1

Territory and reorganisation

MODULE II PART I
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – II
PROF. SHIREEN MOTI
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Readings & Cases

▪ Reorganisation
✓ V.N. Shukla ‘The Union and its Territory’.
✓ Singh, Mahendra Prasad. “Reorganisation of States in India.” Economic and
Political Weekly (2008): 70-75.
✓ Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil), paras. Z-HH.
✓ Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51.
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Readings & Cases

▪ Cession and acquisition of territory

✓ In Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, AIR 1962 SC 845.
✓ N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, AIR 1963 SC 533.
✓ Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644.
✓ Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 783.
✓ In Re Mangal Singh, AIR 1967 SC 944.
 4
Article 1

1. (1) India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.

(2) The States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule.
(3) The territory of India shall comprise—
(a) the territories of the States;
(b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; and
(c) such other territories as may be acquired.
 5
Article 1

▪ The republic of India is described as a ‘Union’ and not a ‘Federation’.

▪ The Constitution makers were of the view that the word ‘Union’ better expresses the
fact that the Union of India is not the outcome of an agreement among the old provinces
with the result that it is not open to any State or group of States to secede from the
Union or to vary the boundary of their States at their own free will.
▪ Therefore, Article 1 declares India that is Bharat as a Union of States.
▪ Unlike the American Federation, none of the constituent units of the Indian Union were
sovereign and independent.
▪ The Constituent assembly, deriving its power from the people of India was unfettered
by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius
and requirements of the Indian people as a whole.
 6
Article 1

▪ The ‘territory’ of India as described in clause 3 of Article 1 of the Indian

Constitution, falls under the following three categories:
✓ State territories
✓ Union territories
✓ Territories which may be acquired by the Government of India
▪ The States and territories are mentioned in the First Schedule.
▪ A territory can be said to been acquired when the Indian Union acquires sovereignty
over such territory.
▪ The expression ‘acquired’ should be taken to be a reference to ‘acquisition’ as
understood in public international law.
 7
Article 1

▪ If there was any public notification, assertion or declaration by which the Government of India
had declared or treated a territory as part and parcel of India, the courts would be bound to
recognize the acquisition as having taken place.
▪ A statement of the Government of India, that it did not consider a particular area to have been
acquired by it, is binding on the Court.
▪ An acquisition of a territory may be done in one of the following ways:
✓ Conquest
✓ Cession following treaty
✓ Occupation of territory unoccupied by a recognized ruler
✓ Terms of an agreement between the two states or
✓ Accretion
 8
Article 1

▪ Examples of acquisition, after the commencement of the Indian Constitution are,

Sikkim, Goa, Daman and Diu, Dadar and Nagar Haveli, and Pondicherry.
▪ No cession of Indian territory can take place without a constitutional amendment.
▪ However, settlement of a boundary dispute between India and any of its neighboring
countries about a disputed territory on the borders does not amount to cession of
territory.
 9
Article 2

2. Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms
and conditions as it thinks fit.
 10
Article 2

▪ Article 2 gives two powers to the Parliament, which are as follows:

✓ The power to admit into the union new States.
✓ The power to establish new States.
▪ The power to admit into the union new States refers to the admission of duly
organized political communities.
▪ The power to establish new States refers to the formation of a State where none
existed before.
▪ As per Article 1(3), no parliamentary sanction is required for the acquisition of
territory.
 11
Article 2

▪ A territory acquired by the Government of India, though factually becomes territory of

India from the date of its acquisition, the formal or legal assimilation is brought about
only by Parliamentary legislation made either under Article 2 when the acquired
territory is established as a new State of the Union, or under Article 3 when the
acquired territory is merged into an existing state.
▪ The admission or establishment of a new State will be on such terms and conditions as
the Parliament may think fit.
▪ There is nothing in the Constitution that would entitle a new State, after its formation
or admission into the Union, to claim complete equality of status with a State existing
at the commencement of the Constitution, or formed under Article 3.
 12
Article 2

