Emanuela Paoletti (Auth.) - The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities - The Case of Italy and Libya-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2010)

The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities
The Migration of Power and

North–South Inequalities
The Case of Italy and Libya
Emanuela Paoletti
Researcher, International Migration Institute and Junior Research Fellow,
Somerville College, University of Oxford, UK
© Emanuela Paoletti 2010
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Contents
List of Illustrations viii

List of Acronyms ix
Acknowledgements xi
1 Introduction and Methodology 1

1.1 Setting the scene 1
1.2 Hypothesis and research questions 4
1.3 Research methodology 8
1.3.1 Discourse analysis 8
1.3.2 Interviews 10
1.3.3 Data-gathering 11
1.4 Structure of the book 12
1.5 Conclusion 16
Part I Theoretical Background and Comparative Analysis

2 Theoretical Framework 19
2.1 Introduction 19
2.2 Why complex interdependence? 19
2.3 Definition of the key concepts 21
2.3.1 Political realism 22
2.3.2 Power in international relations 23
2.3.3 Externalisation of migration policies 28
2.3.4 North–South relations and international
migration 31
2.4 Conclusion 34
3 Comparative Analysis 35
3.1 Introduction 35
3.2 Negotiations on migration between the US and
selected Central and Latin American countries 36
3.2.1 Relations between the US and Cuba 36
3.2.2 Relations between the US and Mexico 40
3.3 Cooperation on migration between Morocco and Spain 46
3.4 Cooperation on migration between Turkey and the EU 50
3.5 Conclusion 54
v
vi Contents
Part II Migration Discourses and Practices in Italy and Libya

4 Italy and Migration 59
4.1 Introduction 59
4.2 Data on migration 60
4.3 Migration discourse in Italy 62
4.4 Italian migration policies 68
4.5 Italian migration policies and relations with third countries 74
4.6 Conclusion 77
5 Libya and Migration 79
5.1 Introduction 79
5.2 Migration from Arab countries and related Libya’s policies 80
5.3 Migration from sub-Saharan Africa and
Libya’s related policies 85
5.4 Refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya 90
5.5 EU–Libyan relations 94
5.6 Libya’s official discourse on migration 97
5.7 Conclusion 102
Part III Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral Agreements on

Migration
6 Historical Background on the Agreements between
Italy and Libya 107
6.1 Introduction 107
6.2 Historical background from 1911 to the 1990s 108
6.3 Joint Communication (1998) 116
6.4 Memorandum of Intent (2000) 119
6.5 Berlusconi government (2001–2006) 121
6.6 Agreements between 2006 and 2008 131
6.7 Conclusion 137
7 Joint Measures on Migration 139
7.2 Centres for irregular migrants funded by Italy in Libya 139
7.3 Repatriations from Italy to Libya 143
7.4 Repatriations from Libya to third countries 151
7.5 Coordinated patrolling 152
7.6 Provision of equipment 156
7.7 Training programmes 158
7.8 Exchange of information 159
7.9 The role of the International Organisation for
Migration (IOM) 160
7.10 Push-backs 163
7.11 Conclusion 165
Contents vii
Part IV Externalisation of Migration Control Measures and

Inter-state Relations
8 Analysis of Externalisation in the Italian–Libyan Context 169
8.2 Is Italian–Libyan joint action on migration
a manifestation of externalisation? 169
8.3 How successful has the collaboration on migration been? 174
8.4 Trade-offs between Italy and Libya 180
8.5 Conclusion 183
9 Implications for International Relations Theory 184
9.2 Analysis of Italy’s and Libya’s interests 186
9.3 Cost-benefit analysis with reference to migration 192
9.4 Power and ideas: The symbolic power of migration 196
9.5 Analysis of wider power relations through issue-linkage 198
9.6 Broadening the analysis 204
9.7 Conclusion 206
10 Conclusion 209
Notes 215
Bibliography 234
Index 295
Illustrations
Tables
5.1 Crimes committed by foreign nationals in

Libya in 2006 and 2007 99
7.1 Number of foreign nationals returned from Italy to Libya 146
7.2 Repatriations from Libya to third countries financed by Italy 152
7.3 Data on undocumented migrants deported and
arrested in Libya 161
8.1 Number of foreign nationals deported from Libya 179
9.1 Analysis of ‘stated’ and ‘substantive’ interests of
Italy and Libya 187
9.2 Cost-benefits analysis in the negotiations on migration 194
Figures
4.1 Annual migration quotas 1996–2009 70

8.1 Apprehensions of undocumented migrants in
Sicily 2000–2009 176
8.2 Total apprehensions of undocumented migrants in
Italy 1998–2009 177
9.1 Issue-linkages in the broad negotiations 199
viii
Acronyms
AI Amnesty International
AIRL L’Associazione Italiani Rimpatriati dalla Libia, Italian
Association for the Italian Exiles from Libya
ALI Azienda Libico Italiana, Italian-Libyan Economic Enterprise
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
AVRR Assistance to Voluntary Return and Reintegration (project by
IOM)
BLM US Border Liaison Mechanism
Caritas Italian branch of the Italian Episcopal Conference
Censis Centre for the Studies of Social Investments
COMESSA Community of Sahel-Saharan States (later renamed as
CENSAD)
DGCS Italian Department for Development Cooperation in the
Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry
DHS US Department of Homeland Security
EC European Commission
ECRI European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance
EMP European Mediterranean Partnership
ENI Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, Italian multinational oil and gas
company
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
ICE Istituto Commercio Estero, Italian Institute for Foreign
Commerce
IDPs Internally displaced persons
ILO Immigration Liaison Officer
ILO International Labour Organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
IR International Relations
IRCA US Immigration Reform and Control Act
ISTAT The Italian National Institute for Statistics
JHA EC Directorate for Justice and Home Affairs
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LPRs Legal Permanent Residents
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO Non-governmental Organizations
NOC Libya’s National Oil Company
PP People’s Party in Spain
ix
x Acronyms
PSOE Socialist Party in Spain

SME Small and Medium Enterprises
TRIM Transit and Irregular Migration Management (project by IOM)
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Acknowledgements
This book was made possible by the tremendous logistical, material and
emotional support provided by many people. Researching and writing it
was not always easy, and I deeply thank all those who accompanied me
on this challenging yet uplifting journey – above all, Dr Matthew Gibney.
The very idea of exploring possible trends of reverse North–South power
relations was his. Through the process of data-gathering and analysis, as
well as the writing, Dr Gibney taught me to ask sharp and counter-intuitive
questions. Professor George Joffé from the University of Cambridge also pro-
vided valuable advice on the majority of my chapters, and I will never forget
his patient and attentive attitude.
Many people made the fieldwork possible. As regards interviews with
Italian politicians, my former professor of Italian literature, Elena Scaroni,
helped me to get in touch with her cousin, Senator Margherita Boniver.
Thanks to the kind support of them both, I was subsequently able to meet
senior officials at the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior,
as well as a former under-secretary at the Foreign Ministry. Likewise, Sister
Agnese, a former high-school teacher of my mother at the College Sacro
Cuore in Cortina, Italy, was instrumental in helping me arrange the inter-
view a former Italian prime minister; and Father Ciman at the Antonianum
in Padova, Italy, where I used to take religion classes at primary school, put
me in touch with the ambassador and professor Sergio Romano. I am also
thankful to Donatella for hosting me in her house in Rome, and to Floriana
for hosting me in Brussels, during my fieldwork.
Likewise, in arranging interviews with Libyan authorities, I benefited from
the support of many people. To start with, Prof. Adrian Wood suggested that
I contact a former professor of mine at the London School of Economics,
Professor Robert Wade, who put me in touch with the former supervisor of
Saif al Islam Qaddafi, Professor Nancy Cartwright. Thanks to both these
academics, I was able to meet Saif Al Islam, who recommended me to one
representative at the Qaddafi Foundation. The latter was immensely patient,
and helped me arrange meetings with officials at the Libyan Ministry of the
Interior and with police officers. In Libya, my research would have never
been possible without the support of Dr Milad Saad Milad at the Academy
of Graduate Studies in Tripoli. I am deeply grateful to Professor Vandewalle
despite the fact that he did not know me, when I first spoke with him on
the phone he provided unique help and gave me the contact of Dr Milad.
The latter provided invaluable support throughout my repeated stays in
Libya. Dr Milad was also exceptionally supportive and arranged some inter-
views with high-ranking government officials. Through Dr Milad, I met his
xi
xii Acknowledgements
secretary, Emma, who, with her ever-warm attitude, never failed to help me.
Dr Milad also helped me find a place to stay during my third visit to Libya.
Indeed, it was because of him that I met Maddalena and the Zeituni family,
who hosted me in May 2008. Spending time with them was a truly eye-
opening experience. Nobody has been more welcoming to me than they
were, or made me feel as at home as they did. Sharing every moment of my
day with them allowed me to discover a new perspective on life, where love
and helping each other come before anything else. The same applies to my
Libyan teacher, Naima, to whom I was introduced by Claudia Gazzini, cur-
rently post-doctoral fellow at the European University Institute. For the pur-
pose of learning Arabic, I would have daily classes with Naima, who ended
up acting as a patient, wise and forward-thinking mum. She rejoiced with
me in the moments in which the research was proceeding well, and com-
forted me in the frequent times of distress and total disorientation. Without
her enlightened and tenderly advice I would have never been able to cope
with the challenges that life in Libya posed at the time. Other people whom
I ought to mention for their help in Libya are Abdulla Habib Amman, Saad
Elshelmani, Horacio Calderón, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Laurence Hart,
Osama Koshadh, Fituri Budor, Kadhim Hashim Niama and Osama El Sedik.
I remain also profoundly grateful for the support of Abdul Monem Alaiwan
formerly at the Qaddafi Foundation.
The process of writing and editing the manuscript was greatly facilitated
in various respects by a number of other people. Paolo Cuttitta, Sijla Klepp,
Bruce St John, Jean Pierre Cassarino, Hein de Haas, Rodney Hall, Stephen
Castles, Mark Miller and Ferruccio Pastore occasionally read some early
drafts and/or provided tremendously useful feedback. The same applies to
Alex Betts who read a number of drafts and has always been a source of
new ideas. Meeting and sharing ideas with them all was a real honour and
pleasure to me. I also sincerely appreciated the help of Andrew Baldwin, also
at St. Antony’s, who edited the manuscripts in a phenomenally timely and
efficient way. Special thanks also go to Nick Van Hear and Andrew Geddes
for their thoughtful and constructive comments. The process of writing was
also made possible by the generous grants that I received by St. Antony’s
College, the ORENGA Fund and the Oxford Department of International
Development. My research was also made possible by the enormous sup-
port of either former professors or colleagues of mine who never turned
away from the tedious task of writing reference letters, i.e. Mike Foley, Joerg
Friedrichs, Barbara Harrell-Bond, Kenneth Booth, Michael Cox, Bridget
Anderson and Jay Dyer. I also ought to thank St. Antony’s College; spend-
ing endless days and nights in the Gulbenkian room surrounded by dear
and inspiring friends was a unique experience. These include Anne, Adam,
Lisa, Nicola, Nahid, Magda, Atef, Daniel and Liz. I am equally grateful
to Somerville College, the Refugee Studies Centre and the International
Migration Institute at Oxford that supported me during the last months
Acknowledgements xiii
before the submission of the manuscript. The same is true for Italian friends
at Oxford: Paolo, Salvo, Pegah, Iginio, Andrea and Giovanni.
Above all, this research would have not been possible without the infinite
love of my parents, Antonia and Maurizio, and of my sister, Giulia. They
followed me in every single step of this process, with the deep conviction
that I could make it. The fact that they always believed in what I was doing,
despite my being often very negative and pessimistic, was the sine qua non
of the whole project. I have no doubt that, without their love and support,
I would have never been able to start and to complete it. The same debt is
owed to my dearest friend Eli and her unyielding friendship.
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my grandparents, Nonno Paolo and Nonna
Emanuela. There are no words in this world that will convey sufficiently my
love, admiration and gratitude to them. They have always been and will
always be my role-models. Their curiosity, kindness and generosity, coupled
with their consistently positive attitude towards life, are a source of continu-
ing inspiration.
1
Introduction and Methodology
1.1 Setting the scene
Over the last two decades, migration1 has become a salient international
issue. Until the second half of the 1970s, migration policy was treated as a
secondary aspect of the political debate in most European countries, and
management of migration was dealt with mainly through domestic admin-
istrative measures. Since the 1980s, however, migration has been receiving
considerable attention from the media, the public and politicians.
As Castles and Miller (2003) have eloquently argued, we are now living in
‘the age of migration’. Although throughout history population movements
have always accompanied demographic growth, technological change,
political conflict and warfare, international migration ‘has never been as
pervasive nor as socio-economically and politically significant as it is today’
(Castles and Miller, 1993: 260). The hallmark of the age of migration is its
global character. It affects more and more countries and regions, and has
linkages with complex processes affecting the entire world (Castles and
Miller, 1993: 260). It is clear that human mobility has become an integral
component of the global economy (Global Commission on International
Migration, 2005). Globalisation, together with advances in communications
and transportation, has increased the number of people with the desire and
the capacity to move to other places.2
In 2009, the number of international migrants was greater than at any time
in history, with 214 million people living outside their country of birth, 3.1
per cent of the world’s population (United Nations, 2009). The equivalent
figure in 1960 amounted to 75 million persons, or 2.5 per cent of the world’s
population (United Nations, 2006a). Statistics also show that those moving
‘South-to-South’ are about as numerous as those moving ‘South-to-North’
(United Nations, 2006b). Additionally, in recent years forced displacement
has grown in complexity and scale. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2009 the total population of con-
cern to UNHCR amounted to 34 million (UNHCR, 2009b). Despite the
1
2 The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities
actual volume of international migration, which is actually not so different

from certain periods in the twentieth century (Sørensen et al., 2003: 7), the
real significance of the current changes lies in the increase in the magni-
tude, density, velocity and diversity of global connections that transcend
state boundaries (Sørensen et al., 2003: 6).
In broad terms, there is a growing awareness that migration is not a zero-
sum game. In the best cases, it benefits the receiving country, the coun-
try of origin and migrants themselves (United Nations, 2006b). Migration
may have a strong and positive impact on development. For example, it is
widely accepted that migrant diasporas ‘are engaged in transnational prac-
tices with direct effects on aid and development’ (Sørensen et al., 2002).
Remittances improve human capital in the developing world by increas-
ing family incomes, helping to defray education and health costs (United
Nations, 2006b). Similarly, from the vantage point of industrialised coun-
tries, the structural needs arising from economic, demographic and social
trends have made migration a vital ingredient of their development as well.3
Yet the prevailing political discourse across European countries sees migra-
tion as a problem, requiring a restrictive response. Indeed, migration is now
commonly viewed as a key international security issue. The putative ‘global
migration crisis’ (Castles, 2004; Weiner, 1995; Zolberg, 2001) has become
one of the main areas in which Western societies express their anxieties and
fears about the negative effects of the process of ‘globalisation’ (Bonifazi,
2000).4 Accordingly, states have responded in a variety of ways to deal with
migration pressures and control borders.5
At the policy level, a wide range of measures has been formulated to either
prevent migrants6 from reaching Europe, or to deter them from settling in
their selected destination country (Gibney, 2004b). Evolving perceptions of
migration have triggered new border control practices, which profoundly
influence relations between countries. Against this backdrop, this book cen-
tres on the concepts of the border and of power relations amongst states. In
order to introduce my main argument, let me define these two ideas and
consider how they interrelate.
The concept of the border is closely linked to that of sovereignty,
which is defined as the prerogative to rule within a defined territory
(De Jouvenel, 1957; Gerth and Mills 1958). Especially since the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648, the state has considered control over borders as the
constitutive attribute and sine qua non of its sovereign power (Weiner,
1985). By virtue of its ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory’ (Weber, 1964), the decisions on who may enter
and who may become citizens lie with the exclusive authority of the state
(Weiner, 1985). As part of this logic, the migration regime of Western
industrialised nations was born of a realist policy (Hollifield, 1992b), with
borders expected to demark the contours of the security as well as politi-
cal and economic agendas.
Introduction and Methodology 3
The recent securitisation of migration policy across the European Union

(EU)7 (Caviedes, 2004) – on which I will expand below – further reifies the
dichotomous normative assumptions attached to the institution of the
frontier. The increasing concern of states with protecting their territories
from the threats allegedly posed by terrorism and migration has triggered
a ‘fixation with secure borders’ (Caviedes, 2004), epitomised in concerns
over Europe’s external frontiers. At the same time, the heightened security
concerns over migration policies are rooted in the notion of territorial space
as divided into ‘fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate domin-
ion’ (Ruggie, 1993: 144–51). The national control logic exercised within sup-
posedly clear territorial boundaries and the presumed ‘natural’ dichotomy
between citizens and aliens and between domestic and foreign domains
form a major focus of this book.
However, the competencies of the state with regard to border manage-
ment are highly contentious (Cassarino 2006a).8 There is now fierce debate
on whether the state is an analytically relevant unit of analysis and whether
its authority translates into effective action to enforce control. With regard
to the first point, the new ‘globalist orthodoxy’ (Weiss, 1997) contends that
greater openness, in terms of trade, finance and flow of information, has
rendered the notion of space and, by implication, state authority over a
bounded territory increasingly irrelevant (Strange, 1995, 1996). For exam-
ple, Soysal (1966) argues that the local and the global have swallowed the
national. In her view, the emerging concept of post-national membership
challenges national fixities and accounts for fluid confines and multiple
borders (Soysal, 1996). A clear manifestation of this reconfiguration is
the gradual relocation of various components of state authority to either
supranational organisations or private actors (Sassen, 1998). Arguably, the
influence of international organisations such as the EU and multinational
corporations in framing the international agenda evinces a more general
‘retreat of the state’ (Strange, 1996). Because of deepening transnational
mobility characterising the ‘era of globalisation’, the state is now considered
to be ‘hollow and ‘defective’ (Strange, 1995). On these grounds, the analyti-
cal relevance of national borders has been questioned.
The reconceptualisation of the state’s territoriality invites reflection on the
actual capacity of states to enforce entry and exit rules. As Castles observes,
the more states and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migra-
tion, the less successful they seem to be (Castles, 2004: 205). Likewise, accord-
ing to the ‘gap hypothesis’ elaborated by Cornelius and Hollifield (1994),
‘significant and persistent gaps exist between official migration policies and
actual policy outcomes’ (Cornelius and Hollifield, 1994: 4). As they further
emphasise, ‘it is an empirical fact that few labor importing countries have
migration control policies that are perfectly implemented or do not result in
unintended consequences’ (Cornelius and Hollifield, 1994: 4). Simply put,
states are either unwilling or unable to prevent some irregular entry.9 From
this empirical perspective, border control measures and the related restric-
tive language of states are not reflected in what occurs on the ground.
These observations raise numerous questions on the meaning and scope
of borders and state actions and expose an apparent paradox. The process
of boundary construction in the form of restrictive policy measures and
national(ist) narratives takes place alongside, and is fuelled by, the blurring
of the analytical distinctions between ‘the inside’ and ‘the outside’ (Gibney,
2003; Soysal 1996: 24). Rising levels of cross-border mobility seem to coexist
with trends consolidating the state authority over its frontiers. In this book,
I take the view that a thorough appreciation of contemporary migration
control practices by states needs to take into account these highly differenti-
ated dynamics. In particular, I consider how such ‘contradictory propensi-
ties’ (Soysal 1996: 24) impact upon interaction between states and the way
in which power is distributed.
State decisions on border control are important variables, which influence
not only the magnitude, characteristics and directionality of international
migration, but also relations between states (Weiner, 1985). The aforemen-
tioned paradoxes in border control rules can affect the patterns of interna-
tional conflict and cooperation10 between nations (Weiner, 1985). There is
an important literature on ‘the irreducible political element’ characterising
international migration (Zolberg, 1989: 405). In 1989, Zolberg emphasised
that ‘it is precisely the control which states exercise over borders that defines
international migration as a distinctive social process’ (Zolberg, 1989: 405).
In other words, state practices on borders are among the main determinants
of migrant movements. As a result, the manner in which states frame their
access and exit norms has an impact on the behaviour of other states. In
particular, migration policies and corresponding movements are the cause
as well as the result of power asymmetries among countries.
As Zolberg put it, ‘it is now well understood’ that, ‘in a world characterised
by widely varying conditions, international borders serve to maintain glo-
bal inequality’ (Zolberg, 1989: 406). In the late 1980s, he predicted that the
future shape of international migration would depend in large part on how
entry and exit doors would be manipulated by countries (Zolberg, 1989:
406). He conjectured that a rise in ‘North–South’ tensions over the issue
of migration would lead poorer states to demand more equitable economic
and political arrangements within the ‘new international order’ (Zolberg,
1989: 423). Accordingly, this book assesses the consequences of emerging
practices of border control for inequalities between states. I consider how
the entry and exit policies of states shape international relations and vice
versa (Weiner, 1985: 122).
1.2 Hypothesis and research questions
To ground this larger discussion of border and inter-state power relations, I

will focus on two major issues: the practice of states to shift border control
policies outside their territory, and the evolving patterns of North–South

interaction in the area of migration.
According to some commentators, the use by EU member states of extra-
territorial control measures to tackle migration is an example of the broader
phenomenon of externalisation, whereby the place where the control of
travellers occurs moves from the border of the sovereign state into which
the individual is seeking to enter to within the state of origin (Boswell,
2003; Geddes, 2000, 2005b; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2006). The techniques –
to be defined below – that states use to prevent potential immigrants from
accessing their territory include, inter alia, visa controls (EC, 2005a; Gibney
2004b), pre-inspection agreements (Council, 2004a) and ‘safe third coun-
try’ measures (UNHCR, 2001). In an effort to reduce the number of per-
sons entering irregularly, EU countries are delocalising frontiers to create
new borders outside of their territory (Bigo and Guild 2005; Lavenex and
Ucarer 2002; Lutterbeck, 2006). Overall, these so-called ‘policing at dis-
tance’ (Bigo, 1998) measures envisaged by the Schengen regime (EC, 2005c)
affect the practices of inter-state cooperation. In the process of expanding
borders, the interaction between migrant-sending and receiving countries
is undergoing profound changes. This observation provides the context
for this research. It is therefore instructive to briefly review the scholarly
debate on the matter.
The discussion on migration has been dominated by the view that EU
migration policies reinforce North–South11 (Brown, 2001) disparities by
shifting the responsibility for providing assistance, and hosting migrants,
to the latter.12 It is assumed that these so-called ‘burden-shifting’ strategies
leave migrant-sending countries powerless. Accordingly, third countries13
are perceived to be under pressure from the EU to adopt a range of restrictive
migration policies. As Claire Rodier points out:
Countries of northern Africa are persuaded, under pressure from the EU,
to introduce control measures at their own borders to prevent nation-
als from their neighbours in Black Africa entering, despite the fact that
they could enter freely before that. As a consequence, it is worrying
today to see the Union structuring its relations with third countries
in line with a logic whose, often devastating, effects can be measured.
(Rodier, 2006: 4)
Similarly, with specific reference to Libya, Human Rights Watch notes:
Pressure from the European Union that Libya should stem the flow of
migrants transiting its territory has contributed to an all-out retreat from
Libya’s previous open door policy for foreigners. The Libyan government
has toughened its border controls and in recent years has implemented a
plan to arrest and forcibly return tens of thousands of migrants, refugees,
and asylum seekers. (Human Rights Watch, 2006b)
Yet, contrary dynamics, whereby the migrant-sending country is capable

of manipulating the migrant-receiving one as a way to advance its own
agenda, have been overlooked. Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this
research is that the North’s exclusionary border management practices pro-
vide the South with a greater degree of bargaining power across a number
of different issues. Said practices of border control and, more specifically, of
externalisation affect the way in which the North–South bargaining proc-
ess is conducted, and provide Southern countries with tools for leverage in
the other matters that are on the negotiating table. International migration
and evolving interdependence amongst countries are reconfiguring tradi-
tional understandings of power relations. Building on the aforementioned
discussion on borders and state interaction, I apply International Relations
(IR) theory to the study of the externalisation of frontiers and North–South
cooperation. These concepts will be put to the test by examining the case
of Italian–Libyan14 negotiations on migration and, to a lesser extent, other
cases of bilateral agreements on migration in the Mediterranean context
and between the United States, Mexico and Cuba. I defend the relevance
of the Italian–Libyan case study and the reasons for its selection below. For
now, let me clarify the three sets of questions at the centre of this research.
1. First, I explore Italian–Libyan cooperation over the last ten years. How
has the migration discourse being constructed in both countries? What
linkage can be drawn between the official rhetoric on migration and the
policies implemented? What do the selected bilateral agreements15 on
migration involve? What joint measures to tackle migration have been
implemented?
2. Second, I focus on the putative externalisation of migration control
measures in Libya. Can ongoing cooperation with Italy be defined as an
example of externalisation? If so, does externalisation increase the over-
all bargaining power of Libya vis-à-vis Italy? If not, in the negotiations
on migration, which factors determine the bargaining position of one
country towards the other?
3. Third, I propose an analysis of the agreements on migration through
the lens of IR theory and, in particular, the concept of interdepend-
ence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Which country has benefited more from
bilateral collaboration on migration? How does migration relate to other
issues on the agenda? What does this teach us in terms of the impact
of migration on state interdependence and power relations? More spe-
cifically, how do externalisation and the securitised migration discourse
affect the bargaining position of each country? Does migration call for a
substantial redefinition of the North–South framework?
The limited focus on state actors and, in particular, on Italian–Libyan

interaction requires justification. In this book, I concentrate on states, as
opposed to non-state actors. Some scholars believe that the exclusive focus
on states is misguided (Bigo, 2006). According to this view, nation states
are no longer in the ascendant, and state power has been reconfigured by
the growing influence of non-state and non-territorial relations of global
governance (Rosenau, 2005). Migration flows and policy responses are a
‘post-state’ phenomenon located in an international setting characterised
by a variety of non-state actors (Hamilton, 1997). Crucially, interdepend-
ence theory cautions against a single-actor approach. Indeed, as I further
explain below, one of its major contributions rests on the recognition of
the variety of actors influencing international affairs. For example, the
EU has played a central role in the definition and redefinition of the
conception of borders (Geddes, 2000). The Europeanisation of migration
and the emergent institutionalisation of common extraterritorial fron-
tiers (Geddes, 2000) have deeply affected individual EU member states’
approach to migration.
By contrast, I take the view that states remain influential actors in the
international agreements on migration (Castles, 2000; Weiss, 1997). For
example, in the Mediterranean context state bilateral relations have pre-
vailed over multilateral ones (Collinson, 1996; Pugh, 2001). In specie, my
narrow focus is based on an appreciation that, in the negotiations between
Italy and Libya, the EU and other non-state actors have not played a deci-
sive role. Whereas the EU has recently initiated a discussion with Libya, the
joint actions on migration have been undertaken primarily at the bilateral
level. Hence, the core of the empirical and analytical chapter will centre on
bilateral interactions. I will nevertheless devote some attention to the role of
the EU, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Frontex, the EU
external border agency. Before turning to the methodology, it is important
to keep in mind the broad landscape in which this book is situated and ask
why does it all matter?
First and foremost, there is an absence of literature on IR and current
migration policies in the Mediterranean. This has led to the neglect of impor-
tant questions of how power and interests shape the inter-state politics of
migration. More than that, controversial positions such as the speculation
on ‘reversed’ power relations have remained at the margin of the academic
debate. This book examines those issues through an in-depth case study of
one of the most high-profile and controversial cases of international coop-
eration on migration, that between Libya and Italy.
From a comparative perspective, the agreements between Italy and Libya
are a pioneering and relatively advanced example of cooperation on migra-
tion in the European context. As I explore in Chapter 3, other European
countries, such as Spain and Greece, are replicating, although with marked
differences, the cooperation that Italy has undertaken with Libya. Moreover,
beyond the issue of migration, a scrupulous investigation of Libya can ben-
efit the wider audience. After protracted isolation, Libya remains largely
unknown. Yet it is expected to emerge as a significant strategic player in the

international milieu in years to come.
More specifically, virtually no in-depth academic research on the Italian–
Libyan agreements has been conducted thus far on the basis of direct field
research. Only two non-academic pieces of work on migration, by the EC
(2005d) and Human Rights Watch (2006a), are supported by direct field-
work in Libya. Furthermore, the few academic studies on Libyan–Italian
relations on migration are not based on primary resources collected in Libya
(Andrijasevic, 2006; Cuttitta, 2006; Pastore, 2008). This gap is attributable
to both the recent nature of the negotiations on migration and the difficulty
in conducting research in Libya. Hence this empirical and work on the bilat-
eral cooperation offers a unique contribution to the debate on migration in
the Mediterranean. I do not intend, however, to provide final policy pre-
scriptions. In fact some limitations apply, and need to be borne in mind.
Libya is an anomalous case because of its considerable economic resources,
a political system that is sui generis, and its strategic geo-political location.
Its uniqueness also stems from the fact that most of the migrants reaching
Italy from Libya are foreign nationals, and that few Libyans migrate through
undocumented channels.16 These realities alert us to the boundaries of this
case that differs from other bilateral agreements on migration and of any
general conclusions that I seek to draw on North–South power relations.
Accordingly, the comparative analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 9 will
serve to establish the broader dynamics whereby migration challenges and
redefines patterns of reciprocity among states.
1.3 Research methodology
1.3.1 Discourse analysis

This research is based on a qualitative methodological approach.17 The
resources that I utilised include elite interviews, the collection of formal
policy documentation, media information and secondary academic mate-
rial. A multiple date source has enabled me to attain a fuller understanding
of the topic. To ensure a thorough quality-check of the data, I engaged in
extensive cross-referencing. This technique alerted me to the reliability of
the sources by establishing accuracy, identifying possible errors and corrob-
orating previous information. In the Italian and Libyan contexts, where pri-
mary and secondary resources on the agreements on migration are sketchy
and unreliable, the exercise of determining the accuracy of the data proved
to be of critical importance. In fact, the discrepancies identified in both
the Italian and Libyan sources made the incongruence between the public
discourse and actual policy actions more visible. The analysis of the other
cases, however, is based primarily on secondary resources.
The examination of the official statements and the policy decisions of
Italian and Libyan authorities was based on the insights of discourse analysis.
In mainstream linguistics, the dominant definition of discourse focuses on

the interpretation of units of spoken or written language. The emphasis
is on the analysis of texts. In particular, from the perspective of ‘critical
discourse analysis’ the main concern is to comprehend the role played by
language in producing power relations and social and political identities.
In order to study the linkage between language and the social and political
contexts, this approach reflects on the symbolic representations of the writ-
ten and spoken word (Chadwick, 2000: 284). Notable postmodern critical
thinkers such as Jacques Derrida (1978) and Michel Foucault (1971) have
formulated their own techniques for conducting discourse analysis.
This approach has also been widely elaborated with reference to security.
For instance, Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen school argues that security
is no longer tied exclusively to the military sector and has become increas-
ingly centred on threats to ‘society’, understood as the ‘dominant identity
collectivity’ (Gammeltoft, 2005: 15; Wæver et al., 1993: 2 and 18). Inspired
by the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the Copenhagen school consid-
ers societal identities as discursive and symbolic constructions. To study
them uses techniques such as speech acts (Gammeltoft, 2005: 15; Laclau
and Mouffe, 1985). Without denying their relevance, a review of these argu-
ments goes beyond the scope of this research.18 In the following chapters I
will not apply discourse analysis in a systematic manner. Instead, I propose
a simple working definition of discourse as the sum of ideas articulated and
debated in the public arena (Chadwick, 2000: 289).
Since it is embedded in political, social and historical contexts, I will look
at how a discourse conflates a wide range of different voices. To explore
the multifaceted nature of the migration discourses in Libya, Italy and the
EU, I concentrate on three dimensions: public opinion, media, and the offi-
cial position19 of the Libyan and Italian governments and of the EU. Yet,
given the lack of independent media and consistent information on public
opinion in Libya, the analysis will be limited to the official position of the
Libyan regime. This is based on interviews with elite members that I con-
ducted in Libya. The understanding of the official discourse turned out to
be instructive, for two reasons. First, the Italian authorities provided a dif-
ferent account of their official position from that elaborated by Libyan offi-
cials. Moreover, some significant discrepancies were also identified between
different interlocutors within or across ministries of the same country. As
Pargeter documents, ‘in Italy, it appears that many officials are not familiar
with their counterparts in other departments or ministries who are dealing
with the same regions or issues’ (Pargeter, 2001: 7–8).
For instance, I was given diverging justifications for the informality of
the migration agreements. In fact, interviewees provided contradictory
responses on the existence of the readmission agreements. It also emerged
that the politicians who have been primarily involved in the discussions had
either forgotten or retained a misleading memory of the facts.20 The reality
that the primary actors do not have a full and precise picture of the events
alerts us to the partial reliability of the information provided by those offi-
cials whom I interviewed. It also illustrates the complex manner in which
discourses are constructed.
The comparison between the public discourse and the actual policy
actions builds upon the work of Huysmans, examining, inter alia, the nexus
between the securitised construction of migration in the European con-
text and policy implementation (Huysmans, 2000, 2004). This analytical
framework directs attention to the possible double agenda, and helps detect
potential incongruities between policy formulation and implementation.
For this reason, in Chapter 9 I will make a distinction between ‘stated’ and
‘real’ interests.
1.3.2 Interviews
Let me now comment on the interview methods that I employed, and on
the problems posed by the media as a basis for academic research. I con-
ducted over 70 interviews with members of the Italian and Libyan govern-
ments who had been involved in the bilateral discussions, Libyan police
officers, European officials (especially from the Directorate-General of
Justice and Home Affairs), journalists who had researched the topic, as well
as selected representatives of non-governmental organisations that have
taken an active stance on the Italian–Libyan migration agreements. I lived
in Libya, on an intermittent basis, for over four months, making seven trips
there between January 2007 and January 2010. During each of the first
three trips I was based in Tripoli for one month, while the other two trips
lasted one week each. I also spent one month in Rome between June 2006
and December 2007, and one week in Brussels in July 2007 to conduct other
elite interviews.
The selection of the interviewees was based on their role in the negotia-
tions. The setting up of the meetings was done through both formal and
personal channels. In Libya, I benefited from the fact that I was based at
the Academy of Graduate Studies (hereafter, the Academy). The other inter-
views with Libyan officials were made possible through personal chan-
nels, distinct from those made available by the Academy and colleagues in
British universities. Similarly, the interviews with former Italian ministers
and prime ministers, were facilitated by personal acquaintances. Overall,
in both the Libyan and Italian contexts, personal contacts built over time
greatly facilitated the process of arranging the interviews and gave access to
resources not directly available to the public.
Elite interviews were based on the semi-structured21 method. By plac-
ing open, non-direct questions throughout the schedule, interviewees were
given the opportunity to contribute their own perspectives and concerns.
The design of the questions depended on the role of each interviewee in the
negotiation process. In most cases, I started the interview by inviting my
interlocutor to explain his/her involvement with, and share his/her opin-

ion on, the cooperation on migration. As anticipated, the majority of the
governmental representatives limited their observations to the rhetorical
position of their respective country. Presumably, the sensitive nature of the
topic explains their reluctance to share substantive information. In stark
contrast to the climate of unease that I encountered while interviewing
Italian officials in Rome,22 in Libya I was unexpectedly given access to valu-
able resources. For example, I was invited to visit one reception centre for
migrants in Tripoli23 and provided with internal documents by the Libyan
Ministries of the Interior and Justice, despite having neither foreseen nor
demanded to visit any detention centre or to obtain written ‘official’ docu-
ments.24 Despite this responsive disposition, Italian and Libyan authorities
alike offered an account that rarely deviated from the official ‘narrative’.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the official public discourses of both countries will be
investigated in greater detail.
Most of the representatives from both the Italian and Libyan sides con-
sented to the interviews on conditions either of anonymity or of being con-
sulted prior the publication of any document containing their quotations.
Accordingly, all the citations in the book are kept anonymous. Furthermore,
it should be noted that most of my interlocutors in Libya were interviewed
twice. This not only allowed me to compare information over a period of
time, but positively affected the relationship of trust between myself and
the interviewees and, by implication, the depth of information provided.
1.3.3 Data-gathering
In the process of data-gathering, I was faced with a general absence of clear
and direct channels of information concerning the agreements on migra-
tion, coupled with the reluctance of most of the interviewees to disclose
details of the action implemented. This owes chiefly to the facts that most
of the bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place behind closed doors,
that none of the technical agreements have been publicly disclosed, and, by
implication, that the scope of Italian action in Libya remains highly con-
tested. For these reasons, a large part of the analytical exercise consisted in
reading between the lines. The chapters in Parts III and IV will make explicit
how I sought to question the rhetorical accounts to which I was exposed.
In terms of language, the research benefited from the fact that Italian is
my mother tongue and that I have a basic knowledge of Modern Standard
Arabic. While in Italy most of the interviews were in Italian, in Libya I could
ordinarily conduct the interviews in English. In the few cases in which the
interviewee did not speak English, I either relied on a translator, who was
a Libyan police officer, or employed my limited Arabic skills. For obvious
reasons, in these cases the information collected was subjected thereafter
to extra scrutiny and cross-checking.25 My research also relied on docu-
ments in English, Italian and Arabic. Unless otherwise specified, the texts
in Italian and Arabic were translated into English by myself. The latter were
subsequently edited by a mother-tongue teacher. For the comparative analy-
sis in chapter I instead employed secondary academic resources, media news
and official documents available online.
Although my main focus is on government relations, I also conducted
informal interviews with migrants in Libya. Through the support of the
Roman Catholic Church in Tripoli, I was introduced to migrants from
Somalia and Cameroon. On two separate occasions in January 2007, I was
taken to their ‘houses’ on the suburbs of Tripoli and spent a few hours with
them talking about their experiences in Libya. The talks were partly medi-
ated by a migrant from Cameroon whom I knew through the Church. Most
of our conversation covered their difficulties in living in the country, their
time spent in Libyan prisons, their relations with IOM, and their aspirations
to either return home or go to Europe.
At this point, a clarification on the employment of media sources is de
rigueur. A substantial part of this research is based on media. Handled with
caution, nearly one decade’s worth of detailed reporting on the bilateral
agreements on migration represents material of significant relevance. Some
journalists26 have worked regularly on this topic, and their experiences
contribute to the quality of their coverage. The value of the media sources
derives from the systematic documentation of empirical data over an
extended period of time, the information having been uncovered through
investigative journalism and the recounting of contrasting perspectives.27
Despite the occasional lack of quality, these sources attest a contested and
differentiated political and social scenario that adds depth to my enquiry.
Therefore, while one must exercise critical acumen in evaluating its reliabil-
ity, the media can be nonetheless instrumental in gaining a non-academic
and long-term perspective.
1.4 Structure of the book
This book is divided into four parts. The first, which sets out the theo-
retical and comparative bases, comprises two chapters. Chapter 1 outlines
the theoretical framework. It presents contending definitions of power,
externalisation, and North–South power relations from the viewpoint of
migration. This theoretical makes explicit the assumptions and limits of
the terminology to be used throughout the book. In considering power
and migration outside the narrow remit of international relations, it singles
out the analytical framework which sustains the argument of the ensuring
chapters.
Second, to remedy the shortcomings of a single case study, I survey four
bilateral negotiations on migration. Specifically, I analyse the work of a
number of authors on the extent to which migration challenges the clas-
sical reading of North–South power dynamics. Attention will be given to
the relations between the United States (US) and Mexico, the US and Cuba,
Spain and Morocco, and the EU and Turkey. By exposing different empiri-
cal claims on migration, I will be able to contextualise the conclusions that
I will draw from the Italian–Libyan cooperation. In short, this compara-
tive analysis confirms the assumption that migration provides a ‘bargain-
ing chip’ for migrant-sending states in their bilateral negotiations with the
migrant-receiving states. In cases involving a de-territorial dimension, the
first group has been able to exert pressure on the second and has succeeded
in dictating the course of the negotiations relative to the other issues on the
negotiating table. The stronger the fears associated with migration in the
Northern countries, the more successful the migration-related tactics of
the Southern countries are.
The second part elaborates the empirical and descriptive groundings on
which my research builds, and includes two chapters. Chapter 4 dwells on
migration policies in Italy. Since this topic has already received ample atten-
tion in both the academic and non-academic literature, I do not devote
excessive space to it there. Instead, I consider the Italian institutional migra-
tion framework and the migration discourse that has been constructed
in the domestic arena. I will argue that migration has been increasingly
defined as a societal threat, and that the emerging securitised migration
discourse has influenced the functioning of Italian institutions (Huysmans,
2000: 751). This empirical account serves as a necessary background to the
examination of the Italian–Libyan migration agreements and their implica-
tions in terms of power relations.
In Chapter 5, attention is devoted to migration in Libya. Because of the
limited academic discussion of this issue, a thorough investigation based on
primary and secondary resources represents, I hope, a unique contribution
to the literature on migration trends and policies in the Mediterranean.
On the basis of interviews with Libyan officials, documents furnished by
Libyan authorities and other sources,28 I illustrate migration patterns to and
through Libya, its migration policies, the security dimension, and its rela-
tions with the EU. The critical point here is that, like Italy, the emerging
Libyan political discourse treats migration as a key security issue. However, I
will emphasise that, in addressing this perceived threat, the Libyan position
has been characterised by profound contradictions due to conflicting moti-
vations. I will also contend that Libya has made instrumental use of migra-
tion to improve its bargaining position towards neighbouring countries in
Africa. Libya has been keen to exaggerate the securitised construction of
migration and has indirectly encouraged undocumented flows through the
country in order to influence the course and pace of the negotiations.
The analysis of the migration dynamics in Italy and Libya, and of EU rela-
tions with Libya, establishes the framework for Part III, which is made up
of two chapters concerned with the Italian–Libyan bilateral agreements on
migration. In Chapter 6, after a brief historical account of bilateral relations
since the late 1960s, I set out the chronology and content of the formal and
informal agreements. Following on from this, in Chapter 7 I detail the joint
measures implemented by Libya and Italy to tackle undocumented migrant
flows. By relying on up-to-date and primary material, this chapter seeks to
enlarge and deepen the level of understanding on Italian–Libyan relations,
which have, so far, remained at the periphery of the academic research.
Building upon the above empirical excursus, Part IV confronts the emerg-
ing trends of border expansion and power relations. In particular, with
regard to the externalisation of border control policies, in Chapter 8 I for-
mulate three arguments.
First, the academic discussion on externalisation applied to the Italian–
Libyan case is deceptive. The de-territorial action of Italy towards Libya is
sui generis, since it defies the standard criteria of externalisation provided
in the literature. For example, the much-cited example of the presumed
asylum processing-centres built by Italians in Libya (Del Boca, 2006;
Rodier, 2006: 8–9) is unfounded. The centres, the existence of which has
been confirmed by both Italian and Libyan authorities, were not intended
to process asylum requests but to host migrants. More crucially, the two
countries have recently agreed to use them for police training and human-
itarian assistance instead. In addition, far from transferring to Libya the
responsibility for managing migration, the increasing Italian activity in
Libya appears to have had the opposite result; i.e. Italian authorities are
increasingly involved with migration-related issues and assuming new
duties.
Second, the Italian de-localising strategy in Libya appears to have failed.
In broad political terms, Italy has not been able to involve Libya as fully
as it might have wished in its ‘struggle’ against undocumented migration.
Italy is dependent on its counterpart for the successful implementation of
their joint measures. Moreover, bilateral cooperation has failed to reduce
undocumented arrivals to Sicily significantly. Indeed, unauthorised arrivals
to Sicily are in the ascendancy in relative terms (i.e. compared to previous
yearly totals). Nevertheless they are negligible in absolute terms (i.e. com-
pared to the overall irregular migrant population in Italy). Accordingly, I
suggest that in the selected case study the notion of externalisation has
become devoid of meaning since it does not subscribe to the standard defi-
nition of externalisation provided in the literatures. For this reason, I will
rename Italian–Libyan relations as ‘de-territorial cooperation on migration’.
In contrast to ‘externalisationist’ assumptions of the inequalities of state
power relations in framing migration policies, the concept of ‘de-territorial
cooperation on migration’ renders more accurately the complex reciprocal
manner in which security discourses and related practices are moulded by
the migrant-sending and receiving country alike. Novel trends in border
control policies evince the gradual erosion of the presumed advantage of the
second and the diffusion of power among a greater circle of states (Buzan
et al., 1998).
The third argument acts as a bridge to the analysis in Chapter 9, and I

argue that, in the broader bilateral relations, neither ‘de-territorial coopera-
tion on migration’ per se, nor the actual migrant flows, significantly affect
the bilateral bargaining dynamics. Rather, the decisive factor in the bargain-
ing patterns is the securitised discourse of migration. This argument leads
back to the initial hypothesis as to whether the migrant-sending country is
in a position to manipulate migration-related issues for its own purposes.
This is the question that underpins the next chapter.
By concentrating on the third set of questions illustrated above, Chapter 9
examines the selected bilateral actions mainly from the IR perspective. It
draws together the threads of the previous chapters and endows them with
more theoretical content. In so doing, I argue that the case studies partially
uphold realist views of power. In the Italian–Libyan case this conclusion is
based on two considerations.
First, the Italian–Libyan case and the comparative analysis show that
migration has acquired substantive symbolic power in the domestic
and international agenda. The securitised migration discourse has been
employed by Libya to exert pressure on Italy. Many scholars, and a diverse
range of evidence, speak loudly of the role that the Libyan regime plays in
somewhat facilitating flows of unwanted migrants to Italy, so as to extract
concessions. By contrast with my initial hypothesis, externalisation does
not significantly affect the bargaining power of either state. Instead, it is
the framing of migration as a security issue that furnishes a critical power
asset to Libya vis-à-vis Italy. Discourses on migration represent a source of
leverage. In part, this view challenges the realist conception of hard power
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55–6).
Second, Libya has been capable of utilising migration as a bargaining chip
because of its economic capabilities. The issue-linkages analysis indicates
that oil and gas resources and historical Italian–Libyan business relations
strengthen Libya’s bargaining position. The Libyan authorities are aware
that Italy places great importance on these economic linkages and that,
consequently, the Italian tolerance threshold towards Libya is high. This
provides Libya with a lever that can be applied on a wide range of other
issues on the agenda. Without such economic preconditions, it is doubtful
whether migration could exert such a powerful lever on Italy. The striking
point here is that the unique political and economic setting of Libya renders
the standard North–South framework inappropriate. It needs hardly be said
that Libya can be considered as part of the ‘North’ by some standards and
of the ‘South’ by others.
Importantly, the comparative analysis supports similar conclusions. The
appreciation of the leverage enjoyed by migrant sending countries helps
untangle one of my initial questions on the possible reconfiguration of
the classical readings of North–South power relations. Beside economic
determinants which continue to impact on states’ interaction, migration
increasingly challenges views presuming irreversible inequality in states’
power relations. Hence, on the one hand this consideration corroborates

traditional accounts of power relations, placing economic assets at the cen-
tre of the power equation. On the other, it challenges this same theoretical
perspective, shedding light on the growing complexity of interdependence,
whereby fixed and clear-cut parameters prove elusive.
1.5 Conclusion
In his seminal work entitled The Inequality of Nations, Tucker writes that ‘the
history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence’
(Tucker, 1977: 3). The objective of this book is to deconstruct and go beyond
this proposition to appreciate how new issues on the international agenda,
such as migration, may partially reverse unequal North–South relations. No
one can – and certainly I do not intend to – deny the massive centripetal
pull that the Western model in terms, for example, of capitalism and liberal
democracy, exercises over the rest of the world (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999).
Nevertheless, within this international landscape marked by widening
inequalities, I seek to unravel the possible nuances and counter-trends. In
this spirit, my starting assumption is that migration leads to asymmetrical
power relations, to the advantage of the migrant-sending countries vis-à-vis
the migrant-receiving ones.
Hence, in order to examine changing power relations in the context of
bilateral negotiations, and the issue of whether new dynamics of interde-
pendence are undermining mainstream approaches to IR, the overarching
question is whether the coalescing of national and international systems
and the evolving states’ interests positively affect the relative bargaining
position of the South vis-à-vis the North. From the perspective of border
control, I shall probe whether the alleged ‘expansion in the sphere in which
entrance controls work’ (Gibney, 2005: 9) impacts on North–South inter-
actions and offers potential leeway for the South. In particular, I consider
whether, by view of the multiple linkages created by a sustained bargaining
process, the South is capable of extracting substantial concessions for the
realisation of its own goals (Haas, 1994). From the broader IR viewpoint,
I ask whether reciprocal conditionality, which issue-linkages may entail,
offers an opportunity to rethink the mainstream reading of North–South
power and to reconsider what is ephemeral and what is permanent in the
patterns of states’ interaction.
Part I
Theoretical Background and
Comparative Analysis
2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
Locating the study of migration within the North–South debate impli-

cates us in discussions about the meaning and normative assumptions of
the concepts central to this endeavour. It is thus necessary to sketch the
contending perspectives from which my argument proceeds. To do so, this
chapter takes a first step by making explicit the theoretical framework
based on the notion of complex interdependence which will be employed,
in Part IV of the book, in order to explain and understand the empirical
material. In the subsequent sections I will then bring into focus the defini-
tion of power, North–South relations and externalisation. In summarising
the scholarly debate on these issues, I intend to locate my research within
the broader academic debates at the interstices of international relations,
development studies and migration studies. This theoretical excursus
sets the necessary terrain for the more empirical discussion of the next
chapters.
2.2 Why complex interdependence?
This research is approached through the lens of IR theory. In particular,

I employ the concepts and analytical tools of interdependence theory,1
located within the wider frame of neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane,
1989), to explore how states cooperate in the context of shifting borders and
the repercussions thereof on North–South relations.2
One of the virtues of interdependence theory derives from its reflec-
tions on states’ efforts to address common problems (Haas, 1995: 28) and
to establish relations of collaboration. It analyses how the actions of sepa-
rate actors are brought into conformity with one another through a proc-
ess in which each party changes its behaviour contingent on changes in
the other’s behaviour (Keohane, 1994: 45). The focus is on the norms and
rules explaining why states collaborate, and on the procedures by which
19
that collaboration is carried out (Haas, 1994: 381). According to Keohane

and Nye, complex interdependence (hereafter, interdependence) has three
characteristics. First, it is defined by ‘multiple channels’ that connect socie-
ties, and which can be summarised as inter-state, transgovernmental and
transnational relations. The second qualification of interdependence is the
absence of hierarchy among issues. Foreign affairs agenda have become
larger and more diverse and ‘no longer can all issues be subordinated
to military security’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 26–7). Third, when com-
plex interdependence prevails, military force is not used by governments
towards other governments within the region. Force is not an appropriate
way of achieving other, increasingly important goals (Keohane and Nye,
1977: 27–8).
Interdependence theory and, in particular, its structural realist perspec-
tive, adopts a rationalist standpoint,3 and claims that, when Pareto-optimal
outcomes cannot be achieved through uncoordinated individual calculation
of self-interest, regimes become instrumental for the coordination of state
behaviours (Krasner, 1995). In this text, interdependence is founded on the
assumption that rational actors operate by following their own conceptions
of self-interest (Keohane, 1984: 245). Indeed, regimes, and their constituent
behavioural conventions, are considered to be responses to coordination
problems in which the pursuit of interests, defined in narrow terms, lead to
undesirable outcomes (Haas, 1994: 365).4
However, the adoption of such realist assumptions ‘does not commit the
analyst to gloomy deterministic conclusions’ (Keohane, 1994: 45). On the
contrary, these views can be used to explore the conditions under which
cooperation occurs and the patterns of practice around which expectations
converge (Keohane, 1994: 45). Overall, interdependence theory sheds light
on the transaction costs specifying and enforcing the contracts that under-
pin exchange (North, 1984: 256).
For my initial purposes, the relevance of this approach rests on its account
of the nexus between power – which I define in the subsequent section – and
issue-linkages (Haas, 1994). As Haas explains, the concept of issue-linkages
refers to ‘the linking of separate items that appear on the agenda of the
negotiators’ (Haas, 1994).5 This is understood as a learning process which
reflects an emerging distribution of power. As such, the study of linkages
rests on the appreciation of the ‘changing knowledge and social goals’ that
define the content of the collaboration (Haas, 1980: 361). The alteration of
interests is related to a perceived increase or decrease in the opportunity
costs of change (Haas, 1994). The critical ‘mediating agent’ is power (Haas,
1994), which influences, and is influenced by, the knowledge of both parties
and, hence, by their perception of interdependence.
The distribution of power is one the main determinants of interests
(Stein, 1995), and of the way in which negotiations are conducted and,
hence, of how issues interrelate. The combination of different issues
Theoretical Framework 21
depends on the congruence of interests, as well as on the mediation of

power (Haas, 1994). The condition of unevenly balanced mutual depend-
ence among states stems from asymmetries in their power relations that
frame the context of multiple linkages (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 12). It fol-
lows that the study of power entails the scrutiny of power disparities, i.e.
how patterns of asymmetry develop and how gains are divided (Keohane
and Nye, 1977: 12).
By and large, the underlying assumption of interdependence theory is
that simultaneous mixed-motive games do not result in a zero-sum world,
but rather in a variable-sum situation where costs and benefits are deter-
mined by complex trade-off calculations made by each actor with reference
to the actor’s own notion of interest (Haas, 1995). Hence, the theoretical
model proposed by interdependence theory is useful for my research pur-
poses. It bestows a vocabulary and specific tools that permit us to examine
how migration generates asymmetrical benefits and shared vulnerabilities
among states (Miller and Papademetriou, 1983). More precisely, its insights
into how the power–interest nexus impacts on state cooperation may greatly
benefit our understanding of the Italian–Libyan bargaining patterns and,
more generally, of North–South power interaction.
Ultimately, however, I will opt for an eclectic theoretical matrix that
builds upon interdependence theory and assimilates notions borrowed from
the realist and neo-Marxist schools of thought. A meaningful and accurate
account of the Italian–Libyan case and the other selected cases demands
that we search beyond self-contained analytical paradigms and reconcile
the usage of these seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives.
2.3 Definition of the key concepts
Having illustrated the fundamentals of interdependence theory and

explained the reasons for selecting it, let us examine the main concepts
that I will employ throughout this book, namely, realist tradition, power,
‘North–South’ relations, securitisation and externalisation. In reviewing
the relevant literature I will make explicit the linkage between them and
further elaborate on the central research questions to be addressed in the
chapters to come.
As regards the concept of power I consider three different definitions:
political realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-Marxism. In elaborat-
ing these three conceptions of power, I follow, with a significant degree of
liberty, the analysis proposed by Linklater (1990), who, inter alia, compares
realism with rationalism and revolutionism.6 In identifying the sequence
of progressively more adequate approaches to world politics, he argues that
the method of ‘dialectical development’ allows us to resolve the differences
between them (Linklater, 1990: 10). I do not intend to either explore or build
upon this method and the related notion of emancipation in critical social
theories. Nevertheless, his line of argument, bridging the linkage between

such ‘radically different conceptions of the nature of international theory’
(Linklater, 1990: 10) and identifying common themes, is useful for us. In
presenting the similarities and differences between these three approaches
to power, I define the key terminology and establish the framework for
answering my initial questions. Indeed, the study of the negotiations on
migration elaborates upon this three-fold understanding of power. Let me
start with political realism.
2.3.1 Political realism

The third set of questions outlined in the introduction is based on the rec-
ognition of the enduring relevance of the realist understanding of power.
On this count, two questions arise. First, why, for the purposes of this study,
is it instructive to elaborate upon the realist doctrine? Second, in view of
the sheer scale of realist scholarship, what do I mean, in this text, by ‘realist
tradition’?7
In response to the first question, realist views of power play a central role
not only in the ongoing academic debate but also in the international poli-
cy-making arena.8 That ‘realist practices and ideas predominated in the past
is largely accepted even by those who claim that realism is no answer to
today’s problems’ (Haslam, 2002: 14). As Haslam notes, two leading IR theo-
rists attest the persisting relevance of realism, despite opposing it (Haslam,
2002: 14). According to Robert Keohane, ‘for over 2,000 years, what Hans J.
Morgenthau dubbed “political realism” has constituted the principal tradi-
tion for the analysis of international relations in Europe and its offshoots
in the New World’ (Keohane, 1986a: 9). Likewise, Michael Doyle defined
realism not only as ‘our dominant theory’ but also as ‘our oldest theory’
(Doyle, 1998). In the same vein, Barnett and Duvall suggest that ever since
E. H. Carr delivered his rhetorical blow against the Utopians, much of the
discipline of IR theory ‘has tended to treat power as the ability of one state
to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would
not do’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40).
These reflections constitute the starting point of this endeavour, and also
reveal why employing realism is profitable for my research purposes. The
predominant assumption in the IR literature on North–South relations is
that the North is disproportionately stronger by economic and political
standards than its counterpart. Arguably, this assumption is based on one
of the central tenets of the realist doctrine, i.e. the importance of economic
factors in shaping inter-state relations. Therefore, the full comprehension
and attentive employment of this ever-influential political tradition is the
prerequisite for untangling my initial conundrum.
Concerning the second question, it is important to make explicit my
working definition of realism. Undeniably, any general statement on politi-
cal realism fails to grasp the multifaceted aspects of a school of thought
that encompasses authors with profoundly different conceptions of interna-

tional relations. In the words of Haslam:
The realist tradition is to be seen as a spectrum of ideas of varying hues

from light to dark rather than a fixed point of focus with sharp definition
that distinguishes itself exclusively and at every point of the compass
from its idealist counterpart. (Haslam, 2002: 249)
Along the same lines, Guzzini writes that:
Having nearly as many realisms as realist protagonists [ ... ] produces

a severe problem for realists themselves. At some point, the ‘richness’
argument begs the question of whether realism is a coherent tradition in
the first place. It is paradoxical that IR (and indeed realists themselves)
seem unable to agree on a definition of realism when this very school,
we are told, has held sway over the discipline for so long. (Guzzini,
2004: 536)
Most of all, the indeterminacy of its central concept of power epitomises

the enduring ‘identity dilemma’ of realism (Guzzini, 2004). Mindful of such
pitfalls, I outline ‘the shared core propositions’ of political realism. In the
view of Waltz, realpolitik has four criteria:
1. The ruler’s, and later the state’s, interest provide the spring of action;
2. The necessities of policy arise from unregulated competition of states;
3. Calculation based these necessities can discover the policies that will best
serve a state’s interest; and
4. Success is the ultimate test of policy and success is defined as preserving
and strengthening the state. (Waltz, 1979: 117)9
This list captures the main tenets of my working definition of political real-
ism. States are power-maximising entities that compete in an anarchic envi-
ronment on the basis of their national interest, defined in terms of security
and survival. International anarchy and the absence of a central monopoly
of legitimate force account for the ‘security dilemma’, whereby measures
that enhance one state’s security typically diminish that of others (Waltz,
1988: 619).
2.3.2 Power in international relations

The appreciation of the full significance of realism compels us to probe its
conceptualisation of power. This exercise is necessary, since the notion of
power fundamentally shapes the realist perception of the world. To do so,
after presenting the realist understanding of power, I will seek to enlarge
it and consider other perspectives that will be useful for this research.
As Waltz notes, power is defined as a function of the capability of the state:
The parts of hierarchic systems are related to one another in ways that
are determined by their functional differentiation and by the extent of
their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are functionally undif-
ferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily
by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. States
are differently placed by their power. Power is estimated by comparing
the capabilities of a number of units. (Waltz, 1979: 97)
Material capabilities define the strength of actors and their capacity to

affect and control outcomes (Guzzini, 2004: 537). What is also known as
‘hard power’ (Nye, 2004)10 is ‘concrete, measurable and predictable’ (Nye,
2004: 3), because it is based on objective and material assets. A country
is considered to be powerful on the basis of ‘the size of population and
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength,
political stability and competence’ (Waltz, 1979: 131). In short, political
realism contends that material power resources dominate other forms of
power and that states with a greater preponderance of the first will con-
trol world affairs.11 For mainstream realists, then, power so defined is the
ordering principle in a self-help and anarchic system that allows states
to guarantee their own survival. One of the fixed laws of international
relations prescribes that force ‘serves not as ultima ratio, but indeed as the
first and constant one’ (Waltz, 1979: 113). As Mearsheimer has written,
‘power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it
among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international
relations’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 12). More precisely, Waltz asks: what does
power do for you?
1. Power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of

force that others wield.
2. Greater power permits wider ranges of action, while leaving the outcomes
of action uncertain.
3. The more powerful enjoy wider margin of safety in dealing with the less
powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and
how. (Waltz, 1979: 194)
Relations between states are based upon relative gains and relative losses,
making international relations a zero-sum game. What counts are not
‘the players’ absolute skills or capabilities but how they perform relative to
their opponents’, since ‘a gain (loss) for one player becomes a correspond-
ing loss (gain) for the opponent’ (Schweller, 1997: 928).12 In short, in an
effort to understand politics ‘as it is’, the realpolitik paradigm is based on
three assumptions: anarchy; statism; and politics as the struggle for power
(Guzzini, 2004: 5). These are believed to be intrinsically valid norms that
transcend both history and geography (Morgenthau, 1978).
In linking the realist definition of power to one of my initial queries, it is
instructive to consider how realism has attempted to explain fundamental
cleavages between the North and the South in terms of power disparities.
As Lake observes, the few realist scholars who have offered such an explana-
tion have grounded their studies in international political economy (Lake,
1987).13 They argue that developing countries do not have any meaningful
choices because they are controlled, directly or indirectly, by external influ-
ences (Rothstein, 1977: 9).
In the words of Fawcett and Sayigh, realism ‘condemns the Third World
to perpetual subservience, as weak states in the world of the strong and con-
siders change difficult if not impossible’ (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 245).
Interestingly, this perspective is akin to the accounts adduced by depend-
ency and world system theorists that I will explore further below. As Fawcett
and Sayigh further note, ‘theories of dependence have also condemned the
“Third World” to subservience or worse: to a state of progressive impoverish-
ment and dependence from which only prolonged struggled or revolution-
ary change provides an outlet’ (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 245). Broadly,
the classical realist formula postulates that the critical power–interest nexus
defines states’ hierarchy, with the more powerful prevailing over the weaker
ones. As a struggle for power, the clash between the North and the South is
considered to be ‘structural and endemic to the international system’ and it
is ‘likely to endure’ (Lake, 1987: 16).
The realist focus on the state and on the necessity of power is central to
the present enquiry. As I will argue in the core chapters, the realist formula
continues to capture important elements in the relations of power between
states and, more specifically, in the agreements on migration between states.
Yet it will be suggested that it is not sufficient. The complex dynamics fram-
ing negotiations on migration necessitate a broader framework of analysis.
As Linklater puts it, ‘the growing importance of economic factors in world
politics made students of international relations more sensitive to the need
to analyse the phenomenon of change’ and ‘the need to solve a number of
emerging common problems’ (Linklater, 1990: 3). While more attention to
North–South relations will follow below, let us continue with our discussion
of power.
This reflection leads to the second understanding of power, elaborated by
the neo-liberal regime branch of IR theory (Lipschutz, 2005).14 Appreciation
of the complex interplay between domestic and international factor reveals
new power dynamics. It is contended that ‘power today is less tangible and
less coercive [ ... ] than it was in the past’ (Nye, 2004: 30). Power is not only
‘hard’, as realists have argued, but it is also ‘soft’ for it involves co-opting
other actors as opposed to coercing them (Nye, 2004). Two aspects of this
reduced tangibility, which I will apply in Part IV, deserve mention.
First, power is less tangible because it is located in ‘the context in which

the relationship exists’ (Nye, 2004: 2).15 On this point, Dahl’s notion of rela-
tional power and its connection with a Weberian understanding of social
action may prove instructive.16 As Dahl famously wrote, ‘A has power over B
to the extent that he can get B to something that B would not otherwise do’
(Dahl, 1957: 203). This notion of reciprocity exhibits an affinity with Weber’s
concept of power as ‘the probability that one actor in a social relationship
will be in a position to carry out his [sic] will despite resistance, regardless
of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber, 1947: 152). Therefore,
power is the capacity to carry through one’s will in a contextual interaction
(Barry, 1976: 34). Power cannot be assessed a priori, i.e. independently from
general norms, the actors’ particular value systems, or the specific historical
context (Guzzini, 2004: 538). By contrast with the realist notion of power as
a measurable capability (Walt, 2002), according this second approach ‘power
is not and cannot be a property concept’ (Guzzini, 2004: 538).
Second, power is closely linked to the role of ideas. In this frame, Barnett
and Duvall’s concept of productive power is instructive.17 While the
authors distinguish four concepts of power – compulsory, institutional,
structural and productive – here I will consider only the last18 which is
defined as ‘the constitution of all social subjects with various social pow-
ers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and
general social scope’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55). It is about clusters of
meaning and networks of social forces that shape one another perpetually
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 55). More specifically, productive power has two
dimensions:
First, productive power concerns discourse, the social processes and the
systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived,
experienced and transformed [ ... ] Discourses are sites of social relations
of power because they situate ordinary practices of life and define the
social fields of action that are imaginable and possible. Second discursive
processes and practices produce social identities and capacities as they
give meaning to them. [ ... ] Discourse, therefore, is socially productive
for all subjects constituting the subjectivity of all social beings of diverse
kinds with their contingent though not entirely fluid identities, prac-
tices, rights, responsibilities and social capacities. (Barnett and Duvall,
2005: 55–56)
In other words, productive power is linked to diffuse and generalised social

processes, and ‘concerns the boundaries of all social identity, and the capac-
ity and inclination for action for the socially advantaged and disadvantaged
alike’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 56). This definition is useful, because it
helps to identify how ‘changing understandings, meanings, norms, customs,
and social identities’ (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 56) affect social relations
and challenge pre-existing orders. By employing the concept of productive

power, I am able to examine how discourses shape interests and identities
and, in particular, how the securitised perception of migration defines the
identities and capacities of the negotiating actors and shapes their behav-
iour. Importantly, the selected concept raises questions that are neglected
by realist theory and which are crucial for comprehending the complexity
of our case study. This is not to suggest, though, that the importance of real-
ism is in any way diminished.19 As already pointed out, I will make the case
for a more comprehensive theoretical approach,20 building upon realism,
interdependence and neo-Marxism.
Lastly, I turn to the third definition of power from the vantage-point of
neo-Marxism. A brief assessment of this theoretical tradition is warranted,
since it has heavily influenced the debate on North–South relations. Before
proceeding any further, I clarify this concept. I use the term ‘South’ since,
unlike the notions of ‘Third Word’ or ‘Less Developed Countries’, it carries
the least ideological baggage. As Brown observes, ‘South conveys nothing
apart from location; but this constitutes a positive advantage, because it
does not load the dice in advance’ (Brown, 2001: 196). Whereas all coun-
tries in the South share certain features, such as non-European origin and
culture and widespread poverty relative to the North, the term itself does
not contain any part of these connotations, and allows us a degree of lati-
tude (Brown, 2001: 196).21 Throughout the analysis, the expressions ‘North/
South’ and ‘sending/receiving countries’ will be employed with the same
meaning.
Based on the orthodox Marxist themes of inequality and economic strat-
ification, neo-Marxism, which includes, amongst others, Latin American
dependency and world-system theorists, reflects on the global web of une-
qual economic exchanges. In disputing the Marxist emphasis on class, as
opposed to the state,22 this approach posits that ‘earlier patterns of depend-
ency and exploitation continued despite the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie’
(Linklater, 1990: 103). It was argued that major sectors of the peripheral
economy were organised to serve metropolitan interests rather than to
meet the needs of the local population. In simplistic terms, the classic prob-
lem of social and economic equality that Marx analysed in the context of
nineteenth-century capitalism was put before the world as a whole. The
metropolis in the North was seen as exercising a monopoly power over the
countries in the South (Linklater, 1990: 102).
Using this line of reasoning, neo-Marxism defines state power as a func-
tion of economic capabilities. The level of economic development deter-
mines countries’ positions in the world economy and the extent to which
they are subject either to economic exploitation or to the dominant players
(Linklater, 1990: 97–9). In other words, power depends on the wealth and the
modes of production of countries and, in turn, defines these countries’ roles
within the world economy. In this respect, the neo-Marxist interpretation
of power has important analogies with classical realism; i.e. the focus on
state agency, a view of the international system as a struggle over the appro-
priation of resources, and a conception of ‘hard’ power that allows states
to influence each other’s behaviour. As Linklater reminds us, realism and
neo-Marxism agree that ‘international anarchy is one of the main reasons
for the existence of the inequality of states and one of the main constraints
upon its super-session’ (Linklater, 1990: 103). Yet the author also notes that
the realist and the Marxist perspectives ‘focus on dimensions of inequal-
ity which have tended to fall outside the other’s purview’ (Linklater, 1990:
101). While realism is concerned with the ‘traditional connection between
the possession of superior economic and military power’, neo-Marxism dis-
cusses international inequality at the level of the world economy (Linklater,
1990: 101). Against the realist contention that the distribution of power
rests on the economic and military assets of countries, neo-Marxism dis-
putes the position of wealth as the primary determinant of the inequality
among states.
To sum up the analysis so far, an understanding of the different notions of
power elaborated by realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-Marxism
is instrumental for my initial purposes. On the one hand, my hypothesis on
the evolving North–South power relations is rooted in these three different
strands of thought. On the other, the employment of these three accounts
of power will allow me to unpack my main research questions on externali-
sation to which I now turn.
2.3.3 Externalisation of migration policies

