ARTICLE IN PRESS

Studies in History and Philosophy of

Modern Physics 38 (2007) 181–201
www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsb

Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of

information-theoretic constraints
Armond Duwell
Department of Philosophy, Liberal Arts 101, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59812, USA
Received 24 November 2005; received in revised form 30 May 2006; accepted 26 September 2006

Abstract

This paper examines Bub’s interpretation of the foundational significance of the theorem of
Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (CBH) which characterizes quantum theories in terms of information-
theoretic constraints. Bub argues that quantum theory must be re-conceived of as a principle theory
of information where information is a new physical primitive, to the exclusion of hidden variable
theories. I will argue, contrary to Bub, that the CBH theorem cannot be used to exclude hidden
variables theories. Drawing inspiration from Bub, I sketch an alternative conception of quantum
mechanics as a theory of information, but one which embraces all empirically equivalent quantum
theories.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Quantum information; CBH; Principle theories; Constructive theories

1. Introduction

There have been several suggestions in the literature that quantum mechanics should be
viewed as a theory of information, e.g. Deutsch and Hayden (2000), Clifton, Bub, and
Halvorson (2004a) (CBH), Fuchs (2002), and Spekkens (2004). By viewing quantum
mechanics as a theory of information, some seemingly perplexing quantum phenomena
might not be so bad, e.g. the measurement problem, or the appearance of non-locality.1

E-mail address: armond.duwell@umontana.edu.

1
For example, Fuchs (2002) views the quantum state as representing an observer’s beliefs (subjective
information) about future measurement results performed on a quantum system. If we adopt this perspective, the
measurement problem and nonlocality (in the EPR sense) are not problematic in the traditional way. Regarding

1355-2198/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.09.001
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182 A. Duwell / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2007) 181–201

One way to motivate an information-theoretic re-conception of quantum mechanics

would be to derive it from information-theoretic postulates whose physical meaning is
clear. CBH with the supplemental result of Halvorson (2004a), have shown a slightly
weaker result: the algebraic structure of states and observables in quantum mechanics can
be derived from three information-theoretic postulates. Even if CBH would have derived
quantum mechanics completely, there would have been a lot more to say about how to
interpret the theory. After all, the algebraic structure we end up with after the new
derivation is still the same one that has caused all the trouble for the last 80 years. Bub
(2004a, 2004b), has attempted to spell out the interpretive or foundational significance of
the CBH result.
Bub argues for the following thesis:

Assuming that the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world,
no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of
measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at
a fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of
information (Bub, 2004a, p. 2).

Bub claims that this thesis follows more or less directly from the CBH theorem
and no go results along the lines of the Kochen–Specker theorem (Kochen & Specker,
1967).2 Essentially, assuming the information-theoretic principles or constraints
are true, the CBH theorem yields the standard algebraic structure of quantum theory.
This structure, as we know from no go theorems, cannot be conceived of classically.
This structure cannot represent a system whose observables all have definite non-
contextually assigned values. As is well known, the no go theorems show that a certain
class of hidden variable theories are incompatible with the algebraic structure of quantum
theory. Bub intends to show that no hidden variable theory is acceptable. Obviously the
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics alone is not sufficient for this task.
Argumentation must be adduced that appeals to factors beyond the algebraic structure of
quantum theory.
Bub’s (2004a) suggests a principle of rationality to argue against all hidden variable
theories. I argue that the principle of rationality Bub appeals to cannot be used to establish
his intended conclusion. Bub (2004b) provides supplemental argumentation using an
analogy to electrodynamics. He suggests that the CBH principles, along with the CBH
theorem, establish that quantum mechanics is a principle theory of information where
information is a new physical primitive. He suggests that the behavior of measurement
devices is not reducible to hidden variables just as electrodynamic phenomena are not

(footnote continued)
the measurement problem, there are necessary and sufficient conditions for state changes. An observer changes
her beliefs (represented by a quantum state) about a system if and only if she is in possession of new information
regarding the system. Nonlocality is not the problem it is with standard quantum mechanics because changes in
states do not correspond to changes in the ontological features of a quantum system on Fuchs’s view. E.g., when
Alice learns the results of her measurement on her member of an EPR pair, she simply updates her information
regarding the quantum system sent to Bob (which again entails no ontological changes in Bob’s system). I am not
endorsing this view, as it may come with more problems than it solves. That said, it is clear that construing
quantum mechanics as a theory of information can change the way we think about traditional problems in
quantum mechanics.
2
References to the CBH theorem are meant to include the supplemental result of Halvorson (2004a).
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A. Duwell / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2007) 181–201 183

reducible to motions in a material medium, i.e. the ether. I argue that Bub misuses the
analogy to electrodynamics and his intended conclusion has little support. Bub’s
argumentation against all hidden variables theories fails. I sketch an analogy to relativity
that avoids the problems raised before, but the analogy does not support Bub’s view that
fundamental physical theories are principle theories.
Though there is seemingly no way to use the CBH result to argue for Bub’s strong thesis,
there is a weaker position that is generally compatible with Bub’s conception of quantum
theory. Using the concept of information advocated in Duwell (unpublished), I argue that
quantum mechanics can be conceived of as a principle theory of quantum information.
The conception so advocated departs from Bub’s conception of quantum mechanics as a
principle theory of information. Quantum information is not considered a physical
primitive and the conception is generally agnostic about the status of empirically
equivalent quantum theories. This conception of quantum mechanics embraces all hidden
variables theories compatible with no go results.
In Section 2, the CBH theorem is outlined. Problems are briefly discussed for the
applicability of the theorem in foundational debates over the status of rival empirically
adequate quantum theories. The focus of this paper is not a critical examination of the
assumptions of the theorem, which has been discussed elsewhere (see Halvorson, 2004a;
Halvorson & Bub, 2003; Smolin, 2003; Spekkens, 2004; Timpson, 2004). Instead, the focus
is to refute Bub on his own terms, assuming that the assumptions of the CBH theorem are
unproblematic, but arguing nonetheless that his thesis cannot be maintained. In Section 3,
Bub’s thesis is discussed and rejected. In Section 4, the argument that quantum mechanics
is a principle theory of information, where information is a new physical primitive is
discussed. Section 5 introduces an alternate conception of quantum mechanics as a
principle theory of quantum information that avoids the pitfalls of Bub’s approach.

2. The CBH theorem

Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson (2003), along with Halvorson (2004a) have shown that
quantum theories can be characterized by information-theoretic constraints. By a quantum
theory, CBH mean a C  -algebra with the following features:

(i) Observables are represented by the self-adjoint operators in a non-commutative

algebra, but where observables for separate systems commute.
(ii) States are represented by positive normalized linear functionals where there exist
entangled states of spacelike separated systems.
(iii) Dynamical changes are represented by completely positive linear maps (Bub, 2004b,
p. 7).

