Article

Israel and Turkey: Contemporary Review

of the Middle East
Once Comrades Now 8(3) 338­–355, 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/23477989211019822
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Tuğçe Ersoy Ceylan1

Abstract
Turkey and Israel have been strategic partners since the 1990s. Yet, there has
occurred a deep crisis between the two countries, particularly since 2009, but
the beginning of the deterioration in bilateral relations dates to the early 2000s.
Today both countries designate each other as opponents despite the history of a
strategic partnership. What are the reasons for this radical shift in the Turkish–
Israeli relations? How might the stalemate in the relations be explained? This
study analyses the rupture in the bilateral relations, particularly on the recent
events that paved the way for a rupture and stalemate and evaluates it via three
levels of analysis laid by Kenneth Waltz. The study argues that bilateral relations
have taken shape at three levels in different times and that the deterioration
and amelioration of the bilateral relations hinge upon the identity and ideology
of the leadership at the individual level, domestic factors at the state level, and
structural factors at the systemic level. In this regard, it seeks to reveal which
of the levels of analysis are in play in the determination of bilateral relations
since 1948.

Keywords
Turkish foreign policy, Israeli foreign policy, Turkish–Israeli relations, Levels of
analysis

1 Department of International Relations, Izmir Democracy University, Turkey.

Corresponding author:
Tuğçe Ersoy Ceylan, Uckuylar Mah. Gursel Aksel Bulvarı. No 14 35140, Karabaglar/Izmir Turkey.
E-mail: tugce.ersoy@idu.edu.tr
Ersoy Ceylan 339

Introduction
Being strategic partners during the1990s, the relations between Turkey and Israel
have downgraded and finally deteriorated in the recent years. Therehas occurred
a deep crisis between the two countries, particularly since 2009, but the beginning
of the deterioration dates back to the early 2000s. Today both countries designate
each other as opponents despite the history of a strategic partnership.What are the
reasons for this radical shift in the Turkish–Israeli relations? This article analyses
the rupture in the bilateral relations with a particular focus on the recent events.
The survey of Turkish–Israeli relations is evaluated via three levels of analysis
laid by Kenneth Waltz which helpsanalyze how foreign policy decisions are made
at various levels and identify causal factors of international politics. According to
this approach, a state’s foreign policy could be analyzed via three levels, which
include the systemic level (the interaction between states), the domestic level,and
the individual level (leaders) (Spiegel, 2003, p.75).
The “three images”approach identified by Waltz suggests that the first image is
the individual level for which the locus of the important causes of war is found in
the nature and behavior of human beings (Waltz, 1959, p.16), andit emphasizes the
role played by individual leaders in determining the direction of government
policy(Spiegel, 2003, p.80). The second image, the internal structure of states,
focuses on the internal constitution of the state, such as its ideological underpinnings,
including societal and bureaucratic factors within (Waltz, 1959, pp.83–84). The
factors that can impact foreign policy at the domestic level include regime type
(democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian), electoral politics, bureaucracy, political
culture, public opinion, and interest groups (Spiegel, 2003, p.78).The third image
is the international system, whose main concern is the structure of the international
system rather than the actors themselves; yet, the actors’ behaviors are determined
according to the structure of the system (Waltz, 1959, pp.159–160).
Hence, the study argues that the bilateral relations have taken shape according
to these three levels in different times and that the deterioration and amelioration
of the bilateral relations hinge upon the identity and ideology of the leadership at
the individual level, domestic factors at the state level, and structural factors
related to the conjuncture at the systemic level. In this regard, it seeks to reveal
which of the levels of analysis are in play in the determination of bilateral
relationsbeginning from 1948.

Turkish–Israeli Relations During the Cold War (1948–1990)

The relationship between Turkey and Israel dates back to the foundation of the
state of Israel. Turkey is the first Muslim country that officially recognized Israel
as a sovereign state on March 28, 1949. Turkey chose to stay neutral in the First
Arab–Israeli War in 1948 and voted against the UN Partition Plan in 1947. It was
only after the Western powers recognized the state of Israel thatTurkey followed
the suit. It might be argued that the structural factorsat the systemic level had been
the catalyst in Turkey’s decision to recognize Israel.
340 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

