Assignment 1

NAME; TAHSEEN IQBAL

ROLL NO; BSCE -F19-113

SAP ID; 70076706

SUBJECT; HYDRO AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

SUBMITTED TO ;
Quick Facts
Location: Idaho, USA 
Year Constructed: 1975
Drainage Area: 853 sq. mi.
Type: Earth fill
Height: 305 ft.
Primary Purpose: Flood Control, Hydropower
Date of Incident: June 5, 1976
Evacuation: Yes
Fatalities: 11
Property Damage: $400 Million
Background

Teton Dam was located in southeastern Idaho about 15 miles from Rexburg in the valley of the Teton
River. The dam and its reservoir were the principal elements of the Teton Basin Project designed by the
Bureau of Reclamation to control flooding as well as provide a source of hydropower, irrigation,
and drinking water. Construction on the Teton Dam, reservoir, and powerhouse began in 1972 and by
November 1975 the zoned earth fill embankment was essentially complete with a structural height of
305 feet and a crest length of 3,100 feet. Less than one year later, the dam experienced catastrophic
failure on June 5, 1976 during its first filling. Failure of the Teton Dam and subsequent draining of the
reservoir caused the deaths of 11 people and approximately $400 million in damages.

Description

On June 3, 1976, two small seeps were observed at the downstream toe of the dam which released
clear seepage and measured less than ¼ cfs. When the rest of the dam was inspected, however, no
further evidence of seepage was noted. Only two days later, in the early morning hours of June 5, 1976,
20 to 30 cfs of clear seepage was observed exiting rock joints near the right abutment of Teton Dam.
Shortly thereafter, the seepage became muddy and a sinkhole developed on the downstream slope of
the embankment dam. Flow developed from the sinkhole and dozers were sent in an unsuccessful attempt
to fill the resulting eroded area with riprap. Flow through the open void that developed
by scour (a piping mechanism) continued to increase and the embankment eventually breached at the dam
crest around 11:55 a.m. (only several hours after the first sign of muddy seepage). The resulting rapid
release of the entire contents of the reservoir flooded five counties, inundated over 300 square miles,
and traveled a distance of 155 miles downstream.

Downstream flooding resulting from failure of Teton Dam and release of entire reservoir.

Investigations of the Teton Dam failure attributed the catastrophe to a series of design and construction
related deficiencies. These inadequacies related primarily to the foundation treatment at the dam and
adherence to the overall construction schedule. It was determined the most probable physical failure mode
was cracking of the dam’s impervious core due to internal erosion initiated by hydraulic fracturing of the
key trench fill material.
Mechanism of Failure

Teton Dam was located in an area with highly permeable foundation materials. During investigation of
the failure, it was discovered that proper treatment of such foundation material was not implemented. It
appeared that the dam’s designers did not take the site-specific geological conditions into account when
developing the structure. This oversight was exacerbated by the lack of communication between the
design and construction engineers about the proper preparation of the dam foundation. As a result, not
only was the foundation treated inadequately, but that treatment was also inconsistent. Although a key
trench was constructed in an attempt to prevent seepage through the pervious embankment, the
slush grouting at the key trench was insufficient. In addition, slush grouting was inexplicably stopped
once El. 5200 was reached. The post-failure review panel also determined that the rock surface at the
right abutment was not adequately sealed under the dam’s impervious core. Working together or alone,
either of these foundation design deficiencies would have provided optimal conditions for internal erosion
of the core.

Although a three-gated spillway existed at crest elevation near the right abutment at the time of failure,
the dam’s powerhouse, auxiliary spillway, and outlet works remained unfinished. Construction delays
caused deviation from the original schedule but the first filling of the reservoir was not
postponed. Therefore, when the unexpectedly rapid filling of the reservoir occurred, there was no
operable low-level outlet works for dewatering the reservoir. Although investigations of the incident
proved that failure of the dam due to improperly treated foundation materials was most likely inevitable,
the lack of a proper reservoir low level outlet works contributed to the severity of the failure and reservoir
release. Had the first filling been managed using a low-level outlet works, the volume of water
suddenly released from behind the Teton dam could have been reduced. Twenty-four-hour monitoring of
the dam and reservoir during its first filling may have also contributed to the lessening of downstream
consequences.

Other Factors Related to Failure

Other factors related to the failure of the dam included a lack of external  review of the project plans and
specifications that may have discovered some of the design deficiencies. Furthermore, the dam was not
designed with any type of secondary defenses against seepage and relied fully on the grout
curtain and key trench.
 Crest collapse and full breach of Teton Dam (11:55 am).

Changing after this failure

The dam has not been rebuilt. After the failure of Teton Dam, scientists used many types of monitoring
instruments on other dam to preventing any type of failure.