Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

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Research Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/respol

Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs

Benoît Le Mauxa, Sarah Neckerb, , Yvon Rocaboya
⁎

a
University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center, France
b
University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Germany

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

JEL classification: Performance incentives have become increasingly important in academia. Evidence suggest that they increase
A11 not only researchers’ effort but also their cheating. We develop a principal–agent framework in which a research
A13 institution (principal) aims to reward scientific productivity considering the social benefit of research and the
D86 remuneration costs. Researchers (agents) take into account what others are doing. As a consequence, the in-
K42
troduction of performance incentives not only leads to fraudulent behavior in the short run, but may also de-
teriorate the scientific norm in the long run. In the face of these dynamics, the principal pursues two goals: to
Keywords:
increase productivity (effort incentive policy) and to deal with fraud (anti-fraud policy). Several factors determine
Contract theory
Economics of science the optimal mix of policies: economic factors (researchers’ cost of providing high or low effort, the societal value
Scientific misbehavior of scientific knowledge and the societal costs of scientific misbehavior) and psychological factors (the evolution
Social norms of norms over time). An important insight of our theory is that when research institutions seek to encourage the
production of high quality research, they should also raise the salary for normal research to avoid misconduct.

1. Introduction popularity of one-time cash bonuses for the publication in peer-re-

Scientific misbehavior imposes high costs on society. It has been
estimated that every paper retracted due to scientific misbehavior costs
almost $400,000 in funds from the US National Institutes of Health, for
a total of $58 million between 1992 and 2012 (Stern et al., 2014).
Additional costs arise if scientific misbehavior misleads or delays sci-
entific progress or even poses threats to society.1 Stern et al. (2014)
estimate that the indirect costs to society are likely to be significantly
larger than the direct costs. To be able to address the problem, it is
fundamental to understand to what extent scientific misbehavior results
from the rewards proposed to researchers and, in particular, the in-
centives to publish. Do the rewards imply not only a short-run rise but
also an increasing level of misbehavior over time, by changing the so-
cial norms guiding research misbehavior? What is the best policy of
research institutions if their rewards induce misbehavior? These are the
questions that we address in our study.
While incentives to publish have a long history in the US and
Canada, they have become increasingly important in other countries
over the last two decades (Franzoni et al., 2011). In recent years, the
viewed journals has risen around the globe (Abritis and McCook,
2017).2 Franzoni et al. (2011) show in a cross country study that all
types of incentives are positively related to scientists’ (successful)
submission to the journal Science. However, one-time cash incentives
have the strongest effect and also appear to encourage the submission
of low quality papers.
More worrying than low quality papers is that the reforms have also
been cited as an explanation for the increasing prevalence of unethical
behavior in academia, such as the disproportionately high number of
positive findings (Fanelli, 2010), statistically-significant results
(Brodeur et al., 2016), and articles being retracted due to fraud (Fang
et al., 2012).
Fanelli et al. (2015) show that scientific misconduct is more fre-
quent in countries where individual publication performance is re-
warded with cash than in countries in which publication performance
determines individual careers or national funding to institutions.
Necker (2014) finds a relationship between perceived pressure to
publish and admitting questionable research practices. Such a link is
also predicted by the economic model of crime, in which cheating

Corresponding author at: Walter-Eucken Institute, Goethestraße 10, 79100 Freiburg, Germany.
⁎