Following the end of the Second World War, the international system became
bipolar, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). In this
bipolar structure,Turkey positioned itself on the Western camp against the threat
of communismand aligned its international security concerns with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey’s membership in NATO had
symbolic importance in domestic politics; it referred to Turkey’s closeness to
Europe as envisioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Turkey’s Western trajectory was
visible in its policy toward the Middle East as well. As the Arab states approached
the USSR, Turkey became alienated from the Arab world. Thus, Turkey’s
recognition of Israel was closely related toits desire to coordinate its relations with
the USA and to improve its posture in the eyes of the West, and it saw Israel as a
bridge between Turkey and the West .
Additionally, Turkey’s concerns that Israel would be a Soviet satellite in the
Middle East were proven to be false after the establishment of the state.
Additionally,at the individual level, the statist elitist intelligentsia was critical of
the pro-Arab policy and supported the improvement of the relations with Israel.
Besides, the policy of removing Arab cultural patterns from theTurkish culture
was an influential factor in the formation of a positive atmosphere on the
recognition of Israel.
Like Turkey, Israel had to operate within the bipolar system of the Cold War
and sought to pursue a policy of neutralism, nonalignment, or
nonidentification;however, the policy of nonidentification gave way to a pro-
Western orientation and later to the USA–Israel alignment.For the USA, Israel
was not an indispensable country in its Middle East policy in the beginning, but
for Israel,the USA has become an indispensable ally, providing Israel with
economic, technical, military, political, diplomatic, and moral support . Israel’s
value as an ally to the USA has augmented following the June 1967War as Israel
proved itself militarily. The US President Nixon and the Secretary of State
Kissinger explained the increasing support for Israel as an efficient way to diminish
the degree of Soviet penetration into the region. Thus, Israel’s military victories
against Egypt and Syria, which the USSR backed, demonstrated Israel’s strategic
value for the USAin the Middle East while at the same time consolidated the
image of the USA in the region Meirsheimer & Walt, 2009, p. 60).
In the light of the bipolar structure in the international system, both Turkey and
Israel positioned themselves on the Western bloc and became allies under the
patronage of the USA. For Israel, along with the benefits of ties with a non-Arab
Muslim state, Turkey’s wide-ranging international relations and key geographical
position in the Middle East enhanced Ankara’s value. The earliest cooperation
between Turkey and Israel was established in the security field,and it was a secret
cooperation in the form of intelligence sharing. The reason for secrecy lied in
Turkey’s signingof the Baghdad Pact with Iraq in 1955,which called for
cooperation on security and defense sectors between the two countries, and which
was the part of the American global strategy of containment, and the parties
signed it upon American encouragement . Hence, the relations between Turkey
and Israel were kept low-profile during which wars were fought between the Arab
states and Israel.
Ersoy Ceylan 341

During the 1950s, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion believed that by
signing a pact with the non-Arab states in the region, Israel would rule out the
possible threats from the Arab states and the rise of pan-Arabism.Three motives
for this pact drove Ben-Gurion: to break the isolation that the Arab countries had
imposed on Israel, to stabilize the region and form a new balance of power, and to
serve Israel in strengthening relations with the West, especially the USA. The
USA supported the pact, which was supposed to be signed by Turkey, Iran, and
Ethiopia. Within this context and with the encouragement of the US Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, Turkey joined the “Peripheral Alliance”or “Phantom
Pact”formed by Israel in 1958. Hence, Turkey and Israel agreed to coordinate in
the military and security sectors and the diplomatic, commercial, and scientific
sectors.Besides, the pact would keep the Soviet expansionism at bay and would
contain pan-Arabism.
The reason forTurkey joining the pact was threefold: The tension between
Turkey and Syria had increased in 1957, and Ankara was uncomfortable with the
Syrian and Egyptian unification while the USSR supported Syria militarily.
Moreover, in 1958, there occurred a coup d’état in Iraq, and Iraq left the Baghdad
Pact; this created a security vacuum in the southern border of Turkey and increased
Ankara’s perception of threat. Another reason was structural systemic concerns as
the USA wanted Turkey to join this pact. The economic dimension of this pact
was particularly important for Turkey as the country was in a deep crisis in those
years; Israel as the major trade partner of Turkey in the region, gave support to the
Democratic Party (DP) government’s efforts to mitigate the impact of crisis.
However,the leitmotif of the pact between Turkey and Israel had been the
military sector. It was unique, being the only cause of a military agreement between
Israel and another country. Although this security cooperation did not constitute an
alliance, it could offer some strategic advantages and some decrease in anxiety
concerning Turkey’s perceived threat of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s
desire to dominate the Middle East. Hence, Athanassopoulou argues that Ankara’s
object in affiliating with security cooperation with Israel was to counterbalance the
shift in the regional balance of power in favor of Egypt since this would threaten
Turkey with encirclement.However, the 1960 coup d’état in Turkey led to a change
in the military establishment and caused cooling of relations.
In this period, particularly following the 1965 elections, the Justice Party
government began establishing relations with the Arab states. The change of
policy was due to Turkey’s estrangement in the international arena over Cyprus
asTurkey sought the support of the Arab states on the Cyprus issue against Greece
at the United Nations. This policy was visible in Turkey’s protests against Israel
during the June War of 1967, as it explicitly supported the Arab stateshoping to
obtain their support at the UN. Besides, approaching the Arab countries would be
useful at the state level as this might serve in pulling votes of conservative voters
in the elections. This policy change came into practice with Turkey’s official
declaration that it would not allow military bases on its soil against Arab states. In
the final analysis, the developments following the coup in Turkey and the June
War had brought a slowdown in the Turkish–Israeli relations; however, there has
not occurred a radical shift in bilateral relations. In the international arena, Turkey
342 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

