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On Derrida’s Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence. Implications for

Scientific Inquiry

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_11

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Book Title The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy
Series Title
Chapter Title On Derrida’s Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence Implications for Scientific Inquiry
Copyright Year 2016
Copyright HolderName Springer International Publishing Switzerland
Corresponding Author Family Name Stimolo
Particle
Given Name Marco
Prefix
Suffix
Division Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section
Organization University of Naples Federico II
Address via Porta di Massa 1, 80133, Naples, Italy
Email marcostimolo@virgilio.it

Abstract The chapter delivers a biref description of Derrida's critique of the metaphisics of presence and shows its
relevant implications for scientific inquiry. It is shown that the deconstruction of the concept of Being as a
trascendental signifier is consistent with the scientific use of operational definitions that simplify the
complexity of real world phenomena through the use of unrealistic assumptions. The argument reaches two
main conclusions. First, the deconstruction of the trascendental signifier entails that unrealistic assuptions
do not have a metaphysical status and they can change in accordance with the specific purposes of
scientific inquiry. Second, the decostrustionistic framework implies that scientific analysis can
asymptotically approximate the target phenomenon without reaching a full correspondence with it. These
results are illustrated through the example of economic analysis of individual behaviour.
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Chapter No.: 11 Date: 16-10-2015 Time: 7:59 pm Page: 103/108
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1 On Derrida’s Critique of the Metaphysics

2 of Presence Implications for Scientific

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3 Inquiry

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4 Marco Stimolo

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5 Abstract The chapter delivers a biref description of Derrida's critique of the
6 metaphisics of presence and shows its relevant implications for scientific inquiry. It
7 is shown that the deconstruction of the concept of Being as a trascendental signifier
8 is consistent with the scientific use of operational definitions that simplify the
9 complexity of real world phenomena through the use of unrealistic assumptions.
10 The argument reaches two main conclusions. First, the deconstruction of the
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trascendental signifier entails that unrealistic assuptions do not have a metaphysical
status and they can change in accordance with the specific purposes of scientific
inquiry. Second, the decostrustionistic framework implies that scientific analysis
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13

14 can asymptotically approximate the target phenomenon without reaching a full

15 correspondence with it. These results are illustrated through the example of eco-
16 nomic analysis of individual behaviour.
17

This chapter delivers a brief review of Derrida’s deconstruction of the western

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19 metaphysics of presence. On these grounds, the study puts emphasis on the

20 coherence of Derrida’s critique of the metaphysical tradition with the real practice
21 of scientific inquiry, with particular concern to the economic analysis of individual
22 behavior. The chapter starts by illustrating the basic features of the metaphysics of
presence through two paradigmatic examples: Aristotle and Husserl. These philo-
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24 sophical inquiries share the common feature of assuming the existence of a tran-
25 scendental signifier that justifies a conception of truth as adaequatio mentis ad rem.
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26 The chapter illustrates the main implications of the deconstruction of the meta-
27 physics of presence for scientific inquiry. More precisely, it explains how the
28 supposed existence of a transcendental signifier is inconsistent with the scientific
29 use of operational definitions that change according to specific analytical purposes.
30 Indeed, operational definitions ground in simplifying assumptions that are necessary
for the analytical tractability of the phenomenon of interest. The use of simplifying
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32 assumptions entails the incompleteness of the result of scientific inquiry. In this

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M. Stimolo (&)
Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, University of Naples Federico II,
via Porta di Massa 1, 80133 Naples, Italy
e-mail: marcostimolo@virgilio.it

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 103

F. Santoianni (ed.), The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy,
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics 24,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_11
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104 M. Stimolo
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33 regard, the proposed argument highlights the coherence of this methodology with
34 the deconstruction of the transcendental signifier that extends asymptotically the
35 role of scientific analysis. The chapter is organized as follows. Section The meta-

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36 physics of presence describes the basic features of the metaphysics of presence.
37 Section Deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. Basic implications for

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38 scientific inquiry identifies the implications of Derrida’s deconstruction of the
39 transcendental signifier for scientific inquiry. Section An illustrative example
40 illustrates these implications through the example of the economic analysis of
41 individual behavior. Final section concludes.

