel for Utah
hearings. [A158691 Vol. 4 RA 631-715, 842-892]
On September 27, 2019, Thygesen’s California attorney, Darrick
Chase ($585/Hr.) flew into Utah and deposed Wang for 8.5 Hours, in a
private office, with a court reporter, and a videographer present. A 325
page transcript of the deposition can be found in [Case no. A161992 Vol.
2 SA 630-705]. (See also Christoffer Thygesen_Discovery on Kailin
Wang Financed by Allan C. Thygesen which is filed in this case no.
A161993, as “Exhibits to Wang's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions''
filed on 08/12/21)
Thygesen has security personnel chauffeur Christoffer for every
Rally visit. One arrives with Christoffer, the other surveillances the
Wang family in their designated [rear] entrance. They wait there even
though Wang per policy for the Non-Custodial parent has to arrive 15
minutes earlier than Christoffer, and depart 15 minutes after he leaves
with the child. [See Case No. A163278 filed on 08/30/2021 “Timeline of
Events with Supporting Exhibits” (pp. 53-67)] [6 AA 1842-1845,
1848-1851] [Case No. A163278, Vol. 5 PA 1744, 1749, 1761, 1764-1766]

15
 Thygesen has hired and flies in $700/hr. expert witness Erik
Rasmussen from Los Angeles to San Francisco for hearings, [6 AA
1623-1627], not only for Christoffer’s custody case in family court but
also as the lead expert witness for the prosecution in People v. Wang
Case No. 19016407. [See Case No. A163278, see “Wang's Opposition to
Real Party in Interest's Objection to Hyperlinks and Request to Strike ''
filed on 09/07/21].
Douglas Rappaport who is $750/hr. has appeared in every one of
the 18 or so Criminal Court hearings, and has been also heard at every
one of those hearings.
Thygesen: “Both parties submitted sworn declarations.” (RB, p. 7)

Wang’s Response: Thygesen’s compliance with mandatory

financial disclosures. [7 AA 2388-2389] [8 AA 2585, 2623-2684]

Thygesen: “Ms. Wang has also used over 20 aliases.” (RB, p.9)

Wang’s Response: If Wang makes so many aliases, why would

the only threatening post (March 6, 2019) related to the child be under
her own name? In addition, just happens to appear the same morning
Thygesen was granted custody after previously being denied his sole
custody requests. [See Case No. A163278 filed on 08/30/2021 “Timeline
of Events with Supporting Exhibits” (pp. 53-67)]

C. Thygesen’s Wealthy Parents are Financing All of the

Parties Civil and Criminal Proceedings

Christoffer’s father, Google Americas president Allan Thygesen heads

Google’s advertising division. He makes hundreds of millions of dollars
every year. Wang learned that Thygesen deliberately quit his job back
in October 2018, a month before the child was born in order to avoid

16
child support. Christoffer was previously working at Square inc. as a
Data Scientist [6 AA 1707]. Since it’s undisputed4 Christoffer’s been
unemployed since October 2018, it would be impossible for Christoffer
to have carried on this multi-state litigation, for the past 2.5 years
without substantial third-party assistance from his parents. [6 AA
1559-1560, 1563-1564, 1613-1630]. Douglas Rappaport is the lead
attorney in the parties’ DVRO Custody Case, as well as the victims’
attorney in People v. Wang 19016407, he also assisted extensively with
the Menlo Park DA’s office, and the Utah DA’s office in the forgery
criminal case against Wang. Mr. Rappaport’s goal is to help Thygesen
achieve its goal of “retaining sole physical and legal custody of his
son forever.” And the termination of Wang’s visitation was
accomplished July 19, 2021, due to the Utah Forgery Charges. [6 AA
1765]

Erica T. Johnstone is one of Thygesen’s attorneys in the family

law case. She also abused the rules of civil procedure and conducted
voluminous discovery abusing the broad rules of civil procedure, and
handed it to Sgt. Michele Martinez of the SFPD. (See: A161993, as
“Exhibits to Wang's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions” filed on
08/12/21)

4
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENCE with the custodial father: On July 5, 2019
Father sent the following e-mail to Rally:

Dear Rally,

“ I had my intake appointment earlier this week on July 2nd. I was told at the
appointment that the only remaining item that you still need from me to
complete my intake is verification from my former employer that I no longer
work there as I have been unemployed since 10/10/18. I have now
obtained this documentation, and it is attached to this email.”

17
 People v. Vasquez, 39 Cal.4th 47, 61-62 (Cal. 2006) (“The
appellate court held the likelihood of conflict between the attorney's
two interests "rises to the level of an overwhelming probability,"
substituting "private vengeance [for] impartial application of the
criminal law" in violation of the defendant's due process rights. ( Id. at
p. 26.) ”) United States v. Tison, 780 F.2d 1569, 1573 (11th Cir. 1986)
(“Similarly , it is improper for the Government to institute a civil action to
generate discovery for a criminal case . United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp.
196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965).”) U.S. v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C.
1965) (“The Court holds that the Government may not bring a parallel
civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices to obtain
evidence for subsequent criminal prosecution. (“See Campbell, 307 F.2d
at 487 (holding that liberal civil discovery procedures are not a ""back
door"" to information otherwise beyond reach under the criminal
discovery rules);”)

Both these attorneys assist and/or step in the role of the

prosecutor, they are literally present at every hearing helping the
Thygesen family achieve its goal, a criminal conviction that will strip
me of my parental rights.
Case law holds that third-party financial assistance for prolonged
litigation constitutes access to financial resources, thus access to
competent legal representation. In re Marriage of Smith, 242
Cal.App.4th 529, 533-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (“The first matter we must
address, then, is whether the trial court properly considered the funds
Kierstin's father paid to Kierstin's attorneys on her behalf in
determining the parties' relative circumstances. It did. In analogous
family law contexts, courts have held that “where a party receives

18
recurring gifts of money, the trial court has discretion to consider that
money as income....” ( In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
718, 722–723, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 849 (Alter ).) Even if characterized as a
loan, an advance against a party's share of an expected inheritance is
properly treated as a gift. (In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313–1314, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 699 [discussing
authority regarding advancements on inheritance].)”)
(3) [14:128] Award for pro per litigant to retain attorney:
There is no requirement that a needy party has yet incurred an
attorney fees obligation. Quite the contrary, to ensure a parity in
litigating strengths, upon finding a disparity in access to funds to
retain counsel and that one party is able to pay for legal representation
of both parties, the court properly awards (indeed, it may be error not
to award) an unrepresented party attorney fees at the outset to enable
him or her to “retain an attorney in a timely manner before proceedings
in the matter go forward.” [Fam.C. § 2030(a)(2) (emphasis added); see
further discussion at ¶ 5:182.1 ff., (Eisenberg)] (A similar provision
applies in actions for exclusive custody (see Fam.C. § 3121(b)) and UPA
custody/visitation actions (see Fam.C. § 7605(b)—where findings
demonstrate disparity in access/ability to pay, pro per litigants must be
awarded fees/costs; see also N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 CA5th 1040, 1045,
231 CR3d 67, 69 ((Eisenberg at ¶ 14:41.5)).)
Kevin Q v. Lauren W (2011), 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d
676 (gifts by the maternal grandfather to mother included in court’s
determination). Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 CA4th 529, 533-535, 195
CR3d 162, 165-167—Court properly considered “recurrent,
regular gifts totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars” paid to

