Eldo J. Cariño, et al., v. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, et al.

G.R. No. L-19808

September 29, 1966

Sanchez, J.

Facts:

Petitioners-appellants Cariño, Espino, Miguel, de Castro and Ilar were appointed permanent

employees of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). Their duties

consisted of conducting investigations of charges of irregularities in any branch of the ACCFA and

appearing as witnesses in court.

On September 17, 1958, petitioners were advised that their items in the budget were abolished

by the Board of Governors. Consequently, their services were terminated. Hence, a suit for mandamus

was filed by petitioners, to compel reinstatement. The lower court dismissed the petition upon

petitioners' alleged failure to exhaust all administative remedies thus, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners-appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies before

coming to the court.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioners-appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies before coming to the

court. This is evidenced by the fact that upon learning of their separation from service, petitioners wrote

to the ACCFA Board of Governors underscoring civil service eligibility, efficiency and permanence of their

positions, and requested reinstatement. Petitioner Espino also wrote to the Commissioner of Civil
Service seeking clarification and advice on their separation. The Commissioner instead of resolving the

matter referred it instead to the ACCFA's administrator. The ACCFA's adminstrator justified the action

taken by the Board of Governors based on the grounds that the abolition was for purposes of economy.

Exhaustion of adminstrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It admits of exceptions and

among these are: (1)the question in dispute is "purely illegal one" and; (2) the controverted act is

"patently illegal". Petitioner's dismissal was patently illegal.

The abolition of the petitioners' items was not for reasons of economy but was "a mere

subterfurge to remove petitioners in order to give room to members of the Board of Governors' own

political proteges." Their removal was done in whimsical exercise of arbitrary power. Petitioners are

entitled to reinstatement and payment of their respective back salaries from the date of their dismissal

to the date they are reinstated.

 "Brotherhood" Labor Unity Movement of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora

G.R. No. L-48645

January 7, 1987

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

Petitioners are workers who have been employed at the San Miguel Parola Glass Factory since

1961. They worked as "cargadores" or "pahinante at the SMC Plant.

Sometime in January 1969, petitioner workers organized and affiliated themselves with the

petitioner union and engaged in union activities. Believing themselves entitled t overtime and holiday

pay, the petitioners pressed management, airing ther grievances such as being paid low, inhuman

treatment, being forced to borrow at usurious interest rates, etc. However, these grievances were not

heeded by the respondents.

Petitioner union filed a notice of strike with the BLR in connection with the dismissal of some of

its members who were allegedly castigated for their union membership and warned that should they

persist in continuing with the union activities they would be dismissed from their jobs. Several

conferences were scheduled.

San Miguel refused to bargain with the petitioner union alleging that workers are not their

employees.

On July 11, 1969, BLUM filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) charging

San Miguel Corporation and some of its officers of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It was

alleged that respondents ordered individual complainants to disaffiliate from the complainant union;
and that management dismissed the individual complainants when they insisted on their union

membership.

Respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that complainants are not

employees of respondent company but employees of the independent contractor. The dispute was

taken over by the NLRC with the decreed abolition of the CIR.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the complainants. The decision of the LA was concurred by

the NLRC However, on appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling on the ground of absence of

employer-employee relationship.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between the complainants and the

respondent company

Ruling:

Yes. There is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner workers and respondent

San Miguel Corporation.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, these elements are

generally considered: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c)

the power of dismissal and; (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the

means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished (i.e. the control test), the most important

element.

Uncontroverted is the fact that for an average of seven (7) years, each of the petitioners had

worked continuously and exclusively for the respondent company. Thus, there is justification to
conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or

trade of respondent and therefore, they are regular employees.

SMC also exercised control over the petitioner workers. Because of the nature of the petitioners'

work, supervision as to the means and matter of performing the same is practically nil. More evident

and pronounced is respondent company's right to control in the discipline of petitioners. Documentary

evidence presented by petitioners establish respondent SMC's right to impose disciplinary measures for

violations or infractions of its rules and regulations as well as its right to recommend transfers and

dismissals of the piece workers.

