Risk Analysis, Vol. 21, No.

6, 2001

Public Response to the Tokai Nuclear Accident

Tsunoda Katsuya1*

This article discusses the influence of the September 30, 1999 nuclear accident in Tokai vil-
lage (Japan) on the public’s attitudes toward nuclear power in Japan. The data used in this re-
port were taken from the results of two surveys conducted mainly to measure the attitudes of
the Japanese public with regard to the use of nuclear power in Japan. The first survey was
done before the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and also in Osaka and Nagoya. The second
survey, which took place after the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and in Osaka and Nagoya,
also included residents in a number of other cities of various sizes throughout Japan. The re-
sults of the two surveys showed that (1) acceptability of and trust in nuclear power operation
had decreased, (2) perceived accident likelihood and public interest had significantly in-
creased, and (3) there had been neither significant nor even a small change in the public’s
self-rated knowledge about nuclear power or their distrust of the government. The results
also showed that the ratio of nuclear power generation opponents to total respondents had
considerably increased (7% to 23%) whereas nuclear power generation supporters had mod-
erately decreased (1% to 12%).

KEY WORDS: Attitude; nuclear power; Tokai accident; Japan; covariance structure analysis

1. INTRODUCTION ation and radioactive substances that had been re-

On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident oc-
curred at a uranium processing plant operated by
JCO Co., Ltd. in Tokai village, Ibaraki Prefecture,
Japan. Gaseous substances (noble gas and iodine),
which were produced in the accident, were released
into the environment, and the radiation dose rate
(gamma radiation) rose at several monitoring sta-
tions in the area. Furthermore, decay products of
iodine and noble gas with short half-lives, as well as
activation products generated by neutron activation,
were detected in some environmental samples.(1) The
nuclear safety commission(1) concluded that the radi-
1
Institute of Social Research, Institute of Nuclear Safety System,
Inc., 64 Sata. Mihama-cho, Fukui 919-1205, Japan.
*Address correspondence to Tsunoda Katsuya, 11-1-704, Saginuma
1-chome, Miyamae-ku, Kanagawa, 216-0004 Japan; PXN13000@
nifty.ne.jp.
leased from the site did not have any significant im-
pact either on the health of local residents or on the
environment. In the JCO plant, however, three JCO
plant workers were exposed to high levels of radia-
tion in the accident, and one of them died in Decem-
ber of 1999 and another in April of 2000. This was the
first time that a fatal accident had occurred at a nu-
clear facility in Japan.
The main question of this study was “How did
the Tokai accident affect public attitudes toward nu-
clear power generation in Japan?” Various studies
have shown that the Chernobyl and Three-Mile acci-
dents influenced public attitudes in Europe and the
U.S.(2–6) Moreover, a historically notable disaster on
an industrial facility not only influences attitudes to-
ward the facility, but also other factors related to
these attitudes, such as perception of risk and so
forth. Hence, using the data of the two surveys before
and immediately after the accident, the effects of the

1039 0272-4332/01/1200-1039$16.00/1 © 2001 Society for Risk Analysis

1040 Tsunoda

Tokai accident on public attitudes or acceptability, as 2. Survey 2 (after the accident)