19
P's attorneys by her father in analyzing parties' relative
circumstances; Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (Kevin Q. II) (2011) 195 CA4th
633, 645-646, 124 CR3d 676, 687-688—regular, recurring monetary
“gifts” considered support (or income) for purposes of calculating ability
to pay. At the October 18, 2019, Utah Temporary Orders Hearing
with Commissioner Ito [RT 23-24] Thygesen admitted his family is
supporting him. [6 AA 1475-1476, Case no. A158691 at 4 RA pp.
658-708]
D. Thygesen Has Never Denied Disparity.
Despite Wang asserting the huge financial disparity in the
parties’ ability to obtain representation, and in numerous pleadings
Wang has filed with the trial court, Thygesen has never denied the
disparity in any of his responsive pleadings. Even in his Opposition
Brief to this Appeal, he does not deny any of my allegations. Wang
contends that this is an admission that what Wang asserts is true and
that he is estopped to deny it.
In any event, Thygesen should be ordered to file an updated
FL-150 form that is required for the trial court to determine if there is
a disparity such that Wang is eligible for needs-based attorneys fees. In
addition to the FL-150 form, Thygesen should be ordered to disclose if
he is the beneficiary of any trust and if he has received any loans or if he
has received any gifts from any source since February 15, 2019, when
he commenced this case against me.

E. Thygesen Even Argues That Wang Needs a Competent

Attorney Because Wang Misunderstands the Law.

“None of the examples Ms. Wang presents in her Opening

Brief are examples of bias, they are instead examples of Ms.

20
 Wang’s misunderstanding of the law and legal process or her
misrepresentations of facts.” (Thygesen’s Opposition Brief, p. 29).

“For example, Ms. Wang asserts that Judge Wiley “flip

flops' ' as to whether the trial court has jurisdiction or not. (See
AOB at pp. 38-42.) However, this is not an issue of “flip-flopping”
but rather the result of the correct application of the law and Ms.
Wang misunderstanding the different applications of the term
“jurisdiction” (Thygesen’s Opposition Brief, p. 29)

“In sum, every single allegation Ms. Wang makes against

Judge Wiley is based either on her misunderstanding of the law or
her misrepresentation of the facts.” (Thygesen’s Opposition Brief,
p. 31).

Thygesen acknowledges that the case Yurasek v. Kesala, Case No.

A158859 (1st Dist, Div. 2 December 2, 2020) is a decision supporting
need-based attorneys fees in a DV matter, but seeks to distinguish it on
irrelevant grounds (Opposition Brief, p. 23, fn. 2).

F. Alternative Resources are not available. (8 AA 2862)

II. THE AWARD OF NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES IS

MANDATORY, “NOT” DISCRETIONARY, WITH THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE.
A. The Purpose of a “Needs-Based” Attorneys Fees Award is
to Provide One of the Parties With an Amount to Properly
Litigate the Controversy.

UPA and exclusive custody actions: Family Code statutes

similar to Fam.C. § 2030 authorize attorney fees and costs awards in
exclusive custody actions and in UPA actions to establish parentage
and custody/visitation. [Fam.C. §§ 3121 & 7605, 7640; see N.S. v. D.M.
(2018) 21 CA5th 1040, 1056, 231 CR3d 67, 78—in applying § 7605,

21
court must determine, among other things, whether there was
“disparity in access and ability to pay” and may rely on more
detailed provisions of §§ 2032/4320 in doing so; Robert J. v.
Catherine D. (2005) 134 CA4th 1392, 1395, 1404, 37 CR3d 104, 105,
112—court has discretion under § 7640 to award attorney fees for
custody/visitation proceedings after final paternity judgment]
Also, the court has discretion to act on fee requests under Fam.C. §
2030 et seq. in UPA paternity cases. [See Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (Kevin
Q. II) (2011) 195 CA4th 633, 642-644, 124 CR3d 676, 684-685; Darab
Cody N. v. Olivera (2019) 31 CA5th 1134, 1142-1143, 242 CR3d 891, 893
(citing Kevin Q. with approval)—§ 7605 specifically allows court
discretion in determining what is “reasonably necessary” under “facts
and circumstances” before it re cost of maintaining/defending
proceeding] ((Eisenberg) (b) [14:41.5])

B. Family Code §7605 Absolutely Applies to this Case

1. § 7605 (a) In any proceeding to establish physical or legal

custody of a child or a visitation order under this part, and in any
proceeding subsequent to the entry of a related judgment, the court
shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation..............
In “any” proceeding subsequent to the entry of a “related”
judgment the court “shall” “ensure that each party has access to legal
representation to preserve each party’s rights.” This proceeding seeking
a DV order and custody is subsequent to the paternity judgment that
was entered under the Family Code.
2. Section 7640 grants a court the discretion to award [attorneys]
fees; Section 7605, subdivision (a), in contrast, requires the court to

22
ensure ‘each party has access to legal representation” by ordering one
party to pay the other party's attorneys fees (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 642).
3. This Case is a Child Custody Case Because Thygesen attached
a request for Sole Custody to his Application for a DVRO, Which Was
Granted. As detailed in my Opening Brief, Respondent created the
child custody case by attaching a Request for Child Custody and
Visitation Orders (DV-105, Item 3, p. 1) to his Request for a Domestic
Violence Restraining Order (DV-100, Item 12, p. 3) and asked for an
award of sole custody and no visitation to the mother. These forms were
attached at the end of my Opening Brief. (AOB pp. 50-60) [8 AA 2848].
4. The Family Code specifically defines a domestic violence case
where there is a request for custody as a “child custody proceeding.”
Family Code § 3402 (d) “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding
in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a
child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for paternity,
termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic
violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include
a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation,
or enforcement under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 3441).
5. When Wang sought child support from Thygesen through the
Los Angeles Child Support Service (LA CSSD) [7 AA 2115-2157], the
LA CSSD filed a lawsuit to determine parentage under Family Code §
7630(c). The results of the genetic testing were completed on February
11, 2019.
Thygesen immediately filed his DV case on February 15, 2019
and sought custody of the child, arguing vociferously that the results of

23
the genetic testing established paternity and allowed him to seek the
custody of the child on an ex-parte basis under Family Code § 6323
(which the court granted without Wang on March 6, 2019).
6. The Los Angeles paternity case was under the Uniform
Parentage Act (§7630 (c)) and the provision mandating need-based
attorneys fees (§ 7605) is also under the Uniform Parentage Act.
7. The cases are related because the parentage case was a sine qua
non, a mandatory, related, prior action. Before Thygesen could request
custody in the DV case he had to participate in the parentage case and
prove he was the child’s parent and the DV/custody case was derivative
from and founded upon the findings of the parentage case.
8. A court cannot issue a temporary ex-parte order in favor of the
person requesting custody (Thygesen) unless the person requesting
custody of the child establishes his paternity of the child in one of the
ways specified in Family Code § 6323 (a) (2)(B) as follows:
§ 6323(a) subject to section 3064:

(1) The court may issue an ex parte order determining the

temporary custody and visitation of a minor child, on the
conditions the court determines, to a party who has
established a parent and child relationship pursuant to
paragraph (2). The parties shall inform the court if a custody or
visitation order has already been issued in any other proceeding.

