The Evolution of Bultmann's Interpretation of John and Gnosticism

Lateranum 70 (2004): 313-52.
THE EVOLUTION OF BULTMANN'S

INTERPRETATION OF JOHN AND GNOSTICISM
Michael Waldstein
Bultmann's reading of John has a dramatic historyl. It begins

with a reading quite close to Kasemann's in agreement with the
History of Religions School and ends in a radically existentialist
interpretation. The present essay offers a historical critical account of
this evolution and raises the question of its "Sitz im Leben" or life-
setting. Following Bultmann's own exegetical technique according to
which the Gospel materials about Jesus reflect the life of the early
community rather than the life of Jesus, the essay considers
Bultmann's reading of John as reflecting the concerns of late
Nineteenth and early Twentieth century German culture rather than
those of the Gospel of John 2 •
1. Ear!J Perspectives
In one of his first contributions to Johannine studies, Bultmann

gives a favorable review of the work of Gillis P. Wetter, a member of
the "History-of-Religions School" 3 • Wetter argues that John must be
1 The present paper is conceived as a tandem piece to my critique of Hans Jonas's
understanding of Gnosticism. See M. WALDSTEIN, Hans Jonas' Construct 'Gnosticism':

Ana!Jsis and Critique, in journal o/ Ear!J Christian Studies 8 (2000) 341-372. Bultmann agrees
in large measure with Jonas's interpretation of Gnosticism and is thus subject to the same
critique.
2 A profound reading of Bultmann's John commentary is offered by Wolfgang
Nethofel, Strukturen existentialer Interpretation: Bultmanns Johanneskommentar im Wechsel

theologischer Paradigmen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1983. Neth6fel is excellent
in bringing out the deep principles of Bultmann's late reading of John. He does not,
however, offer an account of the evolution of Bultmann's reading. Other literature:
W. VAUGHAN, Destructive Retrieval o/ John, in Encounter 60 (1999) 519-49. J. PAINTER,
Inclined to God: The Quest for Eternal lift: Bultmannian Hermeneutics and the Theology o/ the
Fourth Gospel in Exploring the Gospel rif'John,John Knox, Louisville, Westminster 1996,346-
68. M. TuRNER, Atonement and the Death o/Jesus in john: Some Questions to Bultmann and
Forestell, in Evangelical-Quarter!; 62 (1990) 99-122. J. PAINTER, Theology as Hermeneutics:
Rudolf Bultmann's Interpretation o/ the History o/Jesus, Almond Press, Sheffield 1987.
3 R. BULTMANN, Neues Testament: Biblische Theologie, in ThR 19 (1916) 113-126. Among
the work reviewed in this article is Gillis P. WETTER, Die "Verherrlichung" im

Johannesevangelium, Beitrage zur Religionswissenschaft 2/1, Leipzig, Hinrichs 1915, 32-113.
On Wetter, see H. KoESTER, The History-of-Religions Schoo4 Gnosis and Gospel rif'John, in StTh
40 (1986) 115-136; here 116.
314 Michael Waldstein
read as a specimen of "hellenistic mystery piety (hellenistische

A{ysterienfriimmigkeif) " 4• This piety, Bultmann agrees, is built on a
dualist framework in which a heavenly realm of light confronts an
earthly realm of darkness. Divine powers emanate from the realm of
light and help to draw human beings up to their salvation or
divinization. These powers are to be understood "quite realistically"
as quasi substances; "a reinterpretation in spiritual or symbolic terms
is not permissible" 5• Persons especially gifted with such powers are
theioi anthropoi. Even less spectacular humans, however, can gain
access to the divine realm through "the sacramental actions of the
mysteries " 6 •
Although Bultmann disagrees with Wetter's hypothesis of a
specifically Johannine mystery cult reflected in John 12 in which the
passage of the divine man Jesus through death· to the sphere of light
was re-enacted, he agrees, with a positive reference to Bousset, that
"the mystical piety of the Gospel of John is only possible as cultic
piety" 7 • In accordance with this piety, the Johannine Jesus is "a man
furnished with divine powers, theios anthropos, like the savior figures of
Hellenism" 8 •
Of course, there is also "a difference between the Johannine
Jesus and those figures, and in general between Johannine and
hellenistic piety", and Wetter, Bultmann applauds, presents the
difference "clearly and in general correctly".
"Characteristic for the Gospel of John is the influence of the
concept of a personal God, the presence of ethical aspects, the linking
of religious mysticism with orthodox faith, the importance of the
historical person of Jesus and his uniqueness in the faith of the
community. Much remains in common, however. In] ohannine piety as
in Hellenism, the goal is the divinization of human beings through
supernatural powers which have been brought by the redeemer and
which are appropriated in the Christian sacraments" 9•
4 R.BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 124.

5 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 123. Note that Bultmann's later existential reading
of John involves precisely such a reinterpretation.
6 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 123.
7 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 125. The Bousset reference is to Kyrios Christos:
Geschichte des Christusglaubens von denAnfiingen des Christentums bis Irenaeus, Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht, Gottingen 1913, 190; ET: Kyrios Christos: A History ofthe Beliefin Christ from the
Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, Abingdon, Nashville 1970, 215. Note that cultic
elements are almost completely suppressed in Bultmann's later interpretation.
8 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 126. Note that Bultmann later rejects an
interpretation of the Johannine Jesus as a "divine man".

9 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 126.
The evolution of Bultmann 's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism 315
It is difficult to imagine a greater distance from Bultmann's later

existential interpretation of John in which virtually the only point left
from both the negative and the positive side of this comparison is the
uniqueness of Jesus in the faith of the community~
2. The First .$ynthesis
Bultmann soon abandoned this reading of John. Two major

factors were involved in this shift: the Gnostic redeemer myth
hypothesis of the History of Religions School, and the concerns of
dialectic theology10 • Between 1923 and 1925 Bultmann brought these
factors together into a closely reasoned synthesis which provides the
framework for all his further work on John. The new synthesis can
first be observed in the essay, "The Importance of the Newly
Discovered Mandean and Manichean Texts for Understanding the
Gospel of John" 11 •
(a) The Enigma of john: the essay begins by arguing that John's
position in the history of early Christianity is still an enigma.
"The gospel of John belongs neither to Palestinian Christianity,
as attested by the Synoptics, nor to Hellenistic Christianity of the type
of the Pauline communities, or of the type of Jewish-Hellenistic
Christianity as attested by Clement, Hermas, Hebrews and Barnabas"12 •
John's distance from Hellenistic Christianity in particular is clear
"in the absence of the kyrios title and any specifically cultic piety",
1°For an account of these shifts, see R. BULTMANN, Das Johannesevangelium in der
neuesten Forschung, in Christliche Welt 41 (1927) 502-511, here 505 where Bultmann states
that he adopted the Primal Man hypothesis between 1923 and 1925; and 510-511 where he
expresses the emerging theological concerns not yet perceptible in the Wetter review.
11 Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandiiischen und manichiiischen Que/len for das V erstiindnis
des johannesevangeliums, im ZNW 24 (1925) 100-146; reprinted in E. DINKLER (ed.),

Exegetica, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 1967, 55-104. For a partial English translation see
W. G. KCrMMEL, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems, trans.
S. MacLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee, SCM, London 1970, 350-354; for a summary
and analysis from a slightly different perspective than the one offered here see Meeks,
The Prophet-King, 6-12.
"Bedeutung der Quellen" is based on a lecture given in 1923. 1923 is also the year in
which Heidegger joined Bultmann on the Marburg faculty. See the report in one of
Bultmann's letters written in December of 1923, An* Bultmann Lemke, "Bultmann's
Papers", in Bultmann, (ed. E. HoBBS (ed.), Retrospect and Prospect: The Centenary ~mposium at
WeUes0, Fortress, Philadelphia 1985, 3-12; here 9-10. Heidegger's influence on Bultmann
should not be exaggerated. "Bedeutung der Quellen" shows that the outlines ofBultmann's
theological and exegetical synthesis were complete before Heidegger came on the scene.
12 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56.
though it must be admitted that John still has "esteem for the
sacraments " 13 • "Gnostic piety" is also not an appropriate
classification, although Johannine christology "comes dangerously
close to gnostic docetism" 14•
Equally unresolved and enigmatic, Bultmann claims, is the basic
point of Johannine theology. One thing, at least, is clear: John's basic
point must lie in the idea that Jesus is the revealer sent from the
Father. I want to draw special attention to this statement, because it
locates the theme of mission squarely at the core of Johannine
theology.
"What is his Oohn's) central view, his basic conception (zentrale
Anschauun& Gmndkonzeption)? Without doubt it must lie in the assertion
which is repeated again and again that Jesus is the one sent from the
Father (e.g. 17,3.23.25) who brings revelation through words and
works" 15 •
However, the insight that the mission of Jesus as revealer is
central, Bultmann argues, does not completely resolve the enigma of
Johannine theology. For John is not interested in the revelation of
anthropological, cosmological, or theological mysteries. If one asks
what Jesus reveals, no satisfactory answer can be found.
"(W)hat does the Jesus of the Gospel of John really reveal? In
various versions only one thing: that he has been sent as the revealer.
He reveals nothing which could be understood as a revelation" 16 •
Jesus does not even primarily reveal his own person. John does
not give an image of his religious and moral personality. It must be
admitted that he describes Jesus as a divine being in human form.
"True, Jesus is largely the divine man (theios anthropos), omniscient
and in possession of miraculous power. He is more, he is 'a divine
being which majestically strides accross the earth like a stranger (ein
gb'ttliches Wesen, das wie ein Fremder mqjestiitisch iiber die Erde dahini}eh!)"' 17 •
13 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56. Cf. 57: "despite all analogies, the Gospel of
John cannot be taken as a representative of hellenistic mystery piety". Note that the shift
away from the Wetter review of 1916 is not complete. The sacraments still play an
important role. In his final synthesis Bultmann eliminates this remnant.
14 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 56. Note the surprising similarity with
Klisemann's remarks on John's "naive docetism". E. KASEMANN, ]esu le~ifer Wtlle nach
Johannes 17, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 197P, 61-62. ET: E. KAsEMANN, The Testamento/
Jesus: A Stucfy o/ the Gospel o/john.
17 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57. Bultmann is quoting from W. WREDE,
Vorlrage und Studien (1907) 207. Cf. "he is the Son of God who walks over the earth (der
The evolution of Bultmann's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism 317
Yet, despite John's stress on the divinity ofJesus, one cannot say
that even this divinity is the true object of revelation.
"All the miraculous and divine which appears in Jesus' life is
obviously a mere means to an end. Granted, Jesus' humanity 'is merely
the transparent medium (das Transparenl) for letting the divine light
shine through on earth' (Wrede, ibid.) -if only one could say what it is
that shines through. In fact, however, what is really transparent (das
Transparenl) is not the humanity, but precisely the divinity of the
Johannine Jesus. For, the divine which becomes visible in him is
apparently not the true object of revelation" 18 •
Although Bultmann does not develop this point, and drops it in
his later interpretation of John, I would like to draw special attention
to it. It is, I believe, a crucial insight which can play a key role in
deciphering the J ohannine christology: if the J ohannine Jesus is
centrally described as the one sent,. then everything about him,
including his divinity, is not an endpoint; if is transparent and points
to something further. The question is: To what?
In the remainder of the article, Bultmann proposes a resolution
of the enigma of John in two closely intertwined steps: (1) John's
position in. the history of religions: John adopted the Gnostic
redeemer myth from the Mandean community of John the Baptist;
(2) John's basic point: John critically transformed this myth and
thereby achieved an understanding of revelation which converges
with 'the concerns of dialectic theology.
(b) John's Position in the History of Religions: Johannine christology
comes into focus, Bultmann claims, when one sees it as an adaptation
'of the Gnostic redeemer myth 19• Bultmann follows Reitzenstein's
reconstruction of this myth: A divine being, the Primal Man, falls at
the beginning of time from the heavenly world of light into matter.
He is overpowered by matter and breaks up into particles of light
iiber die Erde wandelnde Gottessohn), especially in the Gospel of John". Bultmann,
"Untersuchungen zum Johannesevangelium: B", 188. Note the continuity with the 1916
Wetter review. Note also the similarity with Kasemann, who attacks Bultmann's later
existential interpretation by returning to "the liberal interpretation (e.g., Baur, Wetter,
Liitgert, Hirsch) which is virtually unanimous in describing Jesus as the God who strides
across the earth (a/s den iiber die Erde schreitenden Got!)". E. KAsEMANN,jesu let!{!er Wtlie, 26.
18 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Quelien, 57. On the transparence of Jesus' humanity, in
direct opposition to the later Bultmann, see E. KAsEMANN: "John is the first Christian
who describes Jesus' earthly life only as a foil for the Son of God who strides through the
human world and as the space for the inbreaking of heavenly glory" E. KASEMANN, Jesu
let:ifer Wtlle, 34-35; ET: 13. Completely different from Kasemann, of course, is
Bultmann's insistence on the transparence of the divinity of Jesus.
19 See R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 58-59.
(human souls). This fall is the origin of the cosmos. So trapped are
these souls that they have forgotten their origin. In the fullness of
time a redeemer figure, identical with, or at least parallel to, the Primal
Man, descends again into the world of matter and reveals himself to
his lost fragments, to human souls. By revealing himself, he reveals
thus the saving event which leads to the dissolution of the cosmos
and the return of souls into the divine sphere.
John adopted this myth and applied it to Jesus. Bultmann
supports this claim by giving an extensive list of parallels between
John and Gnostic sources, above all Mandean texts 20 • These
sources, Bultmann notes, are later than the Gospel of John. The
myth they contain, however, precedes the Gospel. One of the most
important arguments for this conclusion, in fact the decisive proof
(" der bestiitigende und durchschlagende Beweis" 21 ), is this: Many elements
of the Gnostic myth are present in John, but the central idea which
makes the myth work, namely, the parallel or identity of the
redeemer with the redeemed souls, is absent. The elements present
in John have their natural place in the complete myth, where alone
they function properly. Therefore, John's version must be
secondary, dependent upon the integral myth as a later
transformation 22 •
Bultmann observes that "of all sources used for comparison, the
Mandean sources show by far the greatest affinity with the Gospel of
John" 23 • The Mandeans are thus probably the community from which
John adopted the redeemer myth. Although the extant Mandean texts
are later than John, some of their strata are quite early.
The Mandean community probably originated within Judaism as
a baptismal sect on the Jordan around John the Baptist. It was a
"phenomenon parallel to early Christianity" 24 inasmuch as it revered
20 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 59-97. This collection is still a gold-mine and I
will make much use of it below. For a translation of the 28 headings under which
Bultmann makes the comparison, cf. Meeks, The Prophet-King, 7-8; the translation leaves
out heading 20 (prayer of the emissary) and has heading 21 in
21 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 97.
22 See R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 97-99; cf. 98 where Bultmann claims that
"the same thing is true of Jewish Apocalypticism which adopts the images of this myth,
but drops the underlying anthropology". For a structurally similar argument, see
Schenke's "natural context" argument for the priority of the myth contained in the
Trimorphic Protennoia in comparison with the prologue to John, G. ScHENKE, Die
dreigestaltige Protennoia: Eine gnostische Offenbarungsrede in koptischer Sprache aus dem Fund von
Nag Hammadi, in 1LZ 99 (1974) 731-746.
24 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 100.

