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Organizational Justice

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From Cropanzano, R., Molina, A., 2015. Organizational Justice. In: James D. Wright
(editor-in-chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences,
2nd edition, Vol 17. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 379–384.
ISBN: 9780080970868
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.
Elsevier
 Author's personal copy

Organizational Justice
Russell Cropanzano, Leeds School of Business, Boulder, CO, USA
Agustin Molina, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
! 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Abstract

Research on organizational justice explores the psychological mechanisms by which people render judgments of fairness, as
well as their responses to these perceptions. When workers believe that they have been treated justly, they tend to show higher
job performance, better work attitudes, and lower levels of stress. With these benefits in mind, this article reviews the
literature on organizational justice, placing emphasis on the different types of fairness, as well as interactions among these
types. Individual-level and group-level approaches to justice are also contrasted, with special attention to recent theoretical
and empirical developments.

Within the organizational sciences, the term ‘organizational
justice’ can be understood as having two meanings, one narrow
and one general. The narrow meaning refers to particular
judgments concerning various types of events. When deciding
whether an occurrence is just or unjust, individuals (or groups)
ascertain whether or not it is morally appropriate. More
generally, the term ‘organizational justice’ can also refer to
scholarly literature. That is, it refers to a body of knowledge
about these fairness evaluations, including such topics as how
they are formulated, their dimensional structure, and their
individual- and group-level effects.
In general, workers respond more favorably – both for
themselves and for their employers – when they perceive that
they have been treated justly. They respond less well when they
perceive an injustice. Research has found that justice percep-
tions are positively correlated with organizational commit-
ment, job performance, leader–member relations, and helpful
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB). They are nega-
tively correlated with work stress, counterproductive work
behaviors, and turnover intentions (Cohen-Charash and
Spector, 2001; Rupp et al., 2014).
Descriptive vs Normative Justice
Within the organizational sciences, justice is generally studied
descriptively. That is, it focuses on the perceptions or evaluations
of fairness that are formulated by people at work. Put more
starkly, an event is treated as ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ because some
person or persons believe it to be. This approach is subjective
and allows disagreement as to what is and is not appropriate.
The descriptive paradigm taken by organizational justice
researchers can be distinguished from the more familiar
normative perspective that is often employed by philosophers.
Speaking very generally, ethical philosophers use logic and
observation to determine what is ‘prescriptively’ or ‘normatively’
fair (Cugueró-Escofet and Fortin, 2014). That is, philosophers
seek to understand what the objective events or attributes are
that make something just (Cropanzano et al., 2011b).
In practice, organizational justice researchers tend to borrow
ideas from ethical philosophy. For example, seminal thinking
on procedural justice was taken from John Rawls, and work on
distributive justice traces back (at least) to Aristotle. Regardless,
even when borrowing philosophical concepts, organizational
justice researchers study them descriptively. For example, they
are unlikely to emphasize whether, say, a voice procedure is
truly fair, but are more likely to investigate whether people
evaluate it as fair. Organizational justice scholars also study the
consequences of having made a fairness judgment.
Forming Perceptions of Justice
This descriptive perspective favored by organizational justice
researchers places a great deal of emphasis on individual
perceptions of fairness. There are a number of different theories
that attempt to account for how justice evaluations are
formulated. However, most of these conceptual models share
certain common features (Cropanzano et al., 2011b), which
are reviewed here.
In most cases, individuals make fairness judgments when an
event, and often one that is personally disappointing, occurs.
To understand whether or not the event was unfair, rather than
simply unfortunate or surprising, individuals make use of
a comparative referent, which acts as a sort of moral yardstick.
These points of comparison go by a number of names, such as
‘norms’, ‘standards’, ‘rules’, or even ‘justice criteria’. When
events are negative and inconsistent with these referent points,
then people are apt to decide that an injustice has occurred. In
short, individuals compare an actual occurrence to a normative
standard and then evaluate the discrepancies (Hollensbe et al.,
2008). As described so far, the formation of justice evaluations
may appear to be somewhat simple and logical. However, this
omits a number of complicating factors.
First, before people begin to appraise the fairness of an
event, it needs to be salient. If it does not catch sufficient
attention, then individuals will be less likely to do the cognitive
work involved in formulating a fairness judgment. This is one
reason why negative events that are surprising and personally
relevant are especially likely to be viewed as unfair.