took a stance on the side of the Arab states and approved the resolutions
condemning Israel but did not cut the diplomatic relations, which steered at the
acting ambassador level.
The real cooling of bilateral relations arose during the October War in 1973
when Egyptian and Syrian forces carried out a surprise attack on Israel. As did
during the June 1967 War, Turkey announced its neutrality;however,in practice,
Ankara positioned itself on the Arab side. It allowed the USSR jets, which carried
military equipment to the Arab states, to use its airspace while preventing the USA
to use the İncirlik base to help Israel . Turkey was still hoping for the support of
Arab states on the Cyprus issue. And the Turkish public opinion was siding with the
Palestinians and their cause. In an atmosphere where Israel was seen as the occupier
and usurper, Ankara could not ignore that tendency and appear on the Israeli side.
Additionally, the Turkish government was under pressure from domestic
radical groups pushing the government to pursue anti-Western and anti-Israeli
policies.Oneof those groups, the Turkish People’s Liberation Front, captured and
murdered the Israeli Consul General Ephraim Elron in May 1971.The Israeli
government condemned the murder strongly, but it was careful in differentiating
between the murderers and the Turkishpeople, saying,

The Israeli government believes that the Turkish people are outragedby violence
aimed at innocent human beings, the Israeli government is certain thatthe Turkish
government is doing and will do everything in its power to bring tojustice those who
are responsible for this terrible crime.(Aviv,2013,pp.756–757)

Notwithstanding official condemnations, under such circumstances,the Turkish

government did not desire to upgrade its relations with Israel. With the public
opinion leverage and due to the relatively autonomous foreign policy, in 1975,
Turkey recognized Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which was designated
as a terrorist organization by Israel. The official recognition of PLO was another
catalyst in the alienation of Turkish–Israeli relations in this period.
The bilateral relations that began friendly but under the pressure of bipolar
international system have stagnated and cooled during the1960s–1970s. The
Israeli declaration of Jerusalem as the united capital of the state in 1980 worsened
bilateral relations. Ankara condemned the Israeli legislative steps of changing
Jerusalem’s status, which was accepted as a Holy Place by Turkey, and Turkey
supported the UN Security Council Resolutions 476 and 478, which condemned
Israel’s act as the violation of international law.Turkey’s rapprochement policy
with the Arab states in return for international support on the Cyprus issue did not
produce the expected results both on economic and political fronts. Nevertheless,
Turkey condemned Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in1982 and declared 24
September “the day of solidarity with the Palestinians”,following the massacres
in the Sabra and Shatila camps where Palestinian refugees lived in Lebanon.
Despite the condemnations,Israel called Turkey secretly for a joint operation in
Lebanon against Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
terrorists; during the operation, many terrorists were killed, and ASALA training
facilities in Southern Lebanon were demolished. Additionally, Israel delivered 28
files that IDF retrieved on Armenian terrorists during the operation to Oktay
Ersoy Ceylan 343

Beşkardeş, the Turkish official managing the operation against ASALA. That was
a gesture of goodwill from Israel to recover the tense relations with Ankara, but
Israel also desired to emphasize the links between Armenian and Palestinian
terrorism and the shared nature of the terrorist threat to encourage Turkey to
soften its criticism toward Israeli operation in Lebanon .
Thus, beginning from 1983, one could assert that the Turkish–Israeli relations
began to improve. This trend toward rapprochement was based upon the
international developments whereby both had to reevaluate their positions. The
Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan drew Turkey
and Israel closer. Likewise, the doctrinal change in the USA’s Middle East policy
implied a political restructuring. The USA needed both Turkey and Israel as its
allies in the region. Once again, two members of the Western camp would
cooperate in accordance with the dynamics of the international system.
In the 1980s, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1983–1989) regarded
relations with Israel as a window of opportunity to develop its ties with the
USAand believed a better relationship with Israel would foster USA–Turkey
relations. Ankara was convinced that Israel could advocate Turkey’s interests in
Washington owing to its special relationship with the USA.According to Israeli
diplomats, it was particularly the Armenian issue that triggered the slight
rapprochement with Özal’s administration. Ultimately, Turkey appointed a senior
diplomatEkrem Güvendiren with ambassadorial rank as its charge d’affaires to its
mission in Tel Aviv in the fall of 1986.
Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the Palestinian state on the
day it was announced by Palestinian National Council onNovember 15, 1988.
This recognition was consistent with the Turkish position that the PLO was the
sole representative of the Palestinian people and that the best way to resolve the
Middle East conflict was to accept UN Resolution 242 (Abadi, 1995, p.112).
Likewise, the Intifada that erupted in the occupied territories in 1987 was closely
watched by the Turkish public opinion. Israel’s disproportionate actions against
Palestinians during the uprising were widely criticized and created a hostile
atmosphere against Israel among the Turkish citizens. Nonetheless, Özal
endeavored for the normalization of Turkish–Israeli relations.In the final analysis,
it should be reiterated that the Turkish–Israeli relations during this initial period
were to a large extent predicated on the Cold War and Turkey’s position as a key
ally of the Western camp. The bilateral relations would reach their peak following
the end of the Cold War.