The evolution rif Bultmann's interpretation rifJohn and Gnosticism 319
"John the Baptist as the incarnate Son of God and revealer" 25 •

Bultmann notes (before the discovery of Qumran) that a more
detailed image of the Essenes would contribute much toward our
understanding of Jewish baptismal sects 26 •
The origin of J ohannine theology in the Mandean sect around
John the Baptist suggests that Johannine christology is older than its
Synoptic counterpart. In its present form, the Gospel of John
certainly presupposes the Synoptics, particularly Mark, but Johannine
christology may precede Synoptic christology.
"Perhaps the public ministry and message of Jesus stood much
more in the context of the Gnostic-baptismal movement which is the
background of John than the Synoptic gospels would lead one to
suppose" 27•
Synoptic christology may, in fact, be "a Judaizing reaction" 28
against the early incarnation-christology of the Gnostic redeemer
myth. This would explain the "fragmentary traces of the redeemer
myth in the synoptic tradition" 29 • It would also explain the continuity
between Palestinian and hellenistic christianity, e.g., Pauline
christianity and its strong christological parallels to John, without
recourse to "mystical Easter complexes" as the source of a sudden
high christology in hellenistic christianity 30 •
(c) John's Basic Point: The main point of this reconstruction of
John~s place in the history of religions is that, in Bultmann's mind, it
helps us to understand the basic point of the Gospel of John, a point
which would otherwise remain in the dark.
If one wishes to give a name to the new interpretation of the
Gospel of John, one can call it a history of mythology interpretation
25 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101. Bultmann considers this hypothesis "almost
demonstrated", if the Prologue originally applied to John the Baptist. SeeR. BULTMANN,
Bedeutung der Que/len, 101; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs
ifJm johannesevangelium, in Eucharisterion II, FS Gunkel, 1923) 3-26; repr. in Exegetica, 10-35;
here 33; ET: The History of Religions Background of the Prologue to the Gospel ofjohn, in, The
Interpretation ofjohn, ed. and tr. J. Ashton, Fortress-SPCK, Philadelphia-London 1986, 18-
35; here 31.
30 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102. In "Der religionsgeschichtliche
Hintergrund des Prologs" Bultmann gives greater emphasis to the Jewish wisdom
background of Johannine christology, see esp. 19 and 21, though he already links this
wisdom background with Bousset's and Reitzenstein's hypothesis of the primal man
myth, see esp. 26-27.
(mythologie-geschichtliche Auffassung). However, even supposing the

correctness of this interpretation, one should not be under the
illusion that one has done more than preliminary work for exegesis.
This preliminary work is, of course, indispensable and has decisive
importance. For, it allows us to understand the language of the
Gospel by showing us the presuppositions of the formation of its
concepts 31 •
John's basic point, Bultmann repeats, lies in the mission of Jesus
as revealer. It is an enigmatic point, because Jesus reveals nothing but
the fact that he is the revealer. This much is clear: John can use the
Gnostic redeemer myth to express this point, because the Gnostic
revealer does not need to reveal any doctrine, except himself, since
his fate is parallel to that of the soul and thus salvific when revealed.
However, the great enigma of John is not resolved but rather
highlighted by this use, because the crucial element which makes the
Gnostic myth work, namely, the redeemer/ redeemed identity or
parallel, is absent in John. After stating this point, Bultmann
concludes the article as follows:
"The author is only interested in the that of revelation, not in
the what. If faith is no longer content with myths as the objects of
revelation and if no dogma suffices, rational knowledge or
psychological experiences tend to take their place. But the author is
equally far from both of these. One possibility still remains,
however, that of construing the concept of revelation in a radical
sense, i.e. without describing its content, whether by speculative
propositions or psychic states, because both would pull down
revelation into the human sphere. One cannot say of God how he is,
only that he is. The divine is nothing which is in any way given and
describable. And thus the Gospel of John speaks of God, not, of
course, by the via negationis of the mystics (all mystical divine
attributes are lacking), but in the only way in which one can speak
of God, namely, through the depiction of the shaking and
undermining (Erschiitteruni) of all that is human through revelation.
The opposition (Gegensat~ between revelation and 'sound common
sense' runs through the whole Gospel. The many misunderstandings
in the dialogues are not a technical device of the author, but they are
deeply rooted in his understanding of revelation. Revelation can only
be depicted as the annihilation of all that is human, as the refusal af
all human questions, as the rejection of all human answers, as that
which puts the human person into question" 32•
31 R. BULTMANN, Das johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, 510.

32 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 103-104.
The evolution rf Bultmann's interpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism 321
It is difficult to follow the argument of this text. The difficulty

may partly be due to a curious shift in the basis of the argument.
After eliminating myth, dogma, rational knowledge and psychological
experience as appropriate categories for the center of J ohannine
theology, Bultmann states that one possibility still remains, that of
understanding the concept of revelation radically, without describing
its content.
Is Bultmann arguing from an exhaustive list of possibilities to
the only one remaining? The argument could run like this: There are
only five possible meanings John can attach to his idea of revelation,
namely, myth, dogma, rational knowledge, and revelation in a
"radical" sense 33 • John does not hold the first four of these; therefore
he must hold the fifth.
However, the text does not unfold this line of reasoning and
there is a sudden curious shift to a more theological perspective.
Speculative propositions and psychic states are not what John is after
"because both would pull down revelation into the human sphere".
The argument continues in the same vein: the divine can in no way be
given or described; "and thus the Gospel of John speaks of God in the
on!J way in which one can speak of God, namely, through the
description of the shaking and undermining of all that is human by
revelation". After briefly illustating this point with the Johannine
"misunderstandings", Bultmann returns to the theological
perspective: "Revelation can on!J be depicted".
Note the curious logic: because it is true, according to Bultmann,
that the only way in which one can speak of God is such and such,
john speaks in this very way of God. John says X, because X is true.
Who is speaking in "Bedeutung der Quellen"? John or Bultmann?
Whatever the answer may be, the center of Johannine theology
identified by "Bedeutung der Quellen" converges closely with the
concerns of dialectic theology as articulated by Bultmann in several
articles of the same period 34•
33 The list of five could be seen as comprehensive along the lines of four traditional
exhaustive disjunctions. The interlocking of these disjunctions is most easily seen if one
takes the list in inverse order. Revelation either does not have any describable content (5:
revelation in a radical sense) or it does (1-4); revelation with a describable content is
either subject-oriented (4: psychological experiences) or object-oriented (1-3); object-
oriented revelation is either arrived at by reason (3: rational knowledge) or not (1-2);
revelation not arrived at by reason is either propositionally developed (2: dogma) or not
(1: myth). If mystical knowledge is a sixth category, it could be placed between the first
two disjunctions as a kind of revelation which, though not without contents, transcends
the subject-object distinction. Bultmann may have this or some similar schema in mind.
34 SeeR. BULTMANN, We/chen Sinn hates, von Gott i!' reden?, im Theologische Bliitter4 (1925)
3. Under!Jing concerns
The intimate interweaving between Bultmann's own convictions

on "the only way in which one can speak of God" and John's
speaking of God is, at least in principle, quite legitimate as an instance
of the hermeneutical circle which forms itself when an exegete
addresses the question of the truth of a text.
"If we abandon neutrality vis-a-vis the text, then the question oftruth
dominates exegesis. Ultimately, then, exegetes are not interested in the
question, What does what is being said, as something merely said, signify
in its historical place (zeitgeschichtliche Stelle), in its historical context?
Ultimately, they ask, What matters (Sachen) are being spoken of? To what
realities does what is being said lead? Historical exegesis asks, What is
being said? We, on the other hand, ask, What is meant?" 35
Naturally, such an enterprise is immediately confronted with the
question, "What is truth?" Gohn 18,38). In the period after his
seminal essay "Bedeutung der Quellen", Bultmann addressed this
question in a lengthy historical study 36 • In the same period he
answered it as a philosopher and theologian in his own right 37 •
(a) Truth: At the very foundations of Bultmann's thought there
lies the first principle of existentialism: being human in the authentic
sense does not mean being an object in the cosmos with a certain
nature or essence; it means "existing"; and existing means being a
historical possibility which continually realizes itself through decision.
"[...] the free deed (die jreie Tat) is the expression of our existence
(Existen:f); in fact, only in the free deed, and nowhere else, do we exist
in the authentic sense (im eigentlichen Sinne), since the free deed is
nothing but our existence itself [...] " 38 •
129-135; repr. in Glauben und Verstehen, I, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 1933, 26-37; ET: Wbat
does it mean to speak of God?, in Faith and
35 R. BuLTMANN, Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments, im Zwischen
den Zeiten 3 (1925) 334-357; here 338. Note the close parallel between Bultmann's says/
means distinction and Krister Stendahl's meant/means distinction in Biblical Theology,
Contemporary, in !DB 1 (1962) 418-432, esp. 421-422.
36 R. BULTMANN, Untersuchungen ~m Johannesevangelium: A. Aletheia, im ZNW (1928)
113-163; repr. in Exegetica, 124-173.

