CASE NO.

53
INSULAR LIFE EAU VS. INSULAR LIFE
L-25291; 30 January 1971

FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter
referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into
separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter
referred to as the Companies).

Unions jointly submitted proposals to the companies ; negotiations were conducted on the Union’s
proposals but were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop. A notice of strike for deadlock on
collective bargaining was filed by union.Subsequently,87 unionist that were reclassified as supervisors
and eventually resigned from the union without any increase to their salaries. Company offered
reinstatement and attempted to bribe.Meanwhile, upon the ultimatum of the company, striking employees
decided to report back to work and secured clearances to City Fiscal’s Office. CIR Prosecutor filed a
complaint of unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice.

HELD:
YES. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their
jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an
active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives

The court ruled further that the company undermine the concerted activities of the employees, an activity
to which they are entitled free from the employer’s molestation. Indeed, respondent offered reinstatement
ad attempted to bribe so they would abadon the strike and return to work. Company is guilty of strike-
breaking and union busting and unfair labor practice
 CASE NO. 54
MANILA HOTELVS. PINES HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION
L-30818; 24 September 1972

FACTS:
The Pines Hotel and the abrupt termination of all its employees as of the same date, petitioner's board of
directors had likewise approved the payment of retirement gratuity to the greater remainder of seventy
(70) [of a total 86] employees who had not completed 20 years of service and were not qualified under the
Retirement Law, R.A. No. 186, at the rate of "one month salary for every year of service, but not
exceeding twelve months.

Respondent court appealed for the payment of the said remainders employees of retirement gratuity of
"one month salary for every year of service, but not exceeding twelve months" as offered and agreed to
by petitioner.After the termination of employment of the individual complainants, the Board of Directors
of the Manila Hotel Company, deliberated and decided to extend some monetary benefits to the
terminated employees who are incidentally members of complainant union. This deliberation was
formally reduced to writing in a subsequent meeting.

Finally, the company admitted that former employees of the Manila Hotel Company in Manila were given
one month pay for every year of service but not exceeding twelve (12) months when their services were
terminated .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the greater remainder employees are entitled to retirement gratuity pay in relation to the
termination of services

HELD:
YES. The court ruled that Manila Hotel Company should deposit with the Court the amount of
P103,856.30 in order to meet the total claims of the workers less their one-month advance pay.The court
further held with reference to Case L-30139 involving payment of retirement gratuity to the sixteen (16)
qualified employees,the respondent court is directed to make the corresponding verification that their
accountabilities to the Government Service Insurance System as such members-employees are fully
discharged before final payment of the amounts found due to them under the appealed order is affirmed
and made.
 CASE NO. 55
SALUNGA VS. CIR
L-22456; 27 September 1967

FACTS:
Petitioner is an employee of San Miguel Brewery, Inc. and a member of PAFLU.Petitioner by being a
member of PAFLU adheres to its CBA that upon resignation from latter he would be forfeiting his
position to the company. Due to open criticism by petitioner to the union, he had been treated badly and
teased by the members of the latter, which prompt his resignation.

The Union accepted his resignation and transmitted it to the company. Company informed petitioner that
his resignation would result in the termination of his employment, in view of Section 3 of the
CBA.Petitioner wrote to the Union a letter withdrawing or revoking his resignation and advising the
Union to continue deducting his monthly union dues.

The union did not accept his withdrawal and urged company to implement the CBA. Petitoner notified the
union that it was appealing to the PAFLU National Convention, hence urging to defer his case pending
appeal. Notwithstanding such appeal, he was given notice of dismmised. Hence, petitioner filed unfair
labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salunga should be readmitted

HELD:

YES. Petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union and is entitled to reinstatement as
member of the Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without
prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne
exclusively by the Union. 
 CASE NO. 56
KIOK LOY VS. NLRC AND KILUSAN
L-54334; 22 January 1956

FACTS:
The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently
certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.

The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At
the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and
remained unacted upon by the Company. Subsequently, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining.Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But
all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed.

     The case was brought to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. In this case,the Company requested for a lot of
postponements. NLRC ruled that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain,
in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.  

ISSUE: 
Whether the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established that (1)
respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain,
accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only
once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter
proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. Petition
dismissed for lack of merit.
 CASE NO. 57
DIVINE WORD V. SOL
GR. 91915; 11 September 1992

FACTS:
Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the Divine Word University. Subsequently, the Divine Union submitted its collective bargaining
proposals.