Turkish–Israeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Era:

Golden Years of the 1990s
Turkish–Israeli relations became more apparent and gained momentum during the
1990s in a unipolar system dominated by the USA. As the “outsiders”and the only
democracies in the region, Turkey and Israel improved relations in the military,
political, and economic sectors. Both states witnessed positive and negative
344 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

impacts of the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc.
Two important developments marked a new economic order understood as the
internationalization of capital and the globalization of production and
distribution,and the new world order declared by US President George
Bush,implying the unconditional supremacy of the West.
In this new conjuncture, Turkey avoided the communist threat coming from
the USSR. However, with the collapse of the USSR, Turkey lost its geo-strategic
importance vis-à-vis the Soviet threat in the eye of the West since there was not
any possibility for a direct Russian aggression against the Middle East anymore.
However, the recent vacuum was in Central Asia and Turkey as a NATO member
could be better suited as a regional partner for the USA (Garfinkle, 1996, p. 569).
As for Israel, the USSR had never been a direct threat; the USSR backing the Arab
states as a counterweight against the USA was the real concern for Israel as it was
vulnerable to the conventional Arab threat. In other words, the USA and Israeli
interests were not identical, and the huge imbalance in the relative power plays to
American desiderata when divergences in interest arose (Garfinkle, 1996, p. 563).
With the end of the Cold War, the Arab threat to Israel lessened dramatically,
and the possibility of peace under the US mediation became an opportunity for
Israel to secureitself in the region. Although this new regional conjuncture did not
bind the USA and Israel as closely as the Soviet–Arab axis did in the 1960s and
1970s (Garfinkle, 1996, p. 568), the Islamic Republic of Iran posed a common
threat for both the USA and Israel. Accordingly, an editorial in the daily Ha’aretz
revealed that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had called upon the USA to support
Turkey to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East. Likewise, the Iranian
initiative to penetrate in the Central Asia and Caucasus made Turkey and Israel
significant in the strategic calculations of the USA. The Muslim majority, secular
states such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan turned to Israel for security
assistance over fears of domestic Iranian Islamist agitation (Pinfold & Peters,
2019, p. 8). Hence, these states and Israel were facing a shared threat which the
USA could exploit for its foreign policy strategy.
The revival in the Turkish–Israeli relations was primarily spurred by
developments at the systemic level. The fact that the USA as the leader of the
democratic world needed democratic and secular partners in the region drove
once again Turkey and Israel closer within the same camp as the new global threat
to democratic world was expected to come from Islamic fundamentalism and the
USAneeding reliable allies. At the state level, Ankara was in search of the
countries that it could cooperate against the new security threat Kurdistan
Workers’s Party (PKK) coming from the southern borders. The fact that PKK
actions were supported by Iraq, Syria, and Iran prompted Turkey to cooperate
with Israel in the region (Ülgül, 2019, p.138). In the same vein, Israel began to
perceive existential threat from the newly founded Islamic regime in Iran and the
rise of Islamism in the region.
During this period, the relations have become bilateral in real terms since two
partners contributed equally toward its formation and continuation. The changing
dynamics in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict were the catalyst,and it was after the
Madrid peace process in December 1991 that Turkey re-engaged with Israel at the
ambassadorial level. Likewise, with the encouragement of the USA, Declaration
Ersoy Ceylan 345

of Principles (DoP) was signed between Israel and PLO. The main contribution of
the DoP in facilitating the bilateral relations was that it removed a longstanding
barrier for the Turkish side and helped launch a flurry of cooperative activities.
Beginning from the second half of the 1990s, Turkish–Israeli relations became
multifaceted and revived in every sector, from tourism and economy to military
and security sectors (Altunışık, 2000). A series of military agreements were signed
during this period which added a strategic dimension to the bilateral relations. The
strategic cooperation in the military and security sectors addressed mainly the
threats of radical Islam which was primarily a domestic issue for Turkey while an
existential threat for Israel coming from the region via Iran and its proxies. The
rise of Welfare Party in Turkey was met with concern by the bureaucratic and
military elites in Turkey and the securitydefense establishment made Israel a
central issue in challenging the authority of Islamists following the rise of Welfare
Party to the power and in preventing the emergence of an Islamic bloc composed
of Muslim Arab countries .
Thereby, in 1996, Turkey and Israel signed two important agreements regarding
military and economic sectors:a military training agreement for joint training of
Turkish and Israeli aircraft pilots, intelligence sharing to a certain degree, and
permitting Israeli air force jets to use the Turkish air space ,and a free trade
agreement. Within the framework of military agreement Turkey signed 11 separate
agreements with Israel until 2000. The major one was the Military Industry
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1996 which included regulations on arms sales
and Israeli participation in Turkish military modernization program. Apart from
arms sales, knowledge transfer and military technology exchange,another
dimension of this cooperation was the common military exercises. In 1996,
Turkish and Israeli jets made joint refueling exercises on the air; in 1998, a joint
search and rescue exercise called Reliable Mermaid was conducted in the
Mediterranean Sea with the participation of the US battleships as well (Oran,
2010, pp.571–572).
Those joint military actions increased the threat perception on the side of the
Arab states and the military cooperation received varying degrees of criticism in
the Muslim world. The Turkish–Israeli strategic partnership began to be seen as
the most dangerous alliance that could redraw the borders of the Middle East.
Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim called the partnership as “the greatest threat
to the Arabs since 1948” and “the most dangerous alliance we witnessed since the
Second World War”. As a result, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Iran sought to constitute
a counter-alliance against Turkish–Israeli cooperation; however, the conflicting
interests between Iraq and Iran, the Syrian–Iraqi competition, and Egypt’s need
for the US support prevented this counter alliance (Inbar, 2001, pp. 55-56).
Economic and commercial bilateral relations struck a blow as well. With the
free trade agreement, the customs were reduced at first step by 12%, and it was
expected to be reduced by 40% in 1998 and, in 2000, the customs were envisaged
to be removed; however, customs were not removed as envisaged. In 1998, during
a visit of Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz to Israel, two states decided to
promote the bilateral trade volume. Accordingly, Turkish carriers could use the
port of Haifa to reach out to the Middle Eastern countries, Turkish and Israeli
346 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