(2) (A) if the party who has obtained the restraining order
has established a parent and child relationship and the other
party has not established that relationship, the court may award
temporary sole legal and physical custody to the party to whom
the restraining order was issued and may make an order of no
visitation to the other party pending the establishment of a
parent and child relationship between the child and the other
party.

24
 (B.) A party may establish a parent and child
relationship for purposes of subparagraph (a.) only by
offering proof of any of the following:

(i) The party gave birth to the child.

(ii) The child is presumed to be a child of the marriage

between the parties, pursuant to Section 7540, or pursuant to
Section 7541.

(iii) Legal adoption or pending legal adoption of the child by

the party.

(iv) The party has signed a valid voluntary declaration of

paternity, which has been in effect more than 60 days prior to the
issuance of the restraining order, and that declaration has not
been rescinded or set aside.

(v) A determination made by the juvenile court that there is

a parent and child relationship between the party offering the
proof and the child.

(vi) A determination of parentage made in a

proceeding to determine custody or visitation in a case
brought by the local child support agency pursuant to
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 17400) of Division 17.

(vii) The party has been determined to be the parent of the

child through a proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act
(Part 3 (commencing with Section 7600) of Division 12).
(viii) Both parties stipulate, in writing or on the record, for
purposes of this proceeding, that they are the parents of the child.

25
 9. In other words, Thygesen could not have asked for or
obtained custody in the ex-parte DV proceeding unless he had first
completed the Uniform Parentage Act proceeding initiated by the Los
Angeles Child Support Services (Case No. 18CWCS 16140). [7 AA
2115-2157] The DV case in which custody was sought (and obtained)
was derivative of, “grew out of”, and was directly based on the
LA case judgment that Thygesen was the father. That makes the cases
“related” within the meaning of § 7605 and needs-based attorneys fees
apply.

10. The other cases that have considered this issue have
found that cases were “related”: Yurasek v. Kesala, Case No.
A158859 (1st Dist, Div. 2 December 2, 2020) (DV proceeding was related
to the custody issues because the ex-husband had checked boxes on the
DV request seeking custody); N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1040,
231 Cal.Rptr.3d 67 (“Although the parties stipulated to paternity in
2012, subsequent proceedings on custody, visitation, and support are
considered part of an action under the UPA for purposes of a [§ 7605]
fee request”- fees granted); Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 CA4th 942, 28
CR2d 284 (civil cases relating to the property could have been
determined in the property settlement proceedings of a family law case
so the cases were related)[5]; In re Marriage of Green (1992) 6 CA4th
584, 590-591, 7 CR2d 872, 875 (filing of a separate lawsuit in an
attempt to exhaust spouse financially and to avoid paying
“needs-based” attorneys fees was “related”); Guardianship of Paduano,
(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 346, 350-352 (guardianship proceedings were
“related” to marriage dissolution action as they affected the child of the

26
marriage); Crook v. Crook (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 745, 7 Cal.Rptr.892
(lawsuit to dispose of the property was “related” to divorce action);
Contra: Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (1957) 155 Cal.App. 2d 715 (tortious
conduct lawsuit was not related to and did not “grow out of” the divorce
action); In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991) 1 CA4th 1489,
1497, 2 CR2d 690, 695 (juvenile dependency proceeding was not
“related” for attorneys fees purposes to a marriage dissolution case
because one proceeding was under the Family Code and the other
proceeding was under the Welfare Code).

11. Thygesen repeatedly argued before the trial court

Judge Darwin when he was seeking the TRO that the Los
Angeles paternity case was related to, and the basis for issuing the
TRO custody order, as itemized in the hearing transcript and quoted in
my Opening Brief. Thygesen admitted that the cases were related when
he listed the case in his DV-100, Item 5, p.2 and DV-105, Item 7.
Thygesen cannot now argue that they are unrelated (estoppel).

12. Thygesen’s Arguments Relating to § 7605 Misinterprets

this Section. Thygesen in his Respondent’s Brief makes three
arguments to try to deny the applicability of § 7605 as follows:
a. Thygesen argues that § 7605 need-based attorneys fees apply
only to proceedings to establish custody or visitation under “this part”.
He argues that “this part” is Part 3 of Division 12 whereas the custody
orders issued in this case were under Division 10 of the Family Code
(pp. 21-22). However, Thygesen neglects to analyze the additional
language in § 7605(a), specifically, “and in any proceeding

27
subsequent to entry of a related judgment.” The DV case is still
pending and these proceedings for custody/visitation for which Wang is
seeking need-based attorneys fees is subsequent to the judgment
entered in the Los Angeles paternity case on May 30, 2019 [7 AA
2115-2157]. It does not matter that the DV case was commenced under
a different “part” of the Family Code.

b. Thygesen argues that there has been no entry of a

“related judgment in the DVPA proceeding, as the case is
essentially on hold.” (p. 22). Thygesen is confusing which case is the
“related judgment.” The Los Angeles paternity case establishing the
paternity of Thygesen is the “related judgment,” not the DV case, which
is still pending.
c. Thygesen argues that the case N.S. v. D.M. is
distinguishable because the court held that in order for cases to be
“related” that they must have the “same or similar subject matter” and
could have been part of that action and that the separate civil suit
intends an effect on the family law action.
First, the N.S. v. D.M., 21 Cal.App.5th 1040 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
case set forth only two examples of how cases might be related—it did
not limit the other ways in which cases might be related. In the case of
In Re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991)1 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1496
the court held that various factors can be considered in determining
whether two cases are “related” such as the type and function of the
proceeding, parties to the proceeding, factual and legal matters at
issue, motives for the litigation, whether both cases are under the
Family Code, etc. [The paternity case involved the same parties, both

28
cases are under the Family Code, and the motive for the filing of the
DV case and adding a request for sole custody was to obtain custody in
a proceeding that is normally pursued under the UPA].
Second, this case meets the requirements that the N.S. v. D.M.
case sets down. Thygesen would like to pretend that the DV case is not
similar to the paternity case, but Thygesen made the DV case into a
custody case by applying for temporary exclusive custody in the DV
case (and it was granted). “Parentage” is “similar” and “related” to
“child custody”; indeed, child custody cannot be determined
without first determining paternity. Thygesen could have asked for
a custody order in the paternity case but his strategy was to file a DV
case and seek custody through the ex parte route.
Third, this DV case is brought under the Family Code; it is not a
separate civil lawsuit under the Civil Code.
Fourth, the N.S. v. D.M. the court said that the request for
attorneys fees needed to be brought in the “family law actions” because
the person seeking attorneys fees had filed a separate civil case. There
is no separate civil case here--the DV proceeding is part of the Family
Code and the continuing dispute about custody and visitation are
occurring in the DV proceeding.

13. This Request for Need-Based Attorneys Fees is Not

Imaginary. In addition to defending whatever new motions and
attacks Thygesen’s attorneys may inflict upon me at any time, the huge
expense of defending the trial in which Thygesen is trying to make the
TRO permanent is pending (Thygesen is trying to make the TRO
permanent so that he can remove my parental rights under Family
Code § 3044).

