January 8, 2021

For: Sir ECL

From: JMF
Re: Legislative Grave Abuse of Discretion

Grave abuse of discretion is defined, thus:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of

jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons,
there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.

Pascual v Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016

Courts generally do not intervene in matters internal to Congress,

such as the manner of choosing its own officers or leaders. Indeed,
Article VI, Section 16(1) of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to adopt its own rules:

Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem

necessary.

Once promulgated, any clear and patent violation of its rules will
amount to grave abuse of discretion. The House of Representatives
has rules on who forms part of the Majority or Minority, or who is
considered an independent member. The rules are also clear with
respect to how affiliations change. It was grave abuse of discretion
for the House ofRepresentatives to disregard the first, second, fourth
to eighth, and last paragraphs of Rule II, Section 8 of the Rules of
the House of Representatives.
Article VIII, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

xxxx

In contrast, the petitioners have ably established the presence of

grave abuse of discretion. Truly, the justiciability of the issue is
anchored on the capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary judgment
committed by respondents in neglecting and refusing to recognize
Representative Baguilat as the ipso facto  Minority Leader, in
accordance with a long-established parliamentary practice and Rules
of the House of Representatives.

There was also grave abuse of discretion in counting the votes of

Representative Suarez and those of the independent members in the
election for Minority Leader. On July 27, 2016, the day of the election
for Minority Leader, Representative Suarez himself belonged to the
Majority and was thus disqualified from being the Minority Leader.
Likewise, the 20 abstaining members and the one (1) who registered
a no-vote were independent members. Not being part of the
Minority, these independent members were disqualified from electing
a Minority Leader.

Rule II, Section 8 of the Rules states in full:

Members who vote for the winning candidate for Speaker shall
constitute the Majority in the House and they shall elect from among
themselves the Majority Leader. The Majority Leader may be
changed, at any time, by a majority vote of all the Majority Members.

The Minority Leader shall be elected by the Members of the Minority

and can be changed, at any time, by a majority vote of all the
Minority Members.

The Majority and Minority shall elect such number of Deputy Majority
and Minority Leaders as the rules provide.

A Member may transfer from the Majority to the Minority, or vice

versa, at any time: Provided, That:
 a. The concerned Member submits a written request to transfer
to the Majority or Minority, through the Majority or Minority
Leaders, as the case may be. The Secretary General shall be
furnished a copy of the request to transfer;

b. The Majority or Minority, as the case may be, accepts the

concerned Member in writing; and

c. The Speaker shall be furnished by the Majority or the

Minority Leaders, as the case may be, a copy of the acceptance
in writing of the concerned Member.

In case the Majority or the Minority declines such request totransfer,

the concerned Member shall be considered an independentMember of
the House.

In any case, whether or not the request to transfer is accepted, all

committee assignments and memberships given the concerned
Member by the Majority or Minority, as the case may be, shall be
automatically forfeited.

Members who choose not to align themselves with the Majority or

the Minority shall be considered as independent Members of the
House. They may, however, choose to join the Majority or Minority
upon written request to and approval thereof by the Majority or
Minority, as the case maybe.

Rule II, Section 8 has two (2) major components: (a) the first,
second, and last paragraphs provide for the different kinds of
members of the House of Representatives, and (b) the fourth to
eighth paragraphs provide for the manner by which a Majority,
Minority, or independent member may change affiliation.

The first paragraph of Rule II, Section 8 states that the

representatives who vote for the winning candidate for Speaker shall
constitute the Majority. The second paragraph declares that the
Minority Leader shall be elected by Members of the Minority. The last
paragraph confirms that "[m]embers who choose not to align
themselves with the Majority or the Minority [i.e. those who
abstained or registered a no-vote] shall be considered as
independent Members of the House." Thus:

Members who vote for the winning candidate for Speaker shall
constitute the Majority  in the House and they shall elect from among
themselves the Majority Leader ...
The Minority Leader shall be elected by the Members of
the Minority  and can be changed, at any time, by a majority vote of
all the Minority Members.

….