▪ Article 2 gives complete discretion to Parliament to admit or establish new States on

such terms and conditions as “it thinks fit”.
▪ Such terms and conditions must, however, be consistent with the foundational
principles or the basic structure of the Constitution.
▪ Several territories such as Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Goa, Dama and Diu, Pondicherry
and Sikkim, have been admitted into the Union since the commencement of the
Constitution. But in all these cases Article 2 was not invoked. Admission in all these
cases was done through the amendment of the Constitution under Article 368.
▪ The only example of admission of a territory under Article 2 appears to be of
Chandernagore under Chandernagore (Merger) Act, 1954.
 13
Article 3

3. Parliament may by law—

(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more
States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;
(b) increase the area of any State;
(c) diminish the area of any State;
(d) alter the boundaries of any State;
(e) alter the name of any State:
Article 3 14

Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament
except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained
in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been
referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon
within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the
President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.
Explanation I.—In this article, in clauses (a) to (e), “State” includes a Union territory, but
in the proviso, “State’” does not include a Union territory.
Explanation II.—The power conferred on Parliament by clause (a) includes the power to
form a new State or Union territory by uniting a part of any State or Union territory to any
other State or Union territory.
 Article 3 15

▪ The scope of Article 2 should be differentiated from that of the preceding article. Article
2 relates to admission or establishment of new States which are not part of the Union,
while Article 3 provides for the formation of or changes in the existing states including
Union territories.
▪ The Constitution contemplates changes in the territorial limits of the Constituent States.
Thus, the States have no guarantee of their territorial integrity. The new States may be
formed in different ways laid down in clause (a) of Article 3, namely, (i) by separation
of territories from any state; (ii) by uniting two or more states, (iii) by uniting parts of
states, and (iv) by uniting any territory to a part of any state.
▪ Subsequent clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) further provide for alteration in the name, area or
boundaries of the existing States.
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Article 3

▪ Increase in the area of any State contemplated by Article 3 (b) may also be the result of
adding to any State any part of the territory specified in Article 1(3) (c).
▪ Clause (c) of Article 3 deals with the diminution of the area of any State which may
occur due to taking away part of the area of a State and its addition to another State.
Parliament can even take away the entire area of a State to form a new State or to
increase the area of another State. There is no constitutional guarantee of continuing
existence of a State that existed at the commencement of the constitution or came into
existence later.
▪ But the power to diminish the area of a State does not entitle the Parliament to cede
Indian territory to a foreign State. Accordingly, Parliament has no power under Article
3 (c) to make a law to implement an agreement with the government of a foreign state
ceding Indian territory to a foreign state.
 17
Article 3

▪ The diminution of the area of any State to which Article 3(c) refers, postulates that the area
diminished from the State in question should and must continue to be a part of the territory
of India. This limitation on cession applies as much to the Union territories as to the
territories of states.
▪ The law referred to in Articles 2 and 3 may alter or amend the First Schedule to the
constitution, which sets out the names of the States and description of their territories, and
the fourth schedule allotting seats in the Council of States in the Parliament.
▪ The law so made may also make supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions
which would include provisions relating to the setting up of the legislative, executive and
judicial organs of the State essential to effective State administration under the constitution;
expenditure and distribution of revenue; apportionment of assets and liabilities; provision
as to services; application and adaptation of laws; transfer of proceedings and other related
matters.
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Article 3

▪ No state can, therefore, be formed or admitted or set up by law under article 4 by

Parliament which does not have effective legislative, executive or judicial organs.
▪ A Bill under Article 3 must satisfy two conditions.
▪ First, it shall be introduced in either House of the Parliament only on the
recommendation of the President.
▪ Second, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of
any of the States, the President must refer the Bill to the legislature of the concerned
State for expressing its views on it.
▪ The President shall specify the period within which the State Legislature must express its
views. He may extend the time so specified. If the views of the State Legislature are not
received within the specified or extended period, the second condition stands fulfilled.
 19
Article 3