investors would bid mutually, and two states would cooperate in agriculture and
share knowhow (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017, p.309). The economic relations were
not limited to the commercial sector. Turkish and Israeli firms began to make
mutual investments,and, in the beginning of 2000, the Israeli investors operating
in Turkey had reached 72. Turkish firms won construction tenders in Israel such
as the project of Ben-Gurion Airport.
During this period, it was apparent that Turkey abandoned the policy of
balancing between Arab states and Israel and pursued a policy in favor of Israel.
However, the fractions represented by Welfare Party designated themselves as
anti-Zionists and these groups were critical of cooperation with Israel over fears
of alienating the Islamic world. Moreover, the partner of the coalition government
led by Necmettin Erbakan did not refrain from displaying its anti-Zionist attitude
on every occasion and described Hamas as composed of a “people who want to
rescue a country that is occupied and in which the Palestinians must live under
tyranny” and that “it is a typical mistake of the West to call them terrorists”. The
situation in bilateral relations caused concerns in some circles in Israel,andIsrael
also did not desire the strategic relationship with Turkey to drag itto take side on
the Turkish–Syrian tensions since Israel expected to repair its relations with Syria
in the long term. Likewise, Israel was in any case at the target of terrorist
organizations; the last thing Israel desired was the emergence of a new security
threat that would come from PKK as a result of being Turkey’s partner. Nor Israel
wanted to face off against Greece and Southern Cyprus because of the level of
relations with Turkey (Oran, 2010, p.575).
The concerns at the state level were manifest in the change of direction in the
bilateral relations. Israel declared the desire of the government to pursue relations
with Turkey at a level that would not bother the other states in the region. The
Israeli Minister of Education Yossi Sarid declared in 2000 that the children of
Israel would be taught about the “Armenian genocide” while Ankara took steps
toward returning to the policy of balancing. In line with this policy, Turkey acted
on the side of the Islamic countries during the Al-Aqsa Intifada that erupted in the
occupied territories. The Second Intifada was a turning point for the beginning of
a change in the negative direction despite there was no immediate change in the
official policy. The Turkish public opinion became pro-Palestinian during the
Intifada and Israel was scrutinized at the domestic level. This stance was displayed
with the statement of Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit when he described the
Israeli attack on the Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin which inflicted massive
civilian Palestinian causalities in 2002 as “genocide”.
The strategic partnership during the 1990s proved to be strong and productive
for both parties. However, the end of the peace process turned the tide. Once a
unique example of cooperation between Israel and a Muslim state in a hostile
environment, the Turkish–Israeli relations began to sour and turnedremittent
following the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
orAKP) rise to power in 2002. That was due to both the major shifts in the foreign
policies of Turkey and Israel and the regional security and policy challenges that
two states were facing. Therelations began to take shape according to the attitudes
and manners of the leaders vis-à-vis each other. Hence, after 2002, it might be
Ersoy Ceylan 347

asserted that the course of bilateral relations was influenced not only atstate and
systemic levels but also atthe individual level. The impact of the individual level
was manifest particularly on the Turkish side in the political discourses of its
leader, and this individual attitude have gradually become the state identity.

