Rovelli’s article from 1996 about quantum mechanics vs.

Rovelli’s books 2015,

2017, 2020. About strong similarities between Carlo Rovelli’s ideas in three
books (2015, 2017, 2019) to my ideas (2002-2008) + commentary February 2018

I investigate:
- Carlo Rovelli, “Relational Quantum Mechanics”, International Journal of
Theoretical Physics, VoL 35, No. 8, 1996
- Van Fraassen investigates Rovelli’s article from 1996. The title of van Fraassen’s
work is “Rovelli’s world”!!!!!
- Matteo Smerlak† and Carlo Rovelli (2007), Relational EPR
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604064v3 4 March 2007
(February 1, 2008)
- Seven Brief Lessons on Physics Hardcover (September 2015)
- Carlo Rovelli (2017): “Space is blue and birds fly through it"
- Rovelli: “There is no time.” In is new book: “The order of time” (2019)
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/14/carlo-rovelli-exploding-
commonsense-notions-order-of-time-interview
- Carlo Rovelli - Helgoland, Making sense of the quantum revolution, Riverhead
Books, 2021 (Translation copyright © 2021 by Erica Segre and Simon Carnell
Originally published in Italy as Helgoland by Adelphi Edizioni, Milan, in 2020)
- Carlo Rovelli (2021): “The Relational Interpretation of Quantum Physics”,
https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.09170v3

I strongly emphasize that Carlo Rovelli had been working within the unicorn world
(world, Universe) until 2015! Then, in 2015 and later, Carlo Rovelli suddenly has
changed his framework of the unicorn world/Universe/world with a framework very
similar to my EDWs!!!

Carlo Rovelli, “Relational Quantum Mechanics”, International Journal of

Theoretical Physics, VoL 35, No. 8, 1996

I investigate Carlo Rovelli’s article from 1996 to indicate that his framework of
thinking from that period (1996) is totally different than his framework of thinking
from 2015 until today.
In this article, his framework of thinking is the “Universe/world” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! After
2015, his framework of thinking has started to be one very similar to my EDWs
perspective!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In this paper, I discuss a novel view of quantum mechanics. This point

of view is not antagonistic to current ones, such as the Copenhagen (Heisenberg,
1927; Bohr, 1935), consistent-histories (Griffiths, 1984; Oran,s, 1988),
decohered-histories (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990), many-worlds (Everett,
1957; Wheeler, 1957; DeWitt, 1970), quantum-event (Hughes, 1989), or
many-minds (Albert and Loewer, 1988, 1989; Lockwood, 1989; Donald,
1990)interpretations, but rather combines and complements aspects of them. (1637)

[We already see here that he did not introduce a new framework of thinking! Anyway,
his framework of thinking is indeed the “Universe/world” and he has no idea about
the EDWs.]
The notion rejected here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent,
state of a system; equivalently, the notion of observer-independent values of physical
quantities. The thesis of the present work is that by abandoning
such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion of state--and values of physical
quantities--relative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more
sense. This conclusion derives from the observation that the experimental
evidence at the basis of quantum mechanics forces us to accept that distinct
observers give different descriptions of the same events. From this, I shall
argue that the notion of observer-independent state of a system is inadequate
to describe the physical world beyond the h --) 0 limit, in the same sense in
which the notion of observer-independent time is inadequate to describe the
physical world beyond the c --~ ~ limit. I then consider the possibility of
replacing the notion of absolute state with a notion that refers to the relation
between physical systems. (1637-8)

[again, his framework of working is the classical one, that of “abondoning” the notion
of the “observer-independent state of a system”! this view is not original at all in
Physics/quantum mechanics. On the contrary, with my EDWs perspective, I re-
introduced this notion of the “observer-independent state of a system”!!!! Carlo
Rovelli replaces this notion with “a notion which refers to the relation between
physical systems”. However, even this notion is not his originality since it was
proposed long time ago by some physicists.]

My point of view in this regard is that quantum

mechanics synthesizes most of what we have learned so far about the physical
world: The issue is thus not to replace or fix it, but rather to understand what
it actually says about the world; or, equivalently, what precisely we have
learned from experimental microphysics. (p. 1638)

[Reading this statement, the reader has to understand very clear that Carlo Rovelli is
working within the unicorn world/Universe/world but not in the EDWs!!!]

I believe, that the problem of the interpretation of

quantum mechanics has not been fully disentangled. This unease, and the
variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics that it has generated, are
sometimes denoted the "measurement problem." In this paper, I address this
sense of unease, and propose a way out.
The paper is based on two ideas:
1. That this unease may derive from the use of a concept which is
inappropriate to describe the physical world at the quantum level.
I shall argue that this concept is the concept of observer-independent
state of a system, or, equivalently, the concept of observer-independent values of
physical quantities.
2. That quantum mechanics will cease to look puzzling only when we
will be able to derive the formalism of the theory from a set of
simple physical assertions ("postulates," "principles") about the
world. Therefore, we should not try to append a reasonable interpretation to the
quantum mechanics formalism, but rather to derive the
formalism from a set of experimentally motivated postulates. (p. 1639)
[Writing about the un-famous “measurement problem”, Rovelli places the entire
discussion within a “formalism” framework “derived from a set of experimentally
motivated postulates”. We cannot accept that Rovelli is writing here about the
EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!! He is working within the unicorn world without any doubts!!!]

The program outlined is thus to do for the formalism of quantum mechanics what
Einstein did for the Lorentz transformations: (i) Find a set of simple
assertions about the world, with clear physical meaning, that we know are
experimentally true (postulates); (ii) analyze these postulates, and show that from
their conjunction it follows that certain common assumptions about the world
are incorrect; (iii) derive the full formalism of quantum mechanics from these
postulates. I expect that if this program could be completed, we would at long
last begin to agree that we have "understood" quantum mechanics. (1640)

[Again, we see very clear here that Rovelli is working within the unicorn
world/Universe/world!!]

In Section 2 I analyze the measurement process as described by two

distinct observers. This analysis leads to the main idea: the observer dependence of
state and physical quantities, and to recognize a few key concepts
in terms of which, I would like to suggest, the quantum mechanical description
of reality "makes sense." Prominent among these is the concept of information
(Shannon, 1949; Wheeler, 1988, 1989, 1992). (1641)

[Rovelli introduces “information” just to deal with the formalism of different

“physical quantitites”.]

By using the word "observer"

I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any
other manner special, systems. I use the word "observer" in the sense in
which it is conventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that an
object has a velocity "with respect to a certain observer." The observer can
be any physical object having a definite state of motion. For instance, I say
that my hand moves at a velocity v with respect to the lamp on my table.
Velocity is a relational notion (in Galilean as well as in special relativistic
physics), and thus it is always (explicitly or implicitly) referred to "something"; it is
traditional to denote this something as the "observer," but it is
important in the following discussion to keep in mind that the "observer"
can be a table lamp. Similarly, I use information theory in its original (Shannon) form,
in which information is a measure of the number of states in which
a system can be--or in which several systems whose states are physically
constrained (correlated) can be. Thus, a pen on my table has information
because it points in this or that direction. We do not need a human being, a
cat, or a computer to make use of this notion of information. (p. 1641)

[Obviously, it seems that my notion of “observer” (related to “relational” notion) is

quite close to Rovelli’s notion. However, this notion of “observer” is not a new idea
introduced by Rovelli. Nevertheless, Rovelli introuduce just here the notion of
“information”. Why? Because he is working within the unicorn world! The name of
his second part is: QUANTUM MECHANICS IS A THEORY ABOUT
INFORMATION]

I have described an actual physical process E taking place in a real

laboratory. Standard quantum mechanics requires us to distinguish system
from observer, but it allows us freedom in drawing the line that distinguishes
the two. The peculiarity of the above analysis is just the fact that this freedom
has been exploited in order to describe the same sequence of physical events
in terms of two different descriptions. In the first description, equation (1),
the line that distinguishes system from observer is set between S and O. In
the second, equation (2), it is between S-O and P. ….

Main Observation. In quantum mechanics different observers may give

different accounts of the same sequence of events.
For a very similar conclusion, see Zurek (1982). (p. 1643)

[In this paragraph, we see Rovelli/Zurek’s main idea: he writes about ‘the same
sequence of physical events in terms of two different descriptions”! It has to be very
clear that he did not write something about the EDWs!!! This idea is very similar to
de Broglie or Bohm views: a particle is associated with a wave!!!! Nothing new here!]

Hypothesis 1. All systems are equivalent: Nothing a priori distinguishes

macroscopic systems from quantum systems. If the observer O can give a
quantum description of the system S, then it is also legitimate for an observer
P to give a quantum description of the system formed by the observer O. Of course, I
have no proof of Hypothesis 1. (p. 1643)

[Again, we can see very clear that Rovelli is writing about “descriptions”, but not
about the EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! If he write that he “has not proof” of this hypothesis,
then how can we consider these descriptions as referring to my EDWs?????????? His
ideas are all constructed within the unicorn world and based on the quantum empirical
results (see Objections 3 and 4!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

In reality, Rovelli did not work within the EDWs perspective, but in a framework
more closely to Everett’s many worlds!!!!!!!!!! He emphasizes this idea at the end of
his article!! See his answer to “Objection 7”, for instance)]

… the descriptions of the same sequence of events given by the two observers can
be different. Classes of observers may agree on sets of outcomes (or interpret
the differences as statistical ignorance), but there may always be other
observers, perhaps observing the sequence of events and O, who have chosen
a different family of consistent histories to describe the same sequence of
events… Thus, the histories interpretations do not emphasize, but confirm
the conclusion that if an observer O gives a description of a sequence of
events, another observer--choosing a different family of histories--may give
a different description of the same sequence. (p. 1648)

[Rovelli emphasizes this idea many times in his article. However, within the EDWs
perspective, we do not talk about the “same sequence of events given by the two
observers” which can be different!!! I talked about the EDWs not about descriptions
or “consistent hisotires to describe the same sequence of events”!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! It is
very CLEAR for the reader the huge difference between Rovelli’s different
descriptions and my EDWs!!!]

If different observers give different accounts of the same sequence of

events, then each quantum mechanical description has to be understood as
relative to a particular observer. Thus, a quantum mechanical description of
a certain system (state and/or values of physical quantities) cannot be taken
as an "absolute" (observer-independent) description of reality, but rather as
a formalization, or codification, of properties of a system relative to a given
observer. Quantum mechanics can therefore be viewed as a theory about the
states of systems and values of physical quantities relative to other systems.
A quantum description of the state of a system S exists only if some
system O (considered as an observer) is actually "describing" S, or, more
precisely, has interacted with S. The quantum state of a system is always a
state of that system with respect to a certain other system. More precisely:
when we say that a physical quantity takes the value v, we should always
(explicitly or implicitly) qualify this statement as: the physical quantity takes
the value v with respect to the so and so observer. Thus, in the example
considered in Section 2.1, q has value 1 with respect to O, but not to P. I
am convinced that there is no way to escape this conclusion.
Therefore, I maintain that in quantum mechanics, "state" as well as
"value of a variable"--or "outcome of a measurement"--are relational
notions in the same sense in which velocity is relational in classical mechanics.
We say "the object S has velocity v" meaning "with respect to a reference
object O." Similarly, I maintain that "the system is in such a quantum state"
or "q = 1" are always to be understood "with respect to the reference O."
In quantum mechanics all physical variables are relational, as velocity is. (p. 1648-9)

[In this statements, we can see again very clear that Rovelli did not write about the
EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! If Rovelli writes that “A quantum description of the state of a
system S exists only if some system O (considered as an observer) is actually
"describing" S, or, more
precisely, has interacted with S.”, for me, the EDWs exist independent of any
observer!!!!!!]

Hypothesis 2 (Completeness). Quantum mechanics provides a complete

and self-consistent scheme of description of the physical world, appropriate
to our present level of experimental observations. (p. 1649)

Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physicaI

systems relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the
world. (p. 1650)

[Again, we can see here that Rovelli did not talk about the EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! He
talks about “descriptions of the physical world” related to the “experimental
observations” !!!! All his systems relative to other systems are just “complete
description of the world”!! But, from the EDWs perspective, the “world” does not
even exist!!!!]
Thus, the hypothesis on which I base this paper is that accounts (1) and
(2) are both fully correct. They refer to different observers: (1) refers to O,
while (2) refers to P. I propose to reinterpret every contingent statement about
nature, as for instance, "the electron has spin up," "the atom is in the so and
so excited state," the "spring is compressed," "the chair is here and not there,"
as elliptic expressions for relational assertions: "the electron has spin up with
respect to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus," ..., "the chair is here and not
there with respect to my eyes," and so on. Quantum states, as well as values
of physical quantities, make sense only when referred to a physical system
(which I denote as the observer system, or reference system). A general
physical theory is a theory about the state that physical systems have relative
to each other. I explore and elaborate this possibility in this paper. (p. 1650)

[It would e quite absurd to consider Rovelli is talking here about the EDWs!!!!!!!]

2.4. Relation Between Descriptions

An immediate issue raised by the multiplication of points of view induced
by the relational notion of state and the values of physical quantities is the problem of
the relation between distinct descriptions of the same events.
What is the relation between the value of a variable q relative to an observer
O and the value of the same variable relative to a different observer?… The key
observations is that in the final state at t2 in (2), the variables
q (with eigenstates I 1) and 12)) and the pointer variable (with eigenstates
IO1) and IO2)) are correlated. (pp. 1650-1)

The relation between the descriptions that different observers give of the same event
is characterized by the fact that an observer with sufficient initial information may
predict what
the other observer has measured, but not the outcome of the measurement.
Communication of measurements results is, however, possible (and fairly
common!). P can measure the outcome of the measurement performed by
O.She can, indeed, measure whether O is in I OI) or in IO2). (p. 1652)

[We can see again that Rovelli refers to “descriptions” of the same physical event.]

From the point of view of the P description:

The fact that the pointer variable in 0 has information about S (has
measured q) is expressed by the existence of a correlation between the q
variable of S and the pointer variable of O. The existence of this correlation
is a measurable property of the O-S state.
Notice that representing the fact that (for P) "the pointer variable of O has
information about the q variable in S" by means of the operator M resolves
the well-known and formidable problem of defining the "precise moment"
in which the measurement is performed, or the precise "amount of correlation"
needed for a measurement to be established--see for instance Bacciagaluppi
and Hemmo (1995). Such questions are not classical questions, but quantum
mechanical questions, because whether or not O has measured S is not an
absolute property of the O-S state, but a quantum property of the quantum
O-S system, that can be investigated by P, and whose yes/no answers are,
in general, determined only probabilistically. In other words: imperfect correlation
does not imply no measurement performed, but only a smaller than 1
probability that the measurement has been completed.

[In this section, Rovelli writes about the “Relation Between Descriptions”, not about
the relations between the EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Moreover, Rovelli introduces
“probabilities” exactly as this notion is used by those working in quantum mechanics.
For the EDWs perspective, probabilities are just epistemological notions furnished by
certain measurement apparatus, no more. These probabilities do not have an
ontological status as Born claimed!]