The argument on externalisation comes as part of a wider debate centred on
the notion of securitisation in the area of migration. If we now look briefly
at the second we are then able to delimit the minimum features of the first.
The entry of migration into the realm of ‘high’ politics is charted by Barry
Buzan’s People, States and Fear (1991), which was amongst the first publica-
tions in the security studies literature to assess the nexus between security
and migration (Collyer, 2006: 258). This debate veers around the notion of
‘securitisation’, which Balzacq defines as the process leading to the trans-
formation of certain entities – either subjects or objects – into a threat, and
whereby threat images are modelled as the result of discursive processes
taking place among the securitising actor(s) and the relevant audience(s)
(Balzacq, 2008: 76). Within this constructivist reading, two major schools
have studied the link between migration policy and security (Gammeltoft-
Hansen, 2005). One is represented by the book by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan,
Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993), Identity, Migration, and the New
Security Agenda in Europe, which gave rise to a stream of thought within
security studies on discourse. The other is Didier Bigo’s research into the
social structures guiding securitisation (Bigo, 1996; Gammeltoft-Hansen,
2005).
This debate sets the framework for studying EU migration policies towards
third countries. Scholars have drawn attention to the ‘externalities’ of
migration, i.e. the impact of the emerging European security discourse and
migration policies on the decision-making settings outside the EU (Lavenex,
2002: 7). This discussion stems from the large scholarship on the European
external border, by for example Anderson and Bort (2001), Donnan and
Wilson (1999) and Zielonka (2001). Even though these works do not focus
exclusively on migration, their conceptualisation of the emerging EU bor-
der regime establishes a basis for the analysis of the so-called process of
‘externalisation of migration policies’.
The concept of externalisation was first used with regard to asylum, and
was associated with the UK government’s proposal of March 2003 to build
‘transit processing centres’ outside the EU (Doukoure and Oger, 2003: 3). In
order to deter those entering the EU ‘illegally’, the UK suggested establishing
‘protected zones in third countries to which those arriving in EU Member
States and claiming asylum could be transferred to in order to have their
claims processed’ (Blair, 2003). Subsequently, the concept was applied to
migration policies as a whole. In this more general sense, externalisation
refers to the EU’s attempt to project its territorial borders onto surrounding
states and regions by exporting its migration and asylum policies (Geddes,
2005a: 801). This process has been defined by Guild and Bigo (2003) as ‘polic-
ing at distance’, whereby a state’s border control mechanisms are exercised
outside the territory of the state by transnational security professionals.
In the process of spatial reconstruction of the policy response to migra-
tion (Geddes, 2005a), transnational joint tasks are agreed, in order to
address a ‘de-territorialised’ threat. According to Walters, de-territoriali-
sation describes a movement that is de-privileging or even escaping from
fixed, geographical territory (Walters, 2004: 681). A very diverse collection
of issues such as migration, narcotics smuggling, weapons trading, political
asylum and terrorism is made intelligible as ‘exemplars of this more general
problem of ‘trans-national’ risk’ (Walters, 2004: 681). Accordingly,
Effective frontier control is to be sought through cooperation between

state agencies on both sides of the frontier. The activity of police must
reconfigure itself as networks and ‘joint tasks’ to counteract a series of
threats that are considered now to take the same form. Rather than a line
which divides armed installations, or a zone of confrontation, the border
becomes a joint responsibility and the locus of a new practice of police
cooperation. (Walters, 2004: 682)
More concretely, the externalisation agenda includes a wide range of differ-

ent policies. One example is the readmission of migrants and asylum-seekers
to supposedly ‘safe third countries’, outside the EU, through which they
have passed (Council, 2005a). Likewise the term refers to ‘capacity-building’
programmes, whereby development aid is employed to create protection

conditions in third countries so that EU states may conclude, among others
policies, readmission agreements with those governments (Human Rights
Watch, 2006b: 92). Externalisation is also associated with so-called ‘pre-
frontier controls’ (EC, 2008b). Such measures entail, for instance, sanc-
tions on private transport companies if they carry people who do not hold
the necessary visas to enter the EU. They also involve the organisation of
joint patrolling operations on sea borders to intercept boats with irregu-
lar migrants, and the locating of so-called European Immigration Liaison
Officers in European neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migra-
tion and to cooperate with local authorities on a wide range of immigration
related issues (ECRE, 2007).
Most observers contend that the de-location of frontiers beyond European
borders implies the transfer of responsibility for migration management
from the migrant-receiving countries to the migrant-sending ones (Carrera,
2007: 26; Oxfam, 2006).23 As Collyer writes, an important aspect of this
new geo-politics is that the real impact of migration flows ‘is not in Europe
at all but in the countries of transit [ ... ] In return for limited financial sup-
port, they are now held accountable by the EU for controlling access to
Europe’ (Collyer, 2006: 4). One of the implications of the European attempts
to externalise migration policies is the ‘largely discretionary nature of bur-
den- and responsibility-sharing’ (Betts and Milner, 2006: 18), which leaves
the migrant-sending countries worse off.
Another criticism levelled against such policies is that they ‘are subject to
minimal scrutiny and accountability, because they are implemented out-
side state territory’ (Oxfam, 2005: iii). The process of extending controls
into the territory of third countries has been decried by human rights and
migrant support groups as jeopardising the rights and safety of those seek-
ing to enter (Lutterbeck, 2006). For example, in reference to the intercep-
tion of undocumented migrants at sea, Oxfam has lamented the fact that
the assessment of protection needs is cursory and inadequate at best, and
at times non-existent (Oxfam, 2005: 38). According to the same organisa-
tion, by imposing carrier sanctions, the EU is ‘privatising’ its international
responsibilities and has created a situation where international principles,
such as non-refoulement, can be breached on a regular basis (Bigo et al., 2007;
Oxfam, 2005: 39). In other words, the enhancement of security through an
increased use of coercive measures and surveillance technology by the EU in
its neighbouring countries has undermined established democratic checks
and balances that should be at the core of EU practice (Carrera, 2007). In
this sense, externalisation, it is contended, enshrines a series of measures
which fall outside the rule of law.
Externalisation by no means constitutes a coherent and monolithic
set of policies (Noll, 2003). Beyond doubt, the approaches vary along a
spectrum from addressing ‘symptoms’, through containment, to tackling

root causes (Betts and Milner, 2006: 7). The outsourcing of policies is not
only highly diversified, but has also changed significantly over the years.
Thus the notion of externalisation is fundamentally elusive, which is why
I will ultimately drop the term in favour of a more ad hoc rendering of the
selected case study. These limitations notwithstanding, in Chapter 8 I will
summarise the aforementioned debate and derive the main characteristics
of externalisation with a view to ultimately assessing the implications for
North–South power relations. Although the arguments on the latter are
familiar to us from the first chapter, it is important to clarify the sense
in which tensions across and beyond the North–South divide have been
understood in the scholarship. This brings us to the task of confronting
(1) the North–South problematique and (2) the impact of migration on inter-
state relations.
2.3.4 North–South relations and international migration

Without wishing to probe here deep into this enduring dispute, let us eluci-
date how the study of North–South relations has developed over the last few
decades. At its most basic, attention has centred on the increasing economic
inequalities between industrialised and developing countries as well as the
general process of globalisation. Notably, within the so-called ‘structuralist’
school, the works of Myrdal (1957, 1970) and Prebisch (1964), and of Latin
American dependencia theorists such as Frank (1969), Dos Santos (1970),
Furtado (1973), Cardoso (1973) and Wallerstein (1974a and 1974b), make a
strong case for the deepening patterns of structural inequality in the world
economy (Dan Walleri, 1978).
Such diverse and copious writings are underpinned by a common logic,
namely their opposition to the liberal paradigm of the post-war era. Rooted
in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, they contend that in the world economy
the resources extracted from the periphery, including raw materials-export-
ing and less developed countries, flow towards the core countries, including
the developed, industrialised and democratic part of the world. This ine-
quality sustains the economic growth and wealth of the latter, but produces
underdevelopment in the periphery and leads to structural problems in its
local economy. The question of whether the global market is able to ensure
the allocation of resources and the production and distribution of goods
in an efficient and equitable manner has been and remains at the centre
of political and economic debate.24 A large segment of academic scholar-
ship maintains that globalisation exacerbates inequality, both within and
among states, and erodes the capacity of traditional institutions to manage
new threats (Hurrell and Woods, 1999: 8, Sachs and MacArthur, 2005). It
is, therefore, illuminating to consider whether the North–South framework
has been applied to migration and inter-state relations.
Until the early 1980s, scholars of political science and IR theory left the
study of migration at the margins of their research.25 As Weiner wrote in
1985:
Theories of international migration pay remarkably little attention to

state interventions, while the literature on international relations says
relatively little about population movements, except insofar as the refu-
gee phenomenon is described as an outcome of conflicts. How do state
actions shape population movements, when do such movements lead to
conflicts and when to cooperation, and what do governments do in their
domestic policies to adjust to or influence population flows are questions
that have received far too little attention. (Weiner, 1985: 441)
At the same time, one definite theoretical development of the past quarter
of a century is the recognition that it is precisely the control that states
exercise over borders that defines international migration (Zolberg, 1989).
Notably, Zolberg et al., reflect on how the policies of receiving countries
influence refugee movements, and point out that, although migration pol-
icy is partially shaped by domestic concerns, ‘it lends itself to many uses as
an instrument of foreign policy, and therefore considerations arising from
this sphere are usually determinative’ (Zolberg et al., 1986: 156). The appre-
ciation that power relations change as a result of migration is one of the
central tenets of my project. As Zolberg et al., further add:
The expansion of the international politico-strategic system to encom-

pass the entire globe implies that even the poorest and geopolitically least
significant of states acquired some value as stakes in the politico-strategic
games of the major players. It follows that internal regime changes among
Third World countries tend to be perceived as having implications for the
wider system, and are therefore likely to provoke some sort of response by
outsiders. (Zolberg et al., 1986: 157)
In the same spirit, Mitchell traces the linkage between foreign policy,
international relations and migration. He underlines that the connections
between ‘domestic change, external intervention and refugee flows’ and
between ‘regional population movements and national immigration poli-
cies’ have ‘obvious relevance to understanding the confrontations of states
with markets, and states with states’ (Mitchell, 1989: 704). As he puts it:
International migration is ‘affected with an international political inter-

est’. While it might once have been heuristically useful to view popu-
lation movements as social or economic phenomena divorced from
influence by (or upon) world politics, that approach is no longer viable.
Both experience and research have demonstrated numerous ways in
which migration is intertwined with international politics. (Mitchell,

1989: 682)
The same opinion is shared by Teitelbaum, who, in the early 1980s, argued
that the linkages between foreign policies and immigration and refugee
policies were ‘not new’ (Teitelbaum, 1984: 430–1). In his own words:
both sending and receiving countries have employed mass migration

movements as tools of their foreign policies. There is, first, what might
be termed ‘mass migration for unarmed conquest or assertion of sover-
eignty. [ ... ] More subtle are the uses made of migrant groups for foreign-
policy purposes. On the sending side, there is reason to believe that mass
expulsions have been employed as tools to destabilize or embarrass for-
eign-policy adversaries. (Teitelbaum, 1984: 437–8)
This line of thinking has been further elaborated by Chimni (1998), who
suggests that in Cold War politics refugees were used as ‘pawns’, and assesses
the implications of this for developing countries.26
Alongside the increasing attention devoted by political scientists to
migration, it is thus possible to observe an emerging literature on the nexus
between North–South relations and migration. This is best exemplified
in the studies by Betts (2005) and Gillespie (2002), to which I return in
the succeeding chapters. Within this stream of thought, there is a broad
acceptance that North–South migration policies are based on ‘asymmetric
interdependence’ (Baradello, 2007: 11; see also Aleinikoff, 2002; Nye and
Keohane, 1987). Geddes, for example, posits that externalisation of migra-
tion and EU asylum policies ‘is closely linked to the organisational and
conceptual borders within and between EU Member States, as well as their
projection onto other states and regions’ (Geddes, 2005a: 801). The under-
lying assumption is that migrant-sending countries are the weaker part-
ners economically and politically (Baradello 2007: 11; Hollifield, 2000) and
that, by contrast, migrant-receiving states are better positioned and enjoy
a capacity to act than their Southern counterparts (Baradello, 2007: 11). In
other words, the thrust of much of the literature on migration has demon-
strated that the benefits of migrations have been distributed unequally, to
the advantage of the already more fortunate receivers, and that ‘the bal-
ance to the already unfortunate sending countries is altogether negative’
(Zolberg, 1989: 424).
Departing from this reading, some observers have disputed the argument
that the participation of the South in the joint efforts to control migration
‘has been dictated’ by pressures exerted by the EU and its Member States
(Cassarino, 2005: 227). For example, in the analysis of the evolving patterns
of interconnectedness between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving
countries, Cassarino suggests that the first have been able to ‘capitalise’ on
their participation in the collaborative efforts on migration and ‘to exert

more leverage on the enlarged EU, in terms of financial aid and develop-
ment assistance’ (Cassarino, 2005: 228). The claim that migration gives
increased bargaining power to the South is also made by Cuttitta (2008a)
and Ellerman (2008). This is the line of enquiry that I pursue in this book,
in order to explore novel patterns of interconnectedness between the North
and the South. In so doing, I build upon the work of Betts (2005) who
approaches the study of the collaboration on migration between states from
the North–South perspective. In particular, Betts’ examination of interna-
tional cooperation in the refugee regime provides a rigorous analysis based
on the work of, among others, Haas and Keohane. His study of North–South
relations through the concept of issue-linkages27 inspires the theoretical
framework of my analysis of Italian–Libyan relations.
2.4 Conclusion
My starting hypothesis is rooted in an academic debate that has been in

process for at least three decades. However, the emerging controversy on
externalisation and securitisation in the North–South context raises new
questions on the capacity of states to control border and to influence other
actors. With regard to externalisation, in Part IV of the book I will dispute
some assumptions attached to the concept, especially in relation to state
sovereignty, and make the case for the limited practical efficacy despite its
profound symbolic dimension. Crucially, this argument is possible only as
long as we recast the assumptions within which the North–South question
has thus far been confronted. My taking issue with the value and utility of
North–South antithetical framing rests on the appreciation of the many
fractures in the ideas and practices of externalisation and of shifting modes
of states’ cooperation.
3
Comparative Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The distinctive nature not just of Libya but also of the bilateral agreements
with Italy on migration prompts the analyst to be circumspect as to the
conclusions that can be drawn. The nature of migration flows through
Libya, which vary considerably from those of other migrant-sending coun-
tries, and its peculiar political system, preclude us from deriving general
lessons relevant for the wider audience of students of development stud-
ies, migration and IR. Thus, in order to enlarge the empirical analysis,
this chapter reviews selected bilateral negotiations on migration. I review
secondary literature on the relations between the US and Mexico, the US
and Cuba, Spain and Morocco and the EU and Turkey and I assess the
extent to which migration challenges classic readings of North–South
power dynamics.
By examining a range of theoretical and empirical claims on migration
from the perspective of IR, I seek to mitigate the shortcomings of a one-
case piece of research. From the conclusions of each of the selected cases,
I derive specific questions, which will be applied to the empirical discus-
sion of the Italian–Libyan agreements in Parts III and IV. Answering such
questions will help determine whether my selected case study contradicts,
or not, other similar cases of negotiations on migration. In this sense, this
comparative exercise is an integral part of this book, since it contextualises
the findings of my research and alerts us to its limits.
The four cases are discussed in separate sections, which follow the same
structure. First, I present an historical excursus of the agreements on migra-
tion, and then I revisit the arguments elaborated by the relevant scholar-
ship on the linkage between foreign policy and migration. In presenting
the key phases of the agreements on migration, I ask whether migration has
conferred increased bargaining power on either of the negotiating coun-
tries, whether such power was maintained over time, and to what the extent
the countries involved have adapted to these changes. This exercise aims to
35
formulate questions that will be applied to the following chapters on the

Italian–Libyan negotiations on migration.
This investigation is based on secondary sources. Since the overall focus
of this book is on Italian–Libyan relations, I do not intend to present a
detailed analysis of the selected comparative cases. In fact, they are sup-
ported neither by direct fieldwork nor by elite interviews. By relying on
the research and information presented by other observers, I introduce a
comparative analysis of what future, more in-depth research is required.
Moreover, in the selection of the case studies I have prioritised the relations
between the US and Latin American countries, since they are supported
by a vast literature on the linkage between migration and foreign policy. I
have also chosen the Morocco–Spain and Turkey–EU discussions because of
the political, geographical and historical analogy with the Italian–Libyan
case. While they have not been approached from a distinctive IR point of
view, they have been subject of conspicuous and differentiated research.
Other bilateral negotiations on migration, such as Philippines–Saudi Arabia,
Ghana–UK, France–Algeria and Indonesia–Malaysia, would merit further
discussion. However, for the sake of consistency and brevity, these other
cases will not be discussed in this chapter.
3.2 Negotiations on migration between the US and

selected Central and Latin American countries
Historically, migration has played a significant role in the interaction

between the US and individual Central and Latin American countries.
As Mitchell writes, the Western hemisphere is ‘a region where the inter-
action between US foreign and migration policies is increasingly evident’
(Mitchell, 1992: 8). Against this background, bilateral discussions on migra-
tion between the US and Cuba or Mexico are of particular relevance.
3.2.1 Relations between the US and Cuba

Within the distinctive context of East–West rivalry, ideological and strate-
gic factors best explain the US–Cuban relations on migration (Dominguez,
1992: 41). As Nackerud et al., note, since the 1960s ‘along with a compre-
hensive economic blockade, an important element of the US plan was the
creation of an open door to spur migration that drained Cuba of human and
economic capital’ (Nackerud et al., 1999: 183).1 Successive administrations,
from Eisenhower’s to Clinton’s, have, in different ways, welcomed refugees
from Cuba in order to further political objectives against its revolution
(Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2). As Masud-Piloto observes, although the American
objectives have varied, at least two have remained constant: (1) to destabi-
lise Castro’s government by draining it of vital human resources and (2) to
discredit the regime through encouraging the flight of thousands from a
communist dictatorship to a capitalist democracy (Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2).
Comparative Analysis 37
To fully appreciate this, a brief chronicle of the four waves of migration

from Cuba to the US is insightful.2
The first wave was in the early 1960s, when President Eisenhower granted
automatic acceptance to over 200,000 migrants from Cuba (Nackerud et al.,
1999: 184). US open migration policy towards Cubans started formally with
the Cuba Refugee Programme in February 1961, which was extended with
the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act 1962 and the Cuban Adjustment
of Status Act 1966 (Colmer, 2000: 427). In so doing, the US set a precedent
for the subsequent waves (Nackerud et al., 1999: 184). Since many of the
Cubans reaching American shores did not meet the criteria outlined by
the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many of them were
granted refugee status under the Walter-McCarran Act 1952 by virtue of
their having fled a communist country (Nackerud et al., 1999: 184). In other
words, US opposition to the Cuban Revolution gave ‘refugees’ from that
country benefits setting them apart from other Latin American asylum-
seekers (Masud-Piloto, 1996: 2). As we shall see below, this policy, favouring
‘exit’ from Cuba, was markedly different from US migration policy towards
Mexico and other Central American and Caribbean countries, to whose
emigrants the US has often closed its borders (Colomer, 2000: 428).
The second wave of Cuban migration took place in 1965, when the Vuelos
de la Libertad, or Freedom Flights, sponsored by the United States, brought
250,000 Cubans to the US. During the third wave in April 1980, also known
as the Mariel Crisis, the Cuban government allowed 125,000 Cubans to
depart ‘illegally’ for the United States from the port of Mariel (Leo Grande,
1998). In response, the US government stopped issuing migrant visas to
all Cubans until and unless the Cuban government took back the Cubans
who had come through Mariel Harbour (Dominguez, 1992: 47). This restric-
tion, however, was lifted by President Reagan, who sought to resume normal
relations. Indeed, in 1984 the two countries negotiated an agreement to
re-establish normal migration (US Department of State, 2001a). Afer a brief
suspension in May 1985, the agreement was reinstated in November 1987
(US Department of State, 2001a).
The 1990s witnessed the fourth wave of migration, known as the Balseros
Crisis. As a result of the protests against food shortages and prolonged unan-
nounced blackouts in Havana in August 1994, Fidel Castro ordered migrant
flows to the US not be stopped, and consequently over 30,000 Cubans left
for the United States. On this occasion, the Cuban leader made the follow-
ing official statement:
If the US does not take rapid, effective measures to stop promoting illegal
departures from [our] country, we will feel obliged to instruct our border
guards to do nothing to stop any vessel that is trying to leave Cuba. We
have set forth our position; we aren’t opposed to solutions if they are
based on sincerity and honesty, if they seek to solve the problem, if they
aren’t proffered as a means of deceiving us – but we cannot continue to

act as border guards for the US. (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178)
Hence, after being made to appear essentially powerless in the face of the
boatlift from Cuba, President Clinton used his executive power to author-
ise the interception and detention of the fleeing Cubans. Thus migrants,
accustomed to being welcomed, were instead imprisoned at the US Naval
Base in Guantánamo Bay (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178).3 Their detention
lasted eight months, until a bilateral agreement was reached whereby
Cuba gained 20,000 regular US visa slots and the automatic acceptance of
Cubans as political refugees was eliminated (Nackerud et al., 1999: 178).
The agreement also legalised the return of Cubans intercepted at sea to
their country (Nackerud et al., 1999: 177). Hence, with this agreement the
Clinton administration reversed the previous welcoming stance of the US,
which had been based on the belief that the departure of migrants from
Cuba would undermine the fabric of Cuban society and its government
(Mitchell, 1997: 48). In other words, the US response to the Balsero Crisis
represented a significant turning-point. Yet, in broad political terms, the
overall US foreign policy objective remained the same, i.e. weakening the
Cuban government. Thus migration represented one of the strategic policy
tools for achieving this objective, both before and after the Balsero Crisis
(Dominguez, 1992: 48). Simply put, migration proved to be a ‘coercive
political weapon’ (Greenhill, 2002: 39, 2010) for the benefit, at different
times, of both Cuba and the US.
To be sure, the recent changes in both the US and Cuba invite a degree
of caution about drawing any conclusions. Migration continues to be on
the bilateral agenda. Semi-annual migration talks between Cuba and the
US had been held regularly for a decade on the implementation of the 1994
and 1995 migration accords. The US State Department, however, cancelled
the 20th round of talks scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks
have been held since (Wasem, 2009: 18). During his election campaign in
2008, Barack Obama promised a ‘new beginning’ with Cuba; to include,
for example, the lifting of restrictions on visits by Cuban Americans to the
island. In this context, in June 2009, the US and Cuban governments agreed
to new talks on migration (Wasem, 2009: 19). It is unclear, however, how
the discussions on migration will affect the broader bilateral negotiations
with Cuba, which has been under the presidency of Raúl Castro, brother of
the former dictator, since February 2008. These caveats notwithstanding, let
us return to our initial questions on soft power.
On the one hand, Cuba, by employing what Greenhill calls ‘extortive
engineered migration’, i.e. the ‘use of the Cuban people as an asymmetric
political weapon against the US’, succeeded in internationalising its domes-
tic crisis and ‘transforming it into an American domestic political and for-
eign policy crisis’ (Greenhill, 2002: 39).4 According to Greenhill, extortive,
engineered migration is ‘one of the relatively few weapons that weak actors
can use to influence the behaviour of more powerful states, particularly
advanced industrial democracies’ (Greenhill, 2002: 41). In reverting to this
device, weak actors can manipulate successfully the actions of more power-
ful states and expose the vulnerabilities of the latter. During the Balseros
Crisis, the US weakness derived from its being trapped between the interna-
tional normative commitments of welcoming ‘refugees’ from a communist
country and its domestic imperatives of controlling borders.
Overall, domestic imperatives prevailed, and the US reversed its migration
policies and increased its restrictive measures. Indeed, Greenhill suggests
that ‘this kind of coercion can only succeed when the expected negative
side effects are visible or domestically salient to the target’s population’
(Greenhill, 2002: 42). With the Balseros Crisis, the side-effects were visible
enough to allow Castro to achieve one of his goals, namely, a US halt to
irregular emigration (Greenhill, 2002: 59). In other words, Castro succeeded
in influencing US foreign policy and forcing the latter to close its borders,
by exploiting the US domestic fears associated with migration. Significantly,
this point applies also to Italian–Libyan relations. As we shall see in the fol-
lowing chapters, the image of migration constructed around control fears
underpins the instrumental use of migration by the Libyan regime.
On the other hand, for its part the US sought to affect the behaviour of
Cuba by using migration as a policy instrument (Mitchell, 1997: 48). This
argument is elaborated by Colomer (2000). By applying Hirschman’s cat-
egories of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’,5 he demonstrates that migration was used by
the US to promote both ‘voice’ against the Cuban regime and ‘exit’ from the
island (Colomer, 2000). The US sought to weaken Cuba by providing refuge
to members to dissatisfied Cuban citizens (exit), as well as to organise ‘voice’
among Cuban exiles and ‘internal voice’ to reintroduce American influence
into the country (Colomer, 2000: 428–9). Nonetheless, as both the Balseros
and the Mariel crises demonstrate, the US migration strategy proved to be
double-edged. Arguably, the US open-door policy and economic blockade6
succeeded in causing disruption to the Cuban economy (Nackerud et al.,
1999: 183). Yet it had some counter-effects. Exit grew ‘at the expense of con-
tributions to collective “voice” as potential critics leave to exile’ (Colomer,
2000: 428). It also engendered domestic resentment calling for more restric-
tive policies (Colomer, 2000: 428). While the US adopted an exceptional
migration policy towards Cuba, Cuba’s adoption of a more typical Latin
American country’s migration strategy gave Castro some advantage in the
interplay with the United States (Colmer, 2000: 431). In Colomer’s words:
Cuba had incentives to promote successive waves of emigration to the

United States in the expectation of obtaining a cooperative response by
the United States toward mutual closing of borders. This has induced
the United States to modify to some extent the exceptional, foreign
policy-oriented migration policy it has pursued toward the Cuban gov-

ernment. (Colmer, 2000: 431)
Put simply, Castro’s intention was to stop the ‘irregular and destabilising pat-
tern of immigration between his country and the US’ (Greenhill, 2002: 45).
He enticed the US to do so by using his migration ‘card’. By closing borders
as a response to Cuba’s opportunistic use of migration, the US served the
interests of Cuba.
In broad political terms, the resulting US–Cuban migration relations
might typically be described as ‘antagonistic cooperation’, whereby, for
opposed and often hostile reasons, each government chose a migration
policy that suited the interests of the other (Dominguez, 1992: 31). This
occasional, if unintended, cooperation served the purposes of their antago-
nism. In the complex web of ideological and strategic factors, migration
was used by both countries for the advancement of their own concepts of
national interest and in order to induce policy change in their counterpart
(Dominguez, 1992: 86).
At different times, migration represented a power asset for both the US
and Cuba. The leverage that they could exert against the other country by
employing this tool evolved over time, and migration policies were adapted
accordingly. The US benefited from migration as a bargaining chip at
political and economic levels when it could accept significant number of
migrants fleeing Cuba. From the viewpoint of negotiating leverage, open-
ness was more profitable than closure at borders. The US found itself more
vulnerable vis-à-vis Cuba when it sought to appeal to an increasingly hos-
tile public opinion and to restrict entry. Cuba succeeded in threatening the
US, advancing its demands and, hence, modifying US migration policies. It
could do so by exploiting the prevailing perceptions of migration as a soci-
etal threat. Accordingly, Greenhill concludes that ‘if a target country can
keep a migration surge from either being perceived as or actually becoming
a crisis [ ... ] it can significantly degrade the perpetrator’s weapons [i.e. migra-
tion] capabilities’ (Greenhill, 2002: 64).
3.2.2 Relations between the US and Mexico

Mexico is by far the leading country of origin for US migrants, accounting
for a third (32 per cent) of all foreign-born residents and two-thirds (66
per cent) of Hispanic migrants (Passel and Cohn, 2009). While the flow
of migrants from Mexico to the United States has declined sharply since
the mid-2000s, the US remains the destination for nearly all people who
leave Mexico, and about one in ten people born there currently lives in the
US (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Likewise, as regards unauthorised migration
through the US southern border, according to the Pew Hispanic Center,
Mexico is the leading country of origin, claiming 59 per cent of the total
in 2008, leaving undocumented migrants from Asia or Central America
trailing at 11 per cent, and South Americans at 7 per cent (McCabe and
Meissner, 2010). By some reckonings, the US–Mexico border is the most
frequently crossed international border in the world, with some 350 million
people crossing legally every year (Embassy of the United States in Mexico,
no date).
Bilateral discussions on migration between Mexico and the United States
are not new. In fact, the two countries have been cooperating on border
control issues since the late nineteenth century. As Rosenblum points out,
with Mexico experiencing regional labour shortages after its Revolution and
favouring a labour-intensive development strategy, the Mexican state dis-
couraged emigration and actively encouraged return migration (Rosenblum,
2007). Economic considerations were reinforced by ideological and secu-
rity concerns, following three US invasions of Mexico since the 1840s.
Consequently, Mexico resented unilateral US recruitment of ‘guest-workers’
during the First World War (Rosenblum, 2007). Subsequently, President
Roosevelt’s administration was keen to negotiate a bilateral agreement
ensuring Mexican workers access to the US and making Mexico an ally in
the war effort (Gamboa, 1990). The resulting ‘Bracero’ agreement in 1942
was intended to relieve wartime labour shortages and to legalise and control
the flow of Mexican agricultural workers into the US (Espenshade, 1995:
198; Gamboa, 1990).7
Importantly since the nineteenth century, unauthorised entries from
Mexico to the United States were a growing preoccupation for American
authorities. These concerns were reflected in the laws passed in 1888 and
1891 allowing deportation of migrants who had entered the country ille-
gally (Espenshade, 1995: 210–11). Through the 1920s and the 1930s, border
apprehensions have increased significantly (Espenshade, 1995: 197).8 In the
1920s, 128,000 migrants were recorded as crossing the border. The number
reached 147,000 in the 1930s, and rose to nearly 1.4 million during the
1940s and one million by the early 1950s (Espenshade, 1995: 197–8).9
The Bracero programme, however, was motivated by foreign policy con-
siderations. According to Rosenblum, US military vulnerability in 1942
and 1951 enhanced Mexican bargaining power, partly because US authori-
ties saw a migration deal as a key element of a stable regional relationship
(Rosenblum, 2007). In support of the Alliance for Progress Programme in
Latin America,10 the Kennedy administration maintained the Bracero agree-
ment, despite domestic objections, between 1961 and 1964 (Plewa, 2009;
Rosenblum, 2007). The same argument is elaborated by Cornelius and
Rosenblum, who contend that, alongside economic interests, diplomatic con-
siderations inspired US concessions to Mexico during the early years of the
Bracero programme, the fundamental aim being to strengthen bilateral rela-
tions (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110). As Teitelbaum posits, the Bracero
programme is an example of how migration was stimulated, restrained or
regulated through foreign policy instruments (Teitelbaum, 1984: 435). At the
same time, migration was the means through which the two countries could
repair their strained relations (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110).
Despite the growing irregular migration across the border, neither the
US nor Mexico pursued bilateral cooperation on migration consistently
(Rosenblum, 2007). With migration being a source of conflict, both coun-
tries opted for unilateral policy choices (Rosenblum, 2007). For exam-
ple, in 1954 the US Border Patrol launched ‘Operation Wetback’, whereby
more than one million undocumented Mexican migrants were deported
to Mexico (Espenshade, 1995: 198). Similarly, in 1986 the US Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in order to curb the flow of
undocumented migrants into the country. The Act restricted the hiring
of undocumented workers, strengthened enforcement at the US southern
borders and, at the same time, decreased the numbers of undocumented
aliens residing in the United States by granting an amnesty to roughly 2.8
million formerly undocumented residents (Espenshade, 1995: 211). More
recently, in November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security estab-
lished the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) ‘to help secure America’s borders’
(US Department of Homeland Security, 2005). One of its goals was ‘to have
operational control of both the northern and southern borders within five
years’. In relation to this initiative, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 requested
the Department of Homeland Security to construct ‘the infrastructure nec-
essary to deter and prevent illegal entry on our Southwest Border, including
pedestrian and vehicle fencing, roads, and technology’ (US Department of
Homeland Security, 2009b). As of December 2009, half of the fence along
the 700-mile US–Mexican border had been completed (US Department of
Homeland Security, 2009a). As a further illustration of the ad hoc approach
to migration, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotia-
tions did not address labour flow issues (Rosenblum, 2007).
Under the respective Mexican and US presidencies of Carlos Salinas and
George Bush in the late 1980s, however, efforts were made to revive bilat-
eral cooperation on migration (Rosenblum, 2007). The 1980s and 1990s
witnessed a ‘massive border enforcement building-up’ (Cornelius, 2001:
678),11 based on more intense cooperation between the US and Mexico. In
1993, the Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM) was established to deal with a
variety of issues concerning border control operations (US Department of
State, 2007a). In 1996, the two countries established a Binational Study on
Migration to produce a collective and state-of-the-art assessment of many
aspects of Mexico-to-US migration (Binational Study on Migration, 1997),
and have since consulted regularly on border safety and consular issues
(Storr, 2005). Similarly, in February 2001, cabinet-level talks on migration
were launched to discuss joint action to ensure safe and legal migration
flows between the countries (Storr, 2005). Teams of experts were designated
by the two governments to discuss a comprehensive agenda on migration
(Mohar, 2004).
Mexico and the US now treat migration as one of their top priorities (Cook
et al., 2008). A Joint Communiqué of June 2001 defined migration as ‘one
of the major ties that binds Mexico and the United States’ (US Department
of State, 2001a). A few months afterwards, in September 2001, during the
opening day of his official visit to Washington, President Fox called upon
the two governments to reach an agreement on migration by the end of the
year (White House, 2001). Thereupon, in March 2002, the Mexico–United
States Border Partnership Action Plan was signed to create a ‘smart border’
to regulate and control flow of people and goods (White House, 2002).
On the same occasion, the two presidents announced the ‘Partnership for
Prosperity’ Action Plan, which entails public–private initiatives to promote
domestic and foreign investment in less developed areas of Mexico with
high migration rates (US Department of State, 2002b).
Unsurprisingly, on 13 and 14 March 2007, President Bush met with the
Mexican President Felipe Calderón in Merida, Yucat, and both agreed that
migration ‘vitally links both countries, involves shared responsibilities,
and represents one of the most critical issues for the future well-being’ of
Americans and Mexicans (White House, 2007). As part of a wider strategy
to address migration, the two presidents discussed ‘productive investment
aimed at creating more and better paid jobs in Mexico’ (White House,
2007).
A similar policy line has been pursued by President Barack Obama. His
administration has favoured legislation that follows the logic of previous
laws: that is, bringing unauthorised migrants into the legal system by rec-
ognising that they violated the law, and imposing fines and other penal-
ties to fit the offence (Hansen, 2009). In this context, Obama has sought
to strengthen the collaboration with Mexico. During a meeting on August
2009 in Guadalajara with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, Obama
spoke of the need for ‘a pathway to citizenship’ for millions of irregular
migrants in the United States, and declared that the system had to be
reworked to avoid tensions with Mexico. Without it, he said, ‘Mexicans will
keep crossing the border in dangerous ways and employers will continue
exploiting workers’ (Washington Post, 2009). Importantly, the success of the
negotiations on migration depends on concurrent discussion of other issues,
such as counter-narcotics, and trade (Sullivan and Beittel, 2009). For exam-
ple, during a visit by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to Mexico
on March 2009, Mexican officials complained about mixed signals from the
United States, noting that even as the US administration had stepped up
law enforcement assistance at the border, Congress cut back funds for the
three-year counter-trafficking campaign known as Merida Initiative (The
New York Times, 2009).
It is clear that in recent years Mexico and the US have been more will-
ing to pursue cooperative efforts to control migration as part of the larger
bilateral agenda. Arguably, both countries stand to benefit from legalising
existing labour flows, enhancing labour protections, and allowing a greater

Mexican role in migration oversight (Rosenblum, 2007).
It is accepted that migrants make a critical contribution to continued US
economic growth. As US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez declared,
‘without people to fill the jobs’ the American ‘economy will not continue
to grow’ (Migration News, 2007b). In the same vein, the Homeland Security
Secretary, Janet Napolitano, has repeatedly emphasised the positive direct
correlation between regular migration and the economic growth. In her
own words: ‘requiring illegal immigrants to register to earn legal status, will
strengthen our economy as these immigrants become full-paying taxpayers.
As labour leaders have made clear to me, immigration reform will be a boon
to American workers’ (Napolitano, 2009). Yet public attitudes are character-
ised by conflicting perceptions and attitudes about migrants. According to
the Pew Research Center, while favouring a change that would make it pos-
sible for many undocumented migrants to remain in the US, the public has
simultaneously favoured stronger efforts to enforce existing migration laws
(Keeter, 2009). Numerous polls over the past several years have found that
the public generally respects migrants for their strong work ethic, but also,
at the same time, that many believe that undocumented migrants weaken
the economy by using public services while failing to pay their fair share of
taxes (Keeter, 2009).
For Mexico, migration yields economic and political benefits. It not only
represents a ‘safety valve’, dissipating the political discontent that could arise
from higher unemployment, but is also a source of remittances (Cook et al.,
2008: 10). President Fox called migrants ‘heroes’ for their remittances of over
$1 billion a month to Mexico, and declared that migrants were indispensa-
ble to creating a modern and prosperous Mexico (Martin, 2005: 454). In
2007 alone, remittances were estimated at US$24 billion (Cook et al., 2008).
Arguably, migration abroad has helped ease the country’s adjustment to the
rapid growth in its working-age population, and to macroeconomic shocks
(Hanson, 2006: 870). Economic studies also suggest that during 1970–2000
Mexican migration to the US helped raise average Mexican wages by 8 per
cent (Martin, 2005: 449).12
We can thus infer that migration relations between Mexico and the US
have been ‘highly sensitive to changes in the broader bilateral, regional and
global context’ (Rosenblum, 2007). Domestic and foreign policies are highly
interrelated and, more significantly, migration plays a pivotal role in forging
this linkage.
Similar dynamics can be detected in other bilateral relations in the Western
hemisphere, where, by either supporting or opposing Latin American govern-
ments, the US has either contained or stimulated migrant flows. For example,
in Guatemala and El Salvador, the US unintentionally encouraged migra-
tion by sponsoring oppressive regimes (Mitchell, 1997: 50). Concerning El
Salvador, the following quote of the 1982 memo from the Central American
Refugee Centre in Washington is insightful:
The United States is the only nation in the world which does not recog-
nise Salvadorans as legal refugees and thus will not grant them political
asylum. There are two major reasons for this. One is that granting politi-
cal asylum to Salvadorans communicates world-wide that the govern-
ment of El Salvador violates the human rights of its citizens. Since the US
aids and supports the government of El Salvador, it does not want to com-
municate this message. Also, granting asylum to the estimated 500,000
undocumented Salvadorans in this country would open up a large sector
of voiced opposition to U.S. policy manoeuvres in El Salvador. This group
of dissent can be kept silent through forcing them to live underground
in fear of deportation to the threat of persecution and death in their own
country. (Teitelbaum, 1984: 439)
By contrast, in Nicaragua the key objective of the US policy was to over-

throw the revolutionary Sandinista government. This policy not only
stimulated out-migration from Nicaragua, but also depended on such pop-
ulation movements for one of its most effective strategy was ‘the use of émi-
gré armies (the contras) based in Honduras but led from Miami’ (Mitchell,
1997).
To some extent, US border control policies were designed to influence the
behaviour of the country to which they were to be applied. In the words
of Cornelius and Rosenblum, the US rewarded allies by refusing to admit
people fleeing these states’ right-wing authoritarian regimes, and punished
communist states during the Cold War by enforcing generous refugee provi-
sions for those applicants (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 110).13
In sum, two preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, the US–Cuban
and US–Mexican contexts show that migration, foreign policy and the
domestic agenda are profoundly interconnected. Migration has been linked
strategically to other issues on the bilateral agenda, such as East–West con-
frontation and domestic economic factors. Second, both migrant-sending
and migrant-receiving countries have, at different times, utilised migration
in an instrumental manner to influence the behaviour of their counter-
parts. The flight of Cubans to the US provided Cuba with a bargaining
device to affect US foreign policy and its border measures. Yet the opposite
was also true. In relations between the US and other Latin American coun-
tries, migration was strategically influenced by the US to induce policy
change in the target country. These examples generate some questions that
I will apply to the Italian–Libyan case in Parts III and IV. How does migra-
tion relate to the domestic and foreign policy agenda? Have both Italy and
Libya succeeded in employing migration in order to influence the behav-
iour of their counterpart? For now, I turn to the issue of Moroccan–Spanish
interaction.
3.3 Cooperation on migration between Morocco and Spain
Having examined the agreements on migration between the US and selected

countries in the Western hemisphere, I now move on to the examination of
the bilateral discussion on migration between Morocco and Spain and, to a
lesser extent, the EU.14
The bulk of unauthorised migrants entering Spain through its Southern
frontiers are either Moroccans, or sub-Saharan Africans transiting through
Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara (de Haas, 2008). Over the
last few decades, Spain has moved from being a country of emigration to one
of immigration. Official figures report that Spain hosted 350,000 foreigners
in 1991, 1.5 million in 2001, 4.5 million in 2007 and 5.5 million in 2009
(Migration News, 2010b; Rosero-Bixby et al., 2008: 1). In 2009, Moroccans
formed the largest group, with 758,174 citizens resident in Spain, followed
by Romanians (728,580), Ecuadorians (441,455), Colombians (288,255) and
British (221,073) (Tedesco, 2010). Spain is now considered one of Europe’s
principal immigration countries (IOM, 2005). In 2003, it received more than
a third of all migrants to the (then) 25 EU member states (Carling, 2007b).
In particular, the North African Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have
become the main transit points into Europe for thousands of undocumented
migrants from Africa (Crain, 1999). Concomitantly, over the second half of
the twentieth century, Morocco evolved into one of the world’s leading emi-
gration countries. With over two million people of Moroccan descent now
living in Europe, Moroccans form one of the largest and most dispersed
migrant communities in Western Europe (de Haas, 2005: 3).
In an effort to reduce unwanted migrant flows from Morocco, Spain and
the EU have sought to strengthen cooperation with the Northern African
country and, at the same time, to tighten southern border controls. In May
1991, visa requirements for Morocco were established (Bodega et al., 1995:
815), and in July of the same year a Treaty of Friendship provided a process
for negotiations between the two countries (Huntoon, 1998: 440). Although
migration was not mentioned, the two countries committed themselves to
collaborating on economic and financial issues, as well as defence, develop-
ment and culture (Spain and Morocco, 1991). In February 1992, Spain and
Morocco signed a bilateral agreement on the readmission to Morocco of
undocumented migrants who had entered Spain through Morocco (Serra
et al., 2005).
During the first five years of José María Aznar’s premiership (1996–2001),
bilateral negotiations ground to a halt. As Gillespie observed, while under
previous Socialist Party (PSOE) administrations foreign ministers had
visited Morocco once or twice a year, Aznar’s first foreign minister, Abel
Matutes, made just one stop-over visit during four years (Gillespie, 2004:
3). Spanish officials took the view that Rabat could regulate the flow of
migrants at will, a suspicion reinforced in August 2001 when around 800
migrants were arrested on the coast of Andalucía in the space of 72 hours

(Gillespie, 2004: 3).
Following the People’s Party (PP)’s re-election in March 2000, overall
Spanish–Moroccan relations continued to deteriorate. Notably, in July 2002
Spain and Morocco almost came to blows over a small island near Ceuta, at
the eastern approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar (Gillespie, 2004). The islet,
known to Spaniards as ‘Perejil’, was occupied successively by Moroccan gen-
darmes and Spanish Legionnaires, before the US State Department involve-
ment helped to broker a return to the status quo ante (Gillespie, 2004).
However, towards the end of Aznar’s government efforts were made to
restore bilateral relations, at least formally (Gillespie, 2005). This approach
towards deepening bilateral collaboration on migration was promoted fur-
ther by the succeeding centre-left government led by José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero (Tedesco, 2010; Wiegand, 2009).
In December 2003, Morocco pledged full cooperation in a memorandum
of understanding, whereby it committed itself to act against undocumented
migration and to cooperate with Spanish sea patrols in return for $390 mil-
lion worth of aid (Briscoe, 2004). The agreed joint actions included meas-
ures that have been labelled as externalisation of border controls, such as
the readmission of undocumented migrants, similar to those implemented
by Italy and Libya (Statewatch, 2004). Morocco claims to have conformed
to a number of such actions (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Schuster, 2005). From
January 2004, it began to accept the return of both Moroccan and non-
Moroccan nationals from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as those
intercepted in boats (Schuster, 2005: 13). In 2005 alone, 16,369 Moroccan
migrants were repatriated (Coslovi, 2007). This number is significantly
higher than the repatriations from Italy to Libya. From February 2004,
Morocco and Spain began naval patrolling (Schuster, 2005: 13), and joint
police training courses were intensified. The courses are held on a monthly
basis and focus on the control of sea borders and intelligence-sharing (EC,
2005e). Furthermore, Morocco has adapted its legislative framework in line
with the EU acquis. For example, on 11 November 2003 Morocco passed a
law regulating the entry and residence of foreigners (de Haas, 2005b). The
law includes heavy sanctions against undocumented migration and human
smuggling but largely ignores migrants’ rights (de Haas, 2005b).
Partly as a result of this cooperation, over the last few years a reduction
in the number of unauthorised arrivals has been observed. The number of
migrants crossing the Strait of Gibraltar decreased from 6,287 in 2003 to
5,395 in 2004 and 4,329 in 2006 (Coslovi, 2007). Likewise, according to
UNHCR, the total number of undocumented arrivals in Spain has decreased
from 31,859 in 2006 to 8,300 in 2008 (UNHCR, 2009a). While in 2005 most
of the migrants reaching the Canary Islands were Moroccan, in 2006 out of
26,498 only 383 were of Moroccan nationality (Coslovi, 2007). Moreover,
whereas in the first seven months of 2007 5,594 Moroccans landed on
Spanish shores, in the same period in 2008 the number of apprehensions

dropped to 4,557 (Fortress Europe, 2008). On these grounds, some com-
mentators suggest that the putative externalising measures of Spain towards
Morocco have succeeded (Coslovi, 2007).
Nevertheless, the bilateral collaboration remains beset by tensions.
More often than not, Morocco has been reluctant to cooperate. For exam-
ple, Morocco has refused to collaborate on readmissions and it has often
declared that migrants transited through Algeria, not Morocco, before arriv-
ing in Spain (Cassarino, 2008: 7). The same conflicts exist in the relations
between the EU and Morocco. In 2005 the EC noted that it had not yet been
able to reach a readmission agreement with Morocco (EC, 2005g; Gil-Bazo,
2006). As the EC Communication specifies:
Despite several rounds of negotiations, the EC has not yet been able to
agree the text of a readmission agreement with Morocco. Most of the
outstanding issues are minor but some, such as the readmission of non-
nationals and the forms of evidence to be provided, remain problematic.
(EC, 2005g: 5–6)
By the same token, the EU Action Plan for Morocco met initially with
strong resistance from the Moroccan government, which argued that the
Action Plan represented the unilateral security agenda of the EU (Ellerman,
2008: 186). Indeed, the Action Plan, drafted in October 1999, on meas-
ures to address the root causes of migration was delayed due to the lack of
dialogue with Morocco (Gil-Bazo, 2006: 586). Moroccan authorities have
emphasised that their involvement in the fight against irregular migration
is contingent on the EU undertaking to support Morocco’s development
efforts (Cassarino, 2005). Migration has also been strategically linked
to the enduring territorial disputes over the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla (Wiegand, 2009). As a result, EU officials have softened their
approach and adopted a series of measures to suit Morocco’s interests more
closely (Ellerman 2008: 186).
The implicit assertion by many academics and policy-makers is that
Morocco needs to be persuaded to collaborate by means of targeted incen-
tives and compensatory measures (Arango and Martin, 2003). Morocco’s
partial compliance with the Spanish and European agenda is attributable
to the complex give-and-take framework. The aggregation of the diverg-
ing issues on the negotiating table, such as migration, the fisheries agree-
ment, the tariffs and quotas envisioned in the EU association agreement,
oil resources and the dispute over Western Sahara (Gillespie, 2004), have
increased the stakes and widened the scope for side-payments. The conduct
of the two countries stems from their preference orderings, which, in turn,
define their cooperative or non-cooperative approaches. In this context,
attention needs to be paid to the interests of the two sides.
When it comes to migration policies, Morocco is concerned most of all

with migrant remittances. Already in the 1960s the transactions between
migrants and their related households in the home country (Alfieri et al.,
2005) represented an important source of income for Morocco (Collyer,
2004: 17–18). Between 1995 and 1999, Morocco was the sixth-largest remit-
tance-receiving country in the world, and by 2001 it occupied fourth place
(de Haas, 2005a: 18). By some reckonings, the relatively stable remittance
flow is five times higher than official development aid, and also exceeds
foreign direct investments, revenues from tourism, and the exports of agri-
cultural produce and phosphates (de Haas, 2005a: 1). As de Haas observes,
remittances are a ‘tool for national economic development’ (de Haas, 2005a:
16) and a primary concern in Morocco’s foreign policy agenda.
Conversely, Spain has been concerned with labour migration policies
(Plewa, 2009). It has sought to reassure an increasingly fearful domestic
public about the effectiveness of its ‘closing border approach’ and, at the
same time, to address the demand by Spanish businesses for cheap and
unskilled labour. On the one hand, it has been observed that in Spain,
unlike Italy, discourses of prejudice and closure towards migrants are virtu-
ally non-existent (Triandafyllidou, 2000: 385). No right-wing, anti-immi-
grant party has taken root in the country to channel citizens’ increasing
anxiety about migration (Encarnacion, 2004: 169). Spanish political insti-
tutions have not adopted the harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies
found in other European countries, such as Italy (Encarnacion, 2004: 169).
On the other hand, it has been amply documented that in Spain migration
has become ‘one of the three most important subjects in the national polit-
ical agenda, together with unemployment and terrorism’ (Agrera, 2002: 5).
Spanish politicians and media have increasingly emphasised the securitar-
ian dimension of migration (Barrero, 2006). Accordingly, the ‘fight against
illegal immigration’ has become a major concern for Spanish authorities
(Carling, 2007a).
The vexing reality for Spain is that its securitised approach to migration
has actually strengthened Morocco’s leverage. Arguably, Morocco benefits
from migrant flows not only because of remittances, but also because it
makes Spain more vulnerable. Morocco has lamented its inability to control
borders because of its lack of resources, yet has also shown that it can reduce,
when it wants to, the number of ‘pateras’ – small boats carrying migrants –
to Spain (Gillespie, 2004: 3). This point is taken further by Qadim, who sug-
gests that the controversial process of externalising migration controls from
Spain into Morocco has reconfigured overall relations with Spain and the
EU (El Qadim, 2006: 89). In her words:
Morocco [ ... ] has largely benefited from being a transit country with the
negotiations with the EU. Indeed, by positioning itself as potential part-
ner in the action against irregular migration, Rabat has been and still is
capable of advancing economic and political requests. [ ... ] Because of

its status as emigration country and being a partner in the fight against
unauthorised migration, Morocco has been able to reposition itself in the
negotiations with the EU. (El Qadim, 2006: 83)
This view is echoed by Afeef, who maintains that Morocco enjoys signifi-
cant bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU. Since the Maghreb region is a ‘vital
transit zone for migrants from sub-Saharan African heading towards Europe,
it is essential for the EU to obtain these countries’ cooperation on migration
issues if it wishes to reduce arrivals in Europe’ (Afeef, 2006: 26). In her view,
‘it is clear’ that Morocco exerts ‘some degree of bargaining power in extra-
territorial asylum arrangements’ and that the relations between Morocco
with the EU are interdependent rather than dependent (Afeef, 2006: 26).
Once again, it is important to remind ourselves that the argument that
migration involves complex bargaining between states is hardly new. Indeed,
this conclusion was reached by Choucri in 1977 with reference to migration
across the Arab world:
The new migration in the Middle East is creating bargaining power for
all states involved. How that power is used will have not only national
implications, but regional implications as well. The extent to which
Egypt shapes and maintains bargaining power – either by arguing that
the other Arab countries will gain by contributing to the development of
Egypt’s manpower resources, or by proposing to withhold its labor from
other Arab states if common, mutual, and shared regional gains are not
envisaged – will, in turn, determine the broad lines of foreign policy
and economic policies for the remaining years of the decade. (Choucri,
1977: 443)
Hispano–Moroccan relations are certainly consistent with Choucri’s account.

As a result of the alleged externalising policies sponsored by Spain and the
EU, migration has furnished Morocco with increased leverage over Spain.
These reflections generate important questions relating to my selected case
study. Do the Italian–Libyan agreements involve a de-territorial dimension?
To what extent does the securitised discourse on migration pervade the
Italian and Libya domestic agenda? How does it influence, if at all, their
bilateral negotiating patterns?
3.4 Cooperation on migration between Turkey and the EU
I now assess the dialogue on migration between Turkey and EU, and how
the accession negotiations, especially on migration, have influenced their
interaction. The discussions between the EU and Turkey differ mark-
edly from the inter-state ones examined thus far. The comparison of the
negotiations between the EU and an accession country, on the one hand,

and those between two states, on the other hand, demands caution. The EU
is characterised by highly complex decision-making structures and nego-
tiating procedures, which display obvious differences from those of a state
(Hix, 1999: 2). Moreover, from an analytical perspective, the EU falls within
the analytical category of an international organisation as opposed to state
actor. Hence a rigorous investigation would entail a separate methodologi-
cal approach. Despite these shortcomings, the following comparative exer-
cise remains worthwhile. Through this brief examination of the Turkish
position on the EU’s presumed efforts to de-locate border controls, we may
gain further perspective on the process of externalisation and North–South
dynamics.
Turkey is a country of immigration, emigration and transit migration
(Icduygu, 2003). Throughout history, it has attracted a large number of
migrants from the Middle East, with the key entry points being the Iranian
and Iraqi borders (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006: 3). Between 1923 and 1997, more
than 1.6 million people are reported to have migrated to Turkey (Kirişçi,
2003). For instance, during the Cold War thousand of asylum-seekers fled
there from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The majority of them were
recognised as refugees, and resettled to third countries, including Canada
and the US, by UNHCR (Kirişçi, 2003). In terms of emigration, starting in
the 1960s large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to Western European
countries, particularly West Germany (Jurgens, 2001). This outflow contin-
ues to the present day, through family reunification schemes, the asylum
system and undocumented channels (Kirişçi, 2003). Additionally, since the
mid-1990s the number of irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Iraq, Iran and Pakistan using Turkey as a transit route has grown (Apap
et al., 2004: 19; Icduygu, 2005).
Turkey has been under EU pressure to control irregular migration, and
has been very assiduous in harmonising its legislation with the European
acquis (Icduygu, 2005: 14). For example, in 2002, as part of the wider acces-
sion discussions, Turkey started to tackle the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA) issues. In June 2002, the Turkish government formed the Task Force
on Asylum, Migration and Border Protection, composed of governmental
representatives (Apap et al., 2004: 13). Working groups were set up in order
to produce legislative proposals on border protection, irregular migration,
the Schengen visa regime and asylum (Apap et al., 2004: 13). A few months
afterwards, in August 2002, a new law including a definition of human
trafficking and prescribing penalties for smuggling organisations was intro-
duced (Icduygu, 2005: 14). Likewise, in January 2005 the Turkish Ministry
of the Interior issued a circular to ensure better coordination between the
police, the gendarmerie and the coast guard (EC, 2005f: 112). The same year,
a law was adopted to allow the recruitment of 10,000 new policemen (EC,
2005f: 112). The new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force
the same year, contains new powers on the conduct of criminal investiga-
tions, covering issues such as search, interception of communication, covert
surveillance and physical examination (EC, 2005f: 112).
The positive results in terms of unauthorised migrant flows were quick
to emerge. In 2003, the EU Progress Report acknowledged that the trend
of irregular migration via Turkey had decreased (Apap et al., 2004: 19).
According to the 2005 EU Progress Report, in 2004 54,810 undocumented
migrants were apprehended in Turkey, compared to 48,055 in 2003 (EC,
2005f: 111). In addition, while in 2003 5,720 foreigners were refused admis-
sion at the borders, in 2004 the number rose to 8,000 (EC, 2005f: 111).
Presumably, Turkey’s revision of its migration policies and border control
measures stems from its eagerness to align itself with the EU Schengen sys-
tem, with a view to fulfilling the accession criteria (Icdygu, 2005; Kirişçi,
2003).15
However, Turkey has not been complying fully with European requests.
The most recent EU progress report laments the fact that ‘Turkey has not
pursued the negotiations on a readmission agreement with the European
Community since December 2006.’ It therefore concludes that ‘limited
progress can be reported on management of irregular migrants in Turkey’ (EC,
2008e: 71). Baldwin-Edwards reports that the Greek authorities have often
resented the persisting difficulties in returning migrants to Turkey (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2006). Between April 2002 and November 2006, Greece submitted
23,689 cases of migrants to be readmitted. Of them, Turkey accepted 2,841.
Ultimately, however, only 1,463 were readmitted (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006:
5). As the Greek authorities bluntly put it, Turkey ‘is not responding substan-
tively to commitments it has assumed with the Greek-Turkish readmission
Protocol of 2001. There is unwillingness for effective cooperation’ (Embassy
of Greece, 2007). In the same vein, in October 2009, Greek Prime Minister
George Papandreou lamented that Turkey was continuing to refuse to hon-
our the migrant readmittance protocol (EU Business, 2009). Reportedly,
Athens has also accused Ankara of harassing aircraft belonging to the EU
border agency Frontex (EU Business, 2009). More recently, in February 2010,
the Greek Citizens’ Protection Minister, Michalis Chrysohoidis, sent an
open invitation to Turkish Minister of Interior Besir Alatay to discuss irreg-
ular migration and organised crime. Noting the explosive potential that
the two issues have gained over the past decade, Chrysohoidis called for
closer bilateral cooperation to tackle the common challenge (Athens News
Agency, 2010). Turkey has also been hesitant as regards the stipulations of
the readmission agreements with the EU. According to some observers, in
March 2004 Turkey reluctantly agreed to start negotiations with the EU on
this agreement, but bewailed the level of pressure they had been under to
start such negotiations (Apap et al., 2004: 22).
On the one hand, Turkish lack of progress in adopting the EU acquis can
be attributed less to a lack of goodwill on the part of the Turkish authorities
than to the practical difficulties that the Turkish authorities face (Mannaert,
2003: 12). In this vein, Kirişçi suggests that ‘Turkey is not ready to carry
out these tasks bureaucratically, organisationally and socio-economically’
(Kirişçi, 2001). On the other hand, Turkey expects a tangible assurance that
the EU is committed to alleviating some of the burden of taking in non-
European refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as to granting EU membership
before Turkey commits itself to all of the EU acquis (Mannaert, 2003: 13). As
Pastore notes, Turkey is technically able to control unauthorised flows across
its territory (Pastore, 2006). The real problem, however, is represented by the
costs entailed by the new role of Turkey as a filter for transit flows towards
current EU territory (Pastore, 2006: 6). Turkey fears becoming a ‘dumping
ground’ for irregular migrants and asylum-seekers who are unwanted in
the rest of Europe. Hence the success of the negotiation depends partly
on the payoffs offered by the EU to secure Turkey’s good will and compli-
ance. These factors could become a major obstacle to the future relations
between Turkey and the EU (Pastore, 2006: 6). Another problematic aspect
relates to the prospects of adopting the EU acquis. If and when membership
occurs, Turkey would become a typical ‘first country of asylum’, responsible
for status determination (Apap et al., 2004: 25). This raises concerns among
Turkish officials, who regard existing burden-sharing mechanisms as insuf-
ficient and not profitable (Alap et al., 2004: 25; Icduygu, 2005).
For a full appreciation of the broader negotiating dynamics, we ought
to consider how migration relates to other issues on the agenda. Despite
Turkish reservations concerning the implementation of the Schengen sys-
tem, the overall bargaining dynamics appear to be more complex than those
observed in the previous cases. A full assessment of the deeper political issues
at stake goes well beyond the scope of this book. Because of the multidimen-
sional and ongoing nature of the EU–Turkish negotiations, it is not possible
to draw final and clear-cut conclusions. This is also due to the slow pace of
the entry negotiations. As of December 2009, negotiations had opened on
the twelfth of 35 chapters. Yet only the chapter on science and research
policy had been completed (Migration News, 2010b). It seems reasonable,
however, to assert that migration and asylum are becoming increasingly
important in the overall diplomatic exchanges. Therefore, it can be argued
that the European security narrative may make Europe, and Greece in par-
ticular, inclined to negotiate, which, in turn, affects the overall pattern of
compliance to the advantage of Turkey. To an extent, then, perceptions of
migration in relation to security as formulated in the European public arena
create a situation of vulnerability for the EU, and allow Turkey to influence
both the European agenda and the accession negotiations. However, the
opposite is also true.
The multiple equilibria characterising the accession discussions may,
nevertheless, undermine the potential benefits that Turkey could derive
from the migration bargaining-chip. This case, albeit peculiar, serves as a
reminder that migration per se does not alter fundamentally the cooperative
arrangements of given negotiating players. We should dismiss, therefore,
excessively simplistic readings whereby migration is considered a decisive
factor that grants new leverage to migrant-sending countries. Nonetheless, it
seems fair to assert that migration does influence the bargaining dynamics,
and that its effectiveness rests on the concomitant conditions of the overall
negotiating structure. In this optic, in the Italian–Libyan agreements on
migration specific attention will be devoted to the linkage between migra-
tion policies and the other issues on the negotiating table.
3.5 Conclusion
In casting the empirical net widely, this chapter looked at a range of differ-
ent inter-state bilateral agreements on migration. The comparative exercise
has obvious relevance to contextualising the findings of the Italian–Libyan
agreements and appreciating the extent to which we can infer broad propo-
sitions beyond the specificities of my selected case.
The empirical excursus demonstrated the numerous ways in which migra-
tion intertwines with international politics (Mitchell, 1989). It has emerged
that receiving states are actively engaged in carrot-and-stick attempts
to influence migration flows by appealing to sending countries’ inter-
ests (Hamilton, 1997: 563). Likewise, sending states have used the migra-
tion issue as a bargaining-chip to achieve other goals (Hamilton, 1997).
Relations between the US and Latin American countries, and between Spain
and Morocco, illustrate that migrant movements have been used symboli-
cally and instrumentally to pursue foreign policy and domestic objectives
(Loescher and Monahan, 1990).
Each of the above cases sheds light on aspects that will be elaborated
throughout the investigation of the Italian–Libyan collaboration. In the
case of Cuban–US relations, both the receiving and sending state have been
able to exert pressure on their counterpart. Mexican–US interaction, mean-
while, demonstrates how migration creates a situation of mutual economic
and political dependence. Equally important are the characteristics of
Moroccan–Spanish and Turkish–EU interaction. In these cases, the migrant-
sending country has been reluctant to collaborate with either the receiving
state or the EU in the absence of significant rewards. In the latter case, how-
ever, the linkage between disparate issues on the negotiating table generates
both costs and benefits. This provides us with clues as to how address our
initial questions.
Migration policies are part of a process wherein actors strive to advance
their interests (Bartram, 2005: 12). In the process, not only migrant-receiving
but also migrant-sending states are able to exert significant, yet not abso-
lute or unilateral control over migration (Miller, 1978). In this chapter we
have seen that institutional configurations evolve as policy-makers become
susceptible to new ideas. Shifts in policy options and objectives may thus
lead to unexpected outcomes whereby actors considered to be marginal to
the political system may succeed in partially altering pre-existing configu-
rations (Clemens, 1999 in Plewa, 2009: 74).
Importantly, migration does not provide a bargaining-chip solely to coun-
tries located in the ‘South’, as I hypothesised at the outset of this book. Yet,
under certain circumstances, it has historically helped the latter to constrain
the action of their counterparts and to determine the negotiation structure
in terms of agenda, rules and procedures. It is also clear that these circum-
stances are not fixed, and are very much history- and country-specific.
The question that emerges now is whether these conclusions are consist-
ent or not with those that I will draw for my selected case study. In particu-
lar, from this cursory comparative analysis it is possible to identify some
points for further discussion in line with my initial quest. How significantly
does migration affect the relations between Italy and Libya? Does it increase
the bargaining power of Libya? If so, what are the conditions that make this
possible? Does Italy succeed in making an instrumental usage of migration
in its foreign policies? Can it do the same with Libya or not? What can be
concluded in terms of overall patterns of state interdependence in relation
to migration? More broadly, is it fair to assert that migration is redefining
North–South power relations fundamentally?
Part II
Migration Discourses and
Practices in Italy and Libya
4
Italy and Migration
4.1 Introduction
In July 2008, following reports of violent anti-Roma protests and indications

that the Italian government intended to bring forward new legislative meas-
ures for stricter migration controls, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner
for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, published an alarming report on
the ‘social stigmatisation and marginalisation’ of migrants in Italy (Council
of Europe, 2008). The Commissioner warned that ‘concern about security
cannot be the only basis for immigration policy’ (Council of Europe, 2008).
Above all, he condemned the measures being taken in Italy, which lacked
‘human rights and humanitarian principles’ and could ‘spur further xenop-
ohobia’ (Council of Europe, 2008). By some reckonings, Italy has adopted
increasingly restrictive policies to address undocumented migration. In this
context, the purpose of this chapter is to search beyond the complex matrix
of Italian migration discourses and practices and reflect on the concurrence
of seclusive and inclusive border policies. Given the vast literature on the
issue, I limit this discussion to an illustration, based mainly on secondary
resources, of two interrelated aspects of the Italian response to migration.
First, I consider the linkage between migration and security in the Italian
discourses – as defined in the introduction – and practices, and, second, the
role of migration in Italy’s foreign policy agenda.
Concerning the first aspect, I suggest that at the level of Italian official
discourse migration has been treated as a major security issue. Images of
a besieged fortress are increasingly pervading the Italian public mind and
nurturing xenophobic sentiments. This has partly contributed to the intro-
duction of restrictive migration policies. However, a thorough examination
of Italian migration policies reveals a more multifaceted picture. Alongside
the coercive measures and surveillance technology employed by Italian
authorities to control frontiers, I make the case for the underlying open-
ness of Italian migration policies. Contrary to the common view that Italian
migration policies are inherently and solely restrictive, it is clear that the
59
number of migrants welcomed either through the annual quotas system or

the recurrent regularisations has increased over the years. Regularisations
are here defined as ‘programmes that give migrants already residing in a
country in an unauthorised way the ability to secure legal status on a per-
manent or temporary basis’ (Papadopoulou, 2005: 2). In broad terms, a dis-
crepancy can thus be observed between the security narrative on migration
at the level of discourse, and the actual policies that have welcomed more
and more foreigners (Geddes, 2008).
As regards the second aspect, I argue that Italian migration policies, such
as the annual quotas, have been used by Italy to extract concessions from
migrant-sending countries. This contention is highly significant for my
research question. The appreciation of the ambivalence between discourses
and practices in Italy’s overall approach to migration forms the basis of the
analysis presented in Parts III amd IV on Italian–Libyan interdependence.
In keeping with these two ideas, this chapter comprises four sections.
First, I survey changing migration trends in Italy over the last two decades.1
In section 4.3, I look at the extent to which migration has been perceived
as a security issue by the Italian citizenry, national media and politicians.
This analysis will be complemented in section 4.4 by a discussion of the
migration policies implemented by successive Italian governments and, in
section 4.5, by an assessment of the linkage between Italian migration poli-
cies and relations with third countries. The period that I consider goes from
the 1970s until January 2010. This empirical and descriptive analysis antici-
pates the discussion of the core chapters of this book concerned with the
nexus between migration and foreign policy.
4.2 Data on migration
Before turning to the study of migration trends in Italy, a cautionary note

on the reliability of the statistics that I employ is required. Unsurprisingly,
different sources have produced diverging figures on, for example, the
migrant population in Italy. As Pastore reminds us, statistics on migration
are fraught with substantive problems concerning, for example, defini-
tion and sampling methods and composition (Pastore, 2007a). They are
also subject to deceptive and instrumental usage by media and politicians
(Pastore, 2007a: 28). Nonetheless, referring to this data is unavoidable
(Pastore, 2007a: 28), and I take the view that, employed with critical aware-
ness, it can still help give a general idea of the changing size of migrant
flows in Italy.
It is well known that migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy.
Up until the late 1970s, a large number of Italians – over 25 million since the
1960s by some estimates – had emigrated to work in Europe or further afield
(Chaloff and Piperno, 2004: 2). However, from the early 1980s emigration
came to an halt, as Italy began to receive foreign labour. Whereas in 1985
Italy and Migration 61
in Italy there were 318,700 migrants, in 1998 there were 1,250,000 (Koff,
2001: 5). In other words, in over a decade the size of the migrant popula-
tion in Italy increased by 292 per cent, by contrast with the 46 per cent
average across Europe (Koff, 2001: 5). Similarly, ISTAT, the Italian National
Institute for Statistics, indicates that between 1992 and 2002 the number
of permits given to foreigners increased on average by 77 per cent every
year (ISTAT, 2004: 9). According to the same source, as of January 2009, the
foreigners legally residing in Italy were 3,891,295, representing over 6.5 per
cent of the total Italian population (ISTAT, 2009). Preliminary statistics also
show that by the end of 2009 the number increased to 4,279,000 (Caritas,
2009; Il Clandestino, 2010). If we take into account the number of irregular
migrants, the total figure of foreigners living in Italy is likely to be much
higher. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, in 2005 there were
541,000 undocumented migrants in Italy, and in 2007 760,000 (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2007h: 325). Recent statistics place the number of irregu-
lar migrants in Italy between 500,000 and 800,000 (European Migration
Network, 2009: 59).
While it is clear that the number of migrants in Italy has grown stead-
ily over the last three decades, it is debatable whether this marks Italy out
among European countries. For example, ISTAT has found that the propor-
tion of foreigners present is low by European standards. According to its
2007 statistics, in 2006 foreign nationals represented 5 per cent of the total
population. Yet in Germany they accounted for 8.8 per cent, in Spain and
the United Kingdom for 6.2 per cent and in France for 5.9 per cent (ISTAT,
2007: 2). Conversely, the calculations made by Caritas, a branch of the
Italian Episcopal Conference, show that in 2006 the total foreign popula-
tion residing legally in Italy amounted to 3,690,000, i.e. 6.2 per cent of the
total population. Thus, Caritas concludes:
Italy, along with Spain, follows Germany as the countries with the largest
immigrant population in the EU and regarding annual increase, these
two Mediterranean countries do not have equals in Europe and even
exceed proportions in the United States (with a population five times
that of Italy, the US registers over one million new immigrant entries per
year). (Caritas, 2007: 4)
Having observed the overall size of the migrant population in Italy, it is

worth considering the origin of migrants living in Italy. Whereas in the
1970s the majority of migrants were from Yugoslavia, and in the 1980s
from Iran, since the 1990s a more diversified pattern of migration has been
recorded (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 323).
Through the 1990s, an increasing number of migrants from countries
outside Eastern Europe docked on Italian shores (Ministero dell’Interno,
2007i). The most prevalent areas of origin were three: the Maghreb and
Sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East, including Turkey, Lebanon and Syria;
and Afghanistan and the Indian sub-continent (Monzini, 2004: 41). Among
these three groups, in the 1990s Africans were the majority, accounting for
35 per cent of the migrant population in Italy in 1991 and 28.7 per cent in
1996 (Pastore, 2007b). However, after peaking in early 2000, African migra-
tion has gradually diminished.2
Indeed, ISTAT found that in 2006 the majority of migrants in Italy were
from Central-Eastern Europe (ISTAT, 2004: 4). Between 2004 and 2007, their
proportion increased by 48.8 per cent (ISTAT, 2007: 4). More precisely, over
these three years Ukrainians increased from 58,000 to 120,000, Romanians
from 178,000 to 342,000, and Poles from 40,000 to 72,000 (ISTAT, 2007: 4).
These findings are corroborated by the 2009 Caritas report, which reported
that the first five largest foreign communities included 800,000 Romanians,
440,000 Albanians, 400,000 Moroccan, 170,000 Chinese and 150,000
Ukrainians (Caritas, 2009: 1). Overall, the increasing presence of migrants
from Eastern Europe invites reflections on the structural changes in the
European migration system resulting from a complex combination of push
and pull factors.3 The study of migratory movements leads to the next
strand of this chapter, concerning the discourses and practices of Italian
migration policies.
4.3 Migration discourse in Italy
The linkage between media and migration has been widely researched in
Italian academic and non-academic literature (Bonifazi, 1992; Campani,
2001). In particular, the analysis of Sciortino and Colombo (2004) offers a
fruitful path of enquiry. While they acknowledge that ‘various descriptions
of the changes in public discourse on immigration are less certain than the
literature on the subject would lead one to believe’ (Sciortino and Colombo,
2004: 106), they identify some common elements in the perception of for-
eigners by the media. From the mid-1980s, migration attracted increasing
attention from Italian newspapers, radio and TV (Sciortino and Colombo,
2004: 101). In the process, migrants started to be ‘associated with the risk of
xenophobic reactions’, deriving both from competition in the labour mar-
ket and from ‘the provincial and old-fashioned nature of Italian culture’
(Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 101).
During the 1990s, news on migrants and criminality increased, while at
the same time news about foreigners’ participation in the Italian labour mar-
ket practically disappeared (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 101). In 2004, the
latter category accounted less than 3 per cent of the news about migrants
published in periodicals, the lowest since 1969. This is remarkable, because
the 1990s was a decade in which foreigners became a structural compo-
nent of labour in many sectors in Italy (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 110).
On the basis of such findings, Sciortino and Colombo conclude that there
is a significant gap between reality and the media portrayal of migration