E-mail addresses: benoit.le-maux@univ-rennes1.fr (B. Le Maux), necker@eucken.de (S. Necker), yvon.rocaboy@univ-rennes1.fr (Y. Rocaboy).
1
In the extreme case, misinformation may even imply the loss of human life. A recent example is Paolo Macchiarini whose research on synthetic organ transplants
made him famous. Several of his papers have been retracted, most of the patients who received his treatment have died.
2
In some countries, cash bonuses have been introduced by national policies, e.g., in Korea, Turkey, or China (where authors can earn up to $165,000 for a paper).
In other countries, national policies target the success of scientists’ institutions (e.g., Australia, Belgium, Denmark) or of individual scientists directly. For instance, in
Germany individual productivity is either rewarded by a higher salary or career progression.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.05.001
Received 28 September 2018; Received in revised form 23 April 2019; Accepted 2 May 2019
0048-7333/ © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Benoît Le Maux, Sarah Necker and Yvon Rocaboy, Research Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.05.001
B. Le Maux, et al.
increases with the associated extrinsic incentives (e.g., Becker, 1968).
However, researchers do not only care about extrinsic rewards.
Merton (1973) argues that scientists are bound by the “ethos of sci-
ence.” Importantly, scientific norms may not be static. The theory of
social customs stresses that a deviation from a social norm by a few
people can induce the erosion of the norm in the long run (Akerlof,
1980). Thus, the introduction of performance-related pay may not only
lead to fraudulent behavior in the short run, but may also change the
norms of the scientific community in the long run.
The aim of our paper is to study the optimal behavior of a research
institution which aims to reward performance and takes into account
the dynamics of behavior. We develop a dynamic principal–agent
model of scientific misbehavior. Only few papers model researchers’
misbehavior (Wible, 1998; Hoover, 2006; Lacetera and Zirulia, 2009;
Kiri et al., 2018). None of these studies considers the principal–agent
relationship between researchers and their institution or the moral costs
of cheating. While it is well known that high-powered incentives can
generate perverse effects (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991;
Benabou and Tirole, 2016), this understanding has not yet been applied
to the academic setting. A study closely related to ours is Andergassen
(2008) which focuses on the remuneration of managers.
Academia is a particularly interesting example for analyzing the link
between rewards, norms, and misbehavior. Although employers (gov-
ernment, universities, or research institutes) can provide incentives for
performance, they cannot directly control monitoring. The design of the
reward policy is thus fundamental for the evolution of scientific mis-
behavior.
In our model, researchers’ (agents) labor productivity is endogenous
(high/low). While high-type (“leading”) researchers can chose between
high effort, low effort, and cheating, low-type (“normal”) researchers
can only choose between low effort and cheating. The research in-
stitution (principal) intends to induce high-type researchers to be
highly productive by rewarding productivity but cannot directly ob-
serve researchers’ effort. Due to the asymmetric information, the ex-
trinsic incentives motivate researchers to cheat to avoid the cost of
effort (high-types) or to obtain a higher income (low-types). Following
the theory of social customs, a central assumption in our model is that
the decision to cheat also depends on the fraction of colleagues who
cheat: moral costs decrease with past misbehavior.
In the face of these dynamics, the principal seeks to maximize the
expected surplus, defined as the difference between the social benefits
of academic research and the costs of remuneration. By paying a higher
salary for high quality research (effort incentive policy), the principal
aims to motivate leading researchers to provide high rather than low
effort. However, the effort incentive policy increases the benefit of
scientific misconduct for both types of researchers. To prevent mis-
conduct, both, leading and normal researchers’, salaries have to be
increased such that cheating becomes relatively less attractive (anti-
fraud policy).
We show that the optimal mix of those two policies depends on
economic parameters, i.e., the social benefit of honest research, the
social cost of scientific misbehavior, and the effort levels necessary to
produce low and high-quality research, and psychological parameters,
i.e., the evolution of social norms over time. An important insight of our
theory is that when research institutions seek to encourage the pro-
duction of leading research, they should not forget to also increase the
salary for normal research to avoid misconduct.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models researchers’
behavior. Section 3 deals with the research institution's choices. In
Section 4, we provide comparative statics results of the model. Section
5 discusses our theory, Section 6 concludes.
2
Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
2. Modeling the behavior of researchers (agents)
2.1. Preliminary considerations
A fundamental goal in the reward structure of science is to establish
priority of discovery by being the first to communicate an advance in
knowledge. Publication is necessary to gain the recognition from the
scientific community (Stephan, 1996). Publications are thus the out-
comes of interest for the researcher. The central question is which
factors motivate researchers to produce these articles in a fraudulent
way. Previous literature suggests that it is important to consider three
different types of motivations.
Extrinsic motivation. The traditional economic theory of crime (de-
veloped by Becker, 1968) focuses on individuals’ extrinsic motivations
to cheat. Cheating results from a rational cost–benefit analysis of the
associated expected external rewards and costs. That implies that in a
tournament, the benefits from cheating increase with the intensity of
competition. A growing body of literature shows that competitive
pressure is positively related to cheating (e.g., Schwieren and
Weichselbaumer, 2010; Gilpatric, 2011; Cartwright and Menezes,
2014). The studies by Necker (2014) and Fanelli et al. (2015) suggest
that publication pressure/incentives increase researchers’ misconduct.
In our setting, this corresponds to the contracts offered to researchers,
in particular, the premium on publications.
Unconditional (intrinsic) commitment to honesty. Recent findings from
psychology and behavioral economics indicate that rewards, mon-
itoring, and sanctions have a less clear-cut influence than traditional
theory assumes (e.g., Rosenbaum et al., 2014). A number of contribu-
tions have shown that individuals cheat much less than predicted (e.g.,
Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Gneezy et al., 2013; Abeler et al.,
2014; Conrads et al., 2014). The studies suggest that moral costs, i.e.,
the costs that arise from the desire to do the right thing, differ across
individuals. Thus, we assume that researchers are heterogeneous in the
utility loss they experience from dishonestly reporting research (as, e.g.,
Funk, 2005, in her theory of crime).
Conditional (norm-based) commitment to honesty. In line with the
theory of social customs (e.g., Akerlof, 1980), the extent to which
others follow (or are believed to follow) the social norm has been
shown to play a role for the moral costs of cheating. Several experi-
mental studies show that subjects who believe or observe that others
cheat are more likely to cheat themselves (e.g., Gino et al., 2009; Abeler
et al., 2014; Diekmann et al., 2015; Dimant, 2018). Bailey et al. (2001)
and Necker (2014) show that economists’ beliefs about others’ behavior
are related to own admitted scientific misbehavior. Following this line
of research, we assume that researchers’ utility is affected by others’
obedience to a code of good conduct. In Appendix A.1, we provide
suggestive evidence based on a survey showing that researchers’ moral
costs of cheating vary with their beliefs about what their peers do.
2.2. Researchers’ incentive-compatibility constraints
Consider a scientific community in which an infinite number of
researchers (the agents in our model) are divided into identical non-
overlapping generations, each working for one period t. The agents are
heterogeneous in their type j (see also Lacetera and Zirulia, 2012),
having either low productivity (“normal researchers”), j = L, or high
productivity (“leading researchers”), j = H. These differences may re-
flect multiple factors: ability, teaching and administrative duties, re-
search budgets, spillover effects due to the presence of colleagues who
are specialized in the field, or family life. The distribution of j is char-
acterized by:
p= (j = L ) (0, 1) and 1 p= (j = H ). (1)
Researchers can honestly or dishonestly produce output. Effort is
measured in effort units, e, and depends on the chosen action, a. Re-
searchers’ choice set depends on their type. The high-type researchers
B. Le Maux, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