Second, in real-world settings people do not always go
through the careful steps outlined above. Often, employees

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 17 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.22033-3 379

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 379–384
 Author's personal copy
380 Organizational Justice
simply model the behavior of their coworkers, thereby adopt-
ing the views of their peers rather than working out their own
personal assessments. This is an important finding, which as
will be seen is relevant to the formation of group-level justice
perceptions.
Third, people differ as to who is and who is not included
within their scope of justice. When other people are within
this scope, such as in-group members, evaluators are more
solicitous and scrupulous about applying fairness rules. Unfor-
tunately, when others are outside the scope of justice, such as
out-group members, then evaluators becomes less circumspect
and more disinterested in how potential victims are treated.
Findings for scope of justice may go far in explaining how
observers can be nonchalant about the mistreatment of others.
Fortunately, everyone does not show this effect to the same
degree. The scope of justice effect is stronger for those with weak
moral identities. Conversely, for individuals who see morality as
important to their identity, this effect is weaker (Reed and
Aquino, 2003).
Fourth, while people seem to care about fairness, they
show considerable egocentric biases in their judgment. These
biases can be automatic and unconscious. For instance, when
individuals are assigned a side in a legal case, either defendant
or plaintiff, and then asked to read about the alleged events,
they show biased recall of facts and more extreme evaluative
judgments. However, when individuals are told to read about
the alleged events and only later assigned a role in the case,
they show more accurate recall of acts and less extreme
judgments (Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). This suggests
that personal relevance affects the processing of factual
information.
Dimensions of Justice
Thus far we have described the precipitating stimuli for justice
judgments broadly, using some terms as ‘events’ or ‘occur-
rences’. In fact, justice scholars have devoted considerable
attention to the types of things that people evaluate. Broadly
speaking, these can be broken into three classes of event –
outcomes (distributive justice), decision-making processes
(procedural justice), and interpersonal treatment (interactional
justice). Each of these is reviewed each, introducing alternative
formulations where these are relevant.
Distributive Justice
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of an allo-
cation or, more broadly, to how people judge what they
receive. It was probably the first type of justice to gain the
attention of organizational justice scholars and continues to
receive wide attention. In general, there are three rules that
people can use to decide whether or not their outcomes are fair
– equity, equality, and need (Deutsch, 1985).
Equity allocations treat a fair allocation as one that pays
individuals in accordance with their contributions. There are
different models of equity – Aristotle even had one – but by far
the most influential is Adams’ (1965) equity theory. According
to Adams, individuals calculate equity comparing two
outcome/input ratios. The first ratio is their own outcomes
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 379–384
divided by their own inputs, while the second is a referent’s
outcomes divided by the referent’s inputs. In order for equity
to exist, these two ratios should match. A counterintuitive
prediction of equity theory is that people care about over-
reward, as well as underreward. If an individual’s ratio is larger
than that of a referent person, this means that the individual
has greater outcomes given his or her inputs. In such
a circumstance, Adams found that the individual will attempt
to restore equity by either raising performance (if pay is fixed)
or lowering performance (if pay is piece rate). In general, equity
theory has received support, including predictions for over-
reward. But it is not the whole story.
An equality allocation provides everyone with the same
amount, without regard to contributions. Equality allocations
are most likely to be used when the goal is to maximize group
harmony; equity allocations are most common when the goal
is to maximize productivity. As such, equality is relatively
common among close, communal groups. There is some
evidence that equality, as opposed to equity, is also preferred
when decision making is allocating something negative, such
as budget cuts. If we must share suffering, it seems that indi-
viduals often prefer to suffer by the same amount or
percentage. Interestingly, equality may also have an informa-
tion processing advantage, as it is a very simple allocation rule
that requires less effortful thought than others. In this regard,
researchers have documented the existence of an equality
heuristic, whereby people simply divide things evenly unless
they have the cognitive resources to consider a more complex
norm (such as equity).
A third allocation rule is need, which provides outcomes on
the basis of a perceived deficit. Perhaps surprisingly, need
allocations have been less widely studied in the organizational
sciences, although even profit-making firms make at least some
use of them. For instance, family leave policies are allocated to
those who need them – only people with particular needs (e.g.,
child care or elder care) receive time off.
In practice, when people are asked to make allocation
decision, they often mix the rules together, such that they are
not always used in a pure form (Cugueró-Escofet and Rosanas,
2013). For example, one strategy might be to provide ‘neces-
sities’ or a minimum income to all. This would be an equality
allocation. However, above this equal minimum the equity
rule could be employed. In this regard, one might use merit to
allocate additional payments. Another mixed approach might
be to allocate different goods in different ways. Among
American employers, for example, socioemotional goods
indicative of group standing are often allocated equally,
whereas economic goods are often allocated through equity
(Chen, 1995). These and other sorts of mixed approaches
seek to balance the strengths and weaknesses of the different
allocation rules.