Members who choose not to align themselves with the Majority or

the Minority shall be considered as independent  Members of the
House. (Emphasis supplied)

Even the official website of the House of Representatives gives notice

to the public that the Minority members are only those who voted for
the Speaker's opponent but do not include those who abstained from
voting:

Those who voted for the Speaker belong to the Majority while those
who voted for the Speaker's opponent belong to the Minority.
Representatives belonging to the Majority choose the Majority Floor
Leader who automatically chairs the Committee on Rules, and those
in the Minority choose the Minority Floor Leader. 144

It is a basic legal principle that those not included in the enumeration

are deemed excluded.145 A person or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 146 As
the definition of Minority omitted those representatives who
abstained or opted for a "no-vote," then they are deemed
intentionally omitted from the definition.

Representative Fariñas himself mentioned the importance of

following the Rules. According to him, "[a] law or a regulation is not
repealed by non-observance. It can only be repealed by express
repeal. Kung hindi sinusunod iyan, batas pa rin iyan." 147

Ironically, in insisting on his July 25, 2016 interpretation 148 of Rule II,
Section 8, the Majority Leader was flouting the Rules himself. He
cannot simply cling to a mistaken opinion without running afoul of
the express provisions of the Rules. Neither Representative Farinas'
erroneous interpretation of Rule II, Section 8 nor petitioners' alleged
silence cured the violation of the Rules and parliamentary practice of
the House.

Baguilat v Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the

power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it
held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power
of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.

xxxx

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I

provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,

hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another
 important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of

power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,

which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the

Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.

xxxx

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan

cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of

legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest
and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the
thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law

in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law

broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question

although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging
its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained
on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one
who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a
public official interested only in the performance of his official
duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who
sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of
the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made
by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute

at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in

question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA  from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as

required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason

of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this

Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial

power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to

challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota  of the

case.

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.

160261, November 10, 2003

This Court has discussed in several cases how the 1987 Constitution
has expanded the scope of judicial power from its traditional
understanding. As such, courts are not only expected to "settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable[,]"30 but are also empowered to determine if any
government branch or instrumentality has acted beyond the scope of
its powers, such that there is grave abuse of discretion. 31

This development of the courts' judicial power arose from the use
and abuse of the political question doctrine during the martial law era
under former President Ferdinand Marcos. In Association of Medical
Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,32 this Court held:

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives , we recognized that

this expanded jurisdiction was meant "to ensure the potency of the
power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any
branch or instrumentalities of government.'" Thus, the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its
history, into black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of
this Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion[:]

....

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former

Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in
a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
question and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court

said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it."

The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.

....

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that

the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.33 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides remedies to

address grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality, particularly through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.
SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of

the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

While these provisions pertain to a tribunal's, board's, or an officer's

exercise of discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of
judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III,34 this Court
differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65 is
the remedy to "set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions ."35

This Court further explained:

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for

determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. . . .

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our

present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company:

....

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of

jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of

jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the
fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or
proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while
prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action,
and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature
and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an

IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition
is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess
of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not
against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly
within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing
or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through
a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but
also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions . This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, . . . .

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.36 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Here, petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to

determine whether respondents Social Security System and Social
Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
releasing the assailed issuances. According to them, these issuances
violated the provisions of the Constitution on the protection of
workers, promotion of social justice, and respect for human
rights.37 They further claim that the assailed issuances are void for
having been issued based on vague and unclear standards. They also
argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of police
power as it is not reasonably necessary and, thus, unduly oppressive
to the labor sector. Lastly, they insist that the revised ratio in
contributions is grossly unjust to the working class. 38

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this
Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the
act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis
mota of the case.39

KMU v Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a

lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law, or
existing jurisprudence.36 We have already ruled that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies
by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution," and
explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo(,and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. "

Ifurung v Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the
concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that
were legally demandable and enforceable.

xxxx

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and

prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but
also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.[116] (Italics supplied.)
It must be stressed, however, that this grant of expanded power of
judicial review did not result to the abandonment of
the Angara model.  Direct recourse to the Court, on grounds of
[117]
grave abuse of discretion, was still allowed only when the questions
presented were legal.

Gios-Samar v DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019