2.5. Information
It is time to introduce the main concept in terms of which I propose to
interpret quantum mechanics: information. In Section 2.3 I emphasized the
relational character of any quantum mechanical assertion: the complete meaning of "q
-- 1" is "q = 1 relative to O." The main hypothesis here is that
this relational character of physical statements is not due to incompleteness of
quantum theory, but to the physical inapplicability of the notion of "observer-
independent value of q" to the natural world. (p. 1653)

[Obviously, working within the unicorn world, Rovelli needs to introduces the notion
of “information”. He claims the “physical inapplicability of the notion of "observer-
independent value of q" to the natural world”, but from the viewpoint of the EDWs
perspective, we can talk about the “observer-independent” value of q!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

Indeed, we can make statements about the state of the

S-O system, provided that we interpret these statements as relative to a third
physical system P. Therefore, it should be possible to understand what is the
physical meaning of "q has a value relative to O" by considering the description that P
gives (or could give) of the S-O system. This description is not
in terms of classical physics, but in quantum mechanical terms; it is the one
given in detail in Section 2.4. The result is that "S has information about q"
means that there is a correlation between the variable q and the pointer
variable in O. (p. 1653)

[Again, in this paragraph, Rovelli writes about the descriptions and the correlations
between these different “descriptions” about the same physical event, within the same
world]

As is
well known, the problem of defining such a notion was brilliantly solved by
Shannon (1949): in the technical sense of information theory, the amount of
information is the number of the elements of a set of alternatives out of
which a configuration is chosen. Information expresses the fact that a system
is in a certain configuration, which is correlated to the configuration of another system
(information source). The relation between this notion of
information and more elaborate notions of information is given by the fact
that the information-theoretic information is a minimal condition for any
"elaborate information." In a physical theory it is sufficient to deal with this
basic information-theoretic notion of information. This is very weak; it does
not require us to consider information storage, thermodynamics, complex
systems, meaning, or anything of the sort. (p. 1653-4)

[Rovelli writes about “correlated information” not about the EDWs!!!!]

Now, as Section 2.4 has shown, the fact that q has a value relative to
O means that q is correlated with the pointer variable in O. Therefore, it
means that the pointer variable in O has information about q, in the information-
theoretic sense. This is the reason for choosing the expression "information" to denote
the relational aspect of physical value ascriptions. Thus, the
physical nature of the relation between S and O expressed in the fact that q
has a value relative to O is captured by the fact that O has information (in
the sense of information theory) about q. By "O has information about q"
we mean "relative to O, q has a value" and also "relative to P, there is a
certain correlation in the S and O states." Notice that this is, in a sense, a
partial answer to the question formulated at the beginning of this section.
First, it is a quantum mechanical answer, because P's information about the
S-O system is probabilistic. Second, it is an answer that only shifts the
problem by one step, because the information possessed by O is explained
in terms of the information possessed by P. Thus, the notion of information
I use has a double valence. On the one hand, I want to weaken all physical
statements that we make: not "the spin is up," but "we have information that
the spin is up"--which leaves the possibility open to the fact that someone
else has different information. Thus, information indicates the usual ascription of
values to quantities that founds physics, but emphasizes the relational
aspect. On the other hand, this ascription can be described within the theory
itself, as information-theoretic information, namely correlation. But such a
description, in turn, is quantum mechanical and observer dependent, because
a universal observer-independent description of the state of affairs of the
world is fantasy.
Physics is the theory of the relative information that systems have about
each other. This information exhausts everything we can say about the world. (pp.
1654-5)

[For Rovelli, there are different “descriptions”/“ascriptions” related to “different

observers”, but because “such a description, in turn, is quantum mechanical and
observer dependent, because
a universal observer-independent description of the state of affairs of the
world is fantasy.” This statement does not refer to EDWs at all!!!! There are just
“descriptions” related to the observers within the unicorn world. Within the EDWs
perspective, we can talk about “universal observer-independent descriptions of the
state of affairs” not about the “world” but about the EDWs!!!!!!! Again it is very
clear, Rovelli is working within the unicorn world!!!!]

Following Hypothesis 1, I reject any such fundamental

distinctions as system/observer, quantum/classical system, physical system/
consciousness. I assume that the world can be decomposed (possibly in a
large number of ways) into a collection of systems, each of which can be
equivalently considered as an observing system or as an observed system.
A system (observing system) may have information about another system
(observed system). Information is exchanged via physical interactions. The
actual process through which information is collected and stored is not of
particular interest here, but can be physically described in any specific
instance. (p. 1655)

Information is a discrete quantity: there is a minimum amount of information

exchangeable (a single bit, or the information that distinguishes between
just two alternatives). The process of acquisition of information (a measurement) can
be described as a "question" that a system (observing system) asks
another system (observed system). This anthropomorphic language is not
meant to suggest any special feature or complexity of the systems considered.
Since information is discrete, any process of acquisition of information can
be decomposed into acquisitions of elementary bits of information. We refer
to an elementary question that collects a single bit of information as a "yes/
no question" and we denote these questions as Q~, Q2 .....
Any system S, viewed as an observed system, is characterized by a family
of yes/no questions that can be meaningfully asked to it. These correspond
to the physical variables of classical mechanics and to the observables of
conventional quantum mechanics. (p. 1655)

[Working within the unicorn world/Universe/world, Rovelli can talk about “the
world” which can be decomposed into a collections of systems”, equivalent systems,
only as “observing system or as an observed system. But what kind of “information is
exchanged via physical interaction”? This information refers to “physical
descriptions” of different observers, no more. It is not about the EDWs at all!! It is
like describing an entity as being a table or being an amalgam of microparticles.
There are different descriptions of the same physical event, no more!!! The reader has
not to confuse these descriptions (all within the same unicorn world) with my EDWs
perspective!!!! It is missing my main principle: one EW does not exist for any
EDW!!!!! However, for Rovelli, even if he writes about “systems”, he refers only to
“different descriptions” or to certain “epistemological systems” since these systems
refers to the same physical event!!!!]

At this point, I can return to the issue of the relation between

information of observers. The important point in this regard is that the information
possessed by different observers cannot be compared directly. This
is a delicate but crucial point of the entire construction. A statement about
the information possessed by O is a statement about the physical state of O;
the observer O is a regular system on the same ground as any other system;
thus, we must discuss his state in physical terms. However, since there is no
absolute meaning to the state of a system, any statement regarding the state
of 0 is to be referred to some other system observing O. The notion of
absolute state of a system, and thus afortiori absolute state of an observer,
is not defined. Therefore, the fact that an observer has information about a
system is not an absolute fact: it is something that can be observed by an
observer. A second observer P can have information about the fact that 0
has information about S. But any acquisition of information implies a physical
interaction. P can get new information about the information that O has about
S only by physically interacting with the O-S system.(p. 1664)
[This statement sends directly to Bohr’s complementarity. But anyway, Rovelli does
not write about the EDWs, but about his descriptions referring to the same physical
event.]

Now, the question "Do observers O and P get the same answers out of
a system S?" is a meaningless question, because it is a question about the
absolute state of O and P. What is meaningful is to rephrase this question
in terms of some observer. For instance, we could ask this question in terms
of the information possessed by a further observer, or, alternatively, by P
herself. (p. 1666)

[For me, there are such absolute states of O and P since there are the EDWs.]

The reader may be convinced that even if we take into account several
observers observing each other, there is no way in which contradictions may
develop, provided that one does not violate the following two rules:
(i) There is no meaning to the state of a system or the information that
a system has, except within the information of a further observer.
(ii) There is no way a system P may get information about a system O
without physically interacting with it, and therefore without breaking down
(at the time of the interaction) the unitary evolution description from any
observer not including both S and O (and their interaction Hamiltonian!) in
its Hilbert space description of the events. (p. 1667)

[Again, we can see that Rovelli works within the same unicorn world, within the
framework of classical quantum mechanics.]

Let me summarize the path covered. I started from the distinction

between observer and observed system. I assumed (Hypothesis 1) that all
systems are equivalent, in the sense that any observer can be described by
the same physics as any other system. In particular, I assumed that an observer
that measures a system can be described by quantum mechanics. I analyzed
a fixed physical sequence of events E from two different points of observation,
one that of the observer and one that of a third system, external to the
measurement. I concluded that two observers give different accounts of the
same physical set of events (main observation).
Rather than backtracking from this observation and giving up the commitment to the
belief that all observers are equivalent, I decided to take this
experimental fact at its face value, and consider it as a starting point for
understanding the world. If different observers give different descriptions of
the state of the same system, this means that the notion of state is observer
dependent. I took this deduction seriously, and considered a conceptual
scheme in which the notion of absolute observer-independent state of a system
is replaced by the notion of information about a system that a physical system
may possess. (p. 1668)

[Within the EDWs, I do not need of “observer” and I do not talk about “different
accounts of the same physical set of events”!!! For me, the “state of the system” is not
observer-dependent!!! Within the EDWs perspective, we can talk about the “absolute
observer-independent state of a system!!!!!! Rovelli’s approach is an extension of
Bohr’s complementarity and de Broglie associationism, but not about the
EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!]

Finally, since we take quantum mechanics as a complete description of

the world at the present level of experimental knowledge (Hypothesis 2), we
are forced to accept the result that there is no "objective," or more precisely
"observer-independent," meaning to the ascription of a property to a system.
Thus, the properties of the systems are to be described by an interrelated net
of observations and information collected from observations. Any complex
situation can be described "'in toto" by a further additional observer, and the
interrelation is consistent. However, such an "in toto'" description is deficient
in two directions: upward, because an even more general observer is needed
to describe the global observer itself, and, more importantly, downward,
because the "in toto" observer knows the content of the information that the
single component systems possess about each other only probabilistically. There is no
way to "exit" from the observer-observed global system.
Any observation requires an observer [the expression is taken from Maturana
and Varela (1980)]. (p. 1669)

[Again, here we have Bohr’s Kantian distinction between phenomen-noumen!!!! and

nothing else!!!! Rovelli need the “observer” for his different descriptions of the
noumena, and he also need probability just because he is working within the unicorn
world of quantum mechanics.]

Quantum mechanics is the theoretical formalization of the experimental

discovery that the descriptions that different observers give of the same events
are not universal. (p. 1669)

[“Descriptions” of noumena realized by “different observers” refers to phenomena.

Bohr’s approach!!!]

For a fixed observer,

the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is maintained. Consistency should only be
recovered between different observers, but--this is a key point--consistency
is only quantum mechanical--probabitistic--as discussed in detail in Section
3.4. Actuality is observer dependent. The fact that the values of physical
quantities are relational and their consistency is only probabilistically required
circumvents the potential difficulties of the modal interpretations. (1673)

[Obviously, Rovelli works within the unicorn world/quantum mechanics and he is

forced to used
probabilities!!!]

In the histories approaches two people may choose

to work with two different families of consistent histories, and therefore give
quite unrelated (and possibly contradictory) accounts of the same events. (p. 1673)

[the “same events” = Bohr’s noumena…]

The histories interpretations
are not inconsistent with the analysis developed here. What I tried to add
here is increased attention to the process through which the observer-independent, but
family-dependent probabilities attached to histories may be related
to actual observer-dependent descriptions of the state of the world. (p. 1674)

[Again, there are “descriptions” related to “actual observer-dependent descriptions of

the state of the world”. We have here phenomena and noumena, but not the
EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
My conclusion: Carlo Rovelli writes about different descriptions of the same event;
his approach mirrors Bohr’s view and de Broglie’s view and other physicists and
philosophers. However, Carlo Rovelli and all other physicists and philosophers have
no idea about the EDWs!!!! Carlo Rovelli and everybody until me worked within the
old framework, the unicorn world or the Universe/world. It is very clear that Carlo
Rovelli and any other physicist or philosopher had no idea about the EDWs.]

Van Fraassen investigates Rovelli’s article from 1996. The title of van Fraassen’s
work is “Rovelli’s world”!!!!!

[We can remark that even the title does not refer to the EDWs at all!]

In the 1950s H. J. Groenewold advocated that we should regard quantum states as

just summaries of information obtained through measurement. There are some
striking
similarities between Groenewold’s description of the quantum mechanical situation
and
Rovelli’s.
Groenewold (1952, 1957) proposed a formulation of the theory that would contain
all its empirical content without referring to states in any essential way. He derided
the
idea that quantum states are to be thought of on the model of states in classical
mechanics. His formulation re-appears quite clearly in Rovelli’s article, though there
in a
more general form. The idea is that a situation of interest is to be depicted as the effect
of
a series of measurements, represented by a series of observables (the ones being
Rovelli’s World 5
measured) interspersed with evolution operators (governing evolution between
measurements). The sole real problem to be addressed, according to Groenewold, is
this:
given the outcomes of preceding measurements, what are the probabilities for
outcomes of later measurements in the series?
The answer is formulated in terms of transition probabilities.2
In the exposition of
Rovelli’s specific version below I shall explain and illustrate how that goes. (p. 5)

Note once again that some form of coordination is presumed given, without
receiving explicit attention: the measurements and their results are assumed
univocally
representable in terms of the observables that characterize the system. This points to
‘absolute’ characteristics of the system, which are not aspects of information gathered
about it, but pertain to the system itself. That the system is characterizable in such a
way
is presupposed when certain operations are classified as, or taken to be, means of
gathering information about it. Thus here, as for Groenewold (and equally for Rovelli,
as
we shall see) there is a divide as well as a link between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
features of the experimental situation. (p. 7)

[This link between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ does not exist in my EDWs
perspective!]

At first sight Rovelli’s treatment of states is not exactly what either Groenewold,
Fuchs, or Bub appears to advocate.6 Rovelli does bring states into the discussion, but
as
states that measured objects can have relative to the measuring system. At first sight
we
seem to detect a tension between what Rovelli does and what he tells us it is possible
to
do. What he calls his Main Observation, motivating the view, is similar to
Groenewold’s
though:
In quantum mechanics different observers may give different accounts of the
same sequence of events.
Having rejected the idea of observer-independent states, there is no question of one of
those descriptions being the sole truth, with the other illusion or error. (p. 7)

[The EDWs perspective does not reject the “observer-independent states”!! The
human being has no role in measuring these states which exist without any
measurement.]

Rovelli also insists on the orthodox eigenvalue-eigenstate link, so that A takes a

value 1 relative to O, but not relative to P -- observables have values only relative to
observers, and may not have the same value relative to different observers.
But is this description of the situation then observer-independent, one that is in
fact not relative to any observer? Shouldn’t we object that the rationale forbids this,
because by Rovelli’s lights we can only have descriptions relative to some observer or
other? (p. 8)

[Obviously, Rovelli is writing about different descriptions relative to some observer

or other, but not about the ED entities which belong to the EDWs!]

