Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?

Author(s): WINSTON NESBITT

Source: Journal of Applied Philosophy , 1995, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1995), pp. 101-106
Published by: Wiley

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24354043

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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol.12, No. 1, 1995

DISCUSSION ARTICLE

Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?

WINSTON NESBITT

abstract Those who wish to refute the view that it is worse to kill than to let
produce examples of cases in which an agent lets someone die but would be generall
less reprehensible than if he had killed. It is argued that the examples produced ty
feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modifie
feature, they provide support for the view which they were designed to undermine

I want in this paper to consider a kind of argument sometimes produced ag

that it is worse to kill someone (that is, to deliberately take action that res
death) than merely to allow someone to die (that is, deliberately to fail to t
were available and which would have saved another's life). Let us, for brevity's
this as the 'difference thesis', since it implies that there is a moral difference
and letting die.
One approach commonly taken by opponents of the difference thesis i
examples of cases in which an agent does not kill, but merely lets someone die
be generally agreed to be just as morally reprehensible as if he had killed. Thi
to common intuitions might seem an unsatisfactory way of approaching t
been argued [ 1 ] that what stance one takes concerning the difference thesis
the ethical theory one holds, so that we cannot decide what stance is correc
of deciding what is the correct moral theory. I do not, however, wish to
approach in question on these grounds. It may be true that different moral
different stances concerning the different thesis, so that a theoretically satis
or refutation of the thesis requires a satisfactory defence of a theory w
soundness or unsoundness. However, the issue of its soundness or otherwise
the attempt to decide some pressing moral questions [2], and we can
demonstration of the correct moral theory before taking up any kind of posit
to it. Moreover, decisions on moral questions directly affecting practice ar
from ethical first principles, but are usually based at some level on common i
is arguable that at least where the question is one of public policy, this is as it

It might seem at first glance a simple matter to show at least that common m
favour the difference thesis. Compare, to take an example of John Ladd's

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102 W. Nesbitt

which I push someone who I know cannot swim into a river, thereby killing her
which I come across someone drowning and fail to rescue her, although I am
thereby letting her die. Wouldn't most of us agree that my behaviour is morally
first case?
However, it would be generally agreed by those involved in the debate tha
importance for our issue, not even concerning common opinion, can be learn
considering such an example. As Ladd points out, without being told any mo
cases mentioned, we are inclined to assume that there are other morally relevan
between them, because there usually would be. We assume, for example, so
motive in the case of killing, but perhaps only fear or indifference in the case
save. James Rachels and Michael Tooley, both of whom argue against the diff
make similar points [4], as does Raziel Abelson, in a paper defending the thes
for example, notes that as well as differences in motives, there are also certain
relevant differences between typical acts of killing and typical acts of failing t
may make us judge them differently. Typically, saving someone requires mor
refraining from killing someone. Again, an act of killing necessarily results
death, but an act of failing to save does not — someone else may come to the re
such as these, it is suggested, may account for our tendency to judge failu
(i.e., letting die) less harshly than killing. Tooley concludes that if one wish
intuitions here, 'one must be careful to confine one's attention to pairs of cas
differ in these, or other significant respects' [6].
Accordingly, efforts are made by opponents of the difference thesis to pr
cases which do not differ in morally significant respects (other than in one
killing while the other is a case of letting die or failing to save). In fact, at least
of the case mounted by Rachels and Tooley against the difference thesis c
production of such examples. It is suggested that when we compare a case of kil
which differs from it only in being a case of letting die, we will agree that eit
culpable as the other; and this is then taken to show that any inclination we ord
to think killing worse than letting die is attributable to our tending, illegitima
of typical cases of killing and of letting die, which differ in other morally relev
want now to examine the kind of example usually produced in these contexts

I will begin with the examples produced by James Rachels in the article men
which is fast becoming one of the most frequently reprinted articles in t
Although the article has been the subject of a good deal of discussion, as far
points which I will make concerning it have not been previously made. Rach
compare the following two cases. The first is that of Smith, who will gain a lar
should his six-year-old nephew die. With this in mind, Smith one evening s
bathroom where his nephew is taking a bath, and drowns him. The other case,
is identical, except that as Jones is about to drown his nephew, the child slips,
and falls, face down and unconscious, into the bath water. Jones, delighte
fortune, watches as his nephew drowns.
Rachels assumes that we will readily agree that Smith, who kills his nephew
morally speaking, than Jones, who merely lets his nephew die. Do we really w