well as other factors regarding nuclear power gener-
ation were investigated. These other factors included
perception of risk and necessity of nuclear power,
trust in the government and electric power compa-
nies, and knowledge about and interest in the subject.
The hypothesis of this study was that the accident
affected not only attitudes, but also the other fac-
tors mentioned above. This hypothesis was derived
from past research(6–11) that showed that the above-
mentioned factors were related to attitudes toward
nuclear power. Sjöberg and Sjöberg,(6) Simooka,(7)
and Tsunoda(8) showed a strong correlation between
attitudes and perceived risk, and Flynn et al.,(9)
showed a strong correlation between trust in nuclear
power operation and acceptance of a radioactive
waste repository. Flynn et al.(9) and Tsunoda(10) both
showed a correlation between perceived risk and
trust, Peters et al.,(5) showed a relation between trust
in federal government and trust in the nuclear indus-
try in West Germany, and Kumagai(11) showed a cor-
relation between knowledge about nuclear power
and attitudes. In addition, it should be noted that the
number of opponents of nuclear power significantly
increased, whereas that of its supporters decreased.
Renn(3) showed that the number of opponents had
significantly increased immediately after the Cherno-
byl accident in Europe.
Survey population: Adults aged over 20 who
lived in Japan.
Sampling method: Stratified two-stage ran-
dom sampling.
Survey term: October 7 to October 17, 1999.
Sampling number: 4,000 participants.
Stratified method: Tokyo District 23 and 12
ordinance-designated cities as large cities
(over about 500,000 populations), mid-
dle cities (over 100,000 populations with-
out Tokyo District 23 and 12 ordinance-
designated cities), small cities (under
100,000 populations), towns and villages in
each of the 10 districts of Japan. The 12
ordinance-designated cities included Osaka
and Nagoya cities. The districts surveyed
were Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokuriku,
Tozan (consisting of Yamanashi, Nagano,
and Gifu prefectures), Tokai, Kinki, Chu-
goku, Shikoku, and Kyushu.
Table I. Demographic Data on the Respondents
in Survey 1 and Survey 2
Survey 1 Survey 2
Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2

Gender
2. METHOD Male 49.8 50.5 50.1 50.3
Female 50.2 49.5 49.9 49.7
Data for this study came from two surveys that Age
had been conducted mainly to analyze public atti- 18–19 1.1 1.5 — —
tudes toward nuclear power (March 1999(12) and Oc- 20–29 15.3 18.2 17.1 15.3
tober 1999(13)) in Japan. The questionnaires used in- 30–39 20.6 19.7 16.4 17.5
cluded the same 31 items to measure public attitudes 40–49 21.3 21.1 20.1 20.2
50–59 22.7 22.6 20.4 20.2
toward nuclear power, perception of risk and neces- 60–69 18.9 16.9 17.9 15.3
sity of nuclear power, trust in the government and 70–89 — — 8.1 11.5
electric power companies, and self-rated knowledge Educational attainment
about and interest in the subject. A 7-point scale (1 = Junior high 13.7 9.7 15.2 12.6
disagree, 7 = agree) was used. The details concerning High school 44.8 40.8 41.3 41.5
each survey were as follows: College 18.2 18.2 20.7 20.2
University or higher 22.3 30.3 22.3 25.1
1. Survey 1 (before the accident) Other 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.5
Survey population: Adults aged over 18 who Employment
Employee 13.1 11.9 14.5 16.9
lived in Tokyo District 23 and in Osaka city
Self-employed person 5.3 4.5 3.8 4.4
and Nagoya city. Family-operated
Sampling method: Two-stage random sam- employee 40.1 41.0 36.7 37.7
pling in each of the three areas. Housewife 28.9 29.1 29.0 25.1
Survey term: March 19 to March 28, 1999. Student 2.6 4.2 3.3 4.4
Unemployed 9.9 9.2 12.6 11.5
Sampling number: 560 participants in each of
the three areas. Note: All values are percentages.
Public Response to the Tokai Accident 1041

Table II. Comparisons of Before and After the Accident

Case 1: Large city Case 2: Tokyo

Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 1 Survey 2

(before (after (before (after
accident) accident) Differences accident) accident) Differences
N = 1,218 N = 627 between M N = 402 N = 183 between M