▪ The President (or Parliament) is not bound by the views of the State Legislature and
may either accept of reject them, even if the views are received in time. A fresh
reference to the State Legislature is not necessary for an amendment of the Bill, if the
amendment is proposed and accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure of
Parliament and is germane to the subject-matter of the original proposals or is not a
direct negation of it.
▪ In case of a Union territory, no reference need be made to the concerned legislature to
ascertain its views and the Parliament can itself take any action as it deems fit
▪ The Constitution authorises the Parliament to form new States or alter the areas,
boundaries or names of existing States without their consent. In other words, the
Parliament can redraw the political map of India according to its will.
 20
Article 3

▪ Hence the territorial integrity or continued existence of any State is not guaranteed by
the constitution. Therefore, India is rightly described as ‘an indestructible union of
destructible states.’ The Union government can destroy the States whereas the State
government cannot destroy the Union. In USA, on the other hand, the territorial
integrity or continued existence of a State is guaranteed by the Constitution.
▪ The term ‘State’ in Article 3 includes a ‘Union territory’. By the first explanation, it is
provided that the term ‘State’ includes a ‘Union Territory’, but since there is no such
necessity with regard to the proviso to Article 3, it is also provided that in the proviso
the term ‘State’ does not include a ‘Union territory’. The reason is that in the case of
alteration of boundaries of the States, it is necessary to elicit the opinion of the
affected states; but since a Union territory is governed by the Parliament itself,
inclusion of Union territory in the word ‘State’ would have been redundant.
 21
Article 3

▪ The second explanation further clarifies the power of the Parliament. It provides that
the Parliament’s power under clause (a) of Article 3 includes the power to form a new
State or Union territory by uniting a part of any State or Union territory to any other
State or Union territory.
▪ Some of the enactments that the Parliament has passed which are relatable to Article 3
of the Constitution are as follows:
✓ Assam (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1951.
✓ Andhra State Act, 1953, which formed the new State and Andhra Pradesh by
separating some territory from the state of Madras.
✓ Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959 provided for the
alteration of boundaries of the States of Andhra Pradesh and Madras.
 22
Article 4

4. (1) Any law referred to in Article 2 or Article 3 shall contain such provisions for the
amendment of the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule as may be necessary to give
effect to the provisions of the law and may also contain such supplemental, incidental
and consequential provisions (including provisions as to representation in Parliament
and in the Legislature or Legislatures of the State or States affected by such law) as
Parliament may deem necessary.
(2) No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution
for the purposes of Article 368.
 23
Article 4

▪ This article directs Parliament, in case it makes a law under Article 2 or Article 3, to
include therein necessary provisions for amendment of the First and Fourth Schedules
of the Constitution.
▪ The First Schedule specifies the States which are the members of the Union and their
respective territories.
▪ The Fourth Schedule specifies the number of seats to which each state is entitled to in
the Council of States.
▪ Further, this article enables the Parliament to include supplementary, incidental and
consequential provisions also.
▪ Clause (2) expressly provides that changes made in the Constitution by such law shall
not be deemed to be amendments of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368.
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Article 4

▪ The result is that alterations in the Constitution coming within the purview of Article 4
may be carried out by a simple majority, subject to the requirements laid down by the
proviso to Article 3, if such alterations relate to the matters specified in Article 3. This
means that laws can be passed by a simple majority and by ordinary legislative
procedure.
▪ Upholding the validity of Section 108, State Reogranisation Act, 1956, which provides
for the continuity of the existing arrangements between the then existing states, the
court held that “The law-making power under Article 3 and 4 is paramount and is not
subjected to not fettered by Article 246 and Lists II and III of the Seventh
Schedule…The Constitutional validity of law made under Articles 3 and 4 cannot be
questioned on the ground of lack of legislative competence with reference to the lists of
the seventh schedule.”
 25
Reorganisation of States in India