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42 1 The Metaphysics of Presence

43 «The entire history of the concept of structure…. must be thought of as a series of

44 substitutions of center for center…. The history of metaphysics… is the history of
45 these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix… is the determination of Being as
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presence in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all names related to
fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable
presence—eidos, arche, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance,
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49 subject)» (Derrida 1967a, b: 279–280).

50 This long quotation provides us the fundamental features of Derrida’s under-
51 standing of the history of the western metaphysics. The grounding idea of this
52 passage is that, beyond the differences of all the metonymic substitutions of center
for center that accumulated through the centuries, western metaphysics exhibits the
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54 invariant feature of thinking of Being in terms of presence. Indeed, the Being can be
55 conceived in terms of idea, ousia, God, and so on, but what holds together all of
56 these different concepts is the modality of thinking about it as a presence.
57 The term “presence” means that both human thought and its language refer to
something external, which does not change independently of the variation of its
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59 conceptual and linguistic expressions. In Derrida’s view, the Being is a “tran-

60 scendental signifier”, which is intended to be the eternal and final reference of the
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61 discourse, writing, and inquiry (Derrida 1967a, b, 1973). In other words, the
62 transcendental signifier is the metaphysical foundation of epistemic certainty: what
63 humans get to know through scientific inquiry is ultimately guaranteed by Being
64 thought as a presence.
65 According to Derrida, such metaphysical stance entails the utopia of eliminating
the linguistic mediation from human understanding of reality. On this account,
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67 signs and words play the role of mediators between the subject and the objective
68 reality, but they are eventually eliminated when the subject corresponds completely
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69 to its object.
70 These general features of the metaphysics of presence are detectable in qualified
71 forms in two paradigmatic examples: Aristotle and Husserl.
72 According to Derrida (1976), Aristotle in the Organon (Categories) aimed at
73 identifying the place where the thought/language coupling emerges. In this
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74 theoretical framework, the Being is intended to be the most general category (i.e.,
75 the category of categories) that opens language to its external reference, which is
76 not linguistic in itself. Hence, the Being guarantees an ontological foundation to all

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77 the categories. Indeed, Aristotle’s theory of the categories pursues the objective of
78 describing and determining the different enunciates through which Being can be

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79 analyzed. However, any enunciate assigns a predicate to Being that guarantees their
80 ontological foundation. On this account, the linguistic mediation ceases whenever
81 the subjective knowledge corresponds completely to Being.
82 Modern epistemology and Cartesian philosophy in particular assume a dualism
83 between psychic objects and some material objects existing outside in the real
84 world. These basic features characterize Husserl’s phenomenology, which Derrida

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85 considers the completion of the Cartesian tradition (Derrida 1973). Husserl’s
86 phenomenology aims at identifying the metaphysical foundation (i.e., the tran-
87 scendental signifier) within the structure of subjectivity (Husserl 1931). In Derrida’s
88 view, the ultimate goal of Husserl’s phenomenology is the identification of the
89 purely rational foundation of philosophy in the ideas that consciousness generates.
90 Husserl inscribes a dualism between the purely formal (empty) subjective intention
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(i.e., noesis) and the objective intuition (i.e., noema). The formal subjective
intention mediates between the transcendental consciousness and its objects.
However, the necessary truth of the objects of consciousness (i.e., noemata)
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94 emerges only if they fully correspond to the objects previously given in the empty
95 intention (i.e., noesis). Therefore, all the mediating signs of language fade away
96 whenever the noesis is in the immediate presence of its noematic intuition.
97 These examples are paradigmatic because they show how the switch from
classical ontology (Aristotle) to modern epistemology (Cartesian philosophy and
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99 Husserlian phenomenology) did not affect the general feature of the metaphysics of
100 presence. Indeed, in both cases Being is thought as a presence that grounds the
101 certainty of human knowledge and in the end eliminates the very need of thought
102 itself.
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2 Deconstruction of the Metaphysics of Presence: Basic

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104 Implications for Scientific Inquiry

105 The basic feature of Derrida’s critical project consists in the attempt to undermine
106 the possibility of eliminating the linguistic mediation by deconstructing the tran-
scendental signifier (Derrida 1967a, b, 1973). Given the intrinsic complexity of
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108 Derrida’s critical project, the proposed argument exclusively focuses on the
109 implications of deconstruction for scientific inquiry.
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110 Consider the main objective of science: explaining a phenomenon by identifying