Procedural Justice
Outcomes need to arrive from somewhere. Procedural justice
refers to the decision-making process or the set of policies that
are used to make allocation decisions. For example, trials are
one way that disputes are adjudicated in many societies.
Research suggests that, to the extent that people perceive
control within the legal process (e.g., they have ‘voice’, or the
 Author's personal copy
opportunity to present their case), they are more willing to
accept an unfavorable decision (Tyler, 2006). Interestingly,
there seems to be marginal ‘fairness returns’ on at least some
procedural safeguards. If a valued process is absent, then even
small gains in its amount will boost perceptions of justice.
However, at a certain point, some amount of the process
appears to be satisfactory and additional gains will produce
fewer benefits.
Leventhal et al. (1980) provided a list of six well-known
criteria that are used to decide whether a procedure is just. In
general, the process should treat all parties consistently, be free
from bias, use accurate information in rendering decisions, take
into account the views of all (something like voice), be
correctable in the event of an error, and remain consistent with
prevailing ethical norms. These six criteria have remained
influential, although some additional rules might also be
important in certain settings. For example, in some settings,
people prefer advance notice before something potentially
negative occurs.
Research reviewed by Tyler (2006) suggests that procedural
justice place an important role in promoting citizen compli-
ance with the law. When people believe that the political
system is essentially fair, such as when citizens are adequately
represented by their elected representatives, they are more
likely to accept legal rules, even when these might not be
viewed as personally desirable.
Interactional Justice
Bies (2001) has argued that in addition to formal outcomes
and procedures, individuals evaluate fairness via social or
communication criteria. That is, they look to how they were
treated by others. Broadly defined, these social criteria have
been found to fall into at least two categories (although there
may be more than two) – interpersonal justice and informa-
tional justice.
Interpersonal justice pertains to the dignity and respect with
which people are treated. An interpersonally fair transaction
would avoid personal attaches, refrain from unnecessary
harshness, eschew bigotry, and so forth. Some scholars have
argued that this interpersonal variety of interactional justice has
an especially unambiguous relationship to judgments of
immorality.
Informational justice, as its names applies, refers to the
provision of relevant evidence and explanations, and this is
especially important when things go wrong. In particular,
research has found that organizations should provide social
accounts, indicating to the employee why things happen as
they do. Such accounts are important (and surprisingly effec-
tive) in mitigating feelings of unfairness (Shaw et al., 2003).
There is some debate over interactional justice’s structure.
Many scholars combine interpersonal and informational
justice together. This results in a three-factor model for fair-
ness – distributive, procedural, and interactional. Others
separate out the interpersonal and informational compo-
nents, producing a four-factor solution (Colquitt, 2001).
Both approaches seem to work psychometrically. Choosing
between the three- and four-factor models may partially
have to do with the goals of the researcher and the under-
lying theory.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 379–384
Organizational Justice 381
Justice Rules in Real-World Settings
In general, fairness researchers argue for three or four families
of events – outcomes, processes, interpersonal transactions,
and information – that are appraised in accordance with a set of
normative standards. While these standards certainly cover
a broad class of situations, it is not clear that actual employees
apply them as neatly as some research might imply. Some
research suggests that decision makers supplement the better
researcher approaches to justice with so-called emergent rules
(Hollensbe et al., 2008). For instance, individuals may notice
high turnover and work backwards to assume that this was
caused by injustice. Alternatively, individuals might assess the
level of supportiveness and use this to infer that a supervisor is
fair. These emergent rules are important and should be the
subject of future research.
Interactions between and among the Types of Justice
So far we have only considered the individual main effects of
the different types of justice. Research has long supported the
idea that the various types of fairness interact. For instance,
individuals dislike receiving an unfair, or even unfavorable,
outcome. However, the ill effects of an unjust allocation can be
partially addressed if the allocation process is viewed as fair. For
example, people who lose their court cases are unhappy with
the outcome, but they are less likely to derogate the legal
system if they perceive that it treated them fairly. Similar
effects have been found for workplace decisions (for a review,
see Brockner, 2002).
In general, the outcome by process interaction suggests that
ill effects of fairness are maximized when both types of justice
are low (e.g., low distributive justice þ low procedural justice).