 Dy Keh Beng v. International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines, et al.

G.R. No. L-32245

May 25, 1979

De Castro, J.

Facts:

Dy Keh Beng, a proprietor of a basket factory, was charged with unfair labor practice for

discriminatory acts within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4) f Republic Act No. 875,

by dismissing respectively Carlos N. Solano and Ricard Tudla for their union activities.

After the conduc of preliminary investigation, a case was filled in the Court of Industrial

Relations for in behalf of the International Labor and Marine Union of the Philippines and two of its

member, Solano and Tudla.

Dy Keh Beng contended that he did not know Solano and that Solan was not his employe

because the latter came to the establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis.

After the trial, the CIR ruled that an employer-employee relationship has existed between Dy

Keh Beng and the complainants, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece basis. Hence,

this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Dy Keh Beng and

complainants Solano and Tudla.

Ruling:

Yes. There exists an employer-employee relationship between Dy Keh Beng and complainaints

Solano and Tudla.

Petitioner contending that the private respondents "did not meet the control test in the fight of

the...definition of the terms employer and employee, because there was no evidence to show that

petitioner had the right to direct the manner and method of respondents' work has no merit. It should

be borne in mind that the control test calls merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of

doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.

It is natural to expect that those working under Dy would have to observe his requirements of

size and quality of kaing since the establishment of Dy Keh Beng is engaged in the manufacture of

baskets known as kaing. This control would necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing

would be subject to Dy's specifications.

 Philippine National Bank v. Florence D. Cabansag

G.R. No. 157010

June 21, 2005

Panganiban, J.

Facts:

Respondent Florence Cabansag applied for employment with the Singapore Branch of PNB

which at the time was under the control of Ruben C. Tobias as its General Manager, with the rank of

Vice-President of the Bank.

Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote to the President of the Bank recommending the

appointment of Cabansag for the position. The President of the Bank has approved the

recommendation.

Cabansag was offered a temporary appointment as Credit Officer and upon her successful

completion of her probation to be determined solely by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion

of the Bank, a permanent appointment. She accepted the position and assumed office.

After four (4) months, Cabansag was informed by Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice President

and Deputy General Manager of the said branch that Tobias was asking her to resign from her job.

Tobias explained to Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a "cost-cutting measure" of the

Bank.

Cabansag refused to submit any letter of resignation to Tobias. She later on received a letter
from Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.

A case was then filed against PNB for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of

Cabansag. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision with the motion for reconsideration also being

denied. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA finding PNB failing to establish a just cause for

Cabansag's dismissal. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Cabansag was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent Cabansag was illegally dismissed. Cabansag was already a regular employee at

the time of her dismissal because her three-month probationary period of employment had already

ended.

As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges under our

labor laws and one of these is that she may not be dismissed without due process (i.e. notice and

hearing). To comply with this, the employer must furnish the employee two written notices: (1) to

apprise them of the particular acts or omissions for which their dismissal is sought; and (2) To inform

them of the decision to dismiss them. Hearing as a requirement simply means the opportunity to be

heard.

Respondent was not notified of the specific act or omission for which her dismissal was being

sought. All that was tendered to respondent was a notice of her employment termination.

Furthermore, there was no valid cause for respondent's dismissal. The valid grounds or causes

for an employee's dismissal was provided under the Labor Code. The employer has the burden of
proving that it was done for any of those just or authorized causes. Failure to discharge this burden

means that the dismissal was not justified, and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and

payment of backwages.

Petitioner PNB has not asserted any of the grounds provided under the law as a valid reason for

terminating respondent's employment. It merely insists that her dismissal was validly effected pursuant

to her employment contract.

The contracting parties may establish such stipulation, clauses, terms and conditions as they

want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them. However, those stipulations

must not be contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order. Moreover, a contract of

employment is imbued with public interest thus positive law that regulate such contracts are deemed

included and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties.
 William Dayag, et al. v. Hon. Potenciano S. Canizares

G.R. No. 124193

March 6, 1998

Romero, J.

