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By
1
Dr. Ahmad Kanyama: Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Infrastructure, Department of Urban
Studies. Stockholm
2
Dr. Annika Carlsson- Kanyama: Environmental Strategies Research Department at FOI, Stockholm
3
Professor Anna-Lisa Lindén: Lund University, Department of Sociology, Lund
4
Dr. John Lupala, University College of Lands and Architectural Studies, UCLAS, Dar-Es-Salaam
1
1. Introduction
The world’s urban population is growing at a fast rate, posing a huge challenge to those
responsible for the management of urban development and provision of services. In the
African continent, urban population is growing faster than in any other continent, with a
growth rate that hit 4.4% per annum between 1990 and 1996. The urban population is
expected to more than double between 1990 and 2010, from 201 million to 468 million
(Kanyama 1999). The continent is currently experiencing an average population growth of
4.7% per annum. In the 1980s, the urban population growth rates for Kenya, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe were 7.7%, 6.6% and 5.9% respectively (Mbara, 2002). It is predicted that by
2030, nearly 800 million people - approximately the population size of the entire continent
today - will be living in urban areas (Mosha, 2001). In 2000, Cairo and Lagos were the only
African cities whose population surpassed 10 million inhabitants. By 2020, the urban areas of
Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Abidjan will also have reached or surpassed the 10 million mark,
while 77 cities - six times more than today - will have more than 1 million people. There will
be nearly 650 towns - close to four times the current figure - with more than 100,000
inhabitants. The built-up areas will be 12 times as dense and the average distance between
towns four times shorter (Ibid, 2001). This development is already manifesting itself in
Africa’s sprawling urban structures, which make the journey to work excessively long and
costly for some of the very poor. In addition, the increase in population has pushed up the
demand for public transport and led to the emergence of transport services that are of very
poor quality. In most African cities, normal bus services have all but disappeared and have
been replaced by minibus paratransit vehicles that go by such colourful names as Danfos –
Nigeria, Matatus – Kenya, Tro-tros – Ghana, Dala-dala – Tanzania, Combis – South Africa,
and Car Rapides – Senegal (White & Hook, 2002).
Public transport services being provided by such buses no longer meet the
expectations of the people owing to their negative environmental and social impacts. These
buses constitute a system of public transport that has such characteristics as: (i) unmanaged
routes and trip frequency, which lead to long queues and road congestion; (ii) unreliability of
services; (iii) excessive energy consumption as vehicles often accelerate/decelerate while at
low speeds or keep engines running when buses are stationary; (iv) excessive gaseous
emissions due to poor maintenance of vehicles, with resulting increases in air pollution; and
(vi) increased traffic accidents as unsafe and reconditioned vehicles are used for many years
and some of them are not roadworthy. As a result, travelling becomes uncomfortable to
people and affects quality of life. These are the visible manifestation of failures in urban
transportation planning today.
As population continues to increase in Africa’s urban areas, it seems that nothing
can stop the breakneck expansion of these cities and the deterioration of public transportation
and the environment unless drastic action is taken soon. Most governments in Africa have
taken the view that they need to control and manage the process of urban growth. Without a
doubt, many governments have adopted specific policies to this end, but few appear to have
been successful. Certainly, there are a number of factors that may constrain the achievement
of sustainable public urban transportation, such as lack of capital and know-how. However, as
this paper shows, one of the main reasons hindering the creation of a viable plan for a
sustainable transport system in African cities may be the lack of co-ordination among
planning institutions and other stakeholders who have a role to play in planning for better
urban transportation. Dar-es-Salaam city forms the case study for this paper, which focuses on
the inefficiency of public transportation viewed from the perspectives of city growth and
institution accountability. The methodology for the study included literature reviews on
2
emerging models for sustainable urban development, reviews of official documents that have
a bearing on public transport in Dar-es-Salaam and interviews with officials in public
institutions and agencies, as well as with residents in selected neighbourhoods.
