SPRING HOMES v. SPS. TABLADA
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale
SPRING HOMES SUBDIVISION CO., INC., SPOUSES PEDRO L.
LUMBRES and REBECCA T. ROARING, Petitioners -versus-
SPOUSES PEDRO TABLADA, JR. and ZENAIDA TABLADA,
Respondents
G.R. No. 200009
January 23, 2017
FACTS:
On October 12, 1992, petitioners, Spouses
Pedro L. Lumbres and Rebecca T. Roaring, entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement with Spring Homes Subdivision Co.,
Inc., through its chairman, the late Mr. Rolando B. Pasic, for
the development of several parcels of land consisting of an
area of 28,378 square meters.
January 9, 1995, Spring Homes entered into a
Contract to Sell with respondents, Spouses Pedro Tablada, Jr.
and Zenaida Tablada, for the sale of a parcel of land located
at Lot No. 8, Block 3, Spring Homes Subdivision.
Subsequently, the Spouses Tablada discovered
that the subject property was mortgaged as a security for a
loan in the amount of over P4,000,000.00 with Premiere
Development Bank as mortgagee and Spring Homes as
mortgagor. In fact, since the loan remained unpaid,
extrajudicial proceedings were instituted.
The Spouses Tablada filed a complaint for
Nullification of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against
Spring Homes and the Spouses Lumbres praying for the
nullification of the second Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
favor of the Spouses Lumbres, as well as the title issued as a
consequence thereof, the declaration of the validity of the
first Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor, and the
issuance of a new title in their name.
Spouses Lumbres filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case against them raising as grounds the non-compliance
with a condition precedent and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
over the subject matter. They alleged that the Spouses
Tablada failed to avail of conciliatory proceedings, and that
the RTC has no jurisdiction since the parties, as well as
property in question, are all located at Calamba City, and
that the action instituted by the Spouses Tablada praying for
the nullification of the Compromise Agreement actually
corresponds to a nullification of a judgement issued by a
co-equal trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Tablada were purchased a parcel of
land in Spring Homes Subdivision in bad faith
HELD:
Yes.
cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided
by law, as in cases where the second buyer first registers in
good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does bar her from availing of
her rights under the law, among them, first her purchase as
against the second buyer. But conversely, knowledge gained
by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge
taints his prior registration with bad faith.
Accordingly, in order for the Spouses Lumbres
to obtain priority over the Spouses Tablada, the law requires
a continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge
of the first sale that would enable their contract to ripen into
full ownership through prior registration. But from the very
beginning, the Spouses Lumbres had already known of the
fact that the subject property had previously been sold to
the Spouses Tablada, by virtue of a valid Deed of Absolute
Sale.
2. SPRING HOMES v. SPS. TABLADA
Facts: Petitioners, Spouses Pedro L. Lumbres and Rebecca T.
Roaring, (Spouses Lumbres) entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Spring Homes Subdivision Co., Inc., through
its chairman, the late Mr. Rolando B. Pasic, for the
development of several parcels of land. The Spouses
Lumbres transferred the titles to the parcels of land in the
name of Spring Homes.
Spring Homes entered into a Contract to Sell with
respondents, Spouses Pedro Tablada, Jr. and Zenaida
Tablada, (Spouses Tablada) for the sale of a parcel of land.
The Spouses Lumbres filed with the RTC of Calamba City a
complaint for Collection of Sum of Money, Specific
Performance and Damages with prayer for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment against Spring Homes for its
alleged failure to comply with the terms of the Joint Venture
Agreement. Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of the Spouses Tablada. The title over the subject
property, however, remained with Spring Homes for its
failure to cause the cancellation of the TCT and the issuance
of a new one in favor of the Spouses Tablada.
The Spouses Lumbres and Spring Homes entered into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Spring Homes conveyed
the subject property, as well as several others, to the
Spouses Lumbres. The Spouses Lumbres started collecting
deficiency payments from the subdivision lot buyers. When
no payment was received, the Spouses Lumbres caused the
cancellation of the Contract to Sell previously executed by
Spring Homes in favor of the Spouses Tablada. the Spouses
Lumbres and Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the subject property, and as a result, a new title was
issued in the name of the Spouses Lumbres.
The Spouses Lumbres filed an ejectment suit of their own
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Calamba
City demanding that the Spouses Tablada vacate the subject
property and pay rentals due thereon. The MTCC, however,
dismissed the suit, ruling that the Spouses Lumbres
registered their title over the subject property in bad faith.
Such ruling was reversed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which found that there was no valid deed of absolute sale
between the Spouses Tablada and Spring Homes.
Nevertheless, the CA, on appeal, agreed with the MTCC and
reinstated the decision thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Lumbres acquired ownership
over the property.