(Sciortino and Colombo, 2004: 110). This ambivalence will become clearer
in the next section on Italian migration policies.
Similar findings emerge from a study conducted in 2003 by Censis, an
Italian private research centre, on the media representation of migration in
Italy. The survey focused on seven national newspapers, ten local newspa-
pers and nine periodicals and a number of television broadcasts between
May and September 2001. Above all, the study identified a number of ‘com-
municative defects’, including a tendency to over-dramatise news and to
use language that favours an emotional rather than a rational response.
Superficial quality checks of sources, proclivity towards sensationalist mes-
sages and biased and misleading representation of various social actors, were
also observed (Censis, 2003: 4). Although direct racism was not deemed to
be a pervasive feature, one of the main conclusions is that migrants were
associated heavily with criminal episodes, at the expense of the everyday
aspects of integration (Censis, 2003: 4). Other academic research, however,
has gone so far as to qualify the Italian media as racist and to detect political
interests behind it. Campani, for example, writes that:
Whilst the media’s stereotypised images of immigrants are expressions

of racist mentalities, lack of professional ethics or, sometimes, just plain
ignorance, such images are also part of political battles and the fight for
specific power interests. (Campani, 2001: 39)
Likewise, the research produced by the Italian scholars Alessandro Dal Lago
(1999b) and Salvatore Palidda (1996) argues eloquently that the Italian
media have played a decisive role in the deepening of the ‘culture of panic
and emergency’ in relation to migration. Beyond doubt, the media portrayal
of migration in Italy influences, and is influenced, by public opinion, to
which I now turn.
Different surveys conducted over the last ten years confirm that, to vary-
ing degrees, a significant proportion of Italians see migration as a social
threat. According to a survey conducted in 1996 by the business associa-
tion Confcommercio, seven Italians in ten believed that migrants were
making criminality worse (Jamienson and Sily, 1998: 9). Eight out of ten
police officers and magistrates thought that the increase in migration was
linked to the spread of organised crime. It also emerged that 94 per cent of
the respondents felt that migrants had aggravated criminality. At the top
of the list of activities for which they felt this to be true was prostitution
(28 per cent), followed by drug dealing (25.6 per cent), micro-criminality
(18.4 per cent), racketeering (3.2 per cent) and unregistered work (2.4 per
cent) (Jamienson and Sily, 1998: 9). According to the 2002 annual report by
Caritas, 23.9 per cent of Italians considered migrants a threat to their culture
and identity, 29 per cent a threat to work opportunities, and 39.7 per cent to
public order and security (Caritas, 2003). Likewise, the 2006 Caritas report
indicated that 40 per cent of Italians believed that significant numbers of
migrants are involved in criminal activities (Caritas, 2006a). Moreover, the
perceived linkage of migration and crime and the lack of accurate knowl-
edge appear to be correlated. The study produced by Makno & Consulting
on behalf of the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 2007 found that 85 per
cent of the Italians interviewed had a perception of migrants based on news
reports, and believed that there were 50 per cent more irregular than legal
migrants, which would mean 4.5 million migrants in the country (Makno &
Consulting 2007)!
By some reckonings, these perceptions have deepened alongside an
increase in racial violence. For instance, Angel-Aiani documents that over
the 1980s and 1990s growing numbers of migrants were being harassed by
Italians (Angel-Aiani, 2000). However, figures released by the Ministry of
the Interior indicate that while the number of offences committed against
foreigners has not increased, it has remained consistently high neverthe-
less (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 373). This bleak impression of Italians’
behaviour towards migrants, however, is not the whole story.
The study conducted by Bordignon and Ceccarini (2007) accounts for
the many nuances in the responses of the Italian public. Although their
research endorses the view that migrants are associated with security fears,
it also emerges that most respondents agree that migrants should enjoy civic
rights, including the right to vote. Likewise, according to a survey conducted
by the German Marshall Fund, in 2009, 53 per cent of Italians supported
providing social benefits and political participation rights to legal migrants
(German Marshall Fund, 2009: 4). Indeed, migration continues to be per-
ceived as necessary for the economy (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2007: 36;
Makno & Consulting, 2007). Accordingly, in the Italian public mind ‘secu-
ritarian fever’ coexists with an awareness that migrants are necessary for the
well-being of the country (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2007: 36). In the same
spirit, the report produced by Makno & Consulting attests that migration
is not considered the most urgent issue, ranking well below other concerns
such as unemployment and increasing costs of life and health care (German
Marshall Fund, 2009: 5; Makno & Consulting, 2007).
The multifaceted stance of Italian public opinion on migration is also
evidenced by the so-called ‘third sector’, namely civil society organisations
which have been playing an increasingly active role in the public discourse
(Carella et al., 2007). Italian NGOs working on migration, such as Carias,
Comunità di S. Egidio and others, have sought to defend the rights of
migrants, promote their integration and combat discrimination (Bozzi and
Fella, 2008). Nonetheless, the broader political impact of these organisa-
tions remains unclear. In fact they have often been described as being weak,
fragmented and unprofessional, ‘devoting their energies to cultural initia-
tives rather than political mobilisation’ (Bozzi and Fella, 2008: 252).
To further comprehend the overall narrative on migration in Italy, we

ought to consider the approach adopted by policy-makers, which is equally
complex. In broad terms, the bias towards the increasing securitisation of
migration in the official discourse is overt. In the second report on rac-
ism in Italy, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) lamented the ‘diffuse employment of racist and xenophobic propa-
ganda from certain exponents of Italian political parties. Such propaganda
is focused on non-EU migrants, and on those that lack legal status’ (ECRI,
2002: 25). ECRI also indicates that, in the Italian political debate, migrants
are portrayed as responsible for the worsening of security conditions and
as a threat to local and national identity. Moreover many unsubstantiated
generalisations are made on the relationship between migrants and drug-
trafficking and prostitution. As the report maintains:
ECRI is deeply concerned for the negative consequences that this propa-
ganda yields on the perception that the Italian population has towards
non-EU migrants and for the general atmosphere of intolerance and xen-
ophobia that such a propaganda fuels. (ECRI, 2002: 25)
For example, it is well known that the arrival of undocumented migrants on

the island of Lampedusa was described by Italian politicians as an ‘assault’
and ‘invasion’ of Italy. On this matter, examples abound. In 2004, following
the disembarkation of over 1,000 migrants at Lampedusa, the then Minister
of the Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu, notoriously declared:
The assault to our coasts has been organised by criminal organizations

that cruelly exploit the movements of clandestine people. We cannot
endorse in any possible way this game and these despicable affairs. We
are dealing with this emergency with the necessary determination.
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2004e)
Besides the ‘invasion’ analogy, the other interrelated theme is that of secu-
rity. As the Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, declared:
My task is to promote a vigorous line in terms of security [ ... ] The prin-

ciple is to guarantee maximum security for the citizens and to prevent as
well as fight in a rigorous manner clandestine immigration and to assert
the principle of legality. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008a)
An extract from the site of the Berlusconi government is another case in

point:
Italians need more security. They expect the State to effectively protect
their lives and their properties. They deserve tranquillity in the face of
the mounting aggression and the widespread criminality, which has wors-
ened because of clandestine immigration. (Governo Berlusconi, 2008)
Overall, the anti-migration and xenophobic tones of right-wing political

parties such as the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale, have been amply
documented (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005; Perlmutter, 2002; Tambini,
2001). The critical point here is that the securitised dimension of migration
remains a prevalent feature of the accounts formulated by Italian politicians
(Sciortino, 2004).
Another important aspect of the political discourse on migration con-
cerns the putative connection between migration and terrorism. This
appears to be a long-standing character of securitised narratives constructed
by Italian politicians. The following quote from a senior government offi-
cial is instructive:
The gradual inter-linkage between the exploitation of illegal immigra-

tion not just with human, drug and arm trafficking but also with inter-
national terrorism, obliges us to be particularly vigilant with regard to
the clandestine coming from the Horn of Africa where Al Qaeda has
taken firm root. We also have to be vigilant with those coming from
Sub-Saharan Africa where Islamic fundamentalism is spreading rapidly.
(Senato, 2005a)4
In other words, the dominant political narrative continues tends to be

exclusionist (Bigot and Fella, 2008). Needless to say, this securitised dis-
course is not peculiar to Italy; it reflects a wider anti-migrant sentiment in
many European countries (Bigo, 1998, 2006). It has long been made to serve
as a focal issue around which the electorate can be mobilised (Huysmans,
2000; Mitchell, 1989). The striking point here is that official pronounce-
ments in Italy and across Europe that emphasise the security-migration
linkage have critical implications for the relations with Libya. I will return
to this point in Chapters 8 and 9.
To argue, however, that state-sanctioned discourses are exclusively
security-based is misleading. Not only have some members of the left par-
ties criticised the securitarian emphasis attached to migration, but within
the right-wing coalitions efforts have been made by some to portray ‘legal’
migration as conducive to the public good. The Minister of the Interior,
Pisanu, also declared:
Of course, migration nowadays is perceived as a problem. However,

because of its structural nature, we have to see it instead as a resource.
Regular migrants represent a significant proportion of the active popula-
tion in Europe and positively contribute to the economic and social vital-
ity of our continent. In other words, immigration is not an emergency
and we cannot and should not qualify the phenomenon in these terms.
This would prevent us from understanding and managing it. Immigration
has come to be a stable feature of our everyday life – whether we like it or
not – and it will cover a conspicuous part of our future and of our sons’
future. (Senato, 2003a)
Likewise, a recent report produced by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei

Ministri attests that ‘the hypothesis whereby extremists make a system-
atic utilisation of irregular migration lacks empirical basis’ (Presidenza del
Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 90). In other words, concepts of multicultural-
ism’ and ‘integration’ remain in the lexicon of Italian politicians on both
the right and left.
An important question that needs to be addressed concerns the validity
of the putative migration–security causal connection. To what extent do
migrants represent a security threat, as a large number of Italian policy-
makers contend? Are the above-depicted societal fears on migration substan-
tiated by empirical data?5 For present purposes, it suffices to observe that the
issue is far more complex than the prevailing societal discourse assumes.
Studies indicate that migrants are likely to be more involved in criminal
activities. For example, in 1998 Jamieson and Silj analysed the involvement
of Albanians in organised crime, and found that Albanian criminal organi-
sations had ‘undoubtedly gained a solid foothold in Italy’ and were likely to
want to expand their activities, competing with rival organisations for the
same markets (Jamieson and Sily, 1998). This analysis is partly confirmed by
a recent study conducted by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The report
released in December 2007 found that between 1988 and 2006 the number
of irregular foreigners arrested for criminal related offences had increased
significantly (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i: 359).
However, the same report maintains that, in relative terms, the offences
committed by foreigners were equal in number to those committed by
Italian nationals (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007i). Therefore, the claim that
foreign nationals are more involved in criminal activities than Italians is
flawed. A further and more substantial point concerns the contested nature
of the figures on crime and migrants. As Alessandro Dal Lago writes, ‘often
the over-representation of migrants in judicial statistics and crime rates is
the product of their social weakness’ and of improper labelling (Dal Lago,
1996: 43). In his view, not merely statistics but also policing practices suf-
fer from a structural bias against foreigners. It follows that the above-noted
figures on foreigners’ criminal offences may, therefore, reflect ‘the politics
of race’ (Angel-Ajani, 2000).
It has also been observed that the incidence of irregular foreigners being
convicted is the consequence of restrictive migration policies, such as the
Bossi-Fini law, which has prevented migrants from either obtaining or
renewing their permits (De Zuleta, 2006b). As the former Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Massimo D’Alema, acknowledged, ‘clandestine immigration

has been favoured by the Bossi-Fini Law, which makes it harder to regularise
status’ (Stranieri in Italia, 5 May 2008). The critical point here is that statistics
should not be accepted at face-value, since they reflect deeper dynamics that
have much to do with the Italian cultural, social, political and legal context.
Uncritical acceptance of such data may further legitimise the ‘securitarian
fears’ informing the public perception on migration. As the former Italian
Minister of the Interior, Giuliano Amato, made it clear: ‘there is an absolute
need not to make an emotional use of the data which leads to identify the
foreigner with crime’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007l). Accordingly, I shall
take the view that the Italian security narrative is more based on perception
than on a ‘real’ threat. In Chapter 9, I will argue that these perceptions have
influenced the Italian–Libyan negotiations in important respects.
In order to examine further the multifaceted Italian approach to migra-
tion, we need to distinguish the official discourse from the policies imple-
mented (Geddes, 2008; Joppke, 2002). Thus I now venture into the measures
enacted in Italy since the 1970s, with a view to appreciating the correlation
between discourses and practices on migration.
4.4 Italian migration policies
In order to outline Italian migration policies, I follow a three-fold time-

line (Caritas, 2006b: 64). The first phase covers the 1970s and 1980s, when
Italy’s approach to migration was one of ‘neutrality and curiosity’ (Caritas,
2006b: 64). At that time, foreign labour regulation was determined by a law
passed on 10 February 1961. This required foreign workers to obtain a work
permit in order to reside in Italy, an obligation that had to be met before
entering Italian territory and being formally hired by an Italian employer
(D’Harmant, 1989: 113). Over the years, the debate on migration at the pol-
icy level intensified.
The oil crisis of 1973 is considered to have been a turning-point,6 since
this is when European countries that traditionally imported labour started
adopting restrictive policies (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004; Sciortino,
2000). Despite the large-scale closure of legal entry points during the 1970s
and 1980s, Italy continued to record a significant growth in migration.
Responding to a recognised demand for labour, foreign workers often entered
the country under tourist visas and then stayed irregularly (Colombo and
Sciortino, 2004: 54). The surge in the number of migrants was also due to
the successive regularisations which, as we shall see, are a central feature of
Italian migration policy.
The second phase, from 1986 to 1995, is defined by Caritas as a period
of ‘emergency’ (Caritas, 2006b: 64). Its onset was marked by the passage of
Act No. 943 of 30 December 1986. This Act was designed to protect Italians
against potentially ‘unfair’ competition on the labour market. Entry and work
permits could be issued only when it had been established that there were
not enough Italians workers to fill the relevant jobs (Zincone and Caponio,
2006: 2). Importantly, however, this Act also regularised approximately
103,000 migrants already living in Italy (Papdemetriou and Hamilton, 1996:
49). It also granted basic civil and social rights to foreign workers with legal
status, and guaranteed equal access to health care, public housing and educa-
tion for migrant children (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 2).
It was not until February 1990 that the first comprehensive legislation to
regulate foreigners’ entry and establish basic rules for asylum admission and
processing was passed. Known as the ‘Martelli Law’, this established that
any migrant – whether documented or not – who could prove that he or she
had come into the country before the end of 1989 could be granted a two-
year residency permit (Hamilton, 2002). A specific budget was allocated for
the construction of ‘initial reception centres’ to house migrants temporar-
ily while they looked for more permanent accommodation (Ministero dell
Giustizia, 1990). Furthermore, a committee was set up to decide how many
workers from non-EU countries could enter Italy every year. In conformity
with the Schengen Treaty, the Martelli Law allowed asylum-seekers to enter
the country, and visas were made compulsory for all people coming from
outside the EU (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). It is also noteworthy that
234,841 undocumented migrants were regularised (Zincone and Caponio,
2006: 3).
A new Decree,7 passed on 18 November 1995, marked the beginning of
the third phase. This, the so-called Dini Decree, instituted severe measures
against smuggling and new provisions on the treatment of migrants (Medici
Senza Frontiere, 2005). The Decree also required identification cards for sea-
sonal workers, and allowed immediate expulsions of foreigners either con-
victed for crimes or considered a threat to the public order (Papademetriou
and Hamilton, 1996: 44). Once again, however, over 200,000 irregular
migrants were regularised at the same time (Stranieri, 2003).
The Dini Decree was part of a broader proposal for law reform drafted in
1993 by the Conti Committee, a commission of experts charged with amend-
ing the 1990 Act and drafting a new, comprehensive Immigration Bill. This
Bill, passed as the ‘Turco-Napolitano Act’ (after the then Social Affairs and
Interior ministers) on 6 March 1998, was based on the following four pil-
lars: (1) preventing and combating ‘illegal’ entry; (2) regulating new flows of
foreign workers; (3) promoting the integration of migrants holding a valid
residence permit; and (4) granting basic individual rights to ‘illegal’ migrants
(Parlamento Italiano, 1998). Under the first pillar, ‘temporary accommoda-
tion centres’ were established to detain undocumented migrants who had
been issued with expulsion orders (Human Rights Watch, 2006a; Vassallo
Paleologo, 2006: 220). Further, the second pillar facilitated entry, through
the introduction of ‘sponsorship’ (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). Potential
workers could enter the country provided they were sponsored by private
individuals, regions, municipalities or associations that had previously depos-

ited an economic guarantee, ensured appropriate accommodation and paid
the contributions for public health insurance (Parlamento Italiano, 1998).
An important aspect of the Turco-Napolitano law is the annual quota sys-
tem. The law revised pre-existing regulation and introduced the so-called
decreto-flussi (‘flows decree’), which establishes the maximum number of
foreign nationals who may enter Italy each year for work reasons (Ministero
dell Interno, no date). Some shares of this quota are reserved to citizens of
particular countries, and other shares to particular categories of countries
(Cuttitta, 2007a: 7; Parlamento Italiano, 1998). The remaining part of the
quota is open to nationals of any non-EU-country (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). I will
return to the issue of annual quotas in the next section of this chapter.
The study of the flows decrees and regularisations provides useful clues
for untangling my initial question on the nexus between Italian political
discourses and practices. On the one hand, a chorus of commentators has
deplored the increasingly restrictive measures that the annual quota system
entails (Dentico and Gressi, 2006; Vassallo Paleologo, 2008a). On the other
hand, the fact that increasingly large numbers of migrants have obtained
legal residence, either through the annual quotas or through regularisation
(Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), has led other observers to see these measures
as quite liberal (Cuttitta, 2006). This is demonstrated by Figure 4.1, which
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 4.1 Annual migration quotas 1996–2009

Source: Elaborated from Pastore (2008b), Ministero dell’ Interno (2009) and Caritas (2009). Three
notes of caution are warranted. First, the year 2007 displays a drastic increase in the number of
migrants because it included different decrees. This is clarified by Cuttitta who observes that
‘the last 2006 decree was regarded from the beginning as a regularisation programme in dis-
guise’ (Cuttitta, 2008b: 48). Second, it is important to emphasise that there are disagreements
as to the reliability of the figures for significant differences exist between different data sets
(Cuttitta, 2008b). Third, the number of applications should not be considered a reliable indicator
of the actual level of domestic demand for foreign labour, nor of the size of an existing network
of irregular labour practices which take advantage of the decreto-flussi to simulate recruitment
from abroad (Einaudi, 2008; Pastore, 2008b).
presents the official figures on the annual quotas provided by the Italian
Ministry of the Interior.
The continuous increase in the quotas demonstrates that the actual labour
demand in Italy has been much higher than political actors have been will-
ing to admit (Pastore, 2007a). As will be apparent in the ensuing discussion,
even the centre-right government coalition, which won the 2001 election
after proposing restrictions on migration, had to bend to employers’ asso-
ciations’ requests for drastic increases. After a slight decrease in 2002, the
2005 quotas were three times as much as the 1999 ones (Cuttitta, 2008a:
47). These measures are evidence of the disconnection between what poli-
ticians say, in terms of reducing migration, and what they actually do, by
welcoming larger number of foreign workers.
The 1998 Act was partially reformed in 2002 by the so-called Bossi-Fini
Law. In passing this new law, the then Berlusconi government sought to
link the granting of new residence permits to employment requirements in
order to reduce unauthorised entry (Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 3). Some
of the most significant changes introduced by the new law included man-
datory employer–migrant contracts, stricter deportation practices as well
as amnesty for undocumented migrants who had worked and lived in the
country for over three months (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2002). The law also pro-
vided for the legalisation of irregular migrants employed either as domes-
tic workers and home-helpers, or as dependent workers. Overall, 634,728
undocumented migrants were regularised, i.e. almost the same number
of foreigners regularised under the previous four amnesties (Governo
Berlusconi, 2002; Zincone and Caponio, 2006: 5). This was the biggest regu-
larisation ever implemented in Europe (Giacca, 2004: 11).
The Bossi-Fini law was understood in different ways (Geddes, 2008: 350).
Some criticised its repressive or even racist elements (Geddes, 2008: 350).
For example, an Italian NGO, Consorzio Italiano Solidarietà, denounced
the severe measures introduced, including the longer period of time during
which migrants could be held in detention centres, the increased number
of years for which those issued with an expulsion order were banned from
entering Italy and the reinforced expulsion methods (Camilleri, 2005). In
fact, some measures were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court, and had to be attenuated by the government (Zincone and Caponio,
2006: 5).
Others have drawn attention to its inherent contradictions (Pugliese,
2006). After an electoral campaign in 2002 promising rigour and sobri-
ety, the government had to take a more pragmatic stance (Pastore 2007a:
25). In so doing, the Berlusconi government broke two European records
(Pastore 2007a: 25). First, it granted the largest regularisation in European
history, and second, it approved the most generous-ever annual quota,
for up to 340,000 foreigners (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009: 126; Pastore
2007a: 25).
Significantly, the policies enforced by the subsequent Prodi government

(2006–8) exhibit the same pragmatic approach, especially as concerns the
quota system and the regularisations (Bigot and Fella, 2008). On the one
hand, attempts were made to revise the Bossi-Fini Law. With the law pro-
posal known as the ‘Amato-Ferrero’ presented in March 2007, significant
changes would be introduced concerning entry and work permits, and the
fight against undocumented migration (Bigot and Fella, 2008). The pro-
posed legislation sought to streamline the procedures for the grant of work
permits, and to facilitate the search for employment opportunities by insti-
tuting the ‘sponsor’ granting work permits to migrants who had secured
jobs prior to their arrival. Moreover, the duration of the decreto flussi would
no longer be annual but tri-annual, in order to allow a longer-term planning
of migrant flows (Governo Italiano, 2007). The collapse of the government
at the beginning of 2008 meant that this reform proposal also fell (Bigot
and Fella, 2008).
On the other hand, however, an unprecedented number of undocu-
mented migrants obtained a work permit through the annual quota sys-
tem and recurrent regularisations (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). This is true for the
Berlusconi government appointed in 2008. For example, a regularisation for
domestic workers (maids and nannies) and care workers was conducted in
September 2009. The government received approximately 295,000 applica-
tions, ‘fewer than originally predicted’ (OECD, 2009b). The critical point
is that the applications were mostly submitted by people who were already
residing and working irregularly in Italy. It can therefore be argued that the
annual quotas are de facto regularisations (Cuttitta, 2008b). It is clear by
now that regularisations and annual quotas have become a ‘chronic’ aspect
of Italian migration policies (Sciortino, 2006: 1034). This is particularly
extraordinary, given that, with the exception of far-left parties and some
activist movements, Italy’s main political parties are opposed to regularisa-
tion programmes (Chaloff, 2003; Levinson, 2005a).
For the sake of a balanced discussion, it is important to underline that,
concurrently with such inclusive policies, restrictive policing practices
have also been implemented. The debate concerning Romanian migrants
in Italy is an illustrative example. On 30 October 2007, an Italian woman,
Giovanna Reggiani, was fatally wounded by a Romanian man as she left a
Rome train station (Reuters, 3 November 2007). On 31 October, the Italian
government adopted an emergency decree giving prefects the authority to
expel EU citizens considered a threat to public order, even in the absence of
a criminal investigation (Human Rights Watch, 2008b). Shortly afterwards,
seventeen expulsion orders for Romanians were signed in Genoa, and three
others in Rome (Reuters, 3 November 2007). Authorities forcibly evacuated
and bulldozed the Roma camp where the alleged murderer was living, and
conducted similar raids on Roma camps in Bologna, Florence and Genoa
(Human Rights Watch, 2008b).
On the day after of the incident, Giuliano Amato invited all Italians to
‘prevent this terrible tiger, which is xenophobic rage, the racist beast, from
getting out of control’ (Reuters, 3 November 2007). However, the surge in
security measures approved by the Italian authorities remains deeply contro-
versial. As a representative of Human Rights Watch warned, ‘if the govern-
ment is serious about curbing xenophobia, it needs to lead by example [ ... ]
Police raids and expulsions send the message that discriminating against
Roma and Romanians is OK’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008b).
Yet again, the subsequent Berlusconi government nurtured this climate
of public alarm. On 25 July 2008, Italy declared a national state of emer-
gency in response to a sharp rise in the number of landings on Lampedusa
(The International Herald Tribune, 25 July 2008). Accordingly, throughout the
whole country police and local authorities were given additional powers to
combat what was defined as the ‘persistent and exceptional’ arrival of irreg-
ular migrants (The International Herald Tribune, 25 July 2008). A few weeks
afterwards, on 4 August 2008, the Italian Ministry of Defence announced
the deployment of 3,000 soldiers in major Italian cities to ensure security
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2008b). The soldiers, who were not given policing
powers, were expected to protect ‘sensitive’ targets, such as institutional
buildings, for the next six months’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 28 July 2008).
At the level of legislation, the newly elected government pushed through
law no. 125/2008 which changed the Italian Penal Code and made it pos-
sible to deport a foreigner or expel an EU-citizen in case he or she has been
found guilty of a crime with a sentence of more than two years (Finotelli
and Sciortino, 2009: 126). It also succeeded in passing law no. 94/2009,
known as the pacchetto sicurezza (‘security package’) which made undocu-
mented entry and stay in Italy a criminal offence punishable by a fine of up
to 10,000 euros (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2009). The law also established citizens’
vigilante groups to detect and report irregular migrants (Human Rights
Watch, 2009a). Whereas it is too early to draw overall conclusions on the
migration policies of the current government, the above empirical excursus
reveals a tension between the security narrative at the level of discourse,
which preaches surveillance, and the measures driven by labour demand
(Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009), which in fact incline towards openness.
While it is important to acknowledge the gradual tightening of secu-
rity mechanisms targeted at undocumented migrants, the overall legisla-
tive measures, by welcoming an unprecedented large number of migrants
through annual quotas and regularisations, evince a deeper pattern of inclu-
sion (Koff, 2001: 2). The complex character of the Italian stance on migra-
tion is even more evident if we consider the migration policies towards third
countries. In line with the initial objectives of this book, I now provide
an (admittedly sketchy) overview of how migration has been employed by
Italy as a foreign policy tool to influence the behaviour of neighbouring
countries.
4.5 Italian migration policies and relations with

third countries
In recent decades, Italy has played a central role in Mediterranean migration

policies. Because of its geographical position as a bridge between Europe and
Africa, it is more exposed than other European countries to any develop-
ments in the political and economic situation at regional level (Coralluzzo,
2008: 115). As a result, relations with Mediterranean countries in general,
and the issue of migration in particular, occupy a pivotal role in Italy’s
foreign policy (Coralluzzo, 2008: 115). It has been argued that one of the
primary objectives of Italian foreign aid towards Northern Africa and the
Balkans has been to halt irregular migration (Carbone, 2008a: 9).8 In this
optic, two main aspects are pertinent: the negotiations on the readmission
agreements and the annual quotas.
In discussing these two issues, I rely principally on the arguments elabo-
rated by Cuttitta (2007a) and Chaloff and Piperno (2004). Broadly speak-
ing, readmission agreements provide for the return, to the country of origin
or transit, of irregular migrants apprehended by the police forces of the
destination country (Cassarino, 2007). Under these agreements, European
countries can send back to another signatory state nationals not only of the
latter but also of third countries, if transit through the signatory state can
be proved (EC, 2005i). Importantly, the combination of readmission agree-
ments and annual quotas has provided Italy with a ‘diplomatic weapon’ in
the negotiations with migrant-sending countries (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7).9
Cuttitta examines the changing Italian quotas since 2001, and notes that:
‘reserved shares have been considered more and more as a useful lever to per-
suade countries of origin of migrant workers to cooperate in stopping illegal
[sic] migration towards Italy’ (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7). This opinion is shared by
Pastore, who highlights the two-fold purpose of the quota system. On the
one hand, the internal objective is to ensure that labour market require-
ments for foreign workers are met in a timely and qualitatively acceptable
manner (Pastore, 2001). On the other hand, the external objective is to offer
concrete advantages to the principal countries of origin and transit of ille-
gal immigrants, in exchange for a stronger commitment to preventing and
counteracting this flow (Pastore, 2001). The latter issue is relevant to the
present analysis.
By increasing or cutting down their reserved shares, Italy has sought to
either reward or punish the countries of origin for their conduct on migra-
tion flows (Favilli, 2005: 157). The second Berlusconi government has also
increased the share reserved to categories of countries. Such categories
include mainly countries that have concluded agreements related to migra-
tion controls or which are negotiating such agreements (Cuttitta, 2007a: 7).
By giving countries of origin the chance to increase their own share in the
migration quotas, Italy has had the opportunity to exert pressure on them
to win their commitment to control borders more effectively (Cuttitta,

2007a: 7).
One illuminating case is the Italian–Egyptian negotiations. In the MENA
region, Egypt is considered to be the largest labour exporter (Sika, 2010;
Zohry, 2003). In the European context in particular, the largest number
of Egyptian migrants, 10 per cent, head for Italy (Sika, 2010). Accordingly,
migration is now considered a central issue in Italo-Egyptian relations
(Stocchiero, 2004). In October 2002, after deciding to cooperate on migra-
tion, Egypt obtained a reserved share from Italy (Cuttitta, 2007a). After the
beginning of bilateral action on migration control in the Suez Canal area
(Delicato, 2004), and after the Italian Ministry of the Interior was allowed to
send a liaison officer to Egypt, Italy approved the decree granting reserved
shares (Chaloff and Piperno, 2004). Egypt was rewarded with a share of
1,000 legal migrants – 10 per cent of the whole share granted to single coun-
tries (Cuttitta, 2007a). Moreover, in 2004 and 2005, after Egypt, despite the
absence of a readmission agreement between the two countries, readmit-
ted thousands of Egyptian citizens from Italy (Ansa, 15 September 2004;
Ansa, 21 July, 2005), the reserved share was further increased and reached
the maximum amount ever allocated to a single country, namely 7,000
(Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). Eventually, a labour agreement was signed in November
2005 (Roman, 2008: 4) and a readmission agreement on 9 January 2007
(Ansa, 9 January 2007; Ministero degli Esteri, 2007a). Ever since, repatria-
tions to Egypt have proceeded unabated (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008c).
According to Ghoneim the quota for Egypt was increased further to 8,000
in 2008 (Ghoniem, 2009 quoted in Sika, 2010).
Another useful example is Tunisia. The critical linkage between migration
and Italy’s development agenda emerges clearly in the following quotation
by the Italian Department for Development Cooperation (DGCS) of the
Foreign Affairs Ministry, concerning relations with Tunisia and Morocco:
Recognizing the important role played by the private sector and above
all by small and medium enterprises (SME) with regard to wealth produc-
tion and distribution, job creation and poverty reduction, and its positive
effect on migratory pressure containment, the DGCS set up an action
plan which increases on the one hand the SME competitiveness, and
on the other allows our economic system to take advantage of the eco-
nomic opportunities that can be developed in those countries. (Chaloff
and Piperno, 2004)
Shortly after Italy committed itself to introducing a reserved share for

Tunisian citizens, Ben Ali agreed to sign a readmission agreement. With the
technical agreement known as ‘Exchange of notes between Italy and Tunisia
concerning the entry and readmission of people without legal status’ on
6 August 1998, Italy bound itself to grant Tunisia preferential treatment in
the annual entry permits (Balfour, 2005: 128; La Stampa, 7 August 1998).
Tunisia’s subsequent failure to cooperate on migration led to the decrease of
reserved shares, however (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8). After the expiry of the bilateral
police agreement and the concomitant increase in arrivals from Tunisia in
Sicily, the reserved share for Tunisian citizens dropped from 2,000 in 2002
to only 600 in 2003 (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8).10 Yet, six days after the signature
of the agreement on 13 December 2003, Italy approved the flows decrees
for 2004, which raised the Tunisian reserved share to 3,000 units (Cuttitta,
2007a: 8).
In 2009 the two countries further discussed the implementation of the
readmission agreement. On 29 January Italian interior minister, Roberto
Maroni, and his Tunisian counterpart, Rafik Belhaj, agreed to step up the
fight against migration and ‘human trafficking’. They also agreed to sim-
plify and speed up procedures to identify Tunisian irregular migrants cur-
rently held in Italian detention centres with the assistance of European
Union funds and international organisations operating in the region
(Adnkronos, 28 January 2009). Different sources confirm that return of
irregular migrants and terrorist suspects from Italy to Tunisia resumed in
February 2009 (Camera, 2010a; Human Rights Watch, 2009b). To secure
Tunisian11 support Italy offered to increase development aid to 50 million
euros and to double migration quotas for Tunisian migrants (AFP, 13 May
2009). Nevertheless, Italian authorities continued to lament the reluctance
of Tunisia to cooperate and the fact that, supposedly, it would accept the
readmission from Italy of ‘no more than seven irregular migrants daily’
(Camera, 2009a).
The linkage between foreign aid and migration policies is also meaning-
ful. By promising and delivering special aid programmes to neighbouring
countries, Italy succeeded in either initiating or deepening cooperation on
migration policies therewith (Favilli, 2005: 159). Simply put, aid and devel-
opment programmes have been granted by Italy as both an inducement and
a reward for the efforts made by third countries to tighten border controls
and fight irregular migration (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8–9). Development aid has
been linked to migration ‘as a containment tool’, targeting some of the areas
that put the strongest migratory pressure on Italy (Chaloff and Piperno,
2004). The principle of conditioned development cooperation was turned
into law in September 2002 with the passage of law no. 189/2002 (Cuttitta,
2007a: 8–9). Article 1 reads as follows:
In the re-elaboration and possible revision of the bilateral cooperation

and aid programmes for non-humanitarian measures with countries that
are outside the European Union [ ... ] the Italian government takes into
account the collaboration that such third countries have provided with
regard to the prevention of illegal [sic] migrant flows, the fight against
criminal organisations working in the field of clandestine immigration,
in human trafficking, prostitution, drug-trafficking, arms-trade [ ... ].

(Ministero della Giustizia, 2002)
In sum, the investigation of Italy’s migration policies towards third coun-

tries reveals that the setting of the annual quotas and the conclusion of
readmission agreements are intertwined with Italy’s foreign policy consid-
erations. It is not my intention to suggest that behind-the-scenes political
manoeuvring is the sole explanatory factor in the changing shares in the
decreto-flussi. Motives related to domestic labour market and demographic
issues also play an important role. I sought instead to draw attention to the
relevant, although not exclusive, linkage between migration and foreign
policy. An appreciation of the impact that migration has on the bargain-
ing power of interacting states lays the groundwork for the analysis of the
agreements on migration between Italy and Libya, as well as of their power
relations in the following chapters.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have advanced two arguments. First, there are discrepan-
cies between the prevailing security discourse as framed by – and fram-
ing – public opinion, the official position of Italian policy-makers and the
national media, and the actual migration policies. While ‘security paranoia’
continues to shape the political debate profoundly and to justify the imple-
mentation of new surveillance practices, a more pragmatic trend of open-
ness towards foreign migrants is also observable. Put another way, if we
look beneath official statements, the ‘illiberal practices of coercion’ (Bigo et
al., 2007) are only part of the very diversified and nuanced range of Italian
migration policies. Contrary to the prevalent argument, which assumes the
relentless deepening of the ‘fortress’ discourse and practices, a close inves-
tigation of annual quotas and recurrent regularisations indicates that the
number of foreign nationals has been increasing. We are thus led to take a
more circumspect view, and to appreciate the complexities of Italian migra-
tion policies. In subsequent chapters, I comment further on the entrenched
ambivalence that has guided successive Italian governments (Carbone,
2008b).
Second, the analysis of Italian discussions on migration with neighbour-
ing countries shows the critical connection between migration and the
Italian foreign policy. In fact, one of the primary objectives of Italy’s policy
towards emigration and transit countries ‘has been to ensure better coop-
eration in migratory flow regulation, and more specifically, control of exit
movements and readmission’ of irregular migrants (Pastore, 2001). In other
words, migration has been employed by Italy to extract concessions from
the selected migrant-sending countries. By exploiting the clear need of the
latter to export their labour force, on some occasions Italy has succeeded in
winning their commitment to collaborate on migration. Migration, then, is

one of the foreign policy tools that Italy has been used to affect the behav-
iour of third countries. Yet, the opposite is also true. The negotiations of
readmission agreements expose the limits of European countries. Unless EU
states offer positive incentives for cooperation, the policies that they pro-
pose are bound to fail (Ellerman, 2008: 185). This multifaceted give-and-
take framework of shared gains and losses puts in context the discussion of
the dialogue on migration between Italy and Libya.
5
Libya and Migration
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an historical analysis of Libyan migration

policies. I focus on the Libyan domestic and foreign policy agenda and the
role of migration in Libya’s relations with its neighbours. In introducing the
discussion in Parts III and IV of the book on the Italian–Libyan negotiations
on migration, I argue that Libya has a long history of using migration and
border control policies to further its domestic and foreign interests.
At first sight, the regime’s stance on migration appears chaotic, if not
irrational. At a deeper level, however, pragmatic adaptability appears to be
a constant feature of Libya’s migration policies. Indeed, the shifting stance
of the Libyan regime stems from a relatively shrewd calculation of costs
and benefits. It is not my intention to make the case for the existence of a
reasoned and thriving grand plan informing Libya’s migration policies. In
fact, any investigation of Libya’s history reveals not only profound changes
in its foreign policy, but also notorious faux pas that have led to its isolation
from the international community.1
In taking up John Davis’ invitation, I will argue that the standard mono-
chrome Western account of the regime as solely deviant and unpredictable
is misleading. A thorough appreciation of Libya’s migration policies reveals
that its unpredictability is rooted in the recurrent use of a set of policy
actions, whereby outward and inward migration serves to influence the
behaviours of other countries.
In keeping with this overall argument, I develop five clusters of ideas.
First, I consider how migration has been used by Libya for economic and
political objectives in its dealings with Arab countries,2 and also – the sec-
ond cluster – with sub-Saharan African countries.3 Third, I provide a brief
discussion on refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya, and assess whether they
have been treated as a bargaining-chip. Fourth, I examine the role that the
EU has played with regard to Libyan migration policies and, finally, the
recent developments in Libya’s migration discourse.
79
The last point and in particular the appreciation of the securitisation of

migration in Libya serve to introduce the discussion in the ensuing chap-
ters, which are concerned with how migration affects Italian–Libyan coop-
eration. Indeed, Parts III and IV of this book consider the extent to which
the security narrative benefits Libya’s bargaining position towards Italy.
5.2 Migration from Arab countries and

related Libya’s policies
A thorough understanding of migrant flows to and through Libya requires

a wide frame of analysis, both historically and geographically. It scarcely
needs to be emphasised that movements across the trans-Saharan region
span centuries and, as Braudel puts it, ‘can only be grasped if the chron-
ological field of study is extended as far as possible’ (Braudel, 1996: 101).
Indeed, Braudel’s widely cited description of the Mediterranean as an ‘espace
movement’ aptly captures the distinctive feature, among others, of Libya as
an historical carrefour through Africa and the Mediterranean (Braudel, 1996:
276). Since at least the eighth century, there has been intensive population
mobility between both sides of the Sahara, through trans-Saharan (cara-
van) trade, conquest, pilgrimage and religious education (De Haas, 2006;
Gregoire, 2004a).
The extensive research on more recent trans-Saharan routes conducted
by authors such as Gregoire and Pliez documents in detail the complex pat-
terns of people movements through Libya as a space of exchange at the
local, regional and supra-regional levels (Gregoire, 2004b; Pliez, 2000).
Crucially, the flows through Northern and sub-Saharan Africa are related to
Libya’s changing internal and foreign policy agenda. By way of illustration,
I now investigate some of the economic and political motives of Libya that
have triggered the large influxes of migrants from Arab countries into the
country.
In terms of the economic dimension, after the discovery of oil in Libya
in 1957 migration thereto from the Maghreb grew significantly (Labib,
1979). For example, Grimaud suggests that the oil industry and the related
expansion of the market influenced migrant flows from Tunisia to Libya
(Grimaud, 1994).4 Already in 1957, Libyan and Tunisian authorities agreed
on the import of Tunisian labour into Libya (Grimaud, 1994: 32). This trend
continued throughout the succeeding decades. Between the late 1970s and
the early 1980s, the Libyan regime actively recruited foreign workers by
negotiating ‘contract-packages’ entailing the ‘import’ of foreign labour for
limited periods of time to work at construction sites (Beauge and Burgat
1986: 60). The consequences were not hard to discern:
Between 1970 and 1982, while the total Libyan population multiplied
by 1.6% and increased from less than two million to over 3 million, the
Libya and Migration 81
active working population grew by 2.7%, from 450,000 to over 1,200,000.

This increase is mainly due to the foreign workers whose proportion in
the total active labour force increased from 11% to 50% even though the
proportion of active Libyan labour force remained stationary at 20%.
(Beauge and Burgat, 1986: 57)5
Specifically, a study produced by the University of Durham found that,

between 1973 and 1975, the non-Libyan Arab contribution to the labour
force was around 85 per cent (Birks and Sinclair, 1978: 53; Pliez, 2004).
Indeed, it has been shown that through the 1970s and 1980s foreign work-
ers from Northern Africa were instrumental in the development of both the
formal and informal economy of Libya (Pliez, 1999: 207).
However, economic considerations alone do not explain Libya’s openness
to migrants from Arab countries. Foreign policy ambitions also played an
important part. Since the revolution of 1969, Qaddafi has sought to remove
any trace of Western influence, and to define Libya as an Arab nation
(Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 64). Notably, the Libyan colonel saw in the
Egyptian Leader, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, an enduring symbol of Arab unity.
In the wake of the Libyan revolution, Qaddafi was reported as saying: ‘tell
President Nasser we made this Revolution for him. He can take everything
of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world’s resources to be used for the
battle’ (Vandewalle, 2006: 80). Accordingly, when his hero died within a
year of the coup, Qaddafi became ‘the self-appointed guardian of Nasser’s
legacy nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity as part and par-
cel of the Libyan Revolution’ (Vandewalle, 2006: 80).
Despite the persistent relevance of ‘laic Pan-Arabism and reformist Islam’
in the leader’s speeches, in the 1980s relations with Arab countries deterio-
rated (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 64). In an effort to break out of its isolation,
the Northern African regime actively pursued a regional diplomatic initia-
tive based on Pan-Arabism (Vandewalle, 2005). In order to mend bridges
with its neighbours, bilateral relations with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia
were reinvigorated. In 1987, Law No. 6 was passed, according to which all
nationals from Arab states, as well as from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea,
could enter Libya without a visa (EC, 2005d: 11). Law No. 6/1987 provides
for granting two types of residence permits to foreign nationals, depending
on the purpose of residence. A red card for short-term residence is issued to
those with irregular status and a green card for long-term residence to those
with legal status (EC, 2005d: 11). Both residence permits have a specified
validity period. A red card is issued to those nationals who have entered the
country without documents and do not have a work contract. If a work con-
tract is obtained within a three-month period, then a green card is issued
on this basis (EC, 2005d: 11).
This regulation built upon a previous one, Law No. 18/1980, that granted
Libyan nationality to nearly every Arab under the age of 50 residing in Libya
(EC, 2005d: 12). Likewise, in September 1985, the dispute with Tunisia con-
cerning the expulsion of Tunisian migrants – to be explored below – was
settled, the western border was opened and police controls were removed
(Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 89). A few years later, on 17 February 1989, the
heads of state of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia signed the
Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (L’Union du Maghreb
Arabe, no date). The following month, on 28 March 1989, Libya announced
the opening of its eastern borders (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 88; Haddad,
2003; Vandewalle, 2005: 36), and resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt,
which had been severed since the border war in 1977 (Burgat and Laronde,
1996: 88). Moreover, in 1990 Libya and Egypt signed the Four Freedom
Agreement, allowing the citizens of both countries to cross the border with-
out visas (El-Sayed, 2007).
As a result of these factors, an increasing number of citizens from Arab
countries settled in Libya (Labib, 1979). Yet while in the 1970s and 1980s the
majority of migrants were from the Maghreb, the 1990s saw a significant
rise in the number of migrants from trans-Saharan Africa (Pliez, 2003: 196).
While migrants from sub-Sahara in 1973 represented only 3 per cent of the
total migrant population in Libya, in 1984 they accounted for 9 per cent,
and in 1995 for 34 per cent (Pliez, 2003: 196). I shall return to this point in
the next section.
However, alongside its encouragement of migration from Arab countries
for economic and political reasons, the Libyan regime has simultaneously
tightened migration measures. It will be argued that such apparently para-
doxical patterns rest on Libya’s consistent use of migration and border con-
trol measures as foreign policy bargaining-chips.
According to a study by the University of Durham, in 1971, when 2,984
Tunisian entered Libya legally, some 40,500 were prevented from crossing
the border because they had no authorisation (Birks and Sinclair, 1978:
56). The same source reports that in 1976 Libya expelled6 13,700 Tunisian
‘clandestine migrants’ (Birks and Sinclair, 1978: 56). Likewise, Grimaud
documents that the return of migrants from Libya to Tunisia grew stead-
ily from 29,356 in 1969 to 33,939 in 1970 and 43,251 in 1972 (Grimaud,
1994: 31). By the 1980s, Libya had imposed severe controls on borders that
led to a significant rise in ‘clandestine’ migration to the country (CESR,
1991: 157).
Arguably, the concurrence of severe border control measures and expul-
sions and of active recruitment of foreign labour, as previously illustrated,
is consistent with Libya’s broader domestic and foreign policy agenda, and
reveals a certain degree of pragmatism. At the foreign policy level, targeted
expulsion and the abrupt closing of borders were used to exert pressure
on the countries to which migrants were sent. Domestically, the regime
sought to balance economic demands for cheap labour with the need to
legitimise and champion the political and economic accomplishments of
the revolution. As Grimaud argues with reference to Tunisian workers in

Libya, migrants were taken as ‘hostage’ and were used strategically in the
course of the political transactions between the two countries (Grimaud,
1994: 32).
In fact, the expulsion of Tunisians in 1976 coincided with the election
of Hedi Nourira as Tunisian Prime Minister, who was hostile to Qaddafi
(Grimaud, 1994: 32). Tunisia was dependent on Libya, which could relieve
Tunisia’s severe unemployment by allowing the ‘export’ of surplus Tunisian
manpower. Hence the forced return of migrants to Tunisia was intended
to have a detrimental effect on Tunisia, both politically and economical-
ly.7 In other words, the expulsions to Tunisia were a political message that
the Libyan leader wanted to send to the newly elected Tunisian govern-
ment. Nonetheless, as a further manifestation of Libya’s oscillating stance,
during the same period the proportion of forced returns was significantly
lower than the number of Tunisians who entered Libya. As Grimaud con-
cludes, this incidence epitomises, once again, ‘Libyan cynicism’ in utilising
migration ‘for political ends’ (Grimaud, 1994: 34). Similarly, the large-scale
expulsion of Tunisians and Egyptians in 1985 stemmed from political and
economic motives (Van Hear, 1992: 5–6). In less than two months, 80,000
migrants were forced to return to Tunisia and Egypt because, among other
things, Tunisia and Egypt were being accused by Qaddafi of being too close
to the United States (Pliez, 2004: 141).8
The manipulation of migration through deportations has targeted not
only migrants from Northern Africa, but also other foreigners from Arab
countries. In 1995, one-third of the Sudanese population in Libya, around
70,000, was forcibly conducted to the border after relations between Tripoli
and Khartoum deteriorated (Pliez, 2004: 142). As CNN reported, the expul-
sions appeared to be motivated by ‘Libyan suspicion that the Sudanese gov-
ernment was involved in clashes with Muslim militants in Libya’ (CNN,
14 December 1995). The same fate befell 10,000 Mauritanians when Libya
wanted to condemn the rapprochement between Israel and Mauritania
(Africa News, 3 December 1995; BBC 1, December 1995; Pliez, 2004: 142).
Libya also closed its embassy in Mauritania and imposed economic sanc-
tions on the country (Agence France Presse, 30 November 1995). During
1995 alone, of 335,000 foreigners who left the country, 200,000 had been
expelled (Pliez, 2004: 142). In the same period, a Libyan delegation travelled
to Baghdad to invite Iraqis to move to Libya to work, even though the Iraqi
population in Libya was already 65,000 strong (Pliez, 2004: 142). Two years
later, advertisements and publicity materials were sent to Egypt to encour-
age Egyptians to move to Libya (Pliez, 2004: 142). As Pliez argues:
this volte-face sheds light on the limits of the instrumentalisation of the

foreign labour force from the Libyan regime that is forced to make new
appeals for migrants in order to counter-balance [in terms of labour force
lost] the departure of those that it had expelled in the previous period.
(Pliez, 2004: 142)
As Choucri foresaw in the late 1970s:
The Libyan episode [referring to the relations between Egypt and Libya]
reflects the importance of political factors influencing migration and the
potential use of population movement as a political threat. [ ... ] Should
migration continue to be viewed as a political weapon, the volume of
Egyptian workers in Arab countries could become one of the most salient
foreign policy issues in the years to come. (Choucri, 1977: 425)
This consideration captures the Libyan attitude towards migration in recent

decades, and has direct implications for my initial question. Migration has
proved to be a critical issue in Libya’s relations with its neighbours.9 The new
migration law announced between January and February 2007 is a case in
point. Presumably because of the economic problems exacerbated allegedly
by migration, which will be analysed below, this law introduced stricter reg-
ulations on foreign labour, targeting Arab migrants. A few days before Libya’s
announcement that it would not participate in the Arab Summit in Saudi
Arabia (The International Herald Tribune, 4 March 2007), on 4 March 2007,
this new law on foreign labour was approved. The regulation stipulated that
all migrants would have to obtain a work contract or face deportation (The
New Statesman, 15 March 2007). The law, enforced by the Libyan Ministry of
Manpower, requires migrant workers to pay, monthly, 25 Libyan dinars in
income tax, 14 dinars for insurance, 15 dinars for an Arab identity card, and
60 dinars for an accredited work permit (El-Sayed, 2007). As part of the same
law, a one-month amnesty period was allowed for the estimated 1.5 million
undocumented migrants working in Libya to return to their home countries
without sanctions to seek work permits (Frontex, 2007). In presenting this
law, the Secretary of Manpower and Training, Mautoq Mohammed Mautoq,
declared that: ‘Libyan businessmen should employ local workers. They
should contact the Secretariat of Manpower and Training in order to replace
their foreign labours with local ones’ (Ljbc, 4 March 2007). Reportedly,
between 15 and 28 February alone 1,299 would-be migrants were deported
to their country of origin (Reuters, 8 March 2007). As the IOM chief of
Mission to Libya, Laurence Hart, observed shortly afterwards, ‘there have
been a lot of police raids since this measure passed, showing that Libyan
authorities are serious this time. But [ ... ] we don’t have anything in writing
of what the procedures are’ (The New Statesman, 15 March 2007).
According to some estimates, as a result of this law 35,000 Egyptians left
Libya (El-Sayed, 2007). Importantly, this move was perceived negatively
by Arab countries. On 7 February 2007, Algeria’s Interior Minister, Yazid
Zerhouni, was reported as saying that ‘if Libya considers the decision useful
for its security, it is sovereign; but it could have effects on the approach
we have to the Maghreb Union’ (The Peninsula Qatar, 7 February 2007).
Perhaps to mitigate this resentment, during the meeting of the AMU, the
Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Abdel-Rahman Shalgam,
denied any Libyan decision to impose visa requirements (Alarabonline,
12 February 2007). Nevertheless, the aforementioned subsequent develop-
ments on deportation indicated otherwise.
By and large, economic and foreign policy considerations are the major
determinants of the changing size of the migrant population from Arab
countries in Libya, and explain the apparently contradictory stance whereby
open border policies coexist with restrictive ones. It is important, however,
to emphasise that this explanation of migrant flows does not exhaust all the
intricate historical motives behind past and present human mobility trends.
Migrant flows are not determined by Libyan political and economic interests
alone. For example, wars, famines and changing economic and political cir-
cumstances across northern and sub-Saharan Africa have affected migrant
movements significantly (Pliez, 2002b: 32). With these provisos, I now turn
to an analysis of Libya’s migration policies toward sub-Saharan Africa.
5.3 Migration from sub-Saharan Africa and

Libya’s related policies
The failure of the AMU Treaty, and of the related project to create a Great
Arab Maghreb, made Qaddafi turn his attention, not without contradic-
tions, to Africa (Sanchez Mateos, 2005: 440; Vandewalle, 1995: 36). In
1990, an agreement for increasing collaboration was signed by Libya and
Sudan (Pliez, 2002b: 37). Likewise, in February 1994, after the International
Court of Justice confirmed the sovereignty of Chad over the Aozou strip
(International Court of Justice, 1994), Libya and Chad signed a number of
bilateral treaties, including one on the movement of people across the bor-
ders and one on commercial cooperation (Pliez, 2002b: 37).
A few years later, Qaddafi took the lead in establishing the Community
of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESSA), later renamed CEN-SAD, involving the
creation of the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank
with 75 per cent Libyan capital (Sturman, 2003). Early COMESSA members
included Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan, and eighteen states,
representing more than half of the continent’s population, joined during
the following three years (St John, 2003: 466).10 This multilateral initiative
was aimed at defining the contours of a space within which migrants could
move (Pliez, 2004: 152). One of the main objectives was:
The removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the mem-

ber countries, through the adoption of necessary measures to ensure
free movement of persons, capitals and interests of nationals of member
States and [ ... ] free trade and movement of goods, commodities and serv-
ices from member States. (CEN-SAD, no date)
In 1998, the Libyan leader announced publicly the abandonment of Pan-

Arabism in favour of Pan-Africanism (Pliez, 2004: 14). Ever since, his slogan
‘Africa for Africans’ has been a recurrent theme in his speeches and foreign
policy rhetoric. To further substantiate his role as the ‘artisan de la paix’ and
‘sage africain’ (Gobe, 1999), on 9 September 1999 in Sirte Qaddafi presented
his grand vision for a ‘United States of Africa’, with a single army, currency
and unified leadership (Perrin, 2004: 33; Sturman 2003). On the same occa-
sion, the leader declared himself a Pan-Africanist and expressed Libya’s
intention of welcoming migrants of African origin, while continuing to
welcome Arab migrants (Ezzat, 1999). The abolition of frontiers and free cir-
culation of people, as a response to the economic exploitation of Africa by
the Western world, were the key tenets of the African project proclaimed by
the Libyan leader (Solomon, 2006). As already illustrated, African passport-
holders were allowed to enter Libya without visas for three months, and
enjoyed easier access to residency and work permits than other foreigners
(Solomon, 2006). In the same vein, during his numerous televised speeches
and visits to other African countries, Qaddafi was reported as encouraging
African migration to Libya (Pliez, 2003: 196). In seeking to consolidate his
key role as a regional actor, Libya privileged diplomacy and economy over
arms. For instance, it sought to act as the principal mediator in settling
regional conflicts such as that between Sudan and Chad, but also engaged
in sustained investments across the African continent (Huliaras, 2001; Pliez,
2004: 14).
As with relations with Arab countries, the openness towards African coun-
tries was motivated by economic and political factors. From an economic
standpoint, Libya’s migration policy was driven by the need to fill the gaps
in the labour force in the local market. From a political angle, the regime
sought a leadership role in the international arena to counter its increasing
isolation from Arab countries and the West. By welcoming migrants from
sub-Saharan Africa, Libya sought to reward African states for their support
during the embargo era (Pliez, 2004: 14). Concisely put, the growing pres-
ence of migrants from Africa in Libya is no accident. The official Libyan dis-
course – to be explored below – according to which the exponential growth
of migrants is due to the difficulty of controlling the 4,000 kilometre-long
desert border, is not the whole story, since it overlooks the entangled histori-
cal economic and political determinants of migration.
Yet again, relations with Africa, and related border control policies, were
not free of ambivalence. Let us then explore further Libya’s putative ‘politics
of contradiction’ (El-Kikhia, 1997), with a view to illustrating its inherent
pragmatism. This exercise may help to put into perspective what is other-
wise perceived as simply eccentric.
The Pan-Africanist rhetoric was accompanied by occasional, yet recur-

rent, deportations targeting African migrants. As Pliez wrote:
Libya is accustomed to these practices, after each period of tension with

some states is followed by expulsions. The victims have been for a long
time Tunisians, Egyptians, Palestinians but recently more and more peo-
ple from Sub-Sahara. (Pliez, 2003: 199)
Events in 2000 provide a further example of the complex position of Libya

towards migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. During the summit of the
Organisation of the African Union in Lomé in July 2000, the project of the
African Union was adopted (Lomé Declaration, 2000). Shortly afterwards,
during a trip to Ghana, Qaddafi famously stated that: ‘Africa is not 50 states.
It is one nation, one people, one culture, one economy, one defence and
no borders’ (Callies De Salies, 2001). In the same year, the Libyan leader
proclaimed his intention to build a road from Libya to Niger and Chad, and
declared that Libya was committed to strengthening ties with the South of
the Sahara (Sudan Tribune, 22 April 2004). Indeed Chinese firms had been
commissioned to build roads and rail networks linking Libya to Niger and
Chad (Afrol News, 15 March 2010; Nkrumah, 2000; Pliez, 2002b: 33).
Nonetheless, since 2000 Libyan policies towards migrants from Africa
have become harsher, and the official stance on migration has increasingly
emphasised the related security threats (De Haas, 2006). Commentators
have attributed this policy shift to the riots in September 2000 (De Haas,
2006).
After the unrest in Tripoli and Zawiya, involving Libyans and foreign
nationals and where 130 migrants died (only six according to Libyan official
sources),11 Libyan authorities unleashed increasingly repressive measures
against foreigners as well as Libyans (Solomon, 2006: 482). These ranged
from lengthy and arbitrary detention of migrants in prisons and camps to
hundreds of thousands of repatriations (Pargeter, 2001; Pliez, 2004: 143).
Between September and October 2000, over 6,000 Nigerians and Ghanaians
were sent home (Obisesan, 2000). In May 2001, 300 Libyans and non-Libyans
were asked to testify before a Libyan tribunal (Africa News, 22 May 2003).
The trial resulted in seven death sentences (two of them against Libyans), 12
life sentences, and 135 prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 15 years
(Pliez, 2003: 197). As I document below, ever since then Libyan authorities
have expressed growing concern over the threats posed by migrants, and
the pace of deportations has continued unabated (Pliez, 2003: 198).
In March 2004, Law No. 2, amending the 1987 law, introduced severe
penalties for irregular migrants. This came a few months before the lifting
of the European embargo. Undocumented migrants, and people facilitating
their stay, faced at least one year’s imprisonment and/or a €1,160 fine, and a
new unit was created to enforce this law (Statewatch, 2005). Every foreigner
had to meet four requirements: (a) proof that a Libyan could not do the job
he or she was proposing to do; (b) a contract with an employer; (c) registra-
tion with the tax authorities; and (d) health certification proving that he
or she did not have any contagious diseases, including HIV/AIDS (Human
Rights Watch, 2006a: 81). Where the individual was not able to meet such
requirements, he or she would receive a permit (red card) granting a stay of
three months, during which time he or she had to find work and meet the
conditions in order to gain a residency permit (green card) (Human Rights
Watch, 2006a: 81). As Human Rights Watch highlights, ‘this system should
protect those holding red or green cards from arrest and deportation, but
would expose those without such documentation to greater risk’ (Human
Rights Watch, 2006a: 81). This system was reversed under the aforemen-
tioned law of February 2007.
Furthermore, over the first few months of 2008, Libyan authorities imple-
mented drastic measures to further reduce the number of undocumented
migrants. On 16 January 2008, a Libyan news agency reported a governmen-
tal decision that ‘all foreigners illegally residing in Libya’ would be gathered
‘for immediate deportation’ (Jana News, 16 January 2008). According to the
same source, Libyan officials had agreed ‘to take several stringent measures to
ensure the implementation of legislation and decisions concerning foreign-
ers’ entry and departure in Libya, and regulations employing non-nationals’
(Jana News, 16 January 2008). Housing authorities were instructed to destroy
makeshift homes and other shelters during police raids on the outskirts of
Tripoli and in other coastal cities (Reuters, 16 January 2008).
While there is no solid evidence that Libyan authorities have fully imple-
mented such a plan, the interviews that I conducted with Libyan police
authorities in February 2008 reported that Libyan security forces were fully
engaged ‘in an unprecedented manner’ in repatriating irregular migrants.12
It is noteworthy that the official Libyan position is that such drastic meas-
ures are the consequence of European pressure. For example, the former
Libyan Ambassador to Malta declared:
Now, under European pressure, we took some hard steps, some hard
measures ... Under European pressure, because of immigration, Libya
took some steps which normally would not take such as [ ... ] detaining
them and then sending them back [to their country of origin]. And this
is because of the European pressure. Because we don’t want our rela-
tions with Europe to suffer from this. But some times you end up doing
something which you did not want to do [ ... ] We felt that we had to do
something [ ... ] to convince them [Europeans] that we are doing our best.
(Klepp, 2008)
Different sources confirm that further security policies have been imple-
mented in 2009.13 For example, new fines against undocumented foreign
workers were introduced. In September 2009, a representative of IOM

reported that in order to enter Libya, foreigners must now pay 150 Libyan
dinars and in order to obtain a residence permit 500 Libyan dinars per per-
son.14 As a result of these fines, in 2009, interviews and anecdotal evidence
collected between September 2009 and January 2010 show that large num-
bers of foreigners have left the country.15 Hundreds of irregular migrants
were also detained. In August 2009 the Ambassador of Nigeria to Libya told
the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) that 2,700 irregular migrants were kept
in various deportation camps in Libya (All Africa, 18 August 2009). There
are also reports indicating that Nigerians are being executed for violating
migration laws in Libya (Africa News, 11 August 2009). Other sources indi-
cate that twenty migrants from Somalia were killed in a prison in Benghazi
during an attempted jailbreak on 11 August 2009 (All Africa, 10 August
2009). This is also confirmed by reports on Libya produced by Human Rights
Watch. While the latest report published in December 2009 states that ‘the
past five years have witnessed an overall improvement in the human rights
situation’ (Human Rights Watch, 2009d), Human Rights Watch also laments
persistent abuse against migrants by police and by guards in Libya (Human
Rights Watch, 2009c).
As it has been made clear in the previous section on Libyan–Arab rela-
tions, in some circumstances migration policies have impaired interac-
tion between Libya and its neighbours. The law passed on March 2004,
for example, gave rise to tensions with some African countries. On March
2004, Ghana’s Interior Minister, Papa Owusu Ankoma, deplored the harsh
treatment of Ghanaians in Libya and the humiliation of those repatriated,
including being flown in cargo flights without humane facilities, seizure
of their passports and imprisonment without trial (Afrol News, 11 March
2004).
These restrictive measures notwithstanding, Colonel Qaddafi continued
to call for a united Africa, and reiterated that Libya was a welcoming coun-
try. Alongside the strengthening of the security apparatus following the
riots in year 2000, Qaddafi’s public pronouncements continued to centre on
his ‘African dream’ (The Economist, 14 September 2000). In February 2002,
Qaddafi announced to all would-be migrants to Libya that ‘the enormous
Libyan projects necessitate a significant labour force from Africa’ (Pliez,
2004: 145). In a similar vein, in June 2005, the leader stressed that:
Libya is a country belonging to all Africans. [ ... ] What we call clandestine

migration is a totally natural phenomenon. [ ... ] It is normal that Africans
move around their own land. [ ... ] Free yourself from the efforts that you
are doing now to control borders: surveillance along frontiers, custom
control, immigration and security[ ... ] Leave people free to move and to
look for a job from one place to another. If they will not find this job they
will go back to where they came from. (Panapress, 18 June 2005)
Despite the tighter security policies, the number of foreigners in Libya

remains high. In fact, it has reached a level unprecedented in Libyan history
(Pliez, 2002b: 36–7). In 2000, Libyan authorities declared that over 2.5 mil-
lion foreigners lived in the country, only 1,700 of whom possessed proper
identity cards (Pliez, 2004: 144). By some reckonings, between 70,000 and
100,000 either documented or undocumented foreigners enter the country
every year (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). Hence, while the employment of
migrants as a foreign policy tool is not new in the Libyan context, the cur-
rent scale of migration in the country, and its centrality to its domestic and
foreign agenda, are. This combination of continuity and novelty has to be
kept in mind for the analysis in the next chapters.
At this point, the analysis of the arbitrary and changeable nature of the
Libyan regime over migration needs to be complemented by an assess-
ment of the stance of the regime towards refugees and asylum-seekers. In
contending that this category of people has been used as critical ‘pawn’
by the regime in its foreign policy dealings, I intend to address one of my
initial questions and locate people’s movements in the wider setting of state
interactions.
5.4 Refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya
The protection system for asylum-seekers in Libya is profoundly ambiguous.