37 The answer is most fully presented in the notes for a course on the nature and
foundations of theology, recently published as R. BULTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie.

For a fuller presentation of the philosophical and theological aspects, including a
historical analysis and critical discussion, see Michael Waldstein, "The Foundations of
Bultmann's Work", in Communio 14 (1987) 115-145.
38 R. BuLTMANN, We/chen Sinn hates, von Gott ~ reden?, 35; ET: 62-63.
The evolution rif Bultmann's interpretation rifJohn and Gnosticism 323
Bultmann's entire ontology is based on this existentialist

principle. One can observe its crucial role particularly clearly in his
doctrine of knowledge, and his correlative doctrine of truth.
"If human existence (das Dasein) is temporal-historical, and thus
concerned in every concrete Now (je im ]etzt) with itself, not merely by
choosing in every concrete Now one among many possibilities that
offer themselves, but, in doing so, by grasping ever again a possibility
of, itself, -if, I say, the Being of human existence (das Stjn des Daseins) is
thus Being-able-to-be (das Seinkiinnen), because each Now is essentially
new and receives its meaning precisely now, now through its decision,
and therefore not from a timeless meaning of the world, then the
question of truth has meaning only as the question of the one truth rif the
moment (des Augenbl/cks), my moment" 39 •
(I) "The truth of the moment" refers to something correlative to
decision, namely, to a certain challenge in the light of which I
understand myself in a concrete moment. Bultmann asserts that this
sense of truth is the only meaningful one.
"The original meaning of the question, What is truth?, as the
question of the challenge (A.nspruch) of the moment, is the question,
What should I do?, on the presupposition that at every moment I am
at stake, that through my deed I become something. The whole truth,
my truth is in question. I want to understand myse!f' 40 •
(II) Since the truth is identical with my existential self-
understanding, I do not encounter an "object" when I encounter the
truth. Truth is thus prior to the subject-object distinction. Anything
"objective" or "subjective" is thereby not authentically true. (III)
Since the truth is tied to my concrete understanding of myself at a
particular moment, it is completely and radically concrete. It is that
which challenges me, me alone, and me only in this concrete situation.
Anything more general is thereby not authentically true. (IV) As the
challenge of a particular moment, the truth is radically temporal or
historical. It is not a timeless validity, but valid only now for that
moment.
(b) Sin: Human beings are not able, Bultmann argues, to live
exclusively in the truth. They also live in "the sphere of the objective"
which is cut off from the challenge of the moment. This sphere arises
inexorably from the inner dynamism of knowledge.
39 R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 48. Heidegger's terminology is palpable in
this text.
40 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 48-49.
"The possibility of distancing itself from life lies from the outset
in knowledge (das W'issen), because knowledge lifts the being it
encounters into the sphere of the objective (in die Sphare des
Gegenstlindlichen) and thus preserves it and still 'knows' it, even when the
present (aktuelle) relation to the being is no longer there" 41 •
The sphere of the objective derives thus from authentic truth

by a certain corruption. Following the four characteristics of
authentic truth listed· above, one can describe this corruption as
follows: (I) When the encounter with truth is merely preserved and
no longer lived, I can no longer see it as a challenge which issues
in decision; I take a point of view outside the challenge and thus
outside my self-understanding in decision. (II) This detachment from
the challenge gives rise to a subject-object dualism. I no longer
stand in the challenge, but I think about something. I confront an
object that is separated off from me. I have thus ol:jecti.fted truth.
(III) Objectification gives rise to the possibility of universal truth,
truth which is no longer valid for me alone, but applies to a variety
of objects. (IV) Objectification is also the basis for positing
timeless truths, which are not valid only now, but always.
Negatively, the corruption of authentic truth consists thus in a
detachment from the challenge of the moment; positively, it
consists in objectification, in the formation of a sphere of objective
being and truth, with the possible accompanying features of
universality and timelessness.
Science can serve as an illustration of this corruption. Bultmann
denies the existence of an objective natural world, real in itself and
merely waiting, as it were, to be discovered by science. Far from
discovering such a world, science constitutes it. When the mind
forces the truth of the moment to hold still, when it thus lifts that
truth into objectivity, it gives rise to the objective natural world.
"In my historical reality (geschichtliche W'irklichkeit) I in no way
encounter nature as an objective reality that follows certain laws. I
encounter it as the fullness of possibilities for my action and suffering,
for my decisions. Only when I disregard my existence do I see nature
as an object, and inasmuch as I then place myself into a certain relation
to it, I see myself as a thing of nature among others, as an object
among others, standing with them in causal connection governed by
law" 42 •
41 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische En?Jklopadie, 44.

42 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische En?Jklopiidie, 107.
The evolution rf Bultmann's intetpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism 325
"Objective" history, as a series of causally connected events in

the past studied scientifically, is also covered by this statement. There
is no series of causally connected events which "really" happened and
to which the human mind must conform in receptive fashion. Like
the world envisaged by natural science, history as studied by the
scientific historian is an objectification.
Science is by no means the only corruption of authentic truth.
Other examples are myth and dogma, at least when these are taken
primarily as objective representations (see below).
The process of objectification, although inevitable, poses a grave
threat to human existence. By living "according to" the objective
world and its stable relations, I can evade the challenge of the
moment to find security in objective truth. Again science can serve as
an example of this evasion.
"As soon as organized science, or culture, is taken as an idea
which stands beyond life and dominates it, it is the organized flight of
human beings away from themselves. Science is something standing
vis-a-vis human beings into which they flee and to which they abandon
themselves. Truth within this science is the general validity of its
propositions, the general validity which is of no concrete concern to
anybody [...]" 43 •
On this background one can grasp Bultmann's concept of sin.
Sin is the refusal of the challenge of the moment, rooted in the desire
for security and expressed in the flight away from the moment into
the sphere of the objective 44 •
(c) God: In the first two points of this sketch (truth and sin) I
outlined the dialectic which lies at the roots of Bultmann's thought.
This dialectic has two sharply distinct sides: one side is the non-
objectified challenge of the moment; the other is the sphere of
objectified truth, the world of escape from the challenge. Given these
two sides, it is clear that Bultmann must locate God exclusively on
the first side, that of existential challenge.
"What is the question of God if not the question, 'What is truth?'
When the question of truth is posed accurately as the question of the
moment, can it be anything but the question of God? For God, if he is
thought at all, is thought as the power which rules the Now, as the
challenge (Anspruch) spoken into the Now" 45 •
43 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie, 39-40.

44 See esp. R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 85; 91; 93; 131-132.
45 R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 50.
This definition of God must be taken in its full philosophical

rigor as an existentialist definition. One must resist the temptation of
distorting it by conforming it to traditional metaphysical notions. For
traditional theism, God exists "objectively", prior to the world and to
human beings in particular. For Bultmann, by contrast, God does not
exist objectively. God is not an objectively real being which, among
other things, challenges me in the moment. No! God is the challenge
of the moment and nothing besides. No being stands behind this
challenge. For that being would be "objective", it would be
something one can "talk about", something pulled down into the
human sphere, something which is not necessarily felt as a challenge,
something, therefore, which is contrary to the deepest nature of God
as absolute Lord.
"God is thus unknowable for science. And this unknowability
does not mean that the object 'God' is too great, too vast, too
incomprehensible. It does not mean that our knowledge is not "adequate".
No idle talk about God's unknowability! God is not a complete or
partial X, such that our lack of knowledge of him would have the
character of a lack of knowledge of certain hidden things, of some
hinterland or over-world. The knowledge of God is the knowledge of the
challenge of the moment. His call becomes heard as the demand which the
moment places on us. God is invisible for the objectifying vision of
scientific research" 46 •
This existentialist understanding of God must be rigorously
applied to all doctrines traditionally associated with God, such as the
doctrine of creation. Understood properly, creation is nothing but the
challenge of the moment; it is not an event whereby an objectively
pre-existing God caused the objective world to be. Such a
cosmological understanding of creation is excluded by Bultmann's
basic ontology. Far from being caused by God, the objective cosmos
arises as a self-enclosed objectification from the corruption of human
knowledge; it has no outside cause 47 •
(d) Scripture: The definition of God as the challenge of the
moment does not imply that the voice of the moment is automatically
God. If this were so, God would be available to philosophical
analysis, because the moment is a universal human phenomenon. In
46 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische EniJ!klopiidie, 51; 57.

47 See R BuLTMANN, Theologische EniJ!klopadie, 106; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Der Sinn des
christlichen Schopfungsglaubens, in ZMR 51 (1936) 1-20; ET: The Meaning of the Christian Faith in
Creation, in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings ofRudolf Bultmann (tr. Schubert Ogden; New
York: Meridian, 1960) 206-225.
fact, however, God is only available to faith in his historical

revelation; he is a concrete historical word spoken from beyond the
moment into the moment.
"One can speak of God only as the How of our existence (das
Wte unserer Existenf), as the one whom I encounter always anew in the
moment. But in order for me to hear God in my moment, my moment
must be determined by a fact (Tatsache), something factual (ein Faktisches).
This happens when I encounter revelation as something spoken in the
moment, or rather to the moment. From the standpoint of
philosophical analysis, this is an accidental historical fact (iftfolliges
geschichtliches Faktum)" 48•
Can this revelation be identified? Yes, God is scriptural; God is
an event which occurs when the word of Scripture is preached.
"[...] all proclamation points to Scripture, not as to its accidentally
first stage, but as to that of which it speaks, namely, revelation. This
first revelation, and nothing else, is tevelation. [...) Thus Scripture is the
authority, the only authority for theology" 49 •
(e) Jesus: The definition of God as an event which occurs when

the historical word of Scripture proclaimed into my moment can be
further specified. Jesus Christ is this Word of God.
"God's revelation as a historical (geschichtlich) event is thus Jesus Christ as
the Word of God. This Word was instituted in the contingent historical
(historisch) event Jesus of Nazareth and it is alive in the tradition of the
Church. The fact of Jesus Christ does not take on importance as a fact
which is visible outside of the proclamation, but only as a fact which
we encounter in the proclamation, as a fact made present by the
proclamation. Jesus Christ is the Word" 50•
Bultmann makes two fundamental assertions in this text. On the

one hand he asserts that Jesus is the unique Word of God. On the
other hand he excludes any objective or metaphysical implications
from this assertion. Jesus is significant for faith, not as a person with
certain objective characteristics, divine or otherwise, but as the
preached Jesus. The traditional dogma of his divinity is contrary to
the inner meaning of revelation, because it falsely objectifies God. In
the world of objective history, Jesus is simply a mere man, one among
other human beings, with no supernatural attributes. However, he does
48 R BULTMANN, Tbeologjsche EniJklopiidie, 63.