2.1 General form versus third-observer description

The answer is that there is no incoherence here, but we must carefully distinguish
what Rovelli gives us when he presents his view, even in such an example, and the
description of the same situation by a third observer. The Example can indeed be
elaborated so as to include a third observer, whom we might call ROV. We could
imagine that ROV has, on the basis of previous measurements, information that can
be
summarized by assignments of initial states to O, S, P and their composites relative to
ROV, plus later states based on their unitary evolution. We’ll look later at how this
goes,
when we will also have occasion to consider measurements that P can make on O or S
later on. But right now we can point out that ROV’s information is not to be confused
with what Rovelli tells us about this sort of situation. The tension that a reader might
feel
could be expressed this way:
Rovelli seemingly purports to be giving us a description of the world that would
on the one hand be on the same level as a description of the rest of the world
relative to some given system ROV, and yet on the other hand not relative to
anything!
But that is not so at all. Rovelli, who can give these examples, is telling us only
something about the general form that these observers’ descriptions (their
information)
can take, given that certain measurement interactions have taken place. The resolution
of
this sensed tension is this: Rovelli does not give any specific such description of the
world -- he describes the form that any description which assigns states must take.
Rovelli describes not the world, but the general form of information that one system
can
have about another – namely as the assignment of states relative to a given system on
the
basis of information available to that system:
- there is no implication of possible specific information about what there is which
is independent of any point of view, but
- there can be knowledge of the form that any such information, relative to a
particular vantage point, must take.
So we have here a transcendental point of view. Rovelli offers us this knowledge of
the
general form, the conditions of possibility. We must take very seriously the fact that
as
he sees it, quantum mechanics is not a theory about physical states, but about
(‘about’?)
information. The principles he sees at the basis of quantum mechanics are principles
constraining the general form that such information can take, not to be assimilated to
classical evolution-of-physical-state laws. (p. 9)

[Again, we can clearly see that Rovelli’s view is placed within a “transcendental
viewpoint”. van Fraaseen clearly emphasizes that Rovelli’s approach is about
“information” which cannot be “assimilated to classical evolution-of-physical-state
laws”!!!!! I emphasizes above exactly the same idea!!! Rovelli’s viewpoint is similar
to Bohr’s complementarity or de Broglie’s associationism between the wave and the
particle!]

Before aiming at greater precision, let’s briefly summarize how this happens
according to Rovelli’s account. A question is asked of a system or source only when
an
appropriate physical interaction takes place. This interaction is a measurement
delivering
a value for some observable, but also serves as a preparation, so that the value
obtained
has (relative to the theory) predictive content. The probabilities of future measurement
outcomes are affected by the outcome obtained -- the measured system has gone into
a
new state relative to the measurement set-up. Thus he accepts (explicitly, in his
rejection
of the Bohm and modal interpretations) von Neumann’s eigenstate-eigenvalue link:
the system to which the observable’s value pertains is (at that time) in an
eigenstate of that observable, corresponding to that value.
But there is a twist, which changes the meaning, so that this says something quite
different from its original. The reference is here not to a physical state of the system,
but
to the state of the system relative to the observer (the measurement apparatus). So the
‘collapse’ is in that observer’s information; the state assigned to the system is a
summary
of that information.
As mentioned earlier, because of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link it follows that if
states are relative, so are values of observables. That an observable takes or has a
certain
value at a certain moment, that too is observable-relative (cf. end of sec.2. in Laudisa
and
Rovelli 2005). Because information can only be had by actual, physical measurement,
the states assigned will rarely be pure. It is not easy to obtain maximal information
about
a system, even with respect to targeted observables. So in general the value of an
observable, relative to a given observer, will not be sharp. (p. 10)

[The observer has a very important role in Rovelli’s approach. In my approach, the
observer does not exist!!!]

Intuitively speaking, this is what P would measure to find out what O found. She
would
get either result 1 or result 0, and would say “O found 1” or “O found 0” accordingly.
But can we understand that literally as referring to what O had as information before
P
made this measurement? If P finds result 1, does that imply that O had found 1 and
that
O had assigned state |A, 1> to S?
According to Rovelli’s rules, this makes no sense. An interpretation of quantum
measurement as revealing pre-existing values is untenable. (p. 14)

[Again, we see that Rovelli is working within the framework of quantum mechanics.
There are no “pre-existing values”!! For me, within the EDWs perspective, there are
such pre-existing values! The observers just observe what is there, they do not
“created” the realitites”, i.e., the entities which belong to the EDWs.]

O has made a complete measurement on S of two-valued observable A, and has a

record of the question asked (call it ?A) and the answer received; say 1. Accordingly
S
has now state |A, 1> relative to O. The pointer observable on O is B, so on the old,
pre-Rovelli view one takes it that the existence of the record means that B has value 1.
For
Rovelli this makes no sense as an observer-independent assertion. (p. 15)

[Again, if for Rovelli, it “makes no sense as an observer-independent assertion”, then

he is working within the unicorn world, but not within the EDWs!!!!]

What we have seen is that the puzzles one might have at first sight of Rovelli’s
account can be resolved. But the resolution leaves one still uneasy, for it hinges on the
point that an observer O can register a measurement outcome – e.g. the answer 1 to
question ?A – but this fact is not equivalent to O being in a particular physical state,
whether relative to itself or relative to any other observer.
In other words there are elements of Rovelli’s ‘meta’ description which may in
particular cases not correspond to any information had by any observer, and hence
apparently not describable in the language of quantum mechanics. One might be
tempted to introduce the fiction that there is a ‘universal observer’ who knows what
information is had (what answers have been registered) by each ‘ordinary’ observer.
But
this fiction can certainly not be admitted without ruining the story.
At the same time, in our reflections on what the observers register as
measurement outcomes, we are targeting the very basis of Rovelli’s understanding of
quantum mechanics, and the very basis of the description of Rovelli’s world:
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems
relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the world. (Sect. IIC)
Drawing on Rovelli’s favorite illustration of different frames of reference in
Einstein’s
world, we are clearly tempted to ask: but what relations are there between the
descriptions that different observers give when they observe the same system? Of
course
there can be no clue at all to an answer if we assume that there are no interactions at
all
between these distinct observers. (p. 19)

[Working within the unicorn world, Rovelli has the same problems as Bohr,
Heisenberg ahd de Broglie! Within the unicorn world, Rovelli could not find the exact
relations between “different descriptions” furnished by different observers!]

What could be the motivation and intuitive warrant for this postulate, within the
point of view of relational quantum mechanics? As Rovelli presented his own
motivation
he refers to the example of Einstein’s methodology in the creation of relativity theory
in
just the same way that the Copenhagen physicists took their inspiration from that
episode.
The inspiration took the form of a certain kind of moderate empiricism: nothing was
to
be attributed to how nature itself is or proceeds beyond what is manifested in
measurement outcomes. Thus the overriding case for the denial that certain
observables
really do have simultaneous sharp values when not measured is precisely that there is
no
measurement procedure to reveal that possibility. More precisely, no configuration of
values of observables is to be postulated for unmeasured nature unless there is a state
in
which measurement would show that configuration as outcome, with certainty. (p. 24)

[Rovelli writes not about “nature itself”; he talks about “what is manifested in
measurement outcomes”: “no configuration of values of observables is to be
postulated for unmeasured nature unless there is a state in which measurement would
show that configuration as outcome, with certainty”! We clearly see that Rovelli is
working within the classical quantum mechanics’ framework!]

The idea that any assertion about what happens in nature must have
cash value in what we can expect to detect, measure, or observe is strong in the
Copenhagen tradition, even if contradicted by hidden variable enthusiasts. It seems to
me
that it echoes precisely the sort of inspiration that both the Copenhagen theorists and
Rovelli derive from Einstein’s reasoning when he introduced relativity. (p. 25)

[As I wrote above, Rovelli’s approach is quite close to Copenhagen’s approach!]

Supposing ROV to be knowledgeable of Relational Quantum Mechanics thus

extended,
what can he know even though he has made no measurements during or after that
interval, on O and P?
He knows that what they found as outcomes of their measurements were indeed
the same.
He already knew on the basis of Quantum Mechanics alone that if he made a
measurement to check on such agreement he would get the answer YES with
certainty.
But now, calculating from the same previous measurement results that constitute his
initial information, but using also Additional Postulate, he deduces that the agreement
he
would find with certainty if he measured was indeed already there. (p. 25)

[Reading this statements about Rovelli’s approach, it is quite impossible to consider

he was working within the EDWs perspective! He was working within the unicorn
world/Universe without any doubts!!!!]

Matteo Smerlak† and Carlo Rovelli (2007), Relational EPR

https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604064v3 4 March 2007
(February 1, 2008)

[In this article, these two authors introduce many UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to
my ideas published in 2002, 2003, 2005 2006. Their ideas are quite different than
Rovellli’s ideas from 1996!]

In
this paper, we argue that in the context of this interpretation, it is not necessary to
abandon locality in order to account for EPR correlations. From the relational
perspective, the apparent “quantum non-locality” is a mistaken
illusion caused by the error of disregarding the quantum
nature of all physical systems.
The price for saving locality is the weakening of realism
which is at the core of RQM. (p. 1)

[In my works 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006, 2007 I indicated the same idea constructed
within the EDWs perspective!!!]

The relational approach claims that a number of confusing

puzzles raised by Quantum Mechanics (QM) result from
the unjustified use of the notion of objective, absolute,
‘state’ of a physical system, or from the notion of absolute,
real, ‘event’.
The way out from the confusion suggested by RQM consists in acknowledging that
different observers can give different accounts of the actuality of the same physical
property [6]. This fact implies that the occurrence of an event
is not something absolutely real or not, but it is only real
in relation to a specific observer. Notice that, in this context, an observer can be any
physical system. (p. 2)

[We have here an indication of the EDWs! The first part of this paragraph indicates
Rovelli’s main ideas from his article 1996 within the unicorn world.However, the last
two statements are very close to my ideas from 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007!]

Thus, the central idea of RQM is to apply Bohr and

Heisenberg’s key intuition that “no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an
observed phenomenon” to each observer independently. This description of physical
reality,
though fundamentally fragmented, is assumed in RQM to
be the best possible one, i.e. to be complete [6]:

“Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems

relative to
other systems, and this is a complete description of the world”. (p. 2)

[The authors are still within the unicorn world: they quote a statement from Rovelli’s
work 1996 which indicates different descriptions of the “world”! I emphasize that
they still work within the unicorn world!

In the context of the EPR debate, realism is taken as the

assumption that, in Einstein’s words [24],

“there exists a physical reality independent of

substantiation and perception”. (p. 2)

We call this assumption “Einstein’s realism”.2 RQM departs from such strict realism.
In RQM, physical reality
is taken to be formed by the individual quantum events
(facts3
) through which interacting systems (objects4
) affect one another. Quantum events are therefore assumed
to exist only in interactions5 and (this is the central point)
the character of each quantum event is only relative to the
system involved in the interaction. In particular, which
properties any given system S has is only relative to a
physical system A that interacts with S and is affected by
these properties.
If A can keep track of the sequence of her past interactions with S, then A has
information about S, in the
sense that S and A’s degrees of freedom are correlated.
According to RQM, this relational information exhausts
the content of any observer’s description of the physical
world. (p. 2)

[I did not notice Einstein’s statement in Rovelli’s work from 1996! Einstein’s
statement is one of my principle from my works 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006! In his work
from 1996, Rovelli did not speak about “individual quantum events”; he writes about
“different descriptions of the same physical event”!!!!! But here, these two authors
introduces “individual quantum events”! The expression is at plural while in the work
from 1996, Rovelli used only singular and plural for “different descriptions”! Then
the authors writes about “quantum events”, but in his article 1996, Rovelli writes
about only one physical event and different descriptions!!!! The last statements mirror
exactly my EDWs!!!!!!!!]

In RQM, the preferred observer

is abandoned. Indeed, it is a fundamental assumption of
this approach that nothing distinguishes a priori systems
and observers: any physical system provides a potential
observer. Physics concerns what can be said about nature on the basis of the
information that any physical
system can, in principle, have. The preferred Copenhagen
observer is relativized into the multiplicity of observers,
formed by all possible physical systems, and therefore it
no longer escapes the laws of quantum mechanics6. (p. 2)

[“all physical systems” is quite different than what Rovelli wrote in his articl 1996
since for him in that paper, there were “different descriptions of the same physical
event”!!! In his article 1996, Rovelli did not use “potential observer” at all!]

The state ψ that we associate with a system S is therefore, first of all, just a coding of
the outcome of these
previous interactions with S. Since these are actual only
with respect to A, the state ψ is only relative to A: ψ is
the coding of the information that A has about S. Because
of this irreducible epistemic character, ψ is but a relative
state, which cannot be taken to be an objective property
of the single system S, independent from A. Every state
of quantum theory is a relative state.7 (p. 3)

[The authors’ relativization did not imply the EDWs directly! For me, every state of
quantum theory is not a “relative state” but a real state which exists in its EW.]

From the relational perspective the Heisenberg picture

appears far more natural: ψ codes the information that
can be extracted from past interactions and has no explicit
dependence on time; it is adjusted only as a result of an
interaction, namely as a result of a new quantum event relative to the observer. If
physical reality is the set of these
bipartite interactions, and nothing else, our description of
dynamics by means of relative states should better mirror
this fact: discrete changes of the relative state, when information is updated, and
nothing else. What evolves with
time are the operators, whose expectation values code the basis of the past quantum
events.8
To summarize, two distinct aspects of physical information, epistemic and predictive,
are subsumed under the
notion of (relative) quantum state; amending Bohr’s epistemology, we can say that
QM is the theory of logical
relations between the two. (p. 3)

[The authors did not mention that one state does not exist for any other ED state, as I
mentioned in my works. They still work within the quantum mechanics framework…
If you introduce “theory of logical relations between the two”, I don’t understand
what the authors want to tell us about these states. In fact, these “two distinct aspects”
are related to “information” and Bohr’s epistemology! Moreover, they are quite close
to Bohr’s interpretation and Spinoza’s dual aspect! So, we cannot claim that the
authors talk about the EDWs.]

Locality is at the very roots of RQM, in the observation

that different observers (in general distant from one another) can have different
descriptions of the same system. (p. 3)

[The same observation as above and for Rovelli’s article from 1996: there is again
about “different descriptions of the same system”. It is not about the EDWs!]

From the relational perspective, what is missing in Einstein’s quotation above, as well
as in all later analyses
of the EPR correlations, is the distinction between “elements of physical reality”
(quantum events) relative to A
and “elements of physical reality” relative to B. (p. 5)

[Obviously, the authors work within the EDWs perspective! The difference between
Rovellis main idea from 1996 and this idea is HUGE: there are different frameworks,
for Rovelli in 1996 the framework was the Universe/world, here in this article 2007,
the authors write about the EDWs (elements of physical reality relative to A and
B!!!). In his work 1996, Rovelli was writing mainly about “different descriptions
referring to the same physical event”!!]
In other words, in the sequence of events which is real
for A there is no definite quantum event regarding β at
time t0, and therefore no element of reality generated nonlocally at time t0 in the
location where B is. Hence Einstein’s argument cannot even begin to be formulated.
What changes instantaneously at time t0, for A, is not
the objective state of β, but only its (subjective) relative
state, that codes the information that A has about β. (p. 5)

[again, we have here the EDWs and not “different descriptions” like in Rovelli’s work
1996!]