111 its cause. Real phenomena exhibit a high degree of variability that is not analyti-
112 cally tractable. This means that the noncontrollable variability of a phenomenon is a
113 confounder for causal attributions. To avoid this problem, scientific inquiry grounds
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106 M. Stimolo
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114 in operational definitions of the target phenomenon. This particular kind of defi-
115 nition holds constant some aspect of the phenomenon according to the specific
116 purposes of the analysis (Garrison 1999). Through this expedient, scientific inquiry

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117 obtains clear results that are useful to interpret real-world phenomena.
118 In Derrida’s view, the grounding mistake of western metaphysics consists of two

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119 false beliefs. First, the western metaphysics believed that outside the knowing
120 subject there exists an unchanging referent. As far as scientific inquiry is concerned,
121 this false belief requires that the basic assumptions and the results of the analysis
122 have an immediate referent in the real world. Second, according to western meta-
123 physics, the transcendental signifier is an absolute center that scientific inquiry can
124 approximate through a convergent dynamic. On this account, scientific analysis can

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125 aim at a perfect correspondence with its object so as to eliminate any analytical
126 mediation.
127 These implications of the metaphysics of presence prove to be inadequate to the
128 real practice of science. The next section illustrates such an inadequacy through the
129 example of the economic analysis of individual behavior.

130 3 An Illustrative Example

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131 Derrida’s deconstruction of the transcendental signifier has two crucial implications
132 for scientific inquiry. First, the inference from the basic assumption of the analysis
133 to an external referent is fallacious. Second, the inference from the result of a
scientific inquiry toward an external referent in the real world is incomplete because
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135 the difference between the external referent and its analytical expression can never
136 be overcome. This means that scientific inquiry is endless for it can never reach a
137 perfect correspondence with its object.
138 To illustrate the point, consider the economic definition of a rational individual:
an individual is rational to the extent that (s)he maximizes his or her utility function.
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140 This definition is operational because it allows one to measure the degree of
141 rationality of an individual. However, individuals’ behavior in the real world is
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142 highly variable because of an indefinite number of influencing factors. Therefore,

143 economic analysis needs to hold something constant to identify general regularities
144 in behavior. To pursue this aim, individuals are assumed to have a set of
145 well-defined preferences that does not change over time. Such an assumption serves
146 the purpose of explaining the average individual behavior in a population. Although
the assumption of unchanging preferences is evidently unrealistic, it simplifies the
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148 analysis of individual behavior (Mäki 2011).

149 Returning to Derrida, the crucial fallacy of philosophy is to confuse the idealized
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150 product of inquiry as an antecedent metaphysical state of affairs. In the proposed

151 example, the philosophical fallacy would be to consider the assumption of a
152 well-defined and unchanging set of preferences as a metaphysical truth and not as a
153 methodological necessity for an operational definition.
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154 Such a distinction between the methodological status of the assumption of a

155 constant and the philosophical fallacy of retaining it as a metaphysical truth traces
156 back to Nietzsche (2011). According to the philosopher from Rocken, logical

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157 thinking and inference are grounded in the condition of assuming the existence of
158 identical cases. If this assumption is not considered as fictitiously fulfilled, any

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159 causal inference would be impossible. However, the need of a false assumption
160 does not allow one to retain it to be a metaphysical truth.
161 If economic analysis of individual behavior grounds in a simplifying assumption
162 of unchanging preferences, then the result of the inquiry can never be a mirror
163 image of real-world phenomena. Indeed, the assumption at stake clears out several
164 aspects of individual behavior. Therefore, the extension of the results of a scientific