▪ The partition of Bengal in 1905 was aimed at forestalling of newly emergent spirit of
Indian nationalism in the English educated new middle class in Bengal to prolong the
British hegemony.
▪ This partition forced the British, in face of a strong popular protest in the form of the
swadeshi movement, to order the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911. A
further partition of the Bengal presidency followed, this time in response to popular
Bihari demands, creating the province of Bihar and Orissa in 1911. In answer to a
similar demand Orissa was bifurcated in 1936.
▪ Though the political map of India by now has been considerably reorganised internally,
the federal union continues to be marked by a great deal of interstate asymmetries of
demographics and territories as well as internal cultural heterogeneity and economic
disparity within each state.
 26
Reorganisation of States in India

▪ There are a number of major problems of reorganisation of states in India in the

decades ahead.
▪ First, the north-south divide that preoccupied Ambedkar intensely in the 1950s is at
least partly moderated by division of bigger north Indian states.
▪ Second, the rise of fragmented ethnic identities and strong micro-regionalism has
forced the short-sighted union governments to create new states, often disregarding
administrative rationality and financial viability.
▪ Third, the asymmetrical federal relations of Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland with
the Indian union are still not sufficiently resolved.
 27
Reorganisation of States in India

▪ Fourth, even after the creation of new states before and after independence, the union
of India is still a complex mosaic of religious, linguistic, caste, and tribal minorities
within and across the existing internal boundaries.
▪ Finally, if South Asia has to exit from the history of internecine feudal and colonial
feuding and warfare, it must become internally democratic and move ahead to embrace
the processes of regional and global integration like other supranational regions in the
world.
▪ It must make a concerted effort to emulate what David Held called the “cosmopolitan
model of democracy.”
 28
Reorganisation of States in India

▪ This model envisages a global and regional order comprising multiple and overlapping
networks of political, economic, and social power and clusters of individual autonomy
and rights “within and across each network of power” spanning states, civil societies,
and regional and global organisations. These developments would give birth to “an
empowering legal order – a ‘democratic international law.’
▪ The emergent legal principles would “delimit the form and scope of individual and
collective action within the organisations and associations of state and civil society.
Certain standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or
civil association can legitimately violate.”
▪ This cosmopolitan model of democracy in the core and peripheral nations of South
Asia alone can ensure simultaneous pursuit of democracy and development and an
escape from the vicious cycle of war and poverty. There is no other way.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 29
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

Facts:
▪ The government removed special status from Jammu and Kashmir, and divided the
former State into two Union territories — J&K and Ladakh — under the Jammu and
Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
▪ The petition was filed by Mohammad Akbar Lone and former Justice Hasnain
Masoodi, both Lok Sabha members belonging to the National conference.
▪ The petitioners had stated that the Writ Petition was being filed for issuance of
appropriate Writ, Direction or Order declaring the Presidential Order G.S.R. 551(E)
(C.O. 272), Presidential Order G.S.R. 562(E) (C.O. 273), and the Jammu and Kashmir
(Reorganisation) Act of 2019 as unconstitutional being violative of Petitioners’
fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; and for the
issuance of consequential writ quashing them.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 30
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

Petitioner’s contention:
▪ The Jammu and Kashmir (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 is constitutionally invalid.
✓ In seeking to downgrade the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into a Union
Territory (with a legislature), the J&K (Reorganisation) Act is ultra vires Article 3
of the Constitution. Article 3 authorises the formation of new States, and the
alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States, but it does not authorise
the degradation of the status of an existing State into a union territory.
✓ This interpretation is supported by the principle of non-retrogression, that was set
out by the Supreme Court in Navtej Johar v. Union of India, 2018 10 SCC 1.
According to the principle of non-retrogression, “the State should not take measures
or steps that deliberately lead to retrogression on the enjoyment of rights either
under the Constitution or otherwise.”
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 31
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

▪ Article 1 of the Constitution of India stipulates that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a
Union of States.” Article 1(3) of the Constitution further stipulates that “the territory of
India shall comprise - (a) the territories of the States; (b) the Union territories specified
in … the First Schedule…” For the purposes of Article 1, “states” and “union
territories” are treated differently, and “states” remain the constituent units of the
Indian Union.
▪ Consequently, Article 3 of the Constitution cannot be read to grant the power to the
Union to convert the status of States into Union Territories, as this power carries with it
the necessary implication that the Union could - if it chose - convert India into a
“Union of Union Territories” instead of a “Union of States.” The framers of the
Constitution could not have - and did not - vest so wide or untrammeled power in the
Union Government.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 32
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