Of course the price to pay for this solution of the puzzle

is that the sequence of events as described by B is different
from what it is as described by A. For B, there is a
quantum event of β at time t′0 and there is no quantum
event regarding α at time t′0
. But the core assumption of
RQM is that quantum events relative to distinct observers
cannot be simply juxtaposed. (p. 6)

[This idea did not appear in Rovelli’s work from 1996! Anyway, this idea represent a
principle in my works from 2003, 2005, 2006!!!]

Finally, let us add one remark on the later arguments

supporting the idea of non-locality in QM [4, 5]. Some of
these works are based on a weaker form of realism than the
one of Einstein or Bell. However, they all still maintain
the assumption that there is an objective element of reality
in the simultaneous realization of the measurements of α
and β at space-like separated locations. (p. 6)

[Wait a moment: an “objective element of reality” sends directly to the ED entities

which belong to the EDWs!!! There are not those different descriptions of the same
physical element!!!!!!!!!!! It seems that those two authors work within the EDWs
perspective and not within the world/Universe (as Rovelli worked in his article from
1996)]

The conclusion appears to be that each observer sees a completely

different world, unrelated to what any other observer sees:
A sees an elephant and hears B telling her about an elephant, even if B has seen a
zebra. Can this happen in the
conceptual framework of RQM?
The answer is no. The reason is subtle and lies at the
core of RQM.
The founding postulate of RQM stipulates that we shall
not deal with properties of systems in the abstract, but
only of properties of systems relative to one system. In
particular, we can never juxtapose properties relative to
different systems. If we do so, we make the same mistake
as when we simultaneously ascribe position and momentum to a particle. In other
words, RQM is not the claim
that reality is described by the collection of all properties
relative to all systems. This collection is assumed not to
make sense. Rather, reality admits one description per
(observing) system, each being internally consistent.

[These statements pushes the reader within the EDWs not within Rovelli’s main idea
from his work 1996!!! It has to be very clear, this work was written within the EDWs
perspective, not within the Universe/world. Rovelli’s work from 1996 was written
under the Universe/world paradigm of thinking!]

In turn, any given system can be observed by another

system. RQM is, in a sense, the stipulation that we shall
not talk about anything else than that, and the observation that this scheme is
sufficient for describing nature
and our own possibility of exchanging information about
nature (hence circumventing solipsism).
So, the case (⋆) can never happen, because it does not
happen either with respect to A or with respect to B. The
two sequences of events (the one with respect to A and the
one with respect to B) are distinct accounts of the same
reality that cannot and should not be juxtaposed. The
weakening of realism is the abandonment of the unique account of a sequence of the
events, and its replacement with
compatible alternatives, not with a self-consistent collection of all relative properties.
(p. 7)

[These statements mirror an essential principle from my EDWs perspective: one EW

does not exist for any EDW. Someone could think to this principle only working for
the mind-brain problem and not for different entities which belong to quantum
mechanics. All these different entities are external to human being, therefore, it would
have been impossible to discover the principles that I had discovered in 2002-2007!]

No property of a physical system S that is objective relative to some observer can be

influenced by measurements performed in space-like separated regions on a
different physical system. (p. 8)

[Rovelli did not talk about “locality” in his article from 1996. However, this
observation is quite close to one of my idea published in 2002-2006!]

We have argued that within the relational framework the

EPR-type correlations predicted by QM do not violate
locality. In fact, the relation between locality and QM
is more than the “peaceful coexistence” which is often
declared: rather, from the relational perspective, QM is
rooted in locality in a way which, although it dismisses
Einstein’s strict realism (the “real, objective state of affairs”), certainly corroborates
QM’s claim to be a fundamental theory.
Needless to say, the weakening of realism implied by
RQM may be considered too high a price to pay by some.
(This view is strongly argued, for instance, in the recent
[35].) Our opinion, instead, is that after almost a century of substantial failure, it may
be worthwhile to try
some bold philosophical step, expanding the original motivations of Heisenberg and
Bohr, in order to make full
sense of quantum mechanics. (p. 8)

[In their Conclusion, the authors repeat the same idea that it is very similar to my idea
(2002-2006)]

However, in a sense RQM can be interpreted as

the discovery of the incompleteness of the description of
reality that any single observer can give: A can measure
the pointer variable of B, but the set of the events as described B is irreducibly distinct
from the set of events as
described by A. In this particular sense, RQM can be said
to show the “incompleteness” of single–observer Copenhagen QM. Then Einstein’s
intuition that the EPR correlations reveal something deeply missing in Copenhagen
quantum mechanics can be understood as being correct:
The incompleteness of Copenhagen QM is the disregard
of the quantum properties of all observers, which leads to
paradoxes as the apparent violation of locality exposed by EPR.
This recalls the conclusion that the late Prof. Peres
reached in his analysis of EPR in 2004: “The question
raised by EPR ‘Can the quantum–mechanical description
of physical reality be considered complete?’ has a positive
answer. However, reality may be different for different
observers” [23]. This is the idea at the basis of RQM, (pp. 8-9)

[Again, we can see some ideas totally different than Rovelli’s ideas from his work
1996!!! This paragraph seems to be written within the EDWs perspective, not within
the Universe/world. Nevertheless, the main ideas from my EDWs (the Universe,
reality does not exist and one EW does not exist for any EDW) are not very clear in
this article. The authors still work within the Universe/world!
Amazing is the fact that Smelark is the first author of this article. It seemed as if
Smelark came with new ideas (ideas very close to my EDWs perspective) and the
authors re-wrote Rovelli’s approach (constructed within the unicorn
world/Universe/world) from 1996 in a new perspective quite close to my EDWs
perspective!!!!! My question would be: how Smelark discovered the EDWs working
on quantum mechanics since NOBOBY discovered the EDWs until him???? It seems
Smelark is a GENIUS! MY question is why Smelark is the first author since the entire
article is about Rovelli’s approach? I really don’t understand this fact… I have
understood it only as I wrote above! The problem is the article is written in 2007-
2008, few years later after I published and posted FREE my works (2002, 2003, 2005,
2006, 2007) and I published my main ideas about the EDWs applied to the mind-brain
problem in Synthese (2005, USA), the best journal of Philosophy in USA in that
period!!!!! In this article, there is a presentation of my EDWs perspective and its
application to the mind-brain problem. Nevertheless, I have a footnote in which I
mention that the application of my EDWs perspective to the mind-brain problem is
very similar to its application to the quantum mechanics problems!!! Later, in 2006, I
published and posted FREE an article about my EDWs perspective applied to
quantum mechanics!!!!!!! My PhD thesis with the EDWs perspective and its
applications to Philosophy of mind, Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience and
Physics (quantum mechanics, Einstein relativities, etc.] has been published and posted
(FREE) at the web of University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia) in 2007!!!]
I was wondering why, few years later, very few people quote my ideas from my
article 2005. Now I understand why…]

Seven Brief Lessons on Physics Hardcover (September 2015)

Somebody indicated me that Rovelli’s book has very similar idea to my ideas of
entities and their “interactions”. I took a look at his book and, indeed, I saw some
quite similar ideas in Rovelli’s book. For me, it seems as if Rovelli had read my
works before writing his book. Moreveor, if you take a look at his articles before
2015, (including those form 1996.. about ‘relationism’[ I checked on these articles
after I discovered this book 2015. His relationism is constructed within the unicorn
world world and it is nothing different than some ideas that appeared in 1920s and
1930s in quantum mechanics…However, in his book 2015, he introduced a
framework very similar to my EDWs perspective!]) you will see that he has been
working within the unicorn world until 2015!! And suddenly he discovered America
(i.e., the EDWs!)…
In this book, there are many ideas are quite similar to my ideas and mainly the
“framework of working” (“reality is interactions”) is very similar! My question is
what does it mean “reality”? Does not “reality” presupposes some entities? Than we
get: reality is entities that interact”. But what exactly is “reality” in this case? If we
replace “reality” with EDWs, we reach exactly my framework of thinking!

The ‘quantum leaps’ from one orbit to another are the only means they have of being
‘real’: an electron is a set of jumps from one interaction to another. When nothing
disturbs it, it is not in any precise place. It is not in a ‘place’ at all. (Rovelli 2015, p.
14)[ “What does this mean? That the essential reality of a system is indescribable?
Does it mean that we only lack a piece of the puzzle? Or does it mean, as it seems to
me, that we must accept the idea that reality is only interaction?” (p. 15) Exactly my
EDWs!]

The idea of the electron does not exist until we measure is an old one. However, here
we have the “interaction” of an electron with another. This is exactly one of my main
essential idea: “interacting” is a kind of “observing”; Rovelli has a “similar” idea in
his work 1996, but his idea is constructed within the Universe/world! Nobody thought
to this idea within the EDWs perspective until my paper 2005, my PhD thesis 2007
and my first book 2008!

The nature of these particles, and the way they move, is described by quantum
mechanics. These particles do not have a pebble-like reality but are rather the ‘quanta’
of corresponding fields, just as photons are the ‘quanta’ of the electromagnetic field.
(p. 25)

The “corresponding” is similar to the “association”, and “association” an old concept

used for describing the relationship between the wave and the particles (for some
physicists). However, the “corresponding” is my main concept and the only one that I
used for describing this relationship! I have never seen somebody using this notion
before me; maybe there have benn other persons, I don’t know.

Where are these quanta of space? Nowhere. They are not in a space because they are
themselves the space. Space is created by the linking of these individual quanta of
gravity. Once again the world seems to be less about objects than about interactive
relationships. (p. 30)[ “The cold teaspoon heats up in hot tea because tea and spoon
interact with us through a limited number of variables amongst the innumerable
variables which characterize their microstate.” (p. 37) Instead of tea and spoon I used
other notions, but the idea is exactly the same, only replacing “characterize” with the
synonym “corresponding”!]

In my EDWs approach, the interactions constitute the entities within the EDWs! So
the “interactive relationship” is, indeed very important. Other notions, almost the
same idea. Nevertheless, the framework seems to be very similar, but my framework
is the EDWs while Rovelli’s framework is the “universe”, which he uses quite often
in his book.

What role do we have as human beings who perceive, make decisions, laugh and cry,
in this great fresco of the world as depicted by contemporary physics? If the world is a
swarm of ephemeral quanta of space and matter, a great jigsaw puzzle of space and
elementary particles, then what are we? Do we also consist only of quanta and
particles? If so, then from where do we get that sense of individual existence and
unique selfhood to which we can all testify? And what then are our values, our
dreams, our emotions, our individual knowledge? What are we, in this boundless and
glowing world? (p. 41)

We can answer to these questions only replacing the “world”, the unicorn-world with
the EDWs. At page 44, Rovelli mentions Spinoza’s idea about two aspects:

Our free decisions are freely determined by the results of the rich and fleeting
interactions between the billion neurons in our brain: they are free to the extent that
the interaction of these neurons allows and determines. Does this mean that when I
make a decision it’s ‘I’ who decides? Yes, of course, because it would be absurd to
ask whether ‘I’ can do something different from what the whole complex of my
neurons has decided: the two things, as the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza
understood with marvellous lucidity in the seventeenth century, are the same. There is
not an ‘I’ and ‘the neurons in my brain’. They are the same thing. An individual is a
process: complex, tightly integrated. (p. 44)

It is amazing that until now, I don’t think Rovelli mentioned Spinoza (or other
philosopher) in his works! Nevertheless, Spinoza’s dualism was created within the
unicorn world, the world/Universe!It seems that something happened in his readings:
maybe he read something that pushed him to read Spinoza. Or maybe he had a dream
about Spinoza! Why about Spinoza and not Descartes? Ask Rovelli…
Rovelli indicates that the “I” and the neurons in my brain” are the same thing. So, he
accepts the identity theory. Spinoza’s dual aspects approach is quite close to my
EDWs, but Spinoza constructed his approach within the unicorn world! I emphasize
that Spinoza’s framework is epistemological (dual aspects of the same thing-in-itself
constructed within the unicorn world); my framework is ontological: all EDWs have
ontological substrate and the thing-in-itself and the unicorn are completely rejected!

The ‘I’ who decides is that same ‘I’ which is formed (in a way that is still certainly
not completely clear, but which we have begun to glimpse) from reflections upon
itself; through self-representations in the world; from understanding itself as a
variable point of view placed in the context of the world; from that impressive
structure that processes information and constructs representations which is our brain.
When we have the feeling that ‘it is I’ who decides we couldn’t be more correct. Who
else? I am, as Spinoza maintained, my body and what happens in my brain and heart,
with their immense and, for me, inextricable complexity. (p. 44)

Yes, it is Spinoza here but constructed within the unicorn world! The main difference
between me and Spinoza is the unicorn world vs. EDWs! Also, I recall that my EDWs
perspective is apparently closer to Kant than Spinoza. Nevertheless, Kant work on
noumen-phenomen distinction, exactly like Rovelli…
At the same page, for emphasizing the identity theory position, Rovelli writes:
“I am, as Spinoza maintained, my body and what happens in my brain and heart, with
their immense and, for me, inextricable complexity.” (p. 44) But just few lines later:

Our moral values, our emotions, our loves are no less real for being part of nature, for
being shared with the animal world, or for being determined by the evolution which
our species has undergone over millions of years. Rather, they are more valuable as a
result of this: they are real. They are the complex reality of which we are made. Our
reality is tears and laughter, gratitude and altruism, loyalty and betrayal, the past
which haunts us and serenity. Our reality is made up of our societies, of the emotion
inspired by music, of the rich intertwined networks of the common knowledge which
we have constructed together. All of this is part of the self-same ‘nature’ which we are
describing. (p. 44)

Emotions are real? In what sense? In dual aspects of Spinoza? Then (1) either there
has to be a contradiction (since those dual aspects cannot both have ontology because
there would be a strong ontological contradiction, and exactly this is in Rovelli’s
statement! Or (2) Rovelli is quite close to my EDWs.
I rejected the ontological part of “society”, I have not been interested on “morals” and
“emotions” (all being the “I”). However, “complex reality” is quite wrong notion.
Wrong is also this idea: “Nature is our home, and in nature we are at home.” (p. 46)
“Nature” does not exist, but only the EDWs are. “Nature is our home, and in nature
we are at home.” (p. 46) No, “nature” does not exist, “we” do not exist in nature since
each self is an EW.
In conclusion: I cannot claim that Rovelli plagiarized my ideas. However,
emphasizing that the reality is “interactions”, Rovelli is quite closed to my EDWs. In
his article 1996, interactions refers to different descriptions to the same physical
event, exactly Kantian noumen-phenomen distinction, but this distinction is totally
different than my EDWs! Moreover, a similar framework to my EDWs seems to
underlie several important ideas in Rovelli’s book!
Carlo Rovelli “Reality is not what it seems - The Journey to Quantum Gravity”
(2015)