3
In 1970, DMT was nationalised and in 1974 it was renamed ‘Usafiri Dar-es-Salaam’ (UDA),
literally meaning ‘Public Transport in Dar-es-Salaam’. The nationalisation of DMT was in
line with the existing socialist ideology that the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy ought
to be under the control of the state. UDA was thus owned jointly by Dar es Salaam City
Council with 51% of the shares, and the National Transport Company (a government agency)
holding 49% of the shares. Being the sole provider of bus services in Dar-es-salaam, UDA
operated fairly satisfactorily immediately after it acquired the assets of DMT. It inherited
good quality buses that were well-suited to, and comfortable for, the city’s public
transportation. It also carried forward DMT’s basic transport planning skills among its staff,
namely planning for bus route networks, number of routes, route length, bus terminals and
principal bus stop locations. However, by and large, UDA operated under the auspices of the
government and hence, the fare levels it set had to get the approval of the Cabinet. Fare levels
were regulated according to what the government thought the majority of the people could
afford to pay, with no investigation or consideration of actual operational costs. The fare
levels sanctioned by the government were too low to cover operational costs and the
government could not cover the financial gap. The financial deficits that occurred as a result
of this situation had a devastating effect on the efficiency of UDA in its deliverance of
services. This problematic situation occurred at the same time as travel demand grew
dramatically during post-independence. Dar-es-salaam’s population grew rapidly, while the
number of UDA buses declined (see Figure 1).
400
350
300
250 Passengers
Carried
200 (millions)
No. of Buses
150
100
50
0
75
77
79
81
88
19 90
00
19 /93
19 /95
19 /97
ja 9
/9
19
19
19
19
19
19
n-
92
94
96
98
Figure 1. UDA fleet size and number of passengers carried, 1975 – 2000.
The bus fleet included standard single-decker buses with a carrying capacity of 90 passengers and minibuses
with a carrying capacity of 30-50 passengers.
(Source: URT, Budget Speech for Year 1983/84, cit. Kombe et al. 2002,
: National Bureau of Statistics, 2002: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/statisticsf.html).
Along with the deterioration in UDA’s capacity to provide buses, there was also a
deterioration in public transport infrastructure, namely unmarked bus stops and terminals,
absence of bus bays, shelters, posts, benches, destination signboards and timetables. On the
whole, the main factors that impaired the public transport services offered by UDA were:
4
Lack of adequate finance (from the main financier, the Tanzanian government)
to purchase buses and spare parts to extend the bus fleet in order to meet public
travel demand
Low fare rates that did not reflect the real market price for travelling
5
In view of the chaotic operations of dala-dalas that became evident in Dar-es-
Salaam, the Regional Commissioner initiated a takeover of management of dala-dala services
from the CTLA. In 1999, the Regional Commissioner formed an agency - the Dar-es-Salaam
Region Transport Licensing Authority (DRTLA) - to license commuter buses within the Dar-
es-Salaam region.
Today, the process followed by a prospective bus operator in Dar-es-Salaam
starts with the submission of an application to the DRTLA. To obtain a license and route
permit the operator must submit the vehicle registration card, business licence tax clearance
certificate and vehicle insurance documents along with the initial application. Thereafter, the
vehicle must be presented to the traffic police for a roadworthiness inspection. Once the
vehicle inspection certificate has been obtained it must be presented to the DRTLA, which
considers the application and grants the bus-operating licence. The licence is usually issued
for 6 months or one year at a time (depending on the financial ability of the applicant).
Vehicles are expected to operate on specific roads. Each route is allocated a certain number of
vehicles and each vehicle is given a colour for that specific route.