To these assumptions correspond three information-theoretic constraints:

ði0 Þ No superluminal information transfer via measurement.

ðii0 Þ No broadcasting.
ðiii0 Þ No bit-commitment (Bub, 2004b, pp. 7, 8).

Briefly, constraint ði0 Þ means that measurement interactions on a system A will not alter
the statistics associated with a physically distinct system B, or equivalently the reduced
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184 A. Duwell / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2007) 181–201

state of system B. Constraint ðii0 Þ is simply a generalization of a no cloning constraint to

mixed states. Constraint ðii0 Þ generally forbids a system A in state rA to evolve to a state
with a system B, rAB , so that trA ðrAB Þ ¼ trB ðrAB Þ ¼ rA . Constraint ðiii0 Þ forbids a certain
type of cryptographic protocol. In this protocol, Alice seeks to supply Bob with an
encoded bit that represents a commitment that Bob cannot decode, but can be revealed at
a later time with no possibility for Alice to alter her commitment. In the quantum case, a
no bit commitment protocol is always defeated using remote steering. Constraint ðiii0 Þ, in
the presence of the other constraints, guarantees the existence of non-local entangled
states. (For a more detailed discussion of these constraints, see Clifton et al., 2003; Bub,
2004a, 2004b.)
Each of the constraints seem quite reasonable at first glance. Constraint ði0 Þ is just the
no-signaling theorem, constraint ðii0 Þ is true because arbitrary mixed states cannot be
broadcast (Barnum, Fuchs, Caves, Jozsa, & Schumacher, 1996), and finally Bub (2001) has
argued extensively that the no bit commitment theorem (Mayers, 1997), has no loopholes.
That said, the constraints themselves can be challenged. Valentini (2002) has shown that
non-equilibrium distributions lead to superluminal signaling, i.e. Bohm’s theory will
generally violate constraint ði0 Þ. Bub (2004a) has pointed out that the GRW theories are
likely to violate constraint ðiii0 Þ because collapses will prevent the use of remote steering of
entangled states to defeat a bit commitment strategy. So, there exist quantum theories
outside of the scope of the definition of ‘quantum theories’ in the CBH sense that, to our
knowledge, predict the results of experiments performed to date just as well as standard
quantum theory.
The issue at stake is more than a rhetorical question about how to best define quantum
theories. If the information-theoretic constraints are to legitimate a conception of quantum
mechanics, their epistemic status should be secure, but that is not the case. They are not
empirically discovered constraints. The evidence for the constraints is indirect and
challengeable. The information-theoretic constraints are predictions of the standard
theory. Only insofar as the standard theory is a reliable device for making predictions are
the constraints justified. We have no direct empirical evidence that they are true. This is the
nature of the verification of constraints, which constrain what is possible, in contrast to
predictions, which can be verified more straightforwardly. As remarked above, there exist
quantum theories, e.g. Bohm’s theory or GRW theory, that are just as well supported by
the extant empirical evidence as the standard theory, but are incompatible with the
information-theoretic constraints.3 So, the extant empirical evidence offers no reason to
believe that the information-theoretic constraints are jointly true, nor jointly false. The
conclusions of any argument depending on the truth of the information-theoretic
constraints will inherit this epistemic uncertainty.
A different kind attack on the applicability of the CBH theorem comes from challenging
the mathematical framework that the constraints are situated in. To make a convincing
formal case that quantum mechanics ought to be conceived of as a theory of information,
arguably the information-theoretic principles alone should be sufficient to recover
quantum theories. The mathematical framework the principles are formulated in should
be neutral in this regard. It is doubtful that the CBH theorem meets this requirement.

3
Experiments have been proposed that would distinguish nonstandard quantum theories from quantum
mechanics, e.g. see Valentini (2003) for theories with a non-equilibrium distribution and Collett & Pearle (2002)
for collapse theories.
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Perhaps most interesting is the toy theory of Spekkens (2004) which satisfies the
information-theoretic constraints, but which is patently not a quantum theory. Because the
CBH result is valid, there is no question that Spekkens toy theory is a counterexample to
the result. Instead, this has focused attention on the assumption of CBH that C  -algebras
form a suitably neutral mathematical framework in which to formulate physical theories.
Halvorson (2004b) has discussed weaker mathematical frameworks for physical theories,
and found that Spekkens toy theory has no formulation in these frameworks, potentially
undermining the power of the objection. In agreement with Halvorson, there must be some
constraints on toy theories, i.e that they can be formulated in some suitably general
mathematical framework, for them to be taken seriously. This is an important and
relatively unexplored research topic. Perhaps the Spekkens toy theory can be ruled out as
unreasonable when it is decided what are reasonable constraints for the formulation of
physical theories, but there are simply no reasons to do that now. An objection due to
Timpson (2004) definitively indicates that a C  framework is just too strong a constraint
on the formulation of physical theories. He has argued that the C  framework is
committed to expectation value additivity, which is simply too strong an assumption.
Timpson has pointed out that Bell said it best:

There is no reason to demand [expectation value additivity] individually of the

hypothetical dispersion free states, whose function it is to reproduce the measureable
peculiarities of quantum mechanics when averaged over (Bell, 1966, quoted from Bell,
1987, p. 4).

So, the mathematical framework that the information-theoretic constraints are formulated
in seems just too strong. That said, Halvorson has conjectured that the CBH result can be
recovered in a weaker mathematical framework. That has yet to be decided. Bub’s
argument is considered in the next section as though the CBH result were completely
uncontroversial. It will be argued that Bub’s suggested re-conception of quantum theories
is untenable nonetheless.

3. Bub’s thesis

This section critically discusses Bub’s thesis:

Assuming that the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world,
no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of
measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at a
fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of information.

For Bub, a mechanical theory of quantum phenomena is one in which the observables are
replaced by ‘beables’ in Bell’s sense or dynamical properties, which are definite and
possessed by a system (2004a, p. 11). In other words, hidden variables theories are
mechanical theories.4 The argumentation Bub uses to support this thesis separates into two
4
Bub sometimes appears to mean for his argumentation to apply to all competitors to standard quantum
mechanics, including dynamic collapse theories, hidden variables theories, and Everettian theories. He most
consistently targets hidden variables theories, and his argumentation works best when construed as an attack on
hidden variables theories. For clarity, it is assumed that when Bub uses the term ‘‘mechanical theory’’ he is
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parts, one for each part of the thesis:

1. No mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement

interactions can be acceptable.
2. The appropriate aim of physics at a fundamental level then becomes the representation
and manipulation of information.

Each subthesis will be examined in turn.