can choose between cheating, honestly producing low-quality research, types j in the past period t j 1 into conditional moral costs v ( t j 1) . We
and honestly producing high-quality research, aH ∈ AH = {Fraud, Low assume v > 0 and v < 0 which implies that the moral costs of cheating
effort, High effort}, with the corresponding effort levels, e ∈ {eF, eL, eH}, decrease with past cheating t j 1.
where eF = 0 and eL < eH. The actions the low-type researchers can Given our assumptions we are now able to describe the decisions of
choose belong to AL = {Fraud, Low effort} with e ∈ {eF, eL}. In other the researchers. First, an agent of type j = H will favor aH = `High ef-
words, both types of researchers can cheat or produce low-quality re- fort' over aL = `Low effort' if and only if the surplus of high effort is
search with the same effort levels, eF or eL. High-type researchers can higher than the surplus of low effort:
also produce high-quality research with effort eH. The surplus of re- u (y H ) eH u (y L ) eL .
searchers is computed as s = u(y) − e where u denotes a concave utility
High effort surplus Low effort surplus (2)
function that positively depends on lifetime income y, with u(0) = 0.
The agents are hired by a single research institution (principal) that In the principal–agent literature, this inequality is referred to as the
aims to pay for performance. While we prefer to interpret the principal ‘effort incentive compatibility constraint’. A rise in the high-effort in-
as a government, he/she may also be a university or a research institute. come yH or a decrease in the low-effort income yL increase high types’
The principal cannot directly observe agents’ effort level. Due to the incentives to produce high-quality research.
difficulty of assessing the value of scientific output, the number of Second, agent i of type j = L or H will not cheat if the surplus from
publications or related metrics are the main measures of comparisons, choosing aL or aH is larger than the expected surplus from choosing
as is the case in most academic incentive schemes. If agents choose a aF = ‘Fraud’ weighted by the moral costs:
low effort level, they have a low publication record and the principal j
offers yL. If high-type agents choose a high effort level, the publication (1 i )
u (y j ) ej j
× (1 ) u (y H ) , j = L, H .
record improves and they obtain high income yH ≥ yL. The publication Surplus from honesty
v( t 1) Surplus from cheating
record also improves when agents cheat. Due to information asymme- Moral costs (3)
tries, cheaters also obtain yH. Fraudulent research by low or high-types
We term this inequality the ‘no-fraud incentive-compatibility con-
will always appear as high-quality research.
straint’ of type j. While low-type researchers may cheat to obtain high
All researchers are subject to an exogenous peer review process.
instead of low income, high-type researchers may misbehave to cir-
Their work is audited with certainty but this auditing process is im-
cumvent effort required to honestly obtain the high income.
perfect, with a probability π of being detected when cheating. If an
To sum up, in our theory, three types of motivation (extrinsic in-
agent does not cheat or is not detected when cheating, he/she receives
centives, unconditional and conditional commitment to honesty) in-
his/her lifetime income. If an agent cheats and gets caught, he/she is
teract with each other and play a role in the decision to cheat. If some
punished by a sanction f, which reduces his/her lifetime income.
researchers with low integrity are attracted by the pecuniary gain from
Following the principal–agent literature, this sanction is set at its
breaking the code of good conduct, this can affect the perception of
maximum value, i.e., f = yH, which is the well-known penalty “à la
what is good behavior in the future and in turn generate more dis-
Becker”.
obedience, as discussed in detail in the next section.
We assume that there is a code of good conduct in the scientific
community. An agent will derive moral costs if he/she cheats. First,
moral costs increase with the individual's unconditional commitment to 2.3. The dynamics of scientific misconduct
honesty, i.e., independent of others’ behavior. This is measured by the
integrity parameter αi which is private information. For each type of Since the agents vary with respect to the integrity parameter, α will
researchers, j = L or H, α has a continuous uniform distribution on the separate those who misbehave from those who do not. The researchers
unit interval I, i.e. F(α) = α. who refrain from cheating are those with a higher value of the integrity
Second, moral costs vary with others’ behavior in the past (condi- coefficient, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a). As researchers are distributed on
tional commitment to honesty). We assume that the true fraction the unit interval, the share of dishonest scientists among types j in the
translates into the perception of what most people do. Cialdini et al. short-run, t j , is directly given by Eq. (3). Solving the equation for t j we
(1990) define social norms that characterize the perception of what have:
most people do as descriptive norms. Past misbehaviors, whether they u (y j ) e j
j j
are detected or not, create an atmosphere in which agents form certain =1 v( t 1) , j = L, H
t
(1 ) u (y H ) (4)
attitudes of approval or disapproval, affecting the disutility of cheating
j
agents. People learn about others’ conduct, e.g., from observing others The fraction of cheaters falls with π but rises with the effort e necessary
behavior (i.e., detected cases) and by direct and indirect communica- to honestly produce output aj (e.g., competition may force agents to
tion (i.e., undetected cases). The fraction of researchers who cheated in provide more publications for each level of income, as shown, e.g., by
the past period is denoted by βt−1.3 Graber et al., 2008). An important determinant of β is researchers’
Social identity theory stresses that others’ behavior has a larger salary. Increasing yH leads to a decrease in βH: ∂βH/∂yH < 0. Similarly,
effect on the observer's social norms when the individual identifies with an increase in yL leads to a decrease in βL. The reason is that raising yJ
those others. It has been shown that individuals are more likely to ex- leads to an increase in the opportunity cost of cheating. However, the
tend their dishonest behavior when others belonging to their group are salary offered to the honest high-type researchers yH represents the
dishonest (Gino et al., 2009; Dimant, 2018). Hence, the relevant share benefit of cheating for low types. Hence, βL increases when yH increases:
of “cheaters” are same-type co-workers, members of the same dis- ∂βL/∂yH > 0.
ciplinary field, or of the broader scientific community. The peer-pres- Eq. (4) shows that the fraction of cheaters is endogenous: t j will rise
sure function v translates the fraction of cheaters among each of the two with past cheating t j 1. This relationship is central in our theory. It
determines the extent to which the generation in t − 1 affects the
generation in t. Because of this relationship, a change in any of the
3
variables yL, yH, π, or ej affects not only t j but also t +j 1, i.e., the level of
The assumption that the fraction obeying the social custom is public in-
future fraud:
formation is common in theories of social customs (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens,
1982; Corneo, 1995). Similarly, in the large bulk of experimental studies of the j j j
t+1 t t+1
effect of social norms on behavior, descriptive norms are generated by giving = × j
.
(·) (·)
people information on people's actual behavior in previous sessions (e.g. t

Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Diekmann et al., 2015).

initial contagion (5)

3
B. Le Maux, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

3. Modeling the behavior of the research institution (principal)

3.1. Contractual setting and the research institution's goals

This section deals with a situation in which one research institution

Fig. 1. The link between the contract, integrity and the social norm.
Eq. (5) shows that the derivative consists of an initial and a contagion
effect, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b) and (c). An exogenous shock that en-
courages fraud at t also reduces the conditional commitment to honesty
at t + 1 which will make cheating even more attractive in t + 2 (and so
on in t+ 3, t + 4, …). Thus, the level of fraud will not only vary with
external factors but will further move due to changes in the social norm.
External factors have multiplier effects. For instance, when j = L, a
slight increase in the low-effort income yL not only reduces the mone-
tary incentives to cheat but can also restore the moral incentives for
researchers to comply with the code of good conduct. Conversely, for
low-type researchers, an increase in the high-effort income yH could
potentially drive the social norm βL to a long-run equilibrium in which
cheating is highly attractive. An important question is which fraud
equilibrium will prevail in the long run ceteris paribus?
We analyze the long-run equilibrium by using the concept of “sta-
(principal) contracts with the researchers (the agents) who, as discussed
previously, possess private information on their type. The principal
faces a trade-off. On the one hand, an increase in yH can induce higher
effort levels and less fraud from high-type researchers but will cause
low-type researchers to extend their cheating. On the other hand, in-
creasing yL can reduce scientific misconduct but, at the same time, will
depress high-type agents’ incentives to exert higher effort.
We describe the contractual setting by adopting the following time
line within each period t: (1) past behaviors t j 1, j = L, H, translate into
perceptions of what most researchers do, affecting the disutility v ( t j 1)
of cheating agents; (2) researchers learn their type j and integrity
parameter i j ; (3) the research institution (principal) designs the con-
tracts {yL, yH}; (4) each researcher accepts or rejects a contract; (5) the
audit is carried out. We assume that in each period the principal cannot
withdraw the offer once it is accepted. Any withdrawal would destroy
the reputation for honoring agreements. An important feature of the
academic setting is that the audit is conducted by an external body
(e.g., reviewers and editors of scientific journals), hence π is considered
exogenous in our theoretical framework.
For each type j of researchers, the principal has to define the optimal
salary, yj, that maximizes the expected surplus from scientific research,
est = ebt − ect, defined as the difference between the social benefits of
scientific research ebt (advancement or misleading of knowledge) and
the financial costs ect (remuneration of researchers). By construction,
due to the infinite number of agents, these items are expressed in per
capita terms:
ebtj = (1 j
)b j j F
b , j = L, H , (9)
t t