However, the DRTLA lacks the professional competence to carry out proper bus
route planning. Unlike the UDA or DMT, the DRTLA had neither traffic inspectors nor traffic
planners among its staff. Instead, it recruited poorly-educated field assistants employed on a
temporary basis to carry out transport planning.5 The findings from these types of staff shape
the decisions that DRTLA takes in assigning routes. It is common that the DRTLA has a
shortage of finance to recruit and pay field assistants and for that reason it is hard for the
DRTLA to retain even low-skilled staff. The secretary of the DRTLA (in our interview)
concedes that today they assign bus routes merely based on intuition and simple methods
including: i) assessments made by traffic counts on different routes; (ii) simple, on-site
observation of concentrations of people in different areas in the city; and iii) hasty and
generalised assessments of income distribution according to the quality of built-up areas.
Furthermore, the DRTLA acknowledges that problems constraining the
management of (dala-dala) public transport in Dar-es-Salaam include: i) lack of inspectors
who could ensure that operators adhered to the route to which they were allocated; ii) only
30% of dala-dala vehicles being roadworthy despite the existence of regulations banning such
vehicles from the roads; iii) high accident rates due to poor driving skills; iv) overcrowding of
passengers in buses and congestion of vehicles on the roads, which leads to delays in arriving
at destinations.
5
Interview with executive secretary – DRTLA
6
Figure 2. Long queues and congestion involving dala-dala buses in Dar-es-Salaam
7
3.3 City Council recognition of its role in managing public transport
in Dar-es-Salaam
The City Council sees itself as the rightful agency to manage public transport in Dar-es-
Salaam according to the 1997 Transport and Licensing Act which was amended in 1999. On
the other hand, the City Council has no department equipped with competent transport
planners and engineers who can adequately plan and manage public transport in Dar-es-
Salaam.6 This is why the DRTLA, despite being inadequately professionally equipped to
manage public transport in Dar-es-Salaam, is assured of the role for some time to come. The
City Council also recognises its legal role in planning and managing public transport in Dar-
es-Salaam. In light of this, and as a result of chronic public transport problems, the mayor of
Dar-es-Salaam announced that the city will begin to develop a new city-wide mobility plan
for public transport. Speaking at a workshop organised by the city council on May 13, 2003,
the mayor said that the proposal will include plans for a world-class Bus Rapid Transit system
(ITDP, 2003). According to a City Council planner, the planned Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
would either replace the existing poor and chaotic public city transport vehicles (dala-dalas)
or reorganise them to operate more efficiently alongside BRT. The BRT vision is to embark
on a modern public transport system at a reasonable cost to the users with quality and high-
capacity buses that meet international service standards, reduce travelling time and that are
environmentally friendly. The target is to make the BRT project operational by 2005
(Guardian, 2003.10.11). Members of the Dar-es-Salaam City Council travelled to Colombia in
2002 with some representatives of the Dar-es-Salaam Bus Owners Association (DABOA) for
a study tour to see how BRT is managed. The City Council has thus identified the Colombian
capital, Bogota, as a setting from which to learn how BRT works.
What is Bus Rapid Transit? This is a new paradigm in delivering bus services which is
being developed in a number of countries, particularly in Latin America, and it shows promise
for revolutionising bus systems around the world (IEA, 2002). As argued by the International
Energy Agency (IEA), separating buses out of the general traffic by assigning specific lanes,
increasing their average speed, improving their reliability and convenience, and increasing
system capacities can ensure high ridership levels and increase the profitability of the Bus
Transit system (IEA, 2002). Upgrading the performance of bus services to meet the objectives
of Bus Rapid Transit will require policies that give priority to bus operations and provide for
investment in crucial system components: infrastructure that separates bus operations from
general-purpose traffic; facilities that provide for increased comfort and system visibility; and
technology that provides for faster and more reliable operations (FTA, www.fta). New
guidance, information and fare technologies offer an expanded range of possibilities for
operating bus systems that have the potential to produce marked improvements in
performance, surpassing previous standards and changing public perceptions of bus service
(ibid). However, Bus Rapid Transit provides maximum benefit when developed in close
coordination with land use policies and community development plans. These operations will
require improved land use options that provide for compact, pedestrian-friendly and
environmentally-sensitive development patterns that can sustain the development of Bus
Rapid Transit.