3.1. Subthesis 1

If we accept the assumptions of the CBH theorem, the information-theoretic constraints

yield the algebraic structure of the standard theory. This means that any quantum theory
(in the CBH sense) has a Hilbert space representation, observables are generally non-
commutative, and the possibilities for value assignments to observables are severely
restricted along the lines of Kochen and Specker (1957), Bell (1964), and Bub and Clifton
(1996).
The important implication of the CBH theorem is this: For any hidden variable theory
which satisfies the information-theoretic constraints there will be a quantum theory (in the
CBH sense) which is empirically equivalent to it. It deserves mention that this is not a
trivial claim. Bub is not making the analytic claim that all acceptable quantum theories are
empirically equivalent. Instead, it is that any theory which satisfies the assumptions of the
CBH theorem will be empirically equivalent to some quantum theory, which does away
with hidden variables.5
Bub needs an argument that hidden variable theories that are empirically equivalent to
the standard theory are unacceptable to establish his subthesis 1. He employs the following
methodological principle:
If T 0 and T 00 are empirically equivalent extensions of a theory T, and if T entails that,
in principle, there could not be evidence favoring one of the rival extensions T 0 or T 00 ,
then it is not rational to believe T 0 or T 00 (Bub, 2004a, p. 17).
This methodological principle does just what Bub needs if we let T be standard quantum
theory and T 0 be Bohm’s theory, etc.6 From the above methodological principle, there is
no reason to believe any other theory than the standard theory. So, there is no reason to
believe in the hidden variables postulated by alternative quantum theories.
Unfortunately, there is a problem with the argument. Essentially it assumes what it
wants to prove.7 Standard quantum theory holds a privileged role in the functioning of the

(footnote continued)
referring to a hidden variables theory. If his argumentation fails on these theories, and I argue it does, it will also
fail when the scope of his arguments is extended. So, other competitors to standard quantum mechanics can be
safely ignored.
5
Special thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
6
One could also postulate some theory that is not empirically equivalent to standard quantum theory, but
satisfies the information-theoretic constraints, and simply take the empirically equivalent quantum theory as the
starting point in the argument. What matters for Bub is to take some quantum theory (in the CBH sense) as a
starting point.
7
I believe that Timpson (2004) was the first to put this point in print.
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methodological principle, but, there seems to be no justification, certainly no empirical

justification, for it to play that role.8 Bohm’s theory with the equilibrium distribution could
be T, and standard quantum mechanics can be considered an extension of Bohm’s theory.
Then it would be irrational to believe standard quantum mechanics.
One might claim that my objection is ignoring an important part of the methodological
principle regarding empirically equivalent extensions of a theory. One might argue that
standard quantum theory cannot be considered an extension of Bohm’s theory, nor a
modal interpretation along the lines of Kochen (1986), whereas it is quite natural to regard
these theories as an extension of standard quantum mechanics.
A few things can be said in response to such an objection. First, to my knowledge, no
one has developed a principled way, given two empirically equivalent theories, to
determine which is an extension of the other outside of temporal priority, which
is irrelevant regarding which is rational, if either, to believe. If that’s right, the
methodological principle can equally be used to argue for or against the standard theory.9
Second, even if there was a principled way to determine when one theory was an
empirically equivalent extension of another, it is not clear why this would be warrant for
believing one theory over another, which is clearly motivation behind the methodological
principle. It is easy to digress into a long discussion about theoretical virtues here, but the
following point should suffice. If philosophy of science has learned anything over the last
200 years or so, its that there are many theoretical virtues, but when comparing empirical
equivalents, there is no single virtue that outweighs the rest, much less a ‘‘virtue’’ as
obscure as not being an extension of some other theory. This is precisely why there are so
many rival versions of quantum theory that are entertained simultaneously. To privilege
one of these virtues, the one singled out in the methodological principle, requires
substantial argumentation to say the least, which Bub does not provide. So, Bub’s
argumentation is insufficient to establish, or even plausibly suggest, that no hidden
variable theory of measurement devices can be rationally acceptable.10

3.2. Subthesis 2

If the information-theoretic constraints are true, then the CBH theorem entails any
empirically acceptable theory of the quantum domain will be empirically equivalent to a
quantum theory in the CBH sense (2004a). Bub recommends the following in such a situation:
I conclude that the rational epistemological stance is to suspend judgment about all
these empirically equivalent but necessarily underdetermined theories and regard
them all as unacceptable (Bub, 2004a, p. 18).
8
Similarly, there is no empirical justification for any quantum theory in the CBH sense to play that privileged
role.
9
One might suggest that a theory T 0 is an extension of theory T when the ontology of T is a proper subset of the
ontology of T 0 . Even given this clear definition, its usefulness is dubious in the case of quantum theories.
Determining the ontology of a theory is a matter of interpretation, and it is by no means clear that there is a
unique ontology compatible with standard quantum theory, which would be required in order for Bub’s
rationality principle to even be applied in the first place.
10
A different attack against Bub’s argumentation would be to defend the not so implausible claim that standard
quantum mechanics is an extension of no collapse no extra values quantum theory, precisely because there are
added values and extra dynamics on the standard theory. Because ‘‘being an extension’’ of another theory is so ill-
defined, no attempt is made to pursue this line of attack.
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The in-principle empirical equivalence of quantum theories is motivating a form of

agnosticism about solutions to the measurement problem. It is worth mentioning
that this agnosticism ought to apply to quantum theories in the CBH sense as
well.
Now, Bub needs to connect this agnosticism about solutions to the measurement
problem to an argument for subthesis 2, that the aim of fundamental physics is the
representation and manipulation of information. Bub’s agnosticism seems to lead
him to suggest that measurement devices are treated as black boxes. Now, there is a
very special notion of black box that Bub has in mind here. Bub is not claiming
that measurement interactions are outside the scope of the theory (the standard
understanding of what it means to be a black box). Measurement devices are
treated as black boxes because there is no epistemic reason to privilege one of the many
treatments of the measurement problem because they all lead to the same empirical
results. Black boxes for Bub represent the analyses that quantum theories give of
measurement interactions which cannot be accessible to empirical test if the information-
theoretic constraints are true. According to Bub, in this epistemological situation, it is
appropriate to describe measurement devices in terms of conditional probability
distributions which relate inputs of the measurement device to outputs. Then measurement
devices then described similar to the components of a Shannon communication system;
hence the claim that fundamental physics is about the representation and manipulation of
information.
It may appear that Bub’s solution to the measurement problem is just to ignore it, but he
does not, at least in his (2004a).

From this information-theoretic perspective, the relevant ‘measurement problem’ is

how to account for the emergence of classical information, the loss of interference
and entanglement, when we perform quantum measurements (Bub, 2004a, p. 19).