After almost three years, the DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated Labor Union
(ALU), requested a conference for the purpose of continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. A
follow-up letter was sent regarding their request but the University persisted in maintaining
silence.DWUEU -ALU filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice
acts, specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on employees.

After the filing of the notice of strike, a conference was held which led to the conclusion of an agreement
between the University and DWUEU-ALU. However, it turned out that the University had filed a petition
for certification election. On the other hand,DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its
collective bargaining proposals but these were ignored by the University.Med-Arbiter Milado issued an
Order directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and “no
union,” after he found the petition to be “well-supported in fact and in law.

The case was brought by DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion on the
matter of the certification election but SOLE dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU-ALU for
unfair labor practice on the   ground of the union’s failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor
practice acts specifically complained of but also the complaint filed by the University for unfair labor
practices and illegal strike for “obvious lack of merit brought about by its utter failure to submit
evidence.”The DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with violation of
the return-to-work order which was previously ordered by the Secretary of Labor and unfair labor
practices such as dismissal of union officers, coercion of employees and illegal suspension.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a refusal to bargain or an impasse in bargaining.

HELD:
YES. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which
defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as “the performance of a mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith.” Moreover, by filing the petition for certification
election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated the mandate of Art. 19
of the Civil Code that “(e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 CASE NO. 58
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEE VS. NESTLE PHILIPPINES
GR. NO. 158944-45; 3 March 2005

FACTS:
UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestlé
belonging to the latter’s Alabang and Cabuyao plants. Before the expriation of the existing CBA between
the Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU, informed Nestle of ther intent to open new Collective Bargaining
Negotaitaion for the next 3 years. Nestle acknowledged the letter and ready to prepare its own counter-
proposal.

In another letter, Nestle underscored its position that “unilaterral grants, one-time company grants,
company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan,
Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of
CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.”

On despite 15 meetings between them, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. 
However, the company requested the NCMB to conduct preventive mediation proceedings between them. 
Conciliation proceedings nevertheless proved ineffective.
 
Nestlé and UFE-DFA-KMU filed their respective position papers. Nestlé addressed several issues
concerning economic provisions of the CBA as well as the non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement
Plan in the collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, UFE-DFA-KMU limited itself to the
issue of whether or not the retirement plan was a mandatory subject in its CBA negotiations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the company is guilty of ULP when it considers some economic benefits as unilaterally
granted and therefore excluded from CBA negotiations.

HELD:
NO. The court affirmed the CA in holding Nestle free and clear from ULP. The parties are directed to
resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan. It is not enough that the union believed that the
employer committed acts of ULP when the circumtances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to
warrant such belief. Nestle, therefore, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as unilaterally
granted.
 CASE NO. 59
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V. HON. ROLDAN-CONFESOR
GR. NO. 114974; 16 June 2004

FACTS:
Standard Chartered Bank is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines.The exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees
Union (the Union, for brevity).The Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. 

Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and the Union, the
Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Bank’s Human Resource Manager and head of the
negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team.
The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno(head of the negotiating team for the bank) suggested to
Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the
federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Union’s negotiating panel. However,
Umali was retained as a member thereof.

The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union violated its no strike- no lockout
clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an
illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Union alleged unfair labor practice when the bank
allegedly interfered with the Union’s choice of negotiator.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was interference with its choice of negotiator
2. Whether or not the bank committed “surface bargaining”.

HELD:
1. NONE. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial
evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at
bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude
Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an
unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization
necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in
the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a
representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to
yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective
bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the
Labor Code is committed.

2. NONE. Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating” without any
legal intent to reach an agreement.” The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done
acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach
an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union . Admittedly,
the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that
the duty to bargain “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
 concession. Hence, the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for
violation of the duty to bargai
CASE NO. 60
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER V. NLRC
124224; 17 March 2000

FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for the rank and
file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc.(petitioner). NFL started to negotiate for better
terms and conditions of employment; which were met with resistance by Petitioner Company.
The NFL filed a complaint for unfair labor practice on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively.

Labor Arbiter issued an order declaring the company guilty of ULP and ordering the
CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between parties. Later, in their petition, the 186 of
private respondents claiming they were wrongfully excluded from the benefits under the CBA filed
a petition for relief. Petitioner asserts that private respondents are not parties to the agreement and may
not claim benefits thereunder. As for the CBA, petitioner maintains that the force and effect of the CBA’s
terms are limited to only three years and cannot extend to terms and conditions which ceased to have
force and effect.