▪ This interpretation of Articles 1 and 3 is buttressed by the holding of the Supreme

Court in S.R. Bommai v Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, where it was clearly held that
“the Courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or
tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the states … let it be
said that the federalism in the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative
convenience, but one of principle - the outcome of our own historical process and a
recognition of the ground realities.”
▪ This interpretation is supported by the consistent history of our Nation, where the
movement has always been from the status of Union territory to Statehood, and never
the other way round.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 33
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

▪ This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Union Territories (with
legislatures) have always been the creations of Constitutional amendments, and not
under the plenary power of Article 3.
▪ Federalism is a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. The principle of pluralistic
federalism would be set at nought if one of the two parties to the federal relationship
(i.e., the Union) can unilaterally amend the terms of their relationship, without even
passing through the rigours of the amending process under Article 368.
▪ The right to autonomous self government and the right to an identity within the federal
framework are fundamental rights flowing from the right to life and other provisions
contained in Part III of the Constitution.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 34
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

▪ The promulgation of C.O. 272 and C.O. 273 are arbitrary exercises of government
power in violation of fundamental rights and further, are in violation of Constitutional
morality.
▪ The J&K (Reorganisation) Act, 2019 violates fundamental rights contained inter-alia in
Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
▪ The Impugned Act is contrary to the Constitutional Scheme.
Mohd. Akbar Lone v. Union of India, Writ Petition 35
(Civil), paras. Z-HH

Prayer:
▪ Issue an appropriate order declaring Presidential Order Presidential G.S.R. 551(E)
(C.O. 272) unconstitutional, void, and inoperative; and
▪ Issue an appropriate order declaring Presidential Order G.S.R. 562(E) (C.O. 273)
unconstitutional, void, and inoperative; and
▪ Issue an appropriate order declaring The Jammu and Kashmir (Reorganisation) Act of
2019 unconstitutional, void, and inoperative; and/or
▪ Pass any other writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interests
of justice and in the facts and circumstances of this case.
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 36
1960 AIR 51

Facts:
▪ On December 22, 1953, the Prime Minister of India made a statement in Parliament to
the effect that a Commission would be appointed to examine “objectively and
dispassionately” the question of the reorganisation of the States of the Indian Union so
that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole
is promoted.
▪ This was followed by the appointment of a Commission under a resolution of the
Union Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 29 December, 1953.
▪ The Bill was introduced in the House of the People on the recommendation of the
President, as required by the proviso to Article 3 of the Constitution.
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 37
1960 AIR 51

▪ Clauses 8, 9 and 10 of the said Bill contained a proposal for the formation of three
separate units, namely, (1) Union territory of Bombay ; (2) State of Maharashtra
including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of Gujarat including Saurashtra
and Cutch.
▪ It was then referred to a Joint Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok
Sabha) and the Council of State (Rajya Sabha).
▪ Some of the clauses of the Bill were amended in Parliament and on being passed by
both Houses, it received the President's assent on August 31, 1956, and became known
as the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (“Act”).
▪ Before the Act came into effect, petitioners filed a writ to the High Court of Bombay.
 38
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr,
1960 AIR 51

Main issues:
▪ To determine on a proper construction the true scope and effect of mainly the proviso
to the Article 3 of the Constitution of India, with particular reference to the second
condition laid down in the proviso to the said article.
▪ Whether the formation of the composite State of Bombay as one unit instead of the
three separate units as originally proposed in the Bill contravened Article 3 of the
Constitution, inasmuch as the Legislature of the State of Bombay had no opportunity
of expressing its views on the formation of such a composite State?
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 39
1960 AIR 51

Prayer:
▪ The appellant asked for a declaration that s. 8 and other consequential provisions of the
Act were null and void and prayed for an appropriate writ directing the State
Government of Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce and implement the
same.
Judgment:
▪ The court declared that the formation of the composite State of Bombay does not
contravene Article 3 of the Constitution of India and hence, any of the provisions of the
Act are not invalid on that ground.
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 40
1960 AIR 51