Itema M SD M SD t M SD M SD t
b
1 4.06 1.28 4.18 1.35 0.12 1.83 4.07 1.37 4.21 1.37 0.14 1.16
2 3.86 1.42 3.63 1.48 20.23 23.18** 3.86 1.45 3.67 1.45 20.19 21.48
3 4.20 1.27 4.64 1.38 0.44 6.68** 4.21 1.32 4.73 1.32 0.52 4.42**
4 3.75 1.40 3.32 1.42 20.43 26.17** 3.78 1.41 3.25 1.41 20.54 24.26**
5 4.36 1.36 4.60 1.51 0.24 3.35** 4.22 1.42 4.54 1.42 0.32 2.43*
6 4.51 1.17 4.63 1.34 0.11 1.76 4.48 1.16 4.70 1.16 0.22 1.92
7 4.30 1.15 4.41 1.30 0.11 1.86 4.32 1.20 4.54 1.20 0.23 1.94
8 4.37 1.15 4.43 1.23 0.07 1.13 4.33 1.17 4.52 1.17 0.20 1.87
9 4.80 1.21 5.07 1.26 0.27 4.50** 4.89 1.15 5.03 1.15 0.14 1.31
10 3.22 1.39 3.26 1.27 0.04 0.70 3.12 1.40 3.27 1.40 0.15 1.23
11 3.65 1.31 3.90 1.29 0.25 3.95** 3.57 1.33 3.87 1.33 0.30 2.51*
12 4.69 1.42 4.64 1.35 20.05 20.73 4.76 1.44 4.58 1.44 20.17 21.36
13 4.95 1.26 5.40 1.27 0.45 7.27** 5.10 1.20 5.44 1.20 0.34 3.04**
14 4.59 1.23 5.13 1.35 0.54 8.41** 4.65 1.26 5.04 1.26 0.40 3.24**
15 4.83 1.33 5.49 1.28 0.65 10.10** 5.00 1.29 5.41 1.29 0.40 3.45**
16 4.22 1.20 4.54 1.36 0.32 5.03** 4.29 1.21 4.50 1.21 0.21 1.80
17 4.32 1.31 4.63 1.32 0.31 4.82** 4.55 1.27 4.69 1.27 0.14 1.22
18 4.50 1.29 4.91 1.14 0.41 6.91** 4.68 1.28 4.94 1.28 0.26 2.54*
19 3.94 1.35 4.60 1.33 0.65 9.89** 4.05 1.33 4.68 1.33 0.63 5.31**
20 4.16 1.47 4.66 1.42 0.50 7.00** 4.35 1.40 4.74 1.40 0.39 3.09**
21 2.87 1.36 2.65 1.35 20.22 23.29** 2.95 1.35 2.70 1.35 20.25 22.05*
22 2.63 1.35 2.78 1.31 0.14 2.20* 2.73 1.36 2.98 1.36 0.25 2.05*
23 2.99 1.34 2.86 1.39 20.14 22.03* 3.00 1.36 2.98 1.36 20.02 20.20
24 4.73 1.37 4.61 1.40 20.12 21.81 4.64 1.38 4.46 1.38 20.18 21.44
25 5.11 1.23 5.42 1.24 0.31 5.06** 5.08 1.21 5.45 1.21 0.36 3.40**
26 5.10 1.29 5.12 1.17 0.01 0.23 5.14 1.29 5.17 1.29 0.03 0.29
27 5.40 1.21 5.34 1.21 20.06 21.01 5.45 1.16 5.42 1.16 20.03 20.28
28 3.41 1.22 2.91 1.33 20.51 27.95** 3.26 1.23 2.87 1.23 20.38 23.44**
29 3.35 1.22 2.89 1.34 20.45 27.07** 3.27 1.25 2.85 1.25 20.42 23.68**
30 3.20 1.23 2.81 1.29 20.39 26.33** 3.07 1.28 2.77 1.28 20.31 22.69**
31 3.21 1.15 2.98 1.30 20.22 23.63* 3.07 1.12 2.91 1.12 20.17 21.60
a
All items are listed in the Appendix.
b
1 = disagree, 7 = agree.
* p , 0.05; ** p , 0.01.