Clearly, implementing Bus Rapid Transit poses a number of challenges in Dar-
es-Salaam. These include the need for adequate lanes on city streets to provide separate
6
Interview with the City Council Planner in mid-2003
8
rights-of-way for buses, yet maintaining the quality of general-purpose traffic flow. These
challenges require detailed analysis in the context of specific local applications to identify
appropriate solutions and to determine where Bus Rapid Transit can have the greatest benefit.
The City Council under its proposed scheme, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
programme, has earmarked some major roads in Dar-es-Salaam for expansion in order to
improve the city’s public transportation. Roads identified in the initial phases of the BRT
programme include Nyerere, Mandela, Morogoro and Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The intension of
the City Council is to expand these roads in order to provide room for another lane to be used
by passenger buses that will serve the public under the BRT programme. No other vehicles
will be allowed to use these additional lanes set aside for BRT. According to the statement
from the City Council, the buses to be used in the BRT programme would be owned and
operated by private firms (Guardian, 2004.01.20). In addition, the City Council plans to
conduct a number of surveys in 2004 to collect standard data for use during the planning and
other stages of execution of the project. These will include an Origin and Destination (OD)
survey to determine the number of commuters from each part of the city and their travelling
patterns in order to allocate a sufficient number of buses at appropriate times (ibid).
4.1 Inability of institutions to manage the physical form and the built
environment in Dar-es-Salaam
Narrow roads dominate the inner part of the city because they were planned during the
colonial period when the traffic volume was smaller than it is today. It will be hard to expand
the roads to increase their capacity by demolishing buildings that were built close to the roads.
Basically the government does not have sufficient financial resources to compensate for
properties that would be demolished. However, the narrowness of roads in Dar-es-Salaam is
not attributed only to the physical characteristics of the older fabric of the city. To a greater
9
extent, the contemporary practice of granting permits to build closer to the roads reduces the
capacity of the roads by taking over space that is meant for parking, walking and bicycling.7
Such discrepancies in planning and management of the city arise partly due to insensitivity of
practitioners to heeding the guidelines that are set for the development of the city. Another
major observable land use phenomenon in Dar-es-Salaam is what Kironde (1995) calls
‘spontaneity’, which means that residential land and open space is being converted for
commercial use, particularly along major thoroughfares, bus terminals and main road
junctions, without government sanction. A stunning example is the area at the junction of
Bagamoyo Road and the road to the drive-in cinema, known as the Namanga shopping centre.
This centre was developed on a road reserve and hazard land without any permission
(Kironde, 1995). Other large-scale changes from residential to commercial land uses can be
observed along Morocco road, at the Mwenge bus terminal, along Shekilango Road and in
many other places. Along several major roads such as the Port Access Road, there are notable
‘squatter shops’ on roads reserves and on industrial land. In most cases, these conversions or
constructions have neither planning consent nor building permits, although the businesses
being carried on have usually trading licences. Yet neither the central government nor the
Dar-es-Salaam City Council have deemed it necessary to take any action (Kironde, 1995).
Similarly, it is common to see street traders occupy space designed for pedestrian and
vehicular traffic in Dar-es-Salaam. This effectively reduces the capacity of the road, causing
congestion and thus affecting traffic flow and compromising safety. So far, the lack of
alternative spaces for both street traders and parking places in many areas of Dar-es-Salaam
has complicated the work of traffic police in enforcing the law against the violations of traffic
regulations.8
Our interviews with City Council officials showed that there is a general
acceptance in the City Council Authority that future land use planning in the city and its
implementation should be carried out in parallel with transport planning, yet there is a
continuing disregard for integrated land use development and transport planning. It is
common to find that the construction of residences in Dar-es-Salaam precedes transport
planning. In the same way, the City Council has neither made efforts to determine the
capacity of its roads nor investigated transport demand for different areas of the city.