tionary points” that we define as an equilibrium which continues to

hold in each period (e.g., Corneo, 1995). Assuming that ectj = (1 t
j
)y j + t
j
(1 )yH , j = L, H . (10)
v ( t j 1) = k µ t j 1, i.e., constant marginal peer pressure, Eq. (4) can be
rewritten as: Table 1 describes the components of Eqs. (9) and (10). When a re-
searcher cheats, the principal suffers a loss equal to bF, which is in-
j j u (y j ) e j dependent of the detection of the fraud and accounts for the possible
=1 [k µ t 1] × , j = L, H ,
t
(1 ) u (y H ) (6) adverse effects of scientific misconduct, in particular, the threats to
scientific progress and external effects on society as a whole.5 The fi-
which is the equation of a line with positive slope.
nancial cost vary with the detection of the misconduct. If undetected,
The interior stationary value of βj is attained when j
= j
= j,
t t 1 the cost amounts to yH, with a probability of t j (1 ) . When being
i.e., for:
honest, the financial costs and the social benefits depend on whether
1
u (y j ) ej
k the contract is effort incentive compatible (inequality (2)). Each agent
) u (y H )
j =
(1
, j = L, H . receives yL or yH and brings a benefit bL or bH (bL < bH) depending on
u (y j ) ej
1
(1 ) u (y H )
µ (7) the chosen level of effort, low or high.
The principal pursues two goals to maximize the expected surplus:
j
By definition, an interior stationary point β is stable if the absolute to encourage high effort (effort incentive policy) and to deal with fraud
value of the derivative of t j with respect to t j 1 in Eq. (6) is strictly less (anti-fraud policy). By paying a higher salary for high quality research,
than 1, and unstable if it is strictly greater than 1. This derivative is the he/she aims to motivate high-type researchers to provide high rather
slope of the line. Hence, the equilibrium is stable if than low effort (inequality (2)). However, the effort incentive policy
(1 ) u (y H ) increases the benefit of scientific misconduct. While low-type re-
µ< , j = L, H . searchers may cheat to obtain yH instead of yL, high-type researchers
u (y ) e j
j
(8)
may misbehave to circumvent effort required to honestly obtain yH. The
Should this condition be fulfilled and if k > μ, we have an interior resulting change in the number of cheating researchers affects the
solution.4 principal's surplus. To prevent fraud, the research institution has to
If an interior stationary point exists, the effect of any external factor increase both types of salary such that cheating becomes relatively less
(yL, yH, π, etc.) on βj is larger as μ increases, i.e., as researchers care attractive (inequality (3)). In the following, we discuss the optimal
more about what others are doing. We have ∂2βj/(∂(·)∂μ) ≶ 0 if ∂βj/ salary levels resulting from the effort incentive policy and the anti-fraud
∂(·) ≶0. This is an important insight of our theory.
5
Having in mind that the most severe cost of scientific misconduct are the
4
Note that if the slope condition is not fulfilled (slope larger than one in Eq. indirect costs to society, e.g., due to misinformation, we assume that bF is in-
(6)), two corner equilibria coexist. This situation is described by Akerlof (1980): dependent of the detection of the fraud. However, one could also argue that
“in one of these equilibria the custom is obeyed; in the other equilibrium the institutions pay penalties for researchers’ detected cheating. We assume that a
custom has disappeared, and no one believes in the values underlying it.” similar result would occur if bF would vary with the detection of fraud.

4
B. Le Maux, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 1 expected benefit and the marginal expected cost of increasing the re-
Components of the principal's expected surplus. searchers salaries, yL and yH. This change depends on the researcher
Percentage of honest type. For low-type researchers L, the change can be expressed as:
Percentage of dishonest researchers: t
j