At the beginning, Rovelli insists in informing us that his framework is the “world”
having space and time. The main notion is here “quantum gravity”. However, in the
last chapter, I would like the reader to read these paragraphs:

There are more than just atoms in this idea: what counts is the way in which they are
combined, one in relation to another. But what relevance can the way in which they
are combined have, in a world in which there is nothing but other atoms? If the atoms
are also an alphabet, who is able to read the phrases written with this alphabet?
The answer is subtle: the way in which the atoms arrange themselves is correlated
with the way other atoms arrange themselves. Therefore, a set of atoms can have
information, in the technical, precise sense described above, about another set of
atoms.
This, in the physical world, happens continuously and throughout, in every moment
and in every place: the light which arrives at our eyes carries information about the
objects which it has played across; the colour of the sea has information on the colour
of the sky above it; a cell has information about the virus that is attacking it; a new
living being has plenty of information because it is correlated with its parents, and
with its species; and you, dear reader, when reading these lines, receive information
about what I am thinking while writing them, that is to say, about what is happening
in my mind at the moment in which I write this text. What occurs in the atoms of your
brain is not any more independent from what is happening in the atoms of mine: we
communicate. The world isn’t, then, just a network of colliding atoms: it is also a
network of correlations between sets of atoms, a network of real reciprocal
information between physical systems. In all of this, there is nothing idealistic or
spiritual; it’s nothing but an application of Shannon’s idea that alternatives can be
counted. All this is as much a part of the world as the stones of the Dolomites, the
buzzing of bees and the waves of the sea. (p. 130)

Careful: when I say that we ‘have information’ about the temperature of cup of tea, or
we ‘don’t have information’ about the velocity of every single molecule, I am not
saying something about mental states, or abstract ideas. I am only saying that the laws
of physics determine a correlation between ourselves and the temperature (for
instance, I’ve looked at a thermometer), but not between ourselves and the velocity of
the individual molecules. It is the same notion of information as the one I started from
in this chapter: the white ball in your hand ‘has information’ about the fact that the
ball in my hand is black. We’re dealing with physical facts, not mental notions. A ball
has information, in this sense, even if the ball does not have mental states, just as a
USB storage device contains information (the number of gigabytes printed on the
device tells us how much information it can contain), even if a
USB storage device does not think. Information in this sense – correlation between
states of systems – is ubiquitous
I believe that in order to understand reality we have to keep in mind that reality is this
network of relations, of reciprocal information, which weaves the world. We slice up
the reality surrounding us into objects. But reality is not made up of discrete objects.
It is a variable flux. Think of an ocean wave. Where does a wave finish? Where does
it begin? Think of mountains. Where does a mountain start? Where does it end? How
far does it continue beneath the Earth’s surface? These are questions without much
sense, because a wave and a mountain are not objects in themselves; they are ways
which we have of slicing up the world to apprehend it, to speak about it more easily.
These limits are arbitrary, conventional, comfortable: they depend on us (as physical
systems) more than on the waves or the mountains. They are ways of organizing the
information which we have or, better, forms of information which we have.
It’s the same for every object, properly considered, including living organisms. This is
why it makes little sense to ask whether a half-cut fingernail is still ‘me’ or has
become ‘not-me’; or if the hairs left on my sofa by the cat are still part of the cat, or
not; or precisely when a child’s life begins. A child begins to live on the day when a
person dreams of her for the first time, long before her conception, or when she forms
her first self-image, or when she breathes for the first time, or when she recognizes
her name, or when we apply any number of other conventions: they are all useful, but
arbitrary. They are ways to think, and to orientate ourselves within the complexity of
reality. (135)

Do you have the feeling of reading some paragraphs from my books? I had this
feeling, but there are paragraphs from Carlo Rovelli’s book (2015).

Carlo Rovelli (2017): “Space is blue and birds fly through it"

Abstract: Quantum mechanics is not about `quantum states': it is about values of

physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the relational
perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications. [Paper
presented to meeting on \Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on
contemporary society", held at The Royal Society in London on 11{12 December
2017; submitted to Philosophical Transactions A.]

Rovelli’s relational alternative to QM is very close to my EDWs. Main main notion

(interactions) is used by Rovelli with exactly the same meaning! We have to recall
that in his article 1996, Rovelli discussed about different descriptions of the same
physical event! In that article, he uses “quantum states”, here he moves to “physical
variables”.
Other paragraphs with EXACTLY my ideas:

There is fundamental discreteness in nature, because of which many physical

variables can take only certain speci_c values and not others. (p. 1)

The values that a variables of a physical system takes are such only relative to another
physical system. (p. 2)

The answer is: when S interacts with another physical system S0. Value actualisation
happens at interactions since variables represent the ways systems a_ect one another.
Any interaction counts, irrespectively of size, number of degrees of freedom, presence
of records, consciousness, degree of classicality of S0, decoherence, or else. In the
course of the interaction, the system S a_ects
the system S0. (p. 3)

The textbook answer is \when we measure it". This obviously makes no sense,
because the grammar of Nature certainly does not care whether you or I are
\measuring" anything. Measurement is an interaction like any other. Variables take
value at any interaction. (p. 4)

The answer of relational QM is that the variable a of the system S actualized in the
interaction with S0 takes value with respect to S0, but not with respect to S00. This is
the core idea underlying the \relational" interpretation of quantum mechanics. (4)

The proper ontology for quantum mechanics is a sparse ontology of (relational)

quantum events happening at interactions between physical systems. (5)

Relational QM is anti-realist about the wave function, but is realist about quantum
events, systems,
interactions... It maintains that \space is blue and birds y through it" and space and
birds can be constituted by molecules, particles, _elds, or whatever. What it denies is
the utility {even the coherence{ of thinking that all this is made up by some
underlying entity. But there is a stronger meaning of `realism': to assume that it is in
principle possible to list all the features of the world, all the values of all variables
describing it, at each moment of continuous time, as is the case in classical
mechanics. This is not possible in relational QM. (6)

The proper ontology for quantum mechanics is a sparse ontology of (relational)

quantum events happening at interactions between physical systems. (5) This
statement mirrors exactly my EDWs! However, this statement is totally different than
what he wrote in his article from 1996!

Ronde_ and R. Fernandez Moujan (2017)[ About Ronde and Moujan

UNBELIEVALBE similarities, see below.] reject Rovelli’s ideas (1996):

“Rovelli’s interpretation takes distance from Bohr’s distinction between macroscopic

and microscopic systems.
“The disturbing aspect of Bohr’s view is the inapplicability of quantum theory to
macrophysics. This
disturbing aspect vanishes, I believe, at the light of the discussion in this paper.”
Instead of the privileging
certain observers (classical systems) Rovelli centers his interpretation in the concept
of information.
“Information indicates the usual ascription of values to quantities that founds physics,
but emphasizes their
relational aspect. This ascription can be described within the theory itself, as
information theoretical
information, namely correlation. But such a description, in turn, is quantum
mechanics and observer
dependent, because a universal observer-independent description of the states of
affairs of the world does
not exist.” [Op. cit.]
Rovelli recognizes the impossibility of presenting an objective description in terms of
systems and replaces
this notion by “net of relations”. According to him: “[...] at the present level of
experimental knowledge
(hypothesis 2), we are forced to accept the result that there is no objective, or more
precisely observerindependent
meaning to the ascription of a property to a system. Thus, the properties of the
systems are to
be described by an interrelated net of observations and information collected from
observations.” [Op. cit.]
The question becomes then: what can we say about this net of relations. Rovelli, talks
about the notion of
information: “The notion of observer independent state of a system is replaced by the
notion of information
about a system that a physical system may possess.” Still, as in the case of Bohr,
Kochen, Bene and Dieks,
the ontological question that any realist would want to answer is still present even
though in a different form:
information about what? Although it is possible to maintain a relational view of
quantum states in terms of
information, the ontological status of such information seems to remain a problematic
issue —at least, from
a realist perspective.” (p. 18)

We can see that Rovelli’s ideas in 1996 were very different than much later: 2017
(about Rovelli’s UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas[ I mention here that
Rovelli’s ideas from 1996 are much different than his ideas from 2015!!!], see this
manuscript!). He was working on “information” under Bohr’s framework.

A commentary introduced by me in February 2018

A commentary introduced by me in February 2018
In some videoclips (2013, but mainly 2016, 2017, 2018), (some of them below)
Carlo Rovelli: "Why Physics needs Philosophy" https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=IJ0uPkG-pr4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlRT8Z2cXlY
On Being with Krista Tippett: Carlo Rovelli — All Reality Is Interaction
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXFbtDR7IF4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nwB6yXIz90
Conclusione Carlo Rovelli - “Osservatore - Osservato” - Conferenza - Associazione
NEL https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNWJY34ew4A
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0hvh4NqgpE

carlo rovelli introduces many of my ideas: ‘interactions’ is my main notion of articles

and books published in 2002. 2004. 2005, 2008 etc. He used this notion in his article
1996 BUT he was referring to “different descriptions” not to ED entities which
belong to the EDWs. However, in his later works (2015, 2017, 2020) he changed his
framework of thinking from “Universe/world to something very similar to my
EDWs!!!

carlo rovelli claims that space and time do not exist! My brother and I wrote a book
about exactly this idea in 2016! He also indicates the role of philosophy in science.
Amazing, a scientist who has never written something about philosophy in the past,
have started to strongly emphasize the role of philosophy just in the last one year or
so! I indicated the same idea in my books 2008, 2010, etc.! It seems carlo rovelli
moves very fast, publishing many of my ideas (not those about quantum mechanics,
but also other ideas) after I published them and posted on various sites on Internet!

The main questions are: Why carlo rovelli did not published ANY of ‘his’ ideas about
the “realities” of quantum mechanics (and not about the “descriptions of the same
physical event”), space and time, the relationship between philosophy-science in the
past (before me, for instance)? How did carlo rovelli SUDDENLY changed his
‘framework of thinking’? In the past, he has written none of these ideas in his works
in quite a long period (many years), but SUDDENLY, in one year or two, he has
changed completely his framework of thinking! How was it possible? Did a miracle
happen in the mind of carlo rovelli? I don’t think so… (In 2015, in a paper posted at
my webpage, I showed that God cannot even exist!)

In my 10 books, I have changed EVERYTHING in Philosophy, Physics and

Cognitive (Neuro)science… Everything: I have changed the framework of human
thinking completely and I have solved the GREAT (i.e. philosophical) problems of
each “special science”. Only two theories remains untouched (Darwin’s evolution and
Boltzmann’s entropy), but my EDWs perspective have furnished their ontologies (for
Darwin book 2016, for Boltzman book 2017)! All other theories have been either
rejected (quantum mechanics, all approaches in cognitive neuroscience, which is a
pseudo-science, etc., books 2008-2016) or majors changed (in book 2010, we
furnished the definition of ‘life’, in book 2017, we re-wrote Einstein’s both relativities
– since in book 2016, we showed that space and time cannot even exist). This is the
main reason so many people have PLAGIARIZED my ideas! Obviously, history does
not forgive plagiarism. They have already lost. “I don’t care that they stole my ideas. I
care that they don’t have any of their own… The present is their; the future, for which
I have really worked, is mine.” (Nikola Tesla)

Rovelli: “There is no time.” In is new book: “The order of time” (2019)

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/14/carlo-rovelli-exploding-
commonsense-notions-order-of-time-interview

from his interview, very similar ideas to my ideas:

-“And I thought: ‘Well, it’s a chemical that is changing things in my brain. But how
do I know that the usual perception is right, and this is wrong? If these two ways of
perceiving are so different, what does it mean that one is the correct one?’” 
-Rovelli’s words, “quantum mechanics cannot deal with the curvature of spacetime,
and general relativity cannot account for quanta”. Both theories are successful; but
their apparent incompatibility is an open problem…
-For Rovelli, there is more: according to his theorising, time itself disappears at the
most fundamental level. 
- He tells us, for example, when explaining that the smooth “flow” of time is an
illusion, that “The events of the world do not form an orderly queue like the English,
they crowd around chaotically like the Italians.” The concept of time, he says, “has
lost layers one after another, piece by piece”. We are left with “an empty windswept
landscape almost devoid of all trace of temporality … a world stripped to its essence,
glittering with an arid and troubling beauty”.
https://physicsworld.com/a/carlo-rovelli-the-author-of-the-order-of-time-discusses-
perhaps-the-greatest-mystery/:
You write in your book that “the nature of time is perhaps the greatest mystery”. What
attracts you to this subject?
I got interested in the nature of time because of quantum gravity. It is well known that
the basic equations of quantum gravity can be written without a time variable, and I
wanted to fully understand what this means. Getting to understand the various sides of
this question has been a long  journey.
In a nutshell, how do you understand time?
I think that the key to understand time is to realize that our common concept of “time”
is multi-layered. Most mistakes about the nature of time, and much of the confusion,
come from taking the full package of properties we attribute to time as forming a
unique bundle that either is there or not. Now we understand that many properties we
attribute to time come from approximations and simplifications.
Many properties we attribute to time come from approximations and simplifications.
Carlo Rovelli
Can you give an example?
For instance, our common idea that time is one and the same for everybody comes
from the fact that we usually move at speeds much smaller than the speed of light
with respect to one another. As we drop approximations, time loses properties that we
instinctively attribute to it. So we can use the word “time” to mean various things,
depending on the generality of the context.
Do you think physicists will ever solve the mystery of time?
Yes, I am optimistic. Why not? Physics has solved so many puzzles that appeared
mysterious in the past. But I think that a full understanding of why time looks to us
the way it does will not be a result that physicists will reach alone. Neuroscientists
have to play their part. There are aspects of our intuitive sense of time that, I believe,
it is a mistake to search for in physics alone. They depend on the specific structure of
our brain.
The Order of Time touches a lot on the philosophy of science; how much philosophy
have you studied?
I am not a philosopher, but I have studied philosophy, read philosophy and go to
philosophy conferences. The best physicists of the past read a lot of philosophy.
Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Bohr, Newton – they were all nourished with
philosophy. There is a current anti-philosophical fashion in physics, which I think is
detrimental for the advancement of science.

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04558-7:
According to theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli, time is an illusion: our naive
perception of its flow doesn’t correspond to physical reality. Indeed, as Rovelli argues
in The Order of Time, much more is illusory, including Isaac Newton’s picture of a
universally ticking clock. Even Albert Einstein’s relativistic space-time — an elastic
manifold that contorts so that local times differ depending on one’s relative speed or
proximity to a mass — is just an effective simplification.
As Rovelli explains, the apparent existence of time — in our perceptions and in
physical descriptions, written in the mathematical languages of Newton, Einstein and
Erwin Schrödinger — comes not from knowledge, but from ignorance. ‘Forward in
time’ is the direction in which entropy increases, and in which we gain information.
In part two, “The World without Time”, Rovelli puts forward the idea that events (just
a word for a given time and location at which something might happen), rather than
particles or fields, are the basic constituents of the world. The task of physics is to
describe the relationships between those events: as Rovelli notes, “A storm is not a
thing, it’s a collection of occurrences.” Nevertheless, in his article 1996, he wrote
about “different descriptions of the same physical event”!!!! Suddenly, Rovelli started
to work on different physical events!!
At our level, each of those events looks like the interaction of particles at a particular
position and time; but time and space themselves really only manifest out of their
interactions and the web of causality between them.