49 R BULTMANN, Theologjsche EniJklopiidie, 169.
50 R BULTMANN, Theologische EniJklopiidie, 95.
become significant when he is preached as God's definitive Word. As

preached, his significance is indeed paramount and exclusive.
"Theology is not a general human possibility such that besides
Christian theology there could also be other theologies. Rather,
theology, as a speaking of revelation and of faith, exists on!Jr as Christian
theology, while all other supposed theology can only be talk about
humanity, if God is really accessible only in his revelation through
Christ. However deeply such talk may grasp human reality, it still does
not reach the reality of God" 51 •
"The idea of God is therefore determined from the outset by the
idea of revelation. To speak of God, means: to speak of his revelation;
and to speak of his revelation, means: to speak of God. And revelation
is not here intended in any general sense; it is rather the saving will of
God that can be experienced in the incarnate Revealer. God was
always the God that was made known in the historical revelation, and
he was this alone" 52•
Back to the question, What is truth? According to Bultmann,
truth is the challenge of the moment in which I encounter the
revelation of God as the scriptural proclamation of Jesus, the Word
of God. Note that this definition is rigorously existentialist. It
excludes all objective or metaphysical aspects.
4. Toward the Final .$ynthesis
When read in the light of these philosophical and theological

principles, Bultmann's final synthesis of Johannine theology as
presented in his Theology of the New Testament is remarkably cohesive
and clear. Before turning to this synthesis, let me return to
"Bedeutung der Quellen" to trace some aspects of the trajectory
which leads up to it.
(a) The Instability rif the First .$ynthesis: Apart from the two main
arguments contained in the final section of "Bedeutung der Quellen"
(the exhaustive list of possibilities, and "John says X, because X is
true"), the crucial argu'ment is contained in the observations about
John's use of the Gnostic redeemer myth.
51 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 159.

52 R BuLTMANN, Johannes, 18; ET: 35. Before dismissing these statements as Bible-
bigotry running amok, one should consider that they are intended as existential
statements which de iure cannot make any "objective" claims about the non-existence of
God outside biblical revelation. For, one cannot speak of God "objectively". See
R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 82-83; 87-88.
The evolution rf Bultmann 's interpretation rfjohn and Gnosticism 329
"The Gospel of John itself is no mythology; it merely uses the

forms of expression of the myth as well as the forms of the older
Gospel tradition in order to present its idea of the revelation of God in
Jesus, and it does so with sovereign and sure purpose" 53 •
One can summarize the main features of this use as follows.
John applies the Gnostic redeemer myth to Jesus, but he does not
apply it in its original form. His true intentions can only be grasped if
one sees this transformation as a critique. By removing the redeemer/
redeemed parallel as well as all speculation about the heavenly destiny
of the soul, he removes the crucial elements which make the myth
work as an oijective representation. In other words, he rejects the
objective or metaphysical aspect of the myth. This shows that he
understands revelation as something radically non-objective, as an
existential impact which shakes human beings out of their flight into
security in the sphere of the obj~ctive. What John really means can
thus not be seen in what he leaves standing of the myth (the Son of
God who descends from heaven to dwell among us), but in the hole,
as it were, which he cuts into its original form.
This highly sophisticated approach to John is basically an
argument from silence. More precisely, it is an argument in which
John's silence about some features of the reconstructed myth is given
more weight than his speech about others. In purely logical terms, an
argument of this sort is quite weak. How can one exclude the
possibility that John is merely selecting a few apt elements of the
myth to draw an equally mythical portrait of Jesus?
Bultmann may have realized this problem. At any rate, in his
final synthesis he reaches the same conclusion with somewhat
different premises, above all with a considerably reduced role of the
Gnostic redeemer myth. I turn now to this reduced role and to three
related developments in Bultmann's history of religions analysis of
John: the retreat from the hypothesis of the Mandean community of
John the Baptist; the elaboration of the hypothesis of Gnostic
revelation discourses; and the emergence of anti-Jewish polemic as
central in John.
(b) The Reduced Role if the Redeemer A{yth: In "Bedeutung der
Quellen" Bultmann focuses primarily on the hole which John cuts
53 R. BULTMANN, Das Johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, 510. Bultmann does not
yet use the term "demythologizing" which Jonas developed in the late twenties. Cf.
James Robinson's introduction to Hans Jonas, Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitsprob!em:
Eine philosophische Studie tJ~m pelagianischen Streit, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gi:ittingen
19652, 11-22; here 14-15. However, the hermeneutical concerns expressed by this term are
already fully present.
into the redeemer myth. He sees the material surrounding this hole as
quite continuous with the original myth, though qualified by the hole:
Jesus appears as the pre-existent Son of God striding over the earth;
his humanity merely serves as the transparent medium of his divinity.
In his final synthesis, on the other hand, Bultmann argues that John
leaves nothing standing of the myth, but merely uses it as a schema to
express the paradox of the incarnation. Instead of the hole cut into
the myth, this paradox now becomes the axis of his interpretation.
The paradox is this: The Johannine Jesus is a "mere man in whom
nothing extraordinary can be perceived, except his claim that he is the
revealer" 54• And yet, precisely as a mere man, he is proclaimed as the
Word of God. "It finally becomes clear that the revealer is nothing
but a concrete historical man, Jesus of Nazareth" 55 • The liberal
reading is thus mistaken:
"Is his human figure (Gestalt) the transparent medium (das
Transparen~,as it were, through which his divine nature shines? At first
glance one might think so" 56 •
As Bultmann goes on to argue, this impression is false. John
empties the myth of all its objective content 57 • The Gnostic redeemer
myth stands thus at a greater distance from the metaphysical
constitution of Jesus. Its role is, in this respect, reduced.
(c) Retreat from the Mandean 1-fypothesis: A related reduction can be
observed in Bultmann's reconstruction of the community out of
which John grew. In "Bedeutung der Quellen" he derives Johannine
christology quite directly from the Mandean community of John the
Baptist. Already in a 1931 review of Lietzmann's Beitrag zur
Mandiieifrage he shifts away from this hypothesis. John the Baptist, he
agrees now with Lietzmann, was introduced in Mandean literature
54 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 0. Merk (ed.), Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen
19849 , 399 and 403; ET: Theology of the New Testament (2 vols; trans. Kendrick Grobel; New
York: Scribner's, 1951-1955) 2.46 and 2.50.
55 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 421; ET: 2.69. Cf. "The revealer is nothing but a man".
Bultmann,Johannes, 40; ET: 62. Cf. also the note on this statement: "Thus it is poindess
to ask what happened in this 'became' (in 'the Word became flesh') or since when the
Logos has been united with the man Jesus". R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 40, note 2; ET: 62,
note 4.
56 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 394; ET: 2.42. The question picks up Wrede's formulation
almost verbatim, cf. above p.

57 See R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 394-399; 2.42-47. Cf. Human beings "will expect the
humanity (of Jesus) to be no more than the visualization or the 'form' (Gestal~ of the
divine. All such desires are cut short by the statement, 'The Word became flesh.' It is in
his sheer humanity that he is the revealer", R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 40; ET: 63; emphasis
added.
The evolution rif Bultmann 's interpretation rif john and Gnosticism 331
only "in the Byzantine-Arabian period" 58 • Still, Gnostic baptismal

movements may have played a role, but this role is less tangible and
more oblique 59 • In his final synthesis, Bultmann still inclines toward
the Baptist hypothesis. He tentatively proposes "that the Evangelist
once belonged to the Baptist community", but he no longer identifies
this community as Mandean 60 •
Bultmann's new evaluation of the sacraments exemplifies the
growing distance of John from Gnostic baptismal movements. In
"Bedeutung der Quellen" he still gives an important role to
sacraments. In his final synthesis he states,
"At least in the original text of the Gospel, any reference to the
~rios cult and to the sacraments is missing. [...] The sacraments were
only added by the redaction (3,5; 6,51b-58). The evangelist avoids
speaking of them and is evidendy suspicious of sacramental piety" 61 •
A corrolary of the Mandean hypothesis in "Bedeutung der
Quellen" is the hypothesis that the ministry of Jesus belongs closely
to the Mandean context of John the Baptist and that Synoptic
christology is a later judaizing reaction against this context. In his final
synthesis, on the other hand, Bultmann argues that Synoptic
christology is in greater continuity with Jesus while J ohannine
christology stands further removed 62 •
(d) Gnostic Revelation Discourses: While Bultmann cuts back the
Gnostic hypothesis of "Bedeutung der Quellen" in the above
respects (points b and c), he amplifies it in at least one respect,
namely, by positing a source of Gnostic revelation discourses behind
John. Already in 1923 he argues that "the whole Prologue has been
adopted from a Baptist document" 63 • In his 1941 commentary he still
maintains this hypothesis without identifying this source as
Mandean 64• At the same time, he expands the source.
"It will become evident that this procedure of the Evangelist is
58 R. BuLTMANN, Review o/ Lietzmann, in ThLZ 56 (1931) 577-580, here 577. "The most
weighty argument is the fact that John the baptist is completely absent in the liturgical
texts", Ibidem. Cf. H. LIETZMANN, Bin Beitrag zur Mandaerfrage, de Gruyter, Berlin 1930).
59 Cf. R. BuLTMANN, Review o/ LiefiJnann, 579-580.
60 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 5; ET: 18.
61 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 361; ET: 2.9. Note the complete break with the Wetter
review and with "Bedeutung der Quellen", cf. above pp. XXX.
62 Cf. R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 355-357; ET: 2.3-5.
63 R. BuLTMANN, Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs, 34-35; ET: 33.
"Baptist" refers, of course, to the community of John the Baptist.

64 See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 4; ET 17.
not limited to the Prologue; the underlying source there stems rather
from a collection of 'revelation-discourses', which are to be thought of
as similar to the Odes of Solomon, and which the Evangelist has made
the basis of the Jesus-discourses in the Gospel" 65 •
The genre of these Gnostic revelation discourses, Bultmann

argues, is characterized by a tripartite schema: (a) self-presentation of
the revealer (ego eimt) and description of the world which motivates his
coming; (b) call to turn away from the cosmos toward the light; and
(c) promises for those who follow the call and threats for those who
do not 66 • It is also characterized by Semitic poetic style with frequent
use of parallelism, especially of the antithetical kind. The anthitheses
often reflects an underlying anti-cosmic dualism 67 • Here is Becker's
construction of the ideal archetype of such discourses.
I am the revealer who descended from heaven.
I am from God,
you are of the world.
God is light,
the world is darkness.
Leave the darkness,
approach the light!
Let go of the world,
and do the works of God!
I am the helper sent from God.
Those who listen to me will see the light;
those who do not listen to me will sink into darkness 68 •
John, Bultmann argues, does not adopt the discourses source

uncritically. Quite on the contrary, his often extensive interspersed
comments stand in "marked contrast" to it69 • Generally speaking,
"the source provides, as it were, the text for the evangelist's sermon.
The evangelist 'historicizes' the revelation-discourses by working
them into his portrait of the life of Jesus" 70 •
65 R. BULTMANN, johannes, 4, note 5; ET: 17, note 5.

