Maxime Goossens

i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020

Crisis Management in Organizations

EBC2100 Tutorial Group 13

Yverna Hu-a-ng

I6158113

Word count: 3293 words

Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
Introduction

On Friday March 11th, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude nine on the Richter scale
struck the East cost of Japan. It was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan and
the fourth most devastating in the world. The earthquake triggered a tsunami with waves up
to 45 metres high. The tsunami caused thousands of deaths. Moreover, both natural disasters
damaged millions of buildings across Japan. According to the then Prime Minister, Naoto
Kan, the Great East Japan Earthquake was the biggest crisis for Japan since the end of World
War II. According to the World Bank, the cost of such a catastrophe is more than two-
hundred billion US dollars, making it the costliest natural disaster ever (2011 Tōhoku
earthquake and tsunami, 2020). The tsunami also caused the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster. Indeed, one hundred and fifty kilometres from the epicentre of the earthquake is the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The plant and its six nuclear reactors are owned by
the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) with headquarters in Tokyo. Due to the
earthquake, the company evacuated its staff and the hundred fifty top managers grouped in
the anti-seismic control base to assess the damage. At their head, Masao Yoshida, the
manager of Daiichi plant supervised the operations. Together they noticed that the site was no
longer supplied with electricity and that the emergency generators had taken over. One hour
after the earthquake, the wave hit Daiichi plant and flooded the basements where the
electricity generators are located. The reactors were deprived of electricity which stopped
their cooling system. A countdown began before the reactors exploded under the pressure of
radioactive gas (Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017). Twenty years after the Chernobyl
disaster, the world is in fear of another nuclear accident. Knowing that Japan is a world
leading nuclear producer, how did they manage this crisis? What really happened at Daiichi?
Even if the disaster was caused by a succession of natural catastrophes, is the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster related to human crisis mismanagement? This paper aims to
understand the different management causes of such a crisis.