It is clear that Bub intends measurement interactions to be treated within the scope of
the theory, consistent with quantum mechanics possibly being a fundamental theory. Now,
recovering our experiences, that measurement devices appear to behave like Shannon
information sources, is exactly what solutions to the measurement problem do, and most
do this with hidden variables. Since Bub thinks that we ought to be agnostic about the
status of hidden variables theories, he cannot endorse them as solutions to the
measurement problem. Instead he advocates environmental decoherence as a potential
solution to the measurement problem (Bub, 2004a, p. 19).11 Arguably, this is the only
current available approach to solve the measurement problem that could be shared by rival
quantum theories, i.e. does not appeal to the epistemologically inaccessible elements of
those theories.
There are problems with this approach. To dispense with the obvious, it is dubious
that environmental decoherence is sufficient to recover our experience of the world
(Bacciagaluppi, 2004). There may be no solution to the measurement problem shared by
11
Note that historically, a ‘‘solution to the measurement problem’’ seemingly required hidden variables theories,
whereby the hidden variables of these theories recovered our experience of seemingly definite measurement results
by assigning definite values to observables on which our experiences arguably supervened. Ultimately though, any
theory can ‘‘solve the measurement problem’’ by explaining, even in the absence of definite values of observables,
why we seem to see measurement devices with definite values of observables, e.g. an Everettian interpretation.
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rival quantum theories. Second, one can point out that environmental decoherence itself
falls prey to an objection in the spirit of Bub. There would be no empirical reason to prefer
a decoherence account of measurement interactions over those that appealed to hidden
variables. Hence, as a matter of consistency, Bub should advocate agnosticism over all
solutions to the measurement problem. Finally, it is not clear that one should look for a
solution to the measurement problem that is shared between all interpretations. I take it
that a solution to the measurement problem should show how the ontology compatible
with a theory is sufficient to recover the appearances. Bub has given us no reason to expect
that there are shared features of the ontologies of different quantum theories or
interpretations thereof which allow for a shared solution to the measurement problem.
Nor has Bub given us reason to believe that none of the ontologies compatible with
quantum theories, especially those that invoke hidden variables, are unreasonable
contenders for representing the real physical ontology of the world, only that
epistemologically we have no reason to prefer one over another. Bub (2004b), argues
that the ontology of the quantum world is not reducible to hidden variables, and that
information is a new physical primitive.

4. Is quantum information a new physical primitive?

Bub (2004b) uses an analogy between the history of electrodynamics and a counter-
factual history of quantum theory to strengthen his argumentation that quantum
theory should be regarded as a theory about the representation and manipulation
of information. This analogy is also employed to argue that quantum informa-
tion is a new physical primitive. Bub argues that quantum mechanics should be
regarded as a principle, as opposed to constructive, theory of information, and
that that is the best that fundamental physics can do. Section 4.1 introduces the
analogy that Bub wants to draw between the history of electrodynamics and quantum
theory. Section 4.2 critically discusses the analogy drawn to electrodynamics.
It will be argued that a careful examination of the analogy actually discredits Bub’s
theses. The section ends by suggesting a possibly fruitful analogy that can be drawn
between special relativity and quantum theory that might be pursued to support some of
Bub’s claims.

4.1. The analogy

The distinction between principle and constructive theories is a useful topic to begin
discussing Bub’s views. Roughly, constructive theories are those that account for
complex phenomena by reducing the phenomena to the behavior of some preferred
class of physical primitives using physical laws. To borrow a phrase from Balashov
and Janssen (2003), constructive theories give an account of the reality ‘‘behind
the phenomena’’. Contrast this to principle theories, which use a set of empirically
discovered principles that when construed formally give rise to a theory, with no
reference to physical primitives. The standard examples of constructive theory and a
principle theory are statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, respectively. Essentially,
Bub thinks that we ought to regard quantum theory as a principle theory of
information and not attempt to give a constructive (hidden variables) account of quantum
phenomena.
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Bub invites us to compare the history of electrodynamics to a counterfactual history of

quantum theory:
Lorentz’s constructive theory of the electrodynamics of moving bodies
!Einstein’s principle theory of special relativity
!Minkowski’s formulation of Einstein’s theory in terms of a non-Euclidean space–
time geometry

compared with the counterfactual history

Bohm’ s constructive theory
!CBH
!Hilbert space quantum mechanics.