Either type of fairness can buffer the effects of the other. Thus, it
could also be said that individuals prefer to be provided with,
say, voice, which is a characteristic of fair procedures. However,
the absence of voice will not be problematic unless an outcome
is unfair or at least unfavorable.
Despite these supportive findings, there are other times
when a fair process is unlikely to ally the anger from an unfa-
vorable outcome. A good example of this comes from research
on ‘moral mandates’ (Mullen and Skitka, 2006). A moral
mandate refers to a strongly held belief or opinion, which is
grounded in an ethical judgment. A moral mandate would exist
for an issue like abortion, when the debate is framed as an issue
of human rights (e.g., the right to choose vs the right to life).
For those possessing strong moral mandates about an issue, an
unfavorable outcome is more difficult to mitigate by means of
the procedure. Rather, the process itself is likely to be derogated
as a result of the moral mandate violation.
Interesting, the two-way interaction works the same for
interactional justice as it does for procedural justice. That is,
interactional justice has the same buffering effects on unfor-
tunate outcomes, and this has been observed in both the
laboratory and the field (Brockner et al., 2003). This raises the
possibility that any of the three types of fairness could allay
the negative impact of the other two. By extension, this suggests
that there should be a three-way interaction, such that the
effects of unfairness are disproportionately present when all
three are low. There is some evidence for this. Studies have
 Author's personal copy
382 Organizational Justice
found that this three-way interaction predicts workplace retal-
iation and organizational attractiveness. At the present time,
research on the three-way interaction is limited but promising,
as the effect has been replicated (Cropanzano et al., 2011).
However, less work has examined the four-factor model of
justice in this way, although presumably this could be done
as well.
Overall Justice
A recent trend within justice research, called overall justice,
suggests that individuals form global judgments of how they
are treated. Instead of focusing on the different sets of justice
perceptions as three (or four) pieces of a puzzle, this approach
allows researchers and practitioners to treat justice as a holistic
assessment. The overall justice approach does not reduce the
importance of the specific types of fairness. On the contrary,
evidence suggests that overall justice judgments can be made in
a ‘bottom-up’ fashion, as the specific justice perceptions are
cognitively combined into an overall opinion. In other words,
the types of justice act as the antecedents of overall justice
judgments (Ambrose and Schminke, 2009).
Multifoci Justice
In the research viewed thus far, justice judgments have been
treated as if they were directed toward a class of events, such as
outcomes or processes. However, it is also important to
consider the entity, such as an organization or a supervisor,
who is the target of these appraisals. In this way, multifoci
justice theory adds to this body of literature by evoking the
importance of the foci or sources of justice. In the workplace,
employees generally engage in social exchange relationships
with multiple parties (Lavelle et al., 2007). Based on the nature
of those exchanges, employees can form different perceptions
for each of the sources of justice with whom they interact (e.g.,
customers, supervisor, coworkers, and the organization as
a whole). Multifoci theory then highlights the importance of
holding others accountable for the just or unjust acts that
individuals experience in the workplace.
In short, research on this area has argued that employees
can distinguish among different sources (Rupp and Spencer,
2006) and meta-analytic research has supported this
contention (Rupp et al., 2014). For example, Rupp and
Cropanzano (2002) found that employees form supervisory
– procedural and interactional – justice perceptions. These
authors further observed that those supervisory-focused
perceptions could be differentiated from organizational-
focused perceptions – organizational procedural and interac-
tional justice. Another interesting finding from multifoci
theory is that the relationship between a justice perception
and a variable of interest will be stronger when the source of
justice matches that of the outcome (Lavelle et al., 2007). If an
organization that values its employees’ commitment as core
strength, for example, was worried about the impact of a new
set of policies that have been implemented, the best approach
to examine the antecedents on organizational commitment
would be to measure its employees’ perceptions of organiza-
tional procedural justice.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 379–384
Group-Level Justice
The discussion so far has focused on individual-level percep-
tions of justice. In the workplace, though, individuals are
constantly submerged within collective social structures. These
may take such forms as teams, branches, and overall organi-
zations. Justice scholars are no strangers to these structures or to
their subjacent social dynamics. Over the last two decades,
organizational justice has extended the scope of interest to
include the appraisal of justice events and occurrences at the
group level. Even though there are several arguments to
describe the emergence of group-level justice phenomena,
social information processing (SIP) theory and the attraction–
selection–attrition (ASA) model represent the two approaches
most used.