Furthermore, it is common to encounter permits that contravene the master plan - a permit
may be granted to develop a certain area contrary to its original use without regard for how
much traffic it can generate. As an example, an open space at the centre of the city, part of the
Gymkhana grounds, was carved off in 1993 and allocated to a private firm for the
construction of a Sheraton Hotel. There were various protests against the scheme from sports
lovers, environmentalists and several of the city residents who respect open spaces, but to no
avail. As argued by Kironde (1995), the decision to locate the hotel on an area of the
Gymkhana recreation ground was political and was made at a higher level than the Ministry
of Lands. In light of this, a conclusive statement by a City Council planner during our
interview was that “the quest for sustainable public transportation in Dar-es-Salaam is
restrained by the way urban development is mismanaged in the City”.
7
Interview with a City planner
8
Source: Interview with Dar-es-salaam Region Traffic Police authority
10
As has been pointed out earlier, the City Council lacks adequately trained transport planners
and engineers who can manage public transportation in the city and there is no organized
department specialised in transport planning. The City Council sees the coordination
between itself and the sub-areas of Dar-es-Salaam as inadequate. For instance, whenever
attempts are made to convene meetings for the City Council’s working groups to discuss the
issues concerning sustainable development, it is common that attendance is poor among
municipal engineers and planners from the sub-areas of Dar-es-Salaam. According to our
interviews at the City Council, inadequate coordination in the sector of public transport
between different units arises due to a lack of clear policy statements as well as a lack of
accountability from respective officers.
Regarding coordination among Dar-es-Salaam Authorities in general, an official with the Dar-
es-Salaam Region Transport Licensing Authority (DRTLA) believed that poor coordination
involves all the institutions that have a role in the operation of public transportation in Dar-es-
Salaam. These include the DRTLA itself, the City Council, the Dar-es-Salaam Region traffic
police department, sub-area councils etc. In view of that, since there is no well-organized
system of coordination between these institutions, overlapping areas of responsibility are
common, and since there is no mechanisms for managing overlaps, conflicts are common
during execution of roles. Lack of coordination among institutions can be exemplified by the
recent row between the Dar-es-Salaam authorities and dala-dala operators when they
temporarily increased their fares in May 2004 due to the increase in oil prices. The operators
unilaterally increased their fares instantly to 250 shillings and 100 shillings for adults and
students respectively without prior notice to their customers. The original fares were 150
shillings and 50 shillings for adults and students respectively. The new fares were charged for
only a week, from 10-17 May 2004, before the Regional Commissioner for Dar-es-Salaam
instructed the bus operators to reduce the fare to the original level. According to the Regional
Commissioner “bus operators held secret meetings during which they decided to raise the bus
fares. This is against the principles of free market economy which requires the consumers, in
this case the commuters, to determine the price” (Guardian, 2004.05.18). During this process,
the Chairman of the DTRLA defended the increased fare levels. He identified four factors that
might have justified the increase in bus fares even despite the current increased fuel prices.
One was the heavy tax imposed by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), another the
insurance premiums, a third the high costs of spare parts and a fourth the illegal fines imposed
by the traffic police on the dala-dala crews (Guardian, 2004.05.20). The argument by the
Chairman of the DTRLA clearly indicates that there is no mechanism of coordination among
different authorities that have a stake in public transport in Dar-es-Salaam.