3. RESULT the data of Survey 1 were compared with the data

In Survey 1, 402 questionnaires were collected in
Tokyo (response rate: 71.8%), 406 (72.5%) in Osaka,
and 410 (73.2%) in Nagoya. In Survey 2, 2,985 ques-
tionnaires (response rate: 74.6%), including 183
(69.3%) in Tokyo, 60 (73.2%) in Osaka, and 53
(79.1%) in Nagoya, were collected. The number of re-
spondents in Tokyo District 23 and the 12 ordinance-
designated cities was 627 (71.7%) in Survey 2. Be-
cause the number of respondents in Osaka and
Nagoya in Survey 2 were too small to be analyzed,
of the respondents in Tokyo District 23 and the 12
ordinance-designated cities of Survey 2 as Case 1.
The data of the respondents in Tokyo for Survey 1
was also compared with the data of the respondents
in Tokyo for Survey 2 as Case 2. Demographic data in
all cases and surveys are shown in Table I. Items are
shown in the Appendix, and the means of responses
to them are shown in Table II.
Maximum-likelihood factor analysis of the data
of Survey 2 was used in Case 1 with oblique promax
rotation (Table III). Factor I was interpreted as ac-
1042 Tsunoda

Table III. Rotated Factor Patterns Table IV. Factor Correlations in Factor Analysis

Factor patterns Factor

2a
Item I II III IV V VI VII VIII h I II III IV V VI VII

1 .86 .10 .03 .05 2.03 .03 .07 2.05 .71 I .42 2.24 2.45 2.08 .11 2.24 .58
2 .75 .03 .02 .02 .05 .01 2.04 .06 .67 II 2.23 2.07 .18 .13 .05 .26
3 2.66 2.03 2.03 .17 .08 .07 .05 .05 .56 III .05 .00 .14 .03 .08
4 .71 2.03 2.07 .02 2.02 .01 .00 .24 .64 IV .39 2.06 .45 2.47
5 2.53 .06 .06 .18 2.04 2.04 .08 .07 .53 V .37 .23 2.19
6 2.03 .90 .02 2.04 .00 2.02 .00 2.06 .62 VI 2.06 .17
7 2.01 .91 2.02 .03 2.06 .01 2.03 .02 .64 VII 2.29
8 .04 .68 .02 2.02 .04 .00 2.03 .09 .48
9 .14 .43 2.04 .04 .09 .08 .13 2.02 .41 Note: Factor descriptions are given in the text.
10 .02 2.03 .66 .05 .01 .04 .05 .10 .48
11 .01 .04 .74 .07 .07 2.05 .01 .02 .48
12 .06 .05 2.57 .16 .11 2.06 .09 .12 .25 ables were the factors in factor analysis, and observed
13 .00 .02 .03 .79 2.04 2.02 .01 .00 .67
variables in measurement equations were the items
14 2.10 2.01 2.05 .80 2.05 .00 2.08 2.07 .69
15 2.06 .03 2.01 .53 .11 2.13 2.02 2.11 .38 that had more than a 0.40 factor pattern in Table III.
16 2.05 2.09 .06 .41 .03 .09 .10 2.12 .33 For example, the observed variables of the latent
17 .05 2.01 .00 .02 .76 .06 2.03 .01 .74 variable, acceptability, were items 1 through 5. The
18 2.06 .03 2.02 2.10 .77 2.02 .01 .01 .66 same measurement equations were used in all cases
19 .05 2.01 .02 .09 .62 .14 2.01 2.03 .53 and surveys. Table V shows that higher levels of per-
20 2.06 .01 .00 .00 .55 2.06 .04 .02 .46
ceived efficiency, lower levels of perceived accident
21 .03 2.03 .02 .09 2.03 .87 .03 .07 .74
22 2.01 .02 .01 2.02 .01 .81 2.02 .02 .61 likelihood, and higher levels of trust in nuclear power
23 2.06 .04 2.04 2.02 .00 .95 .00 .04 .68 operation strongly correlated with acceptability of
24 2.05 .00 2.03 .12 2.07 2.51 .03 .19 .41 nuclear power. In contrast, perceived sufficiency,
25 2.06 .01 2.03 2.14 2.06 .01 .78 2.04 .71 interest, self-rated knowledge, and distrust of the
26 .01 .02 .10 .11 .07 2.05 .56 .00 .53 government in general were not strongly related to
27 2.01 2.01 2.07 .11 .03 .01 .50 2.06 .24
acceptability.
28 .20 .00 .02 .00 2.08 2.04 .06 .71 .55
29 .14 2.03 .00 2.15 .07 2.06 2.05 .55 .59 Moreover, covariance structure analysis with
30 2.10 .01 .00 2.06 .00 .00 .00 .81 .42 structure means was used.(14,15) In this analysis, all fac-
31 .00 .04 .00 2.03 .04 .03 2.11 .51 .45 tor means of the data of survey 1 were fixed at 0 in
each case. Therefore, the factor means of 2 in Table
Note: All items are listed in the Appendix. Factor descriptions are
given in the text. Boldface means )factor pattern) . 0.4. VI are the differences of factor means between the
a
Final Communality Estimate. data of Surveys 1 and 2, and are also the attitude
changes after the accident. For Case 1, the accident
appears to have caused acceptability and trust in nu-
clear power to decrease significantly; perception of
ceptability, that is the public acceptance of nuclear efficiency, perception of sufficiency of electric power,
power; Factor II as perception of efficiency; Factor III perceived accident likelihood, interest, and distrust
as perception of sufficiency of electric power; Factor of the government to increase significantly; and no
IV as perceived accident likelihood; Factor V as inter- significant change in self-rated knowledge about nu-
est, that is the interest in nuclear power; Factor VI as clear power. The only difference in the results for
self-rated knowledge of nuclear power; Factor VII Cases 1 and 2 is that in the latter case the change in
as distrust of the government; and Factor VIII as trust distrust of the government was not significant rather
in nuclear power operation, that is, trust in the gov- than significantly increased.
ernment and electric power companies concerning In all covariance structure analyses in this re-
nuclear power. Factor correlations are shown in Table search, RMSEA was about or less than 0.05. RMSEA
IV. The results of factor analysis of Survey 1 data had is the root mean square error of approximation, a
the same structure. measure of the discrepancy per degree of freedom.
Covariance structure analysis was used to con- Brown and Cudeck(16) concluded that a RMSEA
firm factor structure and calculate interfactor correla- value of about 0.05 or less would indicate a close fit of
tions (shown in Table V). In the analysis, latent vari- the model, whereas about 0.08 or less would indicate
Public Response to the Tokai Accident 1043

