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Recommended Security Guidelines For Airport Planning
Recommended Security Guidelines For Airport Planning
Recommended Security Guidelines For Airport Planning
Revised:
June 2001
TECHNICAL REPORT
DOCUMENTATION PAGE
This report was developed under the auspices of the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning,
and the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ. This supercedes the 1993 document
DOT/FAA/CS-93-1 “Recommended Security Guidelines for New Airport Construction and Major Renovations”,
and is intended to provide airport architects, planners, designers and engineers with guidelines and
recommendations that address numerous changes in aviation security concepts, technology, threat environment and
operational requirements which have occurred in recent years.
It has long been recognized that most airports in the United States were built prior to the development of today's
extensive security regulations, and that their designs have often proven to be incongruent with many basic security
requirements. This document has been developed to assist in the design of security-based requirements at the
earliest possible stages of planning. It features checklists useful to the airport operator, designer and engineer, and
to the FAA prior to the approval of security construction plans.
The recommendations contained in this document have been developed by a Committee of more than 100 persons
and organizations with broad technical expertise from FAA, airports, aircraft operators, consultants, architects,
engineers, fire code officials, law enforcement organizations, government agencies such as FBI, INS, and Customs,
private corporate volunteers and industry trade associations such as the Airport Consultants Council, Airports
Council International, American Association of Airport Executives, and Regional Airline Association, among
others. The recommendations reflect the Committee’s best judgment not only on the current emphasis on the need
to identify critical security requirements and to incorporate them prior to and during the planning and design of
new or expanded airport facilities, but also their best cumulative judgment as to the short and long term
development of regulatory requirements which will have an extensive effect on how security technology and
design will evolve and how they will be applied in the airport's operational environment.
17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement
Security Design Construction Guidelines
Open
Airport Design Recommendations
Airport planner Security Engineering
Planning Architect
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price
Unclassified Unclassified 192
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
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NOTICE
NOTICE
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of
Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government
assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
This document does not contain regulatory language. It is not intended to suggest that any recommendations or
guidelines contained herein might be considered as mandatory requirements to be imposed upon airports or airlines,
nor are these recommendations and guidelines intended to suggest any specific or general criteria to be met in order
to qualify for Federal funding. There are recommendations and guidelines contained in this document that might be
considered highly beneficial in one airport environment while being virtually impossible to implement at another
airport. The purpose of the document is to provide as extensive a list of options, ideas, and suggestions as possible
for the airport architect, designer, planner and engineer to choose from when first considering the security
requirements in the early planning and design of new or renovated airport facilities.
This document provides numerous references to and citations from other government and industry sources. These
are not intended to be modified by this document in any way, and are generally intended to refer to the most current
version of such external resources, to which the reader should go for detailed information.
This document is also available in electronic/digital format. The electronic version contains an extensive array of
hypertext links throughout, cross-referencing the reader among various inter-related sections and concepts. To
obtain a copy of the document in electronic form, please contact the security coordinator at:
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This document is intended to bring to the attention of the airport planning, design, and engineering community the
serious security concerns which must be considered for incorporation into an airport design at the earliest possible
planning stage, in order to bring the most efficient and cost-effective security solutions to bear. An undertaking as
extensive and comprehensive as this document requires the participation and cooperation of a wide range of aviation
security professionals, contributing their time, experience, knowledge and insight so that those who follow may
learn from the experiences of the past and anticipate the needs of the future.
There were over 100 persons who attended meetings and participated in document reviews. A few chaired
subcommittees which drafted entire new sections, most participants rewrote outdated material, submitted technical
documents, edited drafts, and brought real-world perspectives to the table, advising the Committee on ideas that
would, and would not, work in an operating airport environment. This document is not intended to be the final
definitive word on airport security design; it is meant to be used first as a primer on the security issues important to
airport design, and then as a check-list of some of the more important things one must consider when deciding
which of the many concepts offered are appropriate to their design and to the airport's requirements.
We wish to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of all the participating organizations and persons listed below.
Special thanks also go to:
Rick Lazarick of the FAA Technical Center, who saw the need for such a document and made it happen;
Bob Cammaroto of FAA Security who kept the Committee's efforts consistent with the FAA's regulations and
longterm security goals;
Art Kosatka of FAA who chaired the meetings and provided oversight for the compilation of the various submittals;
Suzanne Guzik of CTI Consulting who did the great bulk of the real work in editing and restructuring the document
several times as it evolved, as well as providing her extensive professional security expertise, and to
Theresa Coutu of Invision Technologies and
Michael Patrick of TAMS and Leo A. Daly, both Subcommittee Chairs who took on enormous burdens in providing
two key sections of the document in the Checked Baggage section and the Security Screening Point sections,
respectively. Their respective Subcommittee members provided a wealth of insight and knowledge from both
operational and academic points of view, without which this document would be incomplete.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Rick Lazarick FAA Tech Center AAR-510 Al Graser Port Authority NY & NJ
Paul Polski FAA Tech Center R & D Nancy Johnson Port Authority NY & NJ
Beverly Wright Fed. Bureau of Investigation Michael Brant Portland Int'l Airport
Alex Kerr Federal Express Corp. Joseph Duquette Raytheon
Barbara Churchill Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood Apt Vollie Fields Raytheon
Dirk Herberz Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood Apt Deborah McElroy Regional Airline Assoc.
Charles Chambers Global Aviation Associates Michael Spitzer Reynolds, Smith & Hills, Inc
Parker McClellan Greater Orlando Aviation Auth Mark Brewer RIAC
Jim Sheppard Greater Orlando Aviation Auth Dan McAteer Ross & Baruzzini
Lee Tillotson Greater Orlando Aviation Auth Christer Wilkinson Ross & Baruzzini
Richard Duncan Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport Ray Blackwell Schiff & Associates
Robert Cline Jr. HKS Inc Charles Blood Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport
Scott Hyde HTNB Richard A. Ottele Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport
Marion White HOK P. Clancy Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport
Murray Cooper Honeywell Technology Center M. Moran Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport
Brian Krafthefer Honeywell Technology Lou Kirk Sextant Technologies
Bob Hutnick Immig. & Naturalization Svc Brian Nasky Sunland Engineering
Paul Rodgers Immig & Naturalization Svc Archie Lind Swanson Rink
Michael Fufidio Intellikey Larry Smith Tampa Int'l Airport
Theresa Coutu InVision Technologies, Inc. Michael Patrick TAMS Consultants, Inc.
Rick Muntz InVision Technologies, Inc. Eric Miller TransSolutions
Vince Staten Jackson Municipal Apt Auth Cenk Tunasar TransSolutions
Warren Kroeppel LaGuardia Int'l Airport Thomas O'Sullivan Tucson Airport Authority
Michael Patrick Leo A. Daly Architects Michael Rodriguez Turner Associates
Michael Gearhart Lockwood-Greene Jeff Dunaway United Parcel Service
Richard DeNeufville Massachusetts Inst of Tech Bob Baker URS Greiner
Joe Lawless Massachusetts Port Authority John Spencer URS Greiner
Steve Koranda Matrix Systems Pam Zaresk U.S. Customs
Vincent Caponi Metropolitan Washington Apt Auth Sharan Sharp U.S. Dept of Transportation
Mark Torbeck Midway Airlines Glenn P. Johnson, Jr. Victims of PanAm 103
Jo Edblom Minneapolis/St. Paul Airport Robert Monetti Victims of PanAm 103
Duane McGray Nashville Int'l Airport Mike Ellenbogen Vivid Technologies
Tom Jensen National Safe Skies Alliance
Jay Dombrowski Northwest Airlines
Jim Carter Piedmont Triad Int'l Airport
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I - OVERVIEW
Section A - Introduction............................................................................................................ 1
Section B - Applicability ........................................................................................................... 1
Section C - Purpose ................................................................................................................... 2
Section D - Background ............................................................................................................ 3
Section E - Coordination........................................................................................................... 3
Section F – Changing Security Concerns and Contingency Measures................................. 4
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Section C - Landside................................................................................................................ 33
1. Landside Roads..............................................................................................................................................33
2. Landside Parking...........................................................................................................................................33
a. Terminal Patron Parking ..............................................................................................................................33
b. Employee Parking........................................................................................................................................34
3. Landside Vulnerable Areas ..........................................................................................................................34
4. Landside Facilities .........................................................................................................................................34
a. Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA) .............................................................................................34
b. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations ....................................................................................................34
c. Intermodal Transportation Area...................................................................................................................35
d. Rental Car Storage Areas.............................................................................................................................35
5. Off-Airport Emergency Response ................................................................................................................35
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Section F - Access Control and Alarm Monitoring Systems (ACAMS) ........................... 112
1. Power ............................................................................................................................................................112
2. Data and Communications..........................................................................................................................112
3. Security System Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................112
a. Limited Grouping ......................................................................................................................................112
b. Maintenance Accessibility.........................................................................................................................112
4. Design, Procedures and Personnel .............................................................................................................113
a. Choice of Equipment .................................................................................................................................113
b. Equipment Placement ................................................................................................................................113
1) Terminal ................................................................................................................................................113
2) Site ........................................................................................................................................................113
c. Procedures and Personnel ..........................................................................................................................113
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c. Network Accessibility................................................................................................................................119
d. Information Storage Availability ...............................................................................................................119
5. Future Rough-Ins/Preparations .................................................................................................................120
6. Telecom Rooms ............................................................................................................................................120
7. Radio Frequency (RF).................................................................................................................................120
a. Environmental Considerations...................................................................................................................120
1) Electromagnetic Environment ...............................................................................................................120
2) Physical Environment ...........................................................................................................................120
b. Regulations ................................................................................................................................................121
c. Installation Considerations.........................................................................................................................121
d. Communications........................................................................................................................................121
e. Other Considerations .................................................................................................................................121
f. Wireless LANS ..........................................................................................................................................122
g. Considerations Related to the Use of RFID Devices for Security .............................................................122
1) Antenna Pointing and Equipment Placement ........................................................................................122
2) Choke Effects Integral to Construction .................................................................................................122
3) Other Lessons Learned..........................................................................................................................123
8. Information Assurance for Airport (Re)Construction .............................................................................123
a. Threats .......................................................................................................................................................123
b. Features of Assured Information ...............................................................................................................123
c. Techniques to Provide Information Assurance ..........................................................................................123
1) Privacy...................................................................................................................................................123
2) Authentication .......................................................................................................................................124
3) Integrity .................................................................................................................................................124
4) Scalability..............................................................................................................................................124
5) Availability............................................................................................................................................124
d. Data Transport Vulnerabilities ..................................................................................................................124
Section I - Beyond Our Borders: Aviation Security Design in the U.K............................ 127
1. Roads ............................................................................................................................................................127
2. Car Parks (Parking Lots)............................................................................................................................127
3. Blast Effects..................................................................................................................................................127
4. Lighting ........................................................................................................................................................128
5. Space Requirements of the Passenger Search Area..................................................................................128
6. Screening Office Accommodation ..............................................................................................................129
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PART IV - APPENDICES
Appendix E - Glossary
Appendix F - Bibliography
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PART I
OVERVIEW
PART I
OVERVIEW
Section A - Introduction
This document presents recommendations for incorporating sound security considerations into the planning, design,
construction, and modification of airport terminal buildings and other security-related airport facilities. It consolidates
information developed through the participation of Federal Aviation Administration, government, and aviation industry
professionals, and incorporates a wealth of knowledge. This knowledge was gained through the recent experiences of a
broad range of aviation security programs and projects at numerous United States airports, and through the continuing
efforts of government and industry to develop improved approaches to incorporating cost-effective security features
into the early planning and design of airport facilities. The information is presented here in a single document, which
may be revised and updated periodically as regulations, security requirements, and technology change.