Facts:

Petitioners William Dayag, Edwin Dayag, Eduardo Corton, Edgardo Corton, Leopoldo Nagma,

Aloy Flores and Romeo Punay were hired by Alfredo Young as tower crane operators at his construction

site in San Juan, Manila. They were later on transferred to Cebu City to work at the construction of

Young's Shoemart Cebu project.

On January 30, 1993, William Dayag asked for permission to go to Manila to attend family

matters. He was allowed to do so but was not paid for the period January 23-30, 1993, allegedly due to

his accountability for the loss of certain construction tools. Eduardo Corton had earlier left on January

16, 1993 purportedly due to harassment by Young. Edgardo Corton along with Aloy Flores and Edwin

also left allegedly for the same reason. Petitioners thereafter banded together and filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal against Young with the NCR Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Young filed a motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region VII of the

NLRC. He claimed that the workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned which is Cebu City
should be where the case should have been filed in accordance with Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the New

Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

Petitioners opposed the motion arguing that all of them, except for Punay, were residents of

Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu City.

The Labor Arbiter granted Young's motion and ordered that transmittal of the case to the

regional arbitration branch of Region VII. Petitioners' appeal before the NLRC was dismissed. Petitioners

then moved for a reconsideration. With the Comimission acting in favor of petitioners, it has annulled

and set aside its previous resolution and remanded the case to the original arbitration branch of NCR for

further proceedings. Young in turn filed his own motion for reconsideration and was granted. Hence,

this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has erred in issuing the order to transfer venue.

Ruling:

No. The Labor Arbiter Arbiter did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained

Young's motion to transfer venue.

The Court has consistently ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor

cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice. The Court has also ruled that where a

rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be

disregarded in order to resolve the case.

However, Young cannot derive comfort from the present case since it has been overtaken by

events. As held in Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. NLRC, venue essentially pertains to the trial and relates more to
the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits of the case. It emphasized

that the permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the

plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.

The rationale for the rule is that the worker being the economically-disadvantaged party.

whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, the nearest government machinery to settle the

dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of

another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burder the former.
 Lorenzo C. Dy, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. L-68544

October 27, 1986

Narvasa, J.

Facts:

Private respondent Carlito H. Vailoces was the manager, director and stockholder of the Rural

Bank of Ayungon. On June 4, 1983, a special stockholders' meeting was called for the purpose of electing

the members of the bank's Board of Directors then they proceeded to elect the bank's executive officers

to which the president, vice-president, secretary, cashier and bank manager. Thus, Vailoces was relieved

of his position as bank manager.

Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Ministry of Labor and Employment

against Lorenzo Dy and Zosimo Dy, Sr. which was amended to include additional respondents.

Lorenzo Dy, et al. denied the charge of illegal dismissal and pointing out that Vailoces' position

was an elective one and he was not re-elected as the bank manager because of the Board of Directors'

loss of confidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his
duties.

The Executive Labor Arbiter found that Vailoces was illegally dismissed. Lorenzo Dy, et al.

appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed for being filed beyond the allowable period. Hence, this

petition assailing the ruling as an arbitrary deprivation of their rights to appeal unreasonable adherence

to procedural technicality.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the issue.

Ruling:

No. NLRC has no jurisdiction over the issue.

The position from which private respondent Vailoces claims to has been illegally dismissed is an

elective corporate office. He himself acquired that position through election. The case thus falls under

the jurisdiction the Securities and Exchange Commission as stated under Section 5, par. (c), No. 902-A,

the situation that where the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or

employee, is not determined by the nature of the services but by the incidents of the relationship as

they actually exist (i.e. a corporate controversy).

Therefore, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of the NLRC are void for lack of

cause of consideration. Furthermore, the question of remuneration as was raised by Vailoces, involving

a person who is not merely en employee but a stockholder and officer of the corporation, is not a simple

labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in

fact a corporate controversy in contemplation with the Corporation Code.