Bub intends to use an analogy between these sequences to argue his position. The fact that
one of these is a counterfactual sequence is of little concern. What is at issue is the
epistemological status of standard quantum theory, the justification of information as a
new physical primitive, and the status of alternative quantum theories, none of which
depends on factual or counterfactual chronological details.
Lorentz was trying to give a constructive theory of the electrodynamics of moving
bodies in virtue of specifying how charged particles interact with a material medium, the
ether. A material medium was necessary because, at the time, it was virtually inconceivable
that electromagnetic waves could propagate without a material medium to support the
propagation, much like sound waves need a material medium to propagate. The theory
was constructive because it indicated how molecular forces and their propagation through
the ether resulted in length contraction. Lorentz’s theory suffered an embarrassing
problem in that it was ad hoc and simply saved the phenomena (length contraction)
without making any new predictions.
Contrast this to Einstein’s theory. As opposed to trying to give a constructive theory of
the material constitution of bodies, Einstein simply shows that length contraction (and of
course time dilation) must occur given the light postulate and relativity postulate.12 What
Einstein shows is that the laws of physics in a world in which the light postulate and the
relativity postulate hold must have laws that are Lorentz invariant. What his principle
theory does is show that whatever the correct theory of the material constitution and
stability of bodies is, it will have laws that are Lorentz invariant, and length contraction
will naturally result.
Minkowski gave a geometrical formulation to the special theory of relativity. It is quite
natural to interpret this geometrical formulation of a mathematical theory quite literally,
i.e. to take the geometry of space–time to be Minkowskian. If one accepts this
interpretation of special relativity, then it is quite natural to regard space–time geometry
as providing a explanation, a constructive explanation, of length contraction and time
dilation. To put it another way, when one assumes that the real geometry of space is
Minkowskian, the geometry forces rods and clocks to behave in the way that they do.13 In
this case, it is the reality behind the phenomena that is being appealed to.
12
The Lorentz transformations can only be derived with some additional assumptions, but arguably the light
postulate and the relativity postulate are the core principles of the special theory of relativity.
13
Brown & Poooley (2004) challenge the idea that space–time structure can play a constructive role in an
explanation of length contraction. Balashov & Janssen (2003) argue the opposite.
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Bub’s interpretation of this history is crucial for understanding and ultimately rejecting
his suggestion that information is a new physical primitive. In particular, he sees Einstein’s
analysis as playing a justificatory role to interpret Minkowski’s formulation of special
relativity as reflective of the actual space–time geometry. Bub writes, ‘‘What Einstein’s
analysis provides is a rational for taking the structure of space–time as Minkowskian: we
see this is required for the consistency of the two principles of relativity (Bub, 2004b,
p. 11).’’ What is most uncontroversially implied by Einstein’s analysis is that the laws of
physics should be Lorentz invariant. It is an additional interpretive move to suggest that
the actual geometry of space–time is Minkowskian. A geometrical formulation of the
special theory of relativity alone is certainly not sufficient to warrant this interpretation.14
Special relativity alone cannot justify the interpretation that the geometry of space–time is
Minkowskian.15
Setting that aside for the moment, Bub suggests that the Minkowski formulation of the
special theory of relativity implies that the electromagnetic field is a new physical primitive.
It is worth examining an extended quote:
In this new framework [Minkowski space–time], rigid bodies are excluded by the
symmetry groupyand, strictly speaking, particles (insofar as they are small rigid
bodies) are excluded. Instead, the field becomes the basic physical entity, as a new
physical primitive. In particular, since an electromagnetic wave is not reduced to
the vibratory motion of a mechanical medium (as a sound wave is reducible to the
[m]otion of air molecules), the ether is no longer required as the medium for the
physical instantiation of an electromagnetic field (Bub, 2004b, pp. 4,5).
For Bub, the electromagnetic field is a new stand-alone physical primitive, presumably
because it is regarded as having an ontological status which does not depend on anything
else. In this case, the electromagnetic field does not require a medium for propagation. It is
clear that that is the intended conclusion, but it is unclear what supporting argumentation
Bub has in mind. Following Bub, we may admit that in the framework of Minkowski
space–time, rigid bodies are excluded, but it is not clear what bearing this has on the
existence of the ether. Space–time geometry itself is certainly not obviously physically or
logically incompatible with an ether.
A plausible reconstruction of Bub’s reasoning is the following. Let us grant that the
special theory of relativity indicates that there can be no rigid bodies. As remarked above,
one can interpret this as a result of the fundamental laws that apply to the constitution of
material bodies, whatever they are, are Lorentz invariant, or because the geometry
of space–time itself forces the contraction. In either case, one need not appeal to the ether
to explain length contraction. Formally or mathematically, the ether is not required to
account for electrodynamic phenomena, nor does postulating the ether lead to any new
empirically detectable phenomena. It seems to be the case that Bub thinks this is sufficient
for not regarding the ether as part of the real physical ontology.16
14
I am indebted to Harvey Brown who made this point forcefully in his paper presented at annual philosophy of
physics meeting in Dubrovnik 2006.
15
One might appeal to a plausible principle, such that the symmetries of laws are the symmetries of space–time,
in conjunction with special relativity to argue that the real geometry of space–time is Minkowskian.
16
Textual evidence suggests that this is the right reading of Bub. For example, Bub writes, ‘‘Cushingyquotes
Maxwell as asking whether ‘it is not more philosophical to admit the existence of a medium which we cannot at
present perceive, than to assert that a body can act at a place where it is not (Bub, 2004b, p. 11).’’’ Immediately
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To sum up, Bub sees the situation in electrodynamics as the follows. Einstein provided
the principles which imply that space–time has a Minkowskian geometry. If we accept this
geometry, there is simply no formal role for the ether. According to Bub, no constructive
theory of the electrodynamics of moving bodies is warranted. It is empirically undetectable
and physically superfluous. The electromagnetic field stands on its own. Bub sees a similar
role for the CBH principles (constraints), information as a new primitive, and constructive
theories of quantum mechanics are superfluous.
Bub invites us to consider a counterfactual story about the development of quantum
mechanics to illustrate the foundational significance of the CBH result. Suppose that
Bohm’s theory was developed before the standard theory, and as an explicit attempt to
describe the behavior of quantum measurement devices. This theory involves a number of
oddities, in particular it is a contextual hidden variables theory which postulates a
sourceless guiding field, definite positions to particles which are unobservable, non-local
behavior, etc. Suppose that CBH came along with three constraints and demonstrated that
if the information-theoretic constraints hold, all predictions of Bohm’s theory can be
recovered by a simplified theory, one which does away with sourceless fields and particle
trajectories, which is formulated as a non-commutative C  -algebra. Moreover, if the
information-theoretic constraints are true, there will never be any empirical difference
between Bohm’s theory and the simplified one. Bub writes:
Just as in the case of Lorentz’s theory, Bohm’s theory will have to posit contingent
assumptions [the equilibrium distribution] to hide the additional mechanical
structures (the hidden variables will have to remain hidden), so that in principle, as
a matter of physical law, there could not be any evidence favoring the theory over
quantum theory (Bub, 2004b, p. 12).
It is clear from the above quote that Bub is highlighting the empirical equivalence of
quantum theory and Bohm’s theory given that the information-theoretic constraints are
true. Now similar to the case of the ether, the hidden variable analogue in electrodynamics,
hidden variables are theoretically superfluous. Just as one does not have to appeal to the
ether to make predictions about length contraction, one does not have to appeal to hidden
variables to recover the appropriate statistics for quantum experiments. This fact alone
seems to be enough for Bub to reject hidden variables theories.
Many might cry that there is clearly an explanatory role for the hidden variables, but
Bub dismisses this consideration. He writes of hidden variables theories:
ythe additional non-quantum structural elements that these theories postulate
cannot be doing any work in providing a physical explanation of quantum
phenomena that is not already provided by an empirically equivalent quantum
theory (Bub, 2004b, p. 12).
Tacit in the quote is the following dubious principle: If two theories are empirically
equivalent they provide the same physical explanations of phenomena. The history of
electrodynamics provides a ready counterexample. Lorentz’s explanation of length
contraction was that there was a physical interaction between the moving body and the