Social Information Processing Theory
According to the SIP theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978),
individuals do not work in isolation from one another. On the
contrary, employees generally engage in social interactions to
make sense of the events that take place during their daily
activities. As explained in a previous section, employees may
form justice assessments by simply modeling the behavior of
their coworkers (Hollensbe et al., 2008). Consequently, as time
goes by, the justice perceptions of each member of the group
are said to converge. In other words, if group members receive
similar outcomes, are subjected to similar procedures, and are
treated in a similar fashion by a source of fairness (e.g.,
supervisor), over time, a shared judgment of justice emerges. In
direct support of the SIP theory, Roberson (2006) demon-
strated that the more time spent in sense-making activities, the
higher the convergence of group members’ procedural and
distributive perceptions.
Attraction–Selection–Attrition Model
The ASA model (Schneider et al., 1995) posits that individuals
with similar characteristics are attracted to, selected into, and
retained by the same group. The first step, the attraction,
suggests that individuals find organizations differentially
attractive based on the congruence of the organizations’ goals
and their own personalities. The next step, the selection,
concerns the recruitment and hiring of individuals who possess
the desired attributives looked for by the organization. The
final step, the attrition, argues that the employees who do not fit
the organization will leave their work, whereas employees who
do fit the organization will remain in their jobs.
Colquitt et al. (2002) were among the first scholars to
provide evidence for the ASA model. These scholars observed
that a characteristic such as the demographic – age, ethnicity,
and gender – diversity within a team predicted the level of
convergence among team members’ perceptions on procedural
justice.
Justice Climate and Peer Justice
Thanks to the advancements on multifoci theory, research on
group-level justice has been able to distinguish between two
 Author's personal copy
sources of justice from which shared perceptions can emerge.
These are justice climate and peer justice. The former refers
to how the unit believes that it is treated by an authority
figure, while the latter refers to how teammates behave toward
one another.
Justice Climate
Naumann and Bennett (2000) were the first to use the term
justice climate. They referred to this construct as the shared
perception of how fairly a group is treated by an authority
figure – such as the organization or the supervisor. In their
study, Naumann and Bennet measured the group’s shared
perceptions on the procedures enacted by the organization
(i.e., procedural justice climate). Their results revealed that
procedural justice climate predicted helping behaviors above
and beyond individual-level perceptions of procedural justice.
That is, the perception of the group explained a part of the
helping behavior performed by employees that could not be
explained by its individual counterpart (individual-level
procedural justice). Several studies have been conducted since
then attesting the importance of justice climate as a predictor of
workplace attitudes (e.g., satisfaction, commitment), processes
(e.g., citizenship behaviors, cooperation), withdrawal behav-
iors (e.g., absenteeism, turnover intentions), and unit perfor-
mance (e.g., customer satisfaction, financial performance;
Whitman et al., 2012).
Peer Justice
This construct refers to the shared perception regarding how
individuals judge the fairness with which they treat one another
(Li and Cropanzano, 2009). Peer justice thus examines how
people who do not have formal authority over each other
behave, or believe that they behave, internally to the group.
Despite the novelty of this construct, peer justice has already
demonstrated a great potential for the organizational behavior
domain. Cropanzano et al. (2011a), for instance, showed that
peer justice predicts task and interpersonal teamwork processes
which, in turn, predict performance and citizenship behaviors.
Similar to justice climate, the effects of peer justice were above
and beyond the effects of its individual-level counterpart.
Justice climate and peer justice provide two key instruments
for industries and organizations that keep increasing the
importance of team settings. By measuring both constructs,
researchers and practitioners can assess the full spectrum of
group-level justice phenomenology. Whereas justice climate
reflects the treatment the group receives from an outside person
or entity, peer justice provides a picture from inside the group,
shedding light on the internal social dynamics.
Concluding Thoughts
Organizational justice is an area of study that investigates how
and why people come to form judgments of fairness in regard to
their work settings. Justice scholars also explore the consequen-
tial behavior and attitudes that result from these evaluations. In
general, justice perceptions can be organized into at least three
broad families – distributive, procedural, and interactional – and
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 379–384
Organizational Justice 383
also examined holistically. Justice perceptions can be directed at
specific targets (multifoci justice) or formulated at the individual
or group level of analysis. In all these ways, justice has been
shown to be an important aspect of work life.
See also: Emotions and Work; Happiness and Work;
Organizational Citizenship Behavior; Organizational
Commitment; Supervision, Abusive; Work Motivation;
Workplace Deviance; Workplace Stress.
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