ISSUES:
1. W/hether or not the terms of an existing CBA as to its economic provisions can be extended beyond the
period stipulated therein, even beyond the three year period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new
agreement.
2. Whether or nto the rank and file employees hired after the term of the CBA, considering their
subsequent membership in the bargaining unit, are parties to the agreement and may claim benefits
thereunder.

HELD:
1. Yes. It is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has been executed by and between the parties; they
are duly bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement.

In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered between the parties pending appeal of the decision in
the NLRC. Consequently, the employees from to the year 1985 (after expiration of the CBA) onwards
would be deprived of a substantial amount of monetary benefits if the terms and conditions of the CBA
were not to remain in force and effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Code to curb labor
unrest and promote industrial peace.

2. Yes. When a CBA is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the
non-union members are entitled to the benefits of the contract. A laborer can claim benefits from a CBA
entered into the company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the
agreement even after he has resigned from said union. Therefore, the benefits under the CBA should be
extended to those who only became such after it expired; to exclude them would constitute undue
discrimination
 CASE NO. 61
SMC UNION V. HON. CONFESOR
GR. NO. 11262, 19 September 1996

FACTS: 
Petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union — PTGWO entered into a CBA with private
respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on
June 30, 1989.This CBA was renegotiated and provided that the agreement shall remain in force until
June 30, 1992, but in accordance to Art. 253-A of Labor Code as amended. The term of this Agreement
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, shall be for five (5) years from July 1, 1989 to June 30,
1994. Hence, the freedom period for purposes of such representation shall be sixty (60) days prior to June
30, 1994. Meanwhile, effective October 1, 1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-
off and became two separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel
Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect.As a result of
spin-offs:

1. Each of the companies are run by, supervised and controlled by different management teams including
separate human resource/personnel managers.
2. Each Company enforces its own administrative and operational rules and policies and are not
dependent on each other in their operations.
3. Each entity maintains separate financial statements and are audited separately from each other. 

During negotiations, the petitoner-union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still include the
employees of the spun-off corporations, Magnolia and SMFI, and the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall
be effective only for the remaining two years until June 30, 1994. SMC, on the otherhand, contended that
the members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI automatically ceased to be part of the
bargaining unit at the SMC and that, CBA should be effective three years in accordance with Art. 253-A
of the Labor Code.

ISSUES:
 1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for three years of
for only two years; and
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.

HELD: 
1. Pertinent to the first issue, In the event however, that the parties, by mutual agreement, enter into
a renegotiated contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the said
5-year term, and said agreement is ratified by majority of the members in the bargaining unit, the
subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties.
2. With respect to the second issue, there is, likewise, no merit in petitioner-union's assertion and
SMFI should still be considered part of the bargaining unit of SMC. They were advised that upon
the expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated between the management of the
new corporations and the bargaining representatives of the employees concerned.Indubitably,
therefore, Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. Thus,
they can not belong to a single bargaining unit.
 CASE NO. 62
RIVERA V. ESPIRITU
GR NO. 135547; 23 January 2002

FACTS:
PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week
strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier.PAL was suffering from a difficult
financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and
downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day
strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by airlines in July 1998. PAL ceased operations nad
sent notices of termination to its employees on Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President seeking for intervention. Among others, it proposed the
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA
members accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operation
and on same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998
agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

HELD:
YES.  CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the
result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial
situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial
peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.

There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code.  CBA under Article
253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability.
Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said
agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable,
wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the
parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the
same. In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground employees,
that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year
suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right
to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.
 CASE NO. 63
PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT V. NLRC
GR. NO.88957 25 June 1992
FACTS:
PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of electronic productsIn the
CBA covering the years 1987 to 1989, it was agreed upon that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of
service engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit
would be submitted for arbitration. Labor Arbirter Amansec rendered a decision declaring that the
Division Secretaries and all staff of general management, personnel, industrial relations department,
secretaries of audit, EDP financial system are confidential employees and as such are hereby deemed
excluded in the bargaining unit. NLRC reversed the decision of Labor arbirter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not secretaries may be part of the existing bargaining unit for the rank and file employess of
PIDI.

