Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.

Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Executive Power

Marcos vs. Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
Facts:
September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former
President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said: In
the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until
such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one,
shall otherwise decide.

Issue:
Whether or not President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr.
Marcos and the other petitioners to the Philippines.

Ruling:
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested,
has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime
of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power. That the President has powers other than those
expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S.
Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers
among three (3) separate branches. Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander
Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for
the specific executive authorizations that follow it in Sections 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed
the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the
conditional language of Article I, Section 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States." Hamilton submitted that the Article III
enumeration in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely
to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the
rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in conformity with other
parts of the Constitution.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770;
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of President of the Philippines
GR No. 196231 and GR No. 196232
Brion, J.
Facts:
This involved two separate cases involving Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales
III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras Sulit. On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw
filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-
IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat,
robbery extortion and physical injury. On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent
Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct with the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza, et al.
based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS. On July 2, 2008,
Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his
office. The Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24,
2008. Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his
Order. Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against
Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his allegations. Similarly, on October 17,
2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative
case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute. On February 16, 2009,
after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the
entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review.  In
his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. On August 23, 2010,
pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a
tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board
as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the
hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several
others on board the hijacked bus. President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the
Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct
a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint
Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC).

Issue:
Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the
President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. It is unconstitutional. The inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant
violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the
core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution. The Executive nor the Legislative can
create the power that Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 grants where the Constitution
confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a vacuum, more so when the
authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and constitutional intents, the
Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties granted and imposed on it
by Article VIII of the Constitution. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
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against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further
realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 particularly the Court’s
expressed caution against presidential interference with the constitutional commissions,
on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, on the
other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak for
themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for
violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It was rule that subjecting
the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter
egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional
mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that
the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize The Ombudsman must be
equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in
the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the
Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For
these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a
Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Appointment in the Civil Service
Civil Service Commission vs. Pililla Water District
G.R. No. 190147
Villaram, JR., J.
Facts:
Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous
status under Resolution No. 12 issued on August 7, 1998 by the Board of Directors
(BOD) of respondent Pililla Water District (PWD). His appointment was signed by the
BOD Acting Chairman and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. On October 4, 2001,
CSC, the petitioner, issued Resolution No. 011624 amending and clarifying Section 12,
Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as follows: Section 12. a) No
person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years can be appointed
to any position in the government, subject only to the exception provided under sub-
section (b) hereof. However, in meritorious cases, the Commission may allow the
extension of service of a person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, for a period of six (6) months only unless otherwise stated. Provided, that, such
extension may be for a maximum period of one (1) year for one who will complete the
fifteen (15) years of service required under the GSIS Law. A request for extension shall
be made by the head of office and shall be filed with the Commission not later than
three (3) months prior to the date of the official/employees compulsory retirement.
Henceforth, the only basis for Heads of Offices to allow an employee to continue
rendering service after his/her 65th birthday is a Resolution of the Commission granting
the request for extension. Absent such Resolution, the salaries of the said employee
shall be for the personal account of the responsible official.

Issue:
  Whether or not Rafanan’s coterminous capacity appointment was valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 13, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws and CSC Resolution
No. 91-1631 issued on December 27, 1991, appointments in the civil service may either
be of permanent or temporary status. A permanent appointment is issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with
the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a
temporary appointment may be extended to a person who possesses all the
requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility and for a
limited period not exceeding twelve months or until a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available. Section 14 of the same resolution provides for a coterminous
appointment: Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued
to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and
confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-
existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability
of funds. The co-terminous status may be further classified into the following:l(1) co-
terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability
of funds for the same; (2) co-terminous with the appointing authority - when
appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
(3) co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the
appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the
incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and (4) co-terminous
with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof,
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the position is deemed abolished. the position of general manager remains primarily
confidential in nature despite the amendment of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No.
9286, which gave the occupant of said position security of tenure, in that said officer
could only be removed from office for cause and after due process. The nature of the
duties and functions attached to the position points to its confidential character. First,
the general manager is directly appointed by the board of directors. Second, the general
manager directly reports to the board of directors. Third, the duties and responsibilities
of a general manager are determined by the board of directors, which is a clear
indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between him and the board.
Fourth, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are not merely clerical and
routinary in nature. His work involves policy and decision making. Fifth, the
compensation of the general manager is fixed by the board of directors. And last, the
general manager is directly accountable for his actions and omissions to the board of
directors. Under this situation, the general manager is expected to possess the highest
degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to maintaining trust and
confidence between him and the board of directors. The loss of such trust or confidence
could easily result in the termination of the general managers services by the board of
directors. To be sure, regardless of the security of tenure a general manager may now
enjoy, his term may still be ended by the board of directors based on the ground of "loss
of confidence.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Partisan Political Activity
Seneres vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 178678
Velasco, JR.,J.
Facts:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of
Buhay, a party-list group duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY
provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY
participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. All the
required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises, including
the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as
president of BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections,
BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation. As in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the
signature of Robles as BUHAY president. On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a
Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007 elections. Consequently,
on April 17, 2007, Señeres filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to
Certificates of Nomination. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he was the acting
president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since August
17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Pushing the point, Señeres would claim
that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to
the expiration of the latter’s term as party president. Furthermore, Señeres asserted that
Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any political
party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority
(LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Robles, so Señeres would charge, was
into a partisan political activity which civil service members, like the former, were
enjoined from engaging in.