29
III. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO RETAIN AN ATTORNEY
AND PROVIDE SOME OF THE INFORMATION THAT
THYGESEN ASSERTS WANG MUST PROVIDE BEFORE WANG
CAN BE GRANTED NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES.

A. Alleged Procedural Irregularities

Thygesen argues that a self-represented party on appeal:
“Wang is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys .. .
Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro per litigants must follow correct
rules of procedure.” (Opposition Brief, p. 18).

I’m not repeating procedural arguments already made in my

“Opposition to Motion for Sanctions” filed on 08/11/2021, and my
“Exhibits to Appellant's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions” filed
08/12/2021.

Failure to file the “Optional” form FL-319, and FL-158

Thygesen then argues that because Wang did not file Forms
FL-319 and FL-158 that my appeal should be dismissed. [See: 6 AA
1391-1419, 1545-1627, 1777] [8 AA​​2585-2722]
But these forms are optional and the rule allows for a
“comparable sworn declaration”, which Wang provided. In re Marriage
of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 167.
Thygesen complains that Wang failed to file a separate motion to
make my claim under Family Code §128.5, but Wang did file this
motion seeking attorneys fees and sanctions with the trial court,
why did it need to be a separate motion?

30
 Thygesen complains that Wang cited unpublished opinions. But
they were all published on the internet by legitimate case reporting
services and/or competenant California attorney blogs.

Rule 10.960 of the California Rules of Court states: “Providing

access to justice for self-represented litigants is a priority for California
courts.”
In the Judicial Council of California, A Benchguide for Judicial
Officers, “Handling Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants” (April
2019) it states:
However, there are also four important related principles that
California trial judges must also take into account. The first is the
judiciary’s preference to resolve matters on their merits rather
than by procedural default. It has always been the policy of the
courts in California to resolve a dispute on the merits of the
case rather than allowing a dismissal on technicality. Harding v.
Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App. 3d 1044, 1061 (dis. opn. of Liu, Acting P.J.).
The trial of a lawsuit is not a game where the spoils of victory go to the
clever and technical regardless of the merits, but a method devised by
a civilized society to settle peaceably and justly disputes between
litigants. The rules of the contest are not an end in themselves. Simon
v. City & County of San Francisco (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 590, 600, cited
by Adams v. MurakamWang (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 120 (pp. 3-6, 3-7)
B. Information About an Attorney.
Thygesen complains that Wang has not provided information
about the experience and hourly rate of the attorney Wang intends to

31
hire so Wang is not eligible for need-based attorneys fees. This is a
misunderstanding of the facts and the law:
Factually, I did request the following in accordance with CRC
Rule 5.427. See Memorandum of Point and Authorities filed on 12/04/20
at [6 AA 1500] .
“I request provisional attorney and expert
consultation fees of $15,000.” [6 AA 1500] .

Legally, there is no requirement that a needy party has incurred

an attorney fees obligation before requesting need-based attorneys fees.
In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 231 Cal.Rptr.
757 (attorney fees awards are not limited to situations when the
party requesting fees has prevailed in the outcome of the
litigation and such an award may be made pendente lite).
Wang needs one or more competent attorneys. The case law says
that need-based attorneys fees are to provide “parity” to overcome
“disparity: ”
N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, 231 Cal. Rptr.3d 67
(“Mother's failure to bring a motion in Illinois does not preclude
recovery under section 7605. Because the trial Court did not exercise its
discretion to consider Mother's request under section 7605, subdivision
(a), remand is necessary for the Court to determine using appropriate
needs- based criteria whether an award of fees and costs is appropriate.
We emphasize that section 7605, like section 2030, is aimed at
parity —i.e., ensuring "a fair hearing with two sides equally
represented"—not redistribution to the party with less income. (Alan
S., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 251, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 241.) The Court
must make necessary findings under section 7605, subdivision (b) and

32
may rely on the more detailed provisions of sections 2032 and 4320 in
doing so (Kevin Q.v. Lauren W (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633 at pp.
643–644, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 676).
In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 19 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056, 131
Cal.Rptr.3d 424 (need-based attorneys fees must provide “parity”);
Accord: In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1492,
1497).
Thygesen’s attorneys are charging $750 an hour (Douglas
Rappaport), $585 an hour (Darrick Chase), $575 an hour (Michelene
Insalaco), $500 an hour (Erica Johnstone). Wang needs to be able to
hire at least one attorney of commensurate experience and who will be
charging a comparable rate.
All the competent attorneys Wang have talked to are charging
$750 an hour. Because Wang is indigent, none of them will do any work
for me until Wang has a court order allowing me to have need-based
attorneys fees.
Thygesen also complains Wang didn’t file a factual declaration
completed by an expert including the expert’s hourly rate, the scope of
the expert’s task, and an estimate of the number of hours to complete
the task. This is putting the cart before the horse. Wang needs to retain
an attorney and in consultation with the attorney identify the expert;
then Wang can provide this information. Expert witness fees are also
awardable for needs-based attorneys fees and costs. In re Marriage of
Munguia (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 853, 195 Cal.Rptr. 1990.

It is also impossible to estimate how many hours of their

services Wang will require. There are two problems here:

33
 First, Wang can only guess at the hours (thousands) it will take
to represent me at the trial to determine if the TRO against me should
be made permanent. Thygesen has designated 39 witnesses, some of
which Wang needs to depose. Thygesen has designated an expert,
whom Wang will need to depose. Wang will have to retain my own
expert. Wang will have to file a motion to compel to obtain the
discovery that Wang requested and was ignored by Thygesen. In
discussing it with various attorneys, it seems it could be $250,000, but
it could be more.
Second, as you can see from above, Wang is not the one initiating
the motions and generating litigation in this case. Wang just wants to
see her child. “Parity” cannot be achieved by setting a fixed budget
that leaves me unrepresented whenever the budget runs out.

IV. THERE IS NO PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST AWARDING

NEED-BASED ATTORNEYS FEES IN A DVRO CASE

Thygesen makes an argument that it would violate public policy

for the “victim” in a DV case to have to pay the legal fees of the
“perpetrator.”
This is wrong for four reasons:
(1) In the case cited by Thygesen, In re Marriage of Cauley, 138
Cal.App.4th 1100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), the court terminated the wife’s
spousal support for domestic violence—but awarded her attorneys
fees. Various California courts have held that such fees can be awarded
in domestic violence cases, including situations where the person
obtaining the fee award had committed or was alleged to have
committed domestic violence: In re Marriage of Priem, 214 Cal.App.4th
505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Sangha v. Sangha (In re Marriage of Sangha),

34
D077062 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2021); Yurasek v. Kesala, A158859 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2020); Evilsizor v. Sweeney, A143054 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 22, 2016); Locatelli v. Locatelli (In re Marriage of Locatelli),
B267653 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016). These cases and the relevancy
were each discussed in my Opening Brief.
Sangha v. Sangha (In re Marriage of Sangha), D077062, at *16
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2021) However, nothing in sections 2030, 2032,
or 4320 support the position that documented evidence of a history of
domestic abuse absolutely prohibits a Court from awarding interim
attorney fees.
(2) Thygesen is the one who obtained custody through the dirty
back door way, through an ex parte DVRO. By making it into a child
custody proceeding, he has submitted to the provisions of the law,
which requires parity in legal representation for issues of custody and
visitation.
(3) The child is not a “protected party” under the TRO and there is
no public policy that prevents the mother of the child from having
“parity” legal representation in seeking custody and visitation, that is
in the best interest of the child.
(4) The cruelty of the Thygesens’ is unrivaled. Paired with access
to unlimited resources Thygesen is capable of overwhelming
destruction, all while using an innocent child as a weapon for his
hatred.