The Jamahiriya has signed neither the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the
1967 Protocol. The Libyan government continues to consider refugees and
asylum-seekers as foreigners residing in Libya, without any specific distinc-
tion (UNHCR, 2007: 3). As Human Rights Watch confirms:
According to top Libyan officials, an asylum system is not required

because the country has no asylum seekers or refugees. ‘We do not have
a law for this,’ said Muhammad al-Ramalli, the director of the Passports
and Nationality Office. ‘If you do not have this problem, you do not need
a law for it.’ He continued: ‘When people start to complain that they
need asylum, then we’ll know [that we need a law].’ Other officials did
not deny that Libya has refugees among the foreign population, but they
argued that Libya’s administration could not handle asylum requests.
(Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 20)
Yet the assertion that Libya neglects the institution of asylum in toto is
false. While it has not signed the Geneva Convention, Libya has granted
access to UNHCR, which opened an office in 199116 and works with Libyan
authorities on asylum requests. Libya has also signed the Convention on
Refugee Problems in Africa adopted by the Organisation for African Unity
in 1969, which encompasses a broader refugee concept, including people
displaced from their countries by external aggression or occupation, or
events seriously disturbing public order (UNHCR, 1992). The Convention

also implicitly recognises the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, Libya has
signed the Convention against Torture, and under customary international
law is obliged not to return any person to a place where they may face per-
secution or where their lives or freedom are at risk (Human Rights Watch,
2006a: 21). A few other facts are noteworthy. Libya has endorsed the 1965
Casablanca Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, and
enacted the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation that prohibited the extra-
dition of ‘political refugees’ and the 1991 Endorsement of Freedom Law
which offered ‘shelter for oppressed people and those struggling for free-
dom’ (USCRI, 2008).
According to UNHCR, in 2002 Libya hosted 12,000 refugees, including
approximately 9,000 Palestinians and nearly 3,000 refugees from Somalia
(UNHCR, 2003). Similarly, in 2005, 12,580 refugees were registered with
UNHCR in Libya, mostly from Sudan, Liberia, Eritrea, Chad, Ethiopia,
Somalia and Palestine (UNHCR, 2007: 2). As of 2009, UNHCR registered
approximately 9,000 refugees, although it estimated there were 30,000 in
the country. The majority of refugees were Palestinians, Iraqis and Somalis,
followed by smaller but growing numbers from Sudan, Eritrea and sub-Sa-
haran Africa (US Department of State, 2010).
A 2005 law allowed refugees recognised by UNHCR to receive a permit
(red card) for a stay of up to three months while they fulfilled the necessary
requirements for a residence permit (green card) (USCRI, 2008). Indeed,
UNHCR has been able to issue refugees letters attesting their protected sta-
tus. However, authorities have not always recognised them (USCRI, 2008).
The negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding which started in
2007 have not been finalised. Moreover, Libya has allowed UNHCR to visit
detention centres, although it has severely limited access to all detention
centres for independent monitoring (USCRI, 2008). In 2009 UNHCR signed
a quadripartite agreement with International Centre for Migration Policy
Development (ICMPD), the Italian Refugee Council (CIR) and International
Organization for Peace and Relief (IOPCR) (UNHCR, 2010: 5). Since 2008,
in collaboration with ICMPD and CIR, UNHCR secured the release of some
640 refugees and asylum-seekers from various centres. While they have been
been granted increased access to the centres – fifteen centres throughout
the country as of October 2009 – many such visits have taken place on an
ad hoc basis (UNHCR, 2010). Interviews with representatives of ICMPD and
CIR confirmed that they did not have access to the border zones in southern
Libya, where the majority of asylum-seekers enter the country (UNHCR,
2010: 6).17
Notably, Libya is in the process of drafting a refugee law (Frontex, 2007;
Human Rights Watch 2006a: 23). In 2006, the Libyan Ministry of Justice
established a National Legal Committee, tasked with the drafting of national
legislation on asylum (UNHCR, 2010). UNHCR was invited to advice on
the conformity of the draft with international standards (UNHCR, 2010).

While its comments were largely incorporated by the drafting committee,
as of March 2010 no further progress had been made to advance the bill ‘to
the next stage of deliberation and eventual adoption’ (UNHCR, 2010: 5).
According to one of the members of the drafting committee, its main pur-
pose is to ensure that Libya is able to provide protection free from political
considerations. In his own words:
We want Libya to recognise refugee status not on political grounds

but on humanitarian ones. This is because Libya throughout its his-
tory has always recognised refugee status to those coming from coun-
tries with which Libya had good relations. In other words, Libya has
indeed provided protection to many people fleeing wars and persecu-
tion. This, for example, happened during the war in Kosovo and on
many other occasions. Yet the decision as to whether to grant refugee
status in the past and still now has been based on political considera-
tions. Libya has been granting refugee status only to people coming
from certain countries and not from other countries. Hence, the idea
behind this law is to make sure that Libya is able to recognise refugee
status [ ... ] on humanitarian considerations, regardless of political con-
siderations.18
Overall, the fact that Libya has been providing refugee status and protection
on the basis of political considerations was confirmed by an anonymous
UNHCR informant:
Libyan authorities do not always respect this [the refugee status that
UNHCR grants]. Usually this depends on the nationality of the people
to which refugee status is granted. For example, towards the Palestinians,
Libyan authorities have showed a lot of respect. This is because they are
Arab, they share the same language and they are considered to be close
to Libyans. Hence, Palestinians are not treated as foreigners, and are
respected by Libyan authorities. But, Libyans have shown less respect
towards Africans who are often subject to detention and harassment.
Even people to whom we have granted refugee status face problems in
terms of detention and harassment. This is because the official Libyan
position is that there are no refugees in the country.19
In other words, different sources indicate that Libya has provided refugee
protection, but in a clumsy manner. As UNHCR put it, ‘UNHCR’s operating
environment remains largely unpredictable, and the execution of its protec-
tion functions ad-hoc and unsystematic’ (UNHCR, 2010: 5). Let me turn,
therefore, to discussion of the linkage between asylum-seekers and refugees
and Libya’s foreign policy.20
As Baer notes, Qaddafi’s attempt in 1994 to expel over 30,000 Palestinian

refugees from Libya to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to destabilise
the Israeli–Palestinian peace process exemplifies how Libya has used expul-
sion as a political weapon (Baer, 1996: 244).21 On 1 September 1994, Qaddafi
made a speech condemning the proposed Israeli–Palestinian peace plan. In
his own words, ‘what is happening in the name of peace is nothing but a
surrender and a recognition of the existence of Israel at the expense of the
Palestinians’ (Baer, 1996: 244). Arguing that the proposed peace plan was
a betrayal of the millions of Palestinian ‘refugees’ created when Israel was
founded in 1948, Qaddafi called for a return of the Palestinians to Palestine.
In August 1995, Libya sent approximately 1,000 Palestinians via bus to the
Egyptian–Libyan border, where makeshift refugee camps were constructed
(Associated Press, 30 October 1995). In September 1995, Qaddafi reiter-
ated his intention to expel over 30,000 of the Palestinians present in Libya
(BBC, 30 October 1995). Likewise, in a press conference in October 1995,
the Libyan leader justified such a decision on the grounds that this was not
deportation, but rather return of Palestinians to their home country:
Is deportation from your country or from another one? Why do you for-
get their deportation and expulsion from Palestine? This is a return and
not an expulsion. This is pushing the Palestinians, in accordance with
their wishes or not, to return to Palestine. [ ... ] Hence this is not deporta-
tion. The deportee is he who is deported from his land and not he who is
pushed towards his land. The one pushed towards his home is a returnee.
[ ... ] This is the first point we want to correct and show that there is a
great deception, disregard of the Arabs and misdirection of international
public opinion concerning what is happening now to the Palestinians.
(Al Qaddafi, 1995)
The speech was followed by the expulsion of other Palestinians to camps on

the Egyptian–Libyan border, until the Libyan leader suspended his plans
and permitted some of the Palestinians to return to Libya (Baer, 1996: 244;
UNHCR, 1995: 31). However, some 250 of those expelled remained stranded
on the Libya–Egypt border throughout 1996, unable to travel through
Egypt and unwilling to return to Libya. Large numbers of Palestinians
who remained in Libya were fired from their jobs. During 1996, thousands
approached UNHCR, seeking assistance (US Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants, 1998).
A similar incident occurred in March 2007, when Colonel Qaddafi decided
to boycott the Arab League’s summit in response to what he considered to
be the Arab leaders’ plan to ‘sacrifice’ the refugee issue in order to please
Israel. As the Libyan newspaper al-Jamahiriya reported, Libya opposed ‘the
settling of refugees far away from their homeland’ and wanted ‘to allow
thousand of Palestinians who reside within its territory to move to the Gaza
Strip through Egypt, before the plot to settle them in the Arab countries
materialises’ (Middle East Online, 17 March 2007). However, there is no
evidence that the Libyan regime actually deported them.
The second example regards the ‘protection’ provided to Bosnian children
fleeing the conflict in former Yugoslavia.22 In December 1992, 1,000 chil-
dren were evacuated from Bosnia-Herzegovina, for a supposedly six-month
stay, in a specially built compound in Al-Garabouli, a village 30 miles
(50 km) east of Tripoli. In July 1994, after sixteen months of residence in
Libya, the children were returned to Bosnia at the insistence of the parents
(Associated Press, 10 June 1995; BBC, 2 July 1994). Presumably in providing
assistance Libya intended to strengthen its linkage with Muslim nations, in
opposition to the Western world (Post Standard, 4 August 1992). As CNN
noted, among Serbia’s main oil suppliers, Iran, Iraq and Libya were ‘angered
by the plight of the Bosnian Muslims’ (CNN, 30 May 1992).
These examples corroborate Loescher and Monahan’s observation that
refugees and asylum-seekers are often used as foreign policy tools:
Refugees are often used, both symbolically and instrumentally, to pur-

sue foreign-policy objectives. Symbolically, refugees ‘vote with their feet’,
thereby demonstrating the bankruptcy of their nation’s political and eco-
nomic system. Refugee policy also can be used to embarrass or destabilize
enemy governments. (Loescher and Monahan, 1989: 12)
The recourse to using refugees for political ends appears to be a consistent

feature of Libya’s foreign policy. Its breach of the customary international
law on asylum, and its elusive stance on asylum matters, are accompanied
by initiatives providing ad hoc protection to ‘refugees’. However, to under-
stand the full significance of migration in the domestic Libyan context, I
now direct attention to EU–Libyan relations. The appreciation of such deep-
ening diplomatic interaction carries significant implications for the negotia-
tions between Libya and Italy.
5.5 EU–Libyan relations
With the gradual reintegration of Libya into the international commu-

nity, the European Union has sought to strengthen its relationship with
the former rogue state. Libya’s announcement that it would dismantle its
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme and other factors such as
the gradual settlement of the Lockerbie issue paved the way for a rapproche-
ment between Libya and the EU. In November 2002, the EU Justice and
Home Affairs Council decided that it was essential to initiate cooperation
with Libya, and, on 14 April 2003, it approved the expert mission to Libya
to commence talks on migration (Council, 2005a). This took place on 11
and 17 May 2003 (EC, 2005d: 21). In October 2004, the Council stated that
Libya’s full integration into the Barcelona Process was the overall objec-
tive of the engagement. It also reiterated that participation in the Barcelona
Process,23 and subsequent progress towards an Association Agreement, was
‘subject to Libya’s readiness to accept fully and unconditionally the Barcelona
Declaration’ (Council, 2004b). On 11 October 2004, the European arms
embargo on Libya was lifted, and between November and December 2004
a second mission to Libya was undertaken (EC, 2005d). The findings of this
official visit were released in a detailed and often quoted report focusing on
irregular migration in Libya (EC, 2005d).
The following year, in June 2005, the Council endorsed the initiation
of ‘an ad hoc dialogue’ on migration, in recognition of the fact that full
cooperation could not take place in the absence of formal relations between
the two parties (Council, 2005c). Informal dialogue proceeded slowly until
the landmark events of 2007, namely the release of imprisoned Bulgarian
nurses24 and a Palestinian doctor in July 2007, an issue considered to be as
critical as Lockerbie had been25 (Butler, 2007).
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner applauded Libya’s decision, and, after
the arrival of the nurses in Sofia on 24 July 2007, announced ‘a new and
enhanced relationship between the EU and Libya’, which would reinforce
European ties with the Mediterranean region and the whole of Africa (EC,
2007a). On this occasion, a ‘full’ EU–Libya partnership was agreed upon,
and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the two parties (The
Guardian, 24 July 2007). On February 2008, the EU proposed negotiating
a Framework Agreement with Libya (EC, 2008a). In fact, on 14 September
2008 a preliminary session of EU–Libyan talks was held in Tripoli to pre-
pare for the official negotiations which were officially launched on 12–13
November 2008 (EC, 2010). In particular the following three priorities for
EC cooperation were identified ‘(1) improving the quality of human capital;
(2) increasing the sustainability of economic and social development; and
(3) addressing jointly the challenge of managing migration’ (EC, 2010: 6). In
this context, the specific dialogue on migration warrants consideration.
On 2–3 June 2005 the Council of the European Union adopted concrete
guidelines for cooperation with Libya (EC, 2005d). Consultations were held
on joint measures for rescue at sea and in the desert, and on the adop-
tion of a joint action plan for cooperation on migration issues (EC, 2005d).
The following statement by Frattini, formerly EU Commissioner for Justice,
Freedom and Security, summarises the EU’s approach to Libya:
Our final goal is to have an agreement with Libya because we need an

agreement. We need Libya involved in the Barcelona process. We will
celebrate ten years of the Barcelona process this year in November, and of
course we need Libya on board. But there are political preconditions. The
most important precondition is the full respect, so that’s the signature,
of the Geneva Convention on Refugees. To do that we should encourage
them, I don’t like the blame and shame method. I prefer to stimulate, to
help, also to provide funds because they respond. [ ... ] We should under-
stand that if we want Libya on board, we should help Libya to do that.
(The Parliament, 2005)
Nonetheless, as I will explore in Chapters 6 and 7, Libya turned down

the request from the EU to collaborate with Frontex, and instead asked
the EU engage in a one-to-one interaction. As of 2008, the EU has offered
Libya $1.9 million under the AENEAS programme (EC, no date)26 to sup-
port, among other initiatives, the IOM-managed project, Across Sahara.
This will be explored further in Chapter 7. In 2009, the Commission
announced its intention to allocate €20 million for migration (EC, 2010:
12). As of March 2010, the allocation of such funds had yet to be agreed
upon (EC, 2010).
With the announcement in July 2007 of the full partnership, Shalgam
was reported as saying that the EU was committed to provide other aid on a
wide range of issues including support for security on Libya’s northern and
southern borders to combat irregular migration (The International Herald
Tribune, 24 July 2007). Indeed, in September 2007 a press release from the
Italian Ministry of the Interior indicated that the EU had agreed to finance
the provision of electronic equipment to control Libya’s southern borders
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2007f). As of March 2010, the few measures on
migration that have been financed by the EU have been co-implemented by
the Italian government and IOM (EC, 2010; IOM, 2008a).
It is worth emphasising that, despite European insistence, Libya has
refused to join Frontex missions as well as the Barcelona Process. As con-
cerns the first issue, it is noteworthy that Libyan officials have contin-
ued to oppose EU-led patrolling of the Mediterranean, even though they
have agreed in principle to conduct joint patrolling operations with Italy
(Frontex, 2007: 9). Be that as it may, with the settlement of the dispute
over the Bulgarian nurses and the immediate announcement of full part-
nership, the EU has implicitly complied with the Libyan agenda. As of
March 2010, the North African country is still not an active member of the
European-Mediterranean Partnership and, by implication, is not techni-
cally eligible for MEDA funding (EC, 2009b). Yet, even without adhering to
the Euro-Med institutional framework Libya has been able to obtain partial
and targeted EU assistance (EC, 2009b, EC, 2010). The ongoing discussions
on the Framework Agreement would indeed entail bilateral cooperation
outside the Barcelona framework.27 Arguably, because of the priority that
migration has acquired in the EU political debate, the EU has opted to make
special concessions to the Jamahiriya, at the expense of Libyan endorse-
ment of the Barcelona acquis. It is equally relevant the fact that the negotia-
tions on the Framework Agreement have continued, despite the repeated
refusal of Libya to endorse Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union (Libyaonline,

6 August 2008).28
This brief overview of Libyan–EU interaction invites reflection on
the strategic relevance of migration in foreign policy, taking us back to
the main thread of this chapter. Migration has long been a pivotal issue
shaping the relations between Libya and its neighbours. The interaction
with the EU exemplifies the increasing reliance of the EU on its counter-
part for the successful implementation of effective border control policies.
While the EU–Libya agenda encompasses a diverse range of issues (EC,
2008a), migration markedly influences the wider bargaining patterns.
Concomitantly, over the last few years Libya’s political discourse has increas-
ingly emphasised the security dimension of migration. The construction
and legitimisation of the migration-security paradigm has proved to be a
useful expedient from Libya’s vantage-point. It is the emerging security nar-
rative that I shall now explore.
5.6 Libya’s official discourse on migration
As Minister Shalgam stated, ‘if, for you Italians, illegal immigration is a

problem, for us it’s much more – it’s an invasion’ (The Guardian, 11 August
2004). Similarly, a former Libyan Prime Minister, maintained:
We are victims of illegal immigration more than you [Italians] are. You
are richer and wealthier than us. Plus, the number that comes to us is
higher than the number that comes to you. Your ability to control it is
higher. Hence, migration is becoming for us a much bigger problem than
it is for you.29
In the inaugural address of the Ministerial Meeting on Migration and

Development between the African Union and the European Union on
November 2006, Qaddafi made it clear that he hoped ‘to see an end to
migration’. In his own words:
Libya is one of the countries that have been severely affected by migra-
tion. It has depleted our resources. We have twice or three times as many
people as our own in Libya. We feed them, house them, provide them
with transportation, and they take their share of all the cheap products
subsidized by the Libyan budget. (Al Qaddafi, 2006)
By and large, migration in Libya is considered a sensitive security issue for

five reasons: (1) higher unemployment; (2) rising criminality and linkages
with terrorism; (3) threat to national identity; (4) spread of new diseases;
and (5) educational standards. I shall now analyse each of these factors.
First, according to Libyan officials, migrants strain Libya’s economy and

labour market. A former high-ranking government representative bluntly
told me: ‘migrants take a lot of jobs from us’.30 Presumably, the perceived
grievance caused by foreign workers is linked to rising unemployment
levels.31 According to the World Bank, in 2009 unemployment was esti-
mated to be at least 30 per cent (World Bank, 2009).32 Furthermore, the
same organisation predicted that, because 50 per cent of the population was
under the age of 20, labour market tensions would increase in coming years
(World Bank, 2006). This concern might explain the recent law to revise for-
eign labour regulations and impose new restrictions on work permits (Ljbc,
29 January 2007). It may also justify Qaddafi’s declaration in March 2008
that the Libyan economy had failed and that oil revenues would be distrib-
uted to the Libyan people (Al Qaddafi, 2008a).33
However, some of the officials whom I interviewed expressed a differ-
ent opinion, conceding that migrants are instrumental in filling gaps in
the labour market. For example, a representative of the Libyan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, while emphasising the social and health problems posed by
migrants, also maintained that Libya is ‘not against migrants. They help in
the development of the country and they are a source of cheap labour.’34
Likewise an UNHCR official maintained:
This is the general perception of migration, that migration is a threat.

However, I believe that there is another side of the coin. Little is said
about how vital migration is for the Libyan economy. Migration is indeed
a vital element. Most foreign workers do jobs that Libyans do not want to
do. Foreign workers represent a significant part of the Libyan economy.
Clearly, the focus of the authorities is on illegal migration. But there is lit-
tle discussion on the role of foreign legal workers and their contribution
to the Libyan economy.35
In the same vein, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) acknowl-

edges that ‘over the last few decades, Libya has relied heavily on foreign
labour for its economic development and [ ... ] whole sectors such as agricul-
ture and building industry depend on migrant workers’ (ILO, 2004).
Second, my interviews with Libyan authorities indicate that migrants
have been increasingly associated with rising criminality. As an adviser to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised, ‘migrants pose many problems
[ ... ] and there has been a significant increase in criminal activity as a result
of the higher number of foreigners.’36 Interestingly, this view appears to be
endorsed by African authorities too. For example, according to the Nigerian
Minister for Economic Integration, ‘many [Nigerians] are implicated in crime
and prostitution in order to survive’ (Pliez, 2004: 143).
Many of the governmental representatives whom I interviewed appeared
to perceive migrants as a menace to Libya’s society. The problems of rising
Table 5.1 Crimes committed by foreign nationals in Libya in

2006 and 2007
Type of crimes 2006 2007
Killings 132 213

Drug related crimes 611 768
Thefts 325 761
Crimes related to alcohol 74 224
Fraud 79 200
Public security 1 2
Note: It is important to stress that the data for 2006 refer to crimes that
have already received a sentence from a judge, while the 2007 data are
the number of people arrested but not yet sentenced. Thus, it is impor-
tant not to directly compare such figures. However, the point here is
that, regardless of this differentiation, the number of crimes appre-
hended is minor if compared to the size of the foreign population living
in Libya, i.e. over 1.5 million migrants.
Source: Libyan Ministry of the Interior (2007a).
drug consumption37 and of migrants as ‘assassins’ [sic]38 were mentioned on

several occasions.39 For an accurate assessment to be made, it is illuminat-
ing to compare the official position with the figures on crimes committed
by migrants in Libya. Statistics provided by the Libyan government indicate
that, because of undocumented migration, crime increased by 30 per cent
in 2005 alone.40 Yet the breakdown of crimes provided by other sources at
the Libyan Ministry of the Interior indicates that the crime rate is relatively
low (see Table 5.1). Indeed, as the Chief of Mission of IOM noted, the inci-
dence of criminality is negligible if we compare it to the number of foreign
nationals living in Libya. In his words, ‘if we consider that there are at least
1.5 million migrants, the proportion of criminal offences committed by
foreigners in Libya is not that high.’41
Moreover, migration is treated as a security issue because of its alleged
links with terrorism. According to this view, ‘terrorists’ may infiltrate the
country through migrant flows. The survey conducted by Amal Obeidi
at Garyounis University in Benghazi shows that for Libyan students and
academics ‘illegal’ migration is the biggest concern after terrorism, since it
affects negatively the security of Libya and of its neighbours (Obeidi, 2007:
13).42 Obeidi’s survey also reports that most of the respondents link migra-
tion to the ‘spread of the activities of some of the Islamic groups from other
Arab countries to Libya’ (Obeidi, 2007: 13). This view reflects the opinion of
other Libyan academics whom I interviewed. For example, one influential
Libyan professor told me that ‘60 or 50 percent of migrants are Muslim,
and many come from countries where there are extremist organisations.’43
Likewise, another Libyan professor asserted that ‘migrants represent a link
with terrorist organisations. This link has been proved.’44
The significance of this point can be further appreciated in view of the

increasing concern of Libya about international terrorism. Since the 1990s,
the Libyan regime has sought to realign itself and join the US struggle
against terrorism (Perrin, 2004). In 1999, the Libyan government surren-
dered the two Lockerbie suspects, which led to the suspension of UN sanc-
tions (US State Department, 2007). Not only was Libya the first country to
issue an international arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden, but in the wake
of 11 September 2001 the Colonel immediately offered condolences to the
United States and provided concrete information on Al Qaeda to the Bush
administration (Joffé, 2004: 223; St John, 2003). As part of the efforts to
redeem itself internationally, in August 2003 the regime sent a letter to the
UN Security Council formally renouncing terrorism (US State Department,
2007b). The central point here is that the Libyan regime has, for both inter-
nal and foreign policy reasons, sought to distance itself from international
terrorism.45
Third, migration is considered to be a threat to Libya’s national iden-
tity. According to internal sources provided by the Libyan Ministry of the
Interior, Libya attracts migrants not only for its economic opportunities
but also for ‘its cultural and ethnic homogeneity’.46 Since the revolution
in 1969, the Libyan leader has sought to instil a sense of national identity
through a process of ‘socialisation’ based on Arab nationalism (Obeidi,
2001: 86).47 Consequently, it is feared that the increasing presence of
migrants will reverse the nation-building process advocated by Qaddafi.
This problem applies particularly to Libya’s southern region, where a
growing proportion of inhabitants are of African origin. As Laurence Hart
put it:
There are some villages in the South and in the desert that are undergoing
a process of ‘Africanisation’. In these parts of the country, the Africans
outnumber the Libyans. This clearly raises some questions concerning
integration and national identity.48
Fourth, migration is seen as facilitating the spread of new diseases. During

a press conference in October 1995, Qaddafi declared:
Dangerous diseases have become widespread in Libya because it has

opened its borders to everybody. The AIDS was found in Libya, carried
by those workers who came from abroad. Cholera was found in Ijdabya,
20 cases were found last month, because of African workers. (BBC,
26 October 1995)
A number of Libyan officials interviewed at the Ministry of the Interior and

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that migrants bring HIV and dis-
eases, which did not previously exist in Libya. For example, the director of
a migrant detention centre in Libya maintained:
In our centre, diseases that had not been in the country for over 50 years
have reappeared again. All these new diseases have been brought by
migrants and include pneumonia, lice and AIDS. [ ... ] As a result, it is more
difficult to manage the centre now than it was in the past. For example,
a number of police officers that work in the centre got ill because of the
migrants. One police officer caught a disease from a migrant and had
to remain at home for one month. Another had to be cured outside the
country for the same reason.49
This view appears to be confirmed by the report on Libya produced in

2006 by the World Health Organization which maintains that ‘HIV/AIDS
incidence has increased due to prevailing risk conditions, such as increas-
ing numbers of injecting drug users and unregistered immigrants from
infected areas’ (WHO, 2006: 52). Nonetheless, a subsequent report by the
same organisation maintains instead that ‘official data, which is very lim-
ited, does not show a high rate of HIV/AIDS infection’ (WHO, 2007: 21).
Indeed, the director of a hospital outside Tripoli cautioned against this view.
According to him, Africans do not significantly affect HIV infection rates.
Because there is little interaction between Libyans and Africans, the spread
of HIV in Libya is not pronounced. Indeed, data provided by the CIA World
Factbook indicates that, as of 2001, the HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate was
0.3 per cent (CIA, 2007). According to other sources, as of 2003 the rate
remained unchanged (UNESCO, 2003). Meanwhile, the director reported a
higher incidence of hepatitis A, because of the practice of smoking ‘shisha’,50
introduced into Libya by Egyptians.
Fifth, the Libyan security stance holds that migration offsets the educa-
tional breakthrough that Libya has enjoyed over the last few decades. One
of the primary objectives, and in fact successes, of the Libyan ‘revolution’
has been the remarkable improvements in educational standards. The World
Bank acknowledges that
Libya boasts some of the highest literacy rates in North Africa (estimated
at around 84 percent) and has made substantial improvements in the
past two decades, cutting female youth illiteracy from 39 percent in 1980
to 4 percent in 2007. (World Bank, 2009)
In this regard, the Italian Ambassador to Libya reported a concern shared by

Libyan authorities. Many migrants are unable to provide education to their
children because they lack financial resources and are undocumented. Thus,
a significant number of migrant children grow up illiterate.51 Nonetheless,
this information has been neither confirmed nor disproved by other sources.
In fact limited official data elaborated by UNESCO indicate that education
enrolment ratios have increased (UNESCO, 2007). In the absence of com-

prehensive data on the educational standards of the foreign population in
Libya, it is not possible to assess its validity.
5.7 Conclusion
An examination of migration flows and policies in Libya partly discred-

its Qaddafi’s long-standing reputation as an ‘ebullient and unpredictable
colonel’ (Pliez, 2004: 7). A more precise description is provided by Soliman,
according to whom the regime is an epitome of ‘controlled chaos’ (Soliman,
2004). Arguably, the continued turbulence of the regime can be regarded as
a foreign policy tactic (Soliman, 2004). Qaddafi’s ‘politics of contradiction’
has proved a successful strategy. By confusing any potential interlocutor,
the Libyan leader has been able to increase his bargaining power and, by
implication, advance Libya’s interests (El-Kikhia, 1997; Soliman, 2004). To
be sure, the regime has used controls at borders and on migration to increase
its leeway not only vis-à-vis countries across Africa and the Arab world but
also with countries in the ‘West’. The diplomatic dispute with Switzerland in
2008 and 2009 that resulted in Libya’s refusal to grant visas to citizens from
the Schengen area (Swissinfo, 15 February 2010; Oxford Analytica, 2010)
attests to the instrumental use that the Northern African country makes
of entry and exit policies towards migrant-sending and migrant-receiving
countries alike.
Because of its location at the junction between Africa, Europe and the
Middle East, Libya has historically been a dense migratory space for not
only migrant movements but also an increasingly intense flow of merchan-
dise (Pliez, 2002b: 31). This complexity is summarised in Burgat’s three-fold
characterisation of Libya as ‘le coeur en Orient’, ‘le raison maghrebine’ and
‘l’Afrique des commandes et des credit’ (Burgat and Laronde, 1996: 106–110;
Pliez, 2004: 9). This critical geo-political location has been utilised by the
Libyan regime for both economic and political ends. As Lohrmann and
Manfrass noted in 1974, the movement of people across nations towards
places whose economies are expanding has led to the creation of inte-
grated systems in which labour forces have become a currency for exchange
between states (Lohrmann and Manfrass, 1974).
Libya’s bewildering border control policies expose the critical tie link-
ing migration with Libya’s domestic and foreign policies agenda. If one
looks beneath Libyan contradictory migration policies and relations with
its neighbours and with the EU, the linkage becomes clear. The semblance
of chaos and unpredictability hinges upon, and conceals, a certain degree
of pragmatism, exemplified in a set of policies aimed at advancing Libyan
internal and foreign objectives. These policies have been neither unfailingly
consistent nor politically and economically successful. Furthermore, they
have not been applied in a systematic way, but rather in an ad hoc manner.
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a deeper trend, whereby migration has

proved to be a strategic device for putting political and economic pressure
on specific countries. Thereby, the distinctive framing of the political dis-
course around security, fear and the ‘migrant other’ fits within this larger
setting of migration shaping inter-state relations. The key idea here is that
the securitised stance on migration strengthens Libya’s negotiating position
in the international arena.
Part III
Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral
Agreements on Migration
6
Historical Background on the
Agreements between Italy and Libya
6.1 Introduction
The agreement signed on August 2008 between Silvio Berlusconi, and the
Libyan leader was welcomed by the former as a guarantee of ‘more oil and
less migrants’ (Il Manifesto, 31 August 2008; Paoletti, 2009). As a ‘complete
and moral acknowledgement of the damage inflicted on Libya by Italy dur-
ing the colonial era’, Italy agreed to pay Libya US$5 billion over the next
25 years through investments in infrastructure projects, the largest project
being a coastal motorway between the Egyptian and Tunisian borders (BBC,
30 August 2008; Gazzini, 2009). This agreement was portrayed, at least on
the Italian side, as the final settlement of a more than four-decade-long
conflicting relationship (The Economist, 28 August 2008). To appreciate
why and how the two countries reached this deal, which covered every-
thing from migration, economic relations and archaeological artefacts to
colonial issues, a long-term historical view is instructive. This serves as an
introduction to the core analysis on the joint measures implemented on
migration in the next chapter. An account of the principal issues that have
been of relevance to the two countries from the Italian colonial period to
January 2010 serves to put the present-day negotiations on migration into
context.
Ultimately, I seek to convey the complex political and economic motiva-
tions characterising Italian–Libyan interactions, and examine the under-
lying bargaining patterns that will be further explored in the rest of the
book. It will emerge that migration is closely linked to the other items on
the negotiating table. This empirical and descriptive detour illustrates how
policy options and, by implication, overall negotiation outcomes are reliant
upon the more or less explicit rules and procedures institutionalising the
aggregation or disaggregation of specific demands and concessions.
With these broad aims in mind, I divide the following discussion into five
sections. First, I outline the historical relations from the colonial period until
the mid-1990s. Given the centrality of the colonial issues in the ongoing
107
relations, understanding their full significance is important for my initial

purposes. The next section is devoted to the period between 1998 and 2000,
when the discussions on migration started; while the signature of the Joint
Communication in 2000 is presented in the third section. In the fourth
section, I examine the intense diplomatic exchange under the Berlusconi
government between 2001 and 2006. The fifth section overviews the most
recent developments undertaken by the Prodi government, through the
agreement signed by Berlusconi in August 2008 and January 2010 when this
book was completed after my most recent field research to Libya.
6.2 Historical background from 1911 to the 1990s
The historical relations between Italy and Libya have already been investi-
gated by a number of Italian historians (Bono 2005; Del Boca, 1997a, 1997b;
Labanca 2007; Rochat, 1976). In building upon their work, this chapter pro-
vides a sketchy account of the historical interaction between the two coun-
tries between the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century.
Well before the Italo-Turkish war in 1911, Italy had substantial economic
and political relations with the then Ottoman region. In fact, Italian aspira-
tions to establish the Quarta Sponda,1 (the ‘fourth shore’) as an extension of
Italy across the Mediterranean, date back to the first half of the nineteenth
century (Romano, 2005; Segrè, 1974a). Nonetheless, Italy had failed to estab-
lish a colonial empire by the nineteenth century because of, among other
things, its political weakness after the Unification in 1861 (Askew, 1943:
3–4). Accordingly, after 1880 it became an axiom of Italian foreign policy
that Tripoli, with its long Mediterranean seacoast must, some day, become
Italian territory (Askew, 1943: 4).
Libya was the only region on the North African coast that was outside the
immediate colonial ambitions of the other imperial powers (Hesnawi, 2003:
50). Given its strategic geographic location, Italy saw Libya as a useful foot-
hold that could serve the ends of its colonial designs in the Mediterranean
(Hesnawi, 2003). As a result, the Italian government started implementing
what was called ‘peaceful penetration’, involving the deepening of Italian
commercial interests abroad to ensure incremental control over the region
(Askew, 1943; Hess 1973).
One of the main tools of the peaceful penetration was the Banco di Roma.
Since 1887, the bank, in which the Vatican had deposited its surplus funds
(Cunsolo, 1965), became increasingly active in Libya (Mori, 1957). The gov-
ernment entrusted the bank with its plan of ‘spontaneous colonisation’ in
order to play an active role in the European colonial policy (Hesnawi, 2003:
51). In 1907, the bank opened its first branch in Tripoli and by 1911 had
acquired industrial holdings, mining concessions and shipping installations
in the country (Cunsolo, 1965; Hesnawi, 2003: 51). However, as early as 1904
economic penetration was deemed unsuccessful by the Italian government
Background on the Agreements between Italy and Libya 109
(Winston, 1990). One of the reasons was that Turks discriminated against
Italian enterprises based in the region (Winston, 1990: 31). In response, Italy
resorted to armed conquest.
On 3 October 1911, Italy issued an ultimatum to Istanbul, and the follow-
ing day the Port of Tripoli was attacked (Romano, 2005). The decision to
invade taken by then Italian Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, was driven
mainly by diplomatic considerations at regional level (Romano, 2005).
Giolitti sought to ‘prove’ to the other European states the capacity of Italy to
establish its own colonial power. As Romano puts it, ‘pride and insecurity’
were the defining qualifications of Italy fifty years after its independence
(Romano, 2005: 175). While other factors such as Italy’s demographic prob-
lems also played an important role (Winston, 1999: 31), Italy’s self-image
in the international milieu as the ‘least of the Great Powers’ needs to be
borne in mind (Winston, 1990). Indeed, it has long been recognised that the
‘anxiety’ about being sidelined or even excluded by the other international
players is the thread running through Italy’s troubled foreign policy his-
tory (Pargeter, 2001: 6; Romano, 2005). The frustration of being considered
a ‘Great Power by courtesy’ (Winston, 1990: 35) continues to the present
day, and, as it will become clear in the chapters to come, informs current
Italian–Libyan relations.
A detailed examination of the Italian–Turkish war and of the subsequent
developments of Italian political rule in Libya goes beyond the scope of this
research. I shall therefore limit this analysis to those aspects thereof that
help us to comprehend the negotiations on migration. In short, the Italian
colonial occupation proved more problematic than expected (Romano,
2005). What was expected to be a very easy military venture turned into a
struggle lasting for over thirty years (Segrè, 1974b: 45). While Tripolitania
was brought under control by 1924, the eastern region of Cyrenaica resisted
until 1932 (Hesnawi, 2003: 93).
One of the contentious issues at the centre of the bilateral negotiations
concerns the harm inflicted by Italy on the Libyan population during the
colonial period. By now, historical research has identified with certainty a
number of episodes that, by virtue of existing laws and norms, or conven-
tions to which Italy had subscribed, can be defined as war crimes (Labanca,
2004: 303). Labanca distinguishes the crimes committed in the liberal
and fascist periods. In the first period, those relevant to Libya include the
organised reaction to the defeat at Shara Shat2 and the burning of Tripoli
in October 1911; and, more generally the totality of actions and behaviour
defined as ‘troop excesses’ between 1911 and 1915 (Labanca, 2004).
One example is the Caneva decree of 5 November 1911, imposing death
sentences ‘according to local custom’ (Labanca, 2004: 304). During the fas-
cist period, repression of anti-colonial resistance included the use of chemical
weapons, the construction of concentration camps, especially in Cyrenaica,
to detain the civilian population (Labanca, 2004: 304) and the deportation
of Libyans to Italy (Del Boca, 1991; Edeek, 2003: 94). The detention camps
in Libya included Marsa Brega with 21,000 places, Soluch with 20,000, Sidi
Ahmed el Magrun with 13,050, el Agheila, with 10,900, Agedabia with 10,000,
and el-Abiar with 3,000 (Del Boca, 1991). Between 80,000 and 100,000 peo-
ple died in the repression in general (Del Boca, 1991; Edeek, 2003: 94). On
these grounds, some historians have made a claim of genocidal acts against
the Cyrenean population (Labanca, 2004: 306; Salerno 2008).
Importantly, the ‘dark side’ of the Italian colonial chapter still represents
a national taboo (Del Boca, 2003 and 2005; The Economist, 31 July 2008;
Labanca, 2004). Thanks to a pervasive sense of ‘collective guilt’ (La Rovere,
2008), silence has long reigned in the Italian public discourse, as well as in
Italian historical studies, regarding possible crimes committed by Italy in
its colonial territories (Labanca, 2004). Presumably as a response to the ‘lost
debate’, if not denial, of the colonial faults (La Rovere, 2008), the Libyan
leader has persistently emphasised them.
In fact, until 2007 the month of October continued to be dedicated to
commemoration of Libyan martyrs and, in particular, on 7 October, the
regime used to celebrate the ‘day of the revenge’ against Italy (Del Boca,
1998: 129; Ljbc, 10 October 2007). While in October 2008, the ‘Fulfilment
Day’ was proclaimed to mark the renewed dialogue between the two coun-
tries (Jana News, 7 October 2008), tensions appeared to persist. After the sig-
nature of the friendship agreement with Italy on 1 September 2008, which
was supposed to finally settle the colonial contentions, Qaddafi declared:
We would never forgive Italy for what it had perpetrated against us ... It
displaced us; forced our people to live in the world’s neighboring coun-
tries; you [Italy] destroyed our land and filled it with mines; you erected
gibbets, where thousands of martyrs had been hanged; even Omar al-
Mukhtar, the hero of the Libyan resistance, was executed by hanging
instead of shooting; they considered him as a rebel against the govern-
ment [ ... ] which government? (Al Qaddafi, 2008b)
In returning to our historical excursus, it is noteworthy that, from an eco-

nomic standpoint, the new colony did not prove to be a profitable invest-
ment (Segrè, 1974b). Some of the criticism that had been levelled against
Giolitti before the attack in 1911 proved correct. The land that had been
defined by the Italian parliamentarian Francesco Nitti in 1911 as a ‘box of
sand’ (Pecoraro, 2005) placed an economic strain on Rome. Indeed, Italian
colonies failed to establish solid commercial activities. In Labanca’s words,
‘the narrowness of the commercial interests says a lot about the restricted
bases of the colonial imperialism’ of Italy as ‘the last of the great powers’
(Labanca, 1993: 163–4; see also De Grand, 2004).
In addition, Italy was not able to benefit from the oil resources before
Libya’s independence in 1951. It has been documented that, during the
colonial period, Italy established solid foundations for future searches of oil
(Buccianti, 1999: 34). The first oil explorations, though not successful, date
back to 1914 (Buccianti, 1999: 21; Curotti, 1973: 183). The studies conducted
by the Italian geologist Ardito Desio prove that, by the 1930s, major oil sites
had already been identified (Buccianti, 1999: 34). Accordingly, Buccianti
writes that it is ‘absolutely untrue to argue that Italy has ignored the ques-
tion of oil during its occupation of Libya’ (Buccianti, 1999: 34–6). If Italy
was aware of the oil resources, it was, however, unable to gain from them.
When the commercialisation of oil commenced in the 1960s, Italy had long
gone (Vandewalle, 1995: 4). In a nutshell, the Italian colonial enterprise was
based much less on economic interest than on national pride and as an out-
let for surplus populations (Vandewalle, 2006: 41).
The Second World War marked the end of the Italian colonial experience
(Segrè, 1974b). Following the defeat of the Italian–German axis in 1943,
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came under British administration and Fezzan
under the French (Lewis and Gordon, 1954). Predictably, the interest in
Libya displayed by the European powers was driven mainly by their desire
to secure control over its oil revenues (Bernini, 2001; Buccianti, 1999). It is
also noteworthy that, in the negotiations leading to Libya’s independence,
Italy played a minor role. The discussions preceding the final UN decision
evince, yet again, the ‘political-psychological syndrome’ of Italy as ‘a loser’
that would haunt Italy for years to come in the conduct of its foreign policy
(Buccianti, 1999: 340). Under the terms of the 1947 Peace Treaty with the
Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya (Klunz, 1947).
After the rejection by the UN General Assembly of the Bevin-Sforza agree-
ment, which would have granted Italy control over Tripolitania, on 21
November 1949 the Assembly proceeded to pass Resolution 289 (IV), rec-
ognising the independence of Libya (Pelt, 1970). Upon return from exile
in Egypt, King Idris represented Libya in the subsequent UN negotiations.
On 24 December 1951, Libya declared its independence as the United
Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King
Idris (Khaddouri, 1963). A few years later, on 2 October 1956, Italy and Libya
reached an agreement settling Libyan requests for Italian compensation for
the colonial past (Segrè, 1974b: 206). As part of this agreement, the Italian
government paid the sum of £5 million in colonial damages, and Libya
committed itself to recognise Italian properties (Segrè, 1974b: 206).
The period following the institution of the monarchy saw dramatic
increases in oil production. By the end of 1955, 55 concessions had already
been assigned, and by the end of the 1960s concessions covered 79 per
cent of Libyan territory (Bernini, 2001: 7). Significantly, it was the British
and the Americans, and not the Italians, who dominated the Libyan oil
market during those years (Cricco, 2002: 10). Indeed, much of the rent was
initially provided by the United States and Great Britain, in exchange for
the leasing of military bases (Vandewalle, 1995a: 4). Government revenues
from petroleum exports increased more than fifteen-fold, from US$40 mil-
lion in 1962 to US$625 million five years later (St John, 2007: 205). Within
eight years of its initial oil shipment, Libya became the world’s fourth
largest exporter of crude oil (St John, 2007: 205). As a further illustration
of the extent of change, per capita income increased from US$35 in 1951
to over US$1,000 in 1967 (St John, 2007: 205). The heavy reliance of Libya
on oil revenues made the country a glaring example of a ‘rentier state’, i.e.
a state that derives a substantial part of its revenue from foreign sources in
the form of rent (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 11).3 This is a central feature
of the North African country, which speaks to its distinctive social and
political system and shapes ongoing diplomatic relations with Italy. As
Vandewalle writes:
a critical element in understanding the persistence of the regime is the

presence of those rapid capital inflows in particular the power they
afforded the Libyan government to pursue its idiosyncratic social and
political development without much fear of political and economic
repercussions. (Vandewalle, 1995a: 4)
On 1 September 1969, a small group of military officers, led by 27-year-old

army officer Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qaddafi, staged a coup d’état against
King Idris (Vandewalle, 1995). At the time, Idris was in Turkey for medi-
cal treatment. Without having to use force, revolutionary officers abolished
the monarchy, and proclaimed the new Great Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya. Qaddafi was, and is to this day, referred to as the ‘Brother
Leader’ and the ‘Guide of the Revolution’ in government statements and the
official press.
Shortly after the revolution, on 22 July 1970, some 14,000 Italians living
in Libya were forced to return to Italy, leaving behind all their possessions,
and with a prohibition on ever returning (Segrè, 1974b: 210).4 The Italian
companies operating in Libya were forced to terminate their commercial
activities, and their properties were confiscated (Camera, 2003c, 2003d,
2004). Thereupon, Italy submitted a formal protest to the UN on the legal,
diplomatic and moral inadmissibility of such a decision which would con-
travene the 1956 agreement (Segrè, 1974b: 209). Italy, however, remonstrated
to no avail. As of today, Libya denies the validity of the 1956 treaty that the
King had signed (Allam, 2006; Del Boca 1998: 128; Studio Legale Romano,
2006). As Qaddafi pointed out:
They [the Italians] said there was a treaty made in 1956 with the Kingdom
of Libya and this treaty settled the issue. Shameful thing! They paid about
one million dinars or something like that. The Italian and the Libyan peo-
ple who were ruling in 1956 ended everything [colonial-related disputes]
and the King said ‘we forgive you’. If only they had mentioned those
exiled [the Libyans deported to Italy] or asked to remove the land-mines,

since there were mines at that time; but nothing of the sort happened.
(Al Qaddafi, 2008b)
The complaints of the Italians repatriated and dispossessed of their proper-

ties are now represented by AIRL, the Association of the Italians Repatriated
from Libya, which has lobbied the Italian government to obtain full indem-
nity from Libya, as well as tourist visas for them to return to the country.5
These considerations need to be kept in mind, since they deeply affect ongo-
ing bilateral relations.
Broadly, the 1970s were characterised by the expansion of the oil industry,
alongside the deepening of the ‘popular revolution’ discourse calling for the
Libyan people to seize power through the so-called ‘democracy of the masses’
(St John, 2008b). The official ideology, also known as the ‘Third International
Theory’, was formulated in the three volumes of the Green Book, first pub-
lished in 1975. In March 1977, the leader proclaimed the raison d’être of the
new state in the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the People’s Authority’.
This launched a political system based on popular rule through people’s
committees and without political parties (St John, 2008b: 94).6
The revolution was grounded on an ‘international ideology and not a
national movement’ (Anderson, 1986: 70). True to his word, Qaddafi’s sup-
port of opponents of the world status quo – whom he viewed as supporters
of revolutionary causes – ranged beyond the Libyan state and the Arab world
(Anderson, 1986: 70). This contributed to Libya’s growing isolation and its
notorious reputation as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’. Libya’s alleged support
for independence movements,7 its complicity with the Lockerbie, UTA and
La Belle bombings, and its pursuit of the WMD programme,8 led ultimately
to the imposition of EU, UN and US sanctions (Collins, 2004; Vandewalle,
1995).9
In this context, the role of Italy merits our attention. Despite the conten-
tious issues related to the colonial reparations, the economic and political
collaboration between Italy and Libya proceeded apace. As the former head
of the Italian Intelligence Service made clear:
Between the 1970 and 1974 the basic rule was to save our [Italy’s] interests
in Libya and prevent ENI [the Italian multinational oil and gas company]
from being thrown out. It is for this reason that we helped the Libyan
leader to defeat those that were opposing the regime, provide him with
weapons, organise for him an intelligence service and help with the mod-
ernisation of his armed forces. (Del Boca, 1997c: 131)
Indeed, Italy’s policy towards Libya has followed the principle of politica del
buon vicinato, i.e. a good neighbourhood policy (Andreotti, 1992; Mezran
and De Maio, 2007). As part of this strategy, dialogue with countries
considered to be ‘rogue states’ was preferred over confrontation. As a former

Italian Prime Minister, credited to be one of the prime figures in shaping
this approach, clarified during an interview:
I have always tried to explain this to the US. The first question that one
has to do is to have good relations with our neighbours. If we [Italians]
don’t have good relations with New Caledonia it is pretty indifferent.
However, with countries like Tunisia, Malta, Algeria or Libya we ought to
maintain a positive relationship.10
During the embargo era, Andreotti, former Italian Prime Minister, sought
to act as a mediator between Qaddafi and the other Western powers. As he
declared in an interview to Il Corriere Della Sera with reference to the posi-
tion adopted by the US towards Libya:
The Libyan problem cannot be resolved with a military action. I do not

act as the defence lawyer of anybody, nor do I propose the beatification
of Qaddafi; however, I believe that speaking with him would not hurt
anybody, and this applies also to the Americans. (Del Boca, 1998: 156)
As a matter of fact, in the 1970s Italy was the first country to sell weapons
to Libya, and Libya was Italy’s first commercial partner in Africa and the
seventh in the world (Del Boca, 1998: 130–1). Between 1960 and 1970 the
economic exchange between Italy and Libya increased more than ten-fold
(Del Boca, 1998: 131). By 1986, when Libya launched two missiles at the
Italian island of Lampedusa (Del Boca, 1998: 159; Di Feo, 2005), there were
17,000 Italians in Libya, the second largest Italian community abroad after
that in South Africa (Del Boca, 1998: 131). It is also instructive to note that,
unlike most British and American companies, ENI was not subject to the
Libyan government’s nationalisation campaign commenced in December
1971 (Chapin Metz, 1987; Collu, 2001: 92). Furthermore, on 25 February
1974 the two countries signed an agreement on scientific, technical and
economic cooperation; and in the following September a new contract was
reached between Tripoli and ENI (Del Boca, 1998: 131).
During the 1980s, with the growing difficulties that Libya faced inter-
nationally, Italy remained a critical ally. By the end of 1982, the US had
halted all crude oil imports from Libya, and announced an economic boy-
cott on sales of selected high-technology exports and products related to
oil (Vandewalle, 1995: 26). At the same time, of the four remaining major
multinationals in the country, two – Exxon and Mobil – abandoned their
operations (Vandewalle, 1995: 26). As a result, Libyan oil production and
revenues after 1980 dropped by approximately 40 per cent (Vandewalle,
1995: 26). Likewise, tensions with the rest of the Arab world exacerbated the
Libyan regime’s isolation. Amidst an environment of growing international
hostility, Italy continued to pursue its special relations with what US

President Ronald Reagan called the ‘mad dog of the Middle East’ (Stork,
1986). Many commentators have credited the Italian policy with the grad-
ual reintegration of Libya into the international community.11 By some reck-
onings, Italy has been instrumental in rehabilitation of the former terrorist
country (Andreotti, 1992) and, eventually, in the lifting of the EU sanctions
in 2004 (Fusacchia, 2006).
Consolidation of Italian–Libyan relations, however, was not without its
contradictions. Alongside the economic, political and cultural12 coopera-
tion, Libyan authorities unremittingly demanded indemnities for Italian
colonial wrongdoings. On 30 July 1970, the Libyan foreign minister, Salah
Bouissir, raised the issue with Italy and demanded 100 million Libyan dinars
in compensation for the ‘lands usurped by the Italian government between
1911 and 1943’ (Del Boca, 1998: 130). In similar vein, during the celebration
of the day of revenge on 7 October 1975, the Libyan leader declared:
What Italy has committed [ ... ] represents today a major historical lesson
for humanity and a tragic example of aggression, brutality and barba-
rism. It mirrors the arrogance of the most powerful countries when they
attack those that are poor and weak. (Del Boca, 1998: 134)
Within this complex landscape, where confrontational pronouncements

and actions jostled with more friendly ones, tracing the history of Libyan
requests for colonial repayments is revealing. The first request amounted to
100 million Libyan dinars. However, over the years Libya raised the stakes
and since 2001 the normalisation of relations has been conditioned on
the construction by Italy of the coastal highway from the Egyptian to the
Tunisian border. Let us see in more detail how this came to be the case.
On 31 July 1984, Andreotti met Qaddafi in Benghazi, Libya, and the two
leaders agreed on the construction of a hospital as a symbolic gesture to
apologise for the colonial past (Andreotti, 1992: 347; Del Boca, 1998: 151).
Other requests were also put forward, such as the removal of landmines,
the funding of research on the archaeological sites in Libya, and research
on the Libyans deported to Italy (Camera, 2001). As a high-ranking Italian
politician emphasised, ‘I am in favour of maintaining good relations and it
is clear that in order to have good relations some reciprocity is expected.’13
Beyond the specific requests submitted by Libya, which I will discuss in
greater detail below, the key point here has to do with Italian obstinacy in
maintaining a dialogue with Libya. As it should be clear by now, substantive
economic interests of both parties lie behind this diplomatic engagement.
As Del Boca writes:
Despite the continuing and patient diplomatic mending, the interaction

between the two countries resembles more and more a squalid marriage
of convenience. The two sides hate each other but they cannot break
because Italy needs oil and Libyan concessions, and Libya cannot do
without the Italian market for the oil and the technology from the sixth-
largest industrialised country in the world. (Del Boca, 1998: 143)
In other words, the Italian government endorsed Libya’s requests in the

expectation of establishing a reciprocal climate of constructive interactions
and, once and for all, of overcoming the colonial problem. As we shall see,
the agreement signed in August 2008, seems to have settled the colonial
dispute, for now.
6.3 Joint Communication (1998)
In June 1996, Renato Serri, undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

made an official visit to Libya (Reuters, 25 June 1996). In the aftermath
of the meeting, Serri confirmed that Libya wanted to end its international
isolation and ‘participate actively to the new Euro-Mediterranean dialogue’
(Reuters, 25 June 1996). He further emphasised the determination of the
Italian government to consolidate its relations with Libya and to become ‘the
principal interlocutor in this new political phase’ (La Stampa, 9 November
1996). This and other meetings established the basis for the visit of the then
Secretary of the General People’s Committee, Omar Mustafa El Muntasser,
to Rome on 18 December 1996 (BBC, 20 December 1996; Mezran and De
Maio, 2007: 443). As Aliboni points out, this meeting was in breach of the
embargo set by UN, which banned diplomatic contacts with Libya (Aliboni,
1997: 2; Guazzone 2000). Nonetheless this was consistent with the above
defined politica del buon vicinato. The move reflected the overall orientation
of post-Cold War Italian foreign policy, which aimed at carving out an inde-
pendent role and establishing a dialogue with so-called rogue-states (Pioppi
2002; Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 29; Silj, 1998).
Evidence of the gradual rapprochement is the ‘Joint Communication’
signed on 4 July 1998 by El Muntasser and the then Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini (Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, 2000:
32; Pioppi, 2002: 52). The significance of this agreement derives from the
formal acknowledgement by Italy of the suffering caused during the colo-
nial period. In acquiescing to Libya’s disavowal of the 1956 agreement, Italy
regretted ‘the Libyan people’s suffering at the hands of Italian colonialism’,
and committed itself to remove whatever remained of the colonialist era
(Joint Communication, 1998). The Italian government promised to continue
searching for the Libyan citizens who were coercively expelled from Libya,
to assist Libya with the removal of mines laid during the war, to compensate
the victims of mines, and to return to Libya all manuscripts, archives, docu-
ments, artefacts and archaeological pieces that had been transferred to Italy
(Joint Communication, 1998).
The agreement also involved the establishment of the Italian–Libyan Joint

Company, known as ALI (Azienda Libico Italiana) and the launch of mutual
preferential treatment (Pioppi, 2002). The Company was inaugurated in
Libya on 30 May 1999, with the objective of promoting Italian investments
in Libya (Centro Miliatare di Studi Strategici, 2002; Pioppi, 2002). It con-
sisted of a forum of Italian and Libyan businesses to support the Libyan
economy through basic infrastructure and development projects (The
Financial Times, 16 April 1999). Likewise, Italian exiles would be allowed to
return to Libya on tourist visas. Both parties agreed that ‘with the applica-
tion of such a Communication’ there would ‘no longer be reasons of contest
or tension over the past’ (Joint Communication, 1998).
In short, the relevance of the Joint Communication is two-fold. First, it
contravened the spirit of the UN sanctions, which were suspended one year
later (Pioppi, 2002: 52).14 Second it sought to boost bilateral economic rela-
tions. As an official communication from the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs made clear, one of the primary aims was ‘to strengthen the collabo-
ration across companies specialising on oil and gas’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 July
1998). In an interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, the representative of the gov-
ernment’s Institute for Foreign Commerce (ICE) in Libya, Giacomo De
Gennaro, suggested that it would restore good faith between Italy and Libya
and would overcome the outstanding financial issues related to colonialism,
which had had the negative effect of decreasing the profitability of Italian
businesses operating in Libya. Indeed, he noted that Italy’s economic role
in Libya had been supplanted by France (Il Sole 24 Ore, 10 July 1998). As a
matter of fact, until at least 2008 Italians companies operating in Libya
continue to face discrimination. The ongoing disputes were summarised by
a former representative of the ICE in Libya:
Everything [the activities of Italian companies in Libya] was complicated

by the 1998 protocol that established the ALI, which has engendered
much suffering on Italian enterprises. The rationale behind this asso-
ciation was to overcome the colonial compensation. It was established
that all Italian enterprises would pay a fee ranging from 0.5% of the
total value of the venture to 2.5%, 3% today. [ ... ] Now, we would like to
revise this association. But the Libyans have said: ‘this will happen only
when the discussion, including also the “big gesture”,15 will be settled.’
Recently, the situation has got more and more difficult. There are Italian
businesses that would like to renew their registration and are blocked
because the ALI has not issued the clearance letter [i.e. the document
confirming that the fee has been paid].16
At the time, however, the accord was welcomed as an historic turning point
in Italian–Libyan relations (Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 33). Il Sole 24 Ore
predicted that ‘from now on’ everything would be easier (Il Sole 24 Ore,
10 July 1998). Interestingly, this position appeared not to be shared by

Libyan authorities. The newspaper La Stampa reported a Libyan official as
saying that they did not have time to celebrate: ‘if Italians say that this
is an historical peace between us, we agree, but today we have been busy
with other issues, such as the official visit of President Mubarak’ (La Stampa,
10 July 1998).
The signing of the Joint Communication was accompanied by the so-
called ‘Verbal Process’. However, the legal status of this document appears
to be ambiguous. In fact, during an interview, a high-ranking Italian official
involved in the negotiations with the Libyan leader declared himself una-
ware of the document.17 These ambiguities notwithstanding, this second
text listed specific joint actions, including industrial cooperation, commer-
cial exchange, energy sector, agriculture, telecommunication and tour-
ism. Moreover, coordinated management of undocumented migration was
addressed explicitly. Crucially, this is the first time that the issue of migra-
tion has been mentioned in a written bilateral agreement between Italy and
Libya. Under the heading of ‘Consular and Social Affairs’, Article 3 states as
follows:
Both parties confirm their intention to cooperate in the fight against

organised crime and drug trafficking. To this end they agreed to schedule
a technical meeting in the near future.
Both parties agree that another technical meeting will take place in order to
establish a cooperation to deal with the falsification and illegal use of travel
documents and the prevention of and fight against illegal immigration.
The Arab-Libyan party has presented two proposals in Arab language
concerning the drug trafficking and judicial cooperation and the Italian
party reserves the right to review them. (Verbal Process, 1998)
I shall return to the question of migration in the next section. For now, let
us continue with the brief chronicle of the erratic diplomatic exchanges.
The period following the signature of the agreement was characterised by
numerous visits by Italian authorities to Libya, and vice versa. On 6 April
1999, a few days after the extradition from Libya of the Lockerbie suspects
and the suspension of the UN sanctions, Lamberto Dini flew to Libya to
meet Qaddafi (Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 April 1999). On this occasion, the Colonel
pledged that Libya would become ‘Italy’s bridge to Africa’ and that Italy
would become ‘Libya’s door to Europe’ (The New York Times, 2 December
1999). Similarly, as a press release of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
commented:
The positive evolution of the Lockerbie case created the possibility for
Libya to join the international community fully and to help in the effort
to increase stability in the Mediterranean region. Hence, Libya can be

expected to join the Barcelona Process and in this way to contribute to
the dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean as well as to
improve relations with the EU. (Il Sole 24 Ore, 6 April 1999)
The main issues discussed between Dini and Qaddafi included collaboration
in the energy sector and the construction of a US$3.8 billion gas pipeline
over the following three years (Il Sole 24 Ore, 7 April 1999). In the following
months, Italian companies sought to promote their business in Libya. As The
Financial Times reported, since the suspension of the international sanctions
‘Italian companies have been rushing to Tripoli [ ... ] to open ties with the
Libyans’ (The Financial Times, 16 April 1999). Around 20 leading industrial
figures from Confindustria, Italy’s business federation, ENI, Finmeccanica,
the industrial and defence conglomerate, and Impregilo, Fiat’s infrastruc-
ture building unit, visited Libya to explore forthcoming commercial oppor-
tunities (The Financial Times, 16 April 1999).
At the beginning of August 1999, and one week after ENI announced a
US$5.5 billion deal for gas exploration and a pipeline with Libya’s National
Oil Company (La Stampa, 28 July 1999), the Italian Foreign Minister returned
to Libya for the VII Meeting of the Gruppo di Lavoro Misto (Pioppi and
Pargeter, 2001: 34). Upon return to Rome, he declared himself ‘very happy
with the new spirit that characterises the bilateral relations between Italy
and Libya’, and foresaw the beginning of ‘a new era’ in Italian–Libyan rela-
tions (Guazzone, 2000; Ansa, 6 August 1999).
However, the economic and colonial issues enunciated in the Joint
Communication remained unimplemented. For instance, Giacomo di
Gennaro deplored the fact that ‘preferential treatment’ had yet to be given
to Italian enterprises. In his words:
Even though Italy has promoted significant economic activity in Libya,

as we account for 50% of Libyan oil export there is still no transparency
in the bidding process, and everything is in the hands of the Libyan
authorities. (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 December 1999)
For our purposes, the ambivalences in the bilateral economic relations need
to be borne in mind. The relative dependence of Italian companies on their
Libyan counterparts invites reflection on the relative bargaining power of
one country vis-à-vis the other.
6.4 Memorandum of Intent (2000)
This period of intense dialogue between Italy and Libya culminated with the
two-day visit to Libya of the then Italian Prime Minister, Massimo D’Alema,
on 1 December 1999. This was the first trip of a head of government to Libya
since the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992 (Pioppi and Pargeter, 2001: 33).
The primary issue discussed was international terrorism, and both countries
agreed on ‘the necessity to deny support and protection to those responsible
for terrorist acts’ and ‘to adopt further measures aimed at preventing, con-
tain and repress such acts’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December 1999). At the end of the
talks, an anti-terrorism pact was signed between the two countries.
During the same visit, D’Alema formally invited Qaddafi to come to Italy.
‘I told him’, he stated, ‘that we would be happy if he chooses Italy as the first
country to visit in Western Europe. It is reasonable to expect that the visit
will take place, even though not in the short term’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December
1999). Qaddafi responded that he wished to go to Italy, and hoped that the
Libyan people would allow him to accomplish this trip during the tenure of
the D’Alema government (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 December 1999). In fact, the visit
did not take place until 2009. Until then, however, the Libyan leader sought
to make his point clear. For example, in September 2008 the Libyan leader
rebuked his interlocutor one more time:
I told them [the Italians] it will not be possible for me to visit it [Italy].
I may visit any other country in Europe but not Italy. I will not visit it
because there is vengeance between us and Italy. I told them that I prefer
that the enmity continues until a generation of Libyans is able to take
revenge from Italy. (Al Qaddafi, 2008b)
The actual implementation of the Joint Communication was discussed in

detail in a follow-up meeting in June 2000 between Lamberto Dini and the
Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shalgam. The issues addressed included
economic investments, the ratification of the agreement signed during
D’Alema’s visit, Italian-funded scholarship programmes, cooperation in the
medical field, the Italian commitment to find Libyans expelled during the
Italian occupation, and the removal of landmines (Inform, 14 June 2000).
On 12–13 December 2000, Shalgam returned to Rome to further discuss
the measures envisioned in the 1998 Joint Communication, and to explore
collaborative efforts on migration. On this occasion, the first session of the
Italian–Libyan Partnership, a programme covering political, economic and
trade, financial, social and migratory, cultural and cooperation issues, was
convened (Middle East Newsfile, 20 December 2000).
Importantly, a Memorandum of Intent addressing drug trafficking, ter-
rorism, organised crime and unauthorised migration was signed. The agree-
ment became effective after ratification by the Italian Parliament on 22
December 2002. The agreement dedicated a separate paragraph to migra-
tion and included three main measures:
1. Exchange of information on the modus operandi and the itineraries of

illegal migrant flows and the criminal organisations that favour them.
2. Exchange of information on organizations specialised on the falsifica-

tion of documents and passports.
3. Reciprocal assistance and cooperation in the fight against illegal immi-
gration. (Memorandum of Intent, 2000)
The text identifies a range of measures cantered on cooperation between

police forces on specialised training and the exchange of information on
criminal organisations (Memorandum of Intent, 2000).
The results were praised on both sides. The Libyan Foreign Minister,
Shalgam, declared that they were ‘on the threshold of the new millen-
nium’, that relations between the two countries were ‘a model across the
Mediterranean’ (BBC, 18 December 2000). This was echoed by Lamberto
Dini, who reiterated that a ‘new phase’ of the bilateral collaboration would
commence and that a page had been turned (BBC, 18 December 2000).
Likewise, a mission by Italian parliamentarians to Libya in January 2001
found that the bilateral collaboration was satisfactory:
The relations between Italy and Libya are entering a particularly solid
phase characterised by intense collaboration that could lead to privileged
status [for Italy] not just at economic level but also at political and insti-
tutional levels. (Camera, 2001)
This euphoria, however, proved to be short-lived. Significantly, the same

delegation conceded that ‘not all the points of the Joint Communication
have been implemented’ (Camera, 2001). The important subtext here is that
‘the privileged relationship’ foreshadowed in the 1998 Communication had
yet to be achieved. First and foremost, the tensions over the colonial repara-
tions showed no signs of abating.
6.5 Berlusconi government (2001–2006)
In June 2001, Silvio Berlusconi was elected Prime Minister for the second
time. On 3 September 2001, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Renato Ruggero, flew to Libya to meet his counterpart as well as Italian entre-
preneurs operating in Libya. The trip was motivated by the need to support
Libya in the ‘recognition of its international co-responsibility’ (La Stampa,
3 September 2001). As Ruggero declared, ‘Tripoli can represent a significant
element of stability in the Mediterranean and it is in the interest of Italy
to make this role more credible’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 3 September 2001).
Yet economic and political issues continued to be a source of antagonism
between the two countries. In response to the complaints of Italian entre-
preneurs in Libya about being disqualified by virtue of being Italian, the
minister acknowledged the persistence of ‘this sword of Damocles’, under
the guise of the colonial past, which prevented the overcoming of the past.
In his own words, ‘if we live only in the past we will not be able to build
the future. And what we want is a dynamic future of balanced relations’ (La
Stampa, 3 September 2001).
As anticipated, it was in this tense climate that the issue of the costal was
first raised. Interviews with different high-ranking Italian officials confirm
that the Libya request of the coastal highway was brought up for the first
time on November 2001. As an Italian deputy minister admitted:
I was part of the Commission of the Joint Communication and I under-

stood that [ ... ] the hospital was not enough for them while we [Italians]
always believed that the hospital would have been sufficient. It was then
during the Berlusconi government that while we were thinking of the
hospital, the problem arose. To our disbelief, the Libyans told us that: ‘we
would like instead a highway along the coast!’18
Likewise, as a former undersecretary of the Italian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, maintained during an interview:
The problem explodes with us [the Berlusconi government 2001–6].