researchers: (1 j
) L L
t estL t t L
= (b L + b F + (1 )yH ) + yL (1 t ),
Probability of Probability of not Low level High level yL yL yL
being being discovered: of effort: of effort: Marginal social benefit Marginal social cost (15)
discovered: π (1 − π) eL eH
and for the high-type researchers H it is expressed as:
Financial costs yH − f = 0 yH yL yH
H
Social benefits −bF −bF bL bH estH t
= (b H + b F + (1 )yH )
yH yH
Marginal social benefit
policy. H
t H H
+ yH (1 t ) t (1 ).
3.2. The anti-fraud policy yH
Marginal social cost (16)
We go beyond a steady-state analysis and examine a T-period setting The gain of implementing an anti-fraud policy (increasing y ) comes j
where adjustment paths are accounted for. The research institution from reducing the percentage of cheaters ( t j / y j < 0 ), see Eqs. (15)
maximizes the present value of the expected surpluses for type j, j = L, and (16). It implies a higher benefit from sincere scientific research, bj,
H, denoted PESj, and written as a function of yj and t j 1: less damage from fraudulent research, bF, and a lower cheating re-
T
estj (y j , j
(y j , j searchers’ payroll, (1 − π)yH. However, the anti-fraud policy also im-
t t 1 ))
max PES j = t 1 plies higher costs since the research institution has to grant a higher
yj t=1 j
salary to more honest researchers, t
yj (1 j
) . There is an addi-
j j j u (y j ) e j yj t
where t (y j , t 1) =1 v( t 1) , t = 1…T , tional cost regarding the high-type anti-fraud policy since the principal,
(1 ) u (y H ) (11)
by increasing yH, has to pay more for honest high-type researchers,
and δ ≥ 1 is the discount factor. H
t (1 ).
The principal chooses at t = 1 the contract salary for all periods, i.e., For each type of researchers, there is an inverted-U relationship
the income does not change over time.6 The optimal level of yj is given between expected surplus PESj and income yj. Hence, there exists an
by the following first-order condition: optimal anti-fraud salary, denoted yAF j
, that maximizes the present
T j T j
value of the expected surpluses and results from a trade-off between the
PES j 1 estj estj t 1 estj t expected benefits and the expected costs of increasing salaries. The
= + j
+ j
= 0.
yj t=1
t 1 y j
t
yj t=2
t 1
t
yj (12) optimal anti-fraud salary can be written as a function of the model
j parameters. The optimal salary for the low-type researchers is (see Eq.
Eq. (12) shows that y has two effects. Similar to Eq. (5), the first term
(15)):
represents the initial effect of yj on the contemporaneous expected
surpluses (direct change in the expected surplus and indirect effect via L
yAF = y L (y H , b L , e L, b F , ). (17)
the contemporaneous level of cheaters). The second term corresponds
to the impact of yj on the expected surpluses in future periods through Similarly for the high-type researchers (see Eq. (16)):
the change in social norms (contagion effects). The effect of yj on t j in H
yAF = y H (b H , e H , b F , ). (18)
Eq. (12) can be expressed as:
j t 1 j t 1 j As already mentioned, for two reasons the two contracts are linked.
t
= k m+1
, First, a change in an exogenous parameter of the model, for example in
j
yj k=1
j
y m =k m (13) the social benefit of high-quality research, bH, or in the effort level, eH,
j will affect yAF
H
and thus will have an impact on the low-type salary, yAF L
.
i.e., the principal has to consider that income y will affect t , which in j
Second, an endogenous increase in yH in order to induce high-type re-
turn will affect the level of fraud in t + 1 and so on. The term
t 1
j searchers to produce high-quality research, i.e., to make the high-type
m=k
m+1
j in Eq. (13) is a multiplier: contract effort incentive compatible, will also affect yAF L
. We address
m
t 1 j t 1 that latter issue in the next subsection.
m+1 u (y j ) e j
j
= µ .
(1 ) u (y H ) (14)
m=k m m=k
3.3. The effort incentive policy
The multiplier represents the extent to which past generations influence
future generations (see Eq. (5)). It rises with marginal peer pressure μ, If the effort incentive compatibility constraint (2) is met, the frac-
income yj, and the probability of detection π. While the principal takes μ tion (1 − p) of high-type researchers chooses to provide high effort.
and π as exogenous, contagion is influenced by the choice of yj. Hence, Using that constraint with Eq. (17) gives:
the principal can lower contagion by setting yj at a higher level. L
For each period, the change in the marginal expected surplus of the
u (y H ) eH u (yAF (y H , .)) e L. (19)
research institution results from the difference between the marginal Inequality (19) states that for the effort incentive policy to be effective
for the high types, the private surplus from exerting high effort must be
6 at least equal to the surplus from exerting low effort given that the
In the first best solution to the problem the principal is able to set a different
contract is anti-fraud compatible for the low types, i.e., for yAF
L
.
salary in each period. However, this could imply that income falls over time
(because of a last period effect) which may not be socially acceptable. The If the high-type income yH is low, the surplus of honest high-type
downward rigidity of nominal wages has been abundantly documented. researchers is higher when they only exert low effort and are paid yAF L
.
Nominal wage cuts are rare relative to the number of nominal wage increases Conversely, when yH is high, the honest high-types choose to provide
(e.g., Dickens et al., 2007). Cutting wages is considered unfair and has been high effort to get paid yH. In Fig. 2, we plot the surplus of honest high-
found to decrease work morale (e.g., Kube et al., 2013). Therefore, we focus on types from the two incomes against yH. It shows a crossing point be-
the case in which the salary is constant over time. tween the graphs of functions u(yH) − eH and u (yAF L
(y H , .)) e L . Above