V. OTHER SECTIONS OF THE LAW: (See A161993 AOB) Due to

space limitations, Please see my “Opening Brief,” which includes my

35
arguments relating to Family Code § 271, § 128.5, § 2107, § 3121,
§3027.1(a), § 3412(c), § 3428(c), and § 3452.

VI. JUDGE WILEY IS BIASED AND IF THIS CASE IS

REMANDED MUST BE ASSIGNED TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE.
The request to have this matter assigned on remand to a
different department with the San Francisco County Superior Court is
not easily made by the Appellant. However, the interest of justice
requires disqualification where a reasonable person might doubt
whether the trial judge was impartial. (People vs. Gulbrandsen (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1562.) There has been no logical reason given for
the trial court's refusal to award a single dollar of attorneys fees. It is
submitted that it would be difficult to articulate a more clear cut case of
anger, bias, and/or clouded judgment on the part of a trial court than
that which has occurred in this case. At the very least, it has been a
"whimsical disregard" of the statutory scheme. (People v. Gulbrandsen
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1562.) As such, reassignment is warranted
on remand. [See Case no. A163278, filed on 09/03/2021, Exhibits
lodged on: “Wang's and Thygesen's Request for orders,” submitted by
petitioner]. [12/19/19 RT 3, 10-12,36] [8/27/20 RT 71-73, 77-82, 92-93]
In my Opening Brief Wang identified at least 16 examples of
Judge Wiley’s arbitrariness, bias, prejudice, and ineptitude. Although
Thygesens’ attempts to defend the actions of Judge Wiley in the trial
court in his Opposition Brief, the attempt is deplorable.
Due to space limitations, Wang will add only one more example to
those Wang recited in my Opening Brief--an example that has occurred
since my Opening Brief was filed.

36
 On July 19, 2021, Judge Wiley granted Thygesen’s ex-parte
request to deny Wang all in-person visitation with her child on the
basis that the child was at risk of abduction under Family Code § 3048,
and on July 29, after a hearing, she confirmed that decision
permanently. This was egregious bias because (1) she granted the
ex-parte request to deny me in-person visitation with my child based on
allegations two years old, so there was no “immediate danger”
[A163278 at 3 PA 774] to the child as required by the law; (2) she
granted the request without even reading my opposition brief, as she
admitted in open court; [Case no. A163278: 7/19/21 RT 9:23-28] (3)
Family Code §3048 does not authorize the denial of in-person visitation
as one of the remedies for risk of abduction. Because of her bias and
prejudice, Wang was forced to seek a Writ from the Court of Appeals,
which issued an alternative writ on September 13, 2021, which is
pending.
Judge Wiley has a continuous pattern of remaining silent on the
legal and factual bases for its rulings.5 Judge Wiley’s rulings are often

5
(12/19/19 RT 3: 22-24, 5:9, 9: 27-28, 10: 1-28, 11:8-28, 12:2-3, 36:20-27)
[Vol. 1 AA 9-11] [8 AA 2862] (8/27/20 RT 71: 5-22, 72:6-15, 73: 1-4,
77:14-21, 78:4-12, 81:2-8, 82:9-21, 91: 20-28, 92: 1-28, 93: 1-7) (12/4/20
RT 134:2-28) (12/16/20 RT “Visitation Denial” pp. 176:5-9, 198:16-28,
199:4-28, 200:2-11, 201:5-21) (01/12/21 RT “Fees Denial” pp. 259:21-28,
260:1-23) (7/19/21 RT “Termination of Visitation” pp. 7: 18-28, 8:5-28,
12:10-22, 14:10-15, 17:16-28, 18:1-28, 19:23-28, 20:1-18, 21:1-28,
23:10-28, 24:9-26, 25:12-22, 26: 26-28, 27: 1-8) (07/29/21 RT 75-76:23-4)

37
ambiguous, and the judge often refuses to state her reasons for its
rulings, even when Wang has timely, and repeatedly requested for a
statement of decision under CCP § 632 [8 AA 2723] [RT 252: 25-28,
253:1-3], or a statement of reason, ---------some explanation to be made.
Sadly, no requests have been successful, if anything it appears at each
hearing her rulings become, more and more outrageous further
encouraging Thygesen’s malfeasance, expediting Thygesen’s plans to
put Wang in prison, and terminate her parental rights, and give the
child away for adoption.
This allows Thygesen’s three trial attorneys to make proposed
orders containing provisions not ruled on and contrary to the facts.
It is manifestly unfair to hold a hearing, make rulings from the
bench, or in this case, mostly remain silent on the Court’s position, and
then defer to Thygesen’s counsel to prepare the order, even when they
run completely contrary to the Court’s rulings.
While judges often ask the prevailing party to prepare the order,
the judge usually has stated his/her ruling on the record. But, with
Judge Wiley, no reason is given at all---------there is just a denial, and
no explanation whatsoever. (01/12/21 RT 245-247, 258).
The Court then proceeds to “rubber-stamp" Thygesen’s proposed
orders wholesale, even at times running contrary to its own rulings on
record. (See: Objections to Proposed Orders [3 AA 825] [8 AA 2399,
2816]). All while completely ignoring not only Wang’s objections, but
ignoring the transcripts, the clerk’s minutes, even the Court’s own
previous rulings, and further allowing Thygesen to cherry-pick

38
whatever he deems relevant that solely supports his position. [3 AA
825-850] [8 AA 2399-2459 , 2816-2830]
In re Marriage of Tharp, 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1326-27 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) But, that is not enough. (8) Code of Civil Procedure section
170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) provides that a judge is disqualified if "A
person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the
judge would be able to be impartial." We conclude that the words and
conduct of Judge Silveira create a doubt that he would be able to be
impartial on remand.”)

CONCLUSION

Appellant, Kailin Wang respectfully requests that this Court

reverse the orders denying her an award of attorney's fees with
instructions to the trial court to enter a new order awarding attorney's
fees in accordance with the respective needs of the case.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: September 26, 2021

Kailin Wang, Appellant

39
 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT (Rule 8.204)

I, Kailin Wang, appellant, certify pursuant to the California Rules of Court, that
the word count for this document is 8,358 words, excluding thetables, this
certificate, and any attachment permitted under rule 8.204(d). This document was
prepared in Microsoft Word, and this is the word count generated by the program for
this document.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the foregoing is true and correct. Executed, at Spanish Fork, Utah, on September 26,
2021.
.