Ruling: No. The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first
in time, stronger in right) gains greater significance in case of
a double sale of immovable property. Thus, the Court has
consistently ruled that ownership of an immovable property
which is the subject of a double sale shall be transferred: (1)
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in
default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. The requirement of the law
then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in
good faith. Good faith must concur with the registration –
that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect
or lack of title of his vendor or must not have been aware of
facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor. If it is shown that a buyer
was in bad faith, the alleged registration they have made
amounted to no registration at all.
Here, the first buyers of the subject property, the Spouses
Tablada, were able to take said property into possession but
failed to register the same because of Spring Homes’
unjustified failure to deliver the owner’s copy of the title
whereas the second buyers, the Spouses Lumbres, were able
to register the property in their names. But while said the
Spouses Lumbres successfully caused the transfer of the title
in their names, the same was done in bad faith. As correctly
observed by the Court in Spouses Lumbres v. Spouses
Tablada, 56 the Spouses Lumbres cannot claim good faith
since at the time of the execution of their Compromise
Agreement with Spring Homes, they were indisputably and
reasonably informed that the subject lot was previously sold
to the Spouses Tablada. They were also already aware that
the Spouses Tablada had constmcted a house thereon and
were in physical possession thereof. They cannot, therefore,
be permitted to freely claim good faith on their part for the
simple reason that the First Deed of Absolute Sale between
Spring Homes and the Spouses Tablada was not annotated at
the back of the subject property’s title. It is beyond the
Court’s imagination how spouses Lumbres can feign
ignorance to the first sale when the records clearly reveal
that they even made numerous demands on the Spouses
Tablada to pay, albeit erroneously, an alleged balance of the
purchase price.
Sps. Vallido vs. Sps. Pono, G.R. No. 200173, April 15, 2013, J.
Mendoza
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing th
decision of CA on a case involving a double sale of a parcel of
land.
It appears that Martino was the registered owner of a parcel
of land but he then sold that land to Cerna and gave to the
latter the owner's copy of OCT No. P-429. Cerna then sold a
portion of the land to Pono, the husband, and delivered the
above mentioned owner's copy to the latter. Pono, herein
respondent, registered the portion he bought for taxation
purposes and later allowed his son, herein respondent, to
build a house thereon.
On June 14, 1990, Pono sold the whole subject property to his
grandson Vallido but can no longer deliver any certificate of
title since he had delivered the said OCT No. P-429 to Cerna
in 1960.
On Sept. 17, 1999, Vallido registered the deed that was
granted by the RTC to Pono when he filed for the same and
the Registry of Deeds issued a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed a complaint for
quieting of title, recovery of possession of real property and
damages against the respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and held that there was a
double sale but the CA ruled in favor of the defendant stating
that petitioners were neither buyers or registrants in good
faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are buyers or registrants in
good faith.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled on the negative. The Court
explained that it is undisputed that there is a double sale and
that the respondents are the first buyers while the
petitioners are the second buyers. The burden of proving
good faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein)
which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary
presumption of good faith. After the Court's assiduous
assessment of the evidentiary records, they find that the
petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to
discharge their burden of proof.
There are several indicia that should have placed the
petitioners on guard and prompted them to investigate or
inspect the property being sold to them. First, Martino, as
seller, did not have possession of the subject property.
Second, during the sale on July 4, 1990, Martino did not have
the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Third, there were
existing permanent improvements on the land. Fourth, the
respondents were in actual possession of the land. These
circumstances are too glaring to be overlooked and should
have prompted the petitioners, as prospective buyers, to
investigate or inspect the land. Where the vendor is not in
possession of the property, the prospective vendees are
obligated to investigate the rights of one in possession.
Rosario vs. Soria, 699 SCRA
Facts:
Sps. Luis Rosaroso and Honorata Duazo acquired several real
properties in Daan Bantayan, Cebu City including the subject
properties. The couple had 9 children: Hospicio, Arturo,
Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe, Antonio, and
Angelica.
In 1952, Honorata died. Later on, Luis married Lourdes
Rosaroso. In 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages was filed by Luis against Lucila,
Lucila’s daughter, Laila, and Meridian Realty Corp. Due to
Luis’ untimely death, an amended complaint was filed with
the spouse of Laila, Ham Solutan, and Lourdes, included as
defendants.
It was alleged by petitioners Hospicio, Antonio, Angelica, and
Cleofe that in 1991, Luis, with the full consent of Lourdes
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of some of the
properties in their favor. They also alleged that despite the
fact that said properties had already been sold to them, a
second sale took place when the respondents, through
unscrupulous means, made Luis sign a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying to Meridian Realty Corp. 3 parcels of residential
land.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared that
the first sale of the properties valid and binding. On appeal,
the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision on the
ground that the petitioners failed to prove that they indeed
tendered a consideration for the parcels of land sold to
them.
Issue:
Whether or not the first sale of properties in favor of Luis’
children enjoys the presumption that there was sufficient
consideration for said contract.
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that the first deed of sale was executed,
conveying the subject properties in favor of petitioners, was
never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently
insist, though, is that the said sale was simulated because the
purported sale was made without a valid consideration.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following
are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have
been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has
been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for
a contract.