(footnote continued)
after, Bub writes, ‘‘Yes, but not if we also have to admit thaty the medium must remain undetectable (Bub,
2004b, p. 11).’’
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ether which caused the body to contract in the direction of motion. An alternative
explanation of length contraction is that the real geometry of space–time is Minkowskian
and it controls the behaviors of material bodies. One appeals to the ether as the reality
behind the phenomena, or one appeals to the geometry of space–time as the reality behind
the phenomena. Quite clearly, these are two radically different physical explanations of the
same phenomena, which is a counterexample to the above principle. The call for an
explanation of measurement interactions cannot be dismissed because of the existence of
an empirically satisfactory theory which provides no explanation. Set this problem aside
for the time being. What is Bub aiming for?
Bub writes:
Just as special relativity involves a theory of the structure of space–time in which a
field is a new physical primitive not reducible to the motion of a mechanical medium
(ultimately, to the motion of particles), so quantum mechanics involves a theory of
the algebraic structure of states and observables in which information is a new
physical primitive not reducible to the behavior of mechanical systems (the motion of
particles or fields) (Bub, 2004b, p. 5).
Bub is clearly inviting us to consider information as a new physical primitive. What he
means by this is that measurement devices behave like Shannon information sources and
the behavior of the devices is not to be reduced to hidden variables, just as electromagnetic
waves are not reducible to vibrations in a material medium, i.e. the ether.17 According to
Bub, we ought to view quantum mechanics, ‘‘as a theory about the representation and
manipulation of information constrained by the possibilities and impossibilities of
information-transfer in our world (a fundamental change in the aim of physics), rather
than a theory about the behavior of non-classical waves and particles (2004b, p. 14).’’
It is not clear whether Bub intends this to be a kind of normative epistemological claim,
that we can never know the real physics of measurement interactions, or an ontological
one, that hidden variables theories cannot be a good candidates for representing the real
physical ontology. There is textual evidence for both readings. Bub does not out and out
make an ontological claim. In the above quote that draws the analogy between the field
and accounts of measurement interactions, note that Bub seems to be explicitly endorsing
only a negative claim here. The behavior of measurement devices is irreducible to hidden
variables. He does not seem to be following the analogy to relativity completely by
endorsing a positive ontological claim about the ontology of quantum systems or
measurement devices akin to introducing the field as a new stand-alone part of the real
physical ontology. If this is right, Bub lesson wants us to draw seems to be a rather subtle
one. Because hidden variable theories are empirically equivalent to standard quantum
mechanics if the information-theoretic constraints are true, hidden variables have no
empirical consequences and are theoretically superfluous. It is not a proper part of physics
to describe them. They are out of the domain of physics generally, which is to describe the
observed regularities only. So as ontologically profound as ‘‘considering information as a
new physical primitive’’ sounds, Bub may intend it to be an ontologically neutral regarding
the underlying ontology of measurement interactions. Given the truth of the information-
theoretic constraints, measurement devices ought to be considered as black boxes, because it
17
Bub writes, ‘‘ythe ultimate measuring instrument is treated simply as a probabilistic source of a range of
labeled events or ‘outcomes,’ i.e. effectively as a source of information in Shannon’s sense (2004b, p. 14).’’
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outstrips empirical science to go crack open those black boxes. Information is a ‘‘new
physical primitive’’ only because physics should not analyze the behavior of measurement
devices.
On the other hand, Bub also seems to indicate that the ontology of the world is somehow
incompatible with hidden variables theories. He writes, ‘‘measurement devices are
ultimately treated as ‘black boxes,’ which follows-via the ‘no go’ theorems-once we accept
the three information-theoretic constrains as basic to an explanatory account of quantum
phenomena (2004b, p. 15).’’ I take it that no go theorems are intended to show that the
formalism of quantum mechanics is incompatible with a classical view of the world where
systems have definite valued properties corresponding to all possible observables. It
certainly does not follow from these no go theorems that no hidden variables theories can
account for with quantum phenomena; they seem reasonable contenders for an
approximation of the real physical ontology, and Bohm’s theory is an example. The most
that we can draw from the above quote is that Bub thinks the ontology of the world is not
as hidden variables theories indicate. He writes:
Quantum mechanics represents the discovery that there are new sorts of information
sources and communication channels in nature (represented by quantum states), and
the theory is about the properties of these information sources and communication
channels (Bub, 2004b, p. 14).
It seems that Bub thinks that quantum systems have some ontological features which
give rise to certain statistical properties of these systems, and it is no role of physics to
attempt to describe this new ontology. So, if this is the right reading of Bub, ‘‘information
as a new physical primitive’’ means that there are non-classical properties in the world that
give rise to the statistical features of measurement interactions.18
To sum up, the CBH constraints are to justify a particular formal setting for the
description of quantum systems. It so happens that given that the constraints are true,
hidden variables theories have no empirical consequences beyond the an empirically
equivalent quantum theories in the CBH sense. Moreover, the these CBH style theories
shows that hidden variables are formally or mathematically superfluous. Constructive
theories of measurement interactions are unwarranted in such conditions. They cannot
even play an explanatory role. Finally, though no positive claims are made about what the
quantum ontology is, Bub thinks that it not hidden variables, and no matter what it is, it is
beyond the scope of physics to investigate it. Hence, quantum mechanics ought to be
regarded as a principle theory of information.