Kailin Wang Appellant, in Pro Per

40
 Vol. 6 AA 1613-1637

Thygesen's Currently Retained Legal Team (Non-Exhaustive List) *Financed by his father
Allan C. Thygesen "Google President, Americas & Global Partners"
  Hourl Area of Retaine Date of
Atty. Firm Experience
y Expertise d Date Bar Lic.
PARTNER has practiced
exclusively in family law
Michelene Family Sucherma since 1992. Insalaco is
$575/
1 E. Insalaco Law Atty. n-Insalaco 5/1/19 12/10/1992 Certified as a Family Law
Hr.
#161711 I LLP Specialist by the
California Board of Legal
Specialization in 2003.
Douglas Rappaport for
the past two decades has
been practicing criminal
law in both state and
federal courts throughout
the Western United
Douglas L. Criminal Douglas L States. A Certified
12/7/1988
Rappaport $750/ Law and Rappapor Criminal Law Expert, an
2 8/1/19 CA Bar
#136194 Hr. Family t Law AV-rated Atty., and a
License
(Lead Atty.) Law II Ofcs member of the National
Trial Lawyers
Association's Top 100
Trial Lawyers 2012-2015,
Premier 100, American
Academy of Trial Atty.s,
2015.
Ms. Simmonds has
Janet Sucherma practiced family law
$500/ Appellate
3 Simmonds n-Insalaco 4/1/20 12/4/2006 exclusively since being
Hr. Atty.
# 245506 LLP admitted to the Bar in
2006.
Northern California
Super Lawyer in 2012,
2014, 2015, and
2016-2019. Mr. Chase has
Kaye served as a Pro Tem
Darrick T.
$585/ Family Moser 12/4/1990 Settlement Conference
4 Chase 12/6/18
Hr. Law III Hierbaum CA Bar Judge for the San
#151256
Ford LLP, Francisco Superior Court.
San Francisco Unified
Family Court, assisting
Atty.s seeking to qualify
as Minors Counsel.

41
 Erica is a partner at
Erica T. CA Bar # Ridder, Costa &
Ridder,
Johnstone Internet 4/26/2006 Johnstone LLP, and a law
$500/ Costa &
5 CA Law Atty. 2/5/19 NY # firm focusing on internet
Hr. Johnstone
#242067, NY I 09/25/2007 law. Erica is licensed to
#4536629
LLP,
practice law in states of
New York and California.
Erik
Rasmusse
n is the
Cyber
Practice Cybersecurity Expert
Leader for Witness is paid by the
Kroll Thygesen's to fly in from
Internet Cyber Los Angeles, CA for the
Erik $700/
6 Law Atty. Security 8/1/19   San Francisco Hearings.
Rasmussen Hr.,
II and Also recently hired by the
Investigat San Francisco DA's Office
ions for Wang's Prosecution in
practice People v. Wang 19016407
and Head
of the Los
Angeles
office.
Partner @
Mitchell J.
Olsen &
Olsen $225/ Family Utah Bar:
7 Olsen, 3/3/19 See Below
UT Bar # Hr. Law 10/31/2011
Atty.s at
13826
Law
Clerked for Leonard H.
Russon at the Utah Court
of Appeals, Marty then
went to work for the Utah
Partner @
Martin State Office of Guardian
$325/ Family Olsen & Utah Bar:
8 Olsen, 3/3/19 Ad Litem, Marty has been
Hr. Law Olsen 10/15/1991
UT #: 6015 a Partner at Olsen &
Law, LLC
Olsen Law since 1995,
specializing in family law
and private guardian ad
litem work.
Bryant maintains an AV
Preeminent (4.8) rating
Bryant J. with Martindale-Hubbell.
McConkie
McConkle, ($325/ Family UT Bar #: Bryant was appointed by
9 , Hales & 3/3/19
UT #: Hr.) Law 5/24/2005 the Utah Supreme Court
Gunn
10408 to serve on the Utah State
Bar Ethics and Discipline
Committee.

42
 Beau J.
$215/ Family Olsen & Utah Bar:
10 Olsen Utah 3/3/19  
Hr. Law Olsen 10/18/2014
Bar: 15213

Lindsay who specializes

in Cyber stalking and
extortion. Her cases
include: USA v. Ryan Lin
Lindsay B. Date (2017), a Chinese man
C.A.
Lieberman, $425/ Internet Admitted who was accused of
11 GOLDBE  
NY Bar: Hr. Law in NY: operating a "chilling"
RG PLLC
5020466 02/15/2012 Cyber-Stalking campaign
against his former
roommate. He was
sentenced to 210 months
in Federal Prison.

43
Filed in the Superior Court on 04/26/21(Click on Link to File)
Thygesen's CIVIL Discovery
Sgt. Martinez #1208
Requests and Subpoenas
# Date CRIMINAL Search Warrants No. Filed Date
Executed (CASE: FDV-19-
FOR CASE # 19016407,
814465)
1 March 8, 2019 Google 3.8.19_Redacted.pdf 1 02/22/19 Medium.com Subpoena
Holysmoke 2 March 12,2019 Holysmoke subpoena
2 March 8, 2019 3.8.19_Redacted.pdf March 12,2019
3 April 10, 2019 April 10, 2019 Unlimited
Medium Discovery Order Judge
3 March 8, 2019 3.8.19_Redacted.pdf Darwin
Facebook 4 April 10,2019 Stealth Communications
4 March 14, 2019 3.14.19_Redacted.pdf subpoena
MetroPCS 5 April 12, 2019 Quest Corporation DBA in
5 March 14, 2019 3.14.19_Redacted.pdf CA as Century Link
DeadbeatsExposed 6 April 12, 2019 Charter Communications
6 April 2, 2019 4.2.19_Redacted.pdf subpoena
CenturyLink 7 April 12,2019 Comcast subpoena dated
7 April 17, 2019 4.17.19_Redacted..pdf April 12, 2019
Charter 8 April 19, 2019 Google Inc.
8 April 17, 2019 4.17.19_Redacted..pdf
Comcast 9 April 24, 2019 Thedirty.com subpoena
9 April 17, 2019 4.17.19_Redacted..pdf
10 April 30, 2019 Relic Agency, Inc, dba
10 April 17, 2019 Stealth 4.17.19_Redacted.pdf
11 June 6, 2019 June 6, 2019 Law and
Motion Discovery Requests
11 May 16, 2019 Google 5.16.19_Redacted.pdf by Thygesen
Facebook 12 July 26, 2019 Facebook subpoena
12 May 16, 2019 5.16.19_Redacted.pdf
Google 8.23.19_Redacted 13 July 26, 2019 Instagram subpoena
13 August 23, 2019 False.pdf
AdHocLabs 14 July 31, 2019 Experian subpoena
14 September 10, 2019 9.10.19_Redacted.False.pdf
15 July 31, 2019 Social Security
ConsumerInfo Administration records
15 October 16, 2019 10.16.19_Redacted.pdf request
Lexington 16 August 2, 2019 Menlo Park Emergency
16 October 16, 2019 10.16.19_Redacted.pdf Services subpoena
Facebook 11.1.19 "Death 17 August 2, 2019 San Francisco Emergency
November 1, 2019 Threats from Someone else's Services Subpoena
17 Case"
Facebook 11.6.19 "Death 18 August 9, 2019 Central Utah 911 and
November 6, 2019 Threats from Someone else's Emergency Services
18 Case" subpoenas
19 August 14, 2019 Consumer Info.com
19 January 16, 2020 Phone 1.16.20_Redacted.pdf
20 August 14, 2019 Rally Reports Rally photo
20 May 8, 2020 Phone 5.8.20_Redacted.pdf and Guerrilla Mail