Issue:
Whether or not Robles, acting as BUHAY President and nominating officer, as
well as being the Administrator of the LRTA, was engaging in electioneering or partisan
political campaign.

Ruling:
No. The acts embraced under Sec. 79 pertain to or are in connection with the
nomination of a candidate by a party or organization, then such are treated as internal
matters and cannot be considered as electioneering or partisan political activity. The
twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes
of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the
candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating
Velarde and others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC requirements for
nomination of party-list representatives and cannot be treated as electioneering or
partisan political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution
for civil servants. The argument on the Constitution, which prohibits any officer or
employee in the civil service from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign. He also cites Sec. 4 of the Civil Service Law which
provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall engage in any partisan
political activity." Lastly, he mentions Sec. 26(i) of the Omnibus Election Code which
makes it "an election offense for any officer in the civil service to directly or indirectly
engage in any partisan political activity." This contention lacks basis and is far from
being persuasive. The terms "electioneering" and "partisan political activity" have well-
established meanings in the Omnibus Election Code, Section 79 (b) The term ‘election
campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
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or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate; (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3) Making speeches,
announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of
any candidate for public office (4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or (5) Directly or
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate. The foregoing
enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or coalition
of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Partisan Political Activity

Quinto vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 189698
Nachura, J.
Facts:
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use
an automated election system (AES). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections
to use an Automated Election System In The May 11, 1998 National Or Local Elections
And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises, Providing Funds Therefor
And For Other Purposes." The Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
his/her certificate of candidacy. Political parties may hold political conventions to
nominate their official candidates within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for
filing a certificate of candidacy. With respect to a paper-based election system, the
official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the
services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots. To prevent the use of fake ballots, the
Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such
as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are
provided on the ballot. The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a provision of
additional three ballots per precinct.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 contains conflicting provisions

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by
Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section
13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said
proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In
considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The
fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
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based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all
members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and
substantial differences between the classes treated differently. The classification would
still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is not germane to
the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be
enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive
officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test
that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66
of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Right to Self-organization
SSS vs CA
175 SCRA 686 G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
Cortes, J.
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business
with the SSS that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work that the strikers refused to return to
work and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on
strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay conversion of temporary or contractual employees with
six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. On the other hand, the SSS
advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered
by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do
not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over
the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

Issue:
Whether or not the SSS employees have the right to strike.
Ruling:
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there
be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now
provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of
the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. The 1987
Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the
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Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, that the right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50).
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that the right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus,
while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right
to strike.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
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Doctrine: Right to self-organization

Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister Labor and Employment

G.R. No. L-60403 July 27, 2010
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation
while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees
of the following offices, schools, or government owned or controlled corporations: (1)
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Escolta Street, Manila; (2) Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City; (3) Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) Arroceros Street, Manila; (4) Social Security System (SSS) East
Avenue, Quezon City (5) Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) Consolacion
Building, Cubao, Quezon City; (6) Philippine Normal College (PNC) Ayala Boulevard,
Manila; (7) Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) Hippodromo Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila. On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA)
filed a motion to come in as an additional petitioner. According to the petitioners, P.D. No.
851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their employees with one sole
exception found in Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying their employees
a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. The petitioners contend
that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851
included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in
the decree is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt
other types of employers from the requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not  may act through labor federations which uses the collective
bargaining power to secure increased compensation for its members