Table V. Factor Correlations

Factors (latent variables) I II III IV V VI VII

a
Case 1 (large cities), Survey 1 (before the accident)
I Acceptability .54** 2.18** 2.51** 2.05 .15** 2.18** .60**
II Perception of efficiency 2.14** 2.16** .14** .16** .02 .35**
III Perception of sufficiency of electric power .03 2.12** .03 2.03 .02
IV Perceived accident likelihood .40** 2.02 .40** 2.69**
V Interest .48** .21** 2.26**
VI Self-rated knowledge 2.05 .09*
VII Distrust of the government 2.44**
VIII Trust in nuclear power operation

Case 1 (large cities), Survey 2 (after the accident)b

I Acceptability .44** 2.24** 2.59** 2.09 .12** 2.34** .73**
II Perception of efficiency 2.24** 2.15** .17** .15** .01 .29**
III Perception of sufficiency of electric power .05 .01 .14** .05 .06
IV Perceived accident likelihood .35** 2.12** .52** 2.65**
V Interest .43** .25** 2.22**
VI Self-rated knowledge 2.09 .15**
VII Distrust of the government 2.40**
VIII Trust in nuclear power operation

Case 2 (Tokyo), Survey 1 (before the accident)c

I Acceptability .58** 2.29** 2.49** .00 .12* 2.18** .54**
II Perception of efficiency 2.23** 2.22** .12* .13* 2.03 .32**
III Perception of sufficiency of electric power .03 2.07 .01 .00 2.04
IV Perceived accident likelihood .35** 2.04 .44** 2.72**
V Interest .46** .22** 2.28**
VI Self-rated knowledge .02 .09
VII Distrust of the government 2.52**
VIII Trust in nuclear power operation

Case 2 (Tokyo), Survey 2 (after the accident)d

I Acceptability .32** 2.18 2.49** 2.10 .19* 2.27** .72**
II Perception of efficiency 2.13 .06 .25** .21* .21* .16
III Perception of sufficiency of electric power .01 2.01 .14 .01 .13
IV Perceived accident likelihood .37** 2.09 .59** 2.58**
V Interest .53** .42** 2.28**
VI Self-rated knowledge 2.02 .09
VII Distrust of the government 2.36**
VIII Trust in nuclear power operation