 Mainland Construction, Co., Inc. v. Mila Movilla, et al.

G.R. No. 118088

November 23, 1995

Hermosisima, Jr.

Facts:

Ernest Movilla was hired by Mainland Construction Co., Inc. as its accountant. Thereafter, he

was promoted as Adminstrative Officer. On April 12, 1987, the Board of Directors elected him as

Administrative Manager. He occupied said position until the time of his death.

On April 2, 1991, DOLE found that the petitioner corporation has commited irregularities in the

conduct of its business and ordered petitioner to corporation to pay thirteen (13) of its employees which

included Movilla, an amount which represents their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay

differentials , unpaid wages and 13th month pay.

All the listed employees were paid, except for Movilla. This prompted him to file a case against

petitioner corporation for unpaid wages, separation pay and attorney's fees, with the Regional

Arbitration Branch, Branch XI, Davao City. However, Movilla died during the trial of the case before the

Labor Arbiter. He was then substituted by his heirs, Mila Movilla, et al. with the consent of the Labor

Arbiter.
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction stating that the controversy is

an intra-corporate one and is within the jurisdiction of SEC. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the

NLRC which was granted. NLRC ruled that the case involves a labor dispute and thus, NLRC has

jurisdiction to resolve the case. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the present controversy.

Ruling:

Yes. NLRC has jurisdiction over the present controversy.

The claim for unpaid wages and separation pay filed by Movilla against petitioner corporation

involves a labor dispute. It relates to an employer-employee relationship which is distinct from the

corporate relationship of one with the other. There was also no showing of any change in the duties

being performed by Movilla as an Adminstrative Oficer and as an Adminstrative Manager after his

election. What is essential is whether there was a change in the nature of his functi, ons and not merely

in the nomenclature or title given to his job.

In order that SEC can take cognizance of a case, concurrent factors such as the status or

relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy shall be

considered.
 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, et al. v. Hon. Judge Antonio M. Martinez and Abraham Tumala, Jr.

G.R. No. L-58877

March 15, 1982

Escolin, J.

Facts:

Respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr. was employed as a salesman of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company

in Davao City. In an annual contest conducted by the company, Tumala was declared the winner for his

performance as top salesman of the year, entitling him to a prize of a house and lot. Petitioners have

unjustly refused to deliver said prize despite demands.

On September 19, 1980, Tumala filed a complaint praying for the delivery of his prize and for

illegal dismisal against petitioner company and its officers. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint

on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action which was dismissed. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:

Yes. The Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject

matter in a judicial proceedings is never presumed but must be conferred by law.

Under Article 217 of the Labor Code, Labor Arbiters of the NLRC have exclusive jurisdiction over

claims, money or otherwise, arising from employer-employee relations, except those expressly excluded

therefrom.

The action for delivery of the house and lot, his prize, is not cognizable under courts of general

jurisdiction. The claim for said prize arising from an employer-employee relationship falls within the

coverage of par. 5, P.D. 1961, which is the verbatim reproduction of the test under Article 217 of the

Labor Code.
 San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission and Rustico Vega

G.R. No. 80774

May 31, 1988

Feliciano, J.

Facts:

Respondent Vega works as mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC Plant Brewery in

Tipolo, Mandaue City. An Innovation Program was sponsored by SMC which grant cash awards to all

SMC employees (except ED-HO staff, Division Managers and higher-ranked personnel) who submit to

the corporation ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation. In line with this, Vega

submitted an innovation proposal.

Petitioner corporation however, did not find Vega's proposal acceptable and refused Vega's

subsequent demands for a cash award under said program.