44
 Filed in A161993 on 08/12/2021, "Exhibits to Appellant's Opposition to Motion for Sanctions"
21 August 21, 2019 Century Link
Communications subpoena
21 May 15, 2020 Phone 5.15.20_Redacted.pdf
22 August 23, 2019 Lexington Hotel subpoena
SUBP-010
23 August 29, 2019 Thomas Ferraro, Thygesen
Subpoenaed someone
# Date Missing Discovery else's account
Allan Thygesen/ Asian Man 24 August 29,2019 Airbnb Subpoena
1 March 11, 2019 Call (Page 10 of 31) SFPD
Chron. Report
T-Mobile exigent request 25 September 3, Comcast subpoena issued
2 March 12, 2019 form for records. (Page 10 of 2019 9/3/2019 September 3,
31) SFPD Chron. Report 2019
Los Angeles Child Support 26 September 3,2019 Lexington Hotel subpoena
3 March 27, 2020 Services Re: Kailin Wang New York Subpoena UIDDA
Subpoena
27 September 17, NOTICE OF TAKING
Email from Erica Johnstone
2019 DEPOSITION OF KAILIN
to Sgt. Martinez allegeing
4 April 2, 2020 WANG AND FOR
Wang commiting Perjury &
PRODUCTION OF
Welfare Fraud
DOCUMENTS
28 September 18, September 18, 2019 Ex
Lexington Hotel Subpoena
5 2019 Parte Motion to Compel
and Production
Kailin Wang
8/22/19 @ 14:51 Received 29 September 27, September 27, 2019
email from Erica Johnstone 2019 Deposition of Kailin Wang
including email and photo
from anonymous sender
6 August 22, 2019 regarding photo of child
taken at visitation.
Johnstone also provided
photo metadata (Page 20 of
31) SFPD Chron. Report
Apple iPhone Search 30 October 4, 2019 Illegal Unoticed New York
7 ??
Warrant DMV Subpoena
31 October 4, 2019 Discovery by Thygesen Re:
8 02/13/19 to 3/23/2019 Menlo Park Police Emails to DA about Walker
Stone
2021-04-26 32 October 15, 2019 October 15, 2019 Ex-Parte
EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO CONTINUE HEARING (CIVIL
SUBPOENAS THYGESEN) (TRANSACTION ID # 66540227) FILED BY
Terminating Sanctions
RESPONDENT WANG, KAILIN AS TO PETITIONER THYGESEN, Request
CHRISTOFFER STANFORD 33 June 19, 2020 Walker Stone Transcripts
2021-04-26
EXHBITS IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO CONTINUE HEARING (SFPD Order by Thygesen's Utah
SEARCH WARRANTS) (TRANSACTION ID # 66540227) (TRANSACTION Counsel
ID # 66540227) FILED BY RESPONDENT WANG, KAILIN AS TO
PETITIONER THYGESEN, CHRISTOFFER STANFORD

45
 Hearings in San Francisco Superior Court FDV-19-814465
FDV-19-814465
Hearing Thygesen's
# Description Judge Wang's Atty
Date Atty
RICHARD Darrick Chase,
2019-03-06 Not Served, Not
1 Ex Parte DVRO w/ Custody. C. Erica T.
8:30 AM Present
DARWIN Johnstone
RICHARD Darrick Chase,
2019-04-10
2 Discovery Order/Continuance C. Erica T. Pro Per by Phone
8:30 AM
DARWIN Johnstone
Ceclia
2019-05-08
3 MEDIATOR CW Wang
10:30 AM
Mediation
Bifurcation of DVRO from
RICHARD Darrick Chase, Audrey Courson,
2019-05-08 UCCJEA Custody Jurisdiction
4 C. Erica T. Karl
8:30 AM set for 6/25/19/ Motion to
DARWIN Johnstone Kronenberger
Quash set for 6/6/19
Darrick Chase,
2019-05-17 MONICA F.
5 Trial Setting Erica T. Terry Sudeko
9:00 AM WILEY
Johnstone
Hearing Re Production Of
RICHARD Darrick Chase,
2019-06-06 Documents Karl
6 C. Erica T.
9:00 AM Off Calendar Jun-06-2019 Kronenberger
DARWIN Johnstone
Granted Per Written Order

(1) Darrick
RICHARD Chase,(2) Erica
2019-06-25
7 UCCJEA Evidentiary Hearing C. T. Johnstone, Sami Mason
1:45 PM
DARWIN (3) Michelene
Insalaco

Darrick Chase,
2019-07-19 MONICA F.
8 Trial Setting Erica T. Pro Per
9:00 AM WILEY
Johnstone
Request For Temporary
RICHARD Douglas
2019-09-18 Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders
9 C. Rappaport, Pro Per
1:30 PM Motion to Compel Granted Per
DARWIN Darrick Chase
Written Order
Request For Temporary
Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders RICHARD Douglas
2019-09-20
10 Emergency Order Re: C. Rappaport, Pro Per
1:30 PM
Child(Ren) Sep-20-2019 Order DARWIN Darrick Chase
Shortening Time to 10/3/19

46
 FDV-19-814465
Hearing Thygesen's
# Description Judge Wang's Atty
Date Atty
Request For Temporary
RICHARD Douglas
2019-09-24 Emergency (Ex Parte) Motion
11 C. Rappaport, Pro Per
1:30 PM to Compel #2/ CCP 1008 Sep-
DARWIN Darrick Chase
24-2019
Request For Order: Temporary
Emergency Order Re:
RICHARD Douglas
2019-10-03 Visitation (Parenting Time),
12 C. Rappaport, Pro Per
9:00 AM Attorney Fees And Costs, Oct-
DARWIN Darrick Chase
03-2019 Granted Per Written
Order
Request For Temporary
Emergency (Ex Parte) Re: RICHARD Douglas
2019-10-15
13 Terminating Sanctions C. Rappaport, Pro Per
1:30 PM
Continued To Oct-15-19 At DARWIN Darrick Chase
01:30 P.M. In Dept 405
Douglas
Rappaport,
Notice Of Hearing (Domestic Darrick Chase, Special
Violence) Erica Appearance:
2019-10-22 MONICA F.
14 Off Calendar Oct-22-2019 Johnstone, Cherie Wallace
9:00 AM WILEY
Continued To Nov-07-19 At Erik (Wang's Criminal
01:30 P.M. In Dept 405 Rasmussen, Defense Atty)
Michelene
Insalaco
Notice Of Hearing (Domestic Special
Douglas
Violence) Appearance:
2019-11-07 MONICA F. Rappaport,
15 Off Calendar Nov-07-2019 Cherie Wallace
1:30 PM WILEY Michelene
Continued To Dec-19-19 At (Wang's Criminal
Insalaco
01:30 P.M. In Dept 405 Defense Atty)
Requests For Order (Requested Douglas
Relief And Facts In Support) Rappaport,
2019-12-19 MONICA F.
16 Off Calendar Dec-20-2019 Michelene Pro Per
1:30 PM WILEY
Continued To Mar-19-20 At Insalaco,
01:30 P.M. In Dept 405 Darrick Chase
Status Conference Canceled
2020-03-19 MONICA F. Cancelled Cancelled COVID-
17 (COVID-19) to May-12-20 At
1:30 PM WILEY COVID-19 19
09:00 A.M. In Dept 405
Status Conference Continued Douglas
2020-05-12 MONICA F.
18 To Aug-27-20 At 09:00 A.M. In Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM WILEY
Dept 405 Darrick Chase