Relations in the 2000s: From Deterioration to Rupture

Although the USA has stayed as the basic determiner of the international system
in the 2000s, it was obvious that it was neither capable of orienting nor determining
the international system. The concepts of international terrorism, war on terrorism,
and preventive intervention have become the most cited notions in the international
arena. The main rupture occurred following the 9/11 events when the twin towers
in the USA were attacked by al-Qaida terrorists in 2001. As retaliation, the US
government launched an operation on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, believed
to be the instigator of al-Qaida. Hereby, the era of multilateral intervention has
begun and subsequently the invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003 has paved the
way for a new conjuncture (Dedeoğlu, 2008, p. 896). On the other hand, the
subsequent US-led actions in both Afghanistan and Iraq were seen by many
Muslims as unjustly punitive, as designed to punish fellow believers for their
implicit acceptance or explicit support of the terrorist actions of 9/11 since it also
represented an attempt by Muslims to fight back against what was perceived to be
a globally destructive actor: the United States and the “West”more generally
(Haynes, 2005, p. 402). The eruption of the Second Intifada following Ariel
Sharon’s visit to Haram al-Sahrief/Temple Mount area was designated as another
example of violent actions characterized as religious. The interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq did not eliminate terrorism, and the religious tendency and
violence of those groups have grown stronger and prepared the ideological
infrastructure ofthe East–West cleavage which culminated in the solidification
and increase or the supporters of hardline policies around the world (Dedeoğlu,
2008, pp. 897–898).
With the rise of AKP in power, Turkey signaled a differentpolicy in the Middle
Eastern issues. The establishing of amicable relations with Syria, despite the US
disavowal, invitation to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah—seenby Israel as terrorist
and the agitator of suicide bombings—andthe rapprochement with Iran within the
context of struggle against PKK were indicators of this change. It could be argued
that this change was due to the transformation of Turkish foreign and security policy
that had been traditionally driven by a limited set of actors, including the Turkish
General Staff, senior bureaucrats, and a small number of strategic thinkersinto the
influence for alternative elites who emerged with the rise of Islamic politics in the
1990s, who are less secular, more conservative. Thesetrends were accelerated by
the advent to power of the AKP, a political party with Islamist roots .
The AKP’s understanding of foreign policy was different from the traditional
foreign policy understanding in some basic principles: the relation of zero
problems with neighbors, a multilateral and multi-dimensional policy in line with
Turkey’s central character, developing a new diplomatic style, and discourse and
348 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

switching from a stable diplomacy to a pro-active diplomacy that could adapt to

the dynamic conditions in the international and regional arena . In this respect,
with the AKP in power, Turkish foreign policy has stepped out of the line of
official state policy and a dualism of state policy and government policy have
occurred. According to the government policy, Turkey is no longer a front state as
in the Cold War and nor was it a bridge between East and West as in the post-Cold
War; Turkey should become a regional and pivot power with its history, geography,
and strategic depth. Hence, Turkish foreign policy has been described as more
independent, assertive, active, and multi-dimensional and integrated.
At this point, neo-Ottomanism has served as one of the main conceptual tools for
understanding Turkish foreign policy. It is understood as establishing a Turkish sphere
of influence in the former Ottoman geography by exploiting the power vacuums
created by conflicts and tensions in those areas via soft power projection and material
forms of power (Hoffmann & Cemgil, 2016, p. 5). The term neo-Ottomanism which
was made popular by Turgut Özal ascribed Turkey a more active role in the former
territory of the Ottoman state rather than expansionism. However, under the AKP
rule, the Ottoman past has been idealized and the concept of neo-Ottomanism has
begun to be understood as a counternarrative to the secular Western republican
ideology, a perspective not envisaged by Turgut Özal (Uzer, 2020a, pp.279–285).
The change of ideology and strategy in Turkish foreign policy affected
gradually the Turkish–Israeli relations in the negative direction as both sides’
strategies and policies differentiated in line with the declared national interests
and the changing dynamics in the region. In this period, Israel has been criticized
more over its actions toward the Palestinians and its policies regarding the
occupied territories. Still, the bilateral relations began in a positive atmosphere.
The interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül radioed down his condolences with
regard to a suicide bombing while flying over Israel in January 2003, on his way
to discussions with the Arab leaders on Iraq. In late May 2003, Prime Minister
Erdoğan expressed his support for recent moves to renew Israeli–Palestinian
peace talks and offered to host such negotiations.While visiting Turkey in April
2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalomhe reassured Turkish authorities that
his country also opposed the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
The first crisis during the AKP period broke out in 2004. The Prime Minister
Erdoğan condemned Israel’s assassination of the spiritual leader of Hamas Sheikh
Yassin and defined the assassination as the bombing of the peace process. In 2004
Israel killed another Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi and soon Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat died, and Israel exploited this political vacuum and
initiated a military operation “Iron Orange”on Rafah and Han Yunus refugee
camps with the aim of preventing weapons smuggling. Likewise, Erdoğan defined
these operations on the Gaza Strip as state terrorism.
Despite these rhetorical and harsh criticisms, the military and economic
agreements were still in effect. According to data presented by Umut Oran, a
member of parliament from the opposition Republican People Party (CHP), the
trade with Israel has grown 249.4% between 2002 and 2017; the trade volume
being $1.4 billion in 2002 reached $5.8 billion in 2014.Besides, Turkey used the
drones called Heron in the struggle against PKK which were bought from Israel
Ersoy Ceylan 349