Human error
According to Wagenaar et al. (1990), Reason (2000) and Cellule de crise / Histoire
Secrète (2017), the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster could have been the result of human
error. Indeed, even if the reactor breakdown was due to an earthquake followed by a tsunami,
deeper analysis shows us that the Fukushima disaster is due to a series of human mistakes.
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
On the one hand, looking at the person approach regarding human fallibility, the wall they
built to protect the nuclear plant measured five meters, while the Tsunami wave was three
times higher. Following TEPCO engineer’s estimate, a five-meter wall was sufficient to
prevent a tsunami wave. In fact, they executed the wrong plan based on unrealistic data.
Furthermore, after the first explosion, all eyes were on reactor one. This was a serious
mistake since the third reactor was already in fusion. When they noticed it, it was too late to
cool it down. Those are example of type one error which lead to design failures and missing
defences. Secondly, after the wave hit the plant, confined in a control base inside Daiichi,
Yoshida thought that the reactors were stable. Actually, due to a power cut, the plant’s
engineering tools did not work properly. It is only when radioactivity was measured around
the reactors that they understood that something was wrong. Moreover, when generator
trucks came to the plant to restore electricity, the cables they used were incompatible with the
ones on site, making restoring impossible. In addition, TEPCO operators had to open vanes to
release the pressure inside reactors but they did not know where they were located. They
looked for maps for two hours and after a first misstep, they finally open the vanes twelve
hours later. These slip-ups represent type two errors since the team mismanaged the
emergency plan. On the other hand, looking at the system approach, working conditions at
the plant were poor. Indeed, many mistakes could have been avoided with better logistics.
Because of the reduced staff inside on the plant, TEPCO workers stayed awake all night or
were sleeping on the floor. Nothing and no one were prepared for such a crisis. Finally,
looking at mistakes related to deficient management, communication between Fukushima,
TEPCO head-quarter and Tokyo was non-existent. On the one side, Yoshida was distraught
during the entire crisis. He had to wait for orders from the company head-quarter before
doing anything and even at TEPCO, engineers were disappointing. On the other hand, Kan
had no direct contact with Yoshida. In Tokyo, TEPCO managers made the connection
between the Prime Minister and the plant manager. Furthermore, during the first days, Kan
had the feeling that the company had hidden information on what was going on there.
Therefore, the Prime Minister travelled to Fukushima. This exposed the government to many
risks, and it could have been avoided if there had been better communication.
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
Decision-making biases
According to Ahn, Guarnieri & Furuta (2017), the nuclear community admitted that
Fukushima Daiichi disaster relied on decision-making biases. The decisions Yoshida took
during the crisis, show us that his judgement was altered by emotional factors. For example,
when TEPCO ask Yoshida to evacuate the plant, the manager kept fifty older and single
workers, the “Fukushima 50”. Led by emotions Yoshida did not keep the more skilled ones.
Facing the situation, the fifty employees were no match. Unfortunately, this is not the only
irrational decision made during the disaster. As mentioned above, regarding communication
between TEPCO and the Prime Minister, the company acted irrationally. In fact, management
decided not to communicate on what was going on at Fukushima. Since the situation was out
of control, TEPCO did not want to be considered as the only responsible of the disaster.
Eighteen hours after the tsunami, Japanese citizens had not yet heard about the issues at
Fukushima. Even the Prime Minister ignored the explosion and he heard it in the news.
(Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017). Indeed, Fukushima Central Television (FCT)
filmed a white cloud emerging over the plant. In reality, the smoke was the first reactor
explosion but since TEPCO did not communicate anything media thought it might be water
vapor. Moreover, the government declared that everything was fine, making media work
complicated since they could not evaluate the risk. Hours later, a video of the first explosion
finally ended up on YouTube making people aware of what was happening in Fukushima
(Pacchioli, 2013). According to Babej (2020), the basic rule in communication during crisis is
not to clamp up or to cover up. After the Chuetsu offshore earthquake of 2007 that also
caused the nuclear plant’s shutdown, the firm implemented some Management Polices and
Management Visions. Actually, TEPCO tried to focus on good relation and on the trust of
local communities. They could do it through frequent dialogue and transparency reports with
their stakeholders. During the disaster the company did not respect its commitments and they
should have communicated swiftly, openly and comprehensively with the government, the
citizens and the rest of the world. As mentioned above, TEPCO were too optimistic regarding
the security of the plant. Apart from the height of the protective wall, the company was
dependent on US manufacturers. In fact, the operators did not learn the preventive skills
needed in case of nuclear accident. Since reactor one was operating for almost forty years
increased surveillance should have been implemented (Murata, 2017). Secondly, according to
Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète (2017), decisions taken throughout the crisis were
ineffective. Most of the government actions failed, such as military helicopters intervention to
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
cool the reactor. Indeed, after a week, Japanese had no more solutions to fix the reactor’s
meltdown so the government asked a military helicopter squad to fly above the plant to pour
water on the reactors. Due to the circumstances this operation was a fiasco and no reactors
had cooled. In addition, Japanese TV channels broadcast the many failed attempts. At that
moment, not only did the Japanese government understand that the situation was out of
control but so did the rest of the world. At the end, the situation became so critical that if the
reactors exploded, the consequences would have been ten times worse than Chernobyl.
Therefore, Kan played his last card and he ask for the intervention of the Special Rescue
Team (SRT) of Tokyo. More than hundred men were sent on the plant and they could finally
contain the meltdown. On the one hand, that was the first time that Japanese could regain
control after eight days. On the other, we could wonder why the Prime Minister did not think
of the SRT earlier.