Section B - Applicability
These guidelines are provided for consideration by aviation user-agencies (airport operators, aircraft operators, airport
tenants) as well as airport planners, designers, architects, engineers and consultants engaged in airport facility planning,
design or construction projects, but the reader must be aware that these recommendations may not represent the only
approaches available. Recommendations included in this document are intended to bring a wide range of security
considerations to the attention of those persons planning and designing projects both at existing and new airports. Some
of the recommendations contained in these guidelines will have broad application at many diverse airport facilities,
while others will only apply to a limited number of airports, facilities or security situations. All airport planning, design
and construction projects, whether having security-specific components, equipment or features or not, should be
reviewed against these guidelines for applicable considerations and coordination since any airport project’s successful
conclusion will affect current and future physical and procedural security requirements.
Certain portions of this document will also outline many of the procedural aspects necessary to the operational
process being described, extending well beyond the proposed design and construction concepts. These are integrated
here with the express purpose of acting as a brief tutorial in an area otherwise little known to the designer/architect.
It is very important to understand the complexities of the entire process and the alternatives they offer to the
operator, and thus to the designer, before a design can appropriately accommodate the space allocation, queuing,
equipment, power, and communications requirements, and other such needs. It is further hoped that this document
will serve to facilitate meaningful discussion between the designers, the airport and the aircraft operators, to help
them to know and understand the terms, concepts and needs, and to apply the information in a cost-effective manner
to meet the requirements of each unique site and situation.
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PART I
OVERVIEW
Section C - Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide early guidance to those responsible for and affected by the planning and
design of airport facilities. Use of this document at the start of the airport planning and design process will help to
ensure that security needs are adequately considered. More importantly, this document contains “checklists” to ensure
the coordination, consideration and inclusion of security features in an efficient and effective manner. Security features
that have been factored into initial airport facility design are more likely to be cost-effective, better integrated and more
operationally useful than those superimposed on existing structures through add-ons or change orders. Likewise,
security features which have been coordinated early in the planning and design process with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and other appropriate regulatory bodies, as well as with airport tenants (aircraft operators,
catering, concessions) and end-users (law enforcement, public safety and regulatory agencies, and airport operations
and maintenance personnel) will likely be more well-received and accepted, and thus more widely used and successful.
The guidelines attempt to identify key security concerns and concepts that should be factored into the planning and
design of airport facilities. Essential considerations include the need to:
1. Restrict access to the Air Operations Area (AOA), Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and secured areas,
which are defined in U.S. CFR 14 Part 107 (hereinafter referred to as Federal Aviation Regulation 107, or FAR 107);
2. Control the flow of people from landside to airside and from airside to landside;
3. Provide for efficient security screening of persons and property into sterile areas as described in U.S. CFR 14
Part 108, (hereinafter referred to as Federal Aviation Regulation 108, or FAR 108); including consideration for
queuing space during peak loads;
4. Separate critical areas;
5. Protect vulnerable areas and assets;
6. Protect aircraft, people, and property;
7. Address blast mitigation measures;
8. Provide adequate space for checked baggage Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) and devices;
9. Provide adequate space for trace detection equipment at screening points;
10. Provide adequate space for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations such as robots and threat containment
vessels.
The guidelines identify specific airport areas requiring special attention in the planning process, and are intended to
result in systems that will not hamper operations, cause undue economic burdens, or turn airports into “armed
fortresses.” At the same time, the guidelines must not be interpreted to mandate specific requirements to be met by
any airports. There are numerous solutions to any one physical security problem, and the architects, planners, and
designers are urged to examine and consider all potential avenues before selecting the solution that best addresses
their airport’s needs in a responsive and cost-effective manner.
Users of these guidelines are reminded that the application of physical security equipment and structures (barriers, access
control, screening and detection equipment) is fully effective only if augmented and supported by similarly effective
human procedures. These include ID systems, challenge procedures, personnel security training and procedures,
maintenance training and procedures, as well as constant oversight and vigilance. Appropriate early coordination during
planning and design with airport law enforcement agencies, fire code officials, building code officials, model code
officials, operations and maintenance personnel, and other end-users must occur for effective and efficient airport security.
This document recognizes that no security system is foolproof, and the guidelines include several recommendations
on ways of minimizing injury and damage in the event of a successful criminal or terrorist attack.
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PART I
OVERVIEW
Section D - Background
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (PL 101-604) mandated that the FAA work with the aviation
industry to develop guidelines for airport design and construction to allow for maximum-security enhancement. This
legislation was influenced by recommendations made by the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism and recognizes that the designs of many existing airport structures frequently do not accommodate the
application of appropriate security measures.
A careful review of the prevalent threat environment and consideration of minimum applicable standards prior to
finalization of plans will help to determine an airport’s most appropriate security posture. Such a review may also
help to reduce a later reliance upon labor-intensive procedures and equipment. Inclusion of airport security expertise
early in the planning process will result in a better-coordinated and more cost effective approach to security.
There are numerous advantages to incorporating security concerns into the airport planning and design at the earliest
phases. Timely consideration of such needs is almost guaranteed to result in cost effective, less obtrusive, and more
efficient security systems. Such systems are less likely to engender passenger complaints or employee resistance.
Proper planning can also result in reduced manpower requirements and consequential reductions in airport and
aircraft operator overhead expenses.
Newly available technological tools such as vulnerability/risk analysis and bomb blast analysis programs can reduce
guesswork and minimize certain expenditures in new structures. (See Appendix A and Appendix C)
Section E - Coordination
For new construction or extensive renovation, airport facility planners and designers should encourage the early
involvement of Airport Security Committee and/or consortium members. These include the affected aircraft
operators and tenants, fire code officials, building code officials, and local FAA civil aviation security and other
regulatory officials. Their role is to assist planners and designers to factor the appropriate security and safety
perspective into designs for immediate security concerns and to accommodate anticipated long-term expansion and
regulatory changes where possible. Early security-oriented reviews of design plans can alert project managers to
potential integrated security approaches, which are highly effective as well as operationally and economically
suitable. Local security officials can also assist planners by providing current assessments of the local security
environment. These assessments should focus on prevalent sources of threat, past history of criminal/violent
activities likely to impact airport security, and could include recommended countermeasures.
Careful attention must be given to coordination with the regulatory requirements found in FAR 107, FAR 108, and
FAR 109, and the sometimes-overlapping areas of control and managerial jurisdiction spelled out in the respective
airport’s Airport Security Program (ASP).
Careful consideration should be given to the needs of law enforcement, security, and safety support personnel during
airport facility planning, design, or renovation. Planners and designers are urged to coordinate with local and federal
law enforcement and life safety agencies, K-9 and EOD response elements, and, where relevant, local
representatives of Federal Inspection Service (FIS) agencies.
The specific needs of FIS facilities (Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Public Health Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service) are addressed in “Guidelines for Federal Inspection
Facilities at Airports.” At the time of publication of this document, the FIS agencies anticipate publication of an entirely
new series of security guidelines and recommendations to supersede their existing 1994 document. The reader should refer
to the most current FIS Guidelines when accommodating those agencies’ requirements in an airport design. For related
information contained within this document, see the Federal Inspection Services Areas section on page 88.
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PART I
OVERVIEW
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PART II
INITIAL PLANNING AND
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
PART II
INITIAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Section A - General
Planning for security should be an integral part of any project undertaken at an airport. The most efficient and cost-
effective method of instituting security measures into any facility or operation is through advance planning and
continuous monitoring throughout the project. Selecting, constructing, or modifying a facility without considering
the security implications of the general public and airport personnel can result in costly modifications and delays.