Ruling:
No. dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that
workers in government-owned and controlled corporations or in state colleges and
universities may not enjoy freedom of association. The workers whom the petitioners
purport to represent have the right, which may not be abridged, to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law. (Constitution, Article IV, Section 7). This is a right
which share with all public officers and employees and, in fact, by everybody living in this
country. But they may not join associations which impose the obligation to engage in
concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher
than or different from that provided by law and regulation. The very Labor Code, P.D. No.
442 as amended, which governs the registration and provides for the rights of legitimate
labor organizations states: ART. 277. Government employees.— The terms and conditions
of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned
and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in
the new constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of existing wages, benefits, and
other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the
adoption of this code. Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why
the government employees represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in
matters of salaries different from that extended to all others government personnel. The
provision states: SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to,
and the qualifications required for the positions concerned. It is the legislature or, in proper
cases, the administrative heads of government and not the collective bargaining process
nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from management that determine how much the
workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of salaries,
13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government
institutions which can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to
their personnel from their budgetary appropriations. 
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Freedom of Speech and Expression

GSIS vs. Villaviza

G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque,
Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio
Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario
Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. That
some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and
defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer
Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty.
Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Respondent, together with other
employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002,
otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public
Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the
Investigation Unit during office hours. This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia,
through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security
Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS
Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the
seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3)
days why they should not be administratively dealt with.

Issue:
Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of twenty employees, lasting for more than
an hour during office hours, inside office premises and within a unit tasked to hear an
administrative case, to protest the prohibition against the appearance of their leader as
counsel in the said administrative case, falls within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

Ruling:
Yes. Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person
in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but
can never be taken away. Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited
concerted activity or mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies
or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption
in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts,
attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets,
clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not
constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the
purpose of realizing their demands of force concession. Precisely, the limitations or
qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and
focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers
and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Security of Tenure in the Career Executive Service; Permanent Appointment

Amores vs. Civil Service et. Al

G.R. No. 170093 April 29, 2009
Peralta, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Pepito M. Amores was the Deputy Director for Hospital Support
Services at the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP). His civil service career began in
1982 when he was initially engaged at the LCP as a resident physician.  In the course of
his service, he had been promoted to the position of Medical Specialist, then to
Department Manager, and finally to Deputy Director. Dr. Calixto Zaldivar was then the
Executive Director of the LCP and when he retired from service in 1999, petitioner was
designated as officer-in-charge of the LCP by the Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. Petitioner had taken charge of the LCP in the interim
that the DOH selection board was in the process of selecting a new executive director.
Petitioner was caught by surprise when, on August 27, 2002, he received a letter from
the LCP Board of Trustees informing him of his separation from service as Deputy
Director effective September 30, 2002. To the said letter was attached a copy of the
Board’s Resolution dated August 23, 2002, principally directing petitioner’s termination
from service after consultation with the Career Executive Service Board (CES Board).
Petitioner brought an appeal from the resolution to the Civil Service Commission.
Resolving the appeal, the CSC declared that the LCP Board of Trustees had properly
and validly separated petitioner from his post as Deputy Director. In its Resolution No.
031050, the CSC declined to pass upon the charge of dishonesty on the ground of pre-
maturity as the issue had not yet been finally determined in a proper proceeding and the
Board had not yet in fact made a definite finding of guilt from which petitioner might as a
matter of course appeal. However, it pointed out that petitioner’s separation from
service was anchored on his lack of a CES eligibility which is required for the position of
deputy director and, as such, he enjoyed no security in his tenure.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s separation from service violated his right to security of
tenure.

Ruling:
No. It was clear the fact that petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and
therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not have
been any violation of petitioner’s supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he
had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy
Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no challenge may be offered against his
separation from office even if it be for no cause and at a moment’s notice a permanent
appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of
the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules
issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the
requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. Under
Section 7 of the Civil Service Law, positions in the civil service are classified into open
career positions, closed career positions and positions in the career service. In turn,
positions in the career service are tiered in three levels as follows: SECTION 8. Classes
of Positions in the Career Service. - (1) Classes of positions in the career service
appointment to which requires examinations which shall be grouped into three major
levels as follows: (a) The first level shall include the clerical, trades, crafts and custodial
service positions which involve non-professional or subprofessional work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical and scientific positions which
involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory
capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to the Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. With particular
reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES
Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the
examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, he either earns the status of a
permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has previously been appointed, or
he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position provided only that he
also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that the
possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the
career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility,
however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position was permanent. Security
of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment,
takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It is
that which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his
name in the roster of CES eligible. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the
CES Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board through a
formal board resolution after an evaluation has been done of the examinee’s
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. Upon conferment of
CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an
incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to
a CES rank is made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation. It is this
process which completes the official’s membership in the CES and confers on him
security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does not seem to have gone through this
definitive process.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Re-assignment

