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M&A Chapter (Part2)
M&A Chapter (Part2)
M&A Chapter (Part2)
In practice, many of the terms used to describe various types of transactions are used loosely such
that the distinctions between them are blurred.
For example, the term “consolidation” is often applied to transactions where the entities are
about the same size, even if the transaction is technically a statutory merger.
Similarly, mergers are often described more generally as takeovers, although that term is
often reserved to describe hostile transactions, which are attempts to acquire a company
against the wishes of its managers and board of directors.
REGULATION :
Even when a merger has been accepted by the target company’s senior managers, the board of
directors, and shareholders, the combination must still be approved by regulatory authorities.
This section provides an overview of the key rules and issues that arise from M&A activity.
The two major bodies of jurisprudence relating to mergers are antitrust law and securities law.
Antitrust :
Most countries have antitrust laws, which prohibit mergers and acquisitions that impede
competition.
Antitrust legislation began in the United States with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which made
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or attempts to monopolize an
industry illegal. The Sherman Antitrust Act was not effective at deterring antitrust activity partly
because the US Department of Justice at the time lacked the resources necessary to enforce the law
rigorously.
The last major piece of US antitrust legislation was the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, which required that the FTC (Federal trade commission) and Department of Justice have
the opportunity to review and approve mergers in advance. A key benefit of the Hart–Scott–Rodino
Act is that it gives regulators an opportunity to halt a merger prior to its completion rather than
having to disassemble a company after a merger is later deemed to be anticompetitive.
Just as US transactions are reviewed by the FTC and the Department of Justice, the European
Commission (EC) has the authority to review the antitrust implications of transactions among
companies that generate significant revenues within the European Union. Although the European
Commission’s member states have jurisdiction on mergers within their respective national borders,
mergers with significant cross-border effects are subject to EC review. Similar to the requirements in
the United States, pre-merger notification is required.
Prior to 1982, the FTC and Department of Justice used market share as a measure of market
power when determining potential antitrust violations among peer competitors in an industry
In 1982, the agencies shifted toward using a new measure of market power called the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI).
By summing the squares of the market shares for each company in an industry, the HHI does
a better job of modeling market concentration while remaining relatively easy to calculate and
interpret. To calculate the HHI, the market shares for competing companies are squared and then
summed:
During the 1960s, tender offers became a popular means to execute hostile takeovers. Acquirers
often announced tender offers that expired in short time frames or threatened lower bids and less
desirable terms for those shareholders who waited to tender.
The Williams Act sought to remedy these problems in two keys ways: disclosure requirements and a
formal process for tender offers.
In this approach, the analyst first defines a set of other companies that are similar to the target
company under review. This set may include companies within the target’s primary industry as well
as companies in similar industries.
The sample should be formed to include as many companies as possible that have similar size and
capital structure to the target. Once a set of comparable companies is defined, the next step is to
calculate various relative value measures based on the current market prices of the comparable
companies in the sample.
Such valuation is often based on enterprise multiples. A company’s enterprise value is the market
value of its debt and equity minus the value of its cash and investments.
In order to calculate an acquisition value, the analyst must also estimate a takeover premium.
The takeover premium: is the amount by which the takeover price for each share of stock must
exceed the current stock price in order to entice shareholders to relinquish control of the company
to an acquirer. This premium is usually expressed as a percentage of the stock price and is
calculated as:
𝑫𝑷 − 𝑺𝑷
𝑷𝑹𝑴 =
𝑺𝑷
Where:
Studies on the performance of mergers fall into two categories: short-term performance studies,
which examine stock returns surrounding merger announcement dates, and long-term performance
studies of post-merger companies.
The empirical evidence suggests that merger transactions create value for target
company shareholders in the short run: “On average, target shareholders reap
30 percent premiums over the stock’s pre-announcement market price, and the
acquirer’s stock price falls, on average, between 1 and 3 percent”. Moreover, on
average, both the acquirer and target tend to see higher stock returns surrounding
cash acquisition offers than around share offers
The high average premiums paid to target shareholders may be attributed, at least
partly, to the winner’s curse—the tendency for competitive bidding to result in
overpayment. Even if the average bidding company accurately estimates the target
company’s value, some bidders will overestimate the target’s value and other
potential buyers will underestimate its value. Unless the winner can exploit some
strong synergies that are not available to other bidders, the winning bidder is likely
to be the one who most overestimates the value.
When examining a longer period, empirical evidence shows that acquirers tend to
underperform comparable companies during the three years following an
acquisition.
o This implies a general post-merger operational failure to capture synergies.
Average returns to acquiring companies subsequent to merger transactions
are negative 4.3 percent with about 61 percent of acquirers lagging their
industry peers.27 This finding suggests that financial analysts would be well
served to thoroughly scrutinize estimates of synergy and post-merger value
creation.
Summary
Mergers and acquisitions are complex transactions. The process often involves not only the acquiring
and target companies but also a variety of other stakeholders, including securities antitrust
regulatory agencies. To fully evaluate a merger, analysts must ask two fundamental questions: First,
will the transaction create value; and second, does the acquisition price outweigh the potential
benefit?
o Examples of post-offer defenses include “just say no” defense, litigation, or finding
a white knight…
Antitrust legislation prohibits mergers and acquisitions that impede competition. Major US
antitrust legislation includes the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act..
The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice review mergers for antitrust
concerns in the United States. The European Commission reviews transactions in the
European Union.
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market power based on the sum of
the squared market shares for each company in an industry. Higher index values or
combinations that result in a large jump in the index are more likely to meet regulatory
challenges.
The Williams Act is the cornerstone of securities legislation for M&A activities in the United
States. The Williams Act ensures a fair tender offer process through the establishment of
disclosure requirements and formal tender offer procedures.
The empirical evidence suggests that merger transactions create value for target company
shareholders. Acquirers, in contrast, tend to accrue value in the years following a merger.
This finding suggests that synergies are often overestimated or difficult to achieve.
(Discussion!!!!!)