A case was later on filed by Vega against petitioner corporation with the Regional Arbitration

Branch No. VII (Cebu City) alleging that his proposal was accepted by the methods analyst and
implemented by the Corporation thus, entitling him to a cash prize. On the other hand, petitioner

corporation in its answer alleged that private respondent had no cause of action and that the Labor

Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the matter because Vega has improperly by-passed the grievance

machinery procedure under their collective bargaining agreement.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Vega's complaint for lack of jurisdiction noting that the money claim

was not a necessary incident of his employment and is not among those mentioned under Article 217 of

the Labor Code. However, LA directed the corporation to pay Vega P 2,000.00 as "financial assistance."

The order was subsequently appealed by both parties before the NLRC. NLRC has set aside the order and

ordered the corporation to pay Vega P 60,000.00. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.

The SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner corporation to its

employees to submit innovation proposals, and that petitioner corporation undertook to grant cash

awards to employees who accept such invitation whose innovation suggestions satisfied the standards

and requirements of the program and therefore, could be translated into some substantial benefit to

the corporation. Such undertaking could ripen into an enforceable contractual obligation on the part of

petitioner corporation under certain circumstances. Therefore, questions arising from the matter could

not be resolved by referring to labor legislation but rather having recourse to the law on contracts.

Although paragraph 3 of Article 217 of the Labor Code refers to "all money claims of workers," it
could not be assumed that all the money claims asserted by the workers against their employers have

been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Money claims under the

original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable

causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.

Leonardo D. Suario v. Bank of the Philippine Islands and National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. L-50459

August 25, 1989

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Facts:

Suario was an employee or respondent Bank and later on became the bank's Credit Investigator

Appraiser-Credit Analyst. During the time of his employment with the bank, he pursued his studies of

law. On March 1976, Suario verbally requested the then Asst. Vice-President and Branch Manager,

Armando N. Guilatco for a 6-month leave of absence without pay purposely to take the 1976 pre-bar

review in Manila. Guilatco informed him that there would be no problem as regards the requested leave

of absence.

On May 1976, Suario received a verbal notice from the new branch manager that the Head

Office has only approved a 30-day leave of absence without pay. Guilatco, now the Vice President of the

Head Office has advised him to just avail of the 30-day leave of absence and then proceed to Manila

since his request would be ultimately granted.

 Acting on the said advice, Suario filed a 30-day leave of absence and proceeded to Manila for

his pre-bar review. During the first week of August 1976, he received a letter from the Asst.

Manager/Cashier, Douglas E. Aurelio ordering him to report for work since his request was denied and

that failure to report for work would be a conclusive proof that he is no longer interested to continue

working thus, considered resigned.

Suario has decided not to report back for work upon believing that his request would eventually

be granted. He later on received another letter with a copy of the application for a Clearance to

terminate on the ground of resignation/abandonment. He failed to file his opposition since the bar

examination was two months away.

During the first week of December 1976, he went to respondent bank but was verbally informed

that he was already dismissed. The lawyers of the bank confirmed that his services were considered

terminated.

Suario filed a complaint against respondent Bank for separation pay, damages and attorney's

fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant but the claim for damages and attorney's fees were

dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with the motion

of reconsideration being denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has erred in denying petitioner's claim for damages and attorney's fees.

Ruling:

No. NLRC has not erred in denying petitioner's claim for damages and attorney's fees.

It is well settled that money claims of workers provided by law over which the Labor Arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction are comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a

dismissed employee against his employer. However, in this case, petitioner Suario is not entitled to his

claim for moral damages.

Moral damages would be recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was not only

effected without authorized cause and/or due process- for which relief is granted by the Labor Code- but

was also attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a

manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy- for which the obtainable relief is determined

by the Civil Code.

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove thart there was malice or bad faith on the part of

the private respondents in terminating him. The records show that private respondents acted in

accordance with the law before effecting petitioner's dismissal.

 Alfredo F. Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court and DM Transit

G.R. No. 72644

December 14, 1987

Narvasa, J.

Facts:

Since August 1, 1974, appellee DM Transit's dispatcher did not assign any bus to be driven by

appellant Primero. No reason or cause was given by the dispatcher for not assigning a bus to Primero.