47
 FDV-19-814465
Hearing Thygesen's
# Description Judge Wang's Atty
Date Atty
Declaration Re: Notice And
Service Of Request For
Temporary Emergency (Ex Douglas
2020-08-24 MONICA F.
19 Parte) Orders Off Calendar Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
1:30 PM WILEY
Aug-24-2020 Continued To Aug- Darrick Chase
24-20 At 01:30 P.M. In Dept
405
Request For Order Re: Motion
To Quash; Sanctions Douglas
2020-08-27 MONICA F.
20 Off Calendar Aug-27-2020 Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM WILEY
Continued To Dec-04-20 At Darrick Chase
01:30 P.M. In Dept 405
Motion To Grant Leave To
Amend And/Or Dicharge Kailin
Douglas
2020-09-14 Wang'S Order To Show Cause MONICA F.
21 Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
3:00 PM In Re: Contempt Off Calendar WILEY
Darrick Chase
Sep-14-2020 Granted Per
Written Order

Request For Order Re: Finding

Under Ccp 391(B)(1) That
Respondent Is A Vexatious Douglas
2020-10-22 VICTOR M.
22 Litigant & For Prefiling Order Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM HWANG
Off Calendar Oct-22-2020 Darrick Chase
Continued To Jan-05-21 At
09:00 A.M. In Dept 404

Douglas
2020-12-04 MONICA F. Rappaport,
23 Status Conference Pro Per by Phone
1:30 PM WILEY Michelene
Insalaco,
Rfo Re: Visitation (Parenting
Time), Attorney Fees And
Douglas
Costs, Requesting To Increase
2020-12-16 MONICA F. Rappaport,
24 Visitation Time From 6 To 12 Pro Per by Phone
1:30 PM WILEY Michelene
Hours A Month.....
Insalaco,
Off Calendar Dec-17-2020
Denied
Douglas
2021-01-05 VICTOR M. Rappaport,
25 CCP 391 Vex Lit Motion Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM HWANG Michelene
Insalaco,

48
 FDV-19-814465
Hearing Thygesen's
# Description Judge Wang's Atty
Date Atty
Request For Order Re:
Attorney Fees And Costs, Fc Douglas
2021-01-12 271, 128.5 Ccp, Fc: 2030, 3121, MONICA F. Rappaport,
26 Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM 7605 "Need Based Attorney WILEY Michelene
Fees" Off Calendar Jan-12- Insalaco,
2021 Denied
Douglas
2021-04-22 Status Conference/ Travel MONICA F. Rappaport,
27 Pro Per by Phone
9:00 AM Request WILEY Michelene
Insalaco,
Request For Temporary
Douglas
Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders
Rappaport,
2021-07-19 Emergency Order Re: MONICA F.
28 Michelene Pro Per by Phone
1:30 PM Child(Ren) Continued To Jul- WILEY
Insalaco,
29-21 At 01:30 P.M. In Dept
Darrick Chase
405
Request For Temporary
Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders
Douglas
2021-07-29 Emergency Order Re: MONICA F.
29 Rappaport, Pro Per by Phone
1:30 PM Child(Ren) Off Calendar Jul-29- WILEY
Darrick Chase
2021 Granted Per Written
Order

2021-10-06 MONICA F.
30 Status Conference
1:30 PM WILEY

49
 Filed in A163278 on
San Francisco Superior Criminal Ct. No. 08/30/2021
Click Here
19016407
Hearing
# Description Atty's Present for Wang Atty's Present for Thygesen
Date
(1) Doug. Rappaport, (2) Erica
T. Johnstone, (3) Darrick
Bay Area Criminal Lawyers, Chase, Thygesen Family
1 10/23/19 Initial Appearance
PC (Cherie Wallace) Present (4) Donald A. Dubain
for the People (5) Sgt. Michele
Martinez
Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
2 10/30/19 Passport Confiscation Cherie Wallace
Dubain for the People)
(1) Doug. Rappaport, (2)
3 11/14/19 Arraignment Cherie Wallace Darrick Chase, (3) Donald A.
Dubain for the People
Doug. Rappaport, Donald A.
4 12/11/19 Scheduling Motion to Dismiss Count X Cherie Wallace
Dubain for the People
Doug. Rappaport, Donald A.
5 2/21/20 ADA Dubain/ 1050 Motion Cherie Wallace
Dubain for the People
(1) Doug. Rappaport, (2) Erica
T. Johnstone, (3) Darrick
Chase, Thygesen Family
7 9/17/20 Motion to Dismiss Count X Cherie Wallace
Present (4) Donald A. Dubain
for the People (5) Sgt.
Michele Martinez
(1) Doug. Rappaport, (2) Erica
T. Johnstone, (3) Darrick
Chase, Thygesen Family
8 9/18/20 Motion to Dismiss Count X (Denied) Cherie Wallace
Present (4) (Donald A. Dubain
for the People) (5) Sgt.
Michele Martinez
Bay Area Criminal Lawyers, Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
9 10/15/20 Preliminary Scheduling
PC (Clint Christofferson) Dubain for the People)
Preliminary Scheduling/ March 21-24, Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
10 11/18/20 Clint Christofferson
2021 Dubain for the People)
Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
11 3/12/21 Mental Health PC 1001.36 Clint Christofferson
Dubain for the People)
Bay Area Criminal Lawyers, Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
6 4/7/21 Motion to Withdraw
PC (David J. Cohen) Dubain for the People)
(1) Doug. Rappaport (2)
Public Defender: Lilah Wolf Donald A. Dubain for the
12 4/15/21 David J. Cohen
Assigned/Discovery People (3) Sgt. Michele
Martinez
SF Public Defender: Lilah Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
13 4/27/21 Informal Discovery/Status Conf.
Wolf Dubain for the People)
Doug. Rappaport, ADA:
14 6/8/21 Status Conf. Lilah Wolf
(Jensey)
Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
15 7/13/21 Status Conf. Lilah Wolf
Dubain for the People)
Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
16 8/9/21 Motion to Compel/Seal/Status Conf. Lilah Wolf
Dubain for the People)
Doug. Rappaport, (Donald A.
17 8/19/21 Motion to Compel/Seal/Status Conf. Lilah Wolf
Dubain for the People)

50
CRT 2
 PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Kailin Wang, declare as follows: On September 22, 2021, I served the within

document entitled Reply Brief on the below by serving

through email to the following:

The Honorable Monica F. Wiley

San Francisco Superior Ct. 400 McAllister
San Francisco, CA 94102

Additionally, I caused the within document to be electronically served on all

parties and the California Supreme Court through True-Filing, which will
submit a proof of service.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on September 22,
2021 at Spanish Fork, Utah.

Kailin Wang

51