Because we kept saying that we wanted to close with the ‘big gesture’. So
[ ... ] we hear them [Libyan authorities] talking about either a highway or
a railway. During an informal talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Schalgam, laughingly I said: ‘look if you want to double the costal [the
coastal highway that was built under the Italian colonial rule] and you
will call it Balbia19 we are ready to make a deal with you!’ This was a sar-
castic way to say: but what on earth are you asking? We have already built
a coastal road, that is the Balbia! We could not believe it [that they were
asking for the construction of a road].20
The same informant also conceded that whilst the Italians assumed that it
was about a financial feasibility plan for the construction of the highway,
which would have amounted to €60 million, the Libyans expected the cost
of the whole project. As the undersecretary acknowledged: ‘it all started from
a misunderstanding!’21 The same account is confirmed by a former Italian
Prime Minister who recalled:
As far as the highway is concerned it seems that there has been some con-
fusion either due to the interpreters or to the actual dialogue. Berlusconi
thought that they were discussing about the feasibility project while he
[Qaddafi] meant the complete realization. The two are clearly quite dif-
ferent. [ ... ] Surely, there has been a quid pro quo.22
This reflection on the presumed miscommunication and the intertwining

of political, historical and economic factors, serves as necessary background
to the negotiations on migration. In February 2002, Berlusconi met the

Libyan Foreign Minister, Shalgam, and stressed his ‘priority’ that Libya grant
entry visas to the Italians exiles ‘as soon as possible’. The Prime Minister
also emphasized the need for a ‘swift and just’ solution to the question of
the credits that Libya owed to Italian companies (Ansa, 26 February 2002).
Migration too became an increasingly prominent item in the bilateral and
multilateral discussions. During the 5+5 Dialogue23 meeting on July 2002,
Libya signed the Tripoli Declaration (Pliez, 2006), whereby a roadmap on
migration and development was adopted. Participant countries commit-
ted themselves to ensuring that adequate financial resources were made
available to implement joint measures for tackling undocumented migra-
tion (5+5 Dialogue, no date; Africa–EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, 2007).
At the same time, the political stigmatisation of irregular migration from
Northern Africa, discussed in Chapter 4, gained ground. On December 2002
the Italian Interior Minister, Pisanu declared:
Over the last few days we have seen that little and over-crowed boats car-
rying desperate people have arrived in Lampedusa, while the charter fer-
ries were unable to leave due to the bad weather conditions. For each boat
that gets through, how many sink? This huge question mark is a very
heavy burden on the European civil conscience. Above all, it demands
that single countries, but even more the EU, find effective answers that
can no longer be put off. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2002)
To fully understand the deepening of Italian–Libyan discussions on migra-

tion, it is useful to consider the broader international setting. As already
noted, after 9/11 the Libyan regime made an active effort to re-establish
its international status and Qaddafi was an immediate convert to the Bush
administration’s war on terror (St John, 2003: 473). On 1 September 2002,
in a two-hour speech marking the anniversary of the 1969 coup, the leader
proclaimed:
In the old days, they called us a rogue state. They were right in accus-
ing us of that. In the old days, we had a revolutionary behaviour. [ ... ]
We now decided to address the consequences of our action. (Watanona,
1 September 2002)
It was, therefore, a strategic moment for the Italian Prime Minister to pay his
first visit to Libya. On 28 October 2002, Berlusconi met the Libyan leader,
with the ‘categorical imperative of looking at the future’ (Il Corriere della
Sera, 29 October 2002). Qaddafi, however, initiated the discussion by dis-
playing, and commenting on, a series of photos on the suffering inflicted by
the Italian colonial rule. The gift that he offered to Berlusconi was a weapon
from the Italian colonial army (The Times, 30 October 2002).
The discussion covered the visas claimed by the Italians expelled in the
1970s, the repayments of credits to Italian enterprises, and the donation of a
hospital to Libya, as well the ‘symbolic gesture’ of the highway (Coralluzzo,
2008: 123; La Stampa, 29 October 2002). The two leaders also addressed
joint action to tackle terrorism, irregular migration and organised crime.
This is summarised in the statement of Cosimo Ventucci, Undersecretary
for Relations with Parliament, on June 2003:
The visit of the Prime Minister to Tripoli on October 28, 2002 has
allowed us to make clear to the Libyan authorities how important the
fight against criminal organisations is for us, and our expectations of
full collaboration by Libya, especially with regard to the fight against
clandestine immigration. Libyan authorities have declared that they are
willing to help us. They have emphasised that they find it difficult to
effectively control illicit trafficking because they suffer from an objective
shortage of tools and resources which are necessary for an adequate con-
trol of land and sea borders to be made. For this reason, they demand our
help in the European context to end the embargo and to have access to
European funds which could assist them in the fight against clandestine
immigration and organised crime. (Camera, 2003e)
At the end of the visit, the ‘Treaty of Italian–Libyan Friendship’ was signed
(La Stampa, 29 October 2002). In Berlusconi’s words, this agreement created
the basis of future collaboration, intended to ‘improve the bilateral rela-
tions and the advantages to our enterprises’ (Adnkronos, 28 October 2002;
Camera 2003c). Nonetheless, the outcome was not as successful as expected.
As Berlusconi himself conceded:
Libya is expecting an important symbolic gesture from Italy and what

we have presented as reparation from the colonial past is inferior to the
Libyan expectations. [ ... ] Qaddafi is definitively open to discuss and will-
ing to listen. However, he is extremely skilled in playing arm-wrestling.
He has been governing his country for over 33 years. As I told him, he is
a super professional in his job, and compared to him I am an apprentice.
(Il Corriere della Sera, 29 October 2002)
In the same vein, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Mantica,

observed that the supposedly shared goal of overcoming the past might
have had different meanings for the two countries. In his view, the chal-
lenge consisted in comprehending ‘the interpretation’ of his Libyan coun-
terpart (Ministero degli Esteri, 2002).
Regardless of the persistent difficulties in addressing the issues agreed
upon in 1998 and 2000, the Berlusconi government continued the policy
of previous governments, and sought to deepen collaboration with the
North African regime. In Rome, on 5 February 2003, the Italian Minister of

Foreign Affairs met his Libyan counterpart, Shalgam, to discuss the credits
claimed by the Italian firms, the collaboration on migration, the possible
visas for the Italian expelled, and the war in Iraq (Inform, 5 February 2003).
The same month, Italy established a permanent liaison on organised crime
and migration, based in Tripoli (EC, 2005d: 58), consisting of officials from
the Department of Immigration and Border Police and the Department
of Criminal Police, both reporting to the Italian Ministry of the Interior
(Cuttitta, 2006: 18; Pansa, 2004a). As will be made clear in Chapter 7, its
main goals include designing and testing joint projects to control terres-
trial borders, sharing intelligence on criminal organisations and halting the
boats of irregular migrants while still at sea.
To address the technical implementation of specific measures to tackle
undocumented migration, the Minister of the Interior, Giuseppe Pisanu,
flew to Tripoli on 3 July 2003 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2003a). During the
visit, the two countries agreed on further joint measures to control unau-
thorised migration and human trafficking (Agence France Presse, 25 August
2004; Ministero dell’Interno, 2003a; Parlamento Italiano, 2003), and signed
an agreement involving, among other things, the exchange of informa-
tion on migrant flows, and the provision to Libya of equipment to con-
trol sea and land borders. Two aspects, which will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 7, are worth noting. First, Libya did not accept the Italian proposal
to implement joint patrols on the Libyan coasts, as Italy had done with
Albania (Caffio, 2003: 18). Second, the accord has been neither ratified in
the Italian Parliament nor made available to the public (Cuttitta, 2006: 19). I
will argue that the secrecy of some of agreements has had a significant bear-
ing on Italy’s policy options and the negotiations outcomes.
Overall, the 2003 agreement failed to cement long-standing friendship,
since dissent, especially with regard to the colonial chapter, endured. In
January 2004, through the Libyan foreign Minister, Qaddafi sought to
lay down the practical steps for Italy to meet its obligations towards the
Jamahiriya and to recompense for the colonial damages (AFX News,
29 January 2004). The Libyan leader also lamented that ‘nothing’ had
been done to finally resolve ‘the outstanding issues’ (Il Corriere della Sera,
5 February 2004).
On 10 February 2004, Berlusconi made his second visit to Libya, and con-
crete actions to tackle unwanted migration were discussed (La Repubblica,
11 February 2004). Importantly, the symbolic gesture that Libya expected
from Italy remained unresolved. While Italy was eager to settle with the
delivery of the hospital specialising in heart diseases,24 Libya insisted on
the construction of the coastal highway from Egypt to Tunisia. According
to Qaddafi, this was a necessary gesture of ‘friendship and reparation’,
whose realisation would make Italy ‘the only economic partner of Libya’ (La
Repubblica, 11 February 2004). As Berlusconi put it, what Libya demanded
‘shakes the blood in the veins as well as the wallets’ (La Repubblica,
11 February 2004). The scale of the financial commitment raises questions
about the actual capacity of Italy to comply with Libya’s requests. Arguably,
the dire status of the current Italian economy leads one to question the
likelihood, as well as the repercussions for Italy, of such an unprecedented
undertaking. In the rising political and economic costs incurred by Italy,
the power disparity between the two countries becomes manifest. As a par-
liamentary committee warned in 1999, ‘with Libya we have made positive
and significant steps ahead, but it is still open to question what is the price
in terms of national dignity’ (Senato, 1999).
Accordingly, the visit was depicted by the Italian media as an utter fail-
ure. The headline in La Repubblica reported: ‘Qaddafi freezes Berlusconi’ (La
Repubblica, 11 February 2004). By the same token, the title of Il Manifesto
read: ‘Berlusconi’s Italietta25 makes a meagre impression on Libya and on the
international community’ (Il Manifesto, 11 February 2004).
Despite the persistent swing between enmity and friendship at bilat-
eral level, Libya’s position in the international realm kept improving. On
27 April 2004, Qaddafi accepted an invitation to go to Brussels, which
marked his first visit outside Africa and the Middle East for over fifteen years
(Coralluzzo, 2008: 123). On this occasion, the then President of the EC,
Romano Prodi, called for Libya to join the Barcelona Process. Less than two
months later, the US resumed diplomatic ties with Libya. After twenty-four
years of almost no diplomatic contact, the US removed Libya from the list
of designated state sponsors of terrorism in recognition of Libya’s decisions
to abandon its WMD programme and to comply with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) and the gradual settlement of the Lockerbie
bombing issue (St John, 2008c).26
Largely because of Libya’s intention to reverse its pariah status, collabora-
tion on terrorism and migration with Italy improved. On 25 August 2004,
Berlusconi made a third visit to Tripoli, and the readmission to Libya of
migrants who had reached Italy by boat was discussed and agreed upon
(Cuttitta, 2006: 32). In fact, as the next chapter documents, the return
flights from Italy to Libya commenced the following month. As is clear from
the following statement by Giuseppe Pisanu on September 2004, the results
were deemed positive:
We have reviewed the joint measures implemented so far on terrorism

and organised crime and the status of the Italy–Libya programme on
immigration especially in the light of the abolition of the EU embargo.
The results achieved are satisfactory. This is demonstrated by the intense
activity to contrast human trafficking undertaken by Libyan authorities
on the coasts. This has been possible thanks both to the autonomous
effort of Libya and the collaboration with Italy based on the existing
bilateral agreements. Indeed, as many as 4,500 people awaiting for
their passage to Italy have been repatriated to their country of origin.

(Ministero dell’Interno, 2004g)
In addition, the two countries continued cooperating on the construction

of reception centres for undocumented migrants in Libya and the provision
of equipment on migration control for Libya. These will also explained at
greater depth in the next chapter. According to La Repubblica, the finan-
cial resources committed by Italy amounted to €10 million (La Repubblica,
29 September 2004). As Pisanu simply put it, the objective was ‘to reduce
to zero the number of illegal immigrants’ from Libya (La Repubblica,
29 September 2004).
Yet several voices within the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, expressed concern at the approach taken by the Berlusconi
government towards Libya. In an interview with Il Corriere della Sera, the
outgoing Italian Ambassador to Libya, Claudio Pacifico, bemoaned the poor
accomplishments: ‘I leave after four years and substantially nothing has
changed’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 19 September 2004). The former Ambassador
attributed the existing problems to Berlusconi’s inability to forcefully
respond to Libya’s instrumental use of migration. ‘It is not difficult’, he fur-
ther added, ‘to understand those young people crossing the sea illegally as
an expression of blackmail from Qaddafi’ (Il Corriere della Sera, 19 September
2004). Claudio Pacifico’s comments are relevant, for two reasons. First, they
anticipate a key theme of this research, i.e. the extent to which migration is
used as a bargaining-chip by Libya. Second, they highlight once more the
relevance that migration had acquired on the bilateral agenda by 2004. On
this count, the subsequent events of September and October 2004 exem-
plify the critical nexus between migration and the economic and political
interests of both countries.
On 23 September 2004, the Undersecretary of Economy, Adolfo Urso,
flew to Tripoli to promote Italian businesses (Ministero del Commercio
Internazionale, 2004). The official did not conceal his hopes that the end of
the European embargo would expand economic exchanges and herald new
alliances with Libya (Ministero del Commercio Internazionale, 2004). As
a matter of fact, the lifting of the EU sanctions coincided with the begin-
ning of the systematic repatriations of migrants to Libya, the fourth visit of
Berlusconi to Libya, and the launch of the gas pipeline.
On 1 October, over 1,000 migrants from Libya arrived at Lampedusa by
boat, and Italian authorities immediately ordered the expulsion of 90 of
them back to Libya. The account presented in Chapters 7 and 8 of the suc-
cessive repatriations is proof of Italy’s steadfast determination to respond
to the putative ‘invasion’ of migrants from Libya. Pisanu’s statements were
unequivocal: ‘the desperate people who still think they can sail illegally to
Italy must know that they will be sent back to where they came from as soon
as they have been given humanitarian help’ (BBC, 4 October 2004).
The following week, on 7 October 2004, Berlusconi visited Libya for

the fourth time. The formal occasion was the inauguration of the pipe-
line ‘Greenstream’, part of the ‘West Libyan Gas Project’, built and oper-
ated by ENI, the first of the foreign companies active in Libya. €7 billion
were invested into the 520 kilometre-long pipeline, which now supplies gas
from Mellitah to Sicily (Dietricht, 2004). The pipeline, running under the
Mediterranean, carries at least 280bn cubic feet (8bn cubic metres) of natu-
ral gas a year to Italian power plants (BBC, 7 October 2004). The project was
credited with being the biggest of its kind in the Mediterranean (Dietricht,
2004).
Significantly, the visit of Berlusconi is also associated with an event that
was then perceived as a landmark. During the inauguration of the pipe-
line, Qaddafi declared his willingness to re-enforce relations with Italy and
move beyond the colonial past, so that Italy and Libya could ‘exchange joint
benefits and not enmity’ (BBC, 7 October 2004). Thus the leader solemnly
announced the abolition of the commemoration of the ‘day of revenge’,
which would be replaced by the ‘day of friendship’ (The Independent,
8 October 2004).27 He also asserted his intention to grant to the Italians
expelled in the 1970s the possibility of returning to Libya on tourist visas.
In a follow-up interview with Il Corriere della Sera, the Libyan Prime Minister,
Ghanem, reiterated that for the Italians expelled there were no problems and
‘from now on’ they could apply for visas (Il Corriere della Sera, 14 October
2005). As we shall see, these pledges proved short-lived.
In the midst of these events, on 14 October 2004 the Council of the
European Union, in application of the Security Council Resolutions 748
(1992) and 883 (1993), decided by Common Position to lift the arms embargo
against Libya. As explained in the previous chapter, the EU also resolved
to conduct a technical mission to Libya in order to examine collaborative
arrangements to curb undocumented migration from Libya (EC, 2005d).
By now, one aspect seems clear, namely, the complex give-and-take matrix
that determines the shifting choices of both parties and sets the bargain-
ing pace. The collaboration on migration by Libya was expected to be the
automatic pay-off for Italy’s advocacy of an end to the European embargo.
The concurrent discussions on energy and partnership in the fight against
international terrorism also played an important role in the overall bargain-
ing game (Coralluzzo, 2008: 123; Coslovi 2007). The appreciation of the
substantive interests of Italy vis-à-vis Libya, and the interweaving of differ-
ent items on the negotiating table needs to be kept in mind for it introduces
Part IV of this book.
On December 2004, an Italian delegation led by the Minister of
Infrastructure, Pietro Lunardi, flew to Libya to discuss the symbolic
gesture. Eventually, the feasibility plan was presented to the Libyan
authorities (Il Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). From the intense bilateral
discussions, however, it became obvious that, contrary to what Qaddafi
had declared a few months earlier, the colonial page had yet to be turned.
As the Libyan Prime Minister explained to Adolfo Urso in April 2005, the
outstanding issues on the agenda were conditional upon the construc-
tion of the highway (Agenzia Aise, 2005). From the Libyan viewpoint, the
matter was simple: ‘Qaddafi has felt as if he had been not taken seriously’
(Il Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). In a further not-so-unexpected twist,
Giovanna Ortu, the president of AIRL, was informed by a journalist that
the tourist visas had been granted to over-65-year-olds only (Il Sole 24
Ore, 5 April 2005). In response to the remonstration by Ortu for not being
officially notified by either government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Fini, solicited the Italian Ambassador Sessa to request a formal explana-
tion from Libya. The Libyan Embassy in Italy responded that they were
not aware of the new disposition until a few days after its release (Fini,
2005). Once more, miscommunication, not only between the two parties
but also within the countries themselves, appears to have been a critical
factor affecting the conduct of the bilateral talks. This incident reveals
another critical dimension of the bilateral bargaining, i.e. the unpredict-
able circumstances which retard the overall negotiations. A quote from an
Italian official who was involved in the negotiations may suffice to make
this point:
When we meet our Libyan friends [colleagues at the Libyan ministries]

on the negotiating table, our problems are numerous. We begin at 8 a.m.
and at 10 p.m. we are still at point number one. It would often happen
that at 2 a.m. in the morning we were still negotiating. I was ready to
become Iranian!28
Whereas the discussion on the highway reveals the ambiguity of Italy

as to its ‘real’ commitment and capacity to meet the Libyan request, on
the migration front Italy continued to display relentless determination to
reduce migrant flows to ‘virtually zero’ (La Repubblica, 22 June 2003). On
6 February 2005, Giuseppe Pisanu and Nasser al Mabruk agreed to set up
ad hoc teams with experts from both countries to conduct ‘investigations
of human trafficking and to allow the immediate sharing of information’
(Cuttitta, 2006: ; Ministro degli Esteri, 2005). During the same meeting the
Italian government committed to support a project on joint border con-
trol (Ministro degli Esteri, 2005). In conjunction with the continuation of
the repatriations of undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya, on 12 July
Pisanu was in Tripoli to talk with Qaddafi. As Pisanu summarised it:
Particular attention was given to the fight against Islamic terrorism and
the criminal organisations that control human trafficking and pitilessly
exploit of clandestine immigration. These organizations have their bases
in Italy, Libya and other countries in the Mediterranean region. For this
reason, a more intense international collaboration is needed. (Agence

France Presse, 12 July 2005)
Pisanu clarified that, in order to tackle terrorism, which in his view was
‘knocking at Italy’s door’, new measures were to be launched (Il Sole 24 Ore,
13 July 2005; The Economist, 16 July 2005). Once again, these pronounce-
ments are instructive in as much as they shed light on the conflation of
different issues, such as migration and terrorism, into one single type. The
security narrative linking migration and terrorism appears to be an increas-
ingly decisive factor moulding the negotiations.
On 17 January 2006, the status of the bilateral cooperation was further
discussed between Pisanu and Qaddafi during a visit of the former to Sirte.
Both parties praised the positive results in their collaboration on irregular
migration. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, ‘over 40,000
people’ had been blocked from leaving Libya, and hundreds of persons
responsible for human trafficking had been arrested as a result of Italian–
Libyan cooperation (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006d). The signature of a
‘memorandum of understanding’ on undocumented migration concluded
the talk (Cuttitta, 2007: 17; Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 102).
In an effort to seize the strategic moment before the upcoming elections,
on 23 February 2006 the Italian Council of Ministers decided:
to adopt all necessary measures to give more strategic relevance and

operational substance to the partnership between Italy and Libya by
giving priority to (a) finally close the chapter on the colonial past [ ... ]
(b) and continue to search for an acceptable solution of the economic
contentions concerning the credits that Italian firms claim. (Consiglio
dei Ministri, 2006)
In a rare spirit of general consensus, all Italian parties endorsed the posi-
tion that the highway was to be built (Il Sole 24 Ore, 24 February, 2006). The
Prime Minister was himself convinced that the highway ‘could be done’
(Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August 2006). All the factors which could have led to the
final settlement were potentially there. Yet again, a major diplomatic inci-
dent got in the way.
A few days earlier, an Italian minister, Roberto Calderoli, displaying a
T-shirt with the controversial drawings of Muhammad published by the
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, provoked a protest of hundreds of dem-
onstrators outside the Italian Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. During the pro-
test on 17 February 2006, eleven people were killed and several wounded
(Tgcom, 17 February 2006). In an attempt to remedy the situation, Berlusconi
called for the resignation of Calderoli and, in an interview with Al Jazeera,
he declared that ‘between our two countries there have not been and there
are still no problems’ (Ansa, 21 February 2006).
Not surprisingly, after the riots in Benghazi the Libyan position was not
as well-disposed as Berlusconi’s. In April 2006, during a visit to Italy, the
Libyan Foreign Minister cautioned Italian authorities that Qaddafi, after
the protest in front of the Italian Consulate, would threaten ‘other simi-
lar episodes’ if Italy did not maintain its commitment to close the colo-
nial era with the symbolic gesture of the highway (Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 April
2006).
6.6 Agreements between 2006 and 2008
In 2006, the Berlusconi government completed its full term, and yet the
colonial disputes, first raised in the 1970s, were still far from being solved. In
the elections held in May 2006, Romano Prodi won by a wafer-thin major-
ity and became Prime Minister of a centre–left coalition. The ‘friendship’
with Qaddafi continued as one of the top priorities of Italy’s newly elected
government (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August 2006).
On 3 August 2006, a meeting between the Italian Foreign Minister,
D’Alema, the Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdulati Al Obeidi, and the Libyan
Secretary for Cooperation Affairs, Mohammed Taher Siala, sought to rein-
force the dialogue on migration. In particular, the talks ranged across the
opening of a new reception centre in Libya funded by Italy, the readmission
agreements, the international conference on migration to be held in Tripoli,
the claims of the Italian companies, and the construction of the highway
(Jana News, 3 August 2006).
Shortly afterwards, the Italian Foreign Minister announced his determi-
nation to sign, by the end of the year, a treaty of friendship and cooperation
with Libya, to finally resolve the contentious issues related to the colonial
past. While the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs applauded the
re-establishment of ‘a positive relation with Libya’, the Libyan Ambassador
to Italy, Hafed Gaddur, emphasised that ‘the comprehensive political and
economic agreement’ depended on the construction of the highway as a
symbolic gesture from Italy (Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 August 2006). Similarly, during
a phone call with Prodi, Qaddafi stressed the need for a concrete gesture,
which had been promised by the previous government in order to ‘heal the
wounds caused by the Italian colonial occupation’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 August
2006).
The message was clearly formulated by Al Obeidi, in an interview with Il
Corriere della Sera:
The decision [on the highway] has already been made and the highway
has to be built. This has already been confirmed by the governments that
have preceded this one and by the current government alike. Indeed,
Prodi and D’Alema are discussing the modalities to fulfill this. (Il Corriere
della Sera, 6 September 2006)
In a surprise visit by Prodi to Libya on 8–9 September 2006 (La Stampa,

9 September 2006), and during a subsequent trip to the country by the then
Italian Minister of the Interior, Giuliano Amato, on 12 September 2006, the
joint efforts to control irregular migration were, once more, the top priority
in the discussions (Il Corriere della Sera, 13 September 2006). Libyan officials
announced their intention to send to Italy a police expert to liaise with
Italian counterparts (Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006) and an agreement
was reached to jointly patrol the coastline of the North African country
(Il Corriere della Sera, 13 September 2006; Watanona, 14 September 2006).
In praising the Italian commitment to construct the highway, the Libyan
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shalgam, welcomed the proposed police collabo-
ration (Ansa, 22 September 2006).
Although the construction of the highway had been promised by the
Berlusconi government, Prodi endorsed the commitment. In fact, during an
informal trip to Libya on 7 April 2007, D’Alema made it clear that the high-
way was to be built (Il Corriere della Sera, 8 April 2007). As a high-ranking
diplomat clarified during an interview, on this occasion the two ministers
discussed a draft agreement covering a wide range of issues, including eco-
nomic cooperation, the joint measures against terrorism and migration,
as well as the costal highway.29 Likewise, on March 2007 a Libyan high-
ranking official confirmed the positive developments concerning the high-
way. In his own words:
We have decided that Italy will build a road. We would like to have a
‘big gesture’ made by Italians. This will be done with the Italian speci-
fications of a highway. For this reason, Prodi will soon sign a treaty, in
which this will be agreed upon. [ ... ] Of course the road will be built by
Italian companies. Also, in the treaty there will be no mention of the
colonial issues. This is to avoid setting an international precedent. This
has already been passed in the Italian Parliament. So we have agreed on
the principle and idea of recompensating.30
The official also added that the rationale was that, in finally fulfilling the
Libyan request for a symbolic gesture, Italy would benefit from special eco-
nomic treatment, and Italian companies would be provided with new prof-
itable opportunities. As he succinctly put it, ‘if I was an Italian, I would do
this’.31 Against this background, it is worth noting that the year 2007 repre-
sented a major step forward in EU–Libyan relations.
On 23 July, the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor were
released. As I explained in Chapter 5, such a decision unleashed a new
phase of increasingly intense cooperation between the EU and Libya and
in the next chapter I will further argue that this has important repercus-
sions for the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration. A few months after-
wards, in October 2007, wide-ranging agreement between ENI and the
Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) further consolidated their long-

lasting strategic partnership (ENI, no date). ENI concessions were extended
for another twenty-five years, and the capacity of the gas pipeline was
increased by 37 per cent (Il Sole 24 Ore, 17 October 2007). As the chief of
ENI, Paolo Scaroni, acknowledged ‘Libya is by far the first country for us
[ENI]’ (Il Messaggero, 16 October 2007).
It should be clear by now that if there is an underlying pattern in Italian–
Libyan relations, it is an anomalous ‘logic of exchange’. On the same day
that the ENI–NOC agreement was signed Al Obeidi was in Rome to dis-
cuss with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs the signature of a com-
prehensive agreement to settle the historical contentions (Il Sole 24 Ore,
17 October 2007). In a climate of mounting expectations, the following
month D’Alema travelled to Libya in order to agree ‘in principle’ on the
final treaty. As the Italian minister declared afterwards, whereas the deal
was ‘not yet completed’ they had agreed ‘on the principle’ and had only to
‘finalise the details’ (Libyaonline, 11 November 2007). In fact, the Italian
minister admitted the persistence of some ‘open questions’ (La Repubblica,
11 November 2007). That crucial tensions persisted emerged clearly from
the fact that, during his ten-day trip to Europe in November 2007, Qaddafi
visited Portugal, France and Spain, but not Italy. The decision not to go
to Italy, despite repeated invitations from the Italian government, was per-
ceived as a ‘slap on the face’ for the Italian government (Il Corriere della Sera,
11 December 2007).32
Collaboration on migration was addressed during a visit to Libya by the
Italian Undersecretary of the Interior, Marcella Lucidi. On 19 November
2007 she met El Richie, the Secretary of Immigration Affairs, and Al Obeidi,
which settled the basis of the agreement on joint patrolling, signed in
Tripoli on 29 December 2007 (Panapress, 19 November 2007) and followed
by the implementing protocol of 4 February 2009 (Senato 2009a; UNHCR,
2009). The details of the agreement will be discussed in greater detail in
the chapters to come. What is relevant to us here is a brief insight into
the behind-the-scenes negotiations and Libya’s striking ability ‘to put on a
diverting show’ (The Economist, 30 August 2008). An Italian official recalled
the signing of the December agreement in the following way:
The secretary of the Prefect [the high-ranking Italian official flying from
Rome] contacted me to have a detailed schedule of the meeting with
Libyan authorities. I tried to tell them that it was impossible to know this
in advance. But since they insisted on one, I made up myself a prelimi-
nary schedule. Once the Prefect arrived, of course, the schedule changed
once again. Until the last moment, we were not sure about the text of the
agreement to be signed because of the constant back-and-forth with our
Libyan counterparts. Before the signature it seemed that a deal had been
reached and I tried to make sure that the text was ready so that when the
Prefect met the Libyan authorities we could finally sign it. As we met our
Libyan counterparts to supposedly seal the agreement, we were informed
that they were no longer happy with the text and further negotiations
were needed. The Prefect who had come all the way to Libya just to sign
the text could understand the difficulties that we face on a daily basis
here in Libya. Unexpected developments happen every day. 33
As a matter of fact, a few months later the accord on patrolling had still to
be implemented. A high-level Libyan official interviewed in February 2008
deplored the fact that ‘nothing’ had been done ‘on the ground’.34 In the
midst of these events, the domestic political scenario underwent another of
its notorious reshuffles.
On 24 January 2008, Prodi resigned after losing a confidence vote in
the Senate. A snap general election was held on 13–14 April 2008, which
brought Berlusconi back to power. The centre–right coalition’s comfortable
win was partly attributed to its pledge to tackle undocumented migration.
As Berlusconi bluntly put it, ‘one of the things to do is to close the frontiers
and set up more camps to identify foreign citizens who don’t have jobs and
are forced into a life of crime’ (The Guardian, 16 April 2008). With regard to
Libya, the new government pursued the line of the previous administration.
Libya’s stance did not alter either. As the new cabinet declared the possibil-
ity of Calderoli, who by wearing an anti-Islam T-shirt had provoked the pro-
tests in Benghazi, being appointed minister, Qaddafi’s son was adamant. In
a statement on the site of his foundation, the Gaddafi International Charity
and Development Foundation, he stated categorically that ‘the minister’s
reappointment would have catastrophic consequences on the Libyan–Italian
relations’ (Jana News, 2 May 2008). In connection with this, the Libyan
Minister of the Interior further clarified that Libya was no longer consider-
ing collaborating with Italy on migration. As he put it:
Libya is involved in efforts to repel the influx of illegal migrants to Italy

and it is exhausting its material resources and it is spending a significant
amount of money to protect Italian shores from the wave of clandestine
immigrants. Now Libya is no longer responsible for the protection of the
Italian coasts, because Italy has not fulfilled its commitment to support
Libya. (Rainews, 9 May 2008)
Ultimately, Calderoli was appointed Minister for Regulative Simplification,

and Berlusconi chose Libya as the destination of his first diplomatic trip
abroad of his third term in office. On 28 June, the Italian Prime Minister
met Qaddafi in Sirte for a two-hour discussion focusing on migration and,
in particular, on the implementation of the agreement on common patrol-
ling signed the previous December (AFP, 28 June 2008).
The final deal was reached during a second visit to Libya on 31 August
2008 which was eventually publicised on October 2008 (La Repubblica,
23 October 2008) and ratified with Law No. 2 on 6 February 2009 (Parlamento
Italiano, 2009). In a tent outside Benghazi, the two leaders signed a suppos-
edly ‘historic’ agreement whereby Italy pledged to pay US$5 billion over
twenty-five years in reparations, which would include a diverse range of
projects such as the much-disputed highway (Gazzini, 2009; The Financial
Times, 31 August 2008). The package was intended to finally conclude the
long dispute over the mistreatments of the colonial times. This emerges
clearly from a statement by Berlusconi himself:
I would like to warmly and cordially say thank you to your Leader, who
has sought strongly to reach this point and sign this accord. The agree-
ment deals with the tragic moments of the Italian occupation in your
country. On behalf of the Italian people, as a head of government, I feel
obliged to offer my apologies and express our sorrow for what has hap-
pened years ago and which has affected the lives of many of your fami-
lies. [ ... ] I take this opportunity to publicly praise your Leader for his
efforts in all these years that have brought to your country full dignity
and has placed you at the centre of international politics thanks to his
moderation. (Il Manifesto, 31 August 2008)
Berlusconi’s animated words notwithstanding, the speech that Qaddafi gave

the following day for the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Libyan revolution
was less generous:
Italy pledged to compensate, but [ ... ] nothing could compensate the blood
of our fathers and the Italian occupation of Libya. The reality is that if
someone wanted to be your friend and if he did so in good faith and you
have been recompensed for what he had taken from you, then you might
say yes ‘we can be friends, behave as equals’. (Al Qaddafi, 2008b)
Nevertheless, both countries contended that, with the treaty, the long-
standing clash over the repayment was finally settled, and undocumented
migration would be finally brought under control. The Italian Interior
Minister was indeed unequivocal: ‘the most relevant part of this pact is the
highway, which is the payback in order for us to patrol in Libyan territorial
waters’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008e). In the same way, Berlusconi stated:
‘we have written a page in history and now we will have fewer immigrants
leaving from the coast of Libya and coming to us and we will have more
Libyan oil and gas’ (Paoletti, 2009; The Financial Times, 31 August 2008).
As a matter of fact, Article 19 of the Agreement is devoted to migration. It
provides an ‘intensification of the ongoing cooperation in the context of the
fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and clandestine

migration’ (Parlamento Italiano, 2009).
The events following the agreement would lead one to conclude that
Berlusconi was indeed right. In honouring his promise, Qaddafi abolished
the commemoration of the Day of Revenge which was renamed the Day of
Fulfilment. On 7 October 2008 the renewed friendship between Italy and
Libya was praised. Yet the leader did not fail to ‘salute the Libyan respectful
martyrs who defended the homeland against the Italian colonialism which
took place on this same date in 1911’ (Jana News, 7 October 2008).
On different counts, the bilateral relations have witnessed remarkable
improvements. At the economic level, Tripoli has sought to incentivise
Italian firms to invest in Libya by channelling fresh capital from Libyan
sovereign funds (Ronzitti, 2009: 7). In the words of the Italian Institute
for Foreign Commerce: since the agreement signed in August 2008, ‘Libya
has expressed a growing and unprecedented interest for different Italian
businesses’ (ICE, 2009b: 9). For example, in 2009 the Libyan Central Bank
and the sovereign Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) bought 4.9 per cent
of Unicredit and were about to buy up to 5 per cent of ENI (Ronzitti, 2009:
7; see Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 February 2009). Likewise, in July 2009, Libya made
available 11 billion euros for Italian businesses wishing to invest in Libya
(Il Sole 24 Ore, 2 July 2010). In broad terms, as of 2010, Italian investments
in, and overall commercial relations with, Libya had expanded relatively to
other Mediterranean countries (ICE, 2009a; Ministero dell’Economia, 2009;
Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, 2009).
The collaboration on migration also deepened. As we shall see in the next
chapter, since 2008 new measures to tackle irregular migration have been
introduced in Libya and also at the bilateral level. One of these includes the
push-backs whereby since May 2009 hundreds of irregular migrants inter-
cepted at sea have been returned by Italian authorities to Libya (UNHCR,
2010). The combination of these factors may explain the fact that in 2009
irregular arrivals from Libya to Italy decreased by 90 per cent (Camera,
2010b; Paoletti, 2009).
In marking a definite break from the past, on 10 June 2009 Qaddafi paid
the first visit to Italy since he came to power in 1969. This historic trip was
intended to signal ‘a new era’ of ‘true and profound friendship’ (African
Press International, 14 June 2009). Ironically, Qaddafi arrived in Rome wear-
ing a photo pinned to his military uniform of Omar Al-Mukhtar, the Libyan
resistance fighter during the colonial era who was hanged by the fascist
military government in Tripoli. The picture showed Al-Mukhtar in chains at
the time of his arrest in 1931 (African Press International, 14 June 2009). As
expected, the visit was thwarted by bewildering and controversial episodes.
In one instance, the Libyan leader failed to attend a meeting at the lower
house. Eventually the Speaker, Gianfranco Fini, called the meeting off after
two-hour wait (BBC, 12 June 2009). Similar incidents coloured the second
visit of the Libyan leader which took place a few weeks after. In his capacity
as Head of the African Union, on 8 July 2009, Qaddafi returned to Italy to
attend G8 summit in the central Italian city of L’Aquila (Adnkronos, 7 July
2009). This time, his Bedouin tent was pitched on a sports field belonging
to Italy’s tax police (Magharebia, 8 July 2009).
Having sketched the tortuous historical journey of Italian–Libyan diplo-
matic exchanges, the lingering question is whether the agreement signed
in August 2008 has fundamentally changed their bargaining dynamics. On
the one hand, interviews with Libyan officials between September 2009 and
January 2010 reveal a sense of unyielding dissatisfaction. The agreement –
it was believed – had benefited mainly Italy’s commercial interests, rather
than Libya’s. Along this vein, it has been argued that the agreement has
indeed reversed the cost-benefit balance at the advantage of Italy (Dugger,
2009). On the other hand, a number of critical issues remained unresolved.
In March 2010, the repayment of the Italians repatriated from Libya in the
1970s had yet to be settled (Camera, 2010d). Furthermore, Libya’s refusal in
February and March 2010 to grant visas to citizens from the Schengen area,
and hence also to Italian citizens, as a result of the dispute with Switzerland,
is evidence of the persistent setbacks in the bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions (Camera, 2010c).
6.7 Conclusion
Since the coup by Colonel Qaddafi in 1969, colonial issues have been on
the agenda and have been strategically linked to other aspects of bilateral
diplomatic relations. The tactic of connecting disparate points has contin-
ued to the present day and undermines the Italian stance. Libya holds that
if Italy lives up to its promises and delivers the symbolic gesture, every-
thing would ‘follow automatically’.35 Whether this is the case remains to
be seen.
Libya’s bargaining strategy entails the combination of multiple issues
in order to change the overall balance of interests of its counterpart. This
applies particularly to migration and entry and exit policies. Libya has made
its cooperation on migration contingent on the fulfilment of specific condi-
tions. As Qaddafi made clear during the Lisbon meeting in December 2007,
African countries are willing to help Europe in the fight against migration
if the latter pays back the damages inflicted during the colonial period (AFP,
8 December 2007).
This strategy has proved costly for Italy. The succession of high-level visits
by Italian politicians to Libya demonstrates the obstinate Italian diplomacy
aimed at ‘clearing the Colonel’ for the rehabilitation of the Jamahiriya in
the international arena (Coralluzzo, 2008: 122). It was based on the con-
sideration that the transformation of Libya into a ‘normal country’ and a
‘privileged partner’ would ultimately benefit Italy (Coralluzzo, 2008: 122).
Yet the political developments since Libya’s rehabilitation in the interna-

tional community question such an assumption.
The new era, with Libya no longer a rogue state, has not brought the
expected benefits to Italy. The colonial demands have escalated, and none
of the issues that first emerged in the 1970s have been fully overcome.
Indeed, the striking features of the overall Italian–Libyan discussion have
been the official declarations of consecutive Italian governments insisting
on the allegedly imminent settlement of the outstanding problems. These
pronouncements were invariably negated by subsequent developments
in the bilateral negotiations – until, of course, the latest agreement. With
regard to Libya’s new phase in the international arena, Saif Al Islam declared
recently: ‘it is now a different history, a different page in history. It is a game
and it is a win-win game’ (BBC, 28 August 2008). Whether this pertains also
to Italian–Libyan relations, especially in the wake of the Friendship Treaty
of August 2008, is an open question to which I will return in Part IV.
7
Joint Measures on Migration
7.1 Introduction
In 2010, the Italian Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, lauded the
Friendship Treaty signed with Libya in August 2008 as it finally bore its fruits.
The minister cited statistics according to which since it came into force irreg-
ular migration had decreased by 90 per cent (Camera, 2010b). In this context
we are led to ask what the collaboration consists of. This is the focus of this
chapter which details the measures financed by Italy in Libya in order to
reduce undocumented migration from Libya. Specifically, I concentrate on
the following joint actions: reception camps funded by Italy in Libya; return
flights of undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya and from Libya to third
countries; joint border patrolling; provision of equipment to control borders;
training programmes for police staff; exchange of intelligence information;
projects managed by IOM; and off-shore push-backs. Overall, the aim is to
provide an empirical and descriptive analysis of the Libyan–Italian action on
migration control. This sets the basis of the analytical discussion in Chapter
8 concerned with the extent to which the bilateral collaboration on migration
can be regarded as a manifestation of the externalisation of border controls.
7.2 Centres for irregular migrants funded by Italy in Libya
Before beginning the analysis of the Italian-funded reception camps1 in

Libya, a brief word is necessary on how the idea of centres for migrants
and asylum-seekers in third countries developed within European policy
circles. The proposal to fund centres to host migrants and refugees in third
countries2 was discussed by the Italian Interior Minister, Pisanu, and his
German counterpart, Otto Schily in a meeting on 12 August 2004. As the
press release from the Italian Ministry of the Interior states:
Both Ministers agree on the need to elaborate a procedure defining the

treatment of people found off-shore and who cannot be repatriated to
139
their country of origin because they invoke the Geneva Convention on

the status of refugees. For this category of people, the Ministers are con-
sidering the creation of European structures able to welcome them in
order to process their asylum requests outside our continent. Moreover,
these centres should provide voluntary protection to those recognised as
refugees, either in a third country or in an EU member state. According to
the Ministers, it is important to clarify whether there is a need to create
extra-European reception centres, where the requests for legal immigra-
tion to Europe could be processed on the basis of the need of European
countries. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004b)
During a press conference in September 2004, Pisanu indicated that the

centres were also intended to provide professional training to potential legal
migrants to Europe.
We [Pisanu and Schily] were thinking of facilities in which it was pos-

sible to process requests for asylum or regular migration to our coun-
tries, and to organise professional training courses. For example, Europe
and Italy need nurses, who are not available on European territory. We
cannot import nurses if we don’t provide them with an adequate pro-
fessional training beforehand and a basic knowledge of the European
language that they will need. Moreover, we have thought of these struc-
tures [reception camps] as places where we can provide humanitarian
assistance and identify the nationality of the illegal immigrants who
normally or very frequently arrive here with no documents. (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2004c)
A similar idea was put forward by Rocco Buttiglione, appointed and later
suspended European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. In several
interviews, he defined the reception centres built outside European terri-
tory as a ‘good idea’.3 He further suggested that they could be used to ‘select
the desired [sic] economic migrants to Europe’ (Dietrich and Vogelskamp,
2005). In this vein, he was reported as saying that the Schily proposal to set
up European asylum-seeking centres in North Africa would be a move ‘in
the right direction’ (The Financial Times, 25 August 2004).4
However, the fact that the two countries agreed on utilising the Italian-
funded centres to specifically process asylum requests remains contentious.
In September 2009 the Italian government stated its intention to realise
‘Libyan territory commissions under EU authority’ which could examine
asylum requests. The commissions would be based at ‘gathering centres’ and
would adhere to ‘human rights obligations and would respect the dignity
of those hosted’ (Camera, 2009c). Importantly, this proposal has been put
forward by the EU and, hence, it should not be seen as part of the bilat-
eral agreements.5 Indeed, no consistent evidence is available to contradict
Joint Measures on Migration 141
the latter proposition. In line with its denial of the existence of refugees in
Libya, an internal document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior
indicates that the centres were initially intended to host ‘migrants’ (Libyan
Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). The document refers to three centres to
host foreigners who had entered the country without the required docu-
mentation (Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). Likewise, according to
Pisanu the informal agreement signed between Italy and Libya in July 2003
included the construction of a number of centres in Libya for the general
purpose of regulating migrant movements. An official statement from the
Italian Interior Ministry reads as follows:
The programme under implementation [agreement stipulated between

Italy and Libya in 2003] includes, among others, some measures funded
by Italy and intended to create facilities regulating migrant movements.
The provisions identified in this context are an Italian contribution
to Libyan initiatives. [ ... ] We will contribute to the creation of these
facilities that will be managed exclusively by Libyan authorities. This is
because all forms of collaboration that we have discussed so far are based
on the premise that Libyan sovereignty has to be scrupulously protected.
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c)
This proposal became operational after Law No. 241 passed in 2004 (De
Zulueta, 2006a; Favilli, 2005: 159). The new regulation granted the Italian
Ministry of Interior the possibility to finance, in third countries, ‘structures
useful to contrast the irregular flows of migrants toward Italian territory’
(Parlamento Italiano, 2004).
However, even before this law, in 2003 Italy had financed the construc-
tion of one camp for undocumented migrants in Gharyan, near Tripoli,
and by the end of November 2004 construction was already under way
(Corte dei Conti, 2004; EC, 2005d: 59; Libyan Ministry of the Interior,
2007a). This camp is mentioned in an internal document provided by the
Libyan Ministry of the Interior, which clarifies that it was intended to
provide accommodation to people who had entered the country ‘illegally’
(Libyan Ministry of the Interior, 2007a). The EC report also indicates that
in the financial planning of the Italian government for 2004–5 ‘a special
allocation was foreseen for the realisation of two more camps in the south-
ern part of Libya, in Kufra and Sebha’ (EC, 2005d: 59). The same informa-
tion was confirmed by members of the EP, following a visit to Libya in
December 2005:
The Libyan director for immigration, Brigadier Romali, confirmed that

Italy had financed the construction of a detention camp 20 kilometres
from Tripoli [the one in Gharyan] and that two more centres were being
promised by the Italian authorities in the near future. (EP, 2005)
In addition to these three centres, in 2006 Italy funded the construction of

a fourth one. The fact that Italy has provided the financing and the tech-
nical oversight of four camps for the detention of migrants in Libya was
discussed by Alessandro Pansa, former Director of Immigration and Border
Police at the Italian Ministry of the Interior in a statement before the Italian
Parliament:
One of these centres is near Tripoli, has a capacity of 1,000 people; it be

will handed over next January [2005]. We have started the construction
of a second centre, of the same capacity located in Sebha, at the centre of
the Libyan desert. The third centre will be realised in Kufra next to the
border with Egypt, Sudan and Chad. In the same area the construction of
another may commence during 2006. (Comitato Parlamentare, 2005)
Nonetheless, such plans were later revised. The change in the utilisation of
the centres was confirmed by Italian authorities. According to the repre-
sentative of the Italian Ministry of the Interior based in Tripoli, interviewed
in January 2007, their new purpose would be mainly to provide humanitar-
ian assistance to migrants:
The idea of these centres is to provide medical assistance. We are now

working with Libyan authorities to make sure that these centres have a
distinctive humanitarian function. We would like that these centres were
utilised to provide assistance to the victims of human trafficking.6
The Libyan side, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the
centres. In its view, they were ill-suited to host migrants. One representa-
tive at the Libyan Interior Ministry whom I interviewed in May 2007 main-
tained that the walls surrounding the camps were not high enough and,
thus, could not be used to contain migrants.7 Similarly, the Director of the
Forensic Department in the Libyan police lamented that the camps were not
appropriate for migrants, since they were low-quality pre-fabricated struc-
tures.8 Consequently, in 2007 the Libyan police submitted a request to the
Italian authorities to use the camps for police training instead.9
Other official statements by the Italian Ministry of the Interior confirm
that the centres were to be used for medical and police-training purposes.
In July 2007, the Undersecretary for the Interior maintained that the cen-
tres would provide humanitarian assistance to ‘stranded migrants’ and to
train Libyan police (Camera, 2007a). By July 2007, the centre in Kufra had
not yet been built, and construction of the Sebha one had been halted
(Camera, 2007a). As of September 2009, only the centre in Gharyan had
been handed over to the Libyan authorities for police training and the
camp in Kufra was still under construction.10 It remains unclear, however,
how Libyan authorities would define ‘humanitarian assistance’ and, by
implication, how such centres would differ from the pre-existing ones used
to detain migrants.11
In order to introduce the discussion in the coming chapters, two aspects
behind the change in destination are noteworthy. First, the structures were
criticised by a number of international organisations and NGOs on human
rights grounds.12 Hence, Italy may have revised its policies because of this
international pressure. Indeed, an Italian official explained the modifica-
tion in the following way:
As concerns the centres, I have to say that there are things that in a
certain moment appear to be good but afterwards they are no longer
deemed as positive. We did not do this collaboration, just by ourselves. I
have to say that in building the camps we followed all European stand-
ards. However, a problem remains, i.e. what we thought was good in the
past is seen now in different terms.13
Second, despite such a change in destination, Libyan themselves repeatedly

welcomed the intention of Italy to sponsor such centres. For example, dur-
ing an interview one representative of the Libyan Ministry of the Interior
indicated that Libya had asked the European Union to co-finance ten new
camps.14 This is consistent with the securitised discourse on migration pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
7.3 Repatriations from Italy to Libya15
The practice of returning unauthorised migrants to their supposed coun-

tries of origin has been widely employed by Italy, as well as other European
and non-European countries.16 Italy has signed readmission agreements
with over twenty countries, including Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Moldavia, Nigeria,
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Tunisia
(Caritas, 2006a, 2009; Delicato, 2006: 13). According to Caritas, 23,955
migrants were repatriated by Italy on the basis of bilateral readmission
agreements in 1999, 23,836 in 2000, 34,390 in 2001, 44,706 in 2002, 37,756
in 2003, 35,437 in 2004 and 26,985 in 2005 (Caritas, 2006a).17 More recent
scattered data, however, indicate that since 2007 the number of people
repatriated has decreased (Caritas, 2010). This is partly due to the fact that
Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, who had represented a significant part of
the irregular population, became EU citizens whose stay was legal (OECD,
2009v).18
Repatriations represent a critical aspect of the Italian–Libyan collabo-
ration on migration. Between October 2004 and March 2006, Italy con-
ducted systematic return flights from Lampedusa in Sicily, and Crotone
in Calabria, to Libya, carrying migrants who had recently arrived in Italy
by crossing the Mediterranean. An historical excursus of these measures is

instructive.
From 29 September to 8 October 2004, 1,787 undocumented migrants
reached the island of Lampedusa on twenty vessels that were sighted and
intercepted by the Italian police forces (Council of Europe, 2006). On
1 October, the Italian authorities ordered the expulsion of 90 foreign-
ers from Lampedusa to Libya (Gacon et al., 2005). The following day,
2 October, three flights brought over 300 migrants and asylum-seekers to
Tripoli (Gacon et al., 2005). On 3 October, two special Alitalia flights and
two military planes deported another 400 people, and then on 7 October
four military planes returned still more (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 113).
As the Italian government stated in its response to the appeal before the
European Court of Human Rights, between September and October 2004
‘1,153 foreign nationals – most of them of Egyptian nationality – were
returned to Libya on 11 charter flights’ (Governo Italiano, 2006; Ministero
dell’Interno, 2004d). Before the Italian Ministerial Tribunal,19 Alessandro
Pansa added that the flights were directed to Albeida Airport in Libya so
that the migrants could be easily transferred to Egypt (Collegio per i Reati
Ministeriali, 2006).20
A few months later, a second wave of repatriations took place. On
20 December 2004, a press release from the Italian police reported that 200
irregular Egyptian migrants coming from Libya had been boarded on a
plane at Crotone Airport to Tripoli (Polizia di Stato, 2004). According to the
same source, these measures exemplified ‘the positive collaboration with
Libyan authorities’ (Polizia di Stato, 2004).
A third series of repatriations was carried out in March 2005. Between 13
and 21 March, 1,235 migrants disembarked in Lampedusa (Collegio per i
Reati Ministeriali, 2006). Of them, 421 requested protection and were trans-
ferred to Crotone. Another 494 were returned to Libya and 126 to Egypt
(Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006).
As the then Italian Minister of the Interior commented:
Once again, we are facing an attack conducted by criminal organisa-

tions that unremittingly exploit illegal migrants. [ ... ] We will respond,
as always, in a firm manner. We will provide the necessary assistance
and necessary medical treatment and we will take back to the country of
origin those who are not entitled to stay in Italy. The individual measures
of repatriations are carried out in respect of national and international
rules. (Ansa, 13 March 2005)
Similarly, in April 2005, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of the Interior,

Michele Saponara, claimed that the above-mentioned return flights took
place with the consent of Libya and with respect for human rights laws as
well as existing international laws (Senato, 2005a).
In October 2004 and March 2006, two Italian parliamentarians visited

the reception centre in Lampedusa while the repatriations were under way.
One of the two provides an insightful account of their experiences:
While we were in the centre of Lampedusa, from some documents

that we saw we realised that these people were collectively repatriated
under the same name. We saw long lists repeating the same name [of
those to be repatriated]. Hence, we believe that they were not prop-
erly identified. Moreover, these people were not given the possibility
to apply for asylum. [ ... ] We raised this issue during a parliamentary
interrogation, asking the government how it could send back to Libya
people who had not been identified. The response was that those peo-
ple had been identified. Yet, when we asked if we could have the lists
[with the names of those repatriated proving that they had been iden-
tified], we were told that for privacy reasons this request could not
be met. 21
The same point was made by the other parliamentarian:
When our interpreter shouted at them that they were being sent back
to Libya, there was panic and the people who were about to get into the
aircraft started running away from the plane in order not to board. [ ... ]
Clearly, they had not been told that they were about to be sent back to
Libya.22
Against the claim that migrants were not properly identified, the formal
position of the Italian Ministry of the Interior remains that the people
returned to Libya had been individually identified (Camera, 2005a; Senato,
2005a).
On 12 May 2005, over 800 people arrived at Lampedusa (Ansa, 12 May
2005) and on 14 May an Alitalia flight carried 67 people from Lampedusa
to Albeida in western Libya (Ansa, 20 May 2005; Human Rights Watch,
2006a: 110). Significantly, on 10 May the Third Section of the European
Court of Human Rights requested the Italian government not to expel
eleven migrants who had appealed to the Court (European Court of Human
Rights, 2005). The case, however, was archived in January 2010 (European
Court of Human Rights, 2005). As we shall see later on, as irregular migrants
continued to be returned to Libya, international pressure mounted for Italy
to halt this controversial practice.
A fifth series of return flights from Sicily took place between June and
July 2005. On 22 June, the Italian authorities returned at least 45 people
to Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 110). Other sources report that
on 13 July, 64 Egyptians were transferred to Libya (Il Manifesto, 11 August
2005).23
Table 7.1 Number of foreign nationals returned from Italy

to Libya
2004 2005 2006 Total
1,153 1,876 14 3,043
Sources: The numbers presented in this table are sketchy and are likely
be incomplete. They are based on the data available from the above
sources. More specifically, the figure for the year 2004 is mentioned
in the written response of the Italian government to the European
Court of Human Rights and refers to the people returned in October
2004. The 2005 estimate was provided by the Libyan government
to Human Rights Watch (2006a). For the year 2006 the source is the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (2007).
Other flights from Italy to Libya were arranged in August 2005. On

10 August 2005, 65 migrants were put on an Alitalia flight to Libya
(Arci, 2005; Il Manifesto, 11 August 2005). A few days later, between 21 and
27 August, 130 Egyptians arrived at Lampedusa and were transported first
to Porto Empedocle and then to Catania Airport to be put on two mili-
tary flights to Libya (Ansa, 30 August 2005). On 31 August, another 165
Egyptians were taken from Lampedusa to Libya (Ansa, 30 August 2005).
Overall as table 7.1 summarizes, Libyan authorities indicate that in
2005 the number of foreigners returned from Italy to Libya totalled 1,876
(Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 110). A similar figure is confirmed by the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which documents
that, in 2005, twenty-one flights returned to Libya 1,642 foreign nation-
als from Lampedusa and 221 from Crotone (European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, 2007). 24 Its 2007 report makes clear that in 2006
only one repatriation flight took place (Ansa, 28 March 2006). In fact, on
28 March fourteen people were returned to Libya (European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture, 2007: 31).
Overall, different sources contend that most of the foreigners returned to
Libya were repatriated directly to third countries (Ministero dell’Interno,
2004f, 2004h). A report by the EP cites Libyan authorities saying ‘that the
hundreds of illegal sub-Saharan migrants sent back to Tripoli by the Italian
authorities in 2004 and 2005 have, in most cases, been repatriated to their
countries of origin’ (EP, 2005a). Likewise, Siala made it clear to the EP del-
egation that:
When illegal immigrants are returned to Libya, our mission is to con-

tact the different embassies to verify their nationality and get them a
travel visa. Afterwards we repatriate them to their country of origin. We
are very happy that Italy cooperates with us by financing some of these
return flights. (EP, 2005a)25
Similarly, Human Rights Watch reports:
The quickest returns are of persons sent back from Italy, because the
Libyan and Italian governments have arranged their onward removal to
countries of origin prior to their arrival. ‘This is arranged before they
come [from Italy] so we do not hold them’ said Hadi Khamis the director
of Libya’s deportation camps. He explained, ‘They are not held in al-
Fellah but sent right home.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 55)26
The same position was reiterated by the Libyan Interior Minister, Nasser al-
Mabruk. He was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country had helped
repatriate migrants after their expulsion from Italy:
Italian authorities asked Libyan authorities for their assistance [ ... ] Libya
has accepted this demand and returned them to Egypt through Libya.
[ ... ] They were returned on Italian flights and Italy is paying for the cost.
(BBC, 7 October 2004)
By and large, it appears that migrants returned from Italy were repatri-
ated by Libyan authorities, either by air or by land (Il Tempo, 7 October
2004). It is important to bear in mind that these repatriations from Libya
to third countries are distinct from those that I discuss in the next section
and that concern migrants arrested in Libya and, hence, not necessarily
those who had reached Italian shores. They should also be distinguished
from the push-backs of migrants intercepted at see which I will also discuss
in section 7.10.
Since March 2006, no further repatriations from Italy to Libya have been
reported. However, official statements from the Italian Ministry of the
Interior are ambiguous on the matter. For instance, in May 2006, during
a visit to Lampedusa, the Undersecretary of the Interior, Marcella Lucidi,
declared that there would ‘no longer be expulsions of immigrants to those
countries that have not signed the Geneva Convention, and among them,
Libya’ (La Repubblica, 25 May 2006). Yet on the same day Giuliano Amato,
met with the Libyan Ambassador to the Vatican, Gaddur, to reassure Libya
about the ‘real’ [sic] intentions of Italy. Accordingly, the press release of the
Ministry of the Interior states that Italy intended to cooperate with Libya
in order to control borders, because in the ‘recent past’ this had produced
‘visible results’, and that Italy confirmed its ‘full collaboration to control
illegal immigration especially in consideration of the beginning of the sum-
mer holiday’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 May 2005). In fact, the Undersecretary was
reported clarifying that the ‘expulsions’ to Tripoli would ‘not be indiscrimi-
nate’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 May 2005; La Repubblica, 25 May 2006). However, it
is important to stress that there is no evidence that return flights from Italy
to Libya continued after March 2006.
Presumably, in order to address what could have been perceived as a

potential breach of the informal agreements with Libya, the Ministry of
the Interior sought to remedy the possible misunderstanding caused by the
statement by Lucidi, and to send ‘the right’ message to Libya. Using this
reasoning, one high-level official was reported as saying:
If this was the case [i.e. if expulsions to Libya were to be stopped], the
expulsion machine and the fight against illegal immigration would be
jeopardised. If this was the case we should transfer all the illegal immi-
grants that arrive to Sicily in the 13 receptions centres that [ ... ] are already
full. Since we would not be able to identify them within 60 days as pre-
scribed by law, we would have to free them. Hence, this [what Marcella
Lucidi proposed] would not help the problem of reducing the time
required for the identification procedures. (La Stampa, 25 May 2006)
Overall, the return flights have been the object of numerous critiques.
Notably, Italy has been condemned by the Council of Europe’s Committee for
the Prevention of Torture, Amnesty International (Amnesty International,
2005a), UNHCR (UNHCR, 2005) and the European Parliament (EP, 2005b).
Italy has been also been asked to justify the expulsions by the European
Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights, 2005) and the
Italian Ministers Tribunal (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006).
In the interest of brevity, I will not dwell upon the examination of all
the criticisms made, but will focus instead on the points relevant to our
purposes, which are two: (1) the absence of a formal readmission agreement
between Italy and Libya and (2) the questionable legal basis, from the per-
spective of Italian jurisprudence, for conducting return flights. I shall now
consider the responses provided by the Italian government on these con-
cerns. This analysis sheds light on the bewildering position of the Italian
government on migration policies and vis-à-vis Libya.
On the existence of the readmission agreement, different arguments have
been advanced. The EP deplored the secret nature of the bilateral collabora-
tion with regard to the collective expulsions of asylum seekers and ‘irregu-
lar migrants’ to Libya (EP, 2005b). As a result, the return flights constituted
a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, and the Italian authorities
allegedly failed to meet their international obligations (EP, 2005b). As a
matter of fact, an Italian official based in Tripoli maintained that the two
countries had signed no readmission agreements. 27 Yet, during an inter-
view with me a former Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that the Italian–
Libyan readmission agreement had in fact been sealed. When I argued
that no formal agreements on this matter had ever been discussed before
the Italian Parliament, he responded that verbal agreements hold juridi-
cal value.28 Along this line, the statements of the Italian Interior Minister
evince that the two countries agreed informally to undertake repatriations
from Italy to Libya and from Libya to third countries. On 17 September

2004, Pisanu praised the agreements with Libya in terms of the significant
number of foreign nationals repatriated (Ansa, 17 September 2004) and
on 27 September 2004 he confirmed that Libya had already accepted the
repatriation of 800 migrants (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c). This would
lead one to assume that the two countries had ‘informally’ agreed on such
measures. Moreover, on 8 October 2004 in the Chamber of Deputies Pisanu
reiterated that:
The readmissions to Libya have been carried out on the basis of the
agreements with that government and they reflect the agreements
already finalised with many third countries from the Southern shore
of the Mediterranean. However, the bilateral agreements between Italy
and Libya neither cover the treatment of the foreigners expelled from
Italy, nor the modality of their expulsion to the country of origin. The
agreements [ ... ] concern the fight against illegal migration and human
smuggling, as well as the provision of equipment and the cooperation
on saving the lives of people traversing the Mediterranean. (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2004d)
Other government officials endorsed this point. In the Senate on 14 October,

the former Undersecretary of the Interior, Alfredo Mantovano, made it clear
that the readmissions to Libya were envisioned in the agreements with Libya
(Senato, 2004). Moreover, during an interview a former Undersecretary for
the Interior explained the reasons for their informality:
We had to address the issue of people dying off-shore [ ... ] If one of our
partners, and I don’t necessarily want to say Libya, for its own reasons, is
willing to have an agreement only if its items remain secret for a certain
period of time, I much prefer to have this agreement, even if it is infor-
mal, instead of nothing at all. This is particularly the case if this could
help save human lives and prevent unbalanced situations between coun-
tries of origin and of destination.29
Likewise, in a letter to Human Rights Watch, Giuseppe Panocchia, the

Italian Foreign Ministry’s representative, attested that the readmissions
to Libya were ‘based on informal agreements developed in the course of
diverse bilateral meetings at ministerial level’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a:
106). Furthermore, in his testimony before the Ministers Tribunal, the pre-
fect, Carlo Mosca, stated that the flights to Libya and the subsequent repa-
triations to Egypt took place with the consent of Libya, ‘in the absence of
formal readmission agreements’ (Collegio per i Reati Ministeriali, 2006).
Such a position is also clear from the response of the Italian government
to the European Court of Human Rights, which asserted that ‘there is no
agreement with Libya on readmission of illegal migrants’ (European Court

for Human Rights, 2006).
This point leads to the second issue concerning the legality of the return
flights under Italian legislation. The Italian government argued that the
return flights to Libya were lawful. For example, on 16 March 2005 Pisanu
declared in the Italian Parliament that Italy was acting lawfully (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2006f). In Italian legislative practice, the government is enti-
tled to sign agreements with third countries even in the absence of the
authorisation by Parliament (Favilli, 2005: 158). The vexing dispute con-
cerns the risk of non-refoulement.
In its formal response on the appeal before the European Court of Human
Rights concerning the repatriations of 29 September–6 October 2004, the
Italian government sought to clarify its position with regard to the non-
refoulement principle and the nature of the cooperation with Libya. It argued
that the return flights to Libya fell under the definition of ‘respingimento’30
and are to be considered neither ‘refoulement’ nor ‘expulsions.’ ‘Respingimento’
is defined in Articles 10 and 13 of the Unified Text on Immigration as the
situation where ‘the border police send back foreigners crossing the borders
without the necessary requirements for the entry into the state’s territory as
provided for in the Unified Text’ (Ministero dell’Interno, 1998). This prin-
ciple of ‘refusal of entry’ is distinct from, and does not necessitate the prior
signature of, a readmission agreement (Delicato, 2006). While fundamental
human rights are expected to be safeguarded, foreigners are not allowed to
enter national territory because of their lack of the required documentation
(Delicato, 2006: 2). Hence, the Italian government rejected the charge of
violating the non-refoulement principle, arguing that it had applied the prin-
ciple of ‘respingimento’.
The proposition that Italy has acted lawfully was formulated by the
Italian authorities on several occasions. For example on December 2005,
the Undersecretary, D’Alia, declared in the Chamber of Deputies:
The ‘respingimento’ of migrants to Libya in many cases has been moni-

tored until their reaching of their final destination, their country of ori-
gin – which was Egypt, contrary to what they declared. The decisions of
respingimento and, in the most serious cases, of expulsion have been taken
in full respect of Italian legislation and of the international norms. This
applies also in the case of the most recent crisis affecting the centre in
Lampedusa between October 2004 and June–September 2005. (Camera,
2005b)
Nevertheless, a number of Italian parliamentarians, such as De Zulueta,

Acciarini, Martone and Iovene, have repeatedly emphasised that all the
available evidence points to the principle of non-refoulement having been
violated (Senato, 2005b). They contended that, in conducting what they
termed ‘mass expulsions’ (Senato, 2004), the Italian government not only
breached the Unified Text on Immigration but also ‘committed a whole
series of offences’.31 Similarly, the International Federation for Human Rights
asserted that the non-refoulement principle had been contravened since
the identification of nationality seemed to have been determined pri-

marily by the intuition and snap judgments of two Arabic interpreters,
and Italian officials did not make available the names of those expelled,
despite repeated requests from Italian politicians. (Human Rights Watch
2006a)
As of 2009, the alleged infringement of the non-refoulement principle remains

an open question (AGI, 2007; Vassallo Paleologo, 2008b).32 As regards Italian
law, however, the secrecy of the diplomatic arrangements has been deemed
unconstitutional (Favilli, 2005: 164). Broadly, the lack of clarity on the
arrangements of the return flights from Italy to Libya, and their sudden
interruption despite the continuation of undocumented arrivals to Italy,
are evidence of Italy’s shifting and ambiguous stance.33 Correspondingly,
Libya’s acceptance of the repatriations invites a reflection on its position
towards migration. Arguably, the Libyan substantive interest in full reha-
bilitation within the international community made the benefits of com-
pliance with the return flights from Italy higher than those of defiance.
This consideration directs attention to Libya’s evolving bargaining position,
which I will explore in the chapters to come.
7.4 Repatriations from Libya to third countries
Alongside the return of migrants to Libya, since 2003 Italy has also spon-
sored the return of migrants from Libya to their putative country of origin.34
For example, the Italian Interior Ministry documents that, in 2003, Italy
coordinated 25 flights from Libya to unspecified third countries (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2004a: 27).35
A more comprehensive account is provided by the EC report (2005d),
which documents that, between August 2003 and the end of 2004, Italy
financed fifty flights. Overall, 5,688 migrants were expelled to Egypt,
Ghana, Mali, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria
(EC, 2005d: 61–2). As indicated in table 7.2, according to the Libyan Interior
Ministry, between January 2003 and August 2006, 8,899 foreign nationals
were repatriated from Libya to third countries with Italian financial support
(Libyan Ministry of Interior, 2007a).
The interviews with Libyan police officers conducted in Libya in June
2007 reveal that Italy continues to finance flights of undocumented for-
eign nationals from Libya to third countries. The same information was
confirmed by a Deputy Minister at the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs.36
Table 7.2 Repatriations from Libya to third countries financed

by Italy
Year Number of people deported
2003 1,643
2004 4,947
2005 1,710
Until August 2006 599
Total 8,899
Source: Libyan Interior Ministry (2007a). It is not clear, however, if

these estimates include the migrants repatriated from Italy or just
those arrested in Libya. This serves as an important reminder of the
limits of the available data.
During an interview in June 2007, he pointed out that Libyan authorities

arranged the renting of the planes and that Italy paid for them.37 Similarly,
in March 2008, another high-ranking Libyan official clarified that Italy
was still financing the return flights of undocumented migrants to third
countries,38 and a document from the Libyan Justice Ministry in 2008 stated
that ‘the collaboration between two countries [Italy and Libya] has produced
successful results, the most important of them being the collaboration on
the operations for return of migrants’ (Libyan Minister of Justice, 2008).
This information, however, was disavowed by the Italian officials inter-
viewed in Tripoli between January 2007 and September 2009. According
to them, Italy was no longer providing assistance with the return flights
from Libya to third countries.39 In addition, the aforementioned statements
by Libyan officials were not corroborated by other sources such as media
and international organisations. From an Italian standpoint, the decision
to interrupt the financing of the return flights from Libya may have been a
consequence of the criticism voiced by the international community regard-
ing possible human rights violations.40
7.5 Coordinated patrolling
As illustrated in the previous chapter, Libyan and Italian authorities met on

several occasions to discuss, inter alia, the coordinated patrolling of land and
sea borders. In December 2003, the Undersecretary at the Italian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Antonione, stated that the agreements between
the two countries included the control of terrestrial frontiers, intelligence
support on criminal organisations and ‘contrasting’ undocumented migra-
tion off-shore (Camera, 2003a). More specifically, in June 2004 Alessandro
Pansa confirmed that Italy and Malta had agreed with Libya and Tunisia to
organise joint patrols along sea borders to curb unwanted migration from
Libya (Pansa, 2004b).
Since 2002, Libya has participated occasionally in off-shore military

exercises with Italy (Pagine di Difesa, 2004). In fact, in 2004 Libya gave its
support to the joint patrols carried out by Greece, Malta, Italy and the UK
within the framework of the Neptune project, and in 2005 Libyan units
participated directly in the joint patrols (Ansa, 21 October 2005; Cuttitta,
2007a: 14; Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 October 2004; Polizia di Stato, 2005).41
However, subsequently Libya reconsidered its position. After meeting
Qaddafi in September 2004, Giuseppe Pisanu declared that coordinated sea
patrol systems were no longer on the agenda:
It is clear that in the Libyan programme there is the idea of acquiring

an autonomous capacity to control its borders and of strengthening its
structures. Until recently Libya was not capable of doing such things
because of the embargo. (Ministero Dell’Interno, 2004c)
Likewise, at the multilateral summit with government representatives of

Malta and Italy on 6 September 2006, the Libyan government, while con-
firming its intention to cooperate in the surveillance of the Mediterranean,
also declared that no foreign naval forces would be admitted into its territo-
rial waters (Cuttitta, 2007a: 14). On other occasions, Libyan officials have
opposed altogether joint measures to control sea borders. As the Libyan
Ambassador to Malta, Saad El-Shelmani, observed in 2006, for Libya to
order migrants to do a u-turn to Libya was not the solution, and the joint sea
patrols would have breached Libyan sovereignty (Jeune Afrique, 31 August
2006; Watanona, 27 August 2006). We will see, however, that this was
bound to change after the Friendship Treaty of August 2008.
At this point, it is useful to consider the Libyan position on Frontex. In
September 2006, Libya’s European Affairs Minister, Abdulati Al Obeidi, said
that Libya opposed Frontex on two grounds. First, Frontex could not solve
the migration problem, since priority had to be given to the Libyan southern
borders as the major transit point for migrant flows. Second, the design and
implementation of Frontex had been taken unilaterally by the EU. Hence,
the Libyan diplomat concluded that the EU proposal was ‘unacceptable’ (La
Stampa, 6 September 2006).
Be that as it may, Italian and EU officials continued to affirm that Libya
would take part to the joint patrolling. On 23 November 2006, Giuliano
Amato announced that the Libyan leader was ‘totally’ in support of the
collaboration with Frontex (Ansa, 23 November 2006). Accordingly, Franco
Frattini pointed out:
There is a piece of good news. Libya has finally accepted our proposal
to collaborate [with Frontex]. In exchange it has asked for our help to
control its Southern border along the frontier with Niger. In other words,
Libya told us: we commit to patrolling your [European] shores to block
clandestine people [sic] if you [Europeans] help us to block clandestine

[sic] influxes through the desert. (Il Messaggero, 12 March 2007)
These claims, however, proved to be misguided. After participating in the

joint operations in 2005, Libya refused to grant permission to Frontex to
patrol its territorial waters.42 This is an important clue, since it sheds light on
the communication difficulties between Libyan and EU officials. It is further
evidence of the somewhat bewildering manner in which negotiations have
been conducted. As an official from Frontex declared in June 2007:
Libya has not responded to the requests of the EU to participate to the

joint patrolling. This makes the whole operation very difficult especially
when it comes to decide who is responsible to provide humanitarian
assistance to the migrants found off-shore. (Ansa, 25 June 2007)
Along the same lines, after the recent visit of Frontex to Libya between May
and June 2007, a representative of the EU mission lamented:
There is definitely no political will on Tripoli’s [sic] to stem the problem.