11
The existence of huge outstanding needs of infrastructure maintenance and rehabilitation
work
Inadequate institutional arrangements, laws, regulations and procedures which are
inconsistent or incompatible with each other to create a conducive climate for investment
and hence growth of the sector
Inadequate capacity caused by low level of investment in resources
Low levels of enforcement of safety, environmental sustainability and gender issues
According to the National Transport Policy, persistent weaknesses in the development and
management of the transport sector lie in the Ministries responsible, which are:
Communication and Transport (Road Transport Licensing)
Works (axle-loads control, safety control)
Home Affairs (traffic law and regulations enforcement)
Finance (motor vehicle registration, road tolls)
Regional Administration (regional transport licensing)
Vice-President ( environment)
Planning Commission (key transport utilities)
Trade and Industry (vehicle licensing)
Although the Ministry of Communication and Transport issues policies for transportation
and has a coordinatory role aimed at seeing that the operation of transportation becomes
sustainable, a respondent in the interview (held in 2003) observed that he had not seen the
Ministry carry out a concrete or a systematic research or programme to tackle the problems of
public transport in Dar-es-Salaam. Other institutions crucial for traffic management such as
the Police Traffic department in Dar-es-Salaam expressed frustration at their lack of
involvement: “When the Ministry of Works embarks on building Dar-es-Salaam roads, the
Traffic Police Department is not consulted although its staff have everyday experience of
12
traffic management which could be accommodated during design of roads and in the
provision of associated infrastructure”
The same informants stressed that there is no clear policy for public transport or an effective
coordinating organ to promote better public transport. This manifests itself in “poor
coordination amongst traffic police, road planners and engineers, traffic licensing authority
and the Ministry of Transport and Communication”, the traffic police emphasised. Similarly,
an official in the Ministry of Settlement Planning thought that there was no coordination with
other sectors in solving the problems of public transportation in Dar-es-Salaam.
As pointed out above, the Ministry of Communication and Transport is responsible for issuing
a national transport policy, which includes policies for a safer, effective and environmentally
friendly transport system. In addition, the Ministry is expected to spearhead the development
of safe, reliable, effective, efficient and fully integrated transport infrastructure and operations
which will best meet the needs of travel and transport. It is therefore evident that the Ministry
ought to shoulder the coordination role to promote sustainable public transport in urban areas.
Yet, what we have seen above in this paper is that the coordination among institutions,
government sectors and agencies to promote sustainable public transportation is dismal in
Dar-es-Salaam.
5. Conclusions
Dar-es-Salaam city is experiencing unprecedented growth, which is placing great pressure on
services. Public transport, which is central to development, is one of the services that has to be
provided in an expanding city. Thus, city administrators are faced with immense challenges in
developing a sustainable transport system that is responsive to changing demands. However,
lack of clear policy guidelines for public transport and lack of a clearly identified coordinating
organ has resulted in poor coordination, which makes planning and managing public transport
in Dar-es-Salaam more difficult than it would be even when the limited capacity to generate
tax revenues is considered. For instance, both Dar-es-Salaam Region Transport Licensing
Authority and the City Council struggle to manage public transport in Dar-es-Salaam without
any clear mechanism of coordination among themselves. Lack of coordination extends also to
the Ministries and agencies that have a stake in public transportation in Dar-es-Salaam.
Effective public transport and traffic planning in Dar-es-Salaam should involve
new ways of designing and implementing policy as well as new policy objectives. These new
ways of working will require clear action by national government to put the right conditions
in place that will allow local authorities to do their work effectively. A clear guidance policy
framework must be backed by adequate human resource requirements. The City Council
together with its sub-area Councils need to develop their own transport sector policies that are
consistent with the national transport policy. Such a policy needs to articulate the objectives
of urban transport in relation to economic growth, infrastructure maintenance provision of an
affordable and efficient public transport system particularly for the urban poor, minimising
transport resource costs by making more effective use of existing facilities and minimising the
impact of transport on the environment. Developing possibilities for non-motorized transport
is crucial. Awareness campaigns are imperative to inform the public about the seriousness of
environment and social problems arising from inefficient transportation. This is meant to
motivate them to participate in schemes that can lead to an efficient public transportation. The
development of sustainable transport in Dar-es-Salaam must be accompanied by an
environment that is conducive to development. A transparent and symbiotic partnership
13
between central and local governments, the private sector and civic societies has to exist.
These stakeholders have to share the common goals of developing an economically and
environmentally sustainable transport system.
The results and analysis presented in this paper are an extract from the
forthcoming publications from an ongoing research project with the title: ‘Institution and
Technical Constraints in Planning for a Sustainable Public Transportation: A Case Study of
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania’ carried out from 2003 to 2004 and financed by Volvo Research
and Educational Foundations.
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