66 See R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 363; ET: 10-11. Cf. H. BECKER, Die Reden des
Johannesevangeliums und der Stil der gnostischen Offenbarungsrede, FRLANT 2/50, R. Bultmann
(ed.), Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Gottingen 1956, 54. Becker wrote this work as his
dissertation under Bultmann, accepted in 1941, the year in which Bultmann first
published his commentary on John.
67 See R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 363; ET: 11; Becker, Die Reden des Johannes.
68 BECKER, Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 57.
69 R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 177; ET: 238.
70 R. BULTMANN, johannes, 93; ET: 132.

In agreement with Bultmann, Becker explains this interplay in

more detail. Once the Gnostic source is reconstructed, he argues, one
must ask,
"Where is the specifically Christian element to be sought, or is it

not to be sought at all? For it would be quite possible that the author
of John left the source's mythological meaning intact and simply
understood the myth as a Christ-myth. We think, however, that this is
not the case. We must proceed from a radical reinterpretation of the
source's content by the Evangelist, which is the basis for everything
else. It consists in the demythologizing and historicizing of the Gnostic
myth which is achieved by tying it to the historical figure of Jesus. That
the Logos has become flesh in Jesus, this is the tremendous
proclamation of the Evangelist. The mythological element is thereby
eliminated. The concrete, visible, human appearance of the Logos is
the decisive eschatological· fact" 71 •
Such an understanding of the interplay between John and his

source indicates the direction, Becker concludes, "in which an
existentialist and existential interpretation of John must proceed on
the basis of John's own interpretation of his Gnostic source" 72 •
(e) The Central New Role of jewish Opponents: In "Bedeutung der
Quellen" Bultmann gives a central role to Gnosticism in John's
historical situation. John's situation is one of intense interplay with
the Mandean community of John the Baptist. In his final synthesis,
Bultmann still considers the role of Gnosticism important, but he has
difficulties in pinning this role down beyond the literary-theological
intetplqy between John and his discourses source and the tenuous
biographical intetplay between John's past in the Baptist community and
his present in the Jesus community73 • After John 3, the Baptist and his
community play no central role. At the same time a new player and a
new issue As far as the situation of the community is mirrored in the
Gospel of John, its problem is the controversy with Judaism and the
theme of this controversy is faith in Jesus as the Son of God 74•
It will become clear below, how Bultmann fits this new player
into the overall schema of the Johannine "idea of revelation".
71 BECKER,Die &den des Johannesevangeliums, 124-125.

72 BECKER,Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 128.
73 For the biographical aspect, seeR. BULTMANN,johannes, 5; ET: 18.
74 R. BULTMANN, Theo/ogje, 357.

5. The Final ~nthesis
Bultmann's synthesis of Johannine theology in his .Theology rf the

New Testament has a clear structure. After an historical introduction, the
first of its three major sections lays out the two sides of John's dualist
framework: one side is the escape into security in the sphere of the
objective (in J ohannine terms: the world, sin, darkness, lie, death, etc.);
the other side is the li~erating existential challenge of revelation (in
Johannine terms: God, light, truth, life, etc.). Sections two and three
unfold the second side as it overcomes the first. Section two does so
with an emphasis on revelation as a challenge to authentic existence (in
Johannine terms: the mission of Jesus as revealer and judge, etc.).
Section three does so with an emphasis on authentic existence as standing
under the challenge of revelation (in Johannine terms: faith, etc.). Of
course, the foll6wing presentation is only a selection of some of the
most important points which Bultmann makes in his rich synthesis. I
will follow Bultmann's own three-part outline.
(a) Dualism:
(I) The Duali:rt Framework: John adopts a dualist framework from
Gnostic thought1 5 • However, his understanding of this framework
differs from the Gnostic understanding in two important respects.
First, while the Gnostic understanding is "cosmological", John's
understanding is existential: he understands the dualist framework as
a "dualism of decision" 76 •
"The concepts of light, truth, life, and freedom explain each
other: so do the concepts darkness, falsehood, death, and bondage in
the contrasting group. They all derive their meaning from the search
for human existence (ExisteniJ - for 'life' as 'life eternal' - and denote
the double possibility of human existence: to exist either from God, or
from the human person itself'' 77 •
Thus the Johannine notion of "light" refers to the "illumination
of human existence (Dasein), in which human existence understands
itself, in which human beings gain a self-understanding which
discloses their 'way' to them" 78 •
"phos is not a mysterious substance which can be possessed as
something objectively existing (vorhanden); it is the light of se!f
75 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 369; ET: 2.17.

77 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 372-373; ET: 2.20.
understanding which human beings are challenged to embrace. It is the.

light of·. the self-understanding which does not consist simply in
knowing about the self as a neutral phenomenon, but in the knowing
choice of one's self, which lies at the root of every particular act" 79 •
By contrast, "darkness" refers to an "illusory self-
understanding''80.
Second, John situates God differently in relation to "the world"
than does Gnosticism, inasmuch as he understands the world as
God's creature 8t. Of course, Bultmann insists, John's idea of creation
must not be misunderstood as a cosmological "theory" about the
causing of an objective cosmos; rather, it refers to authentic
"existential self-understanding" 82 • By asserting that all things were
created by God, John asserts that God is the authentic and original
source of human existence and that the sphere of darkness is not a
separate principle, but merely the escape from this light.
"Darkness is nothing other than shutting one's self up against the
light. It is the turning away from the origin of one's existence, away
from that which alone offers the possibility of illumining one's
existence" 83 •
This darkness arises when human beings give way to a false
desire for security and attempt to fulfill their yearning for true life by
things that are under their control, instead of being open in complete
insecurity to the moment in which alone they encounter the divine
Word.
"The delusion that arises from the will to exist of and by one's
self peroerts tmth into a lie, peroerts the creation into the 'world'. For in their
delusion, human beings do not let their quest for life become a
question about themselves so as to become aware of their
creaturehood, but instead they give themselves the answer so as to
have a security of their own" 84•
79 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 27; ET: 47. Note the explicit contrast with the Wetter
review, above note 3 "In its original sense light is not an apparatus for illumination, that
makes things perceptible, but it is the brightness itself in which I find myself here and now;
in it I can find my way about, I feel myself at home, and have no anxiety. Brightness itself
is not therefore an outward phenomenon, but the illumined condition of human existence
(Dasein), of myse(f'. R. BULTMANN, johannes, 22; ET: 41.
82 See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 25, note 3; ET: 44, note 2.

(II) The Controverry Wtth the Jews: This general dualist framework
takes on concrete historical form in John's controversy with the Jews.
John, Bultmann argues, sees the Jewish religion as the concrete
historical paradigm and epitome of the general perversion of truth
into a lie. The Jews manage to pervert even the idea of God.
"Taking the Jewish religion as an example, John makes clear
through it how the human will to self-security distorts knowledge of
God, makes God's demand and promise into a possession and thereby
shuts itself up against God" 85 •
The Jews oppose Jesus' claim to be the revealer by "objective"
criteria furnished by the Jewish religion. They marshal arguments
against him which they have brought into their possession by
searching the Scriptures.
"Their search of Scripture stands in the service of a dogmatics
which gives them self-security by furnishing them criteria for judging
the revelation, but this makes them deaf to the living word of the
revealer" 86 •
The controversy between John and the Jews is thus ultimately a
controversy about the very nature of God. The Jews falsely objectify
God; they think God has certain objective characteristics which
would have to be verified in Jesus if his claim were legitimate. "How
can you, a mere man, claim to be equal to God?" John, by contrast,
breaks through any objectification.
"In their dogmatics they (the Jews) conceive of the divine as a
phenomenon (Phdnomen) whose divinity human beings can verify
(konstatieren) by means of their criteria, rather than as an event
(Geschehen) which nullifies those who attempt to verify it. Their protest
fails to understand that the divine cannot be contrasted to the human
in such a manner as they in the security of their judgment suppose:
'How can a mere man claim to be the revealer?' Just this- for human
thinking an absurdity - is the mystery of the revelation, which is
understood only when human beings let go of their self-security in
which they suppose they can distinguish the divine and the human as
verifiable (konstatierbare) phenomena. What 'the Jews' call mystery is no
mystery at all; for in their mythologizing dogmatics they make the
beyond (das jenseits) -Jesus' mysterious origin in God - into a this-
wordly thing (i!'m Diesseits) which is subject to their evaluation. For
those who wish to verify by criteria at their disposal whether and

The evolution of Bultmann's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism 337
where God's mystery stands before them, there is no longer any

mystery. For, what the recognition and acknowledgment (AnerkennuniJ
of God's mystery presupposes that one be cast into doubt (I"ewerden)
about the current standards. That is why the 'world' remains blind
when faced with the revelation, and just by knowing something, it
knows nothing" 87 •
It is not difficult to recognize Bultmann's basic theological

concerns in this text: God is not an object of which human beings
can in any way get an objective cognitive hold; he is the event which
breaks any such cognitive hold. God is misunderstood as soon as
he is expressed in dogmatic, i.e., objectified, terms. Such a
misunderstanding is a sinful turning away from the true light. "The
sin of the Jews lies in their dogmatics" 88 •
(b) The Mission of jesus as the Revealer. John's message, Bultmann
claims, is that the darkness of escape into false security in the sphere
of the objective is overcome by Jesus, the revealer and light of the
world. The theme of the entire Gospel of John, Bultmann claims, is
that Jesus is the revealer sent from God. "His Qesus') theme is always
just this one thing: that the Father sent him, that he came as the
light" 89 • Concretely, the Johannine theme of liberation from the
sphere of the objective takes the form of incarnation: "The theme of
the whole Gospel of John is the statement: 'The Word became flesh'
Qohn 1,14)" 90 •
Before turning to the meaning of the proclamation of the
incarnation, let me discuss its mythological form. The central
question raised by this form is this:
To what extent are such statements, which speak of Jesus in
mythological form as the pre-existent Son of God who became man,
really to be understood in the mythological sense? 91
(I) Mjthological Form and Existential Sense: To unfold the meaning
of this question, let me take a look at Bultmann's definition of
"myth".
"That mode of representation is mythology in which what is
unworldly (das Unweltliche) and divine appears as what is wordly and
87 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 382; ET: 2.29-30.