5
B. Le Maux, et al.
Fig. 2. Effort incentive compatibility.
the salary threshold ȳ H , the surplus of the high-type researchers is
greater when they provide high rather than low effort. In that case, the
choice set of high-type researchers is reduced to AH = {Fraud, High
effort}.
3.4. The optimal contract
By conducting simultaneously the effort incentive policy and the
anti-fraud policy, the research institution has to find the high-type and
low-type incomes such that the present value of the surpluses from
scientific research is maximized. Formally, the choice of yH and yL re-
sults from maximizing the combination of the present value of the ex-
pected surpluses, given the proportions p and 1 − p of low- and high-
type researchers in the economy:
max PES = p × PESL (y L , y H ) + (1 p) × PESH (y H ).
H L
y ,y
Let yH* denote the solution to the optimization problem. It depends on
the optimal anti-fraud high-type salary yAF H
, resulting from the optimi-
zation problem (11), and on the high-type salary threshold of the effort
incentive compatibility constraint, ȳ H (inequality (19)). Fig. 3 shows
the problem graphically. The curves PES1H and PES2H depict the present
value of the expected surpluses of the high-type anti-fraud policy for
two values of bH. They reach a maximum at y H = yAF H
and y H = yAF
1
The curve PESL* displays the optimal present value of the expected
surpluses of the low-type anti-fraud policy when yH changes,
PESL * = PESL (yAFL
(y H )) . That curve is decreasing due to the increase in
the cost of the anti-fraud policy for the low-types when yH rises, thus
reducing the optimal surplus of the principal.
There are three scenarios regarding the high-type policy to be im-
plemented (yL directly resulting from the optimal low-type anti-fraud
policy). First, if the effort incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied
for the optimal high-type anti-fraud salary ( y¯ H < yAF H
), increasing yH
above ȳ may be optimal. It reduces high-type cheating, thereby raising
H accounting for the social benefits and costs of the remuneration policy.
the principal's surpluses from high-type research PES1H . However, it also
makes the optimal low-type anti-fraud policy more costly, thus redu-
cing the social surpluses from low-type research PESL*. The optimal yH
Fig. 3. The optimal contract.
Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
depends on the share of high-type researchers. The higher that share,
the further above ȳ H the optimal high-type salary. In Fig. 3, the optimal
salary lies between ȳ H and yAF1
H
, see curve PES1H . In that scenario, fraud
is the crucial element to be addressed.
Second, if the effort incentive compatibility constraint is not sa-
tisfied for the optimal high-type anti-fraud salary (for example for yAF2 H
in Fig. 3), the optimal high-type salary is equal to ȳ H . Raising yH above
ȳ H would result in lower social surpluses from both low-type and high-
type research. In this scenario, fraud is not such an important matter,
yet the principal has to pay a sufficiently high salary to high-types so
that they exert high effort.
The third scenario implies that the effort incentive policy does not
improve the principal's social surplus, i.e., it is not optimal to set yH
above ȳ H . This might be caused by several reasons, e.g., a low pro-
portion of high types p, bH low compared to bL, or a high eH. In that case,
all high-types provide low effort. All individuals get paid yL. The op-
timal salary is determined from the maximization of PESL only, when
setting yH = yL. Let us denote PESmin this optimal surplus. Then, sce-
narios 1 and 2 are preferred over 3 iff:
L
PES = p × PESL (yAF (y H *), y H *) + (1 p) × PESH (y H *) PESmin
(21)
In summary, a rise in both researcher types’ salary (anti-fraud
policy) induces both types to comply with the code of good conduct,
increasing the scientific benefits as well as the remuneration costs.
Since granting a higher salary to high-type researchers will induce the
low-types to cheat, the optimal income of low-type researchers is po-
sitively dependent on the high-type optimal salary. The high-effort in-
come also has to be increased to make sure that high-type researchers
provide high effort. There is a threshold ( ȳ H ) above which the high-type
(20) researchers will exert high effort. However, if it is too high, it induces
fraud among the low-types, which necessitates to increase the low-ef-
fort salary (anti-fraud policy).
4. Comparative statics
We present comparative statics to illustrate the effects of a change in
H
. the parameters of the model on the optimal contracts. To this end, we
2
investigate the impact of the change on both the anti-fraud policy
(optimization problem (11)) and the effort incentive policy (inequality
(19)). In other words, changing the parameters of the model may affect
j
yAF and ȳ H . Figs. 4–10 describe the decision to exert high effort for the
high-types (top panel) and the decision for the principal to increase the
high-type salary (bottom panel). More specifically, the top panel de-
scribes the private surplus of high-type researchers when they exert
either high or low effort. The bottom panel displays the expected sur-
plus of the principal for each type of researchers (PESH and PESL), thus
Fig. 4 shows the effect of an increase in the effort required to pro-
duce lower quality research from e0L to e1L on the optimal contracts. As
cheating consequentially becomes more attractive, yAF L
should be raised.
The principal faces higher costs from the low-type anti-fraud policy for
any yH. This induces a downward shift of the PESL* curve (dashed curve
in the bottom figure). Although yAF L
increases, the private surplus of
producing low-quality research decreases as the rise in the income is
more than offset by the increase in eL. There is a shift downward of the
L
u (yAF ) e L curve (dashed curve in the top figure) and consequently a
decrease in ȳ H , from ȳ0H to ȳ1H . Fig. 4 illustrates that situation for
H
yAF < ȳ1H . The impact of an increase in eL on the surplus
pPES* + (1 − p)PESH of the research institution is ambiguous. Since the
effort incentive policy is less costly ( ȳ H is lower), the change in eL may
increase the surplus of the research institution if, e.g., the percentage of
high-type researchers is high.
In Fig. 5, we show the effect of an increase in eH on the optimal
contract. For high-type researchers, this change increases the attrac-
tiveness of cheating for any yH, thereby raising the percentage of
6
B. Le Maux, et al.
Fig. 4. The effect of a change in eL on the optimal contract.
Fig. 5. The effect of a change in eH on the optimal contract.
dishonest high-types. This causes a shift downward of the PESH curve,
from PES0H to PES1H . At the same time, the increase in eH decreases the
private surplus of high-type researchers. To make the high-type con-
tract effort incentive compatible (top panel in Fig. 5), yH has to be
raised from ȳ0H to ȳ1H , which in turn will cause an increase in yAF
L
and
thus a rise in the cost of the low-type anti-fraud policy. Both present
values of the expected surpluses fall, thereby making the research in-
stitution worse off.
Fig. 6 depicts the impact of an increase in the social value of high-
7
Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
Fig. 6. The effect of a change in bH on the optimal contract.
Fig. 7. The effect of a change in bL on the optimal contract.
quality research, bH, on the optimal contract. In that case the marginal
benefit of reducing cheating rises, causing an upward shift of the PESH
curve. The optimal anti-fraud salary for high-types increases from yAF H
0
H
to yAF1 . The change in b will leave the effort incentive compatibility
H
constraint unaffected, i.e., the high-type salary threshold ȳ H will not
change (top panel of Fig. 6). If yAF
H
> ȳ H , like in the bottom panel of
H
1
Fig. 6, a rise in salary y may make the research institution better off,
e.g., if the percentage of high-type researchers is high. If that percen-
tage is low, the cost of preventing high-type and low-type researchers
B. Le Maux, et al.
Fig. 8. The effect of a change in μ on the optimal contract.
Fig. 9. The effect of a change in bF on the optimal contract.
from cheating may be too high compared with the benefit from more
high-quality research. If yAF
H
< ȳ H , the high-type salary is the same as
1 Theory suggests that the choice of a particular contract by the principal
before the increase in bH. The research institution is better off.
In Fig. 7, we consider the impact of an increase in the social value of
low-quality research, bL, on the optimal contract. Like in the previous
case, that change raises the marginal social benefit of low-quality re-
search and yAF L
has to be increased to lower the number of low-type
dishonest researchers. For any yH, the surplus of the low-type anti-fraud
policy is larger than before, thus shifting the PESL* curve upwards
8
Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
Fig. 10. The effect of a change in π on the optimal contract.
(bottom panel of Fig. 7). That increase in yAF L
makes the contract for
high-type researchers less attractive. The high-type salary threshold
shifts from ȳ0H to ȳ1H (top panel of Fig. 7). An increase in yH may make
the principal better off if the percentage of low-type researchers is high.
A change in the marginal peer pressure μ has the same qualitative
effect on the optimal contract as a change in bF, even if the forces at
stake are different (see Figs. 8 and 9). An increase in μ raises the mul-
tiplier effect of fraud and thus the percentage of future cheating re-
searchers; this makes the anti-fraud policies more costly for any yH. This
results in a downward shift of the PESj curves. Similarly, a rise in the
social damage due to fraudulent research bF negatively affects the social
surpluses from research for any yH, leading to a downward shift of the
PESj curves. In both cases (increase in μ or bF), the optimal low-type
anti-fraud salary has to be increased since the marginal benefit of
honest research is higher for any yH. This results in a shift upward of the
private surplus curve of honest low-types; the low-type contract be-
comes more attractive to honest high types and the high-type salary
threshold yH rises. An increase in μ or bF makes the research institution
worse off.7
Finally, the impact of a change in π on the optimal contract is the
symmetric of that of a change in μ or in bF (see Fig. 10). An increase in π
reduces the percentage of cheaters making the anti-fraud policies less
costly for any yH. The marginal benefit of conducting the anti-fraud
policies is lower, yL can be reduced. The low-type contract becomes less
attractive to high-type researchers and yH can be decreased. The re-
search institution is better off because the surpluses from both types of
researchers have increased.
7
could signal information about the social norm, i.e., about the actions of other
agents (see, e.g., Sliwka, 2007). In our model, this could be equivalent to an
increase in μ. When announcing an increase in the researchers’ salaries, the
research institution would convey information about the prevalent fraud in
academia, which could affect the perceptions about what is right. Contagion
effects would be higher, reducing the moral costs and thus the incentives to
provide honest research. Announcing a policy with the aim to reduce fraud
could thus yield lower benefits than expected.
B. Le Maux, et al.
5. Discussion
The main purpose of our theory is to show which contract a research
institution (principal) should offer to researchers (agents) knowing that
the remuneration scheme can affect not only effort but also the dy-
namics of cheating. By paying a higher salary for high quality research
(effort incentive policy), he/she aims to motivate leading researchers to
provide high rather than low effort. However, to prevent misconduct,
leading and normal researchers’ salary has to be increased such that
cheating becomes relatively less attractive (anti-fraud policy).
Our model shows that several factors determine the optimal mix of
the two policies: researchers’ cost of providing high or low effort, the
societal value of scientific knowledge and the societal costs of scientific
misbehavior, and the evolution of norms over time. The results indicate
that the optimal contract also depends on the proportion of low- and
high-type researchers. The higher the fraction of high types, the higher
the chance that the effort incentive policy is efficient. Conversely, at the
limit, if there are no high types, there is no way to conduct any effort
incentive policy. If the effort incentive policy is inefficient, the principal
has to focus on the anti-fraud policy and design it optimally for low-
effort researchers.
An important insight of our theory is that when research institutions
seek to encourage the production of high quality research, they should
also increase the salary for normal research to optimally deal with
misconduct. For instance, if performance is to be rewarded with cash
bonuses, it should be made sure that cash bonuses are not only paid for
publications in key journals such as Science and Nature (as in Korea)
but also for bottom-ranked journals (as in Turkey) (information on
policies taken from Franzoni et al., 2011). As Paula Stephan states
“When you get an enormous cash incentive for a very small subset of
journals, it's inefficient for the system” (quote taken from Abritis and
McCook, 2017).
The assumptions of our model present a simplification of several
features of the real world. To simplify our exposition, we consider a
single principal. Considering several principals is likely to imply that
the gap between the low and the high income is larger due to outside
offers that high types may receive. By offering a high income for high
quality research, a research institution may thus produce negative ex-
ternalities for other research institutions. This may result in two dif-
ferent scenarios. On the one hand, the potential mobility of researchers
may force the research institutions to interact strategically with each
other in implementing their respective policies. Strategic interactions
would lead them to care even more about their reputation, thus yielding
to more efficient decisions. On the other hand, the social norm could be
considered a common good, internationally constructed and common to
all researchers. This could create a tragedy of the commons: research
institutions may act independently according to their own self-interest
in order to win the publication race, eroding the social norm through
the sum of their actions. In that scenario, competition between in-
stitutions is likely to decrease social welfare.
One justification for the focus on one principal is that it reflects a
national government's policy to reward scientific performance. As de-
scribed in the introduction or in Franzoni et al. (2011), in several
countries publication incentives have been implemented at the national
level. However, the principal could also reflect a research institute or
university. These various actors are unlikely to be equivalent. In par-
ticular, they might differ in the importance assigned to the dynamics of
scientific misbehavior. While governments are likely to care about the
long-run effects on the whole community, individual organizations are
likely to ignore them. The choice of the optimal contract hence would
differ depending on the type of principal.8 The long run model and the
8
If the principal is myopic, he/she cares only about the effects of yj on the
surplus at t via the change in the remuneration costs and the contemporaneous
population of cheaters. He/she does not consider the impact of yj on the
9
Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx
short run model can be interpreted as two extremes. There could also be
intermediate cases in which the principal partly considers the dynamics
of misbehavior. The social welfare will increase with the importance
assigned to long-run effects.
In our model, we postulate that every researcher is hired and salary
varies with productivity. As outlined in section 1, performance related
pay or bonuses for publications have been introduced in many coun-
tries. We disregard that scientists might cheat to receive tenure. The
model could be extended to consider academic tenure by providing
income only to a fraction of researchers. The result depends on the
outside offers of researchers. If researchers suffer low material and
psychological costs of dropping out, the results should be unchanged. If
researchers assign a high value to working in academia, the higher
competition induced by the scarcity of tenure positions should amplify
fraud (see, e.g., Gilpatric, 2011).
In academia, the value of a scientist is determined mostly through
peers. In our model, this is considered by an exogenous peer review
process which determines the number of publications a researcher is
able to get and the likelihood of detecting fraudulent work. The model
could be generalized to an endogenous probability of detection which is
dependent on the fraction of cheaters β. However, the fraction of
cheaters can influence the probability of detection in several ways. On
the one hand, if cheating is more widespread the saliency of the pro-
blem increases. This may cause referees to pay higher attention to
standards of honesty and possibly increase the carefulness with which
audits are conducted (Gino et al., 2009). The probability of detection
would also increase if the higher propensity of cheating makes scrutiny
activities from the community more rewarding (Lacetera and Zirulia,
2009). On the other hand, when many researchers violate the code of
conduct and only those who obey the code have an incentive to report
misconduct, the probability of detection decreases (Acemoglu and
Jackson, 2017). To elaborate on the possible effects of making the
probability of detection π endogenous, we do not only need to know the
sign of that relation (positive or negative), but also the marginal effect
of the fraction of cheaters β on the likelihood of detection π.
6. Conclusion
In our principal–agent theory, the research institution aims to
maximize expected surplus, defined as the difference between the social
benefits of academic research and the remuneration costs. Since the
probability of detecting misconduct cannot be controlled by the re-
search institution, choosing the right remuneration scheme of re-
searchers is essential.
We show that even without performance-related pay, researchers
with low integrity may cheat if producing fraudulent research requires
less effort than producing honest research. Introducing performance-
related pay increases the benefit from cheating for high-type
(“leading”) and, in particular, for low-type (“normal”) researchers.
Importantly, since researchers consider the actions of others in their
decision, performance-related pay has multiplier effects. This increases
fraud not only in the short but also in the long run.
The research institute has to consider these dynamics in im-
plementing the salary policy for researchers. The principal knows that
(footnote continued)
expected surpluses in future periods through the change in the fraction of
cheaters (multiplier effects). The incentives to reduce fraud are lower, which
will result in a lower welfare in the long-run. To illustrate, consider again Eq.
(12). If the principal cares only about short-run effects at t, the first-order
condition becomes:
j
estj estj estj t
j
= j
+ j
= 0.
y y yj (22)
t
B. Le Maux, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