Physical security programs should be administered based on applicable federal, state, and local regulations and
policies to ensure the protection of the general public, airport personnel, and assets (including information systems).
At a minimum, a physical security program should include:
1. A physical security survey to evaluate the security of an existing airport or a comprehensive security prospectus
evaluating a new facility or site;
2. Periodic inspections to ascertain whether a security program and its implementation meet pertinent federal,
state, and local standards or regulations;
3. A comprehensive and continuing security awareness and education effort to gain the interest and support of
employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors; and
4. Implementing procedures for taking immediate, positive and orderly action to safeguard life and property
during an emergency.
Once a project has been identified, the airport’s planning and design team may consider consulting experts in the
field of civil aviation security. Such expertise is available from several sources, including FAA, professional
associations and private consultants. The team should coordinate with the appropriate federal, state and local
security personnel. The coordination should continue through the contracting process, actual construction,
installation and training. Appropriate personnel should be provided with all pertinent information, including
timelines, status reports and points of contact.
To ensure there is a systematic approach to acquiring and analyzing the information necessary to support decision-
makers in the protection of assets and the allocation of security resources, all security specialists should refer to the
applicable federal, state, and local requirements and standards referenced in this guide.
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4. Recordkeeping
In addition to physical protection and other protection and prevention criteria, airports may also have a need for
keeping records of incidents, personnel access, or other activities. Some of the records (such as personnel
access) may need to be maintained automatically and/or electronically. In such cases, these recordkeeping needs
may affect designs and equipment locations as well as require considerations for secure data storage and should
be coordinated early in the design process.
5. Delegations of Responsibility
At facilities where the airport (via an FAA-approved ASP required under FAR 107) has delegated protection
authority for a designated portion of the facility to a tenant or aircraft operator, virtually all protection
responsibilities may be transferred to the tenant or aircraft operator, including procurement, installation,
maintenance of physical security equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard
contracts. Normally, the airport will retain responsibility for law enforcement, monitoring of alarms, requests
for criminal investigations, and fire and facility safety and health inspections. This type of agreement between
airport and aircraft operator is known as an “exclusive use area agreement,” or in the case of other airport
tenants, a “tenant security program.” There may also be Letters of Understanding among nearby jurisdictions to
provide assistance to each other during emergencies, but typically these are simply promises to give aid, not
delegations of authority.
6. Design Factors
It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered from the design phase on, so that conduit
runs and system wiring, rough-ins, heavy-duty materials, reinforcing devices, and other necessary construction
requirements are provided in the original plans.
7. Seismic Requirements
This section provides information referencing various state and federal legislation addressing seismic safety.
While much seismic engineering and mitigation guidance exists in the form of state and local codes, directives
and ordinances, these requirements focus only on acts that are currently in effect, not those being proposed for
future planning and design needs.
The existence of these laws does not necessarily indicate that they fully meet their intent, or that they
necessarily accomplish their objectives. Some are considered more or less effective than others, and even some
weaker ones may be enforced to a greater extent than others. Architects, Engineers and Contractors should
refer to further resources for information or expert opinion about the appropriateness and effectiveness of any
specific seismic requirement as it affects their airport design. It is also important to note that the burden of
conformance may rest solely on the Architect, Engineer and Contractor and to remember that the guidelines and
regulations supporting the implementation of individual acts often contain the most important detail.
In recent years enforcement of the earthquake protection requirements in the Model Codes for nonstructural
building components has also become commonplace. Model Codes provide for nonstructural, infrastructure
elements of the building design, such as electrical enclosures, control consoles, conduits, cable trays, etc.
Architects, Engineers and Contractors are relied upon to know, understand, design and install earthquake
protection in accordance with the requirements of these Codes.
It is important to note that all of the Seismic Laws and the Executive Orders apply to virtually all new
construction that is federally owned, leased or regulated or other new construction that receives federal
financial assistance through loans, loan guarantees, grants or federal mortgage insurance. Additionally,
several states require seismic mitigation in the design of all projects.
When designing a project, it is important to meet the federal, state and local code and standard elements
applicable to the project location. Although the following list is not intended to be comprehensive and
complete, as an aid to the designer, the FAA recommends that the following sources of information be checked
to determine the requirements to be applied.
1) Public Laws 95-124 and 101-614 "The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 as Amended"
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PART II
INITIAL PLANNING AND
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
2) Executive Order 12699 of January 5, 1990 "Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted or
Regulated New Building Construction"
3) Executive Order 12941 of December 1, 1994 "Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or Leased
Buildings"
4) ICBO (International Conference of Building Officials) "Uniform Building Code," 1994, and
amendments to include the 1994 NFPA-13 Standard for Building Fire Sprinkler Systems
5) BOCA (Building Officials Code Authority) "National Building Code"
6) SBCCI (Southern Building Code Congress International) "Standard Building Code"
7) Section 13080 of the Corps of Engineers Guide Specifications with Fire sprinkler Sections 15330,
15331, and 15332 revised in March 1995 to unequivocally require seismic bracing on the small
diameter piping.
8) Various State Building Codes, e.g., California, Washington, Alaska, Missouri, New York, etc., which
may require mitigation elements in addition to the national standards.
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PART III
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
PART III
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
Section A - Airport Layout and Boundaries
The first step in the integration of security into airport planning, design or major renovation is the analysis and
determination of the airport’s general security requirements, layout and boundaries. These decisions are critical to
the efficient, safe and secure operation of an airport. While existing airports may not have great leeway in
redesigning the general layout, adjustments to the location or type of boundaries for security areas may be beneficial
and easily rolled into adjacent construction projects. Periodic review of an airport’s boundary system and locations
are recommended to assure that the airport’s needs are met, particularly since aviation security needs, requirements
and surrounding environments are frequently changing.
1. General Layout
The general layout of an airport consists of three (3) major areas generally referred to in the industry as Airside,
Landside, and Terminal. While the terminal area generally lies on the boundary of the airside and landside (as
may other buildings), due to the nature of its use and the special requirements that apply to airport terminals, it
is best treated for security purposes as an area of its own.
a. Descriptions:
1) Airside – The airside of an airport is defined as the nonpublic portion where aircraft operations occur.
Typically, the airside is separated from other areas of the airport by fencing or other boundaries and
includes runways, taxiways, aprons, aircraft parking and staging areas and most facilities which service
and maintain aircraft. For operational, geographic, safety, or security reasons, other facilities may be
located within the airside as well. The airside generally includes areas to which certain security
requirements apply under FAR 107; e.g., the AOA, SIDA and secured areas.
2) Landside – The landside of an airport is defined as the remainder of the airport property not considered
airside. Typically, the landside is outside of the airside fence or other boundaries and includes all
public areas. Facilities which are always located landside include patron and other public parking
areas, terminal and public access roadways, rental car facilities, taxi and ground transportation staging
areas, and any on-airport hotel facilities.
3) Terminal – An airport terminal is defined as the building where the processing of commercial
passengers and boarding of the aircraft occurs. Larger airports or those with general aviation areas
often have more than one terminal. For purposes of this document, the term “terminal” typically refers
to that main building or group of buildings where the boarding of public, scheduled commercial
aircraft occurs or from which persons who have passed through a security screening process will
proceed to boarding facilities located elsewhere on the airside. When considering FAA mandated
security provisions, it is important for planners and designers to differentiate the commercial terminal
from the general aviation terminal where charter and private passenger activity typically occurs.
b. Security Requirements
Each major area of the airport (airside, landside, terminal) has its own special requirements.
Airside/landside requirements and operational parameters should be carefully considered when planning
and designing a new airport or facility. Not only the requirements, but also the barrier and boundary
measures which must delineate airside from landside, may have major effects on the facility’s efficiency,
employee and public accessibility, and overall aesthetics.
It is internationally recognized that maintaining the integrity of airside/landside boundaries plays a critical
role in reducing unauthorized access to, attacks on, or the introduction of dangerous devices aboard,
passenger aircraft. Effective airside security relies heavily on the integrated application of physical barriers,
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identification and access control systems, surveillance or detection equipment, the implementation of
security procedures, and efficient use of resources.
Most U.S. airports were built prior to the implementation of a 1989 amendment to the Federal Aviation
Regulations FAR 107 (then FAR 107.14, now FAR 107.201) requiring access control systems capable of
controlling access to critical secured airside areas. Planners and designers are urged to carefully consider
the operational impact that the design of airside and public/landside areas have.
1) Airside - The airside, by nature, must be nonpublic in order to maintain proper commercial aviation
security. Further information on those security requirements is contained in the Security Areas section
on page 11. In addition, for the airport to obtain certifications required for operations, the airside must
be able to maintain required operational clear areas, have adequate emergency response routes and
response times, and have in place required safety measures. For further information on these
operational design requirements, contact the local FAA Airports District or Regional Office.
2) Landside - The landside, since it is does not typically directly affect the operation of aircraft, has less
stringent security requirements than the airside. However, some clear area and communication
requirements may still affect landside design and layout, such as airside fence/boundary clear areas,
aircraft approach glide slopes, communications and navigational equipment locations and non-
interference areas, and heightened security clear areas in the terminal area. Further information on
these requirements and their effects on the landside are contained in the Security Areas section on page
11. In addition to these airside requirements, the landside in general must meet the local jurisdictions
standards for public safety and security, which may result in special security requirements that will
interface with the airport’s overall security and fire safety system.