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165 inquiry to the real behavior of individuals is incomplete. To put it in philosophical
166 terms, the full correspondence between the results of scientific inquiries and
167 real-world phenomena is impossible in principle. This is consistent with Derrida’s
168 concept of an ineludible difference between linguistic signs and their referent.
169 In the attempt to account for the intrinsic complexity of real-world phenomena,
170 scientific inquiries need to change or modify the basic assumptions of their oper-
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ational definitions consistently with the target phenomenon. It is worth noting that
only the absence of a transcendental signifier opens up the possibility of changing
the operational definition according to the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, within
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174 the framework of the metaphysics of presence, the supposed existence of a tran-
175 scendental signifier would provide a metaphysical status to the grounding
176 assumptions of operational definition, so as to exclude the possibility of changing
177 them according to an instrumental logic.
To illustrate the point, consider a change of the purpose of the economic analysis
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179 from the individual behavior in general to the analysis of the specific effect of peer
180 pressure on individuals’ economic choices. In this case, if the assumption of
181 unchanging preferences were a metaphysical truth, we would not observe any
182 conformist behavior, because individuals’ preferences would be completely insu-
lated from peer pressure; as a result, individuals would follow only their own tastes.
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184 Nonetheless, conformism is a widely observed phenomenon that calls for an

185 explanation. Therefore, given the different purpose of the analysis, economic
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186 inquiry needs to relax its basic assumption about preferences, allowing them to
187 change systematically according to the specific features of the economic environ-
188 ment (Bowels 1998). Thus, the change in the target and purpose of the analysis
189 justifies a change in the basic assumption. This change permits us to construct
190 economic models where the choice behavior of peers affects individual preferences
so as to induce a conformist behavior.
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192 The possibility of relaxing the assumptions of operational definition significantly

193 extends the domain and explanatory depth of the economic analysis. Since it allows
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194 us to switch from the interpretation of individual economic behavior in general to

195 the specific case of conformist behavior. However, given the methodological status
196 of this assumption, the inference from the analytical result to the real-world phe-
197 nomenon is incomplete. This entails that results of scientific inquiry are never
198 identical to their referent. To put it in a deconstructionist language, scientific
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108 M. Stimolo
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199 inquiries do not converge toward an absolute center, where all linguistic and ana-
200 lytical mediations fade away. It follows that scientific inquiries approximate
201 asymptotically their target phenomenon, without reaching a perfect correspondence

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202 to a transcendental signifier.

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203 4 Conclusions

204 This chapter has briefly illustrated how the basic features of the metaphysics of
205 presence entail the philosophical fallacy of retaining the idealized product of

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206 inquiry as an antecedent metaphysical state of affairs. Furthermore, the proposed
207 argument has shown that this fallacy is inadequate to the real practice of scientific
208 inquiry that grounds in an extensive use of operational definitions. To illustrate the
209 point, the case of the economic analysis of individual behavior has been considered.
210 The paper focused on the methodological need to change the basic assumptions
211 about preferences according to the specific purposes of the inquiry. This practice
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entails that the results of scientific investigation can never reach a perfect corre-
spondence with their target phenomenon. By virtue of that fact, the argument
emphasized the consistency of this methodology with Derrida’s deconstruction of
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215 the transcendental signifier that extends asymptotically the role of scientific
216 analysis.
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217 References

218 Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other
219 economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 75–111.
220 Derrida, J. (1967a). De la grammatologie. Paris: Les Éditions di Minuit. English edition: Derrida,
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221 J. 1998. Of Grammatology (trans: Spivak, G. C.). Baltimore: JHU Press.

222 Derrida, J. (1967b). L’Écriture et la différence. Paris: Seuil. English edition: Derrida, J. (1978).
223 Writing and difference (A. Bass, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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224 Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and phenomena, and other essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (D.
225 B. Allison, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
226 Derrida, J. (1976). The supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics. The Georgia
227 Review, 30, 527–564.
228 Garrison, J. (1999). John Dewey, Jacques Derrida, and the metaphysics of presence. Transactions
229 of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 35(2), 346–372.
230 Husserl, E. (1931). Méditations cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie (G. Peiffer, & E.
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231 Levinas, Trans.). Paris: Vrin. English edition: Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations (D.
232 Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Nijhof.
233 Mäki, U. (2011). The truth of false idealizations in modeling. In P. Humphrey & C. Imbert (Eds.),
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234 Representation, models and simulations (pp. 216–233). London: Routledge.

235 Nietzsche, F. (2011). The will to power (Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, & W. Kaufmann, Ed.
236 W. Kaufamann). New York: Random House LLC.

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