In the final section, “The Sources of Time”, Rovelli reconstructs how our illusions
have arisen, from aspects of thermodynamics and quantum mechanics. He argues that
our perception of time’s flow depends entirely on our inability to see the world in all
its detail. Quantum uncertainty means we cannot know the positions and speeds of all
the particles in the Universe.
He is the quintessence of common sense. He quotes Bertrand Russell’s famously
witty comment on the fact that in modern physics one does not speak of “causes” –
“The law of causality . . . is a relic of a past age that survives, like the monarchy, only
because it is assumed, wrongly, that it does no harm” – but acknowledges the
exaggeration. “At an elementary level there are no cats either,” he writes, “but we do
not for this reason cease to bother with cats”.
-Etc. etc. etc.

[carlo rovelli’s ideas (about “relations”, “no space, no time”) published until 2015 are
exactly Leibniz’s ideas (who fought against Newton’s ideas of absolute space and
absolute time)!!! No more or less! Until 2015, with his “relationism” (in fact nothing
else than Bohr’s “complementarity” and Broglie’s “dualism” in Leibniz’s framework
within the unicorn world (the Universe), carlo rovelli had worked within the unicorn
world!!! carlo rovelli had no idea about the “EDWs” or “different realities” (as many
people who have written UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas) call now my
EDWs). I repeat again that, until 2015, carlo rovelli had been working within the
wrong framework of “Universe/world” emphasizing Bohr’s complementarity and
Leibniz’s relationism but both withing the unicorn world!
Until 2015, carlo rovelli introduce nothing new with his “relationism” In fact, he had
never rejected the notion of the “world”/ “Universe”!!!
Then a sudden change happened in his framework, a sudden change that coincide with
the publication of my Springer’s book!!!
On the contrary, my EDWs perspective is a COMPLETELY new FRAMEWORK OF
THINKING!!! I recall that in 2016, together with my brother Mihai, I wrote a book:
“Dark matter and dark energy, space and time, and other pseudo-notions in
Cosmology” in which we indicate that space and time (spacetime) cannot have any
ontological status. Of course, we are not the first who claim space and time do not
exist, but we proved that spacetime cannot exist within the EDWs!
carlo rovelli wrote a paper on rejecting spacetime in 2006 but he works within the
framework of “world”/Universe; he even mentions this word in his paper without
denying its meaning, on the contrary he accepted the existence of the Universe until
2015! However, in that paper, all his ideas are within the unicorn world!!! he rejected
spacetime exactly as Leibniz rejected Newton’s absolute space/time!

In his article, The Disappearance of Space and Time (in eds. Dieks and Redei
2006), on the first page carlo rovelli writes the first paragraph:

Our understanding of the natural world evolves. We have developed a conceptual

structure that allows us to apprehend and frame the world that we perceive
and think; but this conceptual structure evolves, driven by experience and rational
investigation. Science is a continuous exploration of novel and more
effective ways for thinking the world. (p. 25, 2006)
Is it not clear that carlo rovelli is still working within the “world”/Universe even if he
is denying the existence of space and time??? He introduces, then, the notion of
“relativistic” (from Leibniz and Einstein, of course – therefore rovelli came with
nothing NEW since he was still working within the unicorn world!)!

The clean way of expressing Einstein’s discovery is to say that there are no
space and time: there are only dynamical objects. The world is made by dynamical
fields. These do not live in, or on, spacetime: they form and exhaust
reality. (p. 27)

Of course, Einstein relativies the “reality” but he was still working within the unicorn
world!!!

Or course relationalism, i.e., the idea that motion can be defined only in relation to
other objects,
should not be confused with Galilean relativity. Galilean relativity is the statement
that ‘‘rectilinear
uniform motion’’ is a priori indistinguishable from stasis. This is equivalent to saying
that velocity
(just velocity!), is only relative to other bodies. Relationalism, on the other hand,
holds that any
motion (however zigzagging) is a priori indistinguishable from stasis. The very
formulation of Galilean
relativity assumes a nonrelational definition of motion: ‘‘rectilinear and uniform’’
with respect to
what?When Newton claimed that motion with respect to absolute space is real and
physical, he, in a
sense, overdid it, by insisting that even rectilinear uniform motion is absolute. This
caused a painful
debate, because there are no physical effects of inertial motion (therefore the bucket
argument fails
for this particular class of motions). Newton is well aware of this point, which is
clearly stated in the
Corollary V5 of the Principia, but he chooses to ignore it in the introduction of the
Principia. I think
he did this just to simplify his argument, which was already hard enough for his
contemporaries. (p. 30)

This paragraph has nothing to do with EDWs!!! Carlo rovelli was thinking within the
unicorn world!!! IS IT NOT CLEAR????

Conceptually, what disappears with GR is the idea of space as the ‘‘container’’

of the physical world. As mentioned, this disappearance is not so revolutionary
after all: to some extent it amounts to return to the pre-Newtonian
view of space as a relation between equal-status physical entities…. In the 20th and
21st centuries and with GR
we have been learning that we do not need this frame to keep reality in place.
Reality keeps itself in place. Objects interact with other objects, and this is
reality. Reality is the net of these interactions. We do not need an external entity
to hold this net. We do not need Space, to hold the universe. Maybe the Copernican
revolution is finally being completed. (p. 32)

Again, we clearly see here that carlo rovelli was working within the “Universe”, i.e.,
the unicorn world!!! His “objects interact withi toher objects” is nothing more than
Leibniz’s relationism (against newton’s absolute space and time!!)

To illustrate this point, consider a standard expanding cosmological model.

Its space like surfaces of homogeneity are formed by the events at equal proper
time after the big bang, or equal Friedmann time tFr; these are the surfaces
naturally considered ‘‘simultaneous’’ in cosmology. These surfaces are not equal
time surfaces according to Einstein’s simultaneity definition5. Therefore, in a
cosmological context we have the alternative to call either ‘‘simultaneous’’
events at the same Friedmann time, or events that satisfy Einstein’s definition of
simultaneity. Both definitions are useful. The choice between them is a matter of
taste or computational convenience, not a matter of ontology. (p. 33)

There are many distinct notions of time employed in GR: coordinate time t,
proper time S, clock times T, cosmological time tFr, asymptotic Poincare´
timey. The last two refer to the description of special solutions of the Einstein
field equations only. They are irrelevant in a discussion of the ontology of time,
because a different ontology for different solutions of the same theory is certainly
unsatisfactory. Clock times are simply the readings of certain physical variables,
which can be locally employed as the independent variable for convenience.
Once again, they have nothing to tell us about the ontology of time. (p. 34)

This paragraph indicates us that carlo rovelli has no idea about EDWs. Moreover, in
my book 2014, I applied my EDWs to Einstein’s special and general relativity getting
the ONTOLOGY of both theories!!! Of course, carlo rovelli had no idea about this
ontology in the period he wrote this period! He just rejected the existence of space
and time, exactly as Leibniz did against Newton’s absolute space and absolute time!

Instead, we must describe reality in terms of correlations between observables.

We can measure physical quantities around us. The physical theory restricts the
combinations of quantities that we can measure. It predicts relations between
these quantities. (p. 34)
“correlations” is an old concept from QM, but it was created within the unicorn world.
In fact, the above sentences are created within the unicorn world, exacly as Bohr
created his idea of “complementarity” within the unicorn world (i.e., the thing-in-
itself, borrowed from Kant, even if he used other notion…) or de Broglie writes about
the particle associated with the wave.

So, where does temporality, with all its peculiar features (‘‘flow’’ of time,
whatever this means, irreversibility, memory, awarenessy) come from? I think
that all this has nothing to do with mechanics. It has to do with statistical
mechanics, thermodynamics, perhaps psychology or biology. In Rovelli (1993) I
have developed, in collaboration with Alain Connes, the idea that it may be
possible to recover temporality from statistical mechanics, within an atemporal
mechanical universe (statistical time hypothesis). If this point of view is correct,
temporality is an artifact of our largely incomplete knowledge of the state of the
world, not an ultimate property of reality. (p. 35)

This paragraph is on the last page of carlo rovelli’s article. Can the reader deduce that
carlo rovelli was working within the EDWs perspective and rejecting the notion of
“world/Universe”??? No. otherwise, these paragraphs would contradict the first
paragraphs of his article!!
Conclusion of this article: carolo rovelli had no idea about EDWs; he was still
working within the unicorn world, i.e., the world/Universe!!!!!!!!!!!

However, after 2015, carlo rovelli continues to publish more and more
UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas!!! His arguments are UNBELIEVABLE
similar to my arguments… Until 2015, carlo rovelli had been working within the
unicorn world; then he realized a sudden change! I let the reader to understand carlo
rovelli’s step after 2015 since I mentioned that my book at Springer has been
published in November 2015!!
Anyway, I have published FIVE books (2008-2014) with my EDWs, and in 2007, my
entire PhD thesis (my first book 2008) was posted at UNSW (Australia) on their
site!!! Moreover, in 2005, in Synthese article, in a footnote, I mentioned that the
EDWs would be available for all quantum mechanics problems; in 2006 I published
and posted on Internet (FREE) an article about my EDWs applied to quantum
mechancis!
I emaphasize again that I believe that it would be impossible for carlo rovelli to
discover the EDWs working within the quatum mechanics. Why? Because I
discovered the existence of EDWs working on the mind-body problem, that would
involve to special particular entities: the self and the body, that is, the mind-EW and
the macro-EW. Quantum mechanics problems refer to ED entities that all external to
our mind (and body). Therefore, it would be IMPOSSIBLE for someone working only
on particular “external” entities to discover the the existence of EDWs!!!!
Only working for solving the mind-brain problem, that is, the “internal” and the
“external” (wrong distinction, anyway) entities, I could discover the existence of the
mind-EW and the macro-EW (where the body is placed).
Later, I applied this approach to the wave-particle duality, and after this, I applied my
EDWs to the macro-micro duality.
After solving all these problems, I could apply my EDWs perspective to Einstein’s
special relativity (the person on the train that has constant speed and the person on the
pavement are in EDWs) and general relativity (acceleration presupposes the
movement from one particular EW to an EDW in each fraction of second!
The conclusion is the following: it appear that it was impossible for carlo
rovelli to discover the existence of EDWs working ONLY on the problems of
Quantum Mechanics. His approach is nothing new, being just a combination of
Bohr’s complementarity (Copenhagen interpretation), de Broglie’s dualism in the
framework of Leibniz’s “relationism” but within the unicorn world (i..e, the
Universe/world)! No more or less.
It has to be clear that I am the first human being who discovered the existence of
EDWs in the entire history of human thinking (Philosophy, Physics, Cognitive
Science, Biology, etc.)!
The reader cannot believe that my EDWs is a continuation of carolo rovelli’s
approach. In fact, carlo rovelli’s is just a combination of Bohr’s complementarity with
Leibniz’s relationism within the unicorn world (world/Universe). carlo rovelli’s
approach (until 2015) has nothing to do with my EDWs since he still had worked
within the framework of the unicorn world, accepting (officially) the existence of
Universe/world!!

I recall that in 2014, I have sent emails to thousands of people (philosophers,

cognitive neuroscientists, and physicists) in the entire world regarding the
UNBELIEVABLE similarities between my ideas (2002-2008) and markus gabriel’s
ideas (2013). Therefore, it is not accidentally that so many people have started to
published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas since 2015!

After 2015, carolo rovelli have started to publish UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to
my ideas (2002-2008) until today! If someone compare carlo rovelli’s “relationism”
with my EDWs perspective means that that person does not understand my EDWs
and he is still working within the unicorn world! More exactly, even carolo rovelli’s
relationsionism is quite wrong (being constructed within the unicorn word)!

It has to be clear that with the discovery of EDWs (my first publication was in 2002,
in English, at Romanian journal of philosophy and posted immediately on Internet,
then 2003, and 2005 at Synthese (USA, among the best international journals of
philosophy of science, epistemology in the entire “world”)), I HAVE CHANGED
EVERYTHING in philosophy, physics, cognitive neuroscience, EVERYTHING in
human knowledge!
The EDWs perspective is the GREATEST challenge in the history of human thinking!
Therefore nobody can dare to compare my EDWs with carlo rovelli’s relationism
(Bohr’s complementarity and Leibniz’s relations)…

I emphasize, again and again, that de Broglie’s constructed his “duality” within the
unicorn world, exactly as Everett thought his “many-worlds” within the same wrong
framework, the “world”/“Universe”, or the “unicorn world”, as we called. Also,
Bohr’s complementarity was constructed within the unicorn world. Such “duality”, as
any kind of “duality” (so many during the history of human thinking), are incredible
similar to Descartes’s mind-body “duality” or to Leibniz’s “parallelism” also
constructed within the unicorn world. Such dualities have produced strong ontological
contradictions impossible to be solved within the unicorn world!) In fact, working
within the unicorn world, everybody thought that the double-slit experiment indicated
a kind of the duality between the wave and the particle. rovelli’s “relationism” is
mstly a kind of de Broglie’s dualism within the unicorn world, no more or less.

Constructed within the unicorn world, carlo rovelli’s “relationism” is nothing more
than de Broglie’s duality or Bohr’s complementarity within Leibniz’s relationism
framework, but in the unicorn world; therefore his approach is totally wrong (it is an
empty approach without any kind of ontology, exactly as Bohr’s complementariy and
de Brogle’s “dualism wavea-particle”! What does carlo rovelli’s relationism brings
new in quantum mechanics in comparation with Bohr’s and de Broglie’s approaches?
(I mention here that Everett’s “many worlds” approach is still constructed within the
unicorn world and has nothing to do with my EDWs)!

Until 2002 and 2005 (when my articles – in English - have been published in
journals), all other physicists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers had been
working within the unicorn world. Suddenly, after my article at Synthese (USA) in
2005 and my first book 2008 (in English posted FREE on various sites), some people
had published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to our ideas. Later, in 2014, I sent
email to thousands of people (philosophers, cognitive neuroscientists, and physicists)
in the entire world underlying the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between Markus
Gabriel’s ideas of his book 2013 and his ideas (2002-2008). Also, I posted a clip on
YouTube referring to these unbelievable similarities. After 2015 (when my Springer
book has been published), more and more people (from many countries, many
domains, on many topics) have started to published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas
to my ideas.