3) Terminal - The terminal is typically the one area of the airport with the most security, safety, and
operational requirements. Many of these requirements are closely tied to the location of Security Areas
within and in close proximity to the terminal. In addition, since the terminal usually straddles the
boundary between airside and landside, it must also meet those requirements of each respective area.
c. Locations
1) Airside – By definition, the airside is located on the aircraft side of the fencing or other barrier separating
it from the public. However, the choices as to where this fencing or barrier may be located due to the
surrounding environment are sometimes the most critical decisions in designing or renovating an airport.
Aside from the determining factors involved in Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement on page 24,
the following factors should be considered when determining airside boundaries and orientation:
a) Dangerous or hazardous areas that could affect the safety or security of a parked or moving aircraft;
b) Concealed/overgrown areas that could allow persons or objects to be hidden that might endanger
aircraft or critical airport systems;
c) Adjacent facilities having their own unique security concerns and provisions, e.g., correctional,
military or other facilities that could affect or be affected by the proximity of airside operations;
d) Natural features, large metal structures/buildings or electronics facilities that might affect ground
or aircraft communications or navigational systems; (Reduced or limited communications can
endanger not only aircraft and airport personnel safety, but also limit security response capabilities
and information availability during emergency as well as routine situations.)
e) Adjacent schools, parks or community facilities that might affect or be affected by the proximity
of aircraft and the related safety and security concerns. (While certainly safety concerns exist, the
increased possibility of airside penetrations and/or vandalism is a security concern.)
2) Landside – Since landside includes all non-airside areas, location is determined by the airside
boundary. Within landside, factors affecting the location of facilities are discussed in Facilities, Areas
and Geographical Placement on page 24.
3) Terminal – The terminal should be located centrally on the airport site when possible. This not only
provides for efficient aircraft access to most runways and facilities, but can benefit terminal security as
well. A centralized terminal buffers the terminal from outside-airport threats and security risks due to
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distance. A fundamental concept in security planning, “distance” provides the flexibility for the airport
operator to put in place systems, measures or procedures which will detect, delay, and allow for a
response to meaningful penetration. In addition, a centralized terminal can also minimize the
communications interference that might be caused by adjacent, non-airport facilities.
2. Security Areas
The ASP required under FAR 107 will contain specific descriptions of the following specific areas; they are
described below to acquaint the reader with the general differences between them.
a. Descriptions:
1) Air Operations Area (AOA) - That portion of the airport designed and used for landing, taking off or
surface maneuvering of aircraft, and adjacent areas, but not including SIDAs or secured areas.
2) The Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) - Those areas of the airport, sometimes smaller than
the AOA and often focused near the terminal and the passenger aircraft boarding facilities, which
generally require more stringent security provisions than the AOA. Display of airport-issued identity
badges is required in this area, as well as detailed employment histories and other checks of individuals
who have unescorted access to the area.
3) Secured Area – that portion of an airport identified in the FAA-approved airport security program in
which the most definitive levels of access control and security training are required under FAR
107.201. Generally, this area includes a portion of the landside, and encompasses the passenger
handling facilities at and around the passenger terminal. An airport may have several unconnected
secured areas, which may include baggage makeup areas, movement areas, safety areas, etc.
4) Sterile Area – That area of an airport, generally within the terminal, to which access in controlled by
the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security program. It is typically
where passengers wait to board departing aircraft or persons wait to meet arriving aircraft.
5) Exclusive Use Area – That part of an AOA for which an aircraft operator has agreed in writing with
the airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility under an approved security program.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Area – an arrangement permitted under FAR 107.113. The airport
operator and a tenant (other than an aircraft operator regulated under FAR 108 or 129) may enter
voluntarily into an agreement in which the tenant assumes responsibility for certain requirements under
FAR 107; however, only the airport operator may provide law enforcement support. Under a TSP, the
airport must take on the inspection and compliance role normally performed by the FAA. The FAA, in
turn, will oversee the airport’s conduct of the program.
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b. Security Requirements
1) AOA – The airport operator is required to control and prevent access to the AOA; control movement
within the AOA; and control unauthorized penetrations of the AOA. FAA regulations do not specify
how to accomplish this, but rather, leave the solution to the local authorities, subject to FAA approval.
2) SIDA – Described above, the airport operators have the responsibility to secure these areas and prevent
or respond immediately to access by unauthorized persons and vehicles. SIDAs may lie within AOAs;
a secured area is by definition always a SIDA, in that all SIDA requirements under FAR 107 must be
met within a secured area.
3) Secured area – Each such area must independently meet all the requirements placed upon it by the
Airport Security Program, including control of access, challenge procedures, law enforcement officer
(LEO) response, display of ID, etc., particularly where the various secured areas may not enjoy
common boundaries or access points.
4) Sterile Area – The aircraft operator must use adequate facilities and procedures to screen persons and
property to prevent or deter the carriage aboard aircraft of any explosive, incendiary, or deadly or
dangerous weapon on or about each individual’s person or accessible property. In addition, the aircraft
operator must prevent or deter the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in any checked baggage
brought into the sterile area.
5) Exclusive Use Area – The area in which the responsible signatory aircraft operator must perform
security control requirements as listed for the airport operator. The aircraft operator, not the airport,
may control access, and movement within that exclusive area. Specific requirements and conditions
must appear in the FAA-approved written agreement between the airport operator and the aircraft
operator.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Area– The tenant must enter into a written agreement with the airport
and the FAA, subject to a tenant-area-specific security program approved by FAA that states the
security systems, measures or procedures to be provided in that area. The tenant may not assume
responsibility for law enforcement support, and his agreement must be exclusive to one tenant, not
shared among several tenants.
c. Locations
1) AOA
In most cases, it is advantageous to align the AOA boundary with that of other boundaries or physical
barriers. Typically, the location of the AOA is a major portion of the area within the fence or other
barrier that defines the airside/landside boundary of the airport. Exceptions to this may occur when
electronic or natural barriers such as rivers are being used to delineate boundaries. Since the AOA is
required to have a distinct, securable boundary line, see the section on Boundaries on page 16 for more
information.
When allocating AOA space, and since the AOA requires less specific security measures than SIDAs
or secured areas, consider the security and cost benefits that will result from locating general aviation,
cargo facilities, maintenance, and other facilities outside those critical areas, and instead locating them
in the AOA. This will facilitate implementation and may reduce the cost of access control and
ID/badging measures for such areas. Locating most nonterminal areas outside of the SIDA may also
reduce the amount of man-hours needed for badge issuance, background checks, security training and
badge revalidations. Further discussion on Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement is included on
page 24.
2) SIDA
In general, SIDA layouts should be held to the smallest manageable size as would provide the level of
protection sought for the area or facility. It is the area that requires the greatest continuous procedural
attention from employees, and should therefore limit the number of access points to the extent
possible.
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3) Secured Area
Although this generally includes quite broad portions of the landside and terminal, it is desirable to
locate secured areas contiguously or as close together as possible to maximize use of response
personnel, utilize common areas of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance coverage, and
minimize requirements for redundant boundaries and electronic access controls. Where there are
several unconnected secured areas - baggage makeup areas, movement areas, safety areas, etc. - each
may require separate but integrated electronic controls.
4) Sterile Area
Similarly, sterile areas, like any other controlled area, require by definition that there be physical,
financial and manpower resources dedicated to providing that control. Therefore, they, too, should be
held to an operational minimum so that appropriate surveillance and control resources can be
concentrated where necessary, rather than dissipated throughout less security-related sites. Sterile areas
may also include various revenue generating facilities, particularly concessions, which may be
impacted by periods of heightened threat. Consequently, designers and planners should allow
flexibility within sterile areas such that the added security measures during those times will have the
least possible negative impact.
5) Exclusive Use Areas
As described earlier, the exclusive use area is the result of a written agreement between the aircraft
operator, airport and approved by FAA that delineates very specific areas for which the operator agrees
to assume many of the airport’s security responsibilities. Therefore, the same caveat would apply in
their ability to maintain appropriate levels of security by keeping the area to be monitored and
controlled to an operational minimum.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Areas
Where tenants other than air carriers elect to undertake their own security program under FAR 107,
such areas should be constrained to the tenants’ immediate boundaries and sphere of influence, and
should accommodate security requirements for contiguous boundaries with other tenants and/or the
airport and airlines. The tenant may not assume any responsibility for the terminal.
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areas and to limit access to them, this may lead to the assumption that anyone or anything found in the area
is authorized. This suggests a common vulnerability that presumes that once inside the controlled area, an
intruder may expect to move about without encountering additional controls. With access to many of the
valued assets, the intruder may perceive the opportunity to carry out a variety of criminal or terrorist acts.
For example, if an intruder breaches the fence line (considered to be easily and quickly achieved), he would
have no further physical barriers to control access to aircraft, the baggage makeup area (BMA),
maintenance facilities, and other areas. The security measure that is most often depended upon to protect
this situation is the challenge procedure. Other security measures including but not limited to ramp patrols,
CCTV, personnel surveillance or intrusion detection sensors, should be considered.
c. Other means of achieving unauthorized access exist, such as through emergency exits (for example, from
public side to the secured area) or “piggybacking” on access controlled doors. New construction designs
should minimize the number of emergency exits that lead to the secured area from public areas. Some fire
codes allow the use of delay egress hardware on emergency exit doors. Where authorized for use by fire or
building code officials, delay egress hardware should be considered for use as a deterrent to discourage
unauthorized, nonemergency use of emergency exit doors. Where necessary, these doors should be
supported by comprehensive surveillance (such as CCTV) on both sides of the door for alarm assessment.