Bentain vs. CA
G.R. No. 89452 June 9, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.
Facts:
The petitioner holds a permanent appointment as Chief Security Officer of the
U.P. Diliman Police. On May 5, 1981, a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against him in the Office of the Tanodbayan. The
case was eventually filed in the Sandiganbayan but it was dismissed by that court on
June 18, 1982. Meanwhile, on July 20, 1981, then U.P. President Edgardo J. Angara
issued Administrative Order No. 46 reassigning the petitioner to the Office of the U.P.
President to work on the "operationalization" and implementation of the duties and
responsibilities of the University Police Force. On the same day, the U.P. President
issued Administrative Order No. 46-A clarifying that petitioner would work full-time on
the project and that it would be his sole concern and responsibility for the duration of
that assignment. Petitioner wrote several letters/petitions to then U.P. President Angara,
the present U.P, President Abueva, Chancellor Tabujara, the Board of Regents, the
Civil Service Commission, and the President of the Philippines, all praying for
reinstatement or reassignment to his original position in the U.P. Police Force, but to no
avail.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's indefinite detail or reassignment in the Office of the
U.P. Vice-President for Administration, constitutes a violation of his right to security of
tenure.

Ruling:
It should be noted that Administrative Order No. 46 which ordered the petitioner's
detail or reassignment in the Office of the U.P. President clearly specified its purpose: to
work on the operationalization and implementation of the University Police Force's
duties and responsibilities. That statement of the specific purpose of his detail proves
that it was meant to be temporary, or until he would have completed and submitted his
report. Petitioner's reassignment was not permanent. it was not a transfer for he was not
removed from his position as Chief Security Officer. He was not given a new
appointment to a new position with a new title. Since his position as U.P. Chief Security
Officer is a permanent one, he is entitled to security of tenure under the Civil Service
Law and the Constitution. Security of tenure is fundamental and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which
are tantamount to illegal removals. While temporary transfer or assignment personnel is
permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the
transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service. or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards
the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service. A reassignment that is
indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and salary, is, in effect, a constructive
removal from the service.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM

Doctrine: Re-assignment
Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995
Feliciano, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving,
Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and
Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission,
was issued on 7 June 1994. During the general assembly of officers and employees of
the Commission held in the morning of 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when
apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the determination of the Commission to
implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority. Petitioners
then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required
public respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994,
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning
petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in
San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from
enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September 1994,
granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to
security of tenure.

Ruling:
No.  Reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in
the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from
the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively,
without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security
of tenure. The Court turn to the claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure
was breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering
petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V.
Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or
employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their
positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and
that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the
Commission. The Court, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not
appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions
or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV;
or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or
Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to
the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The
same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of
Director IV of the Commission. Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative
vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of
government embraced in the civil service: (7) Reassignment. An employee may be re-
assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, Provided, That
such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary. It follows that
the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the
Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III
had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals
without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation
of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they
retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status
and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of
the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a
vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM
Doctrine: Re-assignment

Remedios Pastor vs. Court of Appeal

G.R. No. 146873 May 9, 2002
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of
Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending
investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by
her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for
reinstatement to her former position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of
the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Commission ordered
her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city
government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Hence this petition for certiorari. Alleging that since her relief as
Budget Officer, no investigation had been conducted regarding the charge that she had
issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections, petitioner filed on
October 20, 1995 a complaint with the CSC. She contended that her protracted detail to
the Office of the City Administrator and the deletion of her name from the payroll for the
City Budget Office for the period October 1-15, 1995 were in violation of Civil Service
laws, rules, and regulations and that they constituted oppression and abuse of authority
on the part of Mayor Eusebio. Petitioner prayed for her reinstatement as City Budget
Officer of Pasig and for an order enjoining Mayor Eusebio from designating another
person to that petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA decision should be set aside and petitioner should be
returned to her original position.

Ruling:
Yes. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a
reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service.
In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioner's reassignment to
different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been
on virtual floating assignments which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank,
hence impermissible under the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992
with her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of
reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections.
However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said charge. To
justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the same was
"due to petitioner's long years of experience in finance which especially fitted her for
studies regarding the city's revenues. Reassignment means an employee may be
reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That
such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary. There is no
question that the Court recognize the validity and indispensable necessity of the well
established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest
demands, public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even
over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to
security of tenure in the civil service. But as we have already stated, such cannot be
undertaken when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal and if the
transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent
position because such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a circumvention
of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the civil
service.

.
Cuevo, Bea Patricia S.
Constitutional Law I
JD 1B
Wednesday and Friday 6:00-9:00 PM