No real patrols on the Mediterranean coast exist, and it is almost a free-
for-all situation with clandestine trafficker groups operating all over the
country. Libya definitely needs help, but there also has to be a political
will to act. (The Times of Malta, 3 June 2007)
The report produced by Frontex (2007) on the same visit concedes that
although discussions with Libyan authorities were ‘extremely friendly and
courteous’, the latter offered no clear signals, ‘as had been hoped by the mis-
sion members’, as to what its position was ‘in respect of (a) participation in
Joint Operation “Nautilus” and (b) possible future operational cooperation
with Frontex’ (Frontex, 2007: 6).
The discussion between Frontex and Libyan authorities also addressed
the patrolling of the southern borders (Frontex, 2007).43 In October 2006,
Franco Frattini had already announced that Frontex intended to allocate
some resources to the joint control of the Libyan southern borders (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2006f).
Simply put, Libyan authorities have been reluctant to patrol European
borders ‘for free’. As a former Libyan Prime Minister observed:
[Europeans would like Libya] to spend our time and money to fight and
to protect you [Europeans] because you are showing your beautiful girls
and nice life. [ ... ] The Europeans tell us: ‘you are not doing enough. This
is illegal immigration that comes from your borders.’ But we cannot con-
trol these borders alone! The Europeans want us to be their police along
their borders!44
The same point was made by a former Director of the Gaddafi Foundation.
During an interview, he explained that the common perception within
Libyan political circles was clear: ‘let Italians and the EU pay!’45
The debate on Frontex ought certainly to be distinguished from that con-
ducted at bilateral level with Italy. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 6, on
28 December 2007, Italy and Libya signed an agreement on the joint patrol-
ling of coasts, ports and bays in northern Libya to prevent irregular migra-
tion (Il Corriere della Sera, 29 December 2007; Ministero dell’Interno, 2007c;
UNHCR, 2009,). As the following extract of the agreement indicates, Italy
committed to provide six patrol boats to Libya:
Libya and Italy will organise sea patrolling with six naval units that will
be temporarily given by Italy. The boats will have mixed crews, with both
Libyan and Italian personnel, to conduct training and ensure technical
assistance on how to utilise and maintain such boats. These boats will
be used to carry out control operations, ‘search and rescue’ operations
in the locations of origin and transit of the boats dedicated to the trans-
port of clandestine immigration both in territorial and international
waters. The two parties will respect International Conventions and the
technical implementation will be defined by the two countries. (Bilateral
Agreement, 29 December 2007)
According to an Italian governmental official, the main rationale of the

agreement was to save lives:
The objective of this agreement is to save people who otherwise die along
the journey from the Mediterranean. Each boat can be a big tragedy and
hence this agreement would be preventive in nature, for search and res-
cue. It should not then be seen as an agreement for further closure. The
primary objective is to put an end to this endless tragedy [of migrants
dying offshore].46
In January 2008 the Italian Parliament approved the allocation of over

€6 million for the Guardia di Finanza, the Italian police force under the
Minister of Economy and Finance, to execute the agreement on joint
patrolling (Senato, 2008). The following year a further €4.8 million had
been budgeted to fund the ‘participation’ of the Guardia di Finanza to the
mission in Libya in accordance with the 2008 agreement (Senato, 2009b:
77). This, together with Libya’s acquiescence to Italian requests on the
push-backs – which I document below – signals a major policy shift from
the former. The question that then arises is why Libya signed the agree-
ment in the first place. Given the fact that it had previously rejected both
European and Italian requests on the grounds of sovereignty, why did it
give its consent this time? I posed the question to a high-ranking Libyan
official, who responded:
We need to engage with other European countries and we have to show

them how big the problem is. By signing this agreement with Italy, we
sought to strengthen our case before the EU in order to obtain more sup-
port in the fight against irregular migration.47
Beyond the debatable motivations on Libya’s compliance, the interviews

with Italian and Libyan officials attested that implementation did not fol-
low suit. In March 2008, the technical arrangements on the implementa-
tion of the accord had yet to be stipulated.48 As Pastore noted, in June 2008
the six patrol boats were still anchored in some Italian port waiting for the
Libyans to declare themselves ready to accept their offer of help (Pastore,
2008a: 1). Not surprisingly, on 1 August 2008 Mantovano expressed dis-
satisfaction with the fact that Libya ‘did not comply with the agreements’
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2008d). In signing the treaty on 31 August 2008,
Italian authorities hoped that the impasse on joint patrolling had been over-
come (Il Corriere della Sera, 31 August 2008). The subsequent facts already
referred to at the beginning of this chapter and the push-backs, would lead
one to observe that from the perspective of the collaboration on migration
the accord did mark a watershed. The first three patrol boats were handed
over by Italian authorities to their Libyan counterparts on 14 May 2010
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2009b) and on 10 February 2010 the remaining
three (Ministero dell’Interno, 2010a). In relation to the latter, the Italian
Minister of the Interior remarked that ‘the contrast to irregular migration
and organised crime which manages human trafficking is the primary
objective for both Italy and Libya’ (Ministero, dell’Interno, 2010a).
In conclusion, the negotiations on the control of the Mediterranean are
an illustration of the extent to which Libyan authorities have been able to
determine the pace of the negotiations and, thereby, to quell Italian and
European pressure. Up until 2008, the inability of both the EU and Italy to
conduct joint patrolling exposes the constraints that they face in advancing
their own agendas. This discussion calls into question the scope and sub-
stantive capacity of the Italian outsourcing action and the costs it incurred
in order to secure the cooperation of its counterpart.
7.6 Provision of equipment
The EC report shows that the informal bilateral agreement signed in July
2003 included, inter alia, the supply of specialised tools to help Libyan
authorities patrol land and sea borders (EC, 2005d). The range of equip-
ment delivered to Libya by Italy is listed in detail. It included Mitsubishi
cars, three Iveco buses, 80 forgery document kits, 12,000 mixed wool
covers, 6,000 mattresses and pillows, 150 binoculars for daylight vision,
500 lifebuoys and 500 lifejacket, 500 wetsuits, 100 Zodiac lifeboats, 100
underwater lamps, 500 nautical light bulbs, 25 road GPS trackers, 50 signal-
ling rockets with a range of 12 miles and 50 for beyond 12 miles, five kits for
checking crime evidence, five kits for fingerprinting, 1,000 body bags, five
cameras and films and 40 night-time viewers (EC, 2005d: 60).
Additionally, on May 2005, the Italian Ministry of the Interior committed
itself to spend €15 million over three years to equip the Libyan police with
the necessary means to combat irregular migration (BBC, 27 May 2005; Il
Corriere della Sera, 27 May 2005). In 2007, five jeeps fully equipped for the
desert, computers and other specialised police equipment were also pro-
vided by Italy, alongside €7 million to set up an information system to reg-
ister Libyan citizens (Il Corriere della Sera, 30 December 2007).
This collaboration notwithstanding, the formal and informal talks that
I had with officials at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior prior the agree-
ment on August 2008 showed a general dissatisfaction with the quality and
quantity of the equipment provided by Italy. For example, the Director of
the Fellah detention centre, when showing me one of the 80 jeeps furnished
by the Italian government, deplored the fact that despite being aesthetically
pleasing, such jeeps were useless in desert-like environments.49 Yet high offi-
cials at the Libyan Ministry of the Interior expressed a different opinion.
For example, the General Director of the Department of Cooperation and
Relations in the Interior Ministry, remarked that the cooperation with Italy
and the material support provided had been satisfactory. The problem was,
instead, with the Europeans, who, as he put it, ‘come here, talk and listen to
us but, in concrete terms, do very little’.50 The subtext here is that views and
perceptions on the collaboration with Italy and the EU vary significantly
between Libyan authorities. This consideration invites us to move away
from the concept of a supposedly monolithic structure of Libyan decision-
making and to appreciate the complexities of the Italian–Libyan negotia-
tion outcomes.
It is important to emphasise that the Friendship Treaty had a significant
impact on the collaboration on equipment provisions and more broadly
on defence. Under Article 19 Italy agreed to co-finance a control system at
Libya’s southern border (Camera, 2009d). Reportedly, the project involv-
ing the setting up of a radar system to monitor the desert (Il Sole 24 Ore,
2 September 2008; Ronzitti, 2009) was contracted out to Selex (Selex, 2007),
an Italian private company which is part of Finmeccanica, the second-
largest industrial group and the largest hi-tech industrial group in Italy.
Importantly, Finmeccanica is partially owned by the Italian government
with around 30 per cent of its shares (Felice, 2010). By October 2009, the
implementation of the €300 million project on for Border Security and
Control had already started (Finmeccanica, 2009a).51 In fact since 2008, the
Italian government has authorised a number of major contracts between
Italian companies with the Libyan Investment Authority on border control
as well as aerospace, electronics, transportation and energy sectors (Casale,

2009; Finmeccanica, 2009b; Unimondo, 2010). The importance of private
sector involvement in inter-state security cooperation adds a further layer
of complexity for it involves us in discussions on accountability and diffu-
sion of power. In fact this issue has been amply examined in the literature
(Bigo, 2002; Van Buuren, 2010). The relevant point for us here, however, has
more to do with the broader give-and-take bargaining game qualifying our
bilateral relation.
7.7 Training programmes
The agreement reached in 2000 included cooperation to train police offic-

ers. Indeed, Article 2 reads as follows: ‘Both parties commit themselves to
cooperating in the area of specialised training and to promote coopera-
tion between the police forces of both countries’ (Memorandum of Intent,
13 December 2000).
Similarly, during a press conference in September 2004, Giuseppe Pisanu
suggested that
The Libyan authorities rely on our [Italian] collaboration, especially as

regards training courses and the provision of know-how concerning
police forces. [ ... ] There are already some forms of collaboration, such
as specialised training ranging from controls on false documentation to
dog-training, as well as the identification of explosives and drugs. The
existing agreements between Libya and us are not in the area of migra-
tion only. We have also discussed collaboration on terrorism, interna-
tional organised crime and human trafficking. (Ministero dell’Interno,
2004c)
The training programme for Libyan police staff covered Italian language
courses, techniques to control borders assistance, identification of illegal
migrants and criminal police strategies. The workshops in Libya were fol-
lowed by seminars in Italy focused on the structure and functioning of the
Italian criminal police (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c).
The same information appears in the EC report (2005d) that lists the
courses organised by Italian authorities between 2004 and 2005. Specifically,
it indicates that, in 2004, three courses in detecting forged documents for
60 officers, one in ‘ballistics survey traces of effraction’ for three officers,
four in the Italian language, one in anti-drugs policing for 19 officers, and
one in dog-training for 8 operators were held (EC, 2005d: 63).
Likewise, the training organised throughout 2005 included one course
in forged documents for 20 officers, one advanced course in forged docu-
ments for a further 20 officers, one course on anti-terrorism for 20 officers,
and one diving course for six officers (EC, 2005d: 62). Likewise, an internal
document provided by the Libyan police confirms that, in 2006, 249 work-
shops were held in both Italy and Libya and 419 Libyan officers were
trained in false documentation, Italian language, scientific police and drug-
trafficking (Libyan Police, 2007). As a senior official in the Libyan police
confirmed during an interview, the training courses for Libyan policemen
organised with Italian authorities have increased significantly over the last
few years.52 A number of such training courses have taken place at the Police
Academy in Tripoli, part of the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, and have
been managed by IOM. In 2009, the latter also organised targeted courses
for Libyan judges and prosecutors ‘on various aspects of irregular migration,
including human trafficking, in a bid to enhance their understanding of
the phenomenon that also affects their country’ (IOM, 2009a).
For the purposes of this study, the linkage between the Italian-sponsored
training courses and Libya’s security agenda deserves attention. In financ-
ing the courses, Italy has acknowledged the legitimacy of the Libyan police
and, in so doing, strengthened an already powerful security apparatus
(Pargeter, 2007). Italy has, ultimately, bolstered the notoriously pervasive
Libyan police state (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). It has long been estab-
lished that ‘the Libyan police force has become an institution for political
supporters of the regime’ (Abdelmoula, 1992: 57). I am thus led to return to
two of my initial questions. What does the police cooperation tell us about
the relative influence of one country towards its counterpart? What is the
relation between the collaborative arrangements, the security discourse and
power relations? These issues are at the core of the more analytical discus-
sion on the bilateral bargaining, to be explored in Part IV.
7.8 Exchange of information
The exchange of intelligence information between Libya and Italy is an

important aspect of the bilateral agreements on migration. The collabora-
tion on intelligence was stipulated in the 2000 agreement and focused, inter
alia, on information-sharing on smuggling organisations (Memorandum
of Intent, 13 December 2000). One example of this is the representative
of the Italian Ministry of the Interior based in Tripoli. In the capacity of
Immigration Liaison Officer (ILO), he exchanges intelligence information
with other European ILOs based across other Northern African countries.53
Moreover, he works closely with the Libyan police and Ministry of the
Interior on the same matter.54 Since September 2006, information-sharing
was further expanded when the Libyan and Italian governments agreed
that a liaison officer from the Libyan Interior Ministry would be based in
Rome (Cuttitta, 2006: 19; Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006). The fact that
Libyan officials are based in Rome to perform security-related functions is
striking. It shows that the collaboration entails Italian officers relocating to
Libya and, albeit to a lesser degree, vice versa.
According to both parties, such cooperation has been successful. For

example, the Italian Interior Ministry showed that in February 2006, as
part of Operation ‘Abid’ undertaken with the support of Libya, the Italian
police had been able to locate criminal organisations based in Libya, Egypt
and Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006a: 51, 2006b: 194). Similarly, in June
and April 2006, two operations led by the Italian Interior Ministry, respec-
tively ‘Harig’ and ‘Kafila’, succeeded in dismantling smuggling organisa-
tions operating between Italy, Libya and Tunisia (Coluccello and Massey,
2007; Ministero dell’Interno, 2007b). As a further example, in January 2007
Amato praised the joint efforts on intelligence-sharing, since the two coun-
tries had successfully located and arrested 190 migrants who were about to
leave for Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007a). As the representative of the
Italian Ministry of Interior based in Libya emphasised:
We [Italians] have provided intelligence information to Libyan officials

on our investigative activities and the Libyan authorities have ana-
lysed such information, confirmed our analysis and implemented ‘on
the ground’ what we had suggested. As a result, the arrivals [of undoc-
umented migrants] to Lampedusa over the last few months have been
reduced by 50%. Hence, we can say that the response from Libyan police
has been positive.55
This positive judgement was shared also by Libyan authorities. An inter-

nal document provided by the Libyan Interior Ministry affirms that intel-
ligence-sharing with Italy has been successful on several different fronts.
For example, the report specifies that, in 2005, as a result of the daily coop-
eration between the two countries, 40,000 undocumented migrants were
arrested, 59 smuggling organisations were dismantled, and measures were
taken against 37 Libyans involved in these organisations (Libyan Ministry
of the Interior, 2007a). According to the same source, intelligence-sharing
had also led to the exponential growth in the number of undocumented
migrants arrested and deported (see Table 7.3).
7.9 The role of the International Organisation for

Migration (IOM)
Since the opening of the office in Tripoli on 9 August, 2005, IOM has imple-
mented a number of projects in collaboration with the Libyan government to
provide assistance to ‘stranded’ migrants.56 The agreement signed between
Libya and IOM identifies specific areas of cooperation, such as labour selec-
tion programmes for migrant workers in Libya, assistance programmes for
trafficked migrants, humane voluntary return and sustainable reintegration
programmes for undocumented migrants, information campaigns to raise
Table 7.3 Data on undocumented migrants deported and

arrested in Libya
Year Number of people deported and arrested
2000 3,087
2001 4,169
2002 7,032
2003 5,705
2004 39,586
2005 47,991
2006 86,006
Total 193,576
Source: Libyan Ministry of Interior (2007a).
awareness amongst potential migrants, and income-generating programmes

in neighbouring countries (IOM, 2005a).
The projects undertaken by IOM are funded by the Italian government
and the EU through the so-called AENEAS programme (Andrijasevic,
2006b; Camera 2007b).57 The most important project is entitled ‘Transit
and Irregular Migration Management’ (TRIM), and aims to improve con-
ditions at reception centres in Libya for unauthorised migrants, and to
help migrants return to their countries of origin through the programme
‘Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration’. The project comprises four
main areas.58 The first one concerns capacity-building, and was directed to
Libyan officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice
and Manpower. IOM has organised workshops, seminars and study-tours
around Italy and Europe to expose Libyan officials to European know-how
on migration management.
Second, as part of TRIM, IOM has provided assistance to migrants stranded
in Libya who wish to return to their own countries. As of August 2008,
IOM guaranteed ‘comprehensive return and reintegration assistance’ to
some 2,200 migrants from twenty-two countries (IOM, 2008a). According
to IOM, an increasing number of migrants have solicited the help of IOM
to return to their country. In the words of Laurence Hart, IOM Chief of
Mission in Libya:
Every week, hundreds of vulnerable migrants, mainly from Sub-Saharan

Africa, but also from Asia, are referred to IOM by religious and charitable
institutions or by their embassies to ask for voluntary return and reinte-
gration assistance. (IOM, 2008a)
These measures are distinct from the aforementioned repatriations organ-

ised by the Italian and Libyan governments. ‘For us’, a representative from
IOM in Libya pointed out, ‘the “voluntary” aspect is important. We do
not endorse forced repatriations. [ ... ] We cannot be asked to support these

practices.’59 Then, in collaboration with the embassies of the countries of
origin, IOM coordinates the return flights.
Third, IOM is working on an information campaign that seeks to reach
would-be migrants in the countries of origin to ‘discourage them from
leaving their country’ and ‘to raise awareness on the risks that such deci-
sion entails’.60 The fourth aspect of TRIM involves research on the Libyan
legislative framework on migration and on the statistics on unauthorised
migration through Libya. On these grounds, IOM will identify possible
inconsistencies and formulate policy recommendations for Libyan authori-
ties. Lastly, IOM has initiated a dialogue with a number of countries of
origin to strengthen coordinated action to identify migrants. In 2009
TRIM continued under the funding of the Thematic Programme through
the ‘LI-MO’ project (European Commission, 2010a: 42). In broadening the
range of collaborators across migrant-sending and receiving-countries
the LI-MO project combines assisted voluntary return with reintegration
initiatives.61
IOM also oversaw the implementation of an EU- and Italian-funded project,
‘Across Sahara’, to promote collaboration on border control policies between
Libya and Niger (EC, 2005; Il Manifesto, 24 November 2006). The project
consisted of three phases. The first focused on the training of 90 police per-
sonnel from both countries and concentrated on, inter alia, the detection
of false documentation and investigation techniques, search and rescue in
the desert, human rights, and assistance to voluntary return (Libyan Police,
2007). The instructors, whom I was able to meet, were mainly Italian. The
second phase concerned the provision of equipment, such as jeeps, radios,
GPS and specialised technology to patrol the desert. With the completion
of the first two phases, fourteen contact points along the desert borders of
Libya and Niger were expected to be set up. This network of police offic-
ers from both countries would then be able cooperate to guarantee control
along the Libyan–Niger borders.62 In the light of the successful collabora-
tion of the project, IOM considered the possibility of involving Algeria.63
Indeed, in 2007 the Italian government was awarded an EU grant to finance
the second phase of the project Across Sahara in both Libya and Algeria (EC,
2008c). However, as of June 2007, Algerian authorities have not confirmed
their interest in participating in this initiative.64
Another aspect of IOM activity that deserves mention is the camp in
Tripoli intended to host migrants in the process of returning ‘voluntarily’
to their countries.65 Inaugurated in March 2008, the centre has been co-
financed by the European Union and Italy, with additional support from
the United Kingdom, and is managed by IOM (IOM, 2008b). It offers tem-
porary accommodation for up to 40 people, and its main purpose is to pro-
vide them ‘with information on the dangers of irregular migration and the
option for voluntary return to their countries of origin’ (IOM, 2008b).
7.10 Push-backs
On 14 July 2003, the Italian Interior Ministry issued a decree enabling

the Italian Navy to intercept ships carrying migrants and, if possible,
to escort the vessels back to the territorial waters of the countries from
which they came (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 113).66 In presenting
this decree to the Italian Senate, Mantovano pointed out that, in order to
ensure the patrolling of sea borders, the Province of Ragusa had set up a
‘provincial anti- disembarkment plan’ (Senato, 2004). This measure is super-
vised by the local government, and is based on the cooperation between
the Carabinieri, a paramilitary corps with police functions, the Guardia
di Finanza and the Navy. Its aim is to ensure effective control along sea
borders (Senato, 2004). According to different sources, in January 2007
this measure was still in effect (Camera, 2006a; Sardegna Oggi, 9 January
2007).
Reportedly, Italy has acted on the 2003 decree numerous times. For
example, the 2004 annual report issued by the Italian Interior Ministry
attests that a number of boats carrying irregular migrants heading to the
Italian coasts have been intercepted and escorted to their country of ori-
gin (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004a). Yet there is no clarity as to how many
times the Italian Navy has implemented this decree by sending migrants
back Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). The report produced by Fortress
Europe, a blog specialising in irregular migration in the Mediterranean,
found different instances of push-back by Italian authorities forcing boats
carrying undocumented migrants to return to Libya. This is clearly illus-
trated by a migrant interviewed by Fortress Europe:
There were more than 200 of us. We left on 26 June 2006 from Farwah,
an islet off the coast of Bu Kammash, half way between Rass Jdayr and
Zuwarah [Libya]. After 20 hours at sea, the ship – which was called
Tulaitila – was intercepted by a military corvette bearing an Italian flag.
They escorted us to land, and we disembarked at eight in the morning
on 28 June 2006. During the landing, around 40 people, including the
passeurs, dived into the sea and managed to escape, all of the rest of us
were taken to a centre. On the same day, at around 9 p.m., they loaded us
back on board of the Tulaitila and escorted us until the morning, to then
hand us over to a green patrol boat of the Libyan Coastguard. (Fortress
Europe, 2008: 16)
Hence, until 2009 there was no evidence indicating that in the specific
Italian–Libyan context this practice had been implemented on a systematic
basis. In fact, during the interviews conduced between 2007 and 2008 offi-
cial Italian sources denied any involvement of the Italian authorities in the
push-backs.67 This was due to change in May 2009.
On 6 May 2009 Italy began returning boats carrying migrants arriving

from Libya that had been intercepted in either international or national
waters. Few days later, on 14 May, the Libyan Ambassador to Italy took
possession of three patrol boats offered by Italy to be used to stop boats
from making the passage from Libya to Italy (BBC, 14 May 2009). Where
previously push-backs were considered an infringement of Libya’s sover-
eign power and migrants were not allowed to return to its shores, Libya
now started accepted boats with undocumented foreign nationals who
had departed from Libya. Presumably this sudden policy shift owes to the
Friendship Treaty and, therefore, is consistent with the overall give-and-take
dynamics previously alluded to. A precise account of the different instance
of push-backs is provided by a report by UNHCR: from 6 May to 6 November
2009, a total of nine operations were carried out, returning a total of 834
persons to Libya (UNHCR, 2010: 3).
The same source clarifies that the ‘push-back’ operations were carried out
by Italian forces belonging to the Guardia di Finanza, the Marina militare
(Navy) and the Guardia Costiera (Coast Guard). In particular:
The persons affected by the ‘push-back’ operations were initially trans-

ferred from their unseaworthy boats onto the Italian vessels. In some
cases they were taken to Libyan territory directly by the Italian authori-
ties (6 May and 30 August 2009). During other operations, they were
handed over by the Italian authorities to Libyan patrol boats, the latter
operated by joint Libyan and Italian crews as foreseen by the opera-
tional Protocol between the two countries on joint patrolling. (UNHCR,
2010: 4)
Between May and July 2009, UNHCR screened 632 boat returnees and found
97 to be seeking international protection (Human Rights Watch, 2009c: 51).
In the same report, UNHCR quoted the Undersecretary of the Ministry of
the Interior according to whom neither an identification process nor an
interview of the persons in question was carried out aboard the Italian ves-
sels during the ‘push-back’ operations (UNHCR, 2010: 3).
Expectedly, the push-backs provoked a national and international outcry.
The main concerns centred on the fate of the persons involved, especially as
regards the protection of their fundamental human rights and over Italian
compliance with international human rights obligations (Nascimbene,
2009). Not only did international organisations such as UNHCR (2010) and
Human Rights Watch (2009) forcefully condemn Italian action, but Italian
civil society organisations (Vassallo Paleologo, 2010) and opposition parties
also raised their voice. In numerous parliamentary debates centre–left MPs
called upon the Italian government to stop ‘inacceptable violations to the
rights of the migrants perpetuated by Italian authorities’ (Camera, 2009e: 7,
2009f, 2009g). Likewise, the European Commission observed that in 2009
between Italy and Libya there was ‘still no clear policy framework for refu-
gees and asylum seekers, as well as for migration management in general’
(European Commission, 2010a: 12). On these grounds, migrants intercepted
by Italian authorities and subsequently incarcerated in Libyan prisons have
filed a suit against the Italian state in the European Court of Human Rights
(Schenkel, 2010). As of March 2010, the Italian government has consistently
denied any wrongdoings. In July 2009, a representative of the centre-right
party declared:
The criticism [against the government concerning the push-backs] is pre-

tentious and ungenerous for they [the actions undertaken by Italy as part
of the agreement with Libya] are fully in line with the new law which
makes clandestine migration a punishable offence and with the new
norms extending the time that can be spent in the identification centers
for possible expulsion. (Camera, 2009g: 9)
In similar vein, in January 2010, the Italian Minister of the Interior made
it clear that ‘the policies undertaken by the government to contrast and
prevent clandestine migration have brought positive results’ (Camera,
2010b).
Since November 2009, however, the Italian government has interrupted
the push-backs. The explanation of the umpteenth policy change belongs
to the realm of speculation.
7.11 Conclusion
The empirical findings on the joint actions on migration implemented by

Italy and Libya reveal that the latter has partially supported Italian initi-
atives aimed at reducing irregular migration. In some cases, such as the
camps for migrants, the training programmes for police officers and the
repatriations of migrants to third countries, Libya has encouraged Italian
action. Arguably, one of Libya’s key concerns has been to counter undocu-
mented migrant flows and, as such, any help that Italy could offer to achieve
this goal has been welcomed. In other cases, such as the patrolling of the
Mediterranean, Libya has adopted an evasive and unpredictable stance.
The recurrent policy shifts – such as the push-backs – and the linkage with
broader diplomatic exchanges are cases in point.
The piecemeal willingness of Libya to uphold the bilateral collaboration
on migration, and, consequently, the Italian dependence on its interlocu-
tor for the successful implementation of the cooperative arrangements, are
revealing. The multifaceted nature of the Italian–Libyan cooperation raises
the question of whether bilateral action is a manifestation of externalisa-
tion, as previously defined, and whether it succeeded in its initial goals.
These queries form the background to the next chapter.
Part IV
Externalisation of Migrant Control
Measures and Inter-state Relations
8
Analysis of Externalisation in
the Italian–Libyan context
8.1 Introduction
During a parliamentary debate on 2 March 2010 the Italian Minister of

the Interior, Roberto Maroni, affirmed Italian commitment to enhance a
‘new governance model which involves both migration sending and des-
tination countries to promote cooperation and common forms of disci-
pline’ (Senato, 2010: 56). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the process whereby
migrant-receiving countries seek to collaborate with, and transfer some of
their migration-related responsibilities to, third countries has come to be
known as ‘externalisation’. This concept is at the core of this chapter which
addresses three main questions. First, can the joint collaboration be consid-
ered a manifestation of externalisation as defined in the academic literature?
Second, have the joint actions discussed in the previous chapter succeeded
in reducing unwanted migrant flows? Third, how has migration influenced
the bargaining dynamics between the two countries? In answering these
questions, I will assess the impact of the putative outsourcing of migration
control practices on inter-state relations. I argue that the theoretical debate
is still open both on the applicability of the externalisation concept to this
particular case and on its broader representativeness. This discussion serves
as a necessary prelude to the next chapter, which examines bilateral actions
on migration from the perspective of IR theory.
8.2 Is Italian–Libyan joint action on migration

a manifestation of externalisation?
As stated in Chapter 2, a number of different definitions of de-territoriali-

sation have been put forward. At the risk of simplification, it is possible to
identify three defining aspects of externalisation, which underpin a large
part of the scholarly contributions on the issue. First, the process entails the
shifting of the place of where controls occur to somewhere within the states
of either origin or transit of unwanted migrants. Second, control practices
169
operate outside the purview of the rule of law, because of the lack of checks
and balances ensuring compliance with international norms. Third, the
collaborative arrangements are based on cross-border networks of security
experts, police and military officials addressing putative transnational secu-
rity threats.
I now apply these three criteria to the empirical findings illustrated in
the previous chapters, in order to determine whether the selected bilateral
collaboration is a manifestation of externalisation defined in these terms.
In so doing, I shall comment on each of the three abovementioned points
in turn.
With regard to the first point, i.e. the transfer of borders beyond Italian
territorial jurisdiction, I argue that all the measures implemented thus far,
except the push-backs, contradict the commonly held view according to
which border control functions that Libyan authorities assume on behalf of
Italy are being externalised. The Italian external action in Libya is subtler
than this. Italy has focused on measures that do not, technically, involve
the export of border management or the transfer of responsibilities to Libya.
Instead, Italy has sought to strengthen the pre-existing Libyan police and
security apparatus. This is epitomised by the work of the Immigration Liaison
Officer appointed by the Italian Interior Ministry and based in Tripoli. To
further problematise the argument that frontiers are ‘moving’ from Italy to
Libya two other points are warranted. Since September 2006 information-
sharing has been further increased, with the Libyan and Italian govern-
ments agreeing that a Libyan liaison officer would also be based in Rome
(Cuttitta, 2006: 19; Il Sole 24 Ore, 13 September 2006).
In addition, it is noteworthy that it is as difficult to leave Libya as it is to
enter (Human Rights Watch, 2006a). Anecdotal evidence shows that Libyan
officials have placed severe and ad hoc controls on entering the country
from the EU. Requests for tourist visas to Libya can be easily turned down
and foreigners have been denied access repeatedly, on unclear grounds.1
Libya’s sudden ban on citizens entering from the Schengen area between
February and March 2010 as retaliation against the Swiss-instigated visa
blacklist against 188 Libyans is another case in point (Reuters, 27 March
2010). Moreover, my personal experience also confirms that Libyan secu-
rity officials occasionally check visas and necessary documents of passen-
gers in third countries before they board flights for Libya. Undoubtedly
this shows that, despite its widely praised international rehabilitation, the
regime remains a closed one. Simply put, pre-frontier controls operate on
both sides. Hence, the argument that Italian authorities have been extend-
ing their border controls outside their own territory also applies, albeit to a
different degree, to the Libyan regime. The presence of Libyan officials in
Italy, and the rigid as well as nebulous border policies of the former, clearly
add a layer of complexity to the concept of externalisation, which, by now,
appears to be overly simplistic.
Externalisation in the Italian–Libyan Context 171
Further, the debate surrounding joint interception at sea demonstrates

that Libya has not succumbed to European and Italian pressure. In fact,
it has opposed Frontex, which would challenge its internal jurisdiction.
This suggests that Libya is not willing to act as the European immigra-
tion gatekeeper (The Malta Independent, 8 July 2008). At bilateral level,
however, the collaboration benefited from the signing of the agreement
in August 2008. This is demonstrated by the onset of joint patrolling
in May 2009 and the implementation of the push-backs to be discussed
below. Despite these ambiguities, it seems reasonable to assert that the
collaboration has not been dictated unilaterally by Italy, but has instead
followed a complex negotiating process where Italy has made significant
compromises.
Similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to the return flights of
undocumented migrants from Italy to Libya. The repatriations conducted
between 2004 and 2006 did not involve the relocation of Italian frontiers to
Libya. The putative controls were enforced by Italian authorities on Italian
soil, upon the arrival of undocumented migrants from Libya (Gatti, 2005b).2
The same applies to the return of migrants from Libya to third countries on
flights financed by Italy, since their management falls under Libya’s author-
ity. The relatively limited influence that Italy has played in this respect is
substantiated by the fact that, as Chapter 5 illustrated, the Libyan practice
of repatriating unwanted migrants pre-dates the bilateral cooperation with
Italy. It would, then, be misleading to assume that Italy, or Europe gener-
ally, has exclusive and direct responsibility for Libya’s notorious repatriation
policies.3
Moreover, considering the Italian-built camps as the exemplification of
the relocation of European borders controls is equally deceptive. Far from
being ‘European immigration counters’ (Rodier, 2006: 8), they are not nec-
essarily used for detaining migrants at all. In fact, recent empirical findings
show that the camps will be used for hosting neither migrants nor asylum-
seekers. Instead, they will serve for police training and humanitarian pur-
poses. However, the question on asylum processing centres being set up in
Libya remains unclear. Recent statements by Italian government officials
would lead one to conclude that these would be managed by the EU and not
by Italy alone (Camera, 2009c; Human Rights Watch, 2009c). As argued in
Chapter 7, whereas Italian officials did initially consider the idea of asylum
processing centres in third countries, as of March 2010 this had not been
translated into concrete action either by Italy or the EU.4
Only the push-backs in 2009, however, corroborate our first criterion.
According to UNHCR and Human Rights Watch, Italian authorities have
not only breached the non-refoulement principle but de facto transferred
to Libya the responsibility of providing assistance to migrants intercepted
(Human Rights Watch, 2009c; UNHCR, 2010). As we have already seen, the
Italian government has denied such allegations. As Roberto Maroni, made
it clear:
We have always acted in accordance with the non-refoulement principle

because we have not denied anyone the possibility of applying for asy-
lum. None of the migrants intercepted have expressed their willingness
to apply for asylum once they were boarded on the patrol boats [on their
way back to Libya]. (Senato, 2010)
Beyond the question non-refoulement, the critical point here has to do with
Italian action on Libyan territory. On the one hand, our first parameter is
upheld insofar as Italian crews shipped irregular migrants back to Libya
shores, and hence operated on Libyan territory. On the other hand, let me
advance two potentially controversial claims. First, the number of those
pushed-backs is relatively small compared not only to the yearly arrivals to
Italy but even more so to overall migration flows to Italy. In this sense, the
action of returning migrant serves as public spectacle (Anderson, 2008). It
yields symbolic power both to the Italian electorate and to Italy itself, being
paid back for condescending to Libya’s request on the colonial recompensa-
tions. The complex linkages between different issues will be explored fur-
ther in the next chapter. Second, the very fact that, as we shall see below,
Libya’s authorities ‘allow’ irregular boats to depart from Libya’s shores may
lead one to counter-argue that a ‘reverse’ externalisation is in the making.
In externalising what is partly a domestic issue, namely migration, Libya is
thus able to put pressure on Italy and, in the process, mould bilateral diplo-
matic exchanges.
With reference to the first criterion, a last aspect of the alleged transfer
of the legal and financial burden of managing migration to Libya deserves
mention. A thorough empirical analysis shows that, with the deepening
of bilateral collaboration, Italy has been more, not less, involved with the
task of tackling undocumented migration in Libya. In fact, Italy’s very pres-
ence and continuous investment in this undertaking suggest that the col-
laboration cannot be labelled as burden-shifting. On the contrary, it has
entailed the sharing between the two countries of more responsibilities to
control borders. Italy’s tasks over migration-related matters in Libya have
significantly expanded. The fact of its increased competencies, however,
highlights the novel policing practices that Italy is implementing outside its
borders. This point takes us to the discussion of the second criterion.
The second feature characterising the process of externalisation concerns
the legality of the bilateral measures. Although the practice of border con-
trols falls under Libya’s authority, Italy has cooperated on a wide range of
security operations related to migration outside its territorial frontiers. A
prominent example of this is the representative office of the Italian Interior
Ministry in Libya. In so doing, Italy contributes to the export of surveil-
lance techniques and skills to Libya. Because of the absence of clear legal
frameworks and the avoidance of public scrutiny, the legitimacy of such

operations is questionable (Favilli, 2005). Interestingly, Libyan authorities,
unlike the Italian ones, were willing to share sensitive information on the
bilateral measures for my research purposes.5 Be that as it may, the joint
undertakings remain outside the rule of law for the ambiguous contractual
relations as noted in the previous chapter. Even though it goes beyond the
objective and capacity of this book to provide a systematic and rigorous legal
examination of the Italian–Libyan agreements on migration (Favilli, 2005),
I argue that, because of the lack of transparency in the manner in which
the measures have been decided and implemented, my second parameter
defining externalisation is confirmed. For example, while the agreements
in 2007 and 2008 have indeed been made public, considerable uncertainty
still surrounds their implementation.
Third, Walters’s characterisation of de-territorialisation as joint tasks
addressing evolving notions of societal threat captures some central aspects
of my case study (Walters, 2004). The Italian–Libyan cooperation is based on
the building up of a security apparatus transcending the internal/external
dichotomy inherent in ‘the territorial state of mind’ (Bigo, 2006: 29). Indeed,
Walters’s notion of ‘networked (non-)border’ cooperation identifies a fun-
damental feature of the selected collaboration, by virtue of its being based
on the enhancement of cross-border police cooperation, mobile surveillance
teams operating on both Italian and Libyan soil, a commitment to informa-
tion exchange, and the recognition of some common standards in the man-
agement of migration (Walters, 2004: 680). As explained in Chapters 4 and
5, in both Italy and Libya the joint security mechanism is perceived to be
the bulwark against the alleged transnational threat, whereby migration is
linked with terrorism and a hybrid and fluid notion of international crime.
To sum up, an empirical examination of the Italian–Libyan cooperation
partially discredits the prevailing claim that outsourcing practices are creat-
ing ‘exclusion zones’ at the EU periphery, which defy sovereignty of migrant
sending countries (Rodier, 2006: 20). Many of the arguments made in the
literature on the Italian externalising policies appear to be inattentive to
the subtleties surrounding their initial objectives and final implementation.
As much as the bilateral action to tackle undocumented migration eschews
clear-cut categorisation, it is crucial to appreciate the conflation of highly
differentiated, if not contradictory, patterns. Overall, the first feature of
externalisation outlined above is not fully attributable to the Italian–Libyan
collaboration. Conversely, the latter two are upheld. Whereas border control
responsibilities have not been de-located from Italy to Libya, the measures
as implemented lack transparency and accountability, and involve the insti-
tutionalisation of ‘extended zones of police cooperation’ at the intersection
of Italian and Libyan territories (Walters, 2004: 680). Further, it must be
highlighted that in our case study the so-called ‘networked (non-)border’
system has been patchy and, as I suggest in the next section, weak.
It can be argued that one of the initial intentions of Italy was indeed the
transfer of the European border to Libya. As Pansa bluntly declared in 2004,
one of Italy’s objectives was to ‘move forward the external border of the EU’
(La Stampa, 12 August 2004). However, the Italian government has not been
capable of fully co-opting Libya into its ‘struggle’ against undocumented
migration, as it might have wished. It is also dependent on its counterpart
for the successful implementation of migration related measures. As already
pointed out, most of the discussion on externalisation in the Italian–Libyan
context has misused the term, because it has neglected the reciprocal nature
of the negotiations. The term has, I believe, lost meaning as well as rel-
evance, and the process itself needs to be reconceptualised.
Therefore for the Italian–Libyan cooperation I will use instead the expres-
sion ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’ (hereafter, ‘collaboration on
migration’). The new expression conveys the transcendence of the territo-
rial dimension of borders, which is the result of a complex negotiating proc-
ess. While drawing the attention to a more fluid notion of national border
and the intertwining of the domestic and external policy arenas (Geddes,
2005a), I also make the case for the enduring relevance of states with regard
to migration management. Unlike the term ‘externalisation’, it rejects the
view that the process underway involves the transfer of border control
responsibilities to third countries. It also disputes the assumption that the
unilateral extension of border policies simply mirrors the will of the sup-
posedly stronger European parties. Yet it does retain the idea that transna-
tional security networks operate on unclear legal grounds. Accordingly, the
notion of ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’ intends to offer a more
nuanced account of the production and negotiation of border control poli-
cies than do concepts like ‘externalisation’ or ‘outsourcing’.
8.3 How successful has the collaboration on migration been?
In introducing the discussion in the next chapter on the relative bargain-

ing power of each country from the viewpoint of International Relations, I
now ask whether bilateral collaboration has succeeded in reducing migra-
tion pressure on Libya and Italy.
Let me first clarify the feasibility of this exercise. It is necessary to bring
some precision to the speculative question raised, and to comment on
its methodological challenges. According to the former Italian Interior
Minister, Pisanu, the measures agreed with Libyan authorities were aimed
at ‘ensuring control on the land borders and block migrant flows across the
sea’ (Camera, 2003b). On another occasion, the minister clarified that the
ultimate objective was to reduce undocumented migration from Libya to
zero (Ministero dell’Interno, 2004c). In the absence of more rigorous and
explicit criteria, I shall test the success of the bilateral collaboration against
these two parameters and I analyse two sets of data. First, I examine the
figures on migrants landing on Italian shores from Libya, observe whether

they have increased or decreased over time, and compare them against the
overall undocumented population in Italy and the annual quota system.
Second, I compare them to the number of foreign nationals who have been
either arrested or deported from Libya.6 This rough calculation may furnish
us with an approximate idea of the extent to which the bilateral measures
have succeeded in reducing migration pressure. Predictably, this exercise is
not problem-free.
In particular, the ensuing analysis requires, among other things, five cave-
ats. The first concerns the comprehensiveness and reliability of the data
available. The statistics on the unauthorised arrivals to Lampedusa do
not allow for a rigorous account of the actual impact of the joint meas-
ures. Unless we compare them with the proportion of would-be migrants
to Italy, these figures alone possess limited explanatory relevance. In fact,
not only there are no recent and reliable official statistics on the presence
of unwanted migrants in Libya but also, more importantly, the proportion
of would-be migrants to Italy versus those who intend to remain in Libya
is not quantifiable. Moreover, some of the data may contain significant
errors. I will show, for example, that the statistics provided by the Libyan
government to the European Commission differ from those that I received
from the Libyan authorities. Secondly, the short time frame does not per-
mit one to draw solid conclusions on the impact of extraterritorial poli-
cies on migrant flows to Italy. Arrivals from Libya started in the late 1990s
and shortly afterwards the bilateral discussion on migration commenced. A
period of approximately seven years precludes the soundness of the assess-
ment and the validity of its sequitur. Thirdly, it is impossible to calculate the
overall number of migrants who been prevented from coming to Italy as a
result of the Italian action in Libya. Indeed, the impact on migrant flows of
all the other joint actions, such as the training programmes and the provi-
sion of equipment, is not measurable. Fourthly, I shall not include in the
calculation the measurement of the migrants repatriated to third countries
from Italy but only from Libya with the partial financial support of Italy. As
an ex post measure, such data cannot account for the increase or decrease of
migration pressure on Italian and Libyan territory. Since the repatriations
target those unwanted migrants who have already reached their interim or
final destination, they do not provide a sound indicator for the success, as
defined above, of the collaborative arrangements. Return flights act as a
deterrent, the impact of which cannot be calculated. Fifthly, it is impossi-
ble to establish the extent to which the fluctuations of migrant flows stem
solely from Italian–Libyan cooperation. Arguably, there are other factors,
such as the international political milieu, European pressure, and Libyan
domestic politics, which influence the trend of the data that I now ana-
lyse. The evolving dynamics of migrant flows hinge upon widely differ-
ing political and economic factors and multiple actors, and not just upon
Italian–Libyan collaboration. Hence, it would be simplistic to attribute the

changing patterns of migration pressure exclusively to the Italian–Libyan
collaboration. Thus, the following data analysis does not pretend to do jus-
tice to such complexity. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the impact of the
collaboration on migration may still prove insightful.
As regards the first, statistics suggest that until 2008 the number of
migrants arriving in Italy from Libya has increased, even if it had not
reached unprecedented levels. Notably, in 2009, 3,185 irregular migrants
landed at Lampedusa, while during the previous year 31,281 arrivals had
been counted (Senato, 2010: 53).
Expectedly, over the years many contradictory arguments have been elab-
orated. As shown in the chapter on Italian migration policies, the arrivals
of migrants from Libya have been portrayed as an ‘assault’ or ‘invasion’ of
Italy. The ‘emergency’ perspective echoes the view of many Italian politi-
cians and a large part of the national media, who amplify the actual size of,
and the alleged threat posed by, irregular migration from Libya, as well as
by migrants in Italy generally.
However, a more rigorous scrutiny of the official counts reveals that the
belief that migrant flows until 2009 were unprecedented is deceptive. To
be sure, consolidated estimates (Figure 8.1) indicate that between 2000
and 2006 the number of arrivals to Sicily, mainly from Libya,7 increased.
Whereas the year 2006 and the first six months of 2007 registered a slight
reduction in the number of arrivals, the overall upward trend is manifest
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2007b).
This is in line with the total figures of unwanted entries to Italy across
the sea, from not only Northern Africa but also other countries such as
Albania, which show a noticeable reduction (Figure 8.2).8 Hence, even
though, as Figure 8.1 delineates, the number of arrivals by sea to Sicily
has grown since 2000, the overall figures of disembarkation of irregular
migrants to Italy have decreased. Moreover, it is well known that arrivals by
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 8.1 Apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Sicily 2000–2009

Sources: Elaborated from Cuttitta (2008a) and Senato (2010: 53).9
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 8.2 Total apprehensions of undocumented migrants in Italy 1998–2009

Sources: Elaborated from Cuttitta (2008a) and Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (2010: 88).
sea represent a fraction of the total undocumented migrant population in

Italy (Ministero dell’Interno, 2008d). According to the data provided by the
Italian Interior Ministry, in 2005 60 per cent of what the government labels
‘illegal migrants’ were ‘overstayers’, i.e. people who enter the country legally
and remain beyond the expiry date of their visa or legal permit (Ministero
dell’Interno, 2006b: 16, 2007b). Conversely, the share of irregular arrivals
by sea was estimated at 14 per cent in 2005, and 13 per cent in the first six
months of 2006 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006b).
In the same vein, even if up to 2008 entries by sea to the southern Italian
border have intensified, the number remains significantly lower than the
annual influx of migrants though legal channels (Cuttitta, 2008b). As
illustrated in Chapter 4, the migrant population that has entered though
the quota system has been growing significantly. For example, in the
year 2005 the Italian government issued two decrees for total quotas of
520,000 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2006), and 720,000 were regularised in 2007
through four decrees (Cuttitta, 2008b). By contrast with such figures, the
scale of unauthorised migration from Libya to Italy appears to be of minor
significance.
By and large, a thorough analysis of the scale of arrivals of unauthorised
foreign nationals from Libya demonstrates two points. First, undocumented
migration by sea from Libya represents a minor proportion of overall
irregular migration to Italy. Second, the national yearly quotas and overall
regular migration flows have increased significantly, suggesting that migra-
tion in Italy is not out of control and, consequently, does not pose a pro-
found societal threat, as the public discourse claims.10 Indeed, the growing
number of foreigners being regularised may be driven by market demands
(De Haas, 2007). Arguably, the perceived failure of state regulation actu-
ally reveals a degree of state complicity in the maintenance of a certain
level of migration (Hamilton, 1997: 552). According to Hamilton, such ‘state
complicity’ may be due to the strength of organised interest groups and
their influence on the internal dynamics of state policy-making with regard

to migration (Hamilton, 1997: 552). In like manner, Freeman asserts that
‘there are important characteristics of migration politics common to the
liberal democracies and these are, contrary to what most scholars seem to
believe, largely expansionist and inclusive’ (Freeman, 1995: 882). In other
words, despite the official discourses about ‘combating illegal immigration’,
Italy, like many other European states, has little genuine interest in stopping
migration, because its economy has become dependent on migrant labour
(De Haas, 2007: 61; Hollifield 1992a). The direct corollary is that the alar-
mistic approach11 and the ‘invasion’ analogy, presented in Chapter 4, are in
tension with the policies implemented, and are evidence of Italy’s migration
contradictions (Pastore 2004a).
At this point of the analysis, it is instructive to contextualise the above
indicators on disembarkment by comparing them to the data available
on the foreign nationals deterred from departing from Libya to Italy and,
more specifically, on the number of people arrested and/or repatriated by
Libyan authorities with the support of Italy. Before commenting on such
figures, two caveats are necessary. First, a proportion of migrants deported
to third countries succeed in returning to Libya, and the same is true of
those repatriated from Italy.12 This raises the question of the extent to which
return flights really deter undocumented migration or reduce the overall
migration pressure on both Italy and Libya. Hence repatriations may not
represent a reliable parameter for assessing the success of the joint action
on migration. Second, different sources suggest that in Libya arrests and
repatriations are conducted on a random basis (EC 2005d; Human Rights
Watch Report, 2006a: 33; US Department of State, 2002a). If they do reduce
the unauthorised migrant presence in Libya, there are no solid grounds
for inferring that those arrested and/or repatriated are would-be migrants
to Italy. Thus, although arrests and deportation temporarily alleviate the
migration pressure on Libya, it is not possible to determine whether the
same applies to Italy.
With an awareness of these limitations, I analyse the figures available on
the repatriations from Libya, and compare them with the number of arriv-
als to Italian shores. According to Human Rights Watch (2006a) and the
European Commission (2005d), between 2003 and 2005 145,000 undocu-
mented foreigners were repatriated from Libya: 47,991 in 2005, 54,000 in
2004 and 43,000 in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 52). Yet such fig-
ures do not correspond to those that I obtained from the Libyan Ministry
of the Interior. As Figure 8.1 illustrates, according to the latter the number
of repatriations for the years 2003 and 2004 is lower than that documented
by the EC (2005d).13 As I discussed in Chapter 7, while the extent to which
Italians have contributed to the organisation of such flights is not clear,
there are grounds for asserting that they have partially supported them.
It has been proven, however, that Italy has financed the repatriation of at
Table 8.1 Number of foreign nationals deported from Libya14
Year No. of foreigners repatriated
2000 3,087
2001 4,169
2002 7,032
2003 5,705
2004 39,586
2005 47,991
2006 86,006
2007 (until April) 8,963
Total 202,539
Source: Libyan Ministry of Interior, 2007b.
least 3,000 foreign nationals, who upon arrival in Libya were supposedly
transferred to their alleged countries of origin, and another 9,000 from
Libya (European Commission, 2005d). It hardly needs to be added that
such figures are relatively lower than the above discussed ones on the irreg-
ular arrivals to Italy.
Mindful of the weaknesses of the data here presented, and of the fact that
any conclusion on this matter is speculative, I attempt to derive three broad
propositions on the success of the collaboration on migration. First, both
parties appear to be increasingly serious about tackling migration, although
to differing degrees. Over time, the bilateral collaborative efforts have inten-
sified. Yet, and this is the second point, the attempts to decrease undocu-
mented migration from Libya to Italy have not been fully successful. Until
2008 the two objectives set by Pisanu of reducing migration from Libya to
zero had not been met. However, this changed with the Friendship Treaty.
After 2008, the overall migration flows through Libya have been brought
‘under control’. As of March 2010 collaboration on migration seems to have
achieved one of its primary objectives of containing the migration pressure
on Italy and Libya. The cost and sustainability of this endeavour are the
subject of the next chapter. At the same time (my third point), within the
overall Italian migration scene the relevance of arrivals by sea from Libya is
marginal. While the phenomenon has not decreased in relative terms, it is
still negligible in absolute terms, i.e. if compared to the overall regular and
irregular migrant population in Italy.
The size of the unwanted inflows to Sicily evinces that overall Italian
authorities have neither lost nor gained control on the overall migrant
movements to Italy and that, compared to the overall annual influxes, arriv-
als from Libya have a minimal impact.15 What needs to be analysed now is
how this inconclusive process of collaboration on migration influences the
bargaining position of each of the two countries.
8.4 Trade-offs between Italy and Libya
The collaboration on migration has created a situation in which Italy is

partially dependent on Libya. The successful implementation of the joint
efforts rests on Libyan willingness to cooperate. Even though Italy has a
strong interest in Libya properly controlling its Mediterranean coastline
and closely cooperating on police matters, Libya has a different, if not con-
tradictory, set of interests that at times clashes with Italian objectives and
expectations. The double agenda and unpredictable rhetoric of the Libyan
regime seriously hampers the Italian ability to contain unauthorised people
movements. On the one hand, Qaddafi has expressed a growing concern
with the reduction of migration to and through Libya. On the other hand,
the regime benefits from smuggling networks and utilises migration to set
the pace of the bilateral dialogue.
Arguably, until 2008 the steady and persistent arrivals on Lampedusa tes-
tify to the reluctance of Libya to abide by Italian and European requests
and to act as the ‘European gendarme’. As the author of the Human Rights
Watch report on Libya (2006a) argues, if the Libyan regime wanted to block
the smuggling activity, it could easily do so.16 Similarly, a member of the
European Parliament admitted:
In December 2005, I led an ad hoc European Parliament delegation to a

visit in Libya on the issue of immigration. The delegation was struck by
the fact that Libya deploys just two, yes two, patrol boats to police its
2,000km-long Mediterranean coast. It is clear that Libya needs an incen-
tive to engage with us. (Busuttil, 2007)
Along the same lines, the latest Frontex report makes no secret of the set-
backs in negotiating with Libya:
Despite constant calls for receiving feedback from the Libyan side on pos-
sible ways to proceed on this issue [joint EU–Libyan operations on migra-
tion] ... there was no clear initiative from the Libyan side to follow up on
this issue in the short term. Although some of the Libyan representatives
indicated that they did recognise the added value and mutual benefit of
such cooperation, they appeared to subscribe to the general approach
that the EU should make the first step to assist and support Libya to
improve management at its southern borders. (Frontex, 2007: 16)
All these claims have indeed been confirmed by the events since 2008. When
Libya was provided ‘material’ incentive to collaborate, irregular migration
across the Mediterranean was halted.
Lack of sustained willingness may also be attributed to corruption within
the Libyan police. The same report by Frontex (2007) also observes that
corruption could play a key role in the migratory situation along the Libyan
southern borders. As the document openly recognises:
As evident as it may seem, no matter what sophisticated equipment or

advanced border management concept and system might be put in place,
the existence of corruption will always undermine the implementation
of an effective border guard response. (Frontex, 2007: 13–15)
Likewise, a recent study on the smuggling network associated to migration

in Libya suggests that:
There is evidence that Libyans with close connections to the [Libyan] gov-
ernment, including diplomats and security agents, are directly involved
in the trade. Informants implicated one of Ghadafi’s sons in providing
protection for those involved. Zuwareh has a long history of dealing in
contraband including alcohol, petrol and cigarettes. [ ... ] The local police
who are invariably low paid are open to corruption. (Collucello and
Massey, 2007: 88)
As a matter of fact, the Libyan police are often aware of the routes fol-
lowed by the ‘smugglers’. For example, a Libyan police officer acknowl-
edged to me that many times after the boats depart from Libyan soil they
are taken to the off-shore oil platforms where Libyan police officers will
arrest the undocumented migrants.17 In turn, this upholds the specula-
tion that in Libya undocumented migration through the country and to
Italy is not only ‘tolerated’ but ‘even solicited’ (Giacca, 2004). Likewise,
an official at the European Commission conceded that they had observed
the timely correspondence between the arrivals to Lampedusa and criti-
cal moments in the negotiations. Such correspondence, in their view, was
not accidental.18 This adds a further layer of complexity to the bilateral
cooperation and the patterns of interdependence to be investigated in the
next chapter.
Broadly, on the one hand, until 2008 the ineffectiveness of collabora-
tion on migration partially reflected Italy’s lack of diplomatic leverage
versus Libya. On the other hand, however, both before and after the 2008
Friendship Agreement, changing migration dynamics from Libya have not
substantially challenged Italy’s overall migration management system. This
is because arrivals from Libya constitute a minor part of the overall undocu-
mented migrant flows to Italy, and an even smaller one if measured against
the annual migration quotas and recurrent regularisations. Why, then, is
Italy so concerned with migration from Libya? The answer to this question
lies in the symbolic power that migration evokes in the Italian and Libya
political arenas. Let me now introduce two ideas that I will develop further
in the next chapter.
First, the Italian construction of migration in a distinctive, securitised

framework provides Libya with a lever. The ‘invasion’ analogy serves as a
strategic tool for the Libyan regime to advance its interests vis-à-vis Italy
and the EU. Libya’s increased leverage stems from the perception of migration
and its securitised connotations, rather than actual migrant flows. Second,
Libya has benefited from linking migration to other items on the negotiat-
ing table. One example concerns the discussions on the construction of the
highway. It is worth recalling that this issue acquired a pivotal role in the
bilateral dialogue, to the point of making the discussion on all other items
conditional on its settlement. This was summarised by an adviser to the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs during an interview:
The problem is that we have the ‘big gesture’, i.e. the construction of the
highway. This means that the overall bilateral relations are influenced by
this one issue. [ ... ] While this remains on the agenda, all other questions
have to somehow circumvent it.19
The connection of the ‘big gesture’ with migration has placed Libya in a
position of strength. From the Italian viewpoint, such a concession, i.e.
building the highway, was aimed at encouraging a closer bilateral dialogue.
As one Libyan professor anticipated, ‘clearly migration is linked to the colo-
nial compensations. Until the latter issue is sorted, Libya will continue
to use migration against Italy.’20 Yet, according to others, Libyan requests
would not be exhausted by the construction of the highway. Asked if, with
the completion of the ‘big gesture’, Libya would have normalised its rela-
tions with Italy, a senior Libyan diplomat conceded: ‘Whatever Italy gives
us, we will say that it is not enough!’21 While it is too early to say whether
or not the agreement signed in August 2008 will finally settle the issue, it
remains the case that, taken together with the other economic and political
outstanding factors, Libya has been able to coerce Italy into meeting its own
terms by playing the migration card.
The inability of Italy and the EU to encourage Libya to fully commit itself
to blocking unwanted flows to Italy, to collaborate with Frontex, as well as
to join the Barcelona Process, exemplifies the limited negotiating power of
the first. Some of the levers that Italy employs with other migrant-sending
counties, such as the yearly quotas, cannot be utilised with Libya, because
there are few Libyans migrating to Italy through either documented or
undocumented channels.22 Libya has agreed to uphold certain measures of
cooperation with Italy insofar as they are in line with its interests. As stated
earlier, Libya is more concerned with the control of its southern borders
than its Mediterranean ones,23 and has actively supported the EU-funded
project Across Sahara.24 Libya has also pleaded for new camps funded by
either the EU or Italy. When asked by Human Rights Watch whether Libya
would ever oppose such camps on its territory, Shukri Ghanem, former
Libyan Prime Minister, answered: ‘Why should we? [ ... ] We don’t want to
be the trashcan for Europe’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 99).
Hence, even though Libya has recently displayed partial willingness to
collaborate on joint measures to tackle migration, such as the push-backs,
it continues to wield the ‘securitised’ power that migration evokes in the
Italian political discourse to extract concessions from Italy and pursue its
interests in the larger European milieu. In endorsing the security logic, Italy
has acquiesced to this game, to its detriment.25
8.5 Conclusion
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the criteria uti-
lised in the academic literature on externalisation do not fully capture the
complex reciprocity of the Italian–Libyan cooperation on migration. Thus,
I opted for an alternative expression to designate the mutually embedded
nature of the discourses and practices on security and migration shaping
our case study, i.e. de-territorial collaboration on migration. I then sought to
assess the impact of the joint actions by looking at the scale of migrant flows
through Libya to Italy. I analysed the trends of undocumented arrivals in
Italy, and contrasted them with the arrests in and repatriations from Libya
of irregular migrants. This exercise revealed that the undocumented arrivals
in Italy continued until 2008. The agreement signed in August 2008 marked
a diplomatic breakthrough. Yet cooperation remains as ambivalent as ever
for neither before nor after the Friendship Treaty have arrivals from Libya
substantially jeopardized overall migration trends in Italy. From an Italian
perspective, the size of arrivals from Libya has been neither unprecedented,
nor even so unwanted.
The second conclusion relates to the bilateral bargaining dynamics. The
expanding collaboration, and the rising prominence of migration in the
international milieu, has made Italy reliant on Libya. In turn, Libya has put
emphasis on the security dimension of migration to further stir up Western
anxieties and to extract specific support. In the overall give-and-take frame-
work, the symbolic power of migration endows Libya with extra leverage.
This point is crucial, inasmuch as it calls for a reconceptualisation of my
initial hypothesis on the extent to which the de-localisation of frontier con-
trols increases Libyan bargaining position. Indeed, I argued that (1) border
controls are not externalised, as claimed in the relevant literature, but that
a subtler de-location process is in the making; and (2) Libya’s critical power
asset derives not from the bilateral collaboration per se, but from the secu-
ritised understanding of migration. We are thus led to shift our attention
to the wider negotiations, and to locate migration within the framework of
North–South power relations.
9
Implications for International
Relations Theory
9.1 Introduction
Two days after the signing of the August 2008 agreement that supposedly
marked the end of the four-decade-long dispute over the colonial past,
Qaddafi made his annual speech to celebrate the twenty-ninth anniversary
of the revolution. On this occasion he did not conceal the tensions that had
bedevilled bilateral relations.
Of course, Italy and Libya need each other; at least, Italy needs Libya. As
you know, Libyan gas is exported to Italy, and Libyan oil is exported to
Italy and other European countries through submarine pipes connecting
Libya and Italy. Italy has big interests in Libya. It we go back to boycott,
the matter would be disaster for Italy; we have threatened with this. We
told them: if this chapter [the colonial one] is not closed, we will bring
relations to zero. (Al Qaddafi, 2 September 2008)
This excerpt conveys eloquently how economic demands have been tied to
those related to the colonial past and to migration, and directs attention
to the complex pay-off matrix that has shaped the negotiations. Building
upon the discussion of the ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’, I now
examine the overall bilateral agreements from the perspective of IR theory.
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate how migration affects
the wider bargaining dynamics. I ask whether realist views of power help
explain Italian–Libyan cooperation on migration and, by elaborating on
the comparative analysis of Chapter 3, the overall patterns of North–South
interaction. One central question is whether realism has the last word, as it
is claimed, when it comes to understanding migration and power dynamics
between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries and the North
and the South more generally. To paraphrase Dunne, could a scholar who
understood the history of international conflict in the fifth century BC
really apply the same conceptual tools to politics in the third millennium
184
Implications for International Relations Theory 185
in general, and to North–South migration bargaining dynamics in particu-

lar? (Dunne, 1997: 112). How does the increasing centrality of migration
to foreign affairs relate to the realist conception of power, as defined in
Chapter 2? Can the transformation of state relations as a result of migra-
tion be explained by the realist tradition? If not, how can they be otherwise
comprehended?
In order to answer to these questions, I review the empirical analysis pre-
sented in the previous chapters through the lens of political realism. The
recognition of its inability to wholly explain the changing and multifaceted
nature of the case under consideration leads us to probe beneath its assump-
tions and to utilise alternative definitions of power, drawing principally on
the concept of productive power formulated by Barnett and Duvall (2004).
While starting the analysis with the realist notions of interest and power, I
subsequently challenge them by engaging with the insights of interdepend-
ence theory. This purposely eclectic theoretical approach will provide the
conceptual tools to scrutinise the costs and benefits to both countries and
the relevance of ideas as power assets. In keeping with this reasoning, this
chapter consists of five parts.
First, I examine the interests of both actors beyond the migration issue.
What induces each actor to establish and sustain cooperative arrangements?
What are their stated objectives and ‘substantive’ intentions? Do the two
correspond? This probing of the motives of Italy and Libya creates a basis
for the next section, which explores who gains what within the specific
boundaries of the agreements on migration. What does the cost-benefit
analysis tell us in terms of power relations in the agreements on migra-
tion? What enables each country to accomplish its interests and what con-
strains its behaviour? In shifting the attention to the ideational dimension
of power, the following section considers the relevance of ‘the symbolic
power of migration’. How do the perceptions associated with migration,
and, in particular, the securitised narrative, impinge on the overall negotia-
tions? To what extent does the recognition of the symbolic power of migra-
tion challenge the realist outlook? The analysis on perceptions leads to the
discussion in Section 9.5 on the broader patterns of collaboration. Here,
I utilise the issue-linkage framework as defined by Haas, and assess the
connection between migration and other issues on the bilateral agenda.
How do the discussions on migration impact on the broader dialogue?
What does the manner in which issues are linked tell us about the overall
bargaining dynamics? Within the larger setting of the Italian–Libyan dia-
logue, are ideas and perceptions fundamentally repositioning traditional
claims of power relations? In section 9.6 I compare the findings of the com-
parative analysis to the conclusions drawn from my case study. How does
the Italian–Libyan case relate to the other cases of bilateral agreements on
migration examined in Chapter 3? In other words, can we generalise the
lessons of Italian–Libyan relations? Is it reasonable to assert that, on the
whole, migration provides a bargaining-chip to the South in its dealings

with the North?
9.2 Analysis of Italy’s and Libya’s interests
To comprehend the complex dynamics framing the relations of interde-

pendence, let us first understand what Italy and Libya seek to obtain from
bilateral cooperation. I focus on interests, because these represent a funda-
mental ingredient in the power equation. Hence, in order to assess the valid-
ity of realism, an illustration of the interests of both parties is required. The
study of the competing interests of both sending and receiving states helps
us to disentangle their dynamic interaction and to make sense of policy
successes and failures (Hamilton, 1997). Thus in this section I assess how
interests relate to evolving perceptions and reciprocal expectations.
I define national interest as the sum of the goals and aspirations of Italy
and Libya within the framework of their bilateral cooperation. Specifically,
I follow Burchill’s definition of interest as the ‘objective and/or subjective
stake in something’ (Burchill, 2005: 10).1 I then proceed in a highly simpli-
fied manner to distinguish between ‘substantive’ and ‘stated’ interests.2 The
first refers to the primary motivations of each country, and builds on the
assumption that each party seeks the self-preservation and well-being of
the state. I take the view that states aspire to some combination of power,
security and wealth, what Waltz defined as ‘a small number of big and
important things’ (Finnemore, 1996: 1). The second concerns the objectives
made explicit in official settings. This roughly corresponds to the stance for-
mulated by politicians through public statements and elite interviews. Once
this distinction is conceded, I follow a two-fold analytical process. After
considering the official position of each country and its policy decisions, I
assess whether substantive interests coincide with the stated ones or not.
Undeniably, this method suffers from some weaknesses. First, by focusing
on the binary opposition, I do not intend to suggest that states speak with
a united voice.3 The formulation of interests stems from unordered interde-
pendent relationships among diverse actors who are part of, or associated
with, the state (Weldes, 1996). The idea of a homogeneous and consistent
set of national interests is simplistic, if not misguided, and runs the dangers
of conceptual overstretching and empirical reductionism. Indeed, the offi-
cial position is far from monolithic. Different ministers, for example, may
think and act differently on any given issue.4 Nonetheless, while keeping in
mind these shortcomings, the distinction between the official policy stance
and more concealed objectives may still provide a fruitful, although not
definitive, basis for discovering how coexisting agendas shape inter-state
bargaining. This consideration leads to the second and more conceptual
riddle. Is there such a thing as a core of ‘substantive’ national interests? As
Beard reminds us, interests can never be objective and quantifiable, because
Table 9.1 Analysis of ‘stated’ and ‘substantive’ interests of Italy and Libya
Libyan interests Italian interests
Substantive interests Stated interests Substantive interests Stated interests
Migration – Preserve economic benefits – Reduce migrant – Respond to the domestic – Obtain full Libyan
deriving from cheap labour flows from Libya electorate and its ‘security cooperation in the fight
force. to Italy. fears’ yet maintain migrant against undocumented
– Reduce negative internal – Fully cooperate flows for clear economic migration.
impact of foreign nationals. with the Italian reasons. – Reduce ‘illegal’ migration
– Selectively support government. – Obtain full Libyan cooperation while encouraging legal
smuggling networks. in the fight against channels and integration.
undocumented migration.
Economic – Maintain positive – Maintain positive – Preserve privileged economic – Preserve privileged
relations economic relations economic relations relations with Libya. economic relations with
with Italy yet, diversify with Italy. Libya.
the range of economic
partners.
Colonial – Obtain colonial – Obtain colonial – Settle the colonial issues. – Settle the colonial issues.
issues compensations. compensations.
Relations – Maintain leading role – Strengthen the – Promote a more active role of – Promote a more active
with the within the African Union. relations with the the EU in managing migrant role of the EU in
EU – Strengthen its reintegration EU on its own flows from Libya. managing migrant flows
in the international terms from Libya.
community.
they ‘cannot be separated from human motives and concerns’ (Burchill,