Ideally the airside surveillance would include an intruder tracking capability to allow for directing the
response force. Attentive planning and incorporation of appropriate surveillance or control devices can
significantly improve the identification and control of piggybacking, as well as the deployment and
efficient use of manpower resources to respond to anomalies.
d. Another area of vulnerability is “breach” or unauthorized entry into the sterile area. Experiences at several
airports in recent years have resulted in highly publicized, and at times costly and massively inconvenient
security reactions. At the planning stage, breach identification and control can be cost effectively incorporated
into the airport design, whereas retrofit actions are usually difficult, costly and can be aesthetically
undesirable. Any open boundary between the public side and the sterile area is a candidate for breach.
Typically the breach will occur either through the screening checkpoint or via the exit lane (bypassing the
security checkpoint). From the planning and design standpoint, the most significant consideration for
implementing a physical breach control system are: 1) source and location of breach identification alarm
generator; 2) location of physical barriers which respond to the breach alarm; and 3) sufficient separation
distance between 1 & 2 to allow safe and sure closure prior to intruder’s further penetration which could result
in terminal evacuation. Other concerns such as fire and safety cases must also be considered.
e. All public access facilities, within which large congregations of people are customary, suffer from a
fundamental vulnerability to terrorist bombing or armed attack. [See Appendix A] This vulnerability can be
reduced significantly at the planning and design stage. For the threat of large vehicle bombs, the primary
blast mitigating consideration is separation distance. This consideration is directly opposed by the
passenger convenience consideration of minimized transit distances. [See charts in Appendix C].
Innovative designs that satisfy both passenger convenience and separation distance for blast mitigation
should be sought, including potential facility design to minimize large congregations of people close to
points of vehicle access or drop-off, or to redirect or otherwise mitigate blast effects.
f. The threat of an armed attack on the terminal as well as the threat of an abandoned article containing an
explosive device raises attention to another form of vulnerability. As long as there is a “public side” within the
terminal, where congregations are expected, there are limited means by which a security system can prevent
an attack. To assure that large improvised explosive devices (IED) or terrorists with weapons do not enter the
terminal requires moving the point of screening “to the front door.” Here again, architects and designers may
seek innovative designs that can accommodate all of the passenger convenience issues, as well as providing
screening of all people and items before entering the terminal (creating a “sterile terminal”), to significantly
reduce this vulnerability. Many other issues that may not be readily apparent require that a “front door”
approach be carefully considered in close coordination with aircraft operators, the airport authority, and FAA.
g. A fundamental vulnerability also exists at any facility using a badge identification system that grants access
privileges to employees and others. These “insiders” have legitimate needs to access the portions of the airport
controlled for security purposes, and are allowed access to those areas, and in some cases to the workings of
the security system itself. However, threats from insiders, acting alone or in collusion with outsiders, pose a
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criminal and terrorist threat to airports. The need to inspect badged individuals and their possessions as they
cross the security boundary, using their access privileges, may increase in the future. At the planning and
design stage, consideration can be given to consolidate and minimize the number of access points that
employees use to gain access to their work site in the secure area. Provisions for screening equipment at these
locations would enable future inspection capability with significantly less impact. The same locations may
also be considered as sites for inspection of deliveries of commercial goods.
h. There are numerous areas in and around an airport, its terminal building complex, support facilities, utility
tunnels, public roadways, parking lots, maintenance areas, cargo and general aviation facilities, commercial
and industrial buildings, etc., which while not necessarily seen to be a target of terrorist activity, might still
be in the path of such an attack, or at the very least might be subject to common crime such as theft or
vandalism, and thus might require varying levels of security protection. These may or may not fall under
the jurisdiction or responsibility of the airport, but it is important to look at the entire airport environment,
make those determinations, and bring every affected entity into the early planning discussions, if for no
other gain than to establish early on where the lines of responsibility lie. The airport must also keep careful
records of these determinations, and consider putting those agreements and lines of demarcation in writing,
possibly as conditions of the lease, or into exclusive area or tenant security agreements.
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relating to response to such incidents. Guidance relating to building design considerations regarding attacks using
chemical or biological agents may also be obtained by contacting these agencies. Local authorities may provide
additional resources or suggest other references. An excellent resource is the National Domestic Preparedness
Office of the Department of Justice, phone (202) 324-9025, e-mail address: ndpo@leo.gov.
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b) Fencing is available in several designs that are difficult to climb or cut as well as those which are
provided with motion, tension or other electronic sensing means. For fences with sensors, there are
other elements to the security system for monitoring of the sensors and response to intrusion
alarms. See the Security Operations Center section on page 86
c) When utilizing fencing as a security boundary, care must be taken to ensure that the provision of
fencing does not conflict with the operational requirements of the airport. Access points will need
to be made in the fence to allow the passage of authorized vehicles and persons. While the number
of access points should be kept to a minimum, adequate access points must be planned for routine
operations, maintenance operations, and emergency operations. For further information on fencing
access points see Gates on page 18 or Guard Stations on page 20.
d) To assist in surveillance and security patrol inspection, keep fences as straight and uncomplicated
as possible, this will also minimize installation and maintenance costs.
e) Effectiveness of fencing in critical areas can be improved by anchoring or burying the bottom
edge of the fence fabric to prevent it from being pulled out or up to facilitate unauthorized entry.
Use of concrete mow strips below the fence line and/or burying the bottom of the fence fabric can
also deter tunneling underneath the fence by persons and animals. Mowing strips may also reduce
security and maintenance man-hours and costs.
f) For safety or operational reasons (e.g. presence of navigational systems) some sections of
perimeter fencing may not be able to meet standard security specifications. Special surveillance or
detection measures may need to be applied to improve the safeguarding of these areas.
g) More specific information on fencing materials and installation, including the use of barbed wire
outriggers, is available in FAA Advisory Circular 107-1, Aviation Security – Airports; Advisory
Circular 150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities; and
Advisory Circular 150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying Construction of Airports, among others.
2) Buildings
Buildings and other fixed structures may be used as a part of the physical barrier and be incorporated into
a fence line if access control or other measures to restrict unauthorized passage through the buildings or
structures are taken at all points of access. Whether those points are located on the airside or landside
boundaries, or perhaps through the middle of such buildings, may be dependent upon the nature of the
business being conducted inside, and the level of continuous access required by those personnel.
3) Walls
Walls are one of the most common types of physical barriers. Various types of walls are used for
interior security boundary separation as well as exterior. In addition, walls play an important part as
visual barriers and deterrents.
a) Interior Walls
When interior walls are to be used as security barriers, consideration should be made as to not only
the wall type and construction material, but also to the wall’s height. When possible, security walls
should be full height, reaching not just suspended ceilings, but complete floor to ceiling or slab.
Interior walls may be used as part of the security boundary, with appropriate attention paid to
maintaining the integrity of the boundary and the levels of access control to a degree at least equal
to that of the rest of the boundary.
b) Exterior Walls
While not typically as economically affordable as chain link fencing, the use of exterior walls as
physical barriers and security boundaries is frequently necessary. Walls provide less visibility of
storage or secured areas and can be matched to the surrounding architecture and buildings. In
addition, some varieties of exterior walls are less climbable and thus more secure than security
fencing or other barriers.
Walls of solid materials should not have hand or foot holds that can be used for climbing, and tops
of walls should have barbed wire or other deterrent materials. Blast walls are not necessarily good
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security fences, although appropriate design can aid in incorporating features of both, spreading
the cost over more than one budget.
As in the case of interior walls, exterior building walls may also be used as part of the security
boundary as long as the integrity of the secured area is maintained to at least the level maintained
elsewhere along the boundary.
b. Electronic Boundaries
In the case of boundaries which are monitored by electronic sensors, motion detectors, infrared sensors,
etc., it is clear that these are intended to serve essentially the same security functions as other detectors, but
are simply employing other technologies, usually with somewhat higher maintenance costs. Typically they
will be used in conjunction with other technologies such as alarms, CCTV, or other reporting and
assessment methods. Nonetheless, there are appropriate places for using such applications, especially where
normal conduit and cabling might be impractical, or where excessive trenching might be required.
c. Natural Barriers
Natural barriers may include bodies of water, expanses of trees, swampland, dense foliage areas, cliffs, and
other such areas. With FAA approval, natural barriers may be incorporated into the security boundary of an
airport in lieu of standard physical barriers. Use of natural barriers may be necessary or advantageous at
airport in areas that cannot structurally support physical barriers or fencing, or where use of fencing or
physical barriers would cause conflict with aircraft navigation, communications, or runway clear areas
beneath approach paths.
Natural barriers may also include the concept of using “time and distance” from the terminal or critical
facilities to be protected. “Time and distance” is the concept that if an unauthorized entry were to occur at
that location, the amount of time, the distance that exists, and the high level of visibility would reduce
significantly the likelihood of the intruder reaching the critical area without detection and/or intervention.
FAA may approve the use of “time and distance” in lieu of actual physical barriers in many areas, but
generally in conjunction with other complementary security systems, measures or procedures. In addition,
“time and distance” may be considered as an enhancement to standard physical barriers/boundaries when
those barriers or boundaries are relatively removed from the critical areas they are protecting.
d. Access Points
Typically there are access points through fencing or other barriers for both vehicles and pedestrians. Access
points through buildings or walls are typically doors. In either case, guard points or electronic means or
controls may be also used. In all cases, the access point type and design may be the determining factor in
the effectiveness of the security boundary and control in that area. So, in all cases, the number of access
points should be minimized and their use and conditions closely monitored.