some researchers are more productive than others and that all re-
searchers may cheat. Introducing performance-related pay thus implies
a trade-off. It can imply higher social benefits due to an increase in
honest high-quality research as well as higher social losses due to dis-
honest research. Thus, the principal pursues two goals. By paying a
higher salary for high quality research (effort incentive policy), he/she
aims to motivate leading researchers to provide high rather than low
effort. However, to prevent misconduct, both, leading and normal re-
searchers’, salaries have to be increased such that cheating becomes
relatively less attractive (anti-fraud policy). Our results suggest that the
effort incentive policy lowers social welfare. However, if the principal
complements it with an increase in each researchers’ salary (anti-fraud
policy), social welfare can be increased.
Author contributions
Benoît Le Maux: theory and preparation of text; Sarah Necker:
empirical analysis, literature review, and preparation of text; Yvon
Rocaboy: theory and preparation of text. All authors have approved the
final article.
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Acknowledgements
We thank the editor and three anonymous referees, Andrew Clark,
Roland B\'enabou, Roland Kirstein, David Masclet, and Fabien Moizeau
for excellent comments. Participants of the following seminars and
meetings also provided useful suggestions: University of Magdeburg,
2014; the European Public Choice Society Meeting, Groningen, 2015;
the Max Planck Institute Bonn, 2015; the Spring Meeting of Young
Economists, Ghent, 2015; the Beyond Basic Questions Workshop,
Hannover, 2015, the University of Lisboa, 2015; the University of
Minho, 2015; the University of Hamburg, 2016; the Congress of the
European Economic Association, Lisboa, 2017.