2005: 11). The study of the national interest is an ‘ineluctably subjective
assessment’ (Burchill, 2005: 11). Accordingly, this chapter is not intended
to supply the last word on the underlying motivations of Italy and Libya.
Nonetheless, such intricacies should not preclude the examination, albeit
problematic, of the multiple motives of each actor, which is fundamental to
address my research questions on inter-state power dynamics.
In order to review the interests of both countries, I separate them into the
four main areas that are on the negotiating table, i.e. migration, economic
relations, colonial issues and relations with the EU. I consider each of these
aspects from the perspective of first Libya, and then Italy.
As regards Libya, in Chapter 5 I demonstrated that migration is of increas-
ing concern. For example, the mounting resources allocated by the Libyan
government to combat undocumented migration, exemplified in the escala-
tion of the return flights to third countries, points to the fact that Libya has
a substantive interest in controlling migration. Nevertheless, the fact that
the Libyan authorities are to some degree aware of how and where smug-
gling networks operate and yet do not fully interfere with these operations
illustrates that Libya’s objectives are not limited to the unqualified reduc-
tion of unwanted migration.5 As de Haas points out:
Trans-Saharan migration is less unwanted than it seems. The demand for

cheap, irregular immigrant labour in Europe and post-embargo Libya is
likely to persist or even increase, a demand to which a new generation of
educated and ambitious sub-Saharan Africans is likely to respond. This
irregular migration has generally been beneficial for economies in transit
and destination countries because of the cheap labour it generates and
the migration-related trade and business activities of smugglers, entrepre-
neurs and state officials. (De Haas, 2007: 70)
Related to this, the Libyan leader has a substantive interest in keeping

alive undocumented migration to Italy to ensure unremitting pressure on
the Italian government. Arguably this applies to both before and after the
Friendship Treaty of 2008. Hence, on the migration issue it is possible to
detect a discrepancy between the substantive and stated interests of the
Jamahiriya.
Likewise, a tension between the official line and the policy action char-
acterises the Libyan approach to economic relations with Italy. It is clear
that Libya values ongoing collaboration with Italian firms. In 2007, Italy
remained the predominant destination of Libyan exports (ICE, 2008).
2008 is also expected to see a record economic exchange between the two
countries. In the first four months of 2008, exports to Libya increased by
55 per cent, and imports by 47 per cent (ICE, 2008: 6). Equally relevant is
the gas pipeline from Libya to Italy, which makes Italy reliant on Libya and
vice versa. Nonetheless, since the removal of the sanctions the situation has
changed. While Libya has a strong interest in maintaining business rela-
tions with Italy, it has increasingly sought to diversify its range of economic
partners. Its status as an oil- and gas-exporting country makes the alliance
with Libya a precious commodity, which a growing number of countries is
keen to contest (Boucek, 2004).6 While with the treaty in 2008 Libya made
a clear move to the advantage of Italian businesses, broader lingering inter-
ests can be discerned. According to Gazzini, investment in ENI will allow
the Italian firms and Libya’s National Oil Company to prospect together
for fossil fuel deposits in third countries. Furthermore, the main economic
impact of the treaty will be in fostering foreign investment and the joint
ventures that the North African country needs in order to bolster its insuf-
ficient technical know-how. As Gazzini observes:
By agreeing to solve pending legal disputes with a number of Italian com-

panies who have been waiting to see their bills settled since the 1980s,
Libya is trying to show the business community that it will honor con-
tracts and thereby increase the international private sector’s confidence
in the country. (Gazzini, 2009)
It is thus established that economic interests related, but not confined, to

Italy have profound implications for broader bilateral interactions, which I
shall cover in the coming sections.
With reference to the colonial issues, there is a correspondence between
the substantive and the stated motivations. Until 2008 Libya insisted that,
until Italy made a ‘significant gesture’ to apologise for its colonial past,
bilateral relations would not be normalised. The case for emphasising this
issue derived from the compelling motivations that Libya had at both the
domestic and foreign levels. Advancing the request for colonial damages
was consistent with internal political considerations; it helped Qaddafi to
strengthen and legitimise his domestic authority (Romano, 2007). As Said
has argued, the construction of opposites and ‘others’ is conducive to the
building of national identity (Said, 1991: 332). The colonial narrative is one
of several strategies that the regime has successfully pursued to accomplish
its nation-building project.7 Moreover, by bringing this issue to the fore
Libya has succeeded in creating extra inducements for Italy, outside the nar-
row economic and political areas of bargaining.
Relations with the EU exhibit a further conflict between Libya’s official
and substantive objectives. As Pliez wrote in 2003:
The paradox is between the discourse preaching openness to the migrant

flows from Sub-Saharan Africa and the participation to the discussions
on regulating clandestine migration in the Mediterranean. For Tripoli it
is about articulating two axes of its foreign policy. (Pliez, 2003: 197)
Indeed, despite the Jamahiriya’s rhetorical claim that it is eager to deepen

relations with the EU, its reluctance to join the Barcelona Process or the
Mediterranean Union testifies to its multifaceted overall position. As Aliboni
notes, since the Mediterranean is the essential arena for their relations, Italy
and Libya have a joint vested interest in making it an area of peace and prosper-
ity (Aliboni, 2002). Yet, while Italy is convinced that the achievement of this
aim can be facilitated by a Pan-Mediterranean organisation like the European
Neighbourhood Policy, ‘Libya prefers a bilateral approach with Italy as well
as other European countries’ (Aliboni, 2002: 2–3). By some reckonings, Libya
aspires to have a leading role within the African Union. Consequently, deep-
ening the bond with the EU may weaken its African aspirations. As a matter
of fact, Qaddafi refused to endorse the Mediterranean Union, on the grounds
that it was a European project ‘cutting up Africa for hypothetical prospects
with Europe’ (EU Observer, 5 August 2008). As he put it:
We are member of the Arab League and also the African Union, and we
will not take any chances with damaging the Arab or African Union. [ ... ]
Our European partners need to understand that. We are in favour of part-
nership projects, but they must take account of these red lines. (France
24, 10 June 2008)
The official pronouncements by Libyan authorities welcoming increased

yet ad hoc cooperation with the EU, simultaneously with Libya’s refusal to
abide by its formal procedures, convey the multifaceted nature of Libyan
interests and the shifting loyalties.
The analysis of Libya’s motives needs to be complemented with that of
Italy’s. In following the same path of enquiry, the examination is broken
down on the basis of the four previously identified main items on the nego-
tiating table.
With regard to migration, Italy’s prime goal is to co-opt Libya in the strug-
gle against undocumented migrant flows. Chapter 4 made clear that Italy’s
prevailing securitised wisdom partially reflects a pro-active policy line
aimed at deepening the dialogue with Libya and reducing irregular migra-
tion. The employment of all available tactics to entice Libya to cooperate,
coupled with the deployment of substantial resource for this cause, is proof
of the concordance between Italy’s stated and substantive interests vis-à-vis
Libya. Nonetheless a discrepancy between discourses and practices is also
observable in Italy’s overall stance on migration. To a degree, the official
narrative, preaching the security–migration mantra, clashes with the inclu-
sive policies undertaken. It is possible, therefore, to detect an inconsistency
between Italy’s substantive and stated interests when it comes to migration
policies.8
Turning to Italy’s economic agenda, an overall coherence between the
substantive and stated aims can be identified. Historically, economic
exchanges have had a decisive role. The stance taken by successive Italian
governments, from the embargo era until the present day, has displayed a
clear bias towards sustaining and further deepening business relations with
Libya. Until 2008, the underlying economic dependence on Libya, rang-
ing from the oil industry to foreign direct investment, has placed Italy in a
vulnerable position (Coralluzzo, 2008: 128). As a former Undersecretary for
Foreign Affairs put it:
The fact that we are highly dependent on the oil and gas from Libya is a
limitation. This however is our choice. If we decide to take the gas from
either Russia or Algeria we know that with them we can discuss only to
a certain point. He [Qaddafi] has a strong weapon against us which is
pretty tough.9
As the quote from the leader cited at the outset of this chapter makes
plain, oil-exporting countries have the option of interrupting oil supplies
at will and changing their business partners. Russia and Azerbaijan, which
have temporarily cut oil supplies to Europe and Russia respectively, provide
evidence of this (BBC, 9 January 2007). Hence, by economic criteria, Libya
has a stronger foothold than does Italy.
It is no surprise that the commitment to build the highway as the ‘big ges-
ture’ was justified by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the grounds
of the preservation and consolidation of Italy’s economic relations with
the Jamahiriya (Ministero degli Esteri, 2007b). As part of the discussions
to settle the colonial ‘chapter’, on 29 October 2007 D’Alema declared: ‘We
own certain debts to Libya, but we also have a fundamental interest in our
links with this essential partner’ (Libyaonline, 11 November 2007). In other
words, the desire of the Italian government to overcome the outstanding
issues concerning the colonial past and to normalise economic relations rep-
resents both its substantive and stated interest. As we shall see, the observed
reliance by Italy on Libya was partially reversed with the 2008 treaty which
benefitted ‘Italian companies first and foremost’ (Gazzini, 2009).
An assessment of the Italian objectives concerning the role of Brussels
brings us to a similar conclusion. As outlined in Chapter 6, Italy has been
a keen advocate of the normalisation of the relations between the EU and
Libya. It was the then EC President and former Italian Prime Minister,
Romano Prodi, who not only masterminded and presided over the sus-
pension of EU sanctions but also welcomed the first official visit of the
Libyan leader to Brussels in 2004. To this date, Italy continues to solicit the
European institutions to lead a European-wide response to tackle migration
from Libya. Indeed, the consolidation of the Italian–Libyan collaboration
has been accompanied by relentless calls by Italy for a more substantive
European involvement. As the President of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano, reiter-
ated on 15 November 2007, ‘the problem of immigration cannot be addressed
by individual states alone’ and that ‘has to be dealt with the strength of
the EU’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 November 2007). In essence, no divergence can
be detected in the Italian rhetorical claims from the country’s actual inten-
tions concerning EU participation.
In sum, whereas Libya’s stated interests are not always in accord with its
substantive ones, the Italian agenda presents a more general correlation
between what is being said and what being sought after. Significantly, Libya
has made no attempt to hide its double agenda. The contradictory remarks
of Libyan officials, presented in the previous chapters, offer substantial evi-
dence of the fact that antithetical objectives are being declared and pursued
simultaneously. Recognition of the complex motivations of both actors and
of the existence of their multiple and, at the times, contradictory interests
serves as a prelude to my next task. In order to unravel the dynamics of
interdependence and the give-and-take framework between the two coun-
tries, I now move on to the relative costs and benefits10 within the agree-
ments on migration.
9.3 Cost-benefit analysis with reference to migration
By referring to the theoretical insights of interdependence theory, I now

look at Italy’s and Libya’s costs and benefits relative to their interests.11 By
investigating the constraints affecting the outcome of the negotiations, I
introduce the discussion in the sections to come on the evolving behaviour
and identities of the two actors (Alker, 1977: 50).
As regards the gains on the Libyan side, considerable financial and mate-
rial resources to strengthen its police operations have been obtained from
Italy. This has come also with a reputational gain. After decades of politi-
cal insularity, the engagement with Italy on migration has allowed Libya
to consolidate its role within the international community and to portray
itself at the forefront in the fight against international organised crime,
including terrorism. In conjunction with the European migration concerns,
Qaddafi has persuaded Italy and the EU to treat its migration problem as
their vital strategic concern. Collaboration with Italy has offered Libya the
opportunity ‘to be seen to be cooperating in combating’ Europe’s alleged
enemies, and to enhance its reputation as a responsible state (Colucello and
Massey, 2007: 83).
One example is represented by the return flights and push-backs from
Italy, which have benefited Libya insofar as they imposed virtually no costs.
The migrants repatriated were not Libyan nationals (EC, 2005). Most of
the migrants simply transited through Libyan airports, whence they were
directed to third countries. As the flights were sponsored by the Italian
government and were not repatriating Libyan nationals, Libya had practi-
cally no obligations. At the same time, the regime enjoyed relative rewards,
in the repair of its pariah image. While doubts over the full rehabilitation
of Libya persist,12 it can be argued that, since the lifting of the interna-
tional sanctions, its status has improved dramatically. The formal support
of Italian initiatives to combat undocumented migration provides a time-
specific benefit with limited resource costs. In the light of Libya’s interest
in full reintegration into the international community, the gains resulting
from formal compliance with Italy are higher than those that would have
resulted from defiance.
Furthermore, the more significant return for Libya is the Italian willing-
ness to talk at ‘any cost’. Partly because of the internal political and public
pressure to address the alleged emergency posed by migration from Libya,
Italy has made significant concessions that, until 2008, have outweighed
the benefits arising from bilateral collaboration on migration.13 Importantly
the Friendship Treaty has significantly affected this overall balance. While
it is too early to draw definitive assessments, it could be argued that in gain-
ing in terms of colonial recompensations, Libya has also made important
concessions such as increased cooperation on migration.
For the sake of a balanced discussion, I should stress that the bilateral
agreement on migration did pose a mainly reputational cost (Lipson, 1991)
on Libya in relation to its presumed human rights violations. Continued
criticism from, for example, human rights advocacy groups, meant that
there was less of an improvement in Libya’s international relations than it
had hoped for through the bilateral agreements. Even though the flights,
the construction of the camps, the training programmes and the push-
backs were co-managed and financed by the Italian government, Libya’s
support for such practices has been perceived to confirm its poor reputation
on human rights.14 Furthermore, the protests against Qaddafi during his
visit to France in December 2007 and to New York in September 2009 had
to do with the regime’s continued infringements of human rights (Human
Rights Watch, 2007; The New York Times, 23 September 2009). Thus the
regime’s endorsement of the return flights may have partially hindered
its overall foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, in broad political terms it
can be argued that the clumsy nature of the agreements and the criticism
directed at Libya have not significantly affected Libya’s interests and behav-
iour. The rapprochement with the US, symbolised by the visit to Libya of US
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in September 2008, is further evidence
of this (BBC, 6 September 2008). In short, Libya’s contested collaboration
with Italy on migration has not significantly hampered the pursuit of its
interests.
In fact, the normalisation of Libya’s international status has neither posi-
tively affected, nor has it been significantly influenced by, the human rights
standards of its migration policies. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 4, the
number of migrants returned from Libya to third countries has increased
over the recent years. Ironically, on the national media channel, Jana, Libyan
authorities record fairly frequently the number of migrants arrested and/or
deported, as evidence of their determination to reduce undocumented

migration (e.g. Jana News, 12 June 2007; Watanona, 19 August 2006).
Arguably, in pursuing and publicising such actions, the Libyan regime has
sought to convince Europe of its commitment to tackling migration, and to
raise awareness of the far-reaching social, economic and political problems
that migration poses to Libya. It can therefore be inferred that the conten-
tious collaboration with Italy on migration, despite Libya’s presumed breach
of human rights, has been largely beneficial for Libya. Its international reha-
bilitation has occurred alongside, for example, the surge in random deporta-
tion practices targeting undocumented migrants.
From the Italian viewpoint, one of the major gains is Libya’s formal col-
laboration on migration. Yet, as noted in Chapter 7, until 2008 this collabo-
ration has been more formal than de facto. The inability to significantly
reduce unwanted migration from Libya, or to persuade the Libyan regime
to comply fully with Italian requests, evinced Italy’s continuing problems.
Throughout the years, the disunited nature of the Libyan regime and
its multiple identities and interests have imposed significant limitations
on Italy.15 By calling officially for a firm and total fight against ‘irregu-
lar’ migration while somewhat tolerating smuggling networks, Libya has
reduced Italy’s potential gains. Despite this, Italy has continued to invest
significant resources, and has taken on new responsibilities to control
migration in Libya. In this sense, the Friendship Treaty may be understood
as a further move to entice Libya. In committing $5 billion as colonial repa-
rations, Italy sought to secure Libya’s willingness to tackle undocumented
migration. As of 2010, it appears that Italian expectations have been met.
Notably, in 2009 the number of arrivals to Italy decreased by 90 per cent
and commercial bilateral relations underwent remarkable expansion. By
some reckonings, the Treaty has thus shifted the overall balance to the
advantage of Italy (Dugger, 2009; Gazzini, 2009). Yet the extent to which
these new gains for Italy will endure remains to be seen. The appreciation
Table 9.2 Cost-benefits analysis in the negotiations on migration
Costs Benefits
Italy – Faltering Libyan commitment. – Formal support of Libya to collaborate

– Financial resources invested on migration.
with limited return.
Libya – To a limited extent, – Financial and material resources.
international reputational – Italian inclination to talk “at any cost.”
cost associated with human – Privileged position in the discussion
rights violations. with the EU and Italy.
Note of caution: The points sketched in this table are intended to provide a general indication
of the gains and losses in the ongoing discussions on migration. Without doubt, they are not
distinct factors but instead deeply interrelated.
that the collaboration is an ongoing activity suggests caution on any con-

clusions drawn.
One factor that has inhibited Italian diplomatic action is related to the
informality of the agreements. On the one hand, the growing relevance of
international human rights law has led Italy, like other Western countries,
to adopt increasingly restrictive policies towards asylum-seekers and undoc-
umented migrants (Gibney, 2003). Human rights law constrains states in
terms of what they can do to migrants and asylum-seekers particularly once
they enter state territory. In this optic, it ‘makes sense’ to prevent arrivals
from asylum-seekers whom a state may be legally bound to grant asylum to.
With the end of the Cold War asylum and migration ‘became part of the cut
and thrust of domestic politics’ and government leaders found themselves
facing more pressure to restrict entry (Gibney, 2003: 28) and, by implica-
tion, to seek to outsource asylum processing practices and migration control
policies.
On the other hand, the same human rights norms that have led coun-
tries such as Italy to adopt new measures beyond their borders in the first
place have subsequently discouraged them from undertaking such policies.
In Chapter 4, I documented how the Italian government was widely con-
demned by different international organisations. Presumably due to the
mounting international pressure, in March 2006 the Italian government
interrupted the practice of repatriating migrants, and the rationale of the
camps was revised. The policy change under the Berlusconi government
was confirmed by the subsequent government of Prodi, and by Berlusconi
on his return to power. The short-term benefits of reducing undocumented
migration through the return flights were wiped out by the costs of justify-
ing controversial readmission policies. Presumably, the loss of reputation
resulting from the disputed nature of the agreements became intolerable.
In sum, in the negotiations on migration Libya is the privileged player
who must be persuaded to collaborate, while Italy has little choice but to
cooperate.16 In other words, the rising cost to Italy of ensuring Libya’s com-
mitment creates a situation of ‘vulnerability’ for the former.17 The linkage
between Libyan officials and smuggling networks, and the relative capacity
of the Libyan regime to control undocumented flows to Italy, provide Libya
with substantial influence over the negotiations. It may be one of the rea-
sons why Italy eventually concurred with Libya’s requests for reparations.
In broad political terms, it can be argued that the increasing relevance of
migration has benefited Libya more, and imposed costs predominantly on
Italy. Be that as it may, Italy has remained committed to this costly venture.
The signing of the Friendship Treaty is glaring example of this. This compels
us to probe the reasons behind Italy’s unwavering, perhaps self-debilitating,
adherence to the bilateral arrangements. The answer lies in the perceived
threat posed by migration and the related electoral-populist pressure to con-
trol borders (Zincone and Caponio, 2004).
9.4 Power and ideas: The symbolic power of migration
In the historical background to Libya’s migration policies, I provided evi-

dence of the recurrent instrumental use of migration as a foreign policy
expedient with its neighbouring countries. Likewise, in Chapters 7 and 8
I posited that Libya’s bargaining power towards Italy is enhanced by the
securitised dimension of migration in the Italian domestic debate and in
the broader bilateral negotiations. The question of the relevance of real-
ism resurfaces once again. Can the realist power prescription be in any way
reconciled with the negotiating dynamics, which are engendered by ‘per-
ceived’ threats rather than ‘real’ economic and military assets? Perceptions
and systems of meanings do not feature in the realist power equation as
defined in Chapter 2. As Alker noted in 1977:
Old methodological prescriptions of Realpolitik – don’t trust intentions,

plan in terms of capabilities, and assume opponents are trying to maxi-
mize a national interest defined as power – have been superseded by a
cautious attempt better to understand the multiple subjectivities affect-
ing policy. (Alker, 1977: 52)
Following this reasoning, I argue that it is necessary to go beyond the

realist concept of ‘hard power’ and explore other conceptualisations capa-
ble of providing a more subtle analysis on the relevance of ideas in foreign
policy.18 Accordingly, the concept of productive power, defined by Barnett
and Duvall (2005) and outlined in Chapter 2, is instructive for the purposes
of this study.19 I shall therefore make the case for reconciling power, defined
in terms of perceptions (Jervis, 1976), with realist views of international
relations.
As far as Italy is concerned, Chapter 4 showed that migration features as a
paramount issue on its domestic and international agendas. This primacy is
largely justified on security grounds. While there is no convincing evidence
that migrants from Libya have a direct causal link with international ter-
rorism or worsening criminal rates, the assumption underlying the overall
Italian public discourse is that there is an inherent connection between
these phenomena. Yet in Italy this enduring perception of migration as a
critical transnational threat coexists with inclusive migration policies. In
other words, the Italian political debate on migration is fraught with com-
plexities at the levels of both discourse and practice.
With regard to Libya, following the example set by the European coun-
tries, Qaddafi has carved out a distinctive, securitised stance on migration.
This security-based approach to migration has shaped Libya’s identity vis-
à-vis Italy in two ways.
First, Libya has defined itself as a migrant-transit country. As Duvell
argues, transit migration is an increasing concern for the European Union,
and has turned into a political discourse (Duvell, 2006: 3–6). In this sense,
‘transit migration’ has become ‘a sort of a war cry directed at countries that
are expected by the EU to keep unwanted migration off European territo-
ries’ (Duvell, 2006: 6). By adopting and refining the security mantra fram-
ing the Italian public debate, Libya has strategically portrayed itself as a
migrant-transit country, as opposed to a migrant destination one. Crucially,
the Libyan ‘transit migration discourse’ is deceptive. Out of a total foreign
population in Libya of over 1.5 million, 15–20,000, or 1 per cent, reach
Italian shores annually (Human Rights Watch, 2006a).20 While such a fig-
ure is significantly lower than the annual Italian quotas, the undocumented
arrivals in Sicily place a relative humanitarian and logistical burden on Italy
(De Mistura, 2007; Dentico and Gressi 2006). Libya, however, remains pre-
dominantly a migrant destination country, and its transit status is relatively
marginal. Yet, in its dealings with Italy, Libya emphasises the second aspect,
and tends to neglect the first. It hardly needs to be added that Libya’s dis-
course on transit migration, while misleading, has proved to be an optimum
strategy to affect Italy’s demeanour.
Second, Libya has increasingly defined migration as a major societal
threat. It has articulated a foreign policy based on a view of migration that
is much more racist than Italy’s. In fact, it has amplified its anti-foreign
sentiments in a way that resembles the European far-right security para-
digms. As documented in Chapter 5, this discourse has culminated in a set
of measures, such as random arrests and mass deportations, which appear to
be human rights abuses. Furthermore, the security narrative legitimises and
corroborates Libyan requests for special assistance from Italy and the EU.
This migration–security construct, however, lacks sound empirical ground-
ing. Although it has been proven that Libya has experienced an exponential
growth in migration over the last few decades, available data suggest that
the security assumptions propounded by the regime are, for the most part,
unsubstantiated.
The vital point here is that the emerging identity, rooted in the securitised
construction of migration, has provided Libya with new capacities vis-à-vis
Italy. What weakens the Italian position are not the unwanted arrivals to
Sicily per se. The critical factor influencing the Libyan bargaining position is
the symbolic power that migration evokes in the Italian and European polit-
ical arena. As Qaddafi bluntly put it during the European Council’s meet-
ing in Seville on June 2002, in order to slow down the ‘invasion of Europe
from illegal immigrants’ it is necessary to increase development projects,
since ‘not one single Northern African state is willing to control the doors
to Europe for free’ (Pliez, 2006: 69). Seemingly, the ‘invasion’ analogy serves
as a strategic tool for the Libyan regime to advance its interests with Italy
and the EU. By manipulating pre-existing Italian and European fears of
‘otherness’, and raising the alarm about perceived social threats, the Libyan
regime has acquired significant control over the ongoing negotiations on
migration. The values and norms framing the Italian approach to migration
and to security represent a critical lever that Libya has employed in order
to consolidate its negotiating power. The security-based agenda forged by
the EU, supposedly to protect its values and way of life, has turned against
its creator. From the point of view of Italy, it has become a double-edged
device, which has been counterproductive at best.21 As we shall see, the
same applies to other case studies explored in Chapter 3.
This reality is enlightening, since it makes the case for Barnett and Duvall’s
notion of productive power as much as it discredits the realist emphasis on
‘hard power’. The securitised migration discourse is an expression of social
processes through which meanings are produced, experienced and trans-
formed. The perception of migration sets the boundaries of social identities
and defines the capacity for action of the negotiating parties (Barnett and
Duvall 2004: 56). To quote Barnett and Duvall, the bases and workings of
the securitised migration discourse ‘are the socially existing and, hence,
historically contingent and changing understandings, meanings, norms,
customs, and social identities that make possible, limit, and are drawn on
for action’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004: 56). The manner in which migration is
constructed moulds the behaviour of one actor towards his counterpart and
his capacity to influence outcomes from any particular diplomatic exchange.
The ideas framing the public debate on migration are power resources with
substantive implications for relations between states. Anti-migrant percep-
tions have affected the actions of both Italy and Libya significantly. Thus,
if an enlarged definition of power beyond the categories provided by realist
thinking is desirable, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the
objective criteria of power set forth by classical political thinking are still
relevant in the context of the larger bargaining framework.
9.5 Analysis of wider power relations through issue-linkage
To establish whether, beside productive power, hard power also plays a role
in the overall Italian–Libyan agreements, I comment first on the linkages
between migration and the other issues on the agenda. To do so, first, I
employ Haas’s concept of ‘issue-linkage’, and I re-elaborate the aforemen-
tioned cost-benefit methodological tools. In doing so I consider how migra-
tion relates to the other items being negotiated. Second, I comment on the
validity of the realist conception of power within the larger bargaining
scene. I will thus conclude that migration calls for a reconfiguration of tra-
ditional views of North–South power relations.
As noted previously, the main issues on the agenda include economic rela-
tions, migration, colonial issues and relations with the EU. In unfolding the
complexity of the broad negotiations, I have already shown that colonial
issues have been linked to bilateral economic relations and to the Libyan
commitment to migration control. Equally, the dialogue between Libya and
Colonial issues Economic issues
Migration EU relations
Figure 9.1 Issue-linkages in the broad negotiations
the EU has affected the ongoing Italian–Libyan interaction for the purpose
of tackling migration. Figure 9.1 illustrates, in a highly simplified manner,
how issues are grouped.
The matter in question concerns how distinctive issues are only linked
with certain other ones (Betts, 2004: 44–5). Who establishes how issues
are linked? What does the process of grouping linkages tell us in terms
the capacity of each country to advance its own agenda? In the process of
linking issues, who gets what? In other words, what does the analysis of
gains and losses reveal in terms of asymmetries in these bilateral relations
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 10)? What, if anything, empowers Libya in its
negotiations with Italy, and vice versa?
I now analyse each linkage from a cost-benefit perspective. The connec-
tion between economic and colonial issues is crucial, and has been rou-
tinely emphasised by the Libyan leader. For example, in December 2007,
during the summit between African and EU leaders, Qaddafi called on
Europe to compensate its former African colonies. In his own words: ‘The
riches that were taken away must be given back somehow. [ ... ] If they don’t
face that truth, they will have to pay the price one way or another – through
terrorism, emigration or revenge’ (BBC, 8 December 2007). No doubt, this
linkage has imposed a cost on Italy, which would have been better off if
the improvement in economic relations had not been conditional upon the
settlement of the colonial recompensations. The Libyan regime is aware of
the fact that, Italy would perceive its non-compliance as disruptive for the
wider interaction. From the Italian viewpoint, refuting the linkage would be
more costly than accepting, on account of the detrimental retaliatory con-
sequences that defaulting might produce in terms of impaired business rela-
tions and undocumented migrant flows. Presumably, Italian policy-makers
believe that, in order to preserve the strategic alliance with Libya, accepting
the rules set by the latter may increase its share of the pie. They bowed to
the high costs in order to safeguard and potentially deepen the economic
relations, which are considered to be strategic. This was confirmed by the
events in 2008. Since October 2008, the Libyan Central Bank has purchased
$64.6 million in ENI stock and expressed interest in buying up to 10 per
cent of the company (Gazzini, 2009). The treaty also advantaged smaller
Italian firms operating in Libya, as these companies were previously obliged
to pay ‘success fee’ of up to 2 per cent on the total value of signed contracts
(Gazzini, 2009). Simply put, the point relevant for us here has to do with
Libya’s role as an oil- and gas-exporting country and its untapped business
opportunities. Italy has continued negotiating with Libya come what may,
largely because of its economic interests.
From the perspective of Libya, the linkage between economic and colonial
is beneficial, for two reasons. First, before the treaty in 2008 it has allowed
Libya to explore economic relations with other countries (St John, 2008d),
such as China (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007: 10), and to move
away from the exclusive ties with Italy that characterised the embargo era.
Second, it has led to the desired side-effect of obtaining the Italian pledge
on the colonial issue. Arguably, Libya’s colonial requests might have been
downplayed by Italy had they been treated in isolation from the other issues
on the agenda. Moreover, the overall degree of obscurity and confusion in
the Libyan diplomatic style further accentuates Italy’s vulnerability. While
it may be argued that since 2008 the economic gains have moved to the
Italian camp, it is too early to firmly establish the overall economic cost-
benefit equilibrium.
As concerns the second linkage between the colonial compensation and
migration, the gains are on the Libyan side. Simply put, Italy has limited
interest in letting the colonial past remain on the agenda, since it touches
upon unresolved tensions and ‘collective guilt’ for its fascist past. It has
been amply documented that, to this day, Italians are unable to come to
terms with their colonial era (Mammone, 2006). Italy accepted the trade-
off with the expectation of longer-run optimal outcomes, including a more
solid commitment from Libya to control migrant flows. Clearly, Libya does
not have a compelling interest in unconditionally supporting Italian poli-
cies to halt migrant flows through the Mediterranean. Hence, from the
Libyan viewpoint, up until 2008 the linking of the colonial issue (which
would otherwise have remained at the fringe of the negotiations) with
migration, which is a top priority for Italy, has yielded the greatest ben-
efit. The signing of the treaty, however, has also served Italian economic
interests.
Lastly, the grouping of migration with the involvement of the EU brings
benefits to both countries. On the one hand, Libya’s gradual reintegra-
tion into the international community has been officially recognised and
widely applauded, to the point that it is now treated as a privileged country.
The launch of the discussion on Framework Agreement on November 2008
is an example of this (EC, 2008d). Although harsh criticism of Libya per-
sists, especially with regard to persistent human rights violations (Human
Rights Watch, 2006a), over the last few years the international standing
of Libya has undergone a spectacular improvement. On the other hand,
Italy has gained from European participation in managing migration in
the Mediterranean. The transfer of some migration policy competencies
to Brussels is expected to reduce the financial and reputational pressure

that the Italian government has faced thus far. This is epitomised by the
ongoing discussion on EU-led ‘commissions’ to examine asylum requests
in Libya. The critical subtext here remains the securitised narrative. The
symbolic power of migration plays to the advantage of both countries,
since it legitimises their pleas for the EU to be more active. In emphasising
this discourse, Italy and Libya have sought to win more assistance from
Brussels.
In the aggregate, our case study is an example of ‘tactical issue-linkage’,
whereby the negotiating ploy ‘eschews reliance on intellectual coherence
among the issues linked’ (Haas, 1980: 372). As Haas indicates, ‘tactical link-
age is a cheap way to increase pay-offs because it expands the agenda of
possible benefits to be derived’ (Haas, 1980: 373). Overall, the objective of
this strategy ‘is simply to obtain additional bargaining leverage, to extract
a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a single
issue’ (Haas, 1980: 372). As Haas further clarifies, ‘the credibility of a tacti-
cal linkage depends on the “linkee’s” perception of the linker’s ability and
willingness to withhold collaboration if the linkage is refused’ (Haas, 1980:
372). In our case, the role of the linkee is played by Libya, and the linker
by Italy. Agenda-setting has represented ‘a primary tool for securing and
extending power’ (Light, 1982). Italy has not withheld its collaboration,
despite the linkage being unfavourable. Libya has succeeded in establish-
ing specific connections between issues in line with its substantive inter-
ests. The construction of knowledge and the self-serving use thereof is an
exemplification of how significant Libya’s leverage is in the wider bilateral
relations.
The tendency of Italian governments to accede to Libya’s requests is a
distinctive feature of these countries’ historical relations. A clear example
is Andreotti’s policy, based on the idea of ‘buon vicinato’, where compro-
mise and dialogue were preferred over confrontation and closure (Collu,
2001). By maintaining diplomatic and economic relations during the era
of UN, EU and US sanctions, when Libya was considered a ‘rogue’ state,
Italy confirmed and crystallised its role as an ‘easy’ ally who would not
easily abandon the long-standing relationship. This is demonstrated by the
manner in which the issues have been connected; Libya has managed to
impose its own ‘knowledge’ on Italy. This is best illustrated in the centrality
accorded to the colonial chapter. As Gazzini notes, ‘given the lack of legal
compulsion, many wondered why Italy would even enter negotiations for
the treaty’ (Gazzini, 2009). The grouping of issues, indeed, reflects Libya’s
preferred order. This was particularly true after the suspension of EU sanc-
tions. During the embargo Libya’s room for manoeuvre was limited, and
Italy could use its invaluable role as Libya’s advocate as a bargaining-chip.
Libya’s regaining of international prestige denied Italy’s of significant dip-
lomatic advantage. As one Italian parliamentarian foresaw in 2003, the
removal of the embargo could not secure Libya’s effective collaboration

against migration (Camera, 2003e). In fact, Italy found itself deprived of a
means of pressure on its rule-breaking interlocutor.
As part of these reflections, let me return to one of my initial questions,
that on whether in this case realist views of power are confirmed. I argue
that hard power should not be dismissed. To an extent, economic con-
siderations continue to explain Italy’s acceptance of the issue-linkage set-
ting dictated by Libya. Furthermore, Libya’s geo-political location, at the
crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, makes the Jamahiriya a strategic
ally whom Italy is eager to content. This may explain why Italy eventually
agreed to sign a unique treaty. Indeed never before had a European state
voluntarily agreed to pay a financial package to a country it once colonised
(Gazzini, 2009). The Libyan regime is aware that Italy places great impor-
tance on, for example, migration and economic collaboration and, conse-
quently, that the Italian tolerance threshold is high. This provides Libya
with leverage that can be applied on a wide range of issues. Without such
economic preconditions, it is doubtful that Libya could have benefited so
significantly from migration-related discourses. 22 I am thus prompted to
make two claims.
First, the realist belief in the enduring centrality of interests and hard
power is upheld. At its most basic realpolitik centres on ‘the concept of inter-
est defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau, 1978). Accordingly, in the
Italian–Libyan interaction both parties are driven by the calculation, or
miscalculation, of their interests (Waltz, 1979: 117). Political realism has
also to be credited for its recognition that interests, both material and ideal,
dominate states’ behaviour directly (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 12). This
is made clear by Beard:
Interest, subjectively considered, may take the form of an idea, and every
idea pertaining to earthly affairs is attached to some interest considered
as material thing and is affiliated with social relationships. Neither can be
separated from the other in operations called ‘understanding,’ ‘appraisal’
or ‘measurement.’ [ ... ] There are, [ ... ] no ideas without interests, and no
interests without ideas. (Beard 1935, quoted in Burchill, 2005)
In other words, the fact that ideas, such as the securitised migration nar-
rative, are power assets does not by itself disprove the core assumptions of
political realism. However, realist methodology fails to provide specific ana-
lytical instruments to explore the ideational dimension of power – which
justifies our resorting to the concept of productive power. This leads to the
second reflection.
The notion of productive power is a necessary complement to the short-
comings of the realist formula. It allows us to appreciate the symbolic poli-
tics of migration based on myths and prejudices (Grabbe 2000; Zielonka,
2001: 519), a politics that transcends calculation and sound evidence

(Perlmutter 1996). The variable-sum spill-over effects across different issues
deriving from multiple and evolving interests, identities and expectations
expose the limits of the realist normative and epistemological assumptions.
It is worth reiterating that realism assumes that state interaction is based on
a zero-sum game, which is plainly disproved by our case study. Once this
point is conceded, I am prompted to question the soundness of the realist
outlook concerning North–South relations.
The empirical analysis and the critical discussion on externalisation show
that emerging interactions among states challenge mainstream conceptions
of North–South power relations.23 Contemporary debates are often based
on North–South polarisation, with Northern states generally enjoying more
political and economic power and Southern states facing severe political
and economic constraints (Betts, 2005: 50). Yet in the light of its complex
political, social and economic conditions, Libya can be considered part of
the North by some standards, and of the South by others.
It belongs to the South because of its political stance vis-à-vis Africa and
the developing world at large. Colonel Qaddafi has sought to champion the
interests of the South in opposition to ‘rich’ countries. For example, he has
referred repeatedly to the rights of former colonies to claim colonial com-
pensation, and urged them to follow Libya’s lead on this matter. With the
lifting of the international sanctions and Libya’s gradual international reha-
bilitation, Qaddafi’s argument has gained in strength, both regionally and
internationally.
From an economic standpoint, however, Libya is unlike what is normally
considered to be a country in the South.24 Above all, its booming econ-
omy and the absence of widespread poverty distinguish the North African
regime from, for example, many African countries. Moreover, its location at
the edge of Europe also plays a crucial role. Due to the economic and politi-
cal implications that this proximity entails, Libya can be situated at the
North–South interstice (Smith, 2005).
Because of all these factors, we are led to call into question the appropri-
ateness of the North–South archetype. The unique political and economic
traits of Libya render the standard North–South dichotomy inaccurate, both
conceptually and analytically.
In conclusion, the Italian–Libyan interaction indicates that realist views
can coexist with enlarged conceptions of power, and with a more fluid
understanding of North–South relations (Barnett and Duvell, 2005). While
the analysis corroborates ‘hard power’ accounts, placing objective and meas-
urable assets at the centre of the power equation, it challenges this same
theoretical perspective. I therefore transcend realist assumptions, in order
to gauge the growing complexity of states’ interdependence whereby fixed
and clear-cut parameters are being elided. This is indeed confirmed by the
comparative analysis to which I now turn.
9.6 Broadening the analysis
The debate on the reframing of North–South power relations raises a fun-

damental question. To what extent can we generalise the findings of the
Italian–Libyan experience? Libya is patently an anomalous case, because of
its considerable economic resources, unique political system and geo-stra-
tegic location. Consequently, if my concern is with broader North–South
power relations, Qaddafi’s regime can hardly be considered an exemplary
focus of enquiry. To address this problem, I revisit the conclusions drawn in
the comparative analysis and elaborate four points.
First, the comparative analysis confirms the assumption that the migra-
tion and refugee decisions that countries make have implications for other
states. Diplomatic and/or security considerations can shape migration pol-
icy and vice versa (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 109). It has long been
suggested that migration represents a matter of high international politics,
engaging the attention of heads of state and ministries involved in defence,
internal security and external relations (Weiner, 1985: 16). The underly-
ing assumption is that migration, as Manning wrote in 1977, is an ‘interm-
estic’ phenomenon (Manning, 1977), resting on the inherent connection
between domestic and foreign policy-making.
Second, migration has provided a bargaining-chip to states in their bilat-
eral negotiations with other states, with which they can extract specific
concessions. As Weiner argued:
Induced or forced emigration can be and has often been a foreign policy
tool. States have used this instrument to destabilise another, force recog-
nition, stop a neighbouring state from interfering in its internal affairs,
prod a neighbouring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping
the flow or extend their political, cultural and economic interests of
those of a dominant ethnic group through internal or external colonisa-
tion or decolonisation. (Weiner, 1995: 33–4)
The same position is supported by Cornelius and Rosenblum:
Many sending states have strong preferences concerning receiving-state

immigration policies, and both sending and receiving states may seek to
employ migration as a tool of foreign policy by linking cooperation on
migration control and/or access to legal entry visas to other dimensions
of bilateral relations, such as trade, investment, and security relations.
(Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005: 109)
Crucially, I found that this applies to both sending and receiving states. In
the case of Morocco, for example, migration has weakened the bargaining
position of its European interlocutors and forced Spain to make significant
compromises to convince Morocco to collaborate. However, the relations

between the US and Latin America and Italy with selected Northern African
countries reveal that a migrant-receiving country is also in a position to
manipulate migration for its own purposes (Greenhill, 2009). Hence, my
initial hypothesis about migration reframing North–South power interac-
tion is not confirmed since migration does not benefit solely migrant-send-
ing countries.
Third, how migration is perceived in the domestic arena affects foreign
policy orientations significantly. In the aftermath of the Balsero Crisis,
the Clinton administration reversed the open-door approach, partly as a
result of it being perceived as weak and vulnerable in the face of the large
number of Cubans fleeing to the US. As Greenhill puts it, ‘the appear-
ance of loss of control over US borders coupled with the perception inside
the US that Florida might be overrun, would be viewed by US leaders
as politically costlier than the alternative of dealing with him (Castro)’
(Greenhill, 2002: 48). The same applies to the discussions between Spain
and Morocco. Although, as I have established thus far, migration is a for-
eign policy tool which has been used by both sides, security-related ideas
in the migrant-receiving countries place the latter in a position of vul-
nerability and are source of diplomatic leeway for the migrant-sending
ones.
Fourth, in the cases of cross-border collaboration on migration, the
migrant-sending country has been able to exert pressure on the migrant-
receiving one, and has partially succeeded in dictating the course of the
negotiations because of the fears associated with migration. This is crucial
for my initial hypothesis on the extent to which the contested practice
of externalisation affects power dynamics between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving countries. Migrant flows per se do not provide increased
influence. The Latin American cases show that, where more powerful states
do not place restrictions at borders, migration cannot be used as power asset.
It follows that migration becomes a source of leverage when the receiving
country seeks to oppose it and restrict entry. This is certainly true in the
Italian–Libyan case. The stronger the ‘control dilemmas’ and the ‘anti-
immigration’ feelings in the receiving countries, the more successful the
gambits of their counterparts are. Hence, the countries in the South come to
benefit from increased leverage in their wider negotiations with the North.
The perception of migration as a security issue engenders a reframing of the
bargaining game to the advantage of the South. If the migrant-receiving
countries were not preoccupied with migration, the migrant-sending ones
would be deprived of a critical lever. Against structural views treating the
South as ineluctably weak, we can here detect a more complex scenario of
gain and losses on both sides.
On these grounds, the assumption of structural inequalities informing
mainstream approaches to North–South relations appears to be inaccurate.
I am thus led to adopt a more multifaceted reading of the evolving patterns

of state interdependence. Static and uncritical usages of the North–South
framework as an ordering principle preclude a subtle appreciation of the
evolving patterns of economic and political inequality amongst states.
The study of migration and international relations reveals that gains and
losses are diffused among participants, and that the international system is
characterised by multiple-sum exchanges rather than zero-sum ones. The
standard assumptions on power inequality underpinning the North–South
paradigm ignore the complex interplay of factors, whereby Southern coun-
tries have also succeeded to an extent in controlling the outcome of the
negotiations. When it comes to migration, the countries in the ‘North’ are
not the only ones that ‘can make and break the rules’ (Wood, 1995). The var-
ying strength that countries exhibit in the agreements on migration and on
other issues on the negotiating table epitomises the dispersion of authority
in the current international system (Rosenau, 2005). While the globalised
world remains an arena of power and influence, the levers that actors can
exert are increasingly fragmented and, as such, transcend fixed paradigms.
In returning to one of my initial questions, I contend that migration studies
require a reconceptualisation of the North–South dichotomy and a more
nuanced comprehension of the transforming manner in which states col-
laborate to tackle common problems.
9.7 Conclusion
The examination of the real and official motives of Italy and Libya has
proved to be critical to appreciating of the costs and benefits of each coun-
try in their cooperation on migration, and, more precisely, of the unequal
obligations binding the two parties in their mutual exchanges (Keohane,
1986b). In light of the fact that, at least until 2008, Italy incurred higher
costs than Libya, it seems reasonable to conclude that the wider discus-
sions on migration are an example of ‘relations among unequals’, in which
the practitioners are, to different degrees, exposed to the danger of exploita-
tion and fraudulent arrangements. The negotiations are based on exchanges
of ‘mutually valued but non-comparable goods and services’, whereby
the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the other
(Keohane, 1986b: 6). Presumably, Italy adheres to such an imbalance in the
bilateral agreement on migration with the expectation of greater gains in
their overall political and economic relationship and, equally relevantly,
because of the symbolic power of migration.
Similar scenarios of ‘relations among unequals’ have been observed in the
other cases. While more empirical research on them is warranted, it is fair to
assert that the outcome of broader negotiations reflects the changing fram-
ing of issues whereby migration has moved from the fringe to the centre of
the diplomatic engagements. This policy change reflects the contest among
actors to establish knowledge and rules most favourable to them (Plewa,

2009: 39) and determines their relative power position. One of the most
striking instances of this ‘redirection’ (Plewa, 2009: 489) in the bargaining
game relates to the ideational reinterpretation of migration. In response to
putative societal menaces posed by migration, migrant-receiving countries,
such as Spain and to an extent Greece, have been willing to conduct and
deepen a dialogue with their counterparts at ‘any cost’. In turn, the latter
have raised alarm about undocumented migration, because this has proved
conducive to obtaining ad hoc concessions. In this sense, the realist formula
fails to capture the extent to which fears and perceptions associated with
migration influence the behaviour and interaction of states. Barnett and
Duvall’s concept of productive power allows one to remedy these pitfalls
and to understand more thoroughly the impact of the securitised migra-
tion discourse on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. The fact that both
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries are actively involved,
and have succeeded, in shaping ideas at distinctive policy junctures (Plewa,
2009) is insightful. The co-implication of migrant-sending and migrant-re-
ceiving countries at the interstice between discourses and practices discloses
new ways of tackling the unyielding predicament of North–South power
relations.
In challenging the realist assumptions, I do not seek to discredit them
tout court. On the contrary, I have argued in favour not only of the nexus
between interests and power, but also of the enduring relevance of the
material dimension of power. Furthermore, the study of issue-linkages
reveals that the securitised nature of migration represents a power resource,
thanks in part to concurrent economic and political factors. Indeed, the
study of the other items on the agenda is instrumental to evaluating the
relative importance of migration. For example, in the relations between
the US and Latin America, migration has impacted on the diplomatic
exchanges for it has been linked to concurrent political dynamics, such
as the Cold War confrontation. The striking point here is that migration
is emerging as a dominant feature in the international political milieu,
and alters the negotiating patterns between migrant-sending and migrant-
receiving countries.
By taking a purposely eclectic theoretical stance, I argue that migration
profoundly affects state interdependence and invites scholars to see beyond
polarised views of North–South power relations. The North–South analyti-
cal construct is helpful as a starting point in as much as it is subsequently
superseded.25 Migration provides a source of bargaining power for migrant-
sending countries in a manner that has been overlooked by the realist tradi-
tion, and displays a growing tendency towards diffusion of power (Rosenau,
1997). On these grounds it is feasible to postulate that what we are witness-
ing is an incremental yet convoluted process whereby power migrates. It
follows that one of the challenges of future research may be the one of
theorising more thoroughly the process whereby the influence of differ-

ent actors is being repositioned in significant respects. There is a need to
develop rigorous analytical tools and theoretical assumptions to reinterpret
changes in the relations among states which counter traditional views of
states’ inequalities and power asymmetries (Van Criekinge, 2009).
10
Conclusion
An argument that has been made at length in the scholarly debate is that
the end of the Cold War has had the effect of widening the gap between the
haves and the have-nots, and that the developing world has been deprived
of any strategic leverage (Clapham, 1992). Globalisation has aggravated
inequality and exposed the sharp distinction between the capacities of weak
and strong states (Fawcett and Sayigh, 1999: 3). Against this backdrop, this
book has sought to provide something of an alternative perspective, and has
challenged the North–South binary opposition with a view to appreciating
the processes of transformation in inter-state relations. I thus argued that
international migration partly contradicts mainstream accounts of power
and reveals the shortcomings of the North–South paradigm. In a nutshell, I
made the case for revisiting our understanding of states’ inequalities in the
light of a metaphorical ‘migration’ of power imbued with factual and idea-
tional aspects of international migration.
In line with the three sets of questions outlined at the outset of the book,
my argument was three-fold. First, I provided a detailed picture of the
Italian–Libyan agreements on migration. In outlining the main phases of
the bilateral discussions, I reflected on the modes of strategic bargaining,
how issue-linkages emerged and how side-payments were negotiated. For
Italy, I considered the mismatch between discourses and practices, as well
as its increasing inability to effectively influence the behaviour of its coun-
terpart. For Libya, I built upon John Davies’s call to appreciate the nuances
of Libyan politics and society. I argued that, while it is possible to identify
a common thread running through Libyan policies, i.e. the instrumental
employment of migration as a foreign and domestic policy tool, it would be
misleading to assume that there has been a coherent grand plan informing
Libyan policies towards Italy and on migration. From the broader political
perspective of Libyan foreign policy, the Libyan regime has made massive
miscalculations – one example being its support for terrorist organisations,
which has led to imposition of international sanctions. In simple terms,
Libya believed it could bypass prevailing international norms. Presumably
209
these episodes have served as a learning process and Libya is more aware of
the opportunities and constraints within the international arena.1 From this
viewpoint, Libya’s dealings with Italy testify to its increased awareness of
the international norms that it has to follow; yet also of the extent to which
it can circumvent standard practices for the pursuit of its own interests.
The empirical analysis reveals that migration furnishes Libya with a
bargaining-chip, which it has used to affect Italy’s actions. This line of
thinking is corroborated by an historical examination of Libya’s policies
with regard to migration and border controls. Chapter 5 showed that, since
the 1970s, the regime has successfully employed migration as a policy tool
in relations with its neighbours. In other words, Libya has benefited from
the growing salience of migration in the international arena. The realisa-
tion that migration is a lever, which Libya has used to exert pressure on
Italy, validates one of my initial hypotheses. In the negotiations on migra-
tion, Libya, unlike Italy, is the player who must be persuaded to collaborate.
At least until 2008, the high cost to Italy of ensuring Libya’s commitment to
the ‘fight against irregular migration’ has created a situation of vulnerabil-
ity for the former. The changing willingness of the Libyan regime to control
migrant flows, coupled with its notoriously unpredictable diplomatic style,
imposes further constraints on Italy.
The second strand of the book concerned the idea of externalisation, a
central theme in the literature on European migration policies. Here two
arguments were adduced. First, the Italian–Libyan interaction cannot be
treated as a case of externalisation as defined by the relevant scholarship.
The cooperative arrangements on migration do not involve the shifting
of border control policies from Italy to Libya, since the latter continues to
exercise its sovereign authority fully. Nonetheless, recent joint measures
defy legal scrutiny, and strengthen what Walters terms networks of joint
tasks to address transnational threats (Walters, 2004: 680–1). The vague and
arbitrary use of the concept of externalisation in the literature led me to
resort to the alternative notion of ‘de-territorial collaboration on migration’.
This expression captures the multifaceted manner in which border control
policies are negotiated and implemented, and is intended to bring some
precision to the debate on the Italian–Libyan interaction. Importantly, it
remains to be seen whether this term can be extended to other similar cases
of bilateral cooperation on migration. My discussion, then, invites further
more detailed research on the application of the term externalisation across
different cases.
I then considered – second argument – whether the joint measures have
been successful. Two concurrent phenomena were observed. First, undocu-
mented arrivals from Libya to Italy continue unabated. Second, due mainly
to the recurrent regularisations and the annual quotas, over the years the
regular migrant population in Italy has increased noticeably. While the
first trend owes to the difficulties in cooperation with Libya, the second
Conclusion 211
can be traced to Italy’s need to fill gaps in its labour force. While migra-
tion from Libya remains a marginal feature in the broader Italian migration
landscape, it has come to be one of the central marks of Italy’s ‘migration
spectacle’ exercise. Despite the relative success in tackling irregular migra-
tion since 2008, Italy remains heavily reliant on the collaboration with
Libya.
In returning to one of my initial questions, I probed the reasons for the
dependency of migrant-receiving countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece and,
at the times, the US. I went on to argue that it is not the unsuccessful col-
laboration on migration and the evolving practices at borders per se that
diminish a country’s negotiating strength. The substantive factor influenc-
ing the diplomatic exchanges is the symbolic power that migration pos-
sesses in domestic arenas. The social construction of migration as a societal
threat has profound repercussions for foreign policies and inter-state power
relations. Simply put, the perception of migration as a security concern
alters the overall bargaining matrix to the advantage of the migrant-sending
country. While there is no conclusive evidence proving that migrants have
any direct link with terrorist organisations, or any disproportionate respon-
sibility for increased crime rates, the prevailing public wisdom tends to take
the connection between these phenomena for granted. As Geddes writes, by
being drawn into the realm of identity politics, the politics of immigration
has acquired a distinctive symbolic dimension (Geddes, 2000: 22). In an
attempt to answer public anxieties associated with the migrant ‘other’, poli-
ticians, at least at the level of discourse, have constructed an ‘emergency’
narrative inspired by a strongly anti-migrant stance. This strategy, however,
has produced meagre benefits for migrant-receiving countries, since it has
constrained their bargaining power.
In the European context, the security-based discourse on migration has
moulded the identity and capacity of two actors on both sides. By adopting
the security mantra underlying European societies, countries like Libya and
Morocco have defined themselves as migrant-transit spaces confronting an
unprecedented migration problem. This emerging identity, rooted in the
securitised understanding of migration, has provided them with renewed
strength vis-à-vis Europe. Above all, they secured a retaliatory instrument,
which has raised the bargaining stakes for the EU.
This thread of narrative was elaborated further in the last part of the
book, where I approached the third set of questions from the perspective
of IR theory. My starting hypothesis drew on three different theoretical
traditions, i.e. political realism, neo-Marxism and neo-liberal institution-
alism. Accordingly, in order to identify and explain emerging negotiating
patterns, I sought to combine and transcend these views. This purposely
eclectic theoretical archetype allowed me to investigate the widely differing
and ambivalent aspects in inter-state relations in the Italo-Libyan case as
well as the other selected cases presented in the third chapter.
On the one hand, the realist concern with hard power remains appropri-
ate insofar as its insights into the nexus between ideas, interests and power
continue to hold relevance. On the other hand, it overlooks the contextual
and ‘soft’ dimension of power. In overly emphasising the material constitu-
ents of power, and in sanctioning definite and fixed rules in the conduct of
foreign affairs, political realism loses sight of important subtleties. For these
reasons, I resorted to the notions of interdependence and productive power,
which offer useful analytical instruments to explore complex mechanisms
of states’ interactions. While realist assumptions of self-interested and
power-seeking actors should not be abandoned, the study of how and why
states seek and undertake cooperation and construct their mutual expecta-
tions furnishes a more fertile path of enquiry.
Having made the case for the relevance of perceptions on migration and
security in inter-state power relations, I considered the implications for
North–South power relations. The argument according to which migrant-
sending countries are placed in a favourable negotiating position towards
the migrant-receiving ones is not new (Hamilton, 1997). In the 1970s, many
IR scholars called for an end to the normative distinctions, asserting the pri-
macy of the North over the South. It was noted that the South was ‘building
new trans-national structures in order to achieve both international and
domestic goals’ (Morse, 1970: 382). These views have been confirmed by my
comparative analysis. On different occasions, migrant-sending countries
have used migrant flows to determine the choices of other countries and
to win a more advantageous position in the given negotiating structure.
In an international environment where migration is considered one of the
top priorities, migrant-sending countries have found new opportunities to
obtain the attention and favour of the North (Gillespie, 2002). The concerns
with migration in the North have led the South to increase its bargain-
ing power by thwarting the control efforts of the North (Ellerman, 2008).
Importantly, this pattern is confirmed even in the absence of substantive
economic assets on the side of the migrant-sending countries. This leads to
an interesting reflection on migrant-transit countries. The poorer the coun-
try, the more chance it may have of using migration as a power-increasing
tool. This is because migrants are presumably more likely to transit through,
rather than settle in, countries with poor economies and few resources. This
issue, which I only briefly examined, deserves further research. However,
it should be noted here that in the cases explored in Chapter 3 the relative
weight of the migration card was contingent on its connection with other
political and economic issues on the agenda. One may, therefore, generalise
the findings of the Italian–Libyan negotiations and maintain that, to some
degree, migration benefits migrant-sending countries in negotiations with
the migrant-receiving ones.
However, this statement demands a note of caution. The comparative
analysis, as well as the examination of Libya’s migration policies, showed
Conclusion 213
that migrant-receiving countries have also used migration to influence the

behaviour of their counterparts. The historical examination of Libya’s migra-
tion policies shows that migrants from Arab countries, as well as from sub-
Saharan Africa, have been used as pawns by Qaddafi in his foreign policy.
Likewise, in its relations with third countries, Italy has conditioned develop-
ment aid and annual migration quotas on the willingness of those countries
to collaborate on migration control policies. Thus migration has been stra-
tegically employed by, and has brought advantages to, both migrant-sending
and migrant-receiving countries. Significantly, this proposition does not
contradict one of my core arguments questioning the validity of the realist
‘laws’. In fact, the novel status of migration as a paramount international
issue, and its implications for inter-state relations, are evidence of import-
ant changes in state interactions. Thus, while it is clear that some of the
prescriptions formulated by the realist tradition are still pertinent, a critical
reflection on the subtle transformations in North–South bargaining beyond
the mainstream readings is necessary.
The fact that perceptions related to migration affect the power position
of countries calls into question the appropriateness of the parameters for-
mulated by the realist tradition, and of its epistemological premises, for
understanding power equilibria. Hence I have suggested one basic idea.
Constructed images of South–North migration add a further layer of com-
plexity to an already dense and fragmented international milieu (Rosenau,
2005) with the potential of recasting states’ preference orderings and policy
options. Migration, an issue that, until few decades ago, was at the periph-
ery of the scholarship on political science, has now acquired unprecedented
prominence, because it impacts so strongly on the manner in which states
cooperate. The argument on the entrenched inequalities across the North–
South divide is too simplistic, since it fails to acknowledge and explain
emergent structures of world politics.
It is not my intention to imply that we are witnessing structural recon-
figuration in North–South relations of power. By economic and political
standards, the international arena remains profoundly unequal. Despite
the increasing weight of emerging countries (The Economist, 18 September
2008) a large part of the developing world has yet to guarantee self-sus-
taining economic growth (Beckfield, 2003). It is undisputable that ‘vast
inequalities of power’ have always pervaded, and still pervade, international
society (Dunne, 2005). Nonetheless, this book has observed the mater-
ial and ideational changes in, and the opportunities for, ‘agency’ (Ba and
Hoffman, 2005) available to actors traditionally labelled as ‘weak’. I con-
tend that migration and, more specifically, perceptions and misperceptions
about national interest and international relations (Jervis, 1976) have given
such actors the wherewithal to partially determine their own conditions.
From a theoretical vantage-point, then, the North–South dichotomy and
its static views of power are open to question. The North–South model is
not, of course, without its merits. Yet it is analytically useful precisely in as

much as it is subsequently overcome. The seemingly paradoxical patterns in
the negotiations on migration make North–South boundaries increasingly
fluid, and have important implications for both scholars and policy-makers.
This applies to my conclusions drawn from the empirical discussion.
In the Italo-Libyan case, the limited scholarly debate on Libya, because
of the lack of primary resources and on-the-ground research, has precluded
a thorough comprehension of the country and of its foreign policy. The
detailed reconstruction in this book of the bilateral discussions on migra-
tion has aimed to clarify a topic that is fiercely debated yet largely unknown.
Given that European countries have sought to replicate the Italian putative
example of ‘externalising’ migration policies, the difficulties experienced
by Italy can be taken as a valuable lesson. In a nutshell, they give centre
stage to the often unrecognised tension between fears related to migration
and relations of power.
The connection between migration, ideas and the balance of power
deserves further reflection if we are not only to address the phenomenon of
irregular migration but also to rethink the potential of the enduring (and
also transforming) structures and processes of the international system.
Realist scholars assert that the laws shaping international relations do not
change. My empirical study of different bilateral negotiations has demon-
strated that a more nuanced outlook may reveal novel – and perhaps unan-
ticipated – patterns in the interaction among states. In this context, more
research is needed on the extent to which migration and its inter-subjective
dimension influence foreign policies and power relations. Not only are
our case studies unfinished stories that require further attention, but the
increasingly relevant role of the EU on migration in the Mediterranean also
necessitates close investigation. For example, the fact that Spain and Greece
are following in Italy’s footsteps may, or may not, trigger similar dynamics
with regard to the power relations between the EU and neighboring coun-
tries. The same applies to the ongoing relations between the US and Latin
American countries. A thorough examination of migration from an IR per-
spective may shed new light on global interdependencies and, more inter-
estingly, on the depth of the changes affecting the international system.
Notes
1 Introduction and methodology