1) Gates
a) While the number of access points should be kept to a minimum, adequate pedestrian and vehicle
access points must be planned for routine operations, maintenance operations, and emergency
operations.
i) Routine Operations
Routine operations gates at an airport are typically those used by police patrols and response
teams, catering, fuel and belly freight vehicles and tugs, scheduled delivery vehicles, and
ground service equipment and maintenance vehicles.
Most airport gates used for routine operations are typically high-throughput and should be
designed for high-activity and long-life. These gates will take the most wear and tear, and
should be designed to minimize delays to users.
SIDA, secured area, AOA, and other security boundary gates that are high-throughput are the
most likely candidates for automation and electronic access control. See Electronic Access
Points on page 20 for further information.
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devices in order to minimize labor costs and to be able to track personnel using specific doors to the
AOA. The use of the term “devices” here means CCTV cameras and/or cardreader/pinpads.
b) Unsupervised emergency exit doors providing egress from the terminal to the airside should be
avoided if possible. If essential, these doors should be equipped with audio and visual alarms.
Consider mounting a police-blue lens (to differentiate security from fire alarms), preferably located
on both sides of the door, which can be monitored from a supervised location such as an airport
security control center. Consider the possibility of CCTV cameras on both sides of certain high risk
or high traffic doors. The use of frangible devices or covers over emergency exit activation bars
deters misuse. Some codes allow for special locking arrangements for emergency exits that provide
delays of up to 45 seconds, depending on local fire and life safety codes, as long as reasonable life
safety is assured. Building codes establish specific performance requirements for doors with delay
egress hardware. Each airport must work with local fire and building code officials to determine the
best systems allowable to accommodate both emergency and security needs. See also the Emergency
Exit section on page 78 for information regarding NFPA fire codes on emergency exits.
c) Passenger gates, aircraft loading walkways and other devices used for aircraft loading must be
capable of being locked or otherwise secured in order to prevent unauthorized access to the airside
and parked aircraft.
3) Guard Stations
Manned guard stations to control access into a security area may be necessary at some airports. The
purpose of such guard stations is to provide a point of entry at which personal identification can be
established and persons and vehicles can be permitted to enter according to local security program
requirements.
a) Until security program requirements have been satisfied, such devices as turnstiles, roll gates, or a
remotely operated drop arm barrier gate must be used to impede onward passage through the
guard station.
b) The provision of a sheltered checkpoint station is recommended for gates secured by security
personnel. The shelter can be designed to permit maximum visibility over the immediate area of
the gate and to provide easy access for the guard to carry out the duties of inspecting vehicles and
their contents.
c) Sufficient space should be provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for further inspection
without blocking access for those following. Dependable and instant communications from these
stations to a central location must be installed, maintained, and frequently tested.
d) It is essential to provide communications between any sheltered security checkpoint station and
the airport security services office, as well as to provide a duress alarm by which emergency
assistance may be summoned.
4) Electronic Access Points
a) Automatic Gates
In cases where gates are automated and induction loops are used on the airside side of gates for
free vehicle exit, ensure the loop is located so as to minimize the possibility of objects being
thrown or pushed from the public side to activate the loop. Additional access control measures,
such as microwave, infrared or other vehicle sensors or CCTV monitoring may be desirable in
addition to loops where space is limited or additional security is desired.
Consider means of protecting access control devices (such as card readers or other monitors) serving
exterior vehicle gates to reduce possible physical damage from passing vehicles. Properly placed
curbing, bollards, and highway railing are useful for this purpose. Consider also protection of
equipment from weather elements, including protection from extreme heat or cold inside equipment
enclosures, which can affect the operation of electronic and mechanical components. Heaters and/or
fans are available as standard options for most access control devices, housings and operators.
b) Doors with Access Controls
There are numerous technologies available for controlling access through doors (magnetic stripe,
Weigand, proximity, Smart card, etc.) and there are numerous ways of implementing their use at
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any kind of doorway – wooden doors, glass, metal, single or double doors, roll-up doors, or indeed
at electronic barriers where there is no physical door at all. The designer should take into account
any existing systems the airport might wish to retain and integrate with new systems, and whether
newer advances in technology might suggest a complete or partial replacement of the old systems
in order to provide better security and security management. An extensive discussion of this issue
is found in the RTCA document “Recommended Standards for Airport Access Control Systems,”
and recent technological advances may provide additional solutions.
c) Sensor Line Gates
Sensor line gates and/or electronic gates function as typical access controlled gates, except that a
sensor line (microwave, infrared, etc.) is used instead of a mechanical barrier. Depending on the
electronic sensor technology used (see the section on Electronic Boundaries on page 18 for further
information), sensor line gates may be comparable in cost to mechanical ones.
The use of sensor line gates is typically the most feasible as a second, interior boundary where
delays due to the mechanical operation of a physical gate are not feasible, where space limited, or
where additional vehicle monitoring is desired. Sensor line gates are most often used to control
vehicle access into a secured area or in cargo or maintenance areas where time is critical.
d) Automated Portals
Automated access portals are designed for high-throughput, performing access control and/or
providing sensing technology in a high-speed, multi-user fashion, yet also providing a positive
means of access denial of unauthorized persons. They typically provide an unobstructed pathway
with the capability of preventing access if multiple or unauthorized persons attempt to enter.
Where these are employed, the delay induced by door opening/closing is eliminated. These portals
are designed to replace high-throughput doors where piggybacking is a concern or to add
additional explosives, drug, or weapon sensing technology to high-throughput areas.
There are also portals and sensing technologies under development that are sensitive to the
direction of the intruder’s movement, and automatically provide photographs of security violators,
and/or detain unauthorized individuals. As technology advances, the capability and affordability of
automatic portals will increase and should be evaluated for high-throughput and/or special-use
access point locations.
e. Other Security Measures
1) Fencing Clear Areas
a) Security effectiveness of perimeter fencing is materially improved by the provision of clear areas
on both sides of the fence, particularly in the vicinity of the terminal and any other critical
facilities. Such clearance areas facilitate surveillance and maintenance of fencing and deny cover
to vandals and trespassers.
b) Suggested clear distances range from 10 to 30 feet, within which there should be no climbable
objects, trees, or utility poles abutting the fence line nor areas for stackable crates, pallets, storage
containers, or other materials. Likewise, the parking of vehicles along the fence must also be
prevented. In addition, landscaping within the clear area should be minimized or eliminated to
reduce potential hidden locations for persons, objects, fence damage, and vandalism.
c) There have been cases in which individuals have gained access to passenger aircraft by scaling or
crashing through perimeter fencing. To deter or delay attacks, sufficient distance should be
maintained between the perimeter fencing and aircraft parking areas.
2) Security Lighting
Lighting of the area on both sides of gates and selected areas of fencing is highly recommended. Not
only is lighting beneficial for security inspection, but also to assure fence/gate signage is readable and
that cardreaders, keypads, phones, intercoms, and/or other devices at the gate are visible and usable.
Similarly, sufficient lighting is required for any area in which a CCTV camera is intended to monitor
activity; reduced lighting or sensor activated lighting may be considered in areas which have minimal
traffic throughput in the off-peak hours.
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3) Locks
Advanced new electronic key technologies should be considered as well as the time-honored deadbolt
lock, built-in door handle lock, or padlock and metallic key to secure a portal, particularly those that
are low-risk, low throughput, or significantly distant from the main areas of concern or from the central
control station. This often also involves other procedural requirements such as a key management
system and the difficulties of recoring at numerous locations and the reissuing of keys when they are
lost or stolen. The most important consideration in such investments in airport equipment is total life
cycle costs, not merely the initial capital cost. This is a concept that should carry over into any
equipment procurement process.
4) CCTV Coverage
a) While gates, like all other access points, should be kept to a minimum and, where physically and
economically feasible, they should be considered for treatment with access control and CCTV
monitoring, it is recognized that certain low-traffic gates, maintenance access points and gates
well removed from the principal areas of security concern may be candidates for greater reliance
on time-and-distance considerations.
b) Further information on CCTV Systems and coverage is contained in the Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) Systems section on page 115.
5) Signage
a) FAA requires signage on certain security boundaries and access points. Specifics on wording and
size should be found in the local ASP. Signs should be located such that when standing at one
sign, the observer should be able to see the next sign in both directions.
b) The use of signage, even in some non-required locations, provides a deterrent by warning of the
boundary as well as for notification of the consequences for violation.
c) Many locations with access control or CCTV equipment may warrant signage for either
directional or legal purposes (e.g. “Alarm will sound if opened”, “Authorized personnel only”,
“Notice: All activities in this area are being recorded via CCTV”, etc.)
d) While signage for security purposes should be designed to draw attention, it should be coordinated
with other airport signage for style and consistency when possible.
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For a full discussion on these areas and their contents, see Security Operations Center on page 86 and
Airport Emergency Command Post on page 87 under the Terminal section.
e. Airport Personnel Offices
Most personnel and administrative offices typically have landside and/or public access during business
hours. During nonbusiness hours they are usually secured, and may be included in the airport’s overall
access control system, particularly if located within the terminal complex. In addition, some personnel
offices, such as airfield maintenance or operations, may be completely airside.
Since most airport personnel offices are located in or near the terminal, and are secured (nonpublic) at least
part of the time, see Airport Personnel Offices on page 83 under the Terminal Nonpublic Areas section.
f. Belly Freight Facility
Belly freight facilities share many of the same security requirements as standard cargo areas, and in many
airports may be part of one joint cargo facilities or area. However, some airports maintain a completely
separate area for belly freight that will be traveling in passenger aircraft rather than cargo planes. One of
the primary differences between most dedicated belly freight facilities and cargo facilities is that the belly
freight facility may not need to be attached to or adjacent to an aircraft ramp. Since most belly freight is
handled via tugs, a belly freight facility can be located either adjacent to the terminal where its aircraft
operator aircraft are or at any point along a service roadway which connects to the terminal. A standard
cargo facility on the other hand may need to handle direct plane cargo where the plane actually pulls up to a
fixed or movable loading bridge.