88 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 380; ET: 2.28; emphasis added.
89 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 414; ET: 2.62. Note the central importance given to the
theme of mission. C£. "In John, Jesus appears neither as the rabbi arguing".
9() R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 392; ET: 2.40.

human or what is transcendent (das jenseitige) appears as what is

immanent (als Diesseitiges), as when for example, God's transcendence
(jenseitigkeif) is thought of as spatial distance" 92 •
The reference to "spatial distance" in this definition should not
lead one to suppose that Bultmann defines "mythological" in the
common fashion as gross or material storytelling about the divine in
contrast to a spiritual understanding. He defines it in terms of the
very precise and rigorous philosophical distinction between the
existential and the objectified. "Diesseitig" includes the notion
"objectified" while ''Jenseitig" is exclusively non-objective and
existential. "Mythology is an objectifying way of talking (oijektivierendes
Reden)" about God 93 •
However, the definition of myth as an objectification of the
divine is incomplete. It does not express the true intention or sense of
myth which is not objective but existential.
"Myth intends to talk about a reality which lies beyond the reality
that can be objectified, observed and controlled, and which is of
decisive significance for human existence. It is the reality that means
for us salvation or damnation, grace or wrath, and that demands of us
respect and obedience" 94•
There is a tension between this intention of myth and its
objectifying form:
"its real intention to talk about a transcendent power to which
both we and the world are subject is hampered and obscured by the
objectifying character of its assertions" 95 •
This tension calls for an interpretation which criticizes the
objective form of myth and fastens on its existential sense. Bultmann
calls this interpretation "demythologizing".
"Demythologizing seeks to bring out the real intention of myth,
namely, its intention to talk about human existence as grounded in and
92 R. BULTMANN, Neues Testament und j}fythologie (1941), in Kerygma und j}fythos (H.-
Werner Bartsch (ed), Reich, Hamburg 1960, 15-48; here 22, note 2; ET: New Testament
and j}fythology, R. BuLTMANN, New Testament and j}fythology and Other Basic Writings, trans.
and ed. Schubert M. Ogdenm, Fortress, Philadelphia 1984) 1-43; here 42, note 5.
93 R. BuLTMANN, Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung (1961), in G/auben und Verstehen, I-
IV, Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen 19844 , 4.128-137, here 4.135. ET: On the Problem of
Demythologi::(jng, in New Testament and j}fythology, 155-163; here 161.
94 R. BULTMANN, Zum Problem der Entmytho/ogisierung, in G/auben und Verstehen, 4.133; ET
160.
95 R. BuLTMANN, Neues Testament und j}fytho/ogie (1941), 23; ET: 10.
The evolution of Bultmann 's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism 339
limited by a transcendent, unworldly pow~r, which is not visible to

objectifying thinking. Thus, negatively,.tiibmythologizing is criticism of
the mythical world-picture insofar as .it·e;~ri~eals the real intention of
myth. Positively, demythologizing is existentialist (existentiale)
interpretation, in that it seeks to make dear the intention of myth to
talk about human existence" 96 •
Back to the question: Are John's. statements about Jesus in

mythological form to be understood in a mythological sense? The
meaning of this question is now clear; ·Are John's objectifying
statements to be understood in an objective or an existential
sense? ·
(II) The Offense of the Incarnation: Bultmann, of course,
emphatically affirms the existential sense of Johannine christology at
the exclusion of any objective aspect.
"It is clear that the mythological statements have lost their
mythological meaning. Jesus is not seriously presented as a pre-existent
divine being who came in human form .to earth to reveal
unprecedented secrets. Rather, the mythological terminology is
intended to express the absolute and decisive significance of his word.
The mythological notion of pre-existence is made to serve the idea of
revelation " 97 •
Here lies the central point of Bultmann's interpretation of

Johannine christology. I have already sketched several auxiliary pillars
of this interpretation: the interplay between John and the Gnostic
discourses source; the existential meaning of Johannine dualism; the
controversy between John and the Jews on the non-objective nature
of God; the analysis of the objective form and existential sense of
myth; and, beneath all these, Bultmann's own philosophical and
theological convictions on the dialectic between objective and
existential. The keystone on which all of these pillars converge is,
without a doubt, the paradox of the incarnation.
"In Jesus we encounter God himself, in a Jesus moreover in whom
nothing extraordinary is perceptible except his bold assertion that in him
we encounter God. In that fact lies the paradox of the idea of revelation, a
paradox which John was the first to see with any distinctness" 98 •
96 R. BULTMANN, Zum Problem der Entnrythologisiemng, in Kerygma und Afythos, vol. 2, H.-
Werner Bartsch (ed.), Reich, Hamburg 1952, 179-195; here 184; ET: On the Problem of
De"!)thologif(jng, in New Testament and Afythology, 95-130; here 99.
97 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 414-415; ET: 2.62.
98 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 403; ET: 2.50.

The meaning of this paradox emerges when one grasps its nature as
offtnse (Anstoss) in relation to John's immediate background, Gnosticism.
The desire for revelation, Bultmann claims, is a basic human desire,
identical with the desire for an authentic self-understanding.
"The striving of human beings to have access to God is nothing
but the expression of their yearning to have 'life' in the 'light' of a
definitive self-understanding, and thus to be in the 'truth' in order that
they may exist authentically (um wahrhqft ifJ sein)" 99 •
This desire is clearly expressed in the Gnostic ideal of gnosis as a

liberation from the dungeon of the objective material cosmos in
which knowledge of the divine and self-understanding are thought to
coincide 100 •
Desire for revelation includes, of course, a certain pre-
understanding (Vorwissen or Vorverstandnis) of revelation 101 • Such a pre-
understanding is reflected in the Gnostic idea that revelation must
have an other-worldly origin and yet be an event which takes place in
the human sphere 102 •
This pre-understanding of revelation, although part of the
uiversal human desire for authentic existence, is dangerous. In fact, it
"can lead human beings to destruction" 103 • Goaded on by their desire
for revelation and misled by inauthentic self-affirmation and self-
security, human beings can succumb to the temptation of
constructing myths or other objectifications as anticipations of
revelation. They think that their desire for authentic existence can
come to rest in these myths, but in fact they merely become more
deeply entangled in the inauthentic sphere of the objective.
"God ceases to be God if he is thought of as an object. The
desire to see God, when it becomes the desire to turn God into an
object of our knowledge, inevitably leads human beings into a radically
false self-understanding" 104•
This radically false self-understanding is exemplified by the

Gnostic redeemer myth. The Gnostic myth deforms the pre-
understanding of revelation by positing an oijective divine "substance"

too See R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 24, note 4; ET: 43, note 2.
tot SeeR. BVLTMANN,johannes, 39; ET: 61; cf. R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 379; ET: 2.26-27.
toz See R. BULTMANN, johannes, 39; ET: 61.

103 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 39; ET: 61.
to 4 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 55; ET: 81; cf. 39; ET: 61-62.

The evolution rf Bultmann's interpretation rfJohn and Gnosticism 341
around which a mythical drama of revelation revolves 105 • While

providing a sham liberation from the earthly objective cosmos, this
"substance" merely serves to entangle the Gnostics in a celestial
objective cosmos. As Bultmann's analysis of the Johannine "Jews"
shows, Gnosticism is not alone in such a radically false self-
understanding.
John's proclamation of the incarnation strikes at the very heart
of the false self-upderstanding exemplified both by the Gnostic myth
and the Jewish dogmatics. In terms of the measures of the world, as
one sees them at work in the Gnostic myth with its dreams of an
objective divine world above the human realm, as well as in the
Jewish mythologizing dogmatics with its claims to secure knowledge
of God, it is an intolerable rffense to proclaim that Jesus, in his sheer
humanity, is the Word of God. This offense, as an offense, is the
heart of John's proclamation. "The event of the revelation is a
question, is an offense. This and nothing else is meant f?y 'The Word became
flesh "'106.
Exactly in its character as offense the incarnation is the liberating
and saving event, because it explodes the false self-understanding of
escape into the sphere of the objective. In this way it frees human
beings from the "world". Here lies the true meaning of Johannine
christology. Becker expresses this point in some admirably compact
formulations:
"The concrete, visible, human appearance of the Logos is the
decisive eschatological fact. This historicizing radicalization of the
myth, however, implies a further aspect which may seem surprising at
first glance: historicizing becomes the basis for de-historicizing and
freedom from the world (Entweltlichung). The possibility for such de-
historicizing lies in the radical historicizing eschatologizing of the
unhistorical gnostic call. The appearing of the incarnate calls this world
and all human beings into question; indeed, it signifies the end of the
world. The coming of the revealer is the krisis in the authentic and
exclusive sense" 107 •
(III) "Historisch" and "Geschichtlich ": This account of the core of
Johannine theology can be clarified by focusing on Bultmann's
distinction between two senses of "historical". Quite simply, the two
senses follow the dialectic between the existential and the objective
which is the omni-present framework of Bultmann's thought. In one
105 SeeR. BVLTMANN,johannes, 39; ET: 62.

106 BuLTMANN, johannes, 39; ET: 63.
R.
107 BECKER, Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 125.
6 .
way something can be historical (historisch) as an objectified thing of

the past, subject to scientific historical criticism. In another way
something can be historical (geschichtlich) as a concrete address which
challenges me in my moment. Yet, since the sphere of the objective is
not an autonomous sphere, but simply an inevitable objectification of
existential challenge, historisch and geschichtlich remain tied to each other
as inseparable sides of a single dialectic.
"The one reality can be seen under a double aspect in accordance
with our double possibility as human beings to exist authentically or
inauthentically. In inauthentic existence we understand ourselves in
terms of the world that stands at our· disposal, whereas in authentic
existence we understand ourselves in terms of the futur~, of which we
cannot dispose. Correspondingly, we can look at the history of the past
in an objectifying way or else as personal address, insofar as in it the
possibilities of human self-understanding become perceptible and
summon us to responsible choice".
The relation of these two modes of self-understanding must be
characterized as "dialecticat', insofar as the one is never given without
the other 108 •
On the basis of this distinction it is clear that the historical
(historisch) Jesus as such is not, and never was, the revealer sent from
God. He simply was one among other human beings. Yet the
historical (geschichtlich) Jesus is the definitive revelation. Inasmuch as
John preaches him as the Logos, Jesus is the revealer. The incarnation
takes place, therefore, only in the preached text of Scripture, not in
"objective" history.
Nevertheless, given the dialectic between historisch andgeschichtlich,
this preaching remains tied to the historical (historisch) Jesus. There is
no inherent reason why this historical (historisch) Jesus should be
preached as the decisive historical (geschichtlich) event, and this
"unreasonableness" is an essential part of John's message, the
"offense" of the incarnation.
"It finally becomes clear that the revealer is nothing but a
concrete historical (geschichtlich) man, Jesus of Nazareth. Why this
specific man? That is a question that must not be answered- for to do
so would destroy the offense which belongs ineradicably to Revelation.
Of course this Jesus must encounter human beings in a concrete form
(Gestalt), but John limits himself to letting only that about Jesus
become visible which was an 'offense'. In any case, he does not
108 R. BULTMANN, Das Problem der Entmytho/ogisierung, in G/auben und Verstehen, 4,131-132;
ET: 158; emphasis added.