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 Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die? 103

asks, that either behaves better from the moral point of view than the other? It would, he
suggests, be a 'grotesque perversion of moral reasoning' for Jones to argue, 'After all, I
didn't do anything except just stand and watch the child drown. I didn't kill him; I only let
him die'. [8] Yet, Rachels says, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing, this defence
would carry some weight.
There is little doubt that Rachels is correct in taking it that we will agree that Smith
behaves no worse in his examples than does Jones. Before we are persuaded by this that
killing someone is in itself morally no worse than letting someone die, though, we need to
consider the examples more closely. We concede that Jones, who merely let his nephew die,
is just as reprehensible as Smith, who killed his nephew. Let us ask, however, just what is
the ground of our judgement of the agent in each case. In the case of Smith, this seems to be
adequately captured by saying that Smith drowned his nephew for motives of personal gain.
But can we say that the grounds on which we judge Jones to be reprehensible, and just as
reprehensible as Smith, are that he let his nephew drown for motives of personal gain? I
suggest not — for this neglects to mention a crucial fact about Jones, namely that he was
fully prepared to kill his nephew, and would have done so had it proved necessary. It would
be generally accepted, I think, quite independently of the present debate, that someone who
is fully prepared to perform a reprehensible action, in the expectation of certain
circumstances, but does not do so because the expected circumstances do not eventuate, is
just as reprehensible as someone who actually performs that action in those circumstances.
Now this alone is sufficient to account for our judging Jones as harshly as Smith. He was
fully prepared to do what Smith did, and would have done so if circumstances had not
turned out differently from those in Smith's case. Thus, though we may agree that he is just
as reprehensible as Smith, this cannot be taken as showing that his letting his nephew die is
as reprehensible as Smith's killing his nephew — for we would have judged him just as
harshly, given what he was prepared to do, even if he had not let his nephew die. To make
this clear, suppose that we modify Jones' story along the following lines — as before, he
sneaks into the bathroom while his nephew is bathing, with the intention of drowning the
child in his bath. This time, however, just before he can seize the child, he slips and hits his
head on the bath, knocking himself unconscious. By the time he regains consciousness, the
child, unaware of his intentions, has called his parents, and the opportunity is gone. Here,
Jones neither kills his nephew nor lets him die—yet I think it would be agreed that given his
preparedness to kill the child for personal gain, he is as reprehensible as Smith.
The examples produced by Michael Tooley, in the book referred to earlier, suffer the
same defect as those produced by Rachels. Tooley asks us to consider the following pair of
scenarios, as it happens also featuring Smith and Jones. In the first, Jones is about to shoot
Smith when he sees that Smith will be killed by a bomb unless Jones warns him, as he easily
can. Jones does not warn him, and he is killed by the bomb — i.e., Jones lets Smith die. In
the other, Jones wants Smith dead, and shoots him — i.e., he kills Smith.
Tooley elsewhere [9] produces this further example: two sons are looking forward to the
death of their wealthy father, and decide independently to poison him. One puts poison in
his father's whiskey, and is discovered doing so by the other, who was just about to do the
same. The latter then allows his father to drink the poisoned whiskey, and refrains from
giving him the antidote, which he happens to possess.
Tooley is confident that we will agree that in each pair of cases, the agent who kills is
morally no worse than the one who lets die. It will be clear, however, that his examples are
open to criticisms parallel to those just produced against Rachels. To take first the case

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104 W. Nesbitt

where Jones is saved the trouble of killing Smith by the fortunate circum
bomb's being about to explode near the latter: it is true that we judge Jones
reprehensible as if he had killed Smith, but since he was fully prepared to ki
not been saved the trouble by the bomb, we would make the same judgemen
had neither killed Smith nor let him die (even if, say, no bomb had been p
Smith suffered a massive and timely heart attack). As for the example of the
sons, here too the son who didn't kill was prepared to do so, and given this,
reprehensible as the other even if he had not let his father die (if, say, he did n
possess the antidote, and so was powerless to save him).
Let us try to spell out more clearly just where the examples produced by
Tooley fail. What both writers overlook is that what determines whether
reprehensible or not is not simply what he in fact does, but what he is pr
perhaps as revealed by what he in fact does. Thus, while Rachels is correct in
we will be inclined to judge Smith and Jones in his examples equally harshly
surprising, since both are judged reprehensible for precisely the same reason
they were fully prepared to kill for motives of personal gain. The same, of cour
Tooley's examples. In each example he gives of an agent who lets another die
fully prepared to kill (though in the event, he is spared the necessity). In the
ensure that the members of each pair of cases they produce do not differ in
relevant respect (except that one is a case of killing and the other of letting
and Tooley make them too similar — not only do Rachels' Smith and Jones,
have identical motives, but both are guilty of the same moral offence.