The reader has to notice that carlo rovelli has changed his framework after 2015: he
has moved from the unicorn world to the UNBELIEVABLE similar framework to
EDWs!!! Even in such conditions, carlo rovelli’s framework is not identical to the
EDWs… it seems as if he could not understand completely all rules of EDWs…

Carlo Rovelli - Helgoland, Making sense of the quantum revolution, Riverhead

Books, 2021 (Translation copyright © 2021 by Erica Segre and Simon Carnell
Originally published in Italy as Helgoland by Adelphi Edizioni, Milan, in 2020)

If the strangeness of quantum theory confuses us, it also opens new

perspectives with which to understand reality. A reality that is more subtle
than the simplistic materialism of particles in space. A reality made up of
relations rather than objects. (p. 10)

[?Relations”? Does it mean “objects” do not exist? Anyway, we have to realize that
Rovelli is working within the framework of the “Universe/world”, a notion which is
mentioned many times by Rovelli!

This book represents where I have gotten to so

far. It does not ignore other opinions, but it is shamelessly partisan: centered
on the perspective that I consider the most effective and that I think opens
up the most interesting paths: the “relational” interpretation of quantum
theory. (p. 11)

[Rovelli writes about “relational” interpretation of quantum theory. This idea has
nothing to do with my EDWs!!

RELATIONS
In a physics laboratory, where we study a small object such as an atom or a
photon of Zeilinger’s lasers, it is clear who the observer is: it is the scientist
who prepares, observes and measures the quantum object, who deploys
their instruments of measurement, detecting the light emitted from the atom
or the place where the photons arrive.
But the vast world is not made up of scientists in laboratories, or
instruments of measurement. What is an observation, when there is no
scientist observing? What does quantum theory tell us, where there is no
one measuring? What does quantum theory tell us about what happens in
another galaxy?
The key to the answer, I believe, and the keystone of the ideas in this
book, is the simple observation that scientists, and their measuring
instruments as well, are all part of nature. What quantum theory describes,
then, is the way in which one part of nature manifests itself to any other
single part of nature.
At the heart of the “relational” interpretation of quantum theory is the
idea that the theory does not describe the way in which quantum objects
manifest themselves to us (or to special entities that do something special
denoted “observing”). It describes how every physical object manifests
itself to any other physical object. How any physical entity acts on any
other physical entity. We think of the world in terms of objects, things, entities (in
physics, we
call them “physical systems”): a photon, a cat, a stone, a clock, a tree, a boy,
a village, a rainbow, a planet, a cluster of galaxies . . . These do not exist in
splendid isolation. On the contrary, they do nothing but continuously act
upon each other. To understand nature, we must focus on these interactions
rather than on isolated objects. A cat listens to the ticking of a clock; a boy
throws a stone; the stone moves the air through which it flies, hits another
stone and moves that, presses into the ground where it lands; a tree absorbs
energy from the sun’s rays, produces the oxygen that the villagers breathe
while watching the stars, and the stars run through the galaxies, pulled by
the gravity of other stars . . . The world that we observe is continuously
interacting. It is a dense web of interactions.
Individual objects are the way in which they interact. If there was an
object that had no interactions, no effect upon anything, emitted no light,
attracted nothing and repelled nothing, was not touched and had no smell . .
. it would be as good as nonexistent. To speak of objects that never interact
is to speak of something—even if it existed—that could not concern us. It is
not even clear what it would mean to say that such objects “exist.” The
world that we know, that relates to us, that interests us, what we call
“reality,” is the vast web of interacting entities, of which we are a part, that
manifest themselves by interacting with each other. It is with this web that
we are dealing.
One of these entities is a photon observed by Zeilinger. But another is
Anton Zeilinger himself. Zeilinger is an entity—like a photon, a cat or a
star. You, reading these lines, are another such entity, and I—as I write them
on a Canadian winter morning with the sky through the window of my
study still dark, and an amber-colored kitten purring nestled between myself
and the computer on which I’m working—I am also an entity like the
others.
If quantum theory describes how a photon manifests itself to Zeilinger,
and these are two physical systems, it must also describe the way in which
any object manifests itself to any other object.
There are particular systems that are “observers” in a strict sense of the
term: have sense organs and memory, work in a laboratory, interact with a
large environment, are macroscopic. But quantum mechanics does not
describe only these: it describes the elementary and universal grammar of
physical reality underlying not just laboratory observations but every type
and instance of interaction. (p. 61-2)

If we look at things in this way, there is nothing special in the

“observations” introduced by Heisenberg: any interaction between two
physical objects can be seen as an observation. We must be able to treat any
object as an “observer” when we consider the manifestation of other objects
to it. Quantum theory describes the manifestations of objects to one another.
The discovery of quantum theory, I believe, is the discovery that the
properties of any entity are nothing other than the way in which that entity
influences others. It exists only through its interactions. Quantum theory is
the theory of how things influence each other. And this is the best
description of nature that we have.52 (p. 62-3)

[UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my EDWs perspective!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! word by

word!!! Carlo Rovelli writes about EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

The first radical consequence is that to attribute properties to something

when it does not interact is superfluous and may be misleading. It is talking
about something that has no meaning, for there are no properties outside of
interactions.54 (p. 62)

[Again, even if Rovelli mentioned Bohr, the main idea is identical to my main idea of
the EWs perspective!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

For you the soporific is released or not, and you are asleep or awake.
For me you are neither awake nor asleep. For me, “there is a quantum
superposition.” For you, there is the reality of being awake, or of not being
so. The relational perspective allows both things to be true: each relates to
interactions with respect to distinct observers—you and me.
Is it possible that a fact might be real with respect to you and not real
with respect to me?
Quantum theory, I believe, is the discovery that the answer is yes. Facts
that are real with respect to an object are not necessarily so with respect to
another.* A property may be real with respect to a stone, and not real with
respect to another stone. (63)

[it is about EDWs……it is the main rule of my EDWs: one EW does not exist for any
EDW!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! In his article 1996, Rovelli was
writing about “different descriptions of the same physical event” which mirrors
exactly Bohr’s Kantian distinction between noumen-phenomen. Here Rovelli writes
about entities which a very close to the entities which belong to the EDWs!]

The gist is that the properties of objects exist only in the

moment of their interactions, and they can be real with respect to one object
and not with respect to another. (p. 64)

[again, my main idea from my EDWs perspective!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

The world is the network of relative facts: relations realized when
physical entities interact. A stone collides with another stone. The light
from the sun reaches my skin. You read these lines. (p. 65)

The world that emerges from these considerations is a rarefied one. A world
in which, rather than independent entities with definite properties, there are
entities that have properties and characteristics only with regard to others,
and only when they interact. A stone does not have a position in itself: it
only has a position in relation to another stone with which it collides. The
sky does not in itself have any color: it has color with respect to my eyes
when they look at it. A star does not shine in the sky as an autonomous
entity: it is a node in the network of interactions that forms the galaxy in
which it resides. (p. 66)

To understand quantum theory, we need to modify the grammar of our

understanding of reality, as when Anaximander understood that the true
shape of the Earth changed the grammar of notions of what is “up” and
“down.”60 Objects are described by variables that assume value when
interacting, and this value is determined in relation to the objects in the
interaction, not to others. An entity is one, no one and one hundred
thousand.
The world fractures into a play of points of view that do not admit of a
univocal, global vision. It is a world of perspectives, of manifestations, not
of entities with definite properties or unique facts. Properties do not reside
in objects, they are bridges between objects. Objects are such only with
respect to other objects, they are nodes where bridges meet. The world is a
perspectival game, a play of mirrors that exist only as reflections of and in
each other. (68)

[statements which mirror exactly my EDWs perspective! In these paragraphs, Rovelli

writes about “ independent entities with definite properties, there are
entities that have properties and characteristics only with regard to others,
and only when they interact”, exactly my ED entities which belong to the EDWs. In
his work 1996, he was talking about “different descriptions of the same physical
event”, but here he moves to “entities” and their “interactions” which are very close to
my EDWs!!!!]

The joint properties of two objects exist only in relation to a third. To say
that two objects are correlated means to articulate something with regard to
a third object: the correlation manifests itself when the two correlated
objects both interact with this third object, which can check.
The apparent incongruity raised by what seemed like communication at
a distance between two entangled objects was due to neglect of this fact: the
existence of a third object that interacts with both the systems is necessary
to give reality to the correlations. Everything that manifests itself does so in
relation to something. A correlation between two objects is a property of
the two objects—like all properties, it exists only in relation to a further,
third object.
Entanglement is not a dance for two partners, it is a dance for three. (73)
y in particular situations: it is what happens, generically, in an
interaction when this interaction is considered in relation to a system
external to it.
From an external perspective, any manifestation of one object to another,
which is to say any property, is a correlation; it is an entanglement between
an object and another.
Entanglement, in sum, is none other than the external perspective on the
very relations that weave reality: the manifestation of one object to another,
in the course of an interaction, in which the properties of the objects
become actual. (p. 74)

[Rovelli explains “entanglement” exactly as I explained in my works, long time

ago!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! In his article 1996,
he did not explain entanglement at all!!!]

Extended to any and every natural

phenomenon, Bohr’s intuition becomes:
Whereas previously we thought that the properties of every object
could be determined even if we overlooked the interactions occurring
between this object and others, quantum physics demonstrates that
the interaction is an inseparable part of phenomena. The
unambiguous description of any phenomenon requires the inclusion
of all the objects involved in the interaction in which the
phenomenon manifests itself. (p. 98)

[Rovelli’s extension of Bohr’s “intuition” is exactly my

EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Again, in his article 1996, he was writing about
different descriptions of the same physical event!!!]

The mind does not enter into the equation. Special “observers” have no
real role to play in the theory. The central point is simpler: the properties of
an object become manifest when this object interacts with others. We
cannot separate the properties from these other objects. We cannot attribute
them just to a single object. All of the (variable) properties of an object, in
the final analysis, are such and exist only with respect to other objects.
“Contextuality” is the technical name that denotes this central aspect of
quantum physics: things exist in a context.
An isolated object, taken in itself, independent of every interaction, has
no particular state. At most we can attribute to it a kind of probabilistic
disposition to manifest itself in one way or another.
102 But even this is only
an anticipation of future phenomena, a reflection of phenomena past, and
only and always relative to another object.
The conclusion is revolutionary. It leaps beyond the idea that the world
is made up of a substance that has attributes, and forces us to think about
everything in terms of relations.103
This, I believe, is what we have discovered about the world with quanta. (p. 99)

[Exactly my ideas in my works 2005, 2007, 2008, etc. Etc.

Etc.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Again, in his article 1996, Rovelli was writing
about different descriptions of the same physical event. He has nothing about
“context”. Moreover, in his article 1996, he did not ex palin at all the relationship
between his “different descriptions”!!!]

In the history of Western philosophy, there is a recurrent critique of the

notion that “entities” are the foundation of reality. It can be found in widely
different philosophical traditions, from the “Everything flows” of Heraclitus
to the contemporary metaphysics of relations.110 Only in the past few years,
books of philosophy have come out with titles such as Formal Approach to
the Metaphysics of Perspectives and Viewpoint Relativism: A New
Approach to Epistemological Relativism Based on the Concept of Points of
View, to name just some most recent examples.111
In analytic philosophy,
structural realism is based on the idea that relations come before objects.112
Michel Bitbol has written From inside the World: For a Philosophy and a
Science of Relations.113 Laura Candiotto and Giacomo Pezzano have
published a book with the title The Philosophy of Relations.114 p. 100

[we can see here other people who have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to
my EDWs perspective!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

There is nothing mysterious about this: the world is not divided into
stand-alone entities. It is we who divide it into objects for our convenience.
A mountain chain is not divided into individual mountains: it is we who
divide it up into parts that strike us as in some way separate. A countless
number of our definitions, perhaps all of them, are relational: a mother is a
mother because she has a child; a planet is a planet because it orbits a star; a
predator is such because it hunts prey; a position in space is there only in
relation to something else. Even time exists only as a set of relations.1 (p. 102)

[I wrote UNBELIEVABLE similar statements in my previous works!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

But there is no need to attribute proto-consciousness to elementary

systems in order to get around a frozen “simple matter.” It is enough to have
observed how the world is better described by relative variables and their
correlations. This allows us to be released from the prison of a blunt
opposition between the objectivity of matter and mental life. The rigid
distinction between a mental world and a physical one fades. It is possible
to think of both mental and physical phenomena as natural phenomena:
both products of interactions between parts of the physical world. (p. 112)

[Rovelli deals here with the mind-brain problem and his solution is exactly my EDWs
perspective applied to this problem!!!!! I published this alternative LONG TIME
AGO!!!!!!! In his article 1996, he writes NOTHING about the mind-brain
problem!!!!!!]

I see a rock falling toward me.124 If I move, I will survive. There is

nothing mysterious about the fact that I move. It is explained by Darwin’s
theory: those who did not move were crushed and killed; I am a descendant
of those who move out of the way. But in order to be able to move, my
body needs to know that the stone is heading for me. For it to know, there
must be a physical correlation between a physical variable inside me and
the physical state of the rock. This correlation is there, obviously, because
the visual system does precisely this: it correlates the surrounding
environment with neural processes in the brain. There are all sorts of
correlation between internal and external, but this one has a particular
characteristic: if it was not there, or if it was not well adjusted, I would be
killed by the rock. The correlation between internal and external that links
the state of the rock to the neurons in my brain is directly relevant in the
Darwinian sense: its presence or absence influences my survival. (116-7)

[These statements mirror exactly my main notion which explain the relationships
between EDWs: “correspondences”!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Again,
in his article 1996, Rovelli was writing about different descriptions of the same
physical event!!! In 2010 van Fraassen emphasizes that Rovelli writes nothing about
the relationships between these different descriptions!!!!]

And so finally I can get to the point: If we think about the physical world
in terms of simple matter with variable properties, correlations are
accessory facts. It seems necessary to add something extraneous to matter
to speak about those correlations. But quantum physics is the discovery that
the physical world is a web of correlations: relative information. The things
of nature are not collections of isolated elements in haughty individualism. Meaning
and intentionality are only particular cases of the ubiquity of
correlations. There is a continuity between the world of meanings in our
mental life and the physical world. Both are relations. (118-9)

[Again, UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! However, he

introduces again his notion of “information” a notion which it is used quite a lot in his
article from 1996. He uses this notion in that article because he was working within
the unicorn world!!]

In order to be coherent, a vision of the world—a theory of the world—

must be able to justify and give an account of the ways in which the
inhabitants of that world arrive at that vision, at that theory.
This condition, which is perhaps a problem for naive materialism, is
beautifully satisfied if we rethink matter as interaction and correlations. (p. 119)

[Again, UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my main ideas of my EDWs

perspective !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

to me, changes the terms of the question. If the world consists of relations,
then no description is from outside it. The descriptions of the world are, in
the ultimate analysis, all from inside. They are all in the first person. Our
perspective on the world, our point of view, being situated inside the world
(our “situated self,” as Jenann Ismael beautifully puts it127), is not special: it
rests on the same logic on which quantum physics, hence all of physics, is
based.
If we imagine the totality of things, we are imagining being outside the
universe, looking at it from out there. But there is no “outside” to the
totality of things. The external point of view is a point of view that does not
exist.128 Every description of the world is from inside it. The externally
observed world does not exist; what exists are only internal perspectives on
the world which are partial and reflect one another. The world is this
reciprocal reflection of perspectives.