HELD:
NO.The Office of the Solicitor General supports the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and refuses
to uphold the position of the NLRC. It holds the view that the division Secretaries; the staff members of
General Management, Personnel and the Industrial Relations Department; and the secretaries of Audit,
EDP and Financial Systems, are disqualified from joining the PEO-FFW as they are confidential
employees. They cannot even form a union of their own for, as held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-
Calleja, This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and
telegraph operators, who having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue
advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy or, spies of either party to a collective
bargaining agreement. This is specially true in the present case where the petitioning Union is already the
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees in the establishment. To allow the confidential
employees to join the existing Union of the rank-and-file would be in violation of the terms of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature of their functions/
positions are expressly excluded.
 CASE NO. 64
NACUSIP V. HON.CALLEJA
GR. NO. 89609;27 January 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a
legitimate national labor organization while private respondent National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization.

Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon) based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental
employs about five hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three hundred (300) on off-
milling season.Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and employer Dacongcogon entered into a CBA for
a term of three years. When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon
negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three years with reservation to negotiate
for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment.

However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases and optional retirement. The
parties agreed on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and further
study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and convened, with a
representative of the DOLE, acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.

Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for certification election among the rank and file workers of
Dacongcogon. Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition alleging that it was
filed out of time and there is a deadlock of CBA negotiation between forced intervenor and respondent-
central.Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
directed the conduct of certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon. Director
Calleja of BLR reversed the order of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day freedom period.

HELD:
NO. A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that: the Med-Arbiter shall
immediately order the conduct of a certification election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60)
days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom
period shall be dismissed outright. The sixty-day freedom period based on the original collective
bargaining agreement shall not be affected by any amendment, extension or renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement for purposes of certification election.
 CASE NO. 65
UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU) V. DIR. BITONIO JR.
GR. NO. 131235, 16 November 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellees are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a
subsisting five-year CBA with UST. Some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with Med-Arbirter
directed againts appellees and the members of the COMELEC, that the COMELEC was not constituted in
accordance with USTFU’s constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern
the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election. Med-Arbiter issued a TRO enjoining the conduct of
elections.

However, a general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by
members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by “non-USTFU members who are
members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit”. On this
occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands.
Appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31
May 2001. Said CBA was ratified by a majority of the UST faculty community.

ISSUE: Whether or not the election of the officers in this case was valid.

HELD:
NO. The importance of a union’s constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized. They embody a
covenant between a union and its members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members’
rights and obligations. As such, the union’s constitution and bylaws should be upheld, as long as they are
not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.
A union election is held pursuant to the union’s constitution and by-laws, and the right to vote in it is
enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be distinguished from a certification election,
which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective bargaining.  Specifically, the
purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be
represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization.There are procedures to be followed in the conduct of election. Thus, the October 4, 1996
election cannot properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down in the USTFU’s
CBL for the election of officers was not followed. It could not have been a certification election either,
because representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election was not followed.
The participation of non-union members in the election aggravated its irregularity.
 CASE NO. 66
R. TRANSPORTATION V. LAGUESMA
GR.NO. 105830; 16 November 1993

FACTS:
Respondent-appellant on the need to consolidate the separate petitions for certification election because
they involve the same bargaining unit. Case No. NCR-OD-M-91-10-058 should be consolidated with that
of Case No. NCR- OD-M-91-05-062, where the petition of NAFLU should be treated as an intervention
and resolved by the Med-Arbiter together with the intervention of ALU-TUCP. The Order of the Med-
Arbiter calling for the conduct of the certification election is hereby affirmed subject to the resolution of
the Med-Arbiter of the motions for intervention. Petitioner further argued that the second petition for a
certification election by respondent CLOP, NAFLU and ALU-TUCP were barred at least for a period of
one year from the time the first petition of CLOP was dismissed pursuant to Section Rule V, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended

Undersecretary Laguesma in a resolution denied the motion to suspend the conduct of the certification
election on the ground that: “The pendency of NLRC-NCR Cases before the NLRC is not a valid ground
for the suspension of the already stalled petition for certification election which must be resolved with
dispatch. This must be so, because the employees subject of the pending cases before the NLRC legally
remain as employees of respondent until the motion to declare them as having lost their employment
status by reason of the illegal strike or their complaint for illegal dismissal is finally resolved.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the employment status of the members of CLOP who joined the must be first be resolved
before a certification election can be conducted?

HELD:
The petition is without merit and resolved to dismiss the petition. As  held  in  the  case  of  Philippine
Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. vs. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992): “At any rate, it is now well-settled
that employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, un-abandoned right to or
expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar
whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could
still qualify to vote in the elections.” Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike,
legally remain as such, until either the motion to declare their employment status legally terminated or
their complaint for illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.