Given the foregoing account of the failings of the examples produced by

Tooley, what modifications do they require if they are to be legitimately use
attitudes towards killing and letting die, respectively? Let us again co
Rachels' examples. Clearly, if his argument is to avoid the defect pointed o
stipulate that though Jones was prepared to let his nephew die once he saw t
happen unless he intervened, he was not prepared to kill the child. The stor
something like this: Jones stands to gain considerably from his nephew's dea
but he is not prepared to kill him for this reason. However, he happens to
when his nephew slips, hits his head, and falls face down in the bath. Reme
he will profit from the child's death, he allows him to drown. We need, how
a further stipulation, regarding the explanation of Jones's not being prepar
nephew. It cannot be that he fears untoward consequences for himself, such
and punishment, or that he is too lazy to choose such an active course, or
simply had not occurred to him. I think it would be common ground in the
the only explanation of his not being prepared to kill his nephew was one of th
would be morally no better than Smith, who differed only in being more da
energetic, whether or not fate then happened to offer him the opportun
nephew die instead. In that case, we must suppose that the reason Jones is p
his nephew die, but not to kill him, is a moral one — not intervening to sav
holds, is one thing, but actually bringing about his death is another, and alto
the pale.

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 Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die? 105

I suggest, then, that the case with which we must compare that of Smith is this: Jones
happens to be on hand when his nephew slips, hits his head, and falls unconscious into his
bath water. It is clear to Jones that the child will drown if he does not intervene. He
remembers that the child's death would be greatly to his advantage, and does not intervene.
Though he is prepared to let the child die however, and in fact does so, he would not have
been prepared to kill him, because, as he might put it, wicked though he is, he draws the line
at killing for gain.
I am not entirely sure what the general opinion would be here as to the relative
reprehensibility of Smith and Jones. I can only report my own, which is that Smith's
behaviour is indeed morally worse than that of Jones. What I do want to insist on, however,
is that, for the reasons I have given, we cannot take our reactions to the examples provided
by Rachels and Tooley as an indication of our intuitions concerning the relative heinousness
of killing and of letting die.
So far, we have restricted ourselves to discussion of common intuitions on our question,
and made no attempt to argue for any particular answer. I will conclude by pointing out that,
given the fairly common view that the raison d'etre of morality is to make it possible for
people to live together in reasonable peace and security, it is not difficult to provide a
rationale for the intuition that in our modified version of Rachels' examples, Jones is less
reprehensible than Smith. For it is clearly preferable to have Jones-like persons around
rather than Smith-like ones. We are not threatened by the former — such a person will not
save me if my life should be in danger, but in this he is no more dangerous than an
incapacitated person, or for that matter, a rock or tree (in fact he may be better, for he might
save me as long as he doesn't think he will profit from my death). Smith-like persons,
however, are a threat — if such a person should come to believe that she will benefit
sufficiently from my death, then not only must I expect no help from her if my life happens
to be in danger, but I must fear positive attempts on my life. In that case, given the view
mentioned of the point of morality, people prepared to behave as Smith does are clearly of
greater concern from the moral point of view than those prepared only to behave as Jones
does; which is to say that killing is indeed morally worse than letting die.

Winston Nesbitt, Department of Humanities, University of Tasmania at Launceston, PO Box

1214, Launceston, Tasmania 7250, Australia.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, John Chandler (1990) Killing and letting die — putting the debate in context, Austr
Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 4,1990, pp. 420-431.
[2] It underlies, or is often claimed to underlie, for example, the Roman Catholic position on certain issues
abortion debate, and the view that while 'passive' euthanasia may sometimes be permissible, 'active' euth
never is. It also seems involved in the common view that even if it is wrong to fail to give aid to the starving o
world, thereby letting them die, it is not as wrong as dropping bombs on them, thereby killing them.
[3] John Ladd (1985) Positive and negative euthanasia in James E. White (ed.), Contemporary Moral Pro
(St Paul, West Publishing Co), pp. 58-68.
[4] James Rachels (1979) Active and passive euthanasia in James Rachels (ed.), Moral Problems (NY, Harper
Row), pp. 490-497; Michael Tooley (1983) Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp. 187-18
[5] Raziel Abelson (1982) There is a moral difference, in Raziel Abelson and Marie-Louise Friqueg
(eds.), Ethics for Modern Life (New York, St Martin's Press), pp. 73-83.
[6] Tooley, op. cit., p. 189.

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106 W. Nesbitt

[7] Apart from the anthology cited in footnote 4, it appears, for example, in James E. W
Contemporary Moral Problems (St Paul, West Publishing Co), pp. 103-107; Bonnie Steinb
Killing and Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, N], Prentice-Hall), pp. 63-68; Tom L. Beaucha
Walters (eds.) (1982) Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing C
Robert F. Weir (ed.) (1986) Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (NY, Columbia University Press)
Ronald Munson (ed.) (1992) Interventions and Reflections (Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing C
John Arras and Nancy Rhoden (eds.) (1989) Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Calif. Mayfiel
pp. 241-244; and in Thomas A. Mappes and JaneS. Zembaty (eds.) (1977) Social Ethics (NY,
pp. 62-66.
[8] Rachels, op. cit., p. 494.
[9] (1980) An irrelevant consideration: killing and letting die, in Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), Killing
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall), pp. 56-62.

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