Appendix A. Evidence on researchers’ moral costs

The above literature review suggests that individuals experience moral costs from cheating that vary with the belief about or observation of what
others are doing. We investigate whether this also applies to researchers by using a unique survey of economists. In 2010 and 2011, an anonymous
online survey was conducted among the members of the European Economic Association (EEA), the German Economic Association, and the mailing
lists from the French Economic Association and the Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée. The survey requested information on economists’ norms,
(mis-)behavior, professional situation, and life satisfaction. A summary of the responses can be found in Necker (2014). Feld et al. (2015) use the
survey to show that the professional situation helps determine economists’ satisfaction. The responses to the survey allow us to examine whether
reported misbehavior and satisfaction are related, and whether the link depends on beliefs on peer behavior.
One concern regarding self-reports is that they underestimate the true frequency of misbehavior. However, John et al. (2012) find that the bias
seems to be smaller with regard to questionable research practices. The survey focuses on these kinds of practices. We include all respondents for
whom the complete information is available (n = 934). An investigation suggests that the sample is representative of the population.9 To account for
item-non response, missing values were replaced via multiple imputation (see Necker, 2014).
The survey asked economists to assess the justifiability of 18 research practices on a 6-point Likert scale, and to report their own engagement in
these practices. We create a misbehavior index Mi based on the answers. We first calculate the average justifiability of each practice. Second, for each
respondent, we sum the average justifiability of the practices that he or she admits to having employed and divide this by the total number of
practices.10 A higher index value indicates that the respondent admits to having employed a greater number of practices or of less well-accepted
practices.
Economists’ beliefs regarding others’ behavior are captured by responses to the question on what fraction of research in the top journals the
respondent believes to be affected by four categories of misbehavior (e.g., “incorrect application of empirical methods”). Respondents answered on a
10-point scale from “up to 10%” to “up to 100%.” We calculate a variable Bi as the sum of these four responses (which we treat as continuous): a
higher value of Bi implies a greater perceived prevalence of misbehavior. The satisfaction question is “Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with
the life you lead?” Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale (“highly dissatisfied” to “highly satisfied”). In line with the literature, reported
satisfaction is employed as a measure of utility Ui (e.g., Layard et al., 2008).
To study whether researchers’ utility Ui is affected by misbehavior Mi, and whether this link depends on the fraction of researchers who are
believed to cheat Bi, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) equation. Much of the happiness literature treats the dependent variable
as cardinal and uses OLS (Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).11
Ui = 0 + 1 Mi + 2 Bi + 3 Mi × Bi + x i 4 + i. (23)
The interaction Mi × Bi captures whether the effect of misbehavior on satisfaction is lower when others are believed to misbehave more. We include
gender, year of birth, citizenship, academic position, and whether the respondent has tenure or not in the controls, xi. We estimate the model with
and without the interaction Mi × Bi and with and without the controls.
Table 2 shows the regression results. Own misbehavior Mi is negatively correlated with satisfaction. A one standard-deviation (SD) rise in this
index reduces satisfaction by 1/10 of a SD (column (1)). This effect is largely unchanged when control variables are included (column (3)). Although
these results cannot prove causality, they are consistent with the idea that individuals face moral costs of cheating. While the relationship seems
small in size, it has to be kept in mind that participants report their overall satisfaction with life. The belief that misbehavior is widespread is also
negatively related to satisfaction. A rise in this belief by one SD implies a decrease in satisfaction of 1/7 of a SD.

9
The response rate was 17% in the first wave (EEA) and 11% in the second (German) and third (French) waves. Survey participants are representative of members
of the association in terms of gender and location of workplace. The comparison of responses from early and late respondents, and from participants who continued
until the last page and those that dropped out, do not indicate unit-non response bias. A detailed description of the methodology, the representativeness analysis, and
the multiple imputation can be found in Necker (2014).
10
The summary statistics of the variables used appear in Necker (2014).
11
The result is the same if we use Ordered Probit regression. Since interpreting the results, in particular, the interaction terms, is much less straightforward in
discrete choice models we prefer to report OLS estimates.

10
B. Le Maux, et al. Research Policy xxx (xxxx) xxxx

Table 2
Misbehavior, beliefs and satisfaction.
(1) (2) (3) (4)

Own misbehavior Mi −0.296 −0.448 −0.264 −0.445

(0.106) (0.235) (0.108) (0.239)
Belief Bi −0.029 −0.037 −0.027 −0.037
(0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016)
Mi * Bi 0.013 0.015
(0.020) (0.020)
Other controls No No Yes Yes
F 13.7 9.5 3.2 3.2
R2 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12
N 934 934 934 934

Notes: Reported are OLS coefficients. Standard errors in brackets. All five imputations are used, the results are combined using Rubin's rule. Hypothesis tests
are based on robust standard errors. The measures of fit are the lowest statistic among results from the five imputations.

Ui
Fig. 11. Marginal effects of misbehavior at different beliefs. Note: Average marginal effects calculated from the regression shown in column (4), Mi
= 1 + 3 Bi , with
95%-confidence intervals at different values of Bi.

The second and fourth columns present the estimates including the interaction term Mi × Bi. The coefficient on this interaction is insignificant.
However, Brambor et al. (2006) stress that the standard error of interest is not the standard error of γ3 but that on the value of Mi = 1 + 3 Bi . We
U
i
calculate the derivative and its standard error at different levels of Bi: the results are shown in Fig. 11. They indicate that, e.g., respondents who
believe that on average up to 10% of the research in journals is subject to misbehavior (Bi = 4) experience a utility loss of 0.4. In contrast, those who
believe that on average up to 30% of the research in journals is subject to misbehavior (Bi = 12) experience a utility loss of 0.3. The effect of Mi on Ui
is insignificant, i.e., no significant utility loss, for economists who believe that there is a high prevalence of misbehavior (Bi ≥ 15). The results are
consistent with the notion that researchers’ moral costs of cheating vary with their beliefs about what their peers do.

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