Socio-cultural causes
According to Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète (2017) and "Japanese cultural traits 'at
heart of Fukushima disaster'" (2020), Fukushima Daiichi disaster was “made in Japan” due to
some socio-cultural causes; the obedience to authority, the loyalty to a plan, the Japanese
politeness and the national pride. During the entire crisis, Yoshida and his employees had
taken inefficient measures as they always had to wait for instructions from Tokyo. Looking at
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, the plant director should have
had the full authority during a nuclear accident. Waiting for his superior orders influenced his
capacity, the speed and the time to manage events. The same scenario occurred during the
Korean Air Flight 801 crash. In Asian countries, it shows the need for approval of hierarchy
even in times of urgency. Looking at the identity-oriented sensemaking approach, Yoshida
failed to understand who he was in this crisis. Indeed, he was the most senior manager in
charge at Daiichi, and he should have undertaken more independent actions (Kalkman, 2019).
According to Weick (1993), companies that want to be resilient during a crisis have to avoid
no disclosive intimacy to keep the situation under control. It also means that actors in the
crisis must trust each other. As explained above, it was not the case between TEPCO and the
Prime Minister. Therefore, Japan often falls into panic. Secondly, looking at the action-
oriented sense-making, Daiichi operators could make sense of the measures they had taken.
To avoid collapse, employees should have been more flexible with regards to the plan. For
instance, they could have shown more improvisation skills in unforeseen situation where
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
measuring tools were biased. Finally, Yoshida had to adapt his plan perpetually since after
every action, a reaction of the situation reconsideration needs to take place (Kalkman, 2019).
In addition, Japan had received a lot of help from foreign countries, but sometimes this help
was unsuitable. For example, the French government sent first-aid workers close to the plant,
at Sendai, but the region had already been covered by other national teams. Second, France
had chartered the world biggest plane to send first aid supply to Japan but most of the
equipment was obsolete. Finally, ex-president Nicola Sarkozy insisted on being received by
the Prime Minister to plead the cause of nuclear power in Japan only three weeks after the
disaster. Out of politeness, Japan has never refused foreign help even when it was useless
(Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017). According to Weick (1993) and Kalkman (2019),
regarding national pride, Japanese actors of the crisis did not reach a common goal. As
mentioned above, miscommunication is one of the main causes of the crisis. For fear of
losing face in the eyes of the world, Japan did not communicate on what was happening at
Fukushima Daiichi. At the beginning, France immediately wanted to help Japan but the little
information that they received was in Japanese and hard to translate (Cellule de crise /
Histoire Secrète, 2017).

Planning and preparing

According to Dickie (2012), TEPCO was overconfidence on Daiichi’s safety. Moreover,
they judged that the plant could withstand an earthquake or a tsunami. This was not the case
and TEPCO could have been much better prepared for such a disaster. According to Saoshiro
(2020), in 2008 and 2011 the government asked TEPCO to enhance the wall. Based on
simulations, a fifteen meters wave could damage Daiichi plant but given the low risk of such
a wave, TEPCO did not take other actions. Furthermore, a Reuters report mention that there
was a lack of nuclear experts on the plant that day. According to Murata (2017), the design of
the multiple-safety system was fragile and dependent on other emergency systems. Indeed,
the power supply, the coolant system and the water supply system were located in the same
aera. When the tsunami hit, they were all shut down instantly. Secondly, operational skills
must be learned to contain radioactivity. Unfortunately, no workers were trained for these
situations, which resulted in mistakes. Most of the actions had to be done manually such as
the vanes opening of reactor one to release the pressure. This kind of handling exposed
employees to high level of radiation. On the one hand, Yoshida and his team were quickly
overtaken by the situation which shows a lack of planning measures. Indeed, to open the
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
vanes of reactor one, operators needed maps to locate them, but they were unavailable at the
control base (they needed two hours to retrieve them). Secondly, regarding the equipment at
their disposal, TEPCO never thought of such a scenario. When two technicians had to get
close to the nuclear core to make cooling possible, their suits started to melt. Moreover, even
when the “Fukushima 50” left, they did not have enough tools to measure radioactivity
outside, making maintenance impossible. Finally, Yoshida should have been better prepared
to manage such a crisis because he quickly gave in to panic, making wrong decisions. On the
other hand, the government was probably not prepared for such an emergency either.
Actually, Japan is used to earthquakes and tsunamis but never experienced a nuclear
catastrophe. That is why the Prime Minister and his team were helpless. First, when they
opened the vanes at Daiichi, a radioactive cloud was threatening the Fukushima surroundings.
Kan decided to evacuate people living up to ten kilometers from the plant, but he should have
done it sooner. Furthermore, the victims had to stay in sport halls for month which created
huge logistic problems. The same happened when the cloud was getting closer to Tokyo. The
government wanted to evacuate the city, but they were not prepared to move millions of
citizens. From a logistics point of view, it was impossible since Kan had never planned such
an evacuation. Secondly, to cool the first reactor, the government called in firefighters from
across the country as no units near Fukushima were available. It took a long time for them to
arrive. The same scenario occurred when the SRT had to intervene. The government should
set up close and dedicated units at Daiichi plant (Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017).