These presumptions operate against an adversary who has
not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the
necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie
case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is
presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof
remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who
has the burden is relieved for the time being from
introducing evidence in support of the averment, because
the presumption stands in place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said
presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale
was made without a consideration, they failed to supply
clear and convincing evidence to back this claim. It is
elementary in procedural law that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court.
Uraca v. CA
Facts:
The Velezes were the owners of the lot and commercial
building in Cebu while the petitioners were lessees of the
said building. The Velezes through Ting wrote a letter
offering to sell the subject property for P1,050,000.00 and at
the same time requesting the petitioners to reply in three
days. Such sale was accepted.
Uraca went to see Ting about the offer to sell but she was
told by the latter that the price was P1,400,000.00 in cash or
managers check and not P1,050,000.00 as erroneously stated
in their letter-offer after some haggling. Emilia Uraca agreed
to the price of P1,400,000.00 but counter- proposed that
payment be paid in installments with a down payment of
P1,000,000.00 and the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30
days. Carmen Velez Ting did not accept the said counter offer
of Emilia Uraca although this fact is disputed by Uraca.
However, no payment was made.
The Velezes sold the lot and commercial building to the
Avenue Group for P1,050,000.00 net of taxes, registration
fees, and expenses of the sale. At the time the Avenue Group
purchased the subject property on July 13, 1985 from the
Velezes, the certificate of title of the said property was clean
and free of any annotation of adverse claims or lis pendens.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the contract of sale was
perfected; and
II. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling
that petitioners have better rights to buy and own
the Velezes property for registering their notice of
lis pendens ahead of the Avenue Groups registration
of their deeds of sale.
Held:
Novation is never presumed; it must be sufficiently
established that a valid new agreement or obligation has
extinguished or changed an existing one. The registration of
a later sale must be done in good faith to entitle the
registrant to priority in ownership over the vendee in an
earlier sale.
On the first issue: no extinctive novation.
The lynchpin of the assailed Decision is the public
respondents conclusion that the sale of the real property in
controversy. The Court noted that the petitioners accepted
in writing and without qualification the Velezes written offer
to sell at P1,050,000.00 within the three-day period
stipulated therein. Hence, from the moment of acceptance
on July 10, 1985, a contract of sale was perfected since
undisputedly the contractual elements of consent, object
certain and cause concurred.
Article 1600 of the Civil Code provides that (s)ales are
extinguished by the same causes as all other obligations, x x x.
Article 1231 of the same Code states that novation is one of
the ways to wipe out an obligation. Extinctive novation
requires: (1) the existence of a previous valid obligation; (2)
the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old obligation or contract; and (4) the
validity of the new one.
On the second issue: double sale of an immovable.
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property.Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle
is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of
the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of
the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights
under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as
against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained
by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge
taints his prior registration with bad faith This is the price
exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second
buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the
second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show
that he acted in good faith throughout.
OBLIGATIONS OF SELLER
DY V. CA
FACTS:
Wilfredo Dy bought a truck and tractor from Libra Finance
Corporation. Both truck and tractor was also mortgage to
Libra as security for a loan and as such, they took
possession of it. Brother of Wilfredo, Perfecto Dy and sister
Carol Dy-Seno requested Libra that they be allowed to buy
the property and assume the mortgage debt. Libra agreed
to the request.
Meanwhile, a collection suit was filed against Wilfredo Dy
by Gelac Trading Inc. On the strength of a writ of execution,
the sheriff was able to obtain the tractor on the premises of
Libra. It was sold in a public auction in which Gelac Trading
was the lone bidder. Gelac subsequently sold it to one of
their stockholders.
The respondents claim that at the time of the execution of
the deed of sale, no constructive delivery was effected
since the consummation of the sale depended upon the
clearance and encashment of the check which was issued
in payment of the subject tractor
ISSUE:
WON the William Dy is still the owner of the tractor when it
was obtained through the writ of execution.
HELD:
The tractor was not anymore in possession of William Dy
when it was obtained by the sheriff because he already sold
it to his brother.
William Dy has the right to sell his property even though it
was mortgage because in a mortgage, the mortgagor
doesn’t part with the ownership over the property. He is
allowed to sell the property as long as there is consent from
the mortgagee such as in this case. But even if there is no
consent given, the sale would still be valid without prejudice
to the criminal action against the mortgagor.
When William Dy sold the tractor, he already transferred
the ownership of it because NCC states that the ownership
of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment
it is delivered to him or in any other manner signing an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee. In the instant case, actual delivery of
the subject tractor could not be made but there was
constructive delivery already upon the execution of a public
instrument which in this case is a deed of sale.
The payment of the check was actually intended to
extinguish the mortgage obligation.
WHEN FORM IMPORTANT IN SALES - FOR ENFRCEABILITY
BETWEEN THE PARTIES: STATUTE OF FRAUDS