Thomas Nagel, in a celebrated article, asked the question, “What is it

like to be a bat?” He argued that this question is meaningful but escapes
natural science.129 The mistake, here, is to assume that physics is the
description of things in the third person. On the contrary, the relational
perspective shows that physics is always a first-person description of
reality, from one perspective. (p. 122)

[Rovelli deals with the mind-brain problem. His solution is UNBELIEVABLE similar
to my solution: the EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

But these are not the only alternatives. If the qualities of an object are
born from the interaction with something else, then the distinction between
mental and physical phenomena fades considerably. Whether it is the
physical variables or what philosophers of the mind call “qualia”—
elementary mental phenomena such as “I see red”—both can be thought of
as more or less complex natural phenomena.
Subjectivity is not a qualitative leap with respect to physics: it requires a
growth in complexity (Bogdanov would say of “organization”), but always
in a world that is made up of perspectives, already from the most
elementary level.
I think that when we wonder about the relationship between the “I” and
“matter,” we are using two concepts that are both confused and misleading,
and this is the origin of the confusion surrounding the questions about the
nature of consciousness.
Who is the “I” that has the sensation of feeling, if not the integrated set
of our mental processes? We have an intuition of unity when we think about
ourselves, but this is justified by the integration of our body and by the
ways our mental processes work, of which the part we call conscious does
one thing at a time. The first term of the problem, the “I,” is the residue of a
metaphysical error: the result of the common mistake of mistaking a
process for an entity. (p. 123)

Introspection is the
worst instrument of inquiry if we are interested in the nature of mind: it is
tantamount to looking for our own prejudices and wallowing in them.
Even worse is the second term of the question, “matter.” It is, as well,
the residue of an incorrect metaphysics based on too naive a conception of
matter as a universal substance defined only by mass and motion. This is
erroneous metaphysics because it is contradicted by quantum physics.
If we think in terms of processes, events, in terms of relative properties,
of a world of relations, the hiatus between physical phenomena and mental
phenomena is much less dramatic. It becomes possible to see both as
natural phenomena generated by complex structures of interactions. (124)
[again, UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my EDWs perspective applied to the mind-
brain problem!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]

In these layers we have been able to recognize regularities and have

gathered information relevant to ourselves that has enabled us to create a
picture of each layer and to think about it with a certain coherence. Each
one is an approximation. Reality is not divided into levels. The levels into
which we break it down, the objects into which it appears to be divided, are
the ways in which nature relates to us, in dynamical configurations of
physical events in our brain that we call “concepts.” The separation of
reality into levels is relative to our way of being in interaction with it. (p. 125)

[UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Rovelli rejects

“levels” exactly as I rejected this notion in my previous works!!!!!!!]

Carlo Rovelli (2021): “The Relational Interpretation of Quantum Physics”,

https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.09170v3

The relational interpretation (or RQM, for Relational

Quantum Mechanics) solves the measurement problem
by considering an ontology of sparse relative events, or
facts. Events are realized in interactions between any
two physical systems and are relative to these systems. (p. 1)

[In his article 1996, Carlo Rovelli did not write about “ontology of sparse relative
events, or
Facts”! He writes mainly about “different descriptions of the same physical event”!!!!
Here, that physical event is replaced with the “ontology of sparse relative events, or
facts”!]

Quantum theory is about physical events, not quantum states (p. 1) + “RQM interprets
quantum mechanics as a theory about physical events, or facts.” (p. 2)

[First statement is a title of a section: the same problem: in his work 1996, he writes
about “different descriptions of the same physical event”, but here we see he talks
about “physical events”. Rovelli, the problem is that in your article 1996, you writes
about “different descriptions of the same physical event”! It is only one “physical
event”, not more! Why did you make a plural of this notion (physical event)? Did
Smelark influence your old idea?
In the second statement, Rovelli emphasizes again he works on physical events or
facts! Nevertheless, he has been working within the unicorn world/Universe/world all
his time, therefore, it seems that this statement produces a huge ontological
contradiction!]

Facts are sparse: they are realised only at the interactions between (any) two physical
systems. This is the
key physical insight in Heisenberg’s seminal paper and a
basic assumption of RQM.
Facts are relative to the systems that interact. That
is, they are labelled by the interacting systems. This
is the core idea of RQM. It gives a general and precise
formulation to the central feature of quantum theory, on
which Bohr correctly long insisted: contextuality. (p. 2)

[Nevertheless, these statements are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my statements from

my previous works (2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007!!!! Rovelli did not have exactly
such statements in his work from 1996! There are some statements apparently quite
close to the above statements, the problem is that in 1996, Rovelli constructed his
statements within the unicorn world/Universe/world!! He did not have any idea about
the EDWs. Amazing, in the article writen with Smelark in 2007, they wrote
statements quite similar to my statements from 2002-2007 and very similar to the
above statements…Rovelli is writing about the EDWs!]

The RQM solution. The solution offered by

RQM is that facts are labelled by systems. They are labelled by the systems involved
in the interaction where
the fact happens. (p. 3)

[The same observation as above…]

Notice that in an ontology based on facts (or events)

rather than quantum states, the phrase “Schr¨odinger’s
cat is in a quantum superposition” means only that we
cannot use neither the cat being dead nor the cat being
alive as inputs for transition amplitudes. This is precisely
what RQM clarifies: facts are labelled by the systems
involved in the interactions and the transition amplitudes
W(b, a) have physical meaning only if a and b are relative
to a same system. (p. 3)

[This statement is written by Rovelli within the EDWs perspective, not within the
Universe/world. AMAZING, in this article Rovelli avoids to use “universe”/“world”
as many times as in his article from 1996!!!! In 1996 he was working within the
“Universe”/“world”, in this article he is working within the EDWs perspective!! Did
Smelark teach Rovelli to move from the “universe” to a kind of EDWs?]

The macroscopic world is

entirely described by stable facts. (p. 3)

[Now, Rovelli moves to the macro-EW! In his article from 1996, he talk about
Universe/world not about the “macroscopic world”!!!!]

RQM is based on the observation that enlarging the

ontology from stable facts to all relative facts resolves
these difficulties, and eliminates the difficulty of characterising what is an observer
and what is a measurement.
Any system is an “observer” in the sense of of being a
system with respect to which facts happen. (p. 3)
[We see here just EDWs, no more or less!!!! It seems that Smelark influenced quite a
lot Rovelli’s view…]

For relative facts, every interaction can be seen as a

“Copenhagen measurement”, but only for the systems
involved. Any physical system can play the role of the
“Copenhagen observer”, but only for the facts defined
with respect to itself. From this perspective, RQM is
nothing else than a minimal extension of the textbook
Copenhagen interpretation, based on the realisation that
any physical system can play the role of the “observer”
and any interaction can play the role of a “measurement”:
this is not in contradiction with the permanence of interference through interactions
because the “measured”
values are only relative to the interacting systems themselves and do not affect other
physical systems. (p. 3)

[Rovelli, in your article from 1996, you talked about different descriptions of the
SAME PHYSICAL EVENT, and now you extend Copenhagen observer to “any
physical system” which can play the “role of the observer” (I.e., the EDWs!!!!!!!!!!!)
It seems that Smelark influenced you quite a lot!!!!]

The idea that quantum states are relative states,

namely states of a physical system relative to a second physical system, is Everett’s
lasting contribution to
the understanding of quantum theory [37]. (p. 4)

[In your article from 1996, you mentioned Everett’s approach influenced your
approach. For me, Everett’s many worlds approach is totally wrong, an approach
constructed within the unicorn world!!!]

The relational interpretation circumvents the PBR (Pusey, Barrett, Rudolph) theorem
because it is not a hidden variable theory [27]: there is no “ontological state” at all,
because reality is understood in terms of sparse relative
events.
A moment of reflection shows that any quantum state
used in real laboratories, where scientists use quantum
mechanics concretely, is always a relative state. (p. 4)

[This statement is quite wrong, for me. I did not talk about “relative state” in my
approach applied to quantum mechanics. I wrote about ED entities which belong to
the EDWs, but these ED entities are not “relative”; the ED entities really exist in their
EDWs. The same observation is available for next statement.]

Finally, there is a simple observation that confirms that

it is a mistake to charge the quantum state with ontological weight [15]. (p. 4)

Hence such a variable can take discrete values only. Any

variable separating finite regions of phase space is discrete.
This is the deep root of the most characteristic quantum phenomena: discrete atomic
spectra, photons (that
is, discrete energy levels of electromagnetic waves), discrete spin, finite black body
entropy, finite black hole
entropy, etcetera. (p. 4)

[We can talk about “discretness” only working within the EDWs, but not in the
Universe/world. In fact, even in this article, Rovelli did not mention exactly if he gave
up to the notion of the Universe/world…]

The 1996 seminal RQM paper [12] indicated information as a key concept to
understand quantum theory (un-der the influence of John Wheeler [39, 40]) and
suggested
the program of understanding quantum theory by deriving its peculiar formalism from
a transparent set of elementary “postulates” formulated in terms of information
Theory. (pp. 4-5)

[As we emphasized above, indeed, working within the unicorn-world/Universe/world,

Rovelli needed the notion of “information”.]

From this perspective, the notion of information as number of possible alternatives

may play a useful role in accounting for the general structure of the correlations in
the physical world.
It is in this sense that the two postulates can be understood. They are limitations on
the structure of the
values that variables can take. The list of relevant variables, which define a physical
system, and their algebraic
relations, are provided by specific quantum theories. (p. 5)

[Obviously, Rovelli, changes the meaning of his notion of “information” from his
article 1996 to this article…]

Locality is what makes this work [68]: the quantum

mechanical notion of “physical system” an be identified with the general relativistic
notion of “spacetime region”. The quantum mechanical notion of
“interaction” between systems is identified with the
general relativistic notion of “adjacency” between
spacetime regions. Locality assures that interaction
requires (and defines) adjacency. Thus quantum
“events” can be associated to three dimensional
surfaces bounding spacetime regions and quantum
mechanical transition amplitudes are associated to
“processes” identified with the spacetime regions
themselves. In other words, variables actualise at
three dimensional boundaries, with respect to (arbitrary) spacetime partitions. The
theory can then
be used locally, without necessarily assuming anything about the global aspects of the
universe. (p. 6)
[Amazing, I have never seen these ideas in his previous works!!!!!! However, these
ideas appear in my book (written with my brother, Mihai) in 2016!!!!!!!!!!!!!! It is
exactly in the same framework in which we reject “spacetime”!! I have never seen
Rovelli rejecting the existence of spacetime exactly in the same manner!!!!!!!!!!!!! I
add that Rovelli still uses this notion of the “universe”, even if I rejected completely
in my first works!!]

The relational interpretation offers an alternative to

the quantum state realism of Many-Words-like interpretation and to the strong
instrumentalism of the strictly
epistemic interpretations [33, 41, 42, 47, 49, 70]. It avoids
introducing “many worlds”, hidden variables, physical
collapse, and also avoids the instrumentalism of other
epistemic interpretations. But, like any other consistent
interpretation of quantum theory, it comes at a price. (p. 6)

[Rovelli, your approach avoids introducing “many worlds”?? but in your article 1996,
you consider “many worlds” quite close to your approach!!! Moreover, you reject
here “instrumentalism” but in your article from 1996, “different descriptions of the
same physical event” send to a kind of instrumentalism. Did your work with Smelark
influenced you so much that you reject now many worlds and any kind of
instrumentalism? But this attitude is quite close to my EDWs perspective!!!]

the actual value of all physical quantities of any

system is only meaningful in relation to another system. (p. 6)

[Again, in your article 1996, you writes about different descriptions of the same
physical system and now you are talking about “all physical quantities”??? Again, it
seems that Smerlak influenced you quite a lot…]

Hence the conceptual cost of RQM is giving up a strong

form of realism: not only to give up the assumption that
physical variables take values at all times, but also to accept that they take values at
different times for different
systems. (p. 6)

[We have here exactly the EDWs!!! in his article from 1996, Rovelli did not write
something like this!!!!! He writes: “different observers can give different accounts of
the same set of events” (Rovelli 1996: 1643)!!!!!!!! What we see in this article (and
also in the article written with Smelark and Rovelli’s works published later in 2015,
2017, 2019, 2020), there are statements completely different than the statement from
1996: 1643!!!!!!!!!!!!! “Different accounts of the same set of events” is totally against
the EDWs! However, in Rovelli’s works published later (that from 2007 written with
Smelark and his later works (2015-2020) he introduces statements UNBELIEVABLE
similar to statement from my works 2002-2007!!!!]

The third element in RQM that challenges strong realism, emphasized by Dorato [25],
is the ‘anti-monistic’
stance implicit in relational QM. Since the state of a system is a bookkeeping device
of interactions with something else, it follows immediately that there is no meaning in
“the quantum state of the full universe”. There is no something else to the universe.
(p. 7)

[But in his article form 1996, Rovelli writes about “different descriptions referring to
the same physical event”!!!!!!!!!!! This statement contradicts completely what it is
written in the above paragraph!!!! In this statement, Rovelli wants to deny the
existence of the “Universe”, but in his article from 1996, the Universe is the
framework of his thinking…]

Relational QM is a radical attempt to cash out the

breakthrough that originated the theory: the world is
described by facts described by values of variables that
obey the equations of classical mechanics, but products of
these variable have a tiny non-commutativity that generically prevents sharp value
assignment, leading to discreteness, probability and to the contextual, relational
character of value assignment. (p. 7)

[Rovelli changes completely his statement about “different descriptions referring to a

single physical event” to “ the world is described by facts described by values of
variables that obey the equations of classical mechanics”! He is still working within
the unicorn world, even if he mentions that “these variable have a tiny non-
commutativity that generically prevents sharp value assignment, leading to
discreteness, probability and to the contextual, relational character of value
assignment.” Discreteness and contextual are quite similar notions to notions from my
EDWs perspective (2002-2007), but I rejected the “probability”.]

the world is better comprehensible

in terms of a sparse relational ontology. RQM is the
realisation that this is what we have learned about the
world with quantum physics. (p. 7)

[Rovelli did not write something about “sparse relational ontology” in his article from
1996!!!! He did not write this word “ontolgy” in his article from 1996! Here, his last
sentence contains the notion of the “world” which the EDWs perspective rejects
completely!]

Conclusion for Rovelli’s works: In his article 1996, Rovelli is working within the
unicorn world/Universe/world under a kind of Spinoza’s dualism or Bohr’s
complementarity or de Broglie’s particle associated with wave. Later, in 2015,
2017, 2020, Rovelli changed his framework of thinking from “different
descriptions of the same physical event” (i.e, the “Universe”/world) to something
very similar to my EDWs!!!!!!!