4.2. A critical appraisal of the analogy

There are several objections to raise over Bub’s use of the analogy to electrodynamics,
and his argumentation generally. The interesting part of the analogy is between an appeal
to the ether to give a constructive theory of length contraction as well as provide a medium
for the propagation of electromagnetic waves, and an appeal to hidden variables to give a
constructive account of measurement interactions. The question is whether this analogy
18
This would seem to be an unfortunate choice of terminology, because rather than take information as a new
primitive, one would be taking the ontological features of that give rise to the information-theoretic properties of
measurement interactions as primitive, which is quite a different matter.
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supports the view that quantum mechanics ought to be regarded as a principle theory
where information is a new physical primitive. Bub is quite right that the ether is not
required to explain length contraction. As remarked above, length contraction can be
accounted for in one of two ways. Either one regards the fundamental laws governing the
constitution of material bodies as Lorentz invariant, in which case length contraction
follows automatically from the forces governing bodies, or one appeals to space–time
geometry itself as somehow constraining bodies to behave in accord with the geometry.
What is crucial here is that length contraction either receives an actual constructive
explanation in the case of the latter, or a promissory one from yet to be discovered but
Lorentz invariant laws of material bodies from the former. What the special theory of
relativity did not do was to obviate the need for an explanation of length contraction, nor a
constructive one at that. Similarly in the case of quantum mechanics, the need for an
explanation of the behavior of measurement devices is not obviated by the fact that
quantum theories will be non-commutative C  -algebras (given that the information-
theoretic constraints are true). The analogy to relativity will not support the view that
constructive quantum theories have no place in physics.
One of the important differences in the analogy between ether and measurement devices
is this. The ether plays an important conceptual, heuristic, and mathematical role in the
development of electrodynamics. The ether was ripe for an application of Occam’s razor
because it was mathematically superfluous, and because length contraction received a more
ontologically parsimonious constructive explanation than that in which the ether played a
role. In the case of quantum theory, Bub is offering nothing to fill the explanatory void left
when one excises hidden variables from the theory. There is a real need for a constructive
explanation of measurement devices that Bub cannot discharge, and it is easy to see where
this comes from.
It is absolutely certain that measurement devices are constructed out of the very same
systems that are in domain of quantum theory, and the behavior of the device supervenes
on the real physical interactions of the quantum systems that constitute the device.
A fundamental theory ought to apply to the workings of measurement devices
which are constituted out of the very systems the theory is meant to apply to. There is
simply no reason to leave measurement interactions somehow unanalyzed, i.e. to consider
information as a new physical primitive in the epistemological sense. Of course, Bub does
seem to think that the behavior of measurement devices is somehow explained.
As remarked above, Bub appealed to the principle that empirically equivalent theories
provide the same physical explanations of phenomena. Hence, Bub is committed to the
strange view that the standard theory provides an explanation of measurement interactions
that is the same as Bohm’s theory’s explanation. Now, he adduces no argumentation
for this principle, and clearly he bears the argumentative burden in this case. A weaker
principle that Bub might appeal to is the following:
If two theories are in principle empirically equivalent, there can be no reason to
prefer one theory’s explanation of a phenomena over another empirically equivalent
theory’s explanation.
Again, electrodynamics seems to provide a counterexample to this principle. Clearly an
explanation that appealed to an ether was rejected, and the explanation of an empirically
equivalent theory was accepted. The history of physics is one in which one empirically
equivalent theory’s explanations are preferred to other theories’ explanations. So, Bub
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cannot appeal to the analogy with special relativity to discharge the demand for an
explanation of the behavior of our measurement devices. Furthermore, he has provided no
argumentation that explanatory power is not a legitimate reason to prefer one theory to
another. Quite clearly, the standard theory, especially if regarded with the operational
leanings that Bub has expressed, gives no explanation of the behavior of measurement
devices. So, the analogy to relativity does not support the rejection of the explanatory
demand for measurement devices, and Bub cannot claim to have given an explanation of
the behavior of these devices.
As argued above, Bub does seem to hold the view that the real ontology is incompatible
with hidden variables theories. This might leave room for a positive account of
measurement interactions, but one which goes beyond standard hidden variables theories.
It may be possible to pursue the analogy to relativity in a different way that Bub does. In
particular one can draw an analogy with Minkowski space–time as an abstract framework
for relativistic kinematics and its interpretation as representing the real space–time
geometry, to the abstract non-commutative C  -algebra framework of quantum theories
and some fairly direct interpretation of how that framework represents the real physical
ontology. The analogy to special relativity suggests that the algebraic structure of quantum
mechanics should be interpreted fairly literally as representing something in the world. It
might not be information, but this raises the question, what does the algebraic structure of
quantum mechanics, when interpreted fairly straightforwardly, suggest about the furniture
of the world?
It would be absurd to suggest that the algebraic structure of quantum theory is some
entity that constrains the structure of states and observables. This would be taking the
analogy to Minkowski space–time too far. A more reasonable suggestion is that quantum
states and observables have a particular algebraic structure which more or less directly
represents features of the world. As is well known, idempotent elements in an algebra of
observables, which are taken to represent properties of quantum systems, cannot be
assigned definite values straightforwardly. The suggestion here is to accept this as reflective
of an underlying fact about the world. Taking the algebraic structure of quantum
mechanics seriously and straightforwardly means accepting the values of observables are
simply not generally definite, i.e. quantum mechanical properties are simply not like
classical definite valued properties. So, the algebraic structure of the theory is not taken to
be a structure that describes the non-classical behavior of mechanical properties, i.e.
hidden variables, but reflects non-definite-valued properties.
One might suggest using these non-definite values of observables to explain why
measurement devices behave as they do. At least in this case, the introduction of a new
element into the world would have some explanatory value. Curiously, if one chases this
analogy to Minkowski space–time, which seems to be the only way to argue against all
hidden variables theories using an argument based on the CBH theorem, one does so by
postulating constructive elements. So, this positive argument against hidden variables is
incompatible with the claim that quantum mechanics can only be a principle theory.
Similar to the decoherence move to account for the behavior of measurement devices, it
would take a lot of careful work to see if non-definite-valued properties could provide any
sort of satisfactory account of the behavior of measurement devices. Certainly it is beyond
the scope of this paper to attempt such an account.
It is not clear that Bub would be interested in following this particular line of
argumentation, but Bub needs something more than he has got. The CBH analysis gives
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the bare structure of Hilbert spaces and the no go theorems rule out a class of hidden
variables theories. To reject all hidden variables theories compatible with the information-
theoretic constraints, Bub has to do something more than stipulate that no hidden variable
theories are acceptable. The analogy Bub sought to draw to relativity fails to support his
view, the other possible analogy that could be drawn takes a wild (but perhaps not
uncalled for) leap into ontological speculation where quantum mechanics features
constructive elements which are not reducible to definite valued observables. As it turns
out, there is a middle way.

5. A new conception of quantum mechanics

In this section I sketch a conception of quantum theory as a theory of information which

is compatible with the spirit of Bub’s work and which bypasses the problems raised in
Section 4.2. Central to this conception is a concept of quantum information which departs
from Bub’s, but arguably captures the most important features of his concept. The concept
is outlined below and then its role in a principle theory of quantum information is
articulated.

5.1. Quantum information

In this section the Duwell (unpublished) analysis of the Schumacher’s (1995) concept of
quantum information is outlined. The concept of quantum information introduced is
properly considered a concept of information in virtue of its similarity to Shannon’s
concept of information. The analogy to Shannon’s theory becomes apparent below. Just as
Shannon’s information theory determines the resources necessary and sufficient for the
transfer of information, so too does quantum information theory determine the minimal
resources necessary and sufficient for transferring quantum information.
It is useful to employ the concept of a quantum communication system. It consists of a
quantum signal source, a compression device, a signal, and a decompression device.
A quantum signal source produces a sequence of quantum systems according to a
probability distribution, or a quantum message. These quantum systems are individually in
a pure state or part of a larger system in a pure state. If the quantum information
source emits an N length sequence of qubits, a Hilbert space of dimension 2N required to
describe the qubits emitted from the source. A compression device manipulates the N
length sequence of qubits and produces a sequence of fewer quantum systems. This
sequence is the quantum signal that is the means to successfully communication quantum
information. The Hilbert space required to represent this compressed sequence, HC , has
dimension less than 2N . The decompression device manipulates the signal to reproduce a
sequence of quantum systems which behave in measurements just as the original sequence
would have.
The von Neumann entropy of the quantum signal source quantifies the dimension of the
signal system that is required for successful information transfer. It turns out that the
signal system need only be approximately dimension 2NSðrÞ o2N , where r is the average
density operator associated with the source, and SðrÞ is the von Neumann entropy.
The success criterion for quantum information transfer is that the entanglement fidelity
of the information transfer process approaches one in the limit of large N (see Nielsen &
Chuang, 2000 for a detailed description of the entanglement fidelity). The entanglement
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fidelity will only be close to one when the sequence of quantum systems that appears after a
quantum signal is decompressed will cause measurement devices to behave almost exactly
like the initial sequence produced by the source would. This means that the probability
distributions associated with measurements on the decompressed sequence will be nearly
identical to those associated with the initial sequence. The success criterion ensures that
not only will the probability distributions associated with measurements on the individual
components of the initial and final sequence be identical (the marginal distributions), but
also distributions associated with measurements on other systems as well (the joint
distributions). So, if the sequence produced by the source is entangled, the transfer
protocol will preserve that entanglement as well.
The concept of quantum information associated with the above communication and
compression scenario breaks into two subconcepts: quantum quantity-information, and
quantum type-information. Quantum quantity-information is that which is quantified by
the von Neumann entropy, the resources required for successful reproduction of the
quantum message at the destination. The quantum type-information is that which is
required to be reproduced at the destination to qualify as successful quantum
communication. Given the entanglement fidelity is the criterion of success, what is
required to be reproduced is the probabilistic behavior of the original sequence under all
possible measurement interactions.
The crucial feature of the Schumacher concept of quantum information (defined by its
subconcepts) is that this concept of quantum information is interpretationally neutral.
Quantum quantity-information, the resources required for quantum communication, is a
concept that can be applied to any version of quantum theory one accepts. Of course the
same is true of the operationally defined quantum type-information. Hence the
Schumacher concept of quantum information embraces all satisfactory theories of
quantum systems.