Note: Factor descriptions are given in the text. RMSEA 5 root mean square error of approximation.
a
N = 1,218, x2(406) = 1,684.995, p , 0.001, RMSEA = 0.051.
b
N = 627, x2(406) = 965.619, p , 0.001, RMSEA = 0.047.
c
N = 402, x2(406) = 909.250, p , 0.001, RMSEA = 0.056.
d
N = 183, x2(406) = 608.0317, p , 0.001, RMSEA = 0.052.
* p , 0.05; ** p , 0.01.

a reasonable error of approximation. They stated that 4. DISCUSSION

they would not want to employ a model with an
RMSEA greater than 0.1.
Figure 1 shows that in all items other than Item
1, in which there was no significant change of mean,
the ratio of the number of opponents of nuclear
power generation to the total number of respondents
considerably increased (7% to 23%), whereas sup-
porters moderately decreased (1% to 12%).
Table V shows a strong correlation between (a)
acceptability of nuclear power and perceived acci-
dent likelihood, (b) acceptability and trust in nuclear
power operation, (c) perceived accident likelihood
and trust, and (d) trust and distrust in the government.
The first result agrees with Sjöberg and Sjöberg,(6)
Simooka,(7) and Tsunoda(8); the second, with Flynn et
1044 Tsunoda

Table VI. Factor Means: Survey 2—After the Accident

Case 1a Case 2b
(large cities) (Tokyo)

Factors (latent variables) M t M t

I Acceptability 20.26 24.21** 20.29 22.55*

II Perception of efficiency 0.12 2.26* 0.22 2.09*
III Perception of sufficiency of electric power 0.14 2.61** 0.21 2.27*
IV Perceived accident likelihood 0.52 9.62** 0.36 3.58**
V Interest 0.42 8.41** 0.32 3.50**
VI Self-rated knowledge 20.09 21.41 20.01 20.12
VII Distrust of the government 0.11 2.14* 0.14 1.54
VIII Trust in nuclear power operation 20.46 28.21** 20.36 2 3.70**

Note: The factor means of Survey 1 (before the accident) fixed to 0.

a
Case 1: x2(858) = 3,080.304, p , 0.001, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) =
0.037.
b
Case 2: x2(858) = 1,685.517, p , 0.001, RMSEA = 0.041.