within the context of 1996 military agreements, and, in March 2002, Israel
undertook the modernization of M-60 tanks.
In 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan paid his first official visit to Israel and met
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The meeting was announced as productive and
successful and Erdoğan told that he supported Sharon’s withdrawal plan from
Gaza and that he hoped this plan would be conducted in coordination with the
Palestinian side. In the same year, the Anti-Defamation League based in the USA
gave an award to Erdoğan in the name of the Turkish diplomats who saved the
Jews from genocide during the Holocaust. During this period, it was no surprise
to read op-eds in the Israeli newspapers hailing Erdoğan and his party as the
cement of Islam and democracy. This attitude of Israel was in line with the US
policy vis-à-vis Turkey as Washington had defined Turkey as the model for the
Muslim states in the Middle East as part of its strategy on war against terrorism.
Following the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, which the West
saw illegitimate, Turkey accepted the results and Hamas leader Khalid Meshal
visited Turkey. This visit was seen by Israel as the sign of sympathy of Turkish
government toward Hamas, and the degree of shock and disapproval was manifest
with counter declarations made by Israeli officials: What would Turkey think if
Israel met Abdullah Öcalan. This official visit was not only interpreted as pro-
Hamas attitude but also as a sign that Turkey would pursue an independent policy in
line with the ideology and strategy outlined by the AKP government. Israel rendered
this new stance of Turkey as a shift of axis and as a trend toward Islamization.
The year 2007 passed relatively calmly and Israeli President Shimon Peres
visited Turkey and made a speech in the Turkish parliament which called Turkey
for mediation between Israel and Hamas. Turkey’s continued role of mediator was
believed to be effective on the Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations. Within this
context, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert paid a visit to Turkey and discussed
with Erdoğan the conditions of peace with Syria. But a few days after this visit,
Israel initiated the Operation Cast Lead on Gaza in December 2008. Erdoğan was
very furious since he claimed that Olmert had promised him that Israel would
peacefully approach the Palestinian issue. Additionally, Turkey interpreted this
situation as diversion and designated Israel’s attitude as betrayal and an act of
humiliation. Erdoğan defined the Israeli operation which killed nearly 1,400
Palestinians as state terrorism and a crime against humanity.
###Apart from AKP, Turkish Islamist civil society associations organized a
series of mass demonstrations to protest Israel and the USA throughout Turkey.
The protestors carried Palestinian flags and pro-Hamas banners and condemned
Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip . Erdoğan’s political discourse proved to be
successful in securitizing Israel before the Turkish public opinion via Mavi
Marmara incident (Uzer, 2020b, p.690). Moreover,the harsh rhetoric on Gaza
served Erdoğan in the local elections. Besides, hard stance and gradual alienation
from mutual relations gave the clue of the changing ideology in Turkish foreign
policy andthe state identity.
The bilateral relations further deteriorated with the “Davos incident”in January
2009 at the Davos World Economic Forum. During a panel discussion, Erdoğan
expressed his displeasure about the Israeli operations in Gaza, his rhetoric was
extremely harsh and, at the end Erdoğan, left the panel due to him being given less
350 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

time to speak than Israeli President Peres and blamed Israel with “knowing well
how to kill”as he left (The Guardian, 2009).Erdoğan’s attitude and stance against
the Israeli president brought the house down in the Arab and Muslim world. While
Ankara succeeded in winning hearts and minds of the Arab street, the relations
with Israel deteriorated in the same speed. Considering the new foreign policy and
strategy of the AKP (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011), the shift in policy toward Israel was a
necessary precondition for a more proactive role in the Middle Eastand it was
consistent with the ideological background of the government officials, several of
whom had been members of the Welfare Party.
The coming days would bring another major blow to the bilateral relations. In
May 2010, Mavi Marmara flotilla carrying humanitarian aid and sailing to Hamas-
ruled Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli–Egyptian blockade, was intercepted by
the Israeli soldiers in international waters. Israeli soldiers took control of the ship
and in the confrontation killed nine Turkish citizens and wounded several others.
Ankara demanded an apology that was refused by Israel. Turkey recalled its
ambassador to Israel Oğuz Çelikkol and closed airspace to Israeli military
flights,which ended the 1996 military agreement. The Mavi Marmara incident
changed the parameters in which both Turkey and Israel had been operating as it
was the first time in republican Turkish history that Turkish civilians were killed
by foreign troops.
Israel has tried to decrease the tension in the following months after the Mavi
Marmara incident. In 2013,Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made an apology
to Turkey for the incident, with pressures from US President Barack Obama. In
2015, Turkey and Israel opened the channels of informal diplomacy and Turkish
Foreign Secretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu met Israeli officials in Rome to discuss the
terms of normalization. Finally in 2016, Turkey and Israel have come to terms
regarding Mavi Marmara incident. Israel paid ex gratiapayment of $20 million to
Turkey for the families of the Mavi Marmara victim as compensation. In return,
Israeli officials and soldiers would not be held criminally liable for Mavi Marmara
incident. Likewise, the gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean have brought them
together; however, for Israel, Turkey was no longer a reliable partner and it sought
to build new alliances with Greece and Southern Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Despite the diplomatic channels beingopened albeit at the acting ambassador
level, currently two states have not yet built the normal relations. One of the
reasons of this stalemate lies in the leaders’ lack of sympathy for each other. It
might be asserted that the Turkish–Israeli relations have been affected mostly by
the factors at the individual level during AKP in power. The ideological background
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party was first believed to be a bridge between
Islam and democracy and to play an important role against radical Islam. However,
this proved to be false.The Milli Görüş movement which Erdoğan used to belong
has always been both anti-Semitic and anti-Israel (Tepe, 2008, p. 335). It could be
asserted that Erdoğan did not change his mind about Israel, but he acted
pragmatically in line withboth domestic and foreign conjuncture, and his
pragmatism was not fake.
Another ideological catalyst was Davutoğlu’s standpoint which claims that the
Turkish–Israeli partnership is an alienation factor indetermining Turkey’s political
Ersoy Ceylan 351