The added flexibility in the location of a belly freight facility, as well as the fact that it can be separate from
the general cargo facility, enables a belly freight facility to be designed with potentially higher or stricter
security levels. Since belly freight usually involves smaller quantities of public airfreight and U.S. mail,
belly freight facilities can be designed which have the potential for 100% EDS screening of cargo, as well
as have more flexibility than direct “cargo to plane” cargo operations in that the facility can be either
landside or airside and still be isolated from critical passenger aircraft areas.
A facility for shared cargo screening, including belly freight and regular cargo, should be considered.
g. Cargo Area
1) Basic security controls to air cargo, especially cargo carried in passenger aircraft, are generally applied
either prior to the cargo's arrival at the airport, or at the physically separated cargo processing areas.
Thus, although not a primary issue of security concern to the airport planner/designer, cargo handling
and control must be considered in the overall allocation of space and manner of transit from cargo
make-up to aircraft loading. This might include space for bulk pallet inspection facilities, and secure
cargo-holding areas.
2) Examining cargo items and reviewing associated documentation in the presence of the shipper or the
indirect aircraft operator is not always feasible at the airport. To be effective, those measures would
normally be applied prior to the cargo’s arrival at the airport. Planners would be well advised to
consider providing a secure environment which would allow aircraft operators to comply with the
current requirement to prevent tampering with, or adding anything to, the cargo after is has been
accepted but before it has been transported; i.e., cargo holding areas.
3) Federal and/or local authorities may develop and disseminate information that would require pre-
planning by the airport or the aircraft operator to carry out additional security measures intended to
respond to an elevated threat. As part of this process, cargo security should be considered. While
airmail is also a consideration, in no case is it handled by the airlines until the United States Postal
Service (USPS), which typically has its own facility and security requirements and procedures, has
processed it. Once again, however, where the Postal facility is not remote, but well within the airport’s
sphere of concern, the designer must determine the space, power, storage, lighting and other
architectural needs by meeting with USPS early in the process. Security tools available to respond to
such threats include additional x-ray machines, decompression chambers, and explosives trace
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detection systems. Availability of such tools at a predesignated airport location would allow the
threatened parties to efficiently apply the measures when necessary.
a) When cargo buildings are included, as part of the barrier between landside and airside, care should
be taken to ensure that they protect against unauthorized airside entry.
b) All cargo facility receiving and dispatching access points should be capable of being locked when
not in use. In cargo buildings where the doors must be kept open for ventilation, various types of
lockable ventilating grills have been used to deter unauthorized entry of persons or vehicles.
Electronic intrusion detection systems (augmented by appropriate alarm assessment and response
capabilities) may be considered as well.
c) Personnel doors used by employees as primary entrances to, and exits from, cargo buildings
should be located so that they can be controlled and secured when required.
d) Security for cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft would be improved if facilities supporting
such activity were located within the secured areas.
e) The lifetime of cargo fencing exposed to vehicle misuse in high traffic areas may be extended
through the use of properly placed curbing, bollards, or highway railing.
h. FAA Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and Offices
While clearly the responsibility of FAA to determine the site and layout, it is not at all unusual for the
tower and its administrative offices to be immediately above and part of the main terminal complex, often
being served by the same elevators and stairwells. Clearly, it behooves the designer to determine the
associated security needs early on. Where the tower is within the terminal complex, its security is likely to
be interfaced with the airport’s system, noting that the tower will require 24-hour protection. Where the
tower is in a remote location, it still requires significant levels of protection as one of the airport’s most
critical operational facilities.
i. Fuel Area
Fuel farms are normally placed in as remote a location of the airport as possible, usually with underground
hydrant systems feeding fuel to the ramp areas. Security fences should surround the fuel tanks, and should
be access controlled whenever possible to monitor all movement even authorized traffic. Where distance
precludes hard wiring to the main system, there are wireless technologies as well as freestanding electronic
locking mechanisms available.
j. General Aviation (GA) Area
See the General Aviation (GA) Parking Area section on page 30 under Airside.
k. Ground Service Equipment Maintenance (GSEM) Facility
Many airports today maintain specialized areas for the storage and maintenance of ground service
equipment (baggage tugs, push-back vehicles, refueling trucks). These areas are often referred to as Ground
Service Equipment Maintenance (GSEM) facilities and may also be used to service and maintain other
airport and maintenance vehicles. As with other maintenance facilities, these areas may be landside or
airside depending upon their needs, and the amount and frequency of landside/airside travel.
As with other service and maintenance areas, particular attention should be paid to material and vehicle
parking/storage areas and assuring they do not compromise airside fencing clear areas or security.
l. Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA)
See the Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA) section on page 34 under Landside Facilities.
m. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations
See the Hotel and On-Airport Accommodations section on page 34 under Landside Facilities.
n. In-Flight Catering Facility
On-airport facilities for in-flight catering service may be located landside, airside, or may be a boundary
facility with portions of both. Due to the nature of the facility, as well as its typical placement near the
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passenger terminal, security needs and choices may require substantial amounts of coordination both
architecturally and procedurally.
The following are critical architectural and design considerations for catering facilities:
1) Catering Screening – Will food, drinks and/or other catering materials/equipment or even personnel be
screened for weapons/explosives? If so, at what point in the preparation process?
While screening at catering facilities is not a requirement, consideration for both safety and/or future
potential requirements should be made during the design or renovation of catering facilities. If
screening is desired or will be a possibility, space and electrical accommodations should be made not
only for screening equipment, but also for related access control and CCTV equipment as well as for
areas and pathways for potential explosives resolution and disposal. Further information on screening
equipment and design considerations can be found within the Checked Baggage section on page 92.
2) Catering Vehicles – Will catering vehicles remain completely airside? If not, will they be searched
prior to use and/or airside entry or sealed at the catering facility?
The design of catering facilities which keep catering vehicles completely airside and/or secured from
public access is advantageous to airport security. However, if the entire catering facility is not airside,
this requires the facility to have an airside/landside boundary somewhere within the facility. With
incoming catering raw materials arriving from landside, this is not only a security challenge, but also
an operational challenge. Early coordination between airport and catering tenant is urged to determine
a solution that is agreeable to both. Coordination with the FAA should also occur to assure that any
pending regulations or requirements can also be considered.
3) Catering Personnel Badging – Will catering food preparation personnel be badged? If so, with what
access and what level of background checks?
This is important to assist in determining whether those areas might require additional perimeter
controls and rough-ins for additional access controls and CCTV coverage.
Currently at most airports, only those personnel needing unrestricted airside access are required to be
badged or have any type of background check. Since food preparation areas may be landside, catering
preparation personnel may not require badging or background checks. These personnel have direct
access to food trays and other containers that are loaded directly onto passenger aircraft, and which
may be used to conceal dangerous items. Particularly where catering screening is not occurring, this
can be a security risk and/or concern. The results of badging considerations will not only affect
operational and police procedures, but will also affect building architecture to accommodate access
control equipment and other security requirements.
o. Intermodal Transportation Area
See Intermodal Transportation Area section on page 35 under Landside Facilities.
p. Military Facilities
Some airports may have adjacent or on-airport military facilities such as reserve, National Guard or active
duty units. Since each of these situations is unique, and since these facilities are often at least partly airside,
detailed coordination between the airport, the FAA, and the military facility must occur for both design and
procedure. Typical areas of coordination include access control, badging and background check
requirements, areas of access, security patrol boundaries, security response responsibilities, and joint and/or
shared security system data and equipment. Proper coordination should also occur to assure that the
security and safety of such military facilities is not compromised by the placement of airport CCTV and
access control equipment.
q. Navigational & Communications Equipment
Since the placement of navigational and communications equipment is typically driven by functionality,
not security, most airports typically have equipment both airside and landside. Where equipment cannot be
included within the airside, it should be at a minimum fenced for both safety and security. In addition,
electronic monitoring and/or controlling of access to critical equipment may be desirable.
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Section B - Airside
Despite the fact that airside areas are beyond security barriers and control lines, there are still additional security
guidelines and concerns that can enhance and increase the security of these areas.
1. Aircraft Movement & Parking Areas (Ref. FAR 139)
While the location of aircraft movement and parking areas is typically dictated by topography and operational
considerations, the placement of the airside/landside and respective security boundaries must be considered.
The most important of these considerations is the placement of security fencing or other barriers. The following
sections discuss security concerns for both normal aircraft movement and parking areas as well as the aircraft
isolated/security parking position:
a. Aircraft Movement Areas
Normal aircraft movement areas include all runways, taxiways, ramps and/or aprons. While there are no
specific security requirements that state how far within the airside/landside security boundary these items
must be, there are other operational requirements that will affect security design.