al.(9); the third with Flynn et al.(9) and Tsunoda(10); and
the fourth with Peters et al.(5) In contrast, Table V
shows that the correlations between self-rated knowl-
edge and factors other than interest, and those be-
tween interest and acceptability were not large. The
former result does not agree with Kumagai,(9) but
Sjöberg and Sjöberg(17) and Biel and Dahlstrand(18)
showed that knowledge had little correlation with risk
perception and support the present study’s result.
Table VI shows that acceptability of nuclear
power and perceived accident likelihood significantly
changed. In the U.S., however, Renn(3) found little
change in the acceptability of nuclear power. Also,
Lindell and Perry(19) found no significant difference
between accident likelihood before the Chernobyl
accident and the likelihood after the accident. This
probably was due to the fact that their American
sample would not have been likely to think that an
accident at a Russian reactor had any relevance to the
operation of an American nuclear power plant. In ad-
dition to this, Renn(3) pointed out that the countries
with the most dramatic attitude changes had been
those with high levels of radiation exposure.
Table VI also shows that distrust of the govern-
ment hardly changed. Table V, however, shows that
distrust of the government correlated with trust in
nuclear power operation, which significantly changed.
One explanation for these results may be as follows.
The respondents who distrusted nuclear power oper-
ations also distrusted the government in general. This
would account for the moderate correlation between
the two variables. However, the accident was directly
related to negligence in nuclear power operations, so
trust in nuclear power operation declined signifi-
cantly in both cases. The government trustworthiness
in other domains was not implicated, so it is unsur-
prising that general trust in the government de-
creased only marginally. The same applies to the rela-
tion between self-rated knowledge and interest. The
most likely explanation may be that the increase noted
in ratings of interest was measuring an increase in
peoples’ concern about their safety that was not large
enough to produce a significance increase in informa-
tion seeking.
Figure 1 shows that in all items other than Item 1,
the ratio of opponents to total respondents con-
siderably increased (7% to 23%). This agrees with
Renn,(3) who showed that opposition to nuclear power
immediately after the Chernobyl accident had peaked
in Finland, Yugoslavia, and Greece (over 30%); con-
siderable increase (over 20%) had been observed in
Austria, West Germany, and Italy; and moderate
changes had taken place in the U.K., France, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, and Spain (12% to 18%). Figure 1
shows that the level of the change that took place in
Japan after the Tokai accident is nearly equal to that in
the U.K. and other areas after the Chernobyl accident.
On the other hand, Fig. 1 also shows that the
ratio of supporters to total respondents moderately
decreased (1% to 12%) in all items other than Item 1.
In Items 2 and 5, the ratio of supporters to total
respondents barely decreased (1% to 5%). One hy-
pothesis is that opponents cited the news of the
accident as support for their perception in the inevi-
tability of a catastrophic accident, whereas support-
ers might find confirmation for their perception that
defense-in-depth had made nuclear power plants safe
enough for continuation, and consider the accidents
Public Response to the Tokai Accident
Fig. 1. Ratios of opponents and supporters. In Items 1,
2, and 4, Categories 1–3 are opponents, 5–7 are support-
ers, and 4 is neutral. In Items 3 and 5, Categories 1–3 are
supporters, 5–7 are opponents, and 4 is neutral.
as unique, that is, not likely to happen again at nu-
clear facilities.(4,19) In Items 3 and 4, however, the ratio
moderately decreased (5% to 12%). It follows from
what has been said that neutrals were more likely to
become opponents than supporters were likely to be-
come neutrals.
APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
1. In the future, we should also use nuclear power
generation.
2. If there is a vote for propulsion of nuclear power,
I will vote for it.
1045
3. We should slowly decrease the number of our
nuclear power stations.
4. In the future, we should also construct new nu-
clear power stations.
5. New nuclear power stations should not be
constructed.
6. Nuclear power generator can produce a greater
amount of electricity and at a lower cost than
thermal power can.
7. A nuclear power generator is efficient.
8. We can use electricity at a low price with nuclear
power.
9. Nuclear power generation can provide a great
amount of electricity with a small amount of fuel.
1046
10. The amount of electricity used in Japan is too much.
11. Japan’s ability to generate electricity is sufficient.
12. In the future, it is likely that electricity will be
insufficient.
13. Within my lifetime, a severe nuclear power plant
accident will occur somewhere again in the world.
14. A severe accident at a nuclear power plant will
eventually occur in Japan as well.
15. I am worried that an accident may occur in a
nuclear power station.
16. Nuclear power plant accidents occur frequently.
17. I am interested in the subject of nuclear power.
18. I am interested in the influences, contributions,
and problems that nuclear power presents to
modern society.
19. I often watch TV news and read news about
nuclear power.
20. I want to know the detailed mechanisms of nu-
clear power generation.
21. I am very familiar with nuclear power plants.
22. I am very familiar with scientific technology.
23. I know nuclear power better than the average
person.
24. I have less knowledge about nuclear power than
other persons.
25. Current politics only emphasize the interests of
specific organizations.
26. The government intends to give priority to the
benefit of big companies over political decision
making.
27. In truth, most of the important decisions in our
society are kept from the general public.
28. We can trust electric power companies with nu-
clear power without anxiety.
29. The nuclear policy of the government is trustworthy.
30. Enterprises of nuclear power are faithful to the
nation.
31. The government openly provides the public with
information about nuclear power.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks Yutaka Kano, Naosuke Itoi-
gawa, Mohamed Hafsi, Sarah Yagi, and the reviewers
for helpful comments.
Tsunoda
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