5.2. Quantum mechanics as a theory of quantum information

This section uses the concept of quantum information developed in Section 5.1 in
conjunction with the CBH theorem to sketch a new conception of quantum theory. This
conception is based on the assumption that the information-theoretic constraints are true,
and that the CBH analysis is unproblematic.19
If the information-theoretic constraints are true, any empirically acceptable theory of
quantum phenomena is empirically equivalent to a quantum theory in the CBH sense. As
such, there can be no empirical evidence to decide between such a theory and others.
Following Bub (2004a) we can conclude that it is rational to withhold accent to any
member of a set of empirically equivalent rival theories. The claim is not being made that
one rival theory cannot be rationally preferred to another, but that it would be irrational to
have a cognitive state as extreme as belief that one theory is true and its empirically
equivalent rivals false. Given this epistemological situation, one ought to be agnostic
about the ontological status of these competing theories which cannot be empirically
decided (in principle!), but positive about the common content of these theories, the
empirical content. This is captured by construing quantum theories as being generally
19
It deserves mention that the information-theoretic constraints can be interpreted as constraints on the
behavior of quantum type-information (as understood in Section 5.1).
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about quantum information. Quantum mechanics is then conceived of as a theory of

quantum information.
Conceiving of quantum mechanics as a theory of quantum information is generally
deflationary. Hilbert space is construed as a codification of the behavior of quantum
information, but the conception advocated here is agnostic as to how that behavior arises.
That said, it preserves Bub’s intuition that quantum mechanics ought to be construed as a
theory of information.
Some might claim that construing quantum theory as being about quantum information
eliminates all interesting foundational work. Two things can be said here. Foundational
work in terms of developing accounts of quantum mechanics that recover our experience
of the world, perhaps via hidden variables, is still a crucial and interesting topic of research
which is perfectly compatible with the conception of quantum mechanics advocated here.
That said, there are quite obviously plenty of interesting foundational issues that do not
revolve around the measurement problem, e.g. explanation of quantum computational
efficiency, the properties of quantum information, especially the quantitative analysis of
entanglement as a physical resource, to name a few. Focusing on quantum mechanics as a
theory of quantum information might lead to interesting new ways to understand quantum
theory. In particular, new explanations of quantum phenomena might be possible in terms
of the yet to be discovered laws of quantum information. Construing quantum mechanics
as a theory of information is an invitation to broaden our conception of foundational work
in quantum mechanics.20

6. Conclusion

Bub wants to use the CBH theorem to argue that quantum mechanics should be viewed
as a principle theory of information where information is a new physical primitive, and
that no hidden variables theory of quantum mechanics is acceptable. Unfortunately, there
are several obstacles in his path.
First, there is considerable question as to whether the information-theoretic constraints
are true. The evidence we have for them is not positive, it is only derived from the fact that
the principles are true on standard quantum mechanics. They are generally not true on
other quantum theories. Given that there is no empirical reason to prefer any rival
quantum theory, it is a substantive and controversial assumption that the constraints are
true. Even if one assumes that the constraints are true, there are non-trivial concerns about
the mathematical framework in which the assumptions were formulated. Hence, even if it
was granted that the information-theoretic constraints are true, C  -algebras are not a
suitable neutral formal setting for quantum mechanics.
Setting those concerns aside, if the information-theoretic constraints are true, the bizarre
formalism of quantum mechanics is well justified via true physical features of the world via
the CBH theorem. Hence, physicists and philosophers should feel confident about the
formal apparatus of the theory (if the 80 or so years of empirical success was not enough).
Bub takes no go theorems as generally ruling out hidden variable accounts of quantum
phenomena in terms of quantum systems’ possession of definite values of observables.
20
It is not being argued that work quantum information theory or quantum computation somehow needs to be
philosophically justified, nor that traditional foundational work is problematic. What is being advocated is a
different perspective on quantum theory which might generate new philosophical insight into quantum theory.
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Of course, these theorems only rule out certain classes of hidden variables theories, and not
all. So, the general rejection of any hidden variables theory requires more argumentation
than mathematics and the truth of the information-theoretic constraints can provide.
There were two lines of argumentation that Bub endorsed. First, there was an argument
assuming a particular principle of rationality. It was argued that that principle could not
be employed to prefer the quantum theories in the CBH sense equipped with a decoherence
account of measurement interactions, as Bub preferred over any other empirically
equivalent quantum theory, nor any empirically equivalent theory over another. The
second line of argumentation came from an analogy to electrodynamics. Bub’s use of the
analogy was faulty. Bub argued that the principles of special relativity theory essentially
made the ether mathematically and physically superfluous, and similarly the CBH
principles make hidden variable accounts of measurement interactions mathematically and
physically superfluous. This analogy is not convincing because the rejection of the ether
was not a rejection of the demand for a constructive explanation of length contraction. In
fact, in the case of quantum mechanics, the demand for a constructive explanation of the
behavior of measurement devices seems even more pressing. One analogy to relativity that
Bub could draw, but did not, led to the introduction of questionable new elements into our
ontology. The elimination of hidden variables was paid for by a heavy and dubious
ontological move, and moreover introduced constructive elements into our ontology.
Hence, the analogies to relativity could not support Bub’s conception of quantum theory
as a principle theory.
As a compromise, a conception of quantum mechanics as a theory of information was
sketched that preserved a good deal of Bub’s conception. If the information-theoretic
principles are true, and if the objections concerning the mathematical formulation of the
principles are resolved, quantum information becomes a unifying thread among all
acceptable (and empirically equivalent) quantum theories. It is hoped that focus on the
common content of quantum theories will lead to new foundational insight into the
quantum world that may have been overlooked due to philosophers’ and physicists’
obsession with the measurement problem.

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