Appellant pleaded that he be allowed to work and inquiring why he was not allowed to work but

was only given a cold treatment, oftentimes evaded and given confusing information or ridiculed,

humiliated, or sometimes made to wait in the officers of some management personnel of the appellee.

On the 23rd day of appellant's seeking an explanation from the management, he was told by the

General Manager to seek employment with other bus companies because he was already dismissed

from his job. Furthermore, appellee persuaded other firms not to employ Primero.
 Primero instituted proceedings against DM Transit with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,

and for recovery of back wages and reinstatement, to which the claims for back wages and

reinstatement were withdrawn with the end in view of filing a damage suit in a civil court.

The Labor Arbiter ordered DM to pay Primero a separation pay. The judgment was affirmed by

NLRC and by the Secretary of Labor. Afterwards, Primero brought suit against DM in the Court of First

Instance of Rizal seeking recovery of damages but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The judgment

was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the claims for moral and other forms of

damages.

Ruling:

Yes. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the claims for damages.

Recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all cases

or matters arising from employer-employee relations is allowable. The Labor Arbiter possessed original

and exclusive jurisdiction also over claims for moral and other forms of damages .

This would include instances where an employee has been unl

awfully dismissed. In such case, LA has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the

reliefs specifically provided by labor laws but also moral and other forms of damages governed by the

Civil Code. Moral damages would be recoverable where the dismissal was fraud, or constituted an act

oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary morals, good customs or public policy.
 Domiciano Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao and the Honorable Amado G. Inciong, Deputy
Minister, Minister of Labor

G.R. No. L-53364-65

March 16, 1987

Alampay, J.

Facts:

Petitioner was employed as driver of Mercantile Corporation of Davao's (MERCO) deliery van

and was also the President of the MERCO Employees Labor Union (MELU), an affiliate of the Federation

of Free Workers (FFW). Private respondent has conducted an investigation due to reports that petitioner

was carrying on his union activities during his working hours for the purpose of transferring his Union's

affiliation to the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) and for this purpose he was even

utilizing the company vehicle of MERCO, which is in violation of the Company's rule.

Later on, MERCO wrote to FFW asking for a grievance conference. Petitioner manifested his

uniwillingness to attend the grievance conference. Due to this, MERCO suspended petitioner for five (5)
days. The report for the action taken was then filed with the Ministry of Labor.

On the other hand, petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MERCO alleging

that his suspension was on account of his union activities. Petitioner was later placed on preventive

suspension upon pendency of the approval of MERCO's application for clearance to terminate

petitioner's services.

The Regional Director granted private respondent's application to terminate petitioner's

employment and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner for unfair labor practice. Upon appeal, the

Deputy Minister of Labor affirmed the appealed order. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair labor practices.

Ruling:

Yes. The Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide over tha case.

At the initial hearing conducted, it was agreed upon by the parties to consolidate the two cases

since both cases involve the same parties and the issues being interrelated. Petitioner accepted the

jurisdiction of the RD by presenting his evidence thus, he cannot rightfully challenge the resolution made

by the same Director for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner "having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure an affirmative relief

against his opponents, petitioner may not now be allowed to repudiate or question the same jurisdiction

after failing to obtain such relief.

 Molave Motor Sales, Inc. v. Hon. Crispin C. Laron and Pedro Gemeniano

G.R. No. L-65377

May 28, 1984

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

ss

Respondent Judge Laron dismissed the case finding that the sum of money and damages sued

upon arose from employer-employee relationship and that jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
 No. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Molave had sued for monies loaned to Gemeniano, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal

cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to

the Labor Code. The cause of action was one of under the civil laws, and it does not breach any provision

of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of Defendant. Hence, the civil courts should have

jurisdiction.

Claims arising from employer-employee relations are now limited to those mentioned in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217: "2. Those that (involve) workers may file involving wages, hours of

work and other terms and conditions of employment; 3. All money claims of workers, including those

based on non-payment or underpayment or wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other

benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, excepts claims for employees' compensation, social

security, and maternity benefits..."