Voice behaviour
According to Murata (2017), many experts inside and outside Japan warned TEPCO of
the low earthquake-proof property of reactors. Additionality, they pointed out the small
capacity to contain radioactivity of reactor one in case of nuclear accident. Finally, as
mentioned above the government asked TEPCO to build up a higher wall to protect Daiichi
plant from tsunami but the company did not do it. No voices had raised against them (Cellule
de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017). According to Edmondson (2003), interdisciplinary
communication between the government and TEPCO was not respected. As mentioned
above, TEPCO did not communicate efficiently with the Prime Minister. Actually, actors
should have coordinated their actions during the crisis, which would have allowed them to
speak up regarding the situation. Looking at the obedience to authorities and the loyalty
issues to a plan, Daiichi workers had difficulties to contradict actions taken by their superiors.
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
Indeed, employees often fell silent regarding the crisis since they did not share what was on
their mind (Morrison, 2014). According to Krenz, Burtscher and Kolbe (2019), voice
verbalization plays a key role for team communication. From a manager perspective, the way
you say things to your team can affect what you want to say. As mentioned above, Yoshida
was quickly overtaken by the events and throughout the way he said things, he made his team
give in to panic too.

Leadership
According to Helslott and Groenendaal (2017), leaders have to reduce uncertainty
through authoritative behaviour. To be successful, crisis managers have to demonstrate that
they are competent decision makers. Trough media, they have to show that they know what is
going on, why the crisis happened and what are the solutions. According to Mahmud,
Mohammad and Abdullah (2020), the way government conducted press conferences was
confusing. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s experts were overwhelmed by the situation and they
could not answer journalists’ questions. Moreover, Kan position was not strong enough in
relation to public opinion. Looking at how he communicated the Fukushima evacuation, he
changed his announcements three times. According to Yakowicz (2020), he said that people
living three kilometres from the plant had to evacuate. Getting new information, he declared
that the contaminated zone had extended to a ten kilometres radius. Finally, he changed his
mind obliging people around twenty kilometres to move out. Japanese accused the Prime
Minister for taking the situation lightly (Lessons in Leadership from the Fukushima Nuclear
Disaster - Knowledge@Wharton, 2013). According to Mahmud, Mohammad and Abdullah
(2020), Japanese authorities never used the word meltdown to describe what was going on
there. This behaviour is seen as unworthy of a leader by citizens (Mahmud, Mohammad and
Abdullah, 2020). As mentioned above, communication between Kan, TEPCO and Yoshida
was not efficient. In fact, no one could get real-time information which is essential to
minimize damage. The Prime Minister did not succeed in the implementation of effective
intercommunication. Therefore, the government failed to take direct actions unlike a leader
(Hayata, 2020). Furthermore, leaders need to act quickly during a crisis, but the Prime
Minister refused to delegate decision-making powers to Daiichi. Finally, the parties involved
blamed each other throughout the crisis. No one wanted to take responsibility, and no one
recognised that the situation was out of control (Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète, 2017).
Ideally, leaders have to find a way to act effectively to limit the loss of life, to protect the
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
environment and to improve multi-organizational coordination (Mahmud, Mohammad and
Abdullah, 2020).

Conclusion
To conclude, the lessons we can learned from Fukushima disaster are the followings;
First of all, the Japanese government and TEPCO were not prepared for a worst-case
scenario. Indeed, they were even too optimistic about nuclear safety. Moreover, crisis
managers have to be fully prepared to face such events. They must be prepared to take
serious decisions quickly without the agreement of their superior. Finally, they must assume
the consequences of their actions so as not to lose credibility and give in to panic (Lessons in
Leadership from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster - Knowledge@Wharton, 2013). According
to Cellule de crise / Histoire Secrète (2017), the catastrophe has an important environmental
impact on the planet. Today, workers still have to inject tones of water inside the reactors to
continue its cooling, contaminating the ocean. Each day hundreds of employees work on the
radioactive plant. Indeed, more than two million of dirt bags need to be treated. Moreover, no
dwelling is viable within a radius of thirty kilometers around the station. Thirdly, there are
more than two hundred thousand evacuated Japanese who have to do regular tests for risk of
cancer. Finally, since 2011, only Germany stopped using nuclear power. Nuclear industry had
a new boom with sixty-eight new reactors build with three in Japan. Did Japan and the rest of
the world really learn lessons from Fukushima Daiichi disaster?
Maxime Goossens
i6158113
International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
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International Business
Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
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Major in Strategy The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. 15 October 2020
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