First contention:
▪ The word “State” in Article 3 should be given a larger connotation so as to mean and include
not merely the geographical entity called the State, but its people as well: this, according to
learned counsel for the appellant, is the " democratic process " incorporated in Article 3 and
according to this democratic process, so learned counsel has argued, the representatives of the
people of the State of Bombay assembled in the State Legislature should have been given an
opportunity of expressing their views not merely on the proposal originally contained in the
Bill, but on any substantial modification thereof.
▪ The Court’s attention was invited to Art. IV, s. 3, of the American Constitution which says inter
alia that “no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor
any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States without the
consent of the Legislatures of the State concerned as well as of the Congress.”
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 41
1960 AIR 51

Court’s discussion:
▪ That relevant provision from the American Constitution is quite different from the proviso that
the Court considered: the former requires the consent of the State Legislature whereas the
essential requirement of our proviso is a, reference by the President of the proposal contained
in the Bill for the expression of its views by the State legislature. Thus, the appellants
contention was not considered to be on point.
▪ The expression “State” in Article 3 of the American Constitution may have different meanings.
it may mean a territorial region, or people united in political relation living in that region or it
may refer to the government under which the people live or it may even convey the combined
idea of territory, people, and government. Article 1 of our Constitution says that India is a
Union of States and the States and the territories thereof are specified in a Schedule. There is,
therefore, no difficulty in understanding what is meant by the expression 'State' in Article 3 of
the Indian Constitution.
 42
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr,
1960 AIR 51

▪ ‘State’ obviously refers to the States in the First Schedule and the ‘Legislature of the State’
refers to the Legislature which each State has under the Constitution. That being the position
the Court saw no reason for importing into the Construction of Art.3. any doctrinaire
consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for giving an extended meaning to
the expression ‘State’ occurring therein.
▪ The Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the sovereign people, was
unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the
genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole.
▪ Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole,
has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or
diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or
Legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the
proposals.
 43
Babulal Parate v. The State of Bombay and Anr,
1960 AIR 51

▪ That being the position the Court saw no reasons for importing into the Construction of
Article 3 any doctrinaire consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for
giving an extended meaning to the expression I State' occurring therein.
Second contention:
▪ The word ‘Bill' in the proviso must be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the
clauses of the Bill, at least any substantial amendment thereof, and any proposal contained in
such amendment must be referred to the State Legislature for expression of its views.
Court’s discussion:
▪ The Court did not agree with this interpretation.
 44
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr,
1960 AIR 51
Court’s discussion:
▪ Wherever the introduction of an amendment is subject to a condition precedent, as in
the case of financial bills, the Constitution has used the expression ‘bill or
amendments.’
▪ Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) lays down the
conditions which govern the admissibility of amendments to clauses or schedules of a
Bill.
▪ The Court recognized that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as in s. 8
of the Act was a substantial modification of the original proposal of three units
contained in the Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment
of the original proposal or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing
its views on all aspects of the subject matter of the proposal.
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr, 45
1960 AIR 51

▪ The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State Legislature several
members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note is that
many different views were expressed in respect of the subject matter of the original
proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that the State
Legislature had no opportunity to express its views in favour of one composite unit
instead of three units if it so desired.
Third contention:
▪ The formation of a new Bombay State as one unit was so different from the three units
originally proposed in the Bill that it was not really an amendment of the original
proposal but a new proposal altogether for which a fresh Bill and a fresh reference were
necessary.
 46
Babulal Parate v. the State of Bombay and Anr,
1960 AIR 51

Court’s discussion:
▪ It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or
pertinent to the subject-matter of the original proposal.
▪ The test for ruling an amendment out of order is:
✓ an amendment must be germane to the subject-matter of the original proposition;
and
✓ it must not be a direct negative thereof.
▪ Judged by these two conditions, it cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead
of three was not germane to the subject-matter of the original proposal or was a direct
negative thereof.