The evolution of Bultmann's intetpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism 343
consider the task of the Church's proclamation to be the transmitting

of historical (historisch) tradition abqut Jesus" 109 •
(IV) The Mission of jesus: The offense of the incarnation is

understood properly, of course, only when one focuses on the authentic
existence which issues from it. Before turning to authentic existence,
however, let me dwell a little more on the figure of Jesus, especially on
his mission. The claim that the Johannine Jesus is a mere man "in whom
nothing extraordinary is perceptible except the bold assertion that in
him we encounter God" 110 runs up against numerous "mythological"
passages in the Gospel. Bultmann is quite aware of these difficulties and
attempts to resolve them with considerable resourcefulness. In every
case, the demythologized end-result is the same. Whatever appears to
be an "objective" supernatural attribute of Jesus simply expresses the
existential idea of revelation. "Jesus' person is described exclusively in
terms of the revelation" 111 • Here are some representative examples:
"On Jesus' pre-existence: 'The point of the statements about pre-
existence and mission is not that they describe things which in
themselves are important for Jesus, but that they draw out the
importance of his person and word. Thus the statement about the pre-
existence describes in mythological imagery the word which we
encounter as a word whose origins are not in this world, and our
situation as one where we must make the decision between life and
death' 112 • "The mythological notion of pre-existence is made to serve
the idea of revelation" 113 •
"On his divine sonship: 'There can be no doubt that the Evangelist
intends the title (Son of God) to outdo the messianic titles listed in John
1,20ff. It is characteristic of him that he should stress the relation to the
Father which is expressed by the title 'Son of God' (cf. already John
1,14.18); thus what is important for him in the title is that it contains the
idea that Jesus is the revealer in whom we encounter God" 114 •
"On his heavenfy conversation with the Father. 'John 5,20 expresses the
idea of revelation in the language of myth ... The Father 'loves' the Son
and shows him everything that he does. [...] All these different phrases,
that the Son does or says what he has seen or heard with the Father,

111 R. BULTMANN, Johannes, 191, note 3; ET: 254, note 8.
112 R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 190-191; ET: 254-255.
113 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 415; ET: 2.62. Cf. R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 17-19; ET: 33-36.

give expression to the same idea, namely, that he is the revealer in whom
we encounter God himse!f speaking and acting" 115 •
"On jesus as omniscient theios anthropos: 'The Johannine Jesus is not
however portrayed as a prophet, but in his omniscience he is more like
a theios anthropos [...] whose miraculous knowledge is not based on a gift
of God which has to be constantly renewed, but on his own personal
divinity. [...] (f) he idea of omniscience belongs to the mythological
elaboration of the idea of revelation, while the task of the theios
anthropos motif is to help portray the idea of omniscience" 116 • "The
omniscience of Jesus is therefore not understood to be his super-
human ability, but his knowledge which is transmitted to the believer:
whoever has recognized him as the revealer knows everything by
knowing this one thing" 117 •
"On his miracles: 'Of course, they are extraordinary occurrences,
but that only makes them indicators that the activity of the revealer is a
disturbance of what is familiar to the world. They point to the fact that
the revelation is no worldly occurrence, but an other-worldly one" 118 •
"On the Jacts rf salvation': 'As we have seen, the 'facts of salvation'
in the traditional sense play no important role in John. The entire
salvation-drama - incarnation, death, resurrection, Pentecost, Parousia
- is concentrated into a single event: the revelation of God's 'reality'
(aletheia) in the earthly activity of the man Jesus" 119 •
Let me unfold Bultmann's interpretation of the mission ofjesus in
greater detail. The difficulty is this: mission implies an "objective"
distinction between a sender and a sent as well as a charge given by
the sender to the sent, - all of which is, on Bultmann's terms,
mythological. Bultmann's general resolution of the difficulty is quite
simple. The theme of mission expresses the existential significance of
Jesus as the eschatological event which breaks into the world of the
objective. "The mission is the eschatological event, and the judgment of
the world takes place .in it" 120•
"In all that he Oesus) is, says and does, he is not to be understood
as a figure of this world, but his appearing in the world is to be
conceived as a sending from without, an arrival from elsewhere. He is
the one 'whom the Father consecrated and sent into the world' Oohn
10,36)"121.
115 R. BULTMANN,johannes, 189-190; ET: 252-253.

118 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 396-397; ET: 2.44.

The evolution rif Bultmann 's interpretation rifjohn and Gnosticism 345
Bultmann attempts to sharpen this demythologized

understanding of mission by integrating it into the paradox of
revelation 122 • According to this paradox, we encounter God in the
sheer humanity of Jesus.
"John emphatically expresses this paradox. He accordingly
presents the fact tl;lat in Jesus we encounter God in a seemingly
contradictory manner: in one direction by statements that declare that
Jesus has equal dignity and rights with God, or even that God has
abdicated his rights to Jesus, so to speak. In the other 4irection, John
declares that Jesus speaks and acts only in obedience to the will of the
Father and does nothing of himself' 123 •
Two distinct groups of texts reflect these two directions. The

first group states that God gave his "name" to Jesus (17,11); that he
gave "everything" into his hands (3,35; 13,3); that he gave him
"authority over all flesh" (17,2); that he gave him "to have life in
himself'' as he himself has life in himself (5,26); and that, accordingly,
he gave him power to do judgment (5,22.27) and power to raise the
dead and bring to life whomever he wills (5,21). Jesus works like the
Father (5,17) and claims the same honor (5,23).
In the second group of texts one finds Jesus saying, "I have
come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him
who sent me" (6,38). "He acts in obedience to the 'charge' which he
received from the Father (10,18; 12,49f; 14,31; 15,10)" 124• His whole
existence lies in this obedience: "It is my food to do the will of him
who sent me and to accomplish his work" (4,34). Accordingly, his last
words are, "It is accomplished" (19,30). His work is to accomplish the
task enjoined on him by the Father (5,36; 9,4; 10,32.37; 17,4) and he
carries it out, not to serve his own glory, but the glory of his Father
(7,18; 8,49f; cf. 11,4).
Many negative formulations reinforce the second group of texts:
Jesus did not come of himself, but the Father sent him (7,28; 8,42; 5,43);
he cannot do anything of himself, but acts only according to the
Father's instructions (5,19£.30; 8,28); he does not teach or speak of
himself, but speaks only the words which the Father has given him
(7,17f; 12,49; 14,10.24; 17,8.14). "Of course, the intent of such
statements is not to .diminish the authority of Jesus and his words, but
122 The following sketch of this integration is drawn from Bultmann, in Theologie, 403-404; ET:
2.50-52. .
124 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 404; ET: 2.51; emphasis added.

just the opposite: to establish it" 125 • Because Jesus does not speak his
own words, he can speak those of God (3,34). Those who hear him
hear God's words (8,47) and gain life by believing in them (5,24).
The two groups of texts are, to repeat, apparendy contradictory.
On the one hand Jesus is equal to God; on the other hand he is
radically subordinate in the obedient accomplishment of his mission.
It would be a misunderstanding, Bultmann claims, to interpret this
obedience in ethical terms.
"It is just this standpoint, from which Jesus' character would be
measured by ethical standards, which is the wrong one; and what the
author is trying to make clear is not Jesus' humility, but his authority:
the paradoxical authority of a human being speaking the words of
God. In other words, it is the idea of revelation that the author is
setting forth" 126 •
The apparent contradiction resolves itself thus in the paradox of

revelation. The idea of revelation implies that we truly encounter God
himself (the first group of texts) and yet that we do so by
encountering Jesus, a mere man, who, in his sheer humanity, is
incomparably other than God (the second group of texts). As a
particular theme within the second group, the theme of mission
contributes, therefore, to express the paradox of revelation.
(c) Authentic Existence:
(I) Faith as Freedom from the World: John's message, which is
placed on the lips of Jesus, is that Jesus has been sent as the revealer
who brings true life. This is why so many of Jesus' words are self-
predications. What is the content of these predications?
"Practically all the words of Jesus in John are se!f-predications
(Selbstaussagen) and no definite complex of ideas can be stated as their
content and claimed to be the 'teaching' of Jesus. [...] His words are
self-predications. This does not mean christological instruction or
teaching about the metaphysical quality of his person. On the
contrary, to understand them in that way would be to misunderstand
them; for it would be a failure to understand that his 'words' are
'deeds"' 127 •
If Jesus' words have no objective content, is his claim to be the

revealer merely an empty claim?
125 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 404; ET: 51.

The evolution o/ Bultmann's interpretation o/john and Gnosticism 347
"It turns out in the end that Jesus as the revealer of God reveals
nothing but that he is the revealer. In his Gospel John presents only the that
of revelation without describing its what. He seems to retain only the
empty that of revelation 128•
This impression is not completely accurate, however. True, on
the object-side revelation is indeed empty, but it can be filled in
existential terms.
"If revelation is not to be presented as the communication of a
definite teaching [...] then all that can be presented is its naked that
(blosses Dass). This that, however, does not remain empty. For the
revelation is represented as the shattering and negating of all human
self-assertion and all human norms and evaluations. And, precisely by
virtue of being such negation, revelation is the affirmation and
fulfillment of human longing for life, fot true reality" 129 •
To accept this revelation in faith is to abandon "the whole
edifice of security" and "to let it shatter"130 • As the acceptance of the
offense of the incarnation, faith is a radical "turning away from the
world, an act of freedom from the world (EntweltlichuniJ " 131 • In such
freedom from the world, the offense of the incarnation is
"overcome" inasmuch as the standards of the world are suspended in
their validity.
"Faith, then, is the overcoming of the offense - the offense that
we encounter life only in the word addressed to us by a mere man,
Jesus of Nazareth. It is the offense raised by a man who claims,
without being able to make it credible to the world, that God comes to
meet us in him. It is the offense of 'the Word became flesh'. As victory
over this offense, faith is victory over the world (1 John 5,4)" 132•
As a "decision against the world" and effective victory over the
world, faith is "eschatological existence: in the midst of the world, the
believer is taken out of worldly existence (weltliches Sein)" 133 •
(II) The Sitz im Leben of Bultmann 's interpretation of John: Why
should the shattering and negating of all human standards be
128 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 418-419; ET: 2.66-67.

129 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 420; ET: 2.67-68. Note the continuity with "Bedeutung
der Quellen", 103-104.
130 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 427; ET: 75.
131 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie, 428; ET: 75. Grobel translates "Entweltlichung" as
"desecularization".
132 R. BULTMANN, Theologie, 428; ET: 74-75.

experienced as the fulfillment of the deepest yearnings for true life?

My goal in raising this question is not to decide whether the
Johannine message is in fact such a fulfillment, but to understand why
Bultmann thinks it is.
When Bultmann embraces the Johannine message as a message
which smashes the entire edifice of human security in an objective
"world", what does "world" refer to in his own life-context? Who or
what represents "the world"? On the level of the text, of course,
Gnostics and Jews do. As historical groups, however, they are not
part of Bultmann's own Sitz im Leben. But perhaps they function as
"foils for an encoded portrayal" 134 of the true, i.e., contemporary,
representatives of "the world".
In one of this characterizations of the Johannine Jews, Bultmann
brands "religion" as the most subversive opponent of God.
"The world's resistance against God is based on its imagined
security, which reaches its highest and most subversive form in
religion and thus, for the Jews, in their pattern of life based on
Scripture" 135•
"Religion with a pattern of life based on Scripture" applies, of
course also to traditional Christianity, - certainly an opponent with
which Bultmann had to deal at much closer range. In fact, his
vehement critique of Catholicism and Protestant Orthodoxy in
Theologische Enzyklopiidie is quite similar to his treatment of Gnosticism
and the Jewish religion in his work on John 136 • In addition, the
demythologizing debate pitted him in an often bitter struggle against
the defenders of objective content and dogma.
It can hardly be denied that the J ohannine Gnostics and Jews act
as foils for B:ultmann's contemporary fellow-Christians. Nevertheless,
the search for a Sitz im Leben cannot rest here. Bultmann clearly
understands himself as standing in continuity with the Christian
tradition, at least with its true existential meaning.
It may be more fruitful to turn to existentialism, which is the
foundation of his thought, and to ask, What is existentialism reacting
against when it pits authentic existence against the entire objective
cosmos? Hans Jonas's analysis may be helpful here.
134 These are the terms used by Dieter Georgi in his attempt to grasp Hegel's
interpretation of the Johannine Jews.

