Fall

10

Eric Gallager

L i t k e , H i s t o r y o f W e s t e r n P o l i ti c a l T h o u g h t
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10
Eudaimonia is a difficult word to translate. Simplistic definitions of it vary from

“happiness” to “flourishing” to “the good life”. However, such facile English renditions

of the word fail to grasp a complete sense of what exactly eudaimonia implies. It is

especially necessary to have a full understanding of the idea of eudaimonia when reading

Aristotle, because the concept plays an important role in both his ethical theory and his

political theory. In this paper, first I will describe what exactly Aristotle’s specific

conception of eudaimonia was, then I will show how it fits in with his larger ethical and

political theories, and finally, I will argue that while we can find fallacies in Aristotle’s

position, doing so is not helpful.

Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia is long and involved. It would make sense to

treat each of its parts in turn. His discussion of this definition arises from his search for

the good at which all things aim. He stipulates that this good must be both final and self-

sufficient, and, after explaining what he means by these qualifications, shows how

eudaimonia meets both of them. Thus, the first part of his definition is, “Happiness, then,

is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.” (1097b) Aristotle’s ethical

theory being teleological makes this part of the definition all the more important.

However, recognizing eudaimonia as Aristotle’s chief good still does not tell us

much about what it actually is. Aristotle recognizes this too, and goes on to investigate

further. He then begins to search for a function of man that remains peculiar to man.

After examining some alternatives, he finds, “There remains, then, an active life of the

element that has a rational principle.” (1098a) This proclamation actually has two parts

that are relevant to his definition of eudaimonia, first, the part about an active life, and

second, the part about a rational principle (logos). The rational principle part in

2
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10
particular is what is unique about man. Other animals may also have active lives, but

they are not according to a rational principle like a man’s active life. Aristotle is

focused on human eudaimonia here, so it makes sense for him to look specifically at

human active lives.

At this point, Aristotle synthesizes the information he has so far towards a

more complete definition. He argues that if everything he has established so far is

true, then “Human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence.”

(1098a) The “activity of the soul” part follows directly from his previous part about

eudaimonia requiring an active life. In fact, he almost makes the two synonymous.

Eudaimonia for Aristotle was not just something that could be passively

experienced, it had to be practiced. The part about excellence is important for the

rest of his ethical theory, because he spends much of the rest of his ethical theory

describing it. The Greek word for excellence, arete, is often translated as “virtue,”

which is why Aristotle’s ethics are often considered “virtue-based”. Aristotle gives

his definition of virtue later when he describes it, saying, “Virtue, then, is a state of

character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this

being determined by a rational principle.” (1106b-1107a) Aristotle’s conceptions of

choice and the mean are also long and involved, so it should be enough to note that

virtue shares the characteristic of a rational principle with eudaimonia. This makes

sense, because virtue is a necessary requirement for eudaimonia.

Before letting his discussion of eudaimonia go, however, Aristotle finds it

necessary to add one more qualification. “But we must add ‘in a complete life’,” he

asserts (1098a). His justification for this point is somewhat shorter than the support he

3
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10
gives some of his other points, but that hardly makes it an afterthought. This requirement

gives a good impression of the lasting, long-term quality Aristotle thought eudaimonia

had. Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not something that can be gained temporarily by single

acts; instead it needs to be built up over time. Only a complete life is a long enough time

for it to build up completely.

Putting all of these parts together, we can define Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a

rational activity of the soul exhibiting virtue in a complete life and the end of all action.

Given such importance, it follows that we should seek things that lead to it. Aristotle

argued that virtue led to happiness, so he used his ethical theory to define what exactly

virtue was and how exactly we should go about seeking it. However, this investigation of

virtue is not merely limited to his ethical theory, it is also intimately tied to his political

theory, as well. As he puts it, “The true student of politics, too, is thought to have

studied virtue above all things, for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and

obedient to the laws.” (1102a) If virtue is equally important across Aristotle’s ethical

theory and political theory, it would follow that ethics and politics both aim at the

same good of happiness, would it not? Aristotle addresses this question himself,

writing, “There remains to be discussed the question, whether the happiness of the

individual is the same as that of the state, or different. Here again there can be no

doubt – no one denies that they are the same.” (1324a5) Happiness playing the

same role in both Aristotle’s ethical theory and political theory shows how

interconnected the two theories are – almost to the point of not being separate

theories.

4
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10
It is kind of tricky to object to Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia. Even when

broken down to its individual parts, it is hard to get around his arguments. If you

disagree that happiness is the final end of action, you would have to list something

else as the end of all action. However, Aristotle would just respond that whatever

you list, you are actually choosing because it leads to happiness in the end. There is

no way around it. If you argue that it is possible to experience happiness through

irrational or non-virtuous activities, Aristotle would argue that what you have

achieved is not actually true eudaimonia but something else, because eudaimonia by

definition does not include those things. The same argument could also be applied if

you object that eudaimonia does not require a full life. While it may seem nice to

have positions so secure, this quality actually makes them fallacious. Specifically,

Aristotle’s arguments about eudaimonia are self-sealing, because they seal

themselves up to any objection. Such arguments are vacuous, or empty, because

there is really no way in which they can be wrong, or falsified. However, it is easy to

forgive Aristotle for this, because it is hard to formulate definitions that do not have

this quality. Calling out his definition of eudaimonia as fallacious is not helpful,

because it does not improve our understanding of the rest of his theory.

By this point, we should have a good idea of what Aristotle’s definition of

eudaimonia is. It is a rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete

life. It plays the same role in both his ethical theory and his political theory as the end of

all action, which in each can be attained through virtue. For this reason, Aristotle’s ethics

and politics are both heavily focused on virtue. Like many definitions, Aristotle’s

definition of eudaimonia faces difficulties of being self-sealing, but regardless of this, it

5
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10
is still his definition and needs to be fully understood to grasp the rest of his ethics and

politics.

6
 Eric Gallager
11/24/10

Bibliography
Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics. Ed. J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson. Trans. David
Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
—. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. Ed. Stephen Everson. Trans.
Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.