identity. According to Davutoğlu, the alienation process has undermined the

Turkey’s effectiveness in the Middle East and that Turkey’s regional policies were
determined according to Israel, “a state having only fifty years of past in the
region” (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 57). Obviously, Davutoğlu’s approach to Israel has
been ideologically characterized and Islam and foreign policy is intertwined in his
understanding. Although anti-Israel rhetoric garnered the support of the Arab
streets following the rupture in Turkish–Israelirelations, it is a fact that Middle
Eastern regimes acted according to the realpolitik rather than ideological/
normative perspectives. Despite the fact that Ankara received many declarations
of support and anti-Israel critics following the Mavi Marmara incident, majority
of states refrained from an open escalation or crisis with Israel .
As Israel appealed to harsher and disproportionate methods and policies
against the Palestinians, the situation got worsened. On the other hand, the efforts
of Benjamin Netanyahu’s becoming more hawkish on the Palestinian issue to
remain in power have been the catalyst for the loss of trust and communication of
two sides at the individual level. Following the US President Donald Trump’s
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017, AKP government
condemned Donald Trump as behaving irresponsibly and Erdoğan again declared
Israel a terrorist state (Al Jazeera, 2017).Netanyahu replied that “he does not
intend to take moral course from a leader who helps the terrorists in Gaza, who
supports Iran on flouting the sanctions, who jails the journalists and who bombs
the Kurdish villages”.
The Arab Spring is also the manifestation of the deterioration of the bilateral
relations and the loss of trust between the leaders as this process displayed the
ideological cleavages between two states (Başkan, 2018). During the protest
wave, Turkey chose to support uprisings and opposed dictators. During the
uprisings in Egypt, Turkey supported the Muslim Brotherhood against the army
rule and in Syria, was encouraged by the rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power in
Cairo, sought to emulate these results in Syria and across the region and hoped to
build friendly Sunni Islamist regimes in Egypt and Syria . This strategy of Turkey
was denounced by Israel. Israel blamed Turkey for supporting radical Islamist
factions in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine (Haaretz, 2016). Currently, Turkish–Israeli
relations are in a stalemate; parties do not rely on each other.

Conclusion
The beginning of 2000s witnessed changes of governments in both Turkey and
Israel. Likud in Israel and AKP in Turkey came to power in 2001 and 2002,
respectively. There has been a change in the Turkish foreign policy beginning
from the AKP government as the Middle East has been given more importance
due to the region’s historical link to the Ottoman Empire. In this period, Turkey
pursued a policy of “zero-problems with neighbors”and the role of mediator
between Israel and Arab states. The fact that Turkey followed a pro-Arab and pro-
Muslim policy has been interpreted by Israel as the shift of axis. This gradual
cooling in relations was due to the changing regional conjuncture, the
352 Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8(3)

diversification of interest at the domestic level and the ideological stances at the
individual level.
However, the Turkish–Israeli relations have been fluctuating from the
beginning, long before the AKP came to power. Those fluctuations were either
due to the factors at the international level or at the state level.However, it is no
doubt that the greatest blow to the bilateral relations has occurred during the
AKP government. Factorsat the induvial level have been at the forefront
concerning mutual relations as both leaders have been reluctant to come to terms
on various issues.Nevertheless, this is not to say that the rupture in Turkey–
Israel relations was solelybecause of the characteristics, attitudes, and ideologies
of the leaders. This study has revealed that all three levels of analysis have been
at play within the course of relations which were usually uneven and remittent
from the beginning.
It is uncertain if there would be a long-term reconciliation in Turkish–Israeli
relations as the process of normalization continues. Israel needs to reconsider its
policy on Kurdish issue, to seem more eager in solving the Palestinian issue and
to display understanding towards AKP governments’ sensitivities in certain issues.
As for Turkey, the government needs to understand Israel’s security concerns
while negotiating for the rights of the Palestinians. Turkey could still be a reliable
mediator between Israel and the Arab states in the region; however, the Arab
Spring has led to a reshuffling of power configuration and alliances in the Middle
East. Unless there is a shift in regional politics, the bilateral relations seem to stay
at this low level.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.

ORCID iD
Tuğçe Ersoy Ceylan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5478-3539

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