135 R. BvLTMANN,johannes, 201; ET: 267-268.
136 See the chapter entitled, R. BULTMANN, The ecclesial idea o/ revelation and its
decomposition, in Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 66-88. For Catholicism, see ibid. 67-71; for
Protestant Orthodoxy, see ibid. 71-72; for a critique of both, see ibid. 72-76.
The evolution of Bultmann 's interpretation ofJohn and Gnosticism 349
"A change in the v1s1on of nature, that is, of the cosmic

environment of man, is at the bottom of that metaphysical situation
which has given rise to modem existentialism and to its nihilistic
implications. The essence of existentialism is a certain dualism, an
estrangement between man and the world, with the loss of the idea of
a kindred cosmos- in short, an anthropological acosmism" 137 •
Jonas argues that existentialism is, in this respect, similar to

ancient Gnosticism. Like Gnosticism, existentialism sees authentic
existence as trapped in the objective world. If anything, the existence-
world dualism in existentialism is more radical than the pneuma-
cosmos dualism in Gnosticism.
"There is no overlooking one cardinal difference between the
gnostic and the existentialist dualism: Gnostic man is thrown into an
antagonistic, anti-divine, and therefore anti-human nature, modern
man into an indifferent one. Only the latter case represents the
absolute vacuum, the really bottomless pit. In the gnostic conception
the hostile, the demonic, is still anthropomorphic, familiar even in its
foreignness, and the contrast itself gives direction to existence. Not
even this antagonistic quality is granted to the indifferent nature of
modem science, and from that nature no direction at all can be elicited.
This makes modem nihilism infinitely more radical and more desperate
than gnostic nihilism could ever be for all its panic terror of the
world" 138•
Jonas's attempt to understand the Sitz im Leben of existentialism

is strikingly confirmed by Bultmann himself. In the year before he
died, he wrote to an American physician who had asked him about
the meaning of hell.
"The existential meaning of hell is not that of an image of a
physical place below the world full of torments. Instead, it is the
recognition of the power of evil, indeed, the evil of the poisoned
and poisoning atmosphere which humankind has created for itself
when we began to assume that we could create security through scientific
knowledge and the ability to dominate the eaft4. With this attitude, the
world does become hell. Such confusion leads to the battle of all
against all. Here are the roots of our doubts, our questioning the
meaning of life" 139•
137 H. joNAS, Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism, in The Gnostic Religion: The Message o/
the Alien God and the Beginnings o/ Christianity, Beacon, Boston 19632, 320-340; here 325.
138 H. joNAS, Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism, 338-339.
139 BULTMANN LEMKE, Bultmann's Papers, 11-12; emphasis added.

6. Some Critical Riflections
On the positive side, one must acknowledge that Bultmann

understood and lived central aspects of our modern situation with
remarkable clarity and intensity. He did not blink at the clash between
the modern scientific world-view and the Christian faith, but faced it
head-on. In this respect he can contribute much toward understanding
the situation of Biblical studies in the Twentieth Century. He himself
played an important role in shaping this situation, but in doing so he
was, in part, merely giving sharp and honest expression to forces that
were at work quite apart from his contribution.
But there are problems in the manner in which he interpreted
these forces and attempted to bring them together into a new
synthesis, most consummately in his reading of John. In attempting to
resolve the clash between the scientific world-view and the Christian
faith, Bultmann takes a violent short-cut: He uncritically accepts the
scientific world-view and then stages an all-out witch hunt on it. By
pressing it into such a Lutheran dialectic he grants it too much and too
little. Too much because he does not criticize it in detail; and too little
because he condemns it entirely as an expression of sin.
Two further criticisms can be brought against Bultmann from
the perspective of the Catholic tradition, focused on two central
Catholic concerns: faith in the goodness of creation and respect for
the normative status of biblical texts in their historical meaning. Of
course, these are not exclusively Catholic concerns, but they do play a
central role in the Catholic tradition.
Perhaps the most central objection against Bultmann's reading
of John from a Catholic perspective is that he abandons the Jewish
and Christian assent to the fundamental goodness of the world as
God's creature. His ontology does not allow any other position. The
objective world is the result of an inauthentic mode of human
knowledge. Far from being caused by God it arises as a self-enclosed
objectification from human sin. In this respect Bultmann's ontology
is closer to Gnosticism than it is to the biblical tradition.
As a second criticism from the point of view of the Catholic
tradition one can point out that Bultmann does not sufficiently respect
the historical meaning of the biblical texts as normative. It may seem
paradoxical to bring such a criticism against the foremost Lutheran
Scripture scholar. Let me unfold it by raising some questions about
demythologizing understood as an interpretive project. As pointed out
above, Bultmann himself sees demythologizing as primarily
interpretive or hermeneutical.
The evolution of Bultmann's interpretation ofjohn and Gnosticism 351
This presupposes that myth indeed talks about a reality, but in an

inadequate way140•
The phrase "in an inadequate way" points to the following
difficulty: To preach the word of God as something located in the
non-objective sphere of existential challenge requires great conceptual
clarity, a clarity which became possible only after the development of
Bultmann's dialectical doctrine of knowledge, developed before and
then in collaboration with Heidegger and Jonas. The ancient
Christians in general and the Gospel of John in particular did not
have this clarity. And so they inevitably and continuously confused
the Word of God with something objective. Bultmann acknowledges
their confusion when he notes that the false objectivity of New
Testament myths must be eliminated. In an important text already
quoted above, Bultmann says,
"Demythologizing seeks to bring out the real intention of myth,
namely, its intention to talk about human existehce as grounded in and
limited by a transcendent, unworldly power, which is not visible to
objectifying thinking. Thus, negatively, demythologizing is criticism of
the mythical world-picture insofar as it conceals the real intention of
myth. Positively, demythologizing is existentialist interpretation, in that
it seeks to make clear the intention of myth to talk about human
existence" 141 •
The problem lies in the negative aspect, that of de-

objectification. If ancient Christian texts, and John in particular, are
mired in objectification, then Bultmann gives them too much credit
when he interprets them as really proclaiming the non-objective
Word of God. He is engaged in over-benevolent apologetics and not
in critical exegesis. In other words, demythologizing is not a
hermeneutical procedure, but the expression of a disagreement with
the text. In its de-objectifying aspect, it replaces the text's theology
with an opposed theology.
Bultmann protests emphatically, "Scripture is the authority, the
only authority for theology" 142• But in fact, a dialectic doctrine of
knowledge determines what can, and what cannot, be Word of God.
From the standpoint of the Catholic tradition, this determination
gives too normative a role to philosophy; it separates the Word of
God too much from the historically concrete meaning of Scripture.
140 R. BuLTMANN, On the Problem rif Delf(Ythologiifng (1961), 155.

141 R. BULTMANN, On the Problem o/ Delf(Ythologiifng (1952), 99.
142 R. BULTMANN, Theologische En1Jklopi:idie, 169.
Bultmann is both a deeply believing Christian and a radical

rationalist critic of the New Testament. This apparent contradiction
constitutes the systematic unity of his work which lies in his dialectic
doctrine of knowledge. By demonizing the Enlightenment and
turning it into his most implacable enemy, he thought he could make
it, paradoxically, comfortable to live with.
"I have never felt uncomfortable in my critical radicalism. As a
matter of fact, I am quite comfortable in it. But I often have the
impression that my conservative colleagues in New Testament studies
feel quite uncomfortable, because I always see them engaged in
salvaging operations. I calmly let things burn, because I see that what is
burning is merely the imaginations and pictures produced by life of
Jesus research and that this is 'Christ according to the flesh'. This
'Christ according to the flesh', however, is of no concern to us" 143 •
But if even flesh is created by God, and if faith sees God's glory
in the Word made flesh, then Bultmann's comfort is too easy. The
more difficult road must be pursued. What is needed for a
constructive sifting of his legacy, I would suggest, is a more positive
and more critical assessment of the Enlightenment which avoids both
his demonizing and uncritical acceptance of it. What is needed is a
renewed philosophy and theology of nature. Only in such a positive
philosophy and theology of nature can one see the meaning of the
central Johannine affirmation, the Word became flesh.
143 R. BuLTMANN, Gfauben und Verstehen, 1,101.

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Lateranum 70 (2004): 313-52.

THE EVOLUTION OF BULTMANN'S

Bultmann's reading of John has a dramatic historyl. It begins

In one of his first contributions to Johannine studies, Bultmann

1 The present paper is conceived as a tandem piece to my critique of Hans Jonas's

understanding of Gnosticism. See M. WALDSTEIN, Hans Jonas' Construct 'Gnosticism':

Nethofel, Strukturen existentialer Interpretation: Bultmanns Johanneskommentar im Wechsel

the work reviewed in this article is Gillis P. WETTER, Die "Verherrlichung" im

read as a specimen of "hellenistic mystery piety (hellenistische

4 R.BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 124.

7 R. BuLTMANN, Biblische Theologie, 125. The Bousset reference is to Kyrios Christos:

interpretation of the Johannine Jesus as a "divine man".

It is difficult to imagine a greater distance from Bultmann's later

2. The First .$ynthesis

Bultmann soon abandoned this reading of John. Two major

1°For an account of these shifts, see R. BULTMANN, Das Johannesevangelium in der

des johannesevangeliums, im ZNW 24 (1925) 100-146; reprinted in E. DINKLER (ed.),

16 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57.

17 R. BULTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 57. Bultmann is quoting from W. WREDE,

24 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Quellen, 100.

"John the Baptist as the incarnate Son of God and revealer" 25 •

27 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102.

28 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102.

29 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 101.

30 R. BuLTMANN, Bedeutung der Que/len, 102. In "Der religionsgeschichtliche

(mythologie-geschichtliche Auffassung). However, even supposing the

31 R. BULTMANN, Das johannesevangelium in der neuesten Forschung, 510.

It is difficult to follow the argument of this text. The difficulty

The intimate interweaving between Bultmann's own convictions

113-163; repr. in Exegetica, 124-173.

foundations of theology, recently published as R. BULTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie.

Bultmann's entire ontology is based on this existentialist

39 R. BULTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopiidie, 48. Heidegger's terminology is palpable in

The sphere of the objective derives thus from authentic truth

41 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische En?Jklopadie, 44.

"Objective" history, as a series of causally connected events in

43 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Em;yklopadie, 39-40.

This definition of God must be taken in its full philosophical

46 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische EniJ!klopiidie, 51; 57.

fact, however, God is only available to faith in his historical

(e) Jesus: The definition of God as an event which occurs when

Bultmann makes two fundamental assertions in this text. On the

48 R BULTMANN, Tbeologjsche EniJklopiidie, 63.

become significant when he is preached as God's definitive Word. As

4. Toward the Final .$ynthesis

When read in the light of these philosophical and theological

51 R. BuLTMANN, Theologische Enzyklopadie, 159.

"The Gospel of John itself is no mythology; it merely uses the

54 R. BuLTMANN, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 0. Merk (ed.), Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen

almost verbatim, cf. above p.

only "in the Byzantine-Arabian period" 58 • Still, Gnostic baptismal

60 R. BuLTMANN, johannes, 5; ET: 18.

63 R. BuLTMANN, Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs, 34-35; ET: 33.

"Baptist" refers, of course, to the community of John the Baptist.

The genre of these Gnostic revelation discourses, Bultmann

John, Bultmann argues, does not adopt the discourses source

65 R. BULTMANN, johannes, 4, note 5; ET: 17, note 5.

68 BECKER, Die Reden des johannesevangeliums, 57.

69 R. BuLTMANN,johannes, 177; ET: 238.

70 R. BULTMANN, johannes, 93; ET: 132.

In agreement with Bultmann, Becker explains this interplay in

"Where is the specifically Christian element to be sought, or is it

Such an understanding of the interplay between John and his

71 BECKER,Die &den des Johannesevangeliums, 124-125.

The Evolution of Bultmann's Interpretation of John and Gnosticism

The Evolution of Bultmann's Interpretation of John and Gnosticism