1. Throughout this book, I refrain from using the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘immi-
grants’. I will instead refer to ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’. I define the latter as
the large and diversified group of people entering their destination or transit
country with or without the required permits. It is also important to stress at
this point that, unless otherwise specified, I do not intend to consider the issue
of refugees.
2. Not all observers, however, agree that migration is on the rise. A recent World
Bank report on migration, for example, contends that current migration flows,
relative to population, are weaker than those of the last decades of the nine-
teenth century (Ratha and Xu, 2008).
3. The linkage between remittance and development remains contested, however.
Some, such as Athukorala (1993), demonstrate that remittances benefit local
households across the developing world. Others, for example, a report by the
IMF in 2003, found that remittances may have a negative effect on economic
growth (Chami et al., 2003) and may sustain conflicts (Van Hear, 2000). For
more on this debate, see Massey et al., (1998).
4. In this text, I follow the definition provided by Giddens (2002).
5. Throughout the book, when I use the term borders I refer to their ‘territorial’
dimension unless otherwise stated. For a detailed account of different concep-
tions of borders see Geddes (2005a).
6. The terms ‘foreigners’, ‘migrants’, ‘foreign workers’ and ‘foreign nationals’ will
be used with the same meaning, as will the terms ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’,
‘unauthorised’ and ‘unwanted’.
7. Throughout the book, I will use the following acronyms: ‘EU’ for European
Union, ‘EC’ for the European Commission, ‘EP’ for the European Parliament
and ‘Council’ for the Council of the European Union. The latter should not be
confused with the Council of Europe.
8. I cannot hope to do justice to the entire debate on this field. This brief discus-
sion simply reviews some of the ideas that are pertinent to the present pur-
poses. Some works dealing with the notion of borders from the perspective of
political science are Anderson (1996), Mathias (2001) and Wilson and Donnann
(1998).
9. Without doubt, the debate on state and border goes beyond the sketchy analy-
sis that I have presented. For example, there is a large body of literature from
a normative angle, where it is argued that internal and external exclusionary
practices exercised by the state should be regarded as fundamentally undemo-
cratic (Walzer, 1983). On this reasoning, the restrictive narrative underpinning
the very conception of border is not justifiable. The state cannot claim a right
to exclude would-be immigrants, because democratic principles may apply with
equal force to the very people against whom the state claims this right (Fine,
2007; Gibney, 2004a).
10. In this book I use the terms ‘cooperation’, ‘coordination’ and ‘dialogue’ to refer
to situations where states seek to identify generalised principles of conduct to
215
216 Notes
reduce transaction costs (Ruggie, 1992). It is noteworthy, however, that some

scholars have drawn a distinction between the two concepts (Stein, 1995).
11. I define the concept of North~South in section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
12. The concept of ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘burden-shifting’ with reference to asylum
is discussed by, for example, Betts and Milner (2006); Chimni (2001); and Rodier
(2006).
13. The terms ‘third countries’ and ‘neighbouring countries’ are treated as
synonymous.
14. Throughout the text I will aslo refer to Libya as a Northern African country and
as the Jamahirya. In addition, Qaddafi will be called ‘the Libyan Leader’, the
‘Leader of the Revolution’ or ‘the Colonel’.
15. Throughout the book I define the terms ‘agreement’, ‘accord’ and ‘treaty’ as the
generic bargaining process from the initial negotiation to enforcement and man-
agement. This understanding is based on the vast literature on complex interde-
pendence to be examined below.
16. Anonymous interview on 23 January 2008.
17. As such I will not rely on statistical and numerical analysis and I will privilege a
constructivist methodology (Moses and Knutsen, 2007).
18. For more on this, see Blommaert (2005) and Gee (2005).
19. Hereafter, rhetorical or official or political discourse. When I refer to pub-
lic discourse, I mean the sum of public opinion, media and statements from
politicians.
20. For example, a former Italian prime minister could not recall that when he signed
the Joint Communication an accompanying document was also agreed by both
parties, also known as ‘Verbal Process’.
21. I follow Wengraf’s definition, according to which semi-structured interviews
have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance, but these are
designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer
must be improvised in a careful and theorised way (Wengraf, 2001: 5).
22. The Italian authorities based in Libya were certainly more willing to share
information.
23. Throughout the book, I will not mention the centre that I visited. While I pro-
vide extracts from the interview with the director of the centre, I will not com-
ment on the conditions of the building or of the migrants detained. Since I was
not given access to the internal rooms where migrants were detained and the
visit lasted no more than 15 minutes, I cannot make a fair assessment on the
overall quality of the centre, nor I can generalise on detention conditions in
Libya.
24. However, the reliability of the information provided in such documents is highly
questionable. Occasionally, the documents had been written by my interlocutors
in response to my specific questions. Most of the time, they were in Arabic, and
the level of information that they presented varied significantly. Yet again, the
gaps and inconsistencies that I identified when comparing diverse sources of
information helped me further appreciate the complexity of Italian and Libyan
policies.
25. It must be clarified that all the quotations from Italian and Libyan sources have
been translated by myself, unless otherwise stated.
26. Among the most prominent are Fabrizio Gatti and Stefano Mencherini.
27. This approach has been inspired by Carling (2005). At this point, it must be
stressed that the employment of media sources in the study on migration in Italy
is not new. A major past example is Sciortino and Colombo (2004).
Notes 217
28. Inter alia, media sources and documents provided by European institutions and
Human Rights Watch.
2 Theoretical framework
1. Keohane and Nye do not use the term ‘interdependence theory’, and refer instead
to ‘complex interdependence’, which they see as ‘an ideal type of world politics
that is opposite to realism’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 23). In this book, however,
I self-consciously employ the expression ‘interdependence theory’. This stems
from the definition by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner of ‘general theoreti-
cal orientations’ that ‘suggest relevant variable and causal patterns that provide
guidelines for developing specific research programs’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998:
646). As it is approached in this text, ‘interdependence theory’ offers relevant
variables, and suggests how they interrelate. Another qualification is in order
here. The concept of regime was originally conceived within a multilateral frame-
work to study negotiating patterns between more than two countries. However,
I depart from this framework and apply the concept of interdependence, and the
analytical tools thereof, to bilateral cooperative arrangements. As I will empha-
sise throughout the book, I employ the analytical tools exposed by realism, as
well as interdependence theory, with a significant degree of flexibility. The exer-
cise of adapting and combining different concepts and analytical frameworks is
intended to facilitate the answering of my initial questions.
2. It could be argued that another potential analytical tool for assessing how states
cooperate is game theory, which is concerned with analysis of the behaviour
of decision-makers whose choices affect each another. One of its better-known
problems is the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, for the sake of coher-
ence I will not elaborate on these approaches. For a discussion on how they have
been applied to IR, see, for example, Snidal (1985). The concepts that I borrow
from interdependence theory and from the work of Barnet and Duvall suffice to
answer my initial questions.
3. The reference to the realist strand of interdependence highlights the diver-
sity within this school of thought. Therefore, we ought to keep in mind that a
number of different perspectives can be identified under the general heading of
interdependence. For more on this, see Krasner (1995).
4. In the chapters to come, I will not use the concept of regime which has been
mainly applied to multilateral fora. For the purposes of coherence, I will focus
instead on other selected aspects, such as the notion of issue-linkages.
5. See also Sebenius (1983).
6. In broad terms, it is possible to associate neo-liberal institutionalism with ration-
alism, since the latter ‘places particular emphasis on the high-level order which
states can achieve in the context of anarchy’ (Linklater, 1990: 9), and neo-Marx-
ism with revolutionism, which ‘contends that a “cosmopolis” [ ... ] will realise the
moral potential of the species if already “immanent” within the international
system of states’ (Linklater, 1990: 9).
7. Hereafter the terms ‘realist tradition’, ‘realist doctrine’, ‘mainstream realism’ and
‘realpolitik’ are employed with the same meaning that I now define.
8. In this book I focus on the realist conception of power. Accordingly, it is not part
of the purpose of this book to assess the validity of other aspects of realist think-
ing, such as balance of power.
9. Waltz is considered to be the most prominent neo-realist (or structural realist)
scholar. His ideas have to be differentiated from realism. As Waltz reminds us,
218 Notes
‘neorealism retains the main tenets of realpolitik, but means and ends are viewed
differently, as are causes and effects’ (1988: 616). Waltz’s neo-realism suits our
purposes, since it challenges and transcends the Hobbesian claim that the life of
man is ‘nasty, brutish and short’, which is not relevant for this study. As Waltz
puts it, ‘neorealism rejects the assumption that man’s innate lust for power con-
stitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other’ (Waltz, 1988: 617).
Significantly, the neo-realist conception of power and the realist one build upon
the same assumption. As Waltz clarifies, ‘realist theory, old and new alike, draws
attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces
that fix the fate of states and their systems’ (Waltz, 1988: 624–5). These distinc-
tions between realism and neorealism should not detain us here. By and large,
the reader should know, however, that the realist definition of power presented
hereinafter is drawn from both realism and neo-realism. This book does not aim
to provide a rigorous consideration of political realism and power. This deliber-
ately eclectic usage of realism, I believe, helps me address my initial questions.
10. Although the debate on hard and soft power is a central one within IR scholar-
ship, I will not elaborate it extensively in this book. For more on this, see, for
example, Abnott and Snidal (2003) and Weaver (2005).
11. Paraphrasing Keohane and Nye (1977: 11).
12. As further evidence of the diverging viewes within the realist tradition, Waltz
would not subscribe to the zero-sum game argument. In his view, the charac-
teristics of great-power politics in a multi-polar world are ‘interdependence of
parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses’ (Waltz, 1988: 624).
13. These critics include Hudson (1977) and Cox (1979).
14. It goes beyond my initial purposes to illustrate the conceptual underpinnings of
this school of thought. In short, neo-liberalism centres on the notion of regimes
as social institutions. As Katzenstein et al., say, ‘where the neo-liberal institu-
tionalism research differed with realist argument was not on its assumptions
about actors, but rather on the nature of the exemplary problem in the interna-
tional system’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998: 663). While realism regards coercion and
power as the critical factors determining relative gains and distributional con-
flicts, neo-liberalism is concerned primarily with market failure, which could
be resolved through the voluntary acceptance of institutions (Katzenstein et al.,
1998: 663).
15. On the relational dimension of power, see also Hall (1997).
16. This comparison has already been elaborated by Guzzini (2004).
17. The literature on the ideational dimension of international relations is certainly
vast. Some of the many studies on this matter are: Goldstein and Keohane (1993),
Hall (1989) and Jervis (1976). It is also important to emphasize that my catego-
risation of Barnett and Duvall’s analysis (2004) as neo-liberal institutionalism
may appear problematic, given that they clearly differentiate their insights of
power from the one defined by neo-liberal institutionalism. Nevertheless, here
I take the view that their formulation builds upon and complements my view
of Barnett and Duvall. This justifies the categorisation proposed herein. The
same applies to my merging of constructivist reading of power with neo-liberal
institutionalism.
18. To be sure, all four concepts are insightful as much as analytically useful. Yet
for the purposes of coherence I consider the one that is more instrumental for
my initial purposes, i.e. productive power. Although I do not consider the other
three concepts that they elaborate, I fully uphold their belief that multiple
Notes 219
concepts of power generate a more robust understandings of international poli-

tics. Indeed, as it will emerge through the discussion, I ultimately put forward
an eclectic theoretical framework combining realism, constructivism and neo-
liberal institutionalism.
19. Here I paraphrase Linklater (1990: 2).
20. Notably, the attempt to expand the analytical terrain set by realism is not new
in the literature. For example, Linklater (1990), as well as Barnett and Duvall
(2005), have already pointed out that it is desirable to combine realist insights
with wider conceptions of power.
21. On a cautionary note, it must be noted that not all countries in the Southern
hemisphere fall within the category of ‘sending’ or ‘developing’ states. Therefore,
it is important to be aware that the terminology employed hereafter still suffers
from conceptual weaknesses
22. To be sure, this statement cannot be said to apply indiscriminately to the whole
Marxist school. For example, Linklater (1990) reminds us that neo-Marxism still
does not consider the state as a independent entity, since it defines it as part of
the capitalist system.
23. It is important to emphasise that not all scholars subscribe to this view. For
example, according to Doukre and Oger (2007: 2), externalisation implies bur-
den-sharing of the European frontiers with bordering countries.
24. Paraphrasing Hurrell and Woods (1995).
25. For a literature review of migration from the perspective of international rela-
tions theory during the 1980s, see Mitchell (1989).
26. Other pioneering discussions on migration and foreign policy include Cornelius
(1989); King (1983); Miller and Papademetriou (1983); Portes and Walton
(1981); and Miller (1979) with reference to the Algeria-Franco negotiations on
migration.
27. To be sure, a number of other authors have applied the concept of issue-linkages
to migration. See, for example, Fawcett (1989), as well as the Berne Initiative
Studies (2005). The analysis by Betts, however, remains distinctive since it elabo-
rates the concept of issue-linkage within the North–South framework.
3 Comparative analysis
1. For more on this, see Arboleya (1996) and Tulchin and Hernandez (1991).
2. The analysis of such four phases builds upon the work of Nackerud (1999).
3. For more on this, see Arboleya (1996) and Pedraza (1996).
4. The domestic crisis, according to the author, refers to the ‘economic downturn
and social unrest’ that Castro faced in the mid-1990s.
5. For the sake of precision, the categories developed by Hirschman are ‘exit’, ‘voice’
and ‘loyalty’. In addition, Colomer (2000) refers to ‘hostility’ as well.
6. An exploration of the economic embargo against Cuba goes beyond the purposes
of this discussion. For more on this, see Schwab (1999).
7. The Bracero programme was terminated in 1964 as a result of public opposition,
the US civil rights movement, and the effective lobbying of labour, Church and
ethnic groups.
8. The author quotes figures from the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service
(1993). A word of caution concerning these figures is in order. Espenshade
himself warns on the reliability of the data provided: ‘apprehensions data are
220 Notes
a conceptually inappropriate indicator because they measure undocumented

aliens who have failed in their attempt to enter the United States, whereas the
issue of general policy and research interest pertains to the number who suc-
ceeded. [ ... ] Not all aliens who enter the United States clandestinely are captured
by the Border Patrol’ (Espensahde, 1995: 198).
9. However, it must be noted that different accounts of this exist. According to
Hanson (2006: 870), between 1911 and 1925 680,000 legal migrants from
Mexico, representing 5 per cent of Mexico’s population in 1919, entered the US.
Be that as it may, Hanson also notes that ‘large-scale illegal immigration in the
United States is a relatively new phenomenon’ (Hanson, 2006: 870).
10. The programme was launched in 1961 and aimed to establish economic
cooperation between North and South America, in an effort to counter the
perceived communist threat posed by Cuba. For more on this, see Levinson
(1972).
11. It is not the aim of this chapter to address the linkage between the increas-
ing border control and border apprehensions. For more on this, see Cornelius
(2001).
12. It is noteworthy, however, that, according to recent estimates, remittances from
the US to Mexico have declined. Remittances for the first nine months of 2009
were down over 10 per cent compared with 2008, putting them on track to reach
a total of $22 billion for 2009. The New York Times on 16 November 2009 reported
on ‘reverse remittances’, that is, Mexicans in Mexico sending money to jobless
relatives in the US (Migration News, 2010a).
13. For more on this, see also Loescher and Scanlan (1986).
14. In this section, I shall focus on bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco,
and only marginal attention will be given to the role of the EU. This is not to
underestimate the relevance of the latter dimension, however. For an introduc-
tion on this, see Gillespie (2005).
15. This is not the place to elaborate on the extent to which Turkish authorities wish
to join the EU. Some commentators have pointed to the increasing scepticism
amongst the public and officials alike. For more on this, see Oguzlu (2004) and
Teitelbaum and Martin (2003).
4 Italy and migration

1. It is not my intention to provide a detailed analysis of migratory trends through-
out Italy, which would require a book-length examination eclipsing my own
research purposes. Hence, the following analysis to follow is by no means an
exhaustive one. For more accurate examinations, please see Monzini et al.,
(2004).
2. The same findings are confirmed by Sciortino – in the article in Monzini et al.,
(2004: 21). It is beyond the remit of this discussion to elaborate this point in
detail. However, it suffices to point out that an extensive discussion exists on
the changing pull and institutional factors that have influenced cross-Mediter-
ranean migration. For more on this, see Zimmerman (1995).
3. Arguably one of the factors that has had an impact on migrant flows has to do
with the financial crisis. This issue, however, goes beyond the purposes of the
present analysis. For more on this see OECD (2009a).
4. Hereafter ‘Senato’. Likewise, in the references, I will refer to the ‘Chamber of
Deputies’ as ‘Camera’.
Notes 221
5. Other interesting parameters could be the supposed linkage between migration

and terrorism, as well as the impact on employment figures. For an analysis of
these issues at European level, see Buonfino (2004b, 2004c); Canoy et al., (2006);
Collyer (2006).
6. Not all commentators agree with this view. Colombo and Sciortino (2004), for
example, dispute that a thorough analysis of the data suggests that immigration
into Italy did not begin in 1974.
7. For an account of the Italian jurisprudence and the differences between ‘laws’
and ‘decrees’ see Fameli and Socci (2007).
8. Other considerations than migration determine Italy’s relations with third coun-
tries. For the purpose of consistency, I do not elaborate on this aspect. For more
on this, see Colombo and Ronzitti (2008) and Holmes (1993). Neither do I elabo-
rate in detail Italy’s foreign policy agenda and its overall relations with the EU.
On this concern, see Balfour (2005) and Carbone (2008a). As a last precaution,
in this chapter I do not intend to suggest that the quota system and the readmis-
sion agreement derive solely from foreign policy considerations; economic and
demographic factors also influence Italy’s stance on migration. For a compara-
tive analysis on such issues at European level, see Stalker (2003).
9. An in-depth examination of the bargaining dynamics of the readmission agree-
ments and the costs and benefits for migrant-sending and receiving countries
may be found in Cassarino (2008).
10. However, Cuttitta also clarifies that ‘this was however in line with the decision
of reducing reserved shares for single countries and increasing reserved shares
for categories of countries, which made the instrument of reserved shares more
flexible’ (Cuttitta, 2007a: 8).
11. Interestingly the EU faced similar difficulties in convincing countries across
North Africa to sign readmission agreements. See for example PANA (13 March
2009).
5 Libya and migration

1. I am grateful to the conversations with Professor Lisa Anderson (on 13 May.2008)
as well as Professor George Joffé for these insights. Comprehensive historical
accounts can be found in St John (2008a) and Vandewalle (2006).
2. In this context, Northern Africa includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
The emphasis on the Libyan policies towards Arab versus African countries neces-
sitates two clarifications. First, it must be emphasised that the analytical distinc-
tion between the policies aimed at migrants from Arab countries versus those
targeted at sub-Saharan Africans is not without its problems. Undoubtedly, this
blunt distinction runs the danger of overlooking the subtleties and entangled
nature of Libyan migration rhetoric and actions. Nonetheless, it provides a fruit-
ful basis for exploring the extent to which migration through Libya has changed
over time and has been used as a strategic device in the two different political
contexts. For this reason, while maintaining this categorisation, in the course of
this chapter I will not only unravel the discrepancies and contradictions within
the two set of policies but also explore how they overlap and interrelate. Second,
Libya has historically also attracted migrants from Europe, the US and Asia; and
large communities from, inter alia, Italy, the UK, the US and the Philippines have
settled in Libya. Significantly, according to some scholars Libyan policies towards
these foreign communities confirm the initial hypothesis of this chapter on
222 Notes
migration being manipulated by the regime for political motives (Davies, 1987:
106). However, without denying the relevance of such migrant movements from
economic and political perspectives, for the purpose of coherence and because
of space limitations, this chapter concentrates on migrants from Africa.
3. The employment of foreigners for foreign-policy purposes is not limited to
migrants from Africa and people seeking asylum in Libya. For example, follow-
ing the killing of a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, allegedly by a Libyan
national, in 1983, four British citizens were detained in Libya. Terry Waite, the
envoy of the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, succeeded in estab-
lishing a contact with the Libyan Colonel, and eventually secured the release of
the hostages. For more on this see Barnes (1987). More recently, two Swiss nation-
als were detained in Libya after Hannibal Qaddafi, son of the Libyan leader was
administratively arrested on suspicion of assaulting hotel staff (Agence France
Presse, 1 August 2008). The more recent events of Libya denying to release visas
from Schengen countries as a response to the diplomatic dispute with Switzerland
is another case in point (Libyaonline, 20 February 2010).
4. This is confirmed also by Beauge and Burgat (1986), Birks and Sinclair (1978)
and De Haas (2006), who report that in 1975 the majority of expatriate work-
ers in Libya were from Arab countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, Palestine,
Lebanon, Sudan and Morocco). The only non-Arab countries were Pakistan
(accounting for 1.7 per cent of the total) and Yugoslavia (2.9 per cent).
5. At this point of the analysis, a cautionary note is required concerning the reli-
ability of the data on migrants either residing in or going through Libya. The
very exercise of calculating the number of foreigners in Libya is fraught with
difficulties. The lack of consistent figures provided by the Libyan government
is aggravated by the fact that there is little consensus among different non-
governmental sources on the size of migrant flows through Libya (Pliez, 2000).
Mindful of these shortcomings, I provide here a rough, yet by no means com-
plete, idea of the changing size of the foreign population in Libya since the late
1950s (Pliez, 2000). This exercise aims to set the basis for the core of this chapter,
which analyses Libya’s interaction with its neighbours.
6. Throughout the book I will use interchangeably the expressions ‘repatriation’,
‘return flights’, ‘expulsions’ and ‘readmission’ to refer to the practice of return-
ing migrants from Italy to Libya, as well as from Libya to third countries. An
account of the legal implications of this practice goes beyond my present pur-
poses. For more on this, see Cassarino (2007) and Schieffer (2003).
7. In a formal meeting of the Tunisian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Social
Affairs in March 1970, it was declared that ‘the emigration of labour-force abroad
is a necessity. Indeed the evaluation of our demographic structures compared
with our economic development capacity tells us that 270,000 people will be
unemployed in 1980. Hence the placement of Tunisians abroad appears to the
only possibility of providing them with an employment’ (Grimaud, 1994: 32).
8. However, according to Burgat and Laronde (1996: 105) the number of Tunisian
expelled was 100,000. Interestingly, the authors also specify that the precedent
had been set by Algeria towards Morocco in 1977.
9. Libya’s interaction with Arab and African countries is not limited, however, to
migration. For an account of the wider economic and political relations, see
Deeb (2000), Otayek (1986) and Solomon and Swart (2006).
10. As an illustration of the fact that there are no clear boundaries between the
Libyan approach to sub-Saharan Africa and Arab countries, it is noteworthy that
Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco joined CEN-SAD in 2001–2 (Sturman, 2003).
Notes 223
11. Different sources provide different data. For example, Young et al., (2007: 834)
report between 50 and 500 dead in the period between August and September
2000.
12. Anonymous interviews with Libyan officials in February 2008.
13. Anonymous interview on 29 September 2009.
15. Anonymous interviews on 29 September 2009 and 12 January 2010.
16. Anonymous interview on 6 February 2007.
17. Anonymous interviews on 12 January 2010.
18. Anonymous interview on 13 May 2007.
20. I selected the examples of Palestinian and Bosnian refugees; but they are by no
means the only cases of political manipulation of refugees by the Libyan gov-
ernment. For example, Pliez (2002) reports a third instance. In 1983 Qaddafi
welcomed Touareg refugees who were fleeing repression in Niger. Putatively, his
intention was to destabilise the ‘government’ in Niger. As a matter of fact, in
the course of a few years ‘une diaspora en communautés’ moved to the border
between Libya and Algeria. In particular, a large number of Touareg settled in
the Libyan towns of Sebha, Koufra and Tamanrasset (Pliez, 2002: 35). On this,
see also Bourgeot (1995).
21. On the issue of forced mass repatriations of Palestinians see Van Hear (1992).
22. Anonymous interviews on 24 May 2007 and 13 May 2007.
23. The Barcelona Process, launched by Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in
November 1995, brings together the 27 Members of the European Union and 12
Southern Mediterranean states to discuss economic, political, cultural and social
issues. For more on this see EC (2009a).
24. Five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor were imprisoned in 1999 for
supposedly deliberately infecting children with HIV in Benghazi, Libya. The
death sentence proclaimed by the Libya’s highest court became a major issue
in EU–Libyan relations. For more on this see Amnesty International (2007) and
Butler (2007).
25. Anonymous interview on 25 July 2006.
26. For a brief illustration of the AENEAS technical assistance fund, see Higazi
(2005).
27. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. However, the EU acknowledges the
difficulties in furthering the cooperation because of the weak institutional
capacity of the Libyan beneficiaries, the lack of clear sector strategies and
the possibility of insufficient cooperation from the Libyan authorities (EC,
2010: 20).
28. Qaddafi did not attend the first meeting of the Mediterranean Union on 12 July
2007. He justified his opposition on these grounds: ‘This is taking us for fools
[ ... ] We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the
African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to
go through Cairo and Addis Ababa (Reuters, 10 June 2008).
32. This figure, however, is disputed by other sources. According to the EU unem-
ployment in 2008 stood at 20.7 per cent (EC, 2010: 32).
33. As of March 2010, it remains to be seen whether the regime will commit to such
promises.
224 Notes
34. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007.

37. As evidence of the fact that Libya is increasingly serious about drug abuse in
November 2009 Libya signed a ‘host country agreement’ with the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to UNODC, the agreement
paves the way for the opening of a UNODC sub-regional office for the Maghreb
countries to be located in Tripoli (UNODC, 2009).
39. During the informal talks with police officers and representatives at the Libyan
Ministry of the Interior in January and May 2007.
40. Document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, January 2007.
41. Anonymous interview on 4 May 2007 in Tripoli, Libya.
42. The survey was conducted within the University of Garyounis in Benghazi.
Beyond the information that Obeidi provides, it is almost impossible to rigor-
ously assess Libyan public opinion because of the highly controlled and central-
ised political system and the total absence of a free press.
44. Anonymous interview on 4 June 2007. On this matter it is noteworthy that
throughout my research I could not actually find sound evidence of this linkage.
For more on this topic see Pargeter (2005).
45. On this matter, it is illuminating to comment on the manner in which the regime
has sought to fight domestic extremist groups. The most prominent of these
was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), established in 1995 and alleg-
edly associated with Al Qaeda (Gambill, 2005; Ronen, 2002b). In addition, the
LIFG was reported as having connections with extremist groups across Northern
Africa and the Middle East (Gambill, 2005). In the 1990s, Qaddafi had hundreds
of key members of the LIFG and other extremist groups arrested (Ronen, 2002b).
They were eventually sentenced in a mass trial in 2002, with two receiving
death sentences and others received life imprisonment (Pargeter, 2005). Recent
reports, however, document the persistence of extremists groups associated with
Al Qaeda and based in Libya (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 36).
46. Document provided by the Libyan Ministry of the Interior, January 2007.
47. However, the analysis by John Davies indicates that Qaddafi has never actually
sought to create a sense of Libyan nationhood as opposed to Arabness. In his
words, the Libyan leader ‘scarcely attached any notion of statehood to it [Arab
nationalism]. Qaddafi’s willingness to dissolve the Libyan state and his readiness
to amalgamate with Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Chad is a symptom of his uncer-
tainty about the boundaries of the nation and his indifference to the sovereignty
of the state – Libyan or other’ (Davies, 1987: 31).
6 Historical background on the agreements between

Italy and Libya
1. Quarta Sponda – ‘Fourth Shore’ – is the expression coined by Mussolini to refer
to Libyan territory, which added to the roughly three shores that Italy has along
the Adriatic, Tyrrenian and Ionian seas.
Notes 225
2. In October 1911, around 600 Italians were killed in what was considered to be
an ambush by the Libyan resistance. The Giolitti government responded with,
inter alia, massive deportation to the Italian islands of Ponza and Ustica and the
execution of thousands of Libyans (Del Boca, 2005).
3. In this book I will not analyse in depth the Libyan economy or its dependence
on oil revenues. For more on this, see Sandbakken (2006) and Vandewalle (1998,
2006).
4. Throughout the book I refer to them interchangeably as Italian ‘exiles’ or
‘repatriated’.
5. The issue of the indemnity claimed by the repatriated Italians will not be inves-
tigated in detail in this book. For more on this, see Segrè (1974), Sinagra (no date)
and Studio Legale Romano (2006).
6. The complexity of Libya’s ideology and social and political structures go beyond
my research purposes. For more on this, see Davies (1987) and Obeidi (2001).
7. For example, Libya provided weapons to the IRA. For more on this, see BBC
(14 August 2001) and Simons (1993).
8. The Lockerbie bombing refers to the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 on
21 December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 259 passengers and
crew, including 189 Americans, as well as 11 people on the ground. The United
States and Britain held Libya responsible for the bombing. For a detailed account
of this, see Matar and Thabit (2004). The Lockerbie bombing was followed, on
19 September 1989, by the bombing of the French airline UTA’s fight 772 over
Niger, killing 171 passengers and crew. For a brief account of this, see McNamara
(2007). The La Belle incident refers to the bombing the bombing of the La Belle
discothèque in Berlin on 5 April 1986, which killed three people (including two
US soldiers) and injured more than 200 other people (Jentleson and Whytock,
2005). As regards WMD, Libya was also reported to have built three chemical
weapons facilities in Rabta, Sebha and Tarhuna in the 1980s and 1990s. However,
in December 2003 Libya issued a statement announcing that it had agreed to dis-
mantle its WMD programmes (Bahgat, 2008).
9. The US designated Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. In 1982, an
embargo on oil exports was placed on the country, and in 1986, after the bomb-
ing in Berlin, Libyan government assets in US banks were frozen. In September
2004, President George W. Bush formally ended the US trade embargo on Libya
to reward it for giving up WMD, and two years later, in June 2006, he rescinded
Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (St John, 2008c). The UN
sanctions were imposed in 1988 against Libya for its refusal to hand over two
Lockerbie suspects. Subsequently, sanctions 748, 883 and 731 between 1992 and
1993 established a total air blockade and an arms embargo. Following the extra-
dition of the Lockerbie suspects, UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999
and finally lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted responsibility for the
Lockerbie bombing (Hurd, 2005). In 1986 the European Community agreed to
place an arms embargo on Libya (European Political Cooperation Presidency,
1986). The measures were partially abolished in 1999 and finally lifted in August
2004 (Fusacchia, 2005).
11. It is important to emphasise, however, that not all commentators agree with
this view. For example, according to Pioppi, ‘Italy did not cover a role as a pro-
tagonist in the diplomatic mediation that anticipates and follows the surrender
of the Lockerbie suspects and that marks the onset of Libya integration in the
international community. [ ... ] Italy had a role of simple walk-on part’ (Pioppi,
2002: 52).
226 Notes
12. For an in-depth analysis on the cultural collaboration see Rossi (2000).
14. However, according to Pioppi (2002) the signing of the agreement did not con-
stitute a formal breach of the international sanctions.
15. Expression used to refer to the construction of the coastal highway.
16. Anonymous interview on 25 January 2007. However ICE reports that the
agreement signed in August 2008 between Italy and Libya abolishes ALI (ICE,
2008).
18. Anonymous interview on 18 December 2006.
19. From Balbo, Italian Governor-General of Libya between 1933–34.
23. Such a forum includes the following countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco,
Mauritania and Tunisia, along with their counterparts from Spain, France, Italy,
Portugal and Malta (5+5 Dialogue, no date).
24. The interview with an undersecretary for Foreign Affairs documents that one
hospital was inaugurated in 2001 in Benghazi (interview conducted on 14
December 2006 in Rome). It was commissioned by INSO, an Italian company,
and amounted to €300 million (Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 April 2005).
25. Italietta literally means: the little Italy. The word has a deprecatory connotation.
26. In the same period, Qaddafi agreed to compensate the victims of the 1986 bomb-
ing in Berlin (Associated Press, 10 August 2004).
27. The following year, however, the Day of Revenge was reintroduced (Adnkronos,
11 October, 2005). As already illustrated in October 2008 the Day of Revenge was
replaced by the Day of Fulfilment.
29. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008.
30. Anonymous interview on 10 June 2007. As a matter of fact, the accord signed
in August 2008 explicitly referred to the formal apology of Italy for the colonial
past.
32. However, the BBC reported that it was the Italian Prime Minister’s decision not
to invite the Libyan leader (BBC, 10 December 2007a).
34. Anonymous interview on 3 March 2008. It is noteworthy that in the following
month, March 2008, Qaddafi gave a speech in which he famously declared that
all oil revenues would be distributed to the Libyan people and that the public
sector would be drastically reduced. For more on this see Al Qaddafi (2008a) and
ICE (2008).
35. Interview with high-ranking Libyan official at the Foreign Ministry 3 March
2008, Tripoli.
7 Joint Measures on migration

1. I will use the terms ‘reception camps’ and ‘centres’ with the same meaning. For
a critical analysis on the issues see Dentico and Gressi (2006).
2. According to the information made available by the Italian government, the
discussion with Schily focused not on the camps to be built in Libya, but rather
on those in a third country or an EU member state.
Notes 227
3. Among others, on the radio station Deutschlandfunk on 27 August 2004

(Dietrich and Vogelskamp, 2005).
4. Buttiglione’s ideas were subjected to substantial criticism (Melting Pot, 2005b). A
similar proposal known as ‘transit processing centres’ was put forward by Tony
Blair (Blair, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2006a: 94; Noll, 2003).
5. The idea of building centres to process asylum requests has been proposed by the
EU and, as of March 2010 it was still being negotiated as part of the framework
agreement (Human Rights Watch, 2009c).
11. For a detailed account of the camps built and managed by Libyan authorities to
detain irregular migrants see Fortress Europe (2008a).
12. These include, for example, the European Court of Human Rights, the EP and
UNHCR. See Amnesty International (2005b), Dietrich (2005) and Human Rights
Watch (2006a: 115–16).
15. As previously clarified in this book, I regard the terms ‘repatriation’, ‘expulsion’
and ‘return’ as having the same meaning.
16. For example, on the EU readmission agreements, see Statewatch (2003). For an
introduction to readmission agreements, see Collinson (1996).
17. There is significant inconsistency in the available data concerning repatriation.
For example, the website of the Forza Italia (no date) states that between 1998
and 2001 43,754 migrants were ‘expelled’ and that between 2001 and 2004 this
number grew to 65,483. The latter estimates do not correspond to those pro-
vided by the Minister of the Interior, who in September 2004 stated that 42,317
migrants had been either expelled or repatriated that year.
18. In January 2010 the Interior Minister declared that between 2008 and 2009 42,000
had been repatriated, which means, on average, less that the rates of the previous
year. In fact the Minister himself recognised that ‘many difficulties’ hampered
the implementation of such operations (Ministero dell’Interno, 2010b).
19. For a summary of the different appeals, see Human Rights Watch (2006a).
20. According to the text of the interrogation before the Tribunal, Pansa stated that,
even though Tobruk Airport would have been better because of its proximity to
the Egyptian border, the flights landed at Albeida Airport, not only because it is
bigger but also because Tobruk is not part of the Convention on International
Maritime Organisation.
23. According to the newswire Ansa, between June and July 2005 741 foreign nation-
als were flown out, ‘mainly’ to Libya (Ansa, 21 July 2005).
24. The total would be 1,863, which differs from the number provided by Libyan
authorities to Human Rights Watch and illustrates, once again, the dubious reli-
ability of the data available.
25. The same information emerges from another report by the EP following a visit to
Libya in April 2005 (Flautre, 2005).
26. It is important to stress, however, that, according to other sources, some of the
migrants who were repatriated from Italy were not taken back by air to their
228 Notes
countries of origin, but had instead to return by bus through the desert (Cuttitta,
2006: 189).
30. The word ‘respingimento’ literally means ‘repulsing’.
32. In January 2010 the case brought to the European Court of Human Rights was
archived. The decision was taken on the ground that it was impossible for the
Court to gather the necessary information on the particular circumstances of
the claimants (European Court of Human Rights, 2010: 10).
33. As already illustrated, Italy has signed and made publicly available readmission
agreements with other countries. The same is true of other European and non-
European countries. For example, in October 2005 Libya and the UK signed a
memorandum of understanding to facilitate deportation to Libya ‘of persons
suspected of activities associated with terrorism’; the text thereof is available
in the libraries of the House of Commons and House of Lords (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, 2005).
34. There is no evidence on the repatriations from Libya funded by Italy prior to
2003.
35. The report does not specify when these repatriations took place, but it can be
assumed that it was during 2003.
39. Anonymous interview on 10 February 2008 and 29 September 2009 in Tripoli,
Libya.
41. For example between 10 and 20 October the Eastern Sea Borders Centre led joint
patrols including forces from Cyprus, French, Germany, Malta, Spain, the United
Kingdom, Libya and EUROPOL. More precisely, nine Libyan officials were on
board ships of the Italian Navy to participate in the training and actual patrol-
ling (AGI, 21 October). It is noteworthy that, according to a statement of the
then president of the Schengen Commission, Di Luca, in May 2004, it appears
that the Italian–Libyan joint patrolling had already taken place and was deemed
successful.
42. The Frontex report (2006) confirms that in 2006 efforts were made for ‘conclud-
ing working arrangements’, but does not specify their outcomes.
43. The Terms of References of the Frontex mission state that one of the main objec-
tives of the visit was ‘possible EU assistance to Libya related to management of
its southern borders’ (Frontex, 2007: 21).This information was confirmed by the
members of the Libyan police that I interviewed. For example, it emerged from
informal talks I had with Osama El Sedik, Project Manager at the International
Organization for Peace, Care and Relief as well as other police staff. On the gen-
eral intention of the EU to patrol Libyan Southern borders see Agence France
Presse (6 June 2007).
48. Anonymous interviews on 2 March 2008 and 3 March 2008.
Notes 229

51. As a matter of fact the collaboration between Finmeccanica, and in particu-
lar its AugustaWestland is not new. Italo-Libyan defence cooperation stretches
back to at least 2006 when Finmeccanica, AgustaWestland and the Libyan
Company for Aviation Industry signed an agreement to form a joint venture
called Libyan Italian Advanced Technology Company (LIATEC) (Defence Wed,
2010).
54. The daily collaboration between the Italian and Libyan police has been con-
firmed by both parties during informal talks that I had with both Italian and
Libyan officials in Libya in June 2007.
56. For an account of the expression employed by IOM, i.e. ‘stranded migrant’, and
the people falling under the IOM mandate, see Perruchoud (1992).
57. In 2007, for example, out of the €2 million allocated by the EU, Italy provided
€700,000 (Il Corriere della Sera, 30 December 2007).
58. What follows is a summary of the two interviews with Laurence Hart, 16 January
2007 and 4 May 2007, Tripoli.
60. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. The practice of IOM to support vol-
untary return has been the focus of much controversy (Gosh, 2000b). For a
general introduction to EU policies on return, see Cassarino (2006b) and IOM
(2004).
65. Anonymous interview on 1 October 2009.
66. However, according to Cuttitta, under a legislative amendment of 2002 naval
ships were also allowed to board vessels suspected of transporting undocu-
mented migrants outside Italian territorial waters (Cuttitta, 2007a: 6).
67. Anonymous interview on 15 January 2007 in Tripoli, Libya.
8 Analysis of externalisation in the Italian–Libyan context

1. An article pointing out the difficulty of obtaining tourist visas is Solomon (2006).
A further illuminating example of the random character of visa procedures is the
case of 3,000 tourists on a cruise boat who were denied permission to visit Tripoli
because of a newly implemented law requiring Arabic translation of passports
(Il Corriere della Sera, 14 November 2007).
2. The same information was confirmed in interviews with two Italian parlia-
mentarians (on 12 July 2006, and 8 February 2007 in Rome, Italy) who were in
Lampedusa while the return flights were being carried out.
3. This is not to deny, however, that Italy and Europe have in fact influenced Libya’s
stance on migration. As such, the recent surge on repatriations conducted may
partly owe to Libya’s willingness to yield to the requests of Italy and demon-
strates that it is serious about migration (Collucello and Massey, 2008; Paoletti,
2008).
230 Notes
4. Neither the elite interviews conducted in Italy and Libya nor the official docu-
ments and secondary resources indicate that the initial idea of these centres was
to process asylum requests.
5. I was given detailed lists of the Italian-funded return flights from Libya to third
countries as well as other internal documents commenting on the Italian–Libyan
dialogue. Furthermore, without my even asking, the Libyan police gave me the
opportunity of visiting a migrant detention camp in Tripoli, whose director was
particularly eager to talk about the problems concerning the management of
these centres.
6. This comparison is not problem-free. Arguably, you cannot really compare the
undocumented arrivals to Sicily to the annual quotas because the latter, unlike
the first, respond to particular economic considerations based on the job market.
Hence, even if the first is much lower than the second, it may still be a problem
beyond control, as many politicians and media contend. Nonetheless, it could be
argued that both undocumented arrivals in Italy, and those arrivals who enter
annually through the quota system, are low-skilled and hence do not differ sig-
nificantly. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 4 the regularisation programmes
that the Italian government has sponsored may suggest that the overall undocu-
mented population in Italy may not be so unwanted, and, more significantly,
may not represent such a significant threat to Italian society and its economy as
it is often purported to do.
7. At this point, the analysis demands a note of caution concerning the provenance
of the migrants. Among others, Cinzia Gubbini, a journalist for the Italian news-
paper Il Manifesto, questions whether most migrants come from Libya as the offi-
cial Italian sources claim. She suggests that this might not always be the case.
During an interview, Gubbini pointed out that, in October 2004, two weeks before
the arrivals of over 1,000 migrants to Lampedusa, supposedly from Libya, a boat
of migrants was recorded close to the Tunisian cost. Nonetheless, interviews with
Italian officials from the Ministry of the Interior whom I interviewed contended
that supposedly clear parameters existed to establish the provenance of the boat
carrying migrants. On the basis of the evidence of smuggling networks based in
Libya (Colluccello and Massey, 2007), its geographical proximity to Italy, the offi-
cial agreements that Italy signed with other Northern African countries deterring
migrants from leaving, as well as the large migrant population living in Libya,
I take the view that the argument of Gubbini remains unconfirmed. This, how-
ever, is not to deny tout court the fact that a small proportion of undocumented
migrants arrives by boats to Italy from countries other than Libya. For example,
on March 2007 it was reported that a growing number of boats from Algeria
reaches the Italian region of Sardinia (Magharebia, 9 March 2007).
8. Hence not just to Sicily but other southern Italian shores, such as Puglia,
Calabria and Sardinia. The high number in the late 1990s is due to migration
from Albania. On this, see, for example, Bonifazi and Sabatino (2003).
9. As a further note on the questionable reliability of the data, the report on secu-
rity produced by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri for the year 2009
reports that the arrivals to Lampedusa in 2007 amount to 30,657 (Presidenza
del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2010: 89). This does not correspond to the figures
for the same year provided by the same organisation elsewhere (Presidenza del
Consiglio dei Ministri, 2009) and used herein.
10. On the issue of economic integration of foreign nationals, see, for example,
the yearly report produced by Caritas (2005) and (2006b). Further, it might be
argued that the migrants crossing the sea should be differentiated from those
Notes 231
entering Italy as part of the national quota. Arguably, the former, unlike the
latter, do not necessarily respond to the specific labour force demand. Yet this
cannot be correct, given that the migrants benefiting from the quota system and
the regularisation are de facto often those already residing in Italy with irregular
status (Ministero dell’Interno, 2006c).
11. It is important to stress that this stance stems partly from the significant loss of
life that migration from Libya involves. For an account of this aspect, see Fortress
Europe (2008a).
12. Anonymous interview on 16 January 2007. The same point is supported by
Caritas (2005: 129) and Coslovi and Piperno (2005: 23).
13. Furthermore, the figures mentioned in the latest Frontex report (2007) differ
from those provided by the Libyan authorities. According to the first, ‘during
2006, the Libyan authorities had apprehended 32,164 illegal migrants and had
repatriated 53,842 during the same period’ (Frontex, 2007: 10).
14. As a further confirmation of the errors included in the data available, such fig-
ures are much higher than the supposedly comprehensive figures for deporta-
tions and arrests by Libyan authorities. In principle, the latter should be higher
than the former. Yet the opposite is the case.
15. This is not to deny the humanitarian challenge that the arrival of undocumented
migrants to Italian southern shores poses to the Italian reception system. For a
critical analysis of this, see Andrijasevic (2006a).
16. Anonymous interview on the phone 23 March 2007.
17. Anonymous interview on 28 August 2007.
22. According to the representative of the Italian Ministry of the Interior in Libya,
19 Libyans arrived at Lampedusa in 2005 and 50 in 2006. Anonymous interview
on 23 January 2007.
25. It goes beyond my initial purposes to assess why Italy has taken this policy line
and corroborated a discourse that has proved to be counterproductive at best.
One possible explanation has to do with electoral politics. For more on this, see
Bigo (2002).
9 Implications for international relations theory

1. For a more in-depth discussion of interest, see Burchill (2005) and Finnemore
(1996).
2. This distinction is inspired by the work of Hein de Haas (2007: 58–61) and
Hamilton (1997), who discuss the ‘secret’ interests of states with regard to migra-
tion. On the study of state interests with regard to migration, see also Baradello
(2007: 41).
3. With regard to Italy, and in particular to the fact that there is limited commu-
nication between different ministries, see Pargeter (2001: 7–6). I do not explore
this point further, since I could not find more substantive evidence for such a
discrepancy with regard to migration policies specifically.
4. The lack of collaboration between ministries has already been noted in
Chapter 1.
232 Notes
5. This emerged in the course with numerous discussions with Libyan police offi-
cials in May 2007 and February 2008.
6. For a summary of all the recent contracts signed by different countries in Libya
see Cometto (2008).
7. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the extent to which Qaddafi has
succeeded in building a sense of national identity. For more on this, see Obeidi
(2001).
8. The corollary to this argument is that if Italy made no secret of this inclusiveness
and moderated its security ‘paranoia’, it would be able to deny Libya the extra
lever that derives from this very restrictive policy line. This consideration, how-
ever, belongs to the realm of speculative prescription, which takes us outside my
purposes.
10. It is not my intention to review in detail the literature on cost-benefit analy-
sis. Some of the works within the IR literature in this connection include Jervis
(1992), Levy (1992) and Nye (1967). In this chapter, I focus on selected aspects
relevant to our initial purposes, and it should be noted that I will use the expres-
sions cost/benefit and gain/loss interchangeably.
11. In this context, I elaborate concepts that have been discussed with reference to
regimes. Arguably, the interdependence dynamics within regimes are distinct to
those in a bilateral dialogue. However, as I suggested in Part I of the book, the
conceptual framework proposed by regime theorists may also prove instructive
for the study of bilateral negotiations.
12. The criticism with regard to human rights that Qaddafi’s trip to Europe pro-
voked is instructive. For example, the French Foreign Minister refused to meet
the Libyan leader (Reuters, 14 December 2007). Likewise, while the meeting
between Rice and Qaddafi on 5 September 2008 was regarded by many as an his-
toric turning-point (BBC, 6 September 2008), it was also criticised as legitimising
a regime still deemed undemocratic (Human Rights Watch, 2008c). For example,
Joe Biden, US vice-presidential nominee, expressed reservations on account of the
persistent lack of freedom and political prisoners (The Independent, 5 September
2008).
13. One of the losses that could be ascribed to Libya is the domestic problems caused
by increasing irregular migration. However, as shown in Chapter 4, this is not
necessarily related to the bilateral negotiations with Italy.
14. Among others, one controversy concerned the manner in which Libyan authori-
ties repatriated the undocumented migrants flown from Italy to third countries.
See, for example, Gatti (2006a, 2006b).
15. For example, the peculiar decision-making structure, whereby significant deci-
sions have to be approved by the Leader, was mentioned during an anonymous
interview on 2 March 2008.
16. This sentence paraphrases Betts (2004: 45).
17. This is a concept developed by Keohane and Nye (1977: 13–15).
18. The non-unified nature of the state, epitomised in the multiple nature of its
motives, highlights another potential weakness of the realist tradition, which
assumes the state to be a unified actor and overlooks its internal dynamics. In
this book, however, I refrain from addressing this point, since it would demand
an in-depth analysis of the realist definition of state and an empirical over-
view of the multiple actors influencing Italian and Libyan rethoric and policy
actions.
Notes 233
19. The linkage between power and knowledge has already been explored by
realist authors. For example, Nicolò Machiavelli, and E. H. Carr rather more
recently, recognised the role of ideology and ideas as power resources. Thus we
are reminded once more about the limits of the definition of realism, which I
presented in Chapter 1. Yet my underlying point still stands: the constructivist
work of Barnett and Duvall raises questions and provides analytical tools that are
useful for my research and have been neglected by mainstream realist scholars
(Hall, 1997).
20. Of course, to this figure we ought to add those losing their lives when crossing
the Mediterranean. According to Fortress Europe, since 1988 12,955 migrants
have died. This figure includes migrants leaving different Northern African
countries and not just Libya (Fortress Europe, 2008c).
21. This reflection raises a set of more substantial questions. In defining migration
as a threat, what are policy-makers seeking to defend? What makes policy-mak-
ers take such a securitised stance towards migration? What conception of state
and of state interest underlines such an alarmist and counterproductive view?
Are we talking about a perceived or a real threat? Not only would it be interesting
to analyse what is real as opposed to constructed, but also there is the question
of what the state is seeking to preserve and how this fits within the realist credo.
This question opens up a series of issues concerning the complex process of iden-
tifying and defining state interests, and the extent to which states motives are
rational and coherent within an overarching conception of state interest. Yet
while addressing such questions is crucially important, it transcends the pur-
poses of this book. In other words, for the purposes of coherence I shall refrain
from addressing such questions, and instead invite future researchers to do so in
the specific context of Italian–Libyan relations.
22. These reflections belong to the realm of pure speculation. As such, their purpose
here is to furnish a circumspect and impressionist account of the implications
that issue-linkages yield within the larger framework of power relations.
23. Morgenthau himself also argues that politics is influenced by irrational/emo-
tional elements which may deviate from rationality (Morgenthau, 1946).
24. This is not the place to discuss the contested meaning of developing countries
and the different terminologies that have been employed. For more on this, see,
for example, Edwards (1989) Escobar (1995) and Fawcett and Sayigh (1999: 5–6
and 15–33). This issue has also been discussed in Chapter 1.
25. While keeping in mind these critical caveats, I will continue to use the expres-
sion in the final chapter.
10 Conclusion
1. I am grateful to Professor Lisa Anderson for sharing this idea with me.
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Index
Accession negotiations to the European Bush, George

Union, 50–3 On Mexico, 42–3
African Union, 87, 97, 137, 187, 190, 223 On the embargo on Libya, 225
Al Mukhtar, Omar, 110, 136 On the war on terror, 100, 123
Al Obeidi, Abdulati, 10, 11, 131, 133, 153
Al Qaeda, 66, 100, 224 Calderón, Felipe, 43
Albania, 67, 125, 143, 176, 230 Cameroon, 12
Algeria, 36, 48, 81, 82, 84, 114, 143, 162, Camps
191, 219 During colonial time, 89, 109–110
Amato, Giuliano, 68, 72, 73, 132, 147, For migrants in Italy, 72, 134
153, 160 For migrants in Libya, 87, 93, 139–43,
Amensty of migrants, see under 147, 193, 195
Regularisations Managed by IOM in Libya, 162
Amnesty International, 148 Canada, 51
Andreotti, Giulio, 113–15, 201 Canary Islands, 47
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 82, 85 Caritas, 61–4
Association of the Italians Repatriated Castro, Fidel, 37, 39–40, 205
from Libya (AIRL), 113, 129 Castro, Raul, 38
Asylum, 79, 90–4 CEN-SAD, 85–6, 222
see also under Refugees Centres for migrants, see under Camps
Azienda Libico Italiana (ALI), 117 Ceuta, 46–8
Aznar, José María, 46–7 China, 200
Citizenship
Balseros Crisis, 37–9 In the Italian context, 65, 70, 73
Barcelona Declaration, see under In the Libyan context, 82, 137
Barcelona Process In US-Mexican relations, 43
Barcelona Process, 95–7, 119, 126, 182, Clinton, Bill, 36, 38, 205
190, 223 Clinton, Hillary, 43
Benghazi, 89, 99, 115, 130–1, 134, 223, Cold War, 33, 45, 51, 116, 195, 207, 209
224, 226 Colonial
Berlusconi, Silvio, 65, 71–4, 121–31, Period, 108–16
134–6, 195 Recompensation, 113, 121, 124–5,
Bevin-Sforza, agreement, 111 135, 172, 193–4, 195, 199
Big gesture, 117, 122, 132, 182, 191 Communism, 36–9, 45, 220
Blair, Tony, 227 Community of Sahel-Saharan States
Border, concept of, 2–7, 29–34, 169–74 (COMESSA), see under CEN-SAD
Bossi-Fini Law, 67–72 Complex interdependence, 19–21, 33,
Bracero programme, 41, 219 181, 185, 198–206
Braudel, Fernand, 80 Convention against torture, 91
Brussels, 126, 191 Convention on refugee problems in
Bulgarian nurses, 95–6, 132, 223 Africa, 90
Burden-sharing, 5, 30, 53, 172, 216, 219 Cooperation, in International Relations,
Burden-shifting, see under 4, 20–1, 32–4, 78, 204–8
Burden-sharing Cost-benefit analysis, 21, 192–5
295
296 Index
Council of Europe, 49, 148 In relation to migration in Libya, 98

Council of the European Union, 94–5, In relation to migration in Mexico, 44
128, 197, 215 In relation to migration in Spain, 49
Criminality ENI, 113–14, 119, 128, 132–3, 136, 141,
In the Italian context, 62–7, 73, 76 189, 199
In the Libyan context, 98–9 European acquis, 47, 51–3
In Turkey, 51–2 European Commission, 94–7
Cuba, 36–40 European Council, see under Council of
Cyrenaica, 109, 111 the European Union
European Court of Human Rights,
D’Alema, Massimo, 68, 119, 120, 131–3, 144–5, 148–50, 165
191 European Neighborhood Policy, 190
Decreto-flussi, 70–2, 77 European Parliament, 148, 180
Democracy European-Mediterranean Partnership,
Industrial democracies, 39 96, 116, 119, 190, 223
Lack of, 232 Expulsions, see under Deportation
Liberal democracy, 178, 215 External dimension, European, see under
Of the masses, 113 Externalisation
Demography, 77, 109, 221 Externalisation
Dependencia, see under Dependency theory In the Italian-Libyan context, 169–83
Dependency theory, 31 Theoretical debate, 28–31, 33
Deportation Towards Morocco, 47–50
During colonial times, 109 Towards Turkey, 51
In international relations, 33
In Italy, 69–73, 143–51 Fascism, 109, 136, 200
In Libya, 82–9, 93, 127 Fiat, 119
In the US, 41, 45 Fini, Gianfranco, 67–72, 129, 136
Detention Finmeccanica, 119, 157–8, 228
During colonial times, 110 First World War, 41
In Italy, 71, 76 Fletcher, Yvonne, 222
In Libya, 87, 91–2, 101, 141–2, 157, Fortress Europe, 59, 77
216, 230 Fox, Vicente, 43–4
In the US, 38 Framework agreement (between Libya
De-territorialisation, 29, 169, 173 and the European Union), 7, 95–6,
see also under Externalisation 200
Development aid, 2, 30, 34, 49, 74–6, 213 France, 36, 61, 117, 133, 193, 226
Dini, Lamberto, 116, 118–21 Frattini, Franco, 95, 153–4
Dini decree, 69 Friendship Treaty (between Italy and
Discourse analysis, 6, 8–15, 26–9, Libya), 138, 139, 153, 157, 164, 179,
50–104 183, 188, 193–5
Frontex, 7, 52, 84, 96, 153–5, 171,
Education 180–2, 228
and migration in Italy, 69 Frontier, see under Border, concept of
and migration in Libya, 97
Egypt, 111, 142–7, 150, 160, 222 Gaddafi International Charity and
Eisenhower, Dwight David, 36–7 Development Foundation, 134, 155
El Salvador, 44–5 Gas pipeline, 119, 127–8, 133, 184, 188,
Embargo, see under Sanctions 191
Employment Gaza Strip, 93–4
In relation to migration in Italy, 64, Geneva Convention on the status of
71–2 refugees, 90, 95, 140, 147
Index 297
Ghana, 36, 87, 89, 151 In the Italian context, 63, 110–15, 121
Giolitti, Giovanni, 109–10, 225 In the Libyan context, 79, 85, 102
Greece, 52–3 In the Moroccan context, 48, 54
Green Book, 113 International aid, see under
Greenstream, see under Gas pipeline Development aid
Guardia di finanza, 155, 163 International Centre for Migration
Guatemala, 44 Policy Development (ICMPD), 91
Guest-workers, 41 International Organization for Peace
and Relief (IOPCR), 91
Hammarberg, Thomas, 59 International Organization of Migration,
Health 84, 89, 96, 99, 160–2, 229
And migration in Italy, 64, 69–70 International protection, 30, 44, 51,
And migration in Libya, 88, 98–101 90–4, 120, 140, 144, 164, 181
Highway, coastal, 115, 122–5, 129–35, Intolerance, 65
182, 191 Iran, 51, 61, 94, 129
see also Big gesture Iraq, 51, 83, 91, 94, 125
Historic gesture, see under Big gesture, Irish Republican Army (IRA), 225
Highway, coastal Islamic extremism, 66, 129
HIV/AIDS, 88, 100, 101, 116, 223 Israel, 83, 93
Hobbes, Thomas, 218 Issue-linkages, 20–1, 34, 185, 198–203,
Honduras, 45 207, 209
Human rights, 30, 59, 73, 89, 140, Istituto Commercio Estero (ICE), 117
143–4, 149–52, 162–4, 171, 193–5, Italian National Institute for Statistics
197, 200 (ISTAT), 61–2
Human Rights Watch, 73, 88–90, 147, Italian Refugee Council (CIR), 91
149, 164, 178, 180
Human trafficking, 76 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 41
Keohane, Robert, 20, 22, 34, 217, 218
Ideas in IR theory, 26–7, 196–8, 204–6,
214 La Belle, bombings at, 113, 225
Identity Labour market
Identity politics, 211 In Italy, 60, 62, 68, 71, 73–5, 77,
National identity, 9, 26, 189, 232 211, 230
In relation to migration, 65, 100–1 In Libya, 80–4, 86, 89, 98, 102
In relation to migration policies and In Spain, 49
power relations, 196–7, 211 In the US-Mexican context, 44
Identity cards, 40, 69, 81, 84, 88, 90–1 Lampedusa, 114, 123, 127, 143–50, 160,
Idris, King, 111–12 175–6, 180–1, 230
Illiberal practices, on migration, 77 Landmines, 110, 113, 115–16, 120
Immigration Liaison Officers, 30, 42, Latin America, 27, 31, 36–45
75, 125, 159, 170 Law
Independence, of Libya, 109–11 International law, 30
Indonesia, 36 In Italy, 67–76
Inequality, 4, 16, 27–8, 31–4, 206, 209–14 In Libya, 81–94, 98, 109, 114
Integration, 63–4, 67, 69, 85, 94, 100, 230 In the US-Mexican context, 41, 43–7
Interdependence, 6–7, 16, 19–21, 27, 33, In Turkey, 51
55, 181, 192, 196–208 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),
Interests 224
In International Relations, 20–3, 32 Libya’s National Oil Company (NOC),
In the bilateral context, 128, 136, 137, 119, 133, 189
186–92 Linklater, Andrew, 21, 25, 28
298 Index
Literacy, 101 Obama, Barack, 38, 43

Lockerbie bombing, 94, 100, 113, 118, Oil, 15, 48, 68, 80, 94, 98, 107–19, 135,
126, 225 181, 184, 189–91, 200, 225, 226
Lome Declaration, 87 Ottoman period, 108
Outsourcing, 174
Maghreb, 50, 61, 80–5, 102
Malaysia, 36 Palestine, 91, 93, 222
Mali, 151 Palestinian doctor, see under Bulgarian
Malta, 88, 114, 143, 152–3, 171 nurses
Manpower, 50, 83, 84, 161 Pan-Africanism, 86–7
Mariel Crisis, 37–9 Pan-Arabism, 81, 86
Marina Militare, 164 Pateras, 49
Maroni, Roberto, 65, 76, 139, 169, 171 Petrol, see under Oil
Martelli Law, 69 Pisanu, Giuseppe, 65, 66, 123, 126–9,
Marxism, 27–31, 219 139–41, 149–50, 153, 158, 174, 179
Marxist-leninism, 31 Political realism, 22–8, 185, 202,
Mass expulsions, see under Deportation 211–12, 218
Mauritania, 82, 83, 226 Population, 24, 27, 32, 60–2, 65, 80–5, 99,
Media, 8–12, 49, 60–3, 77, 126, 152, 176, 143, 175, 177–9, 197, 210, 222, 230
216, 217, 230 Poverty, 27, 75, 203
Mediterranean Union, 97, 190, 223 Power
Melilla, 46–8 Hard power, 15, 24–5, 28, 196, 198,
Mexico, 40–6, 220 202–3, 212, 218
Middle East, 50, 51, 62, 102, 115, 126, Productive power, 26–7, 43, 185,
202, 224 196–8, 202, 207, 212, 218
Mobility, 1–2, 80, 85 Soft power, 25, 38, 212, 218
Morgenthau, Hans J., 22–5, 202 Prisoner’s Dilemma, 217
Muslim, 83, 94, 99 Prisons in Libya, 12, 87, 89, 95, 165,
Mussolini, Benito, 224 223, 224
see also under Detention
Nasser, Gamal Abd, 81, 129 Prodi, Romano, 72, 108, 126, 131–4,
Nationality 191, 195
In Italy, 140, 151 Public opinion, 63–5, 77, 93, 216
In Libya, 81, 90, 92, 146 Push-backs, 136, 163–5
In Morocco, 47, 75
Neo-liberal institutionalism, 19, 21, 25, Qaddafi, Hannibal, 222
28, 211, 217, 218 Qaddafi, Muammar, 134–7, 153, 180, 184,
Neo-marxism, 21, 27–8, 211, 217, 219 189–93, 196–7, 199, 203–4, 213, 216
Neo-realism, 218 Qaddafi, Saif, 134
Nicaragua, 45 Quarta sponda, 108, 224
Niger, 85, 87, 151, 153, 162, 223, 225
Nigeria, 89, 98, 143, 151 Readmission agreement
Non-refoulement, 30, 148, 150–1, Between Italy and Libya, 9, 30, 126,
171–2 131, 143–51
North American Free Trade Agreement Between Italy and third countries,
(NAFTA), 42 74–8
North-South, 25–8, 31–4, 203–8, 209, Between Morocco and Spain, 46, 48
212–14 Between Turkey and the EU, 52
Nuclear weapons, 126 Reagan, Ronald, 37, 115
Nye, Joseph, 20, 24–6, 217 Realpolitik, 23–4, 196, 202, 217–18
Index 299
Refugees, 5, 32–9, 45, 51, 53, 90–4, 95, In the Italian-Libyan context, 130,
139–41, 165, 204, 215, 223 158–9, 170–4, 182–3, 187, 190,
see also under Asylum 196–8
Regularisations, 60, 68, 70–3, 77, 181, In the Morocco-Spain context, 48–9
210, 231 In the US-Mexican context, 41–2
Remittances, 2, 44, 49, 215, 220 Siala, Mohammed, 10, 131, 146
Rentier state, 112 Smuggling networks, 29, 47, 51, 69, 149,
Reparations, see under Colonial, 159, 160, 180–1, 187–8, 194–5
Recompensation Somalia, 12, 89, 91
Resettlement, 51 South Africa, 114
Respingimento, 150, 228 South-to-South migration, 1, 80–5
Revolution Soviet Union, see under Russia
Cuba’s, 37 Spain, 46–50, 54, 61, 133, 204–5, 207,
Libya’s, 81, 83, 100, 101, 112–13, 123, 211, 214, 228
135, 184 Statistics, 1, 60–1, 67–8, 99, 139, 162,
Mexico’s, 41 175–6
Rice, Condoleeza, 193, 232 Stranded migrants, 229
Riots, in Libya in 2000, 87, 89 Sub-Saharan Africa, 46, 50, 62, 66, 79,
Rogue state, 94, 114, 116, 123, 138, 201 80, 85–90, 91, 146, 161, 188–9, 213,
Rome, 10, 11, 72, 110, 116, 119, 120, 221, 222
125, 133, 136, 159, 170 Sudan, 81, 83, 85–6, 91, 142, 151, 222
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 41 Surveillance, 30, 52, 59, 73, 77, 89, 153,
Russia, 51, 191 172–3
Switzerland, 102, 137, 143, 222
Said, Edward, 189
Salinas, Carlos, 42 Technology, 30, 42, 59, 114, 116, 146,
Sanctions 162, 218, 229
American sanctions, 113, 193, 201, Territory, 2–5, 24, 29–30, 53, 68, 93,
225 108, 140–1, 150, 164, 170, 172, 175,
European sanctions, 113, 115, 127, 182, 195, 224
191, 193, 201, 225 Terrorism
On Mauritania, 83 International, 3, 29, 49, 120, 124, 192,
UN sanctions, 100, 113, 117, 118, 120, 196, 199
193, 201, 225 Libya sponsored, 113, 126, 225
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 97 In relation to migration, 66, 99–100,
Scaroni, Paolo, 133 221
Schengen In the bilateral collaboration, 128–32,
System, 5, 52–3, 102, 137, 170 136, 158, 173
Treaty, 69 Trafficking, 136, 142, 154, 156–60
Visas, 51, 222 Transit migration, 5, 30, 46, 48–51, 74,
Second World War, 111 77, 153, 155, 188, 196–7, 212
Securitisation, 3, 21, 28, 34, 65, 80 Trans-Saharan, 80, 82, 188
Security Tunisia, 75–6, 80, 81–3, 87, 114–15, 152,
In international relations, 9–10, 20, 160, 221, 230
23–8, 204–11 Turco-Napolitano law, 69–70
In Italy, 64–8, 73, 77 Turkey, 50–4, 62, 112
In Libya, 80, 85, 87–102
In relation to migration policies, 3, 6, UNCHR, 1, 47, 51, 90–4, 98, 148, 164,
13–15, 29–30, 59–60 171
In the EU-Turkish context, 53 Unemployment, see under Employment
300 Index
United Kingdom, 61, 111, 162, 225 Waldner Ferrero, Benita, 95

United States, 36–45, 61, 83, 100, 111, Wallerstein, Immanuel, 31
225 Waltz, Kenneth, 23–4, 186
United States of Africa, 86 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
UTA bombing, 113, 225 94, 113, 126, 225
West Bank, 93
Vatican, 108, 147 Western Sahara, 46, 48
Visas World Bank, 98, 101, 215
In the Cuban-US context, 37–8 World System theory, 25, 27
In the Morocco-Spain context, 46
In the Turkish-EU context, 51 Xenophobia, 65, 73
To Italy, 69, 177
To Libya, 81–6, 102, 113, 117, Yugoslavia, former, 61, 94
123–5, 128–9, 137, 146, 170,
222 Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 47
To the EU, 30 Zawiya, 87

Emanuela Paoletti (Auth.) - The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities - The Case of Italy and Libya-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2010)

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The Migration of Power and North–South Inequalities

The Migration of Power and

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List of Illustrations viii

1 Introduction and Methodology 1

Part I Theoretical Background and Comparative Analysis

Part II Migration Discourses and Practices in Italy and Libya

Part III Empirical Analysis of the Bilateral Agreements on

Part IV Externalisation of Migration Control Measures and

5.1 Crimes committed by foreign nationals in

4.1 Annual migration quotas 1996–2009 70

PSOE Socialist Party in Spain

1.1 Setting the scene

actual volume of international migration, which is actually not so different

The recent securitisation of migration policy across the European Union

1.2 Hypothesis and research questions

To ground this larger discussion of border and inter-state power relations, I

policies outside their territory, and the evolving patterns of North–South

Similarly, with specific reference to Libya, Human Rights Watch notes:

Yet, contrary dynamics, whereby the migrant-sending country is capable

The limited focus on state actors and, in particular, on Italian–Libyan

unknown. Yet it is expected to emerge as a significant strategic player in the

1.3 Research methodology

1.3.1 Discourse analysis

In mainstream linguistics, the dominant definition of discourse focuses on

interlocutor to explain his/her involvement with, and share his/her opin-

1.4 Structure of the book

The third argument acts as a bridge to the analysis in Chapter 9, and I

power relations. Hence, on the one hand this consideration corroborates

Locating the study of migration within the North–South debate impli-

2.2 Why complex interdependence?

This research is approached through the lens of IR theory. In particular,

that collaboration is carried out (Haas, 1994: 381). According to Keohane

depends on the congruence of interests, as well as on the mediation of

2.3 Definition of the key concepts

Having illustrated the fundamentals of interdependence theory and

theories. Nevertheless, his line of argument, bridging the linkage between

2.3.1 Political realism

that encompasses authors with profoundly different conceptions of interna-

The realist tradition is to be seen as a spectrum of ideas of varying hues

Along the same lines, Guzzini writes that:

Having nearly as many realisms as realist protagonists [ ... ] produces

Most of all, the indeterminacy of its central concept of power epitomises

2.3.2 Power in international relations

As Waltz notes, power is defined as a function of the capability of the state:

Material capabilities define the strength of actors and their capacity to

1. Power provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of

First, power is less tangible because it is located in ‘the context in which

In other words, productive power is linked to diffuse and generalised social

and challenge pre-existing orders. By employing the concept of productive

2.3.3 Externalisation of migration policies

Effective frontier control is to be sought through cooperation between

More concretely, the externalisation agenda includes a wide range of differ-

programmes, whereby development aid is employed to create protection

spectrum from addressing ‘symptoms’, through containment, to tackling

2.3.4 North–South relations and international migration

Theories of international migration pay remarkably little attention to

The expansion of the international politico-strategic system to encom-

International migration is ‘affected with an international political inter-

which migration is intertwined with international politics. (Mitchell,

both sending and receiving countries have employed mass migration

their participation in the collaborative efforts on migration and ‘to exert

My starting hypothesis is rooted in an academic debate that has been in