First and foremost among the non-security requirements are the FAA safety and approach runway
protection zone requirements. While the specific distance requirements vary by runway, taxiway and/or
aircraft class and wingspan (See A/C 150/5300-13), they all share the same types of requirements noted
below. While these are not security related areas, their location, orientation and boundaries may have
security implications (i.e., fencing, communications/interference, lighting, sight lines, etc.) They include:
Object Free Area; Building Restriction Lines; Runway Protection Zone; Runway Safety Area; Glide Slope
Critical Area; Localizer Critical Area; and Approach Lighting System.
b. Passenger Loading/Unloading Aircraft Parking Areas
Security recommendations for parking passenger aircraft for loading and unloading at or near the terminal,
including aircraft parked at loading bridges, should include consideration of the distance to fence/public
access areas; distance to other parked aircraft awaiting loading or maintenance, minimum distance
recommendations for prevention of vandalism, thrown objects, etc.), and visibility of the areas around the
parked aircraft to monitor for unauthorized activity.
c. Passenger Aircraft Overnight Parking Areas
These areas are generally the same, or not far removed from, the arrival and departure gates. Where an
aircraft must be moved for some operational reason to a parking area other than the airline’s maintenance
or service facility, the design of its security environment should receive the same attention, since its status
as a passenger carrying aircraft has not changed, only the time spent in waiting. Where such areas are
relatively remote, they should be well lighted, with no visual obstructions.
Security of aircraft during overnight or maintenance parking is the responsibility of the aircraft operator.
Where exclusive area or tenant security plans exist, they should include considerations of these
requirements.
d. General Aviation (GA) Parking Area
1) It is advisable to the extent possible to exclude general aviation areas from the SIDA of the airport.
However, this is not always possible, as in the case where international general aviation flights, which
would include charters, private and corporate flights, must be directed to the International Arrivals
Building (IAB) which is almost always found within or attached to the secured area at the main
terminal complex. The limited security resources of an airport operator should be focused on the
critical passenger aircraft operator areas.
2) Taxiways leading to the general aviation areas should, if possible, be planned to avoid ramps used by
passenger aircraft operators.
3) General aviation tenants should always be a part of the planning process for security related matters
that may affect their operation.
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4) Airport security costs rise in proportion to the number of facilities to which access must be controlled.
Consideration should be given to the security related consequences of diminished or diluted asset
protection because it compromises the system’s effectiveness. If possible, general aviation facilities
should be significantly removed from the critical passenger loading area that requires additional
security measures.
e. Isolated/Security Parking Position
1) ICAO Standards require the designation of an isolated security aircraft parking position suitable for
parking aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference, to remove and examine
cargo, mail and stores removed from an aircraft during bomb threat conditions or which for other
reasons needs isolation from normal airport activities. This location is also referred to as a
“Hijack/Bomb Threat Aircraft Location” or “hot spot” in many Airport Security Programs. Planners
and designers are urged to gather input on ideal locations for these positions from those security or law
enforcement agencies that will respond to such incidents. (Reference ICAO Annex 17).
2) The isolated parking position should be located at the maximum distance possible (ICAO Annex 14
advises the allowance of at least 328 feet or 100 meters) from other aircraft parking positions,
buildings, or public areas and the airport fence. If taxiways and runways pass within this limit they
may have to be closed for normal operations when a threatened aircraft is in the area.
3) The position should not be located above underground utilities such as gasoline, aviation fuel, water
mains, or electrical or communications cables.
4) Such parking areas would ideally be located to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized persons
physically reaching or being able to launch an attack against the aircraft. Likewise, consideration
should be given to the parking area’s visibility to public and press areas. Areas visible from major
roadways should also be avoided to prevent roadway obstructions and accidents due to onlookers.
5) Use of CCTV to view the “suspect” aircraft and surrounding area may be beneficial to emergency
response and/or negotiations personnel.
6) Consideration should be given to adjacent areas in which emergency response agencies (both
personnel and vehicles) can enter and be staged during the incident. Communications, utilities and
facilities, victim isolation, treatment and/or interview areas, and other features may be accommodated
based on the respective airport’s Emergency Plan as required under FAR 139 and coordination with
local agencies. The area’s capability for cellular, radio and other wired or wireless methods of
communication should also be considered.
2. Airside Roads
Roads located on the airside should be for the exclusive use of authorized persons and vehicles. Placement and
quantity of airside roads should not only consider standard operational and maintenance needs, but also
emergency response needs and access to crash sites and isolation areas. Perimeter roads should be airside and
providing clear view of fencing. Airside roads are for the use of maintenance personnel, emergency personnel,
and security patrols (an ICAO Recommendation).
Where landside roads must be adjacent to airport fencing, a clear area adjacent to fences should be established.
3. Airside Vulnerable Areas & Protection
Although this topic is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is a useful reminder here that the airport
designer, in concert with security and operations leadership, must consider such things as NAVAIDS, runway
lighting and communications equipment, fueling facilities and FAA’s own air traffic facilities when developing
an overall integrated security plan, as well as meet the specific and unique security requirements for each such
area. There is no single plan that appropriately or adequately covers all these issues; it becomes the job of the
architect, space planner, and designer to meet with all interested parties to suggest a balance among all these
concerns.
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Section C - Landside
Landside areas accessible to the public are the most difficult to control or monitor from a security standpoint because
they must remain accessible to the traveling public and service personnel. Public areas of airports are not subject to
federal security inspections, but during implementation of crisis contingency plans they can be expected to be affected
by special security measures to prevent criminal acts. Prudent use of CCTV and other technologies should be
considered in monitoring areas of concern, in consultation with airport law enforcement, the airport security
coordinator, operations personnel, and other local crime control interests. CCTV should be considered for coverage of
terminal curbside areas, parking lots/garages, public transportation areas, loading docks, and service tunnels.
In considering the security needs of public areas (normally a local responsibility), it is readily apparent that current
trends in terminal design are focused on facilitating passenger throughput and generating revenue. Many medium
and large-sized terminals now feature large expanses of retail concessions that provide an important source of
airport revenue. Such areas are vulnerable targets and are difficult to secure, but basic tenets of physical security
remain applicable. Access is always a primary concern, and when designing terminal areas one must recognize that
doors, windows, and gates should not exceed the number required for safe and effective operations.
Consider incorporation of life safety (emergency medical equipment) and/or duress alarms in public and restroom
areas and/or at locations where airport personnel deal directly with money, baggage, ticketing, and/or disgruntled
persons. In addition, emergency phones/intercoms in public areas and parking should also be considered. When
possible, life safety, duress alarms, and phones/intercoms should be complemented by CCTV surveillance to assist
emergency dispatch personnel.
1. Landside Roads
When planning landside roads, bear in mind their proximity to security fencing, considerations of potential airside
access where elevated roadways may provide access or threat to adjacent areas of the terminal, or apron and/or
nearby aircraft. When security levels are raised, consider the possibility of having to screen vehicles before they
reach the terminal. This can be accomplished with temporary inspection stations positioned on the approach roads,
but that will require conduit and rough-ins at those locations for power, communications and security data lines.
2. Landside Parking
a. Terminal Patron Parking
1) During high-threat periods, it is reasonable to assume that special security measures could prohibit the
parking of unauthorized vehicles close to, beneath or on top of the terminal to minimize injury or
damage from a vehicle bomb. Therefore when space permits, consider allowing a safe distance
between parking lots and any terminal or operational buildings. A standard Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) setback chart, along with a blast analysis and mitigation model as found
in Appendix C, can aid determination of such distances.
2) Underground parking facilities and rooftop parking areas overlooking the passenger loading area may
also be subjected to special security measures during a high threat period. Designs should
accommodate the possibility of permitting vehicle access only after a detailed inspection process, or of
closing them off, or of segmenting them to control access only by authorized personnel such as
employees or other known entities.
3) Consider providing sufficient space in parking areas to facilitate the movement of vehicular security
patrols.
4) It is important to maintain close coordination with the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) and to
remain aware of any constraints placed upon the airport through the ASP, the Emergency Plan, and any
contingency plans. In addition, the Ground Security Coordinator for each airline can assist in being
certain their contingency measures have been considered at the design and planning stage.
5) General security of parking and toll areas includes the need to consider cash-handling operations, and
the potential for criminal activity such as robbery, assault or auto theft, and thus the potential for
CCTV, lighting, intercoms, and duress buttons to be integrated with the main airport security system.
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b. Employee Parking
Protection of employee parking areas, and the employees who use them, is no less important than that of
parking areas for the traveling public, and should be treated similarly, especially where they are either
remotely located or accessible to vandalism. Employee areas may, however, be designed to include the
security provided by the same access control system used throughout the airport. Different parking lots can
be considered as separate zones, keeping unauthorized use to a minimum.
3. Landside Vulnerable Areas
Although this topic is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is a useful reminder here that the airport
designer, in concert with security and operations leadership, must consider such things as utility tunnels and
culverts; communications cables; catering facilities, fuel lines; and storage areas for service and maintenance
vehicles when developing an overall integrated security plan, as well as meet the specific and unique security
requirements for each such area. As noted for airside vulnerable areas, there is no single plan that appropriately
or adequately covers all these issues. Again, it becomes the job of the architect, space planner, and designer to
meet with all interested parties to suggest a balance among all these concerns.
4. Landside Facilities
a. Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA)
1) As airports have become more efficient at moving larger numbers of people in the same amount of time,
the need for taxis, limousines and charter buses at airports has increased. In order to mitigate congestion
at the terminal, many airports have moved towards remote GTSAs where these vehicles wait until
needed. Sometimes because of the number of vehicles needed, there are multiple staging areas or levels.
2) While airport planners and designers are urged to consider this GTSA concept, they are also
encouraged to consider the security and safety implications and plan accordingly.
3) Security and safety concerns at GTSAs are similar to that of any area where large groups of people,
particularly those expected to be carrying cash are waiting, such as bus stations. They include:
a) Personal safety of the drivers from outside thieves or assailants
b) Personal protection of the drivers from other drivers
c) Deterrence of vandalism, theft or other illegal activity
d) Possibility of terrorist or other criminal assault
4) Planning and design measures which may be considered to assist in meeting these concerns include:
a) Limitation of concealed areas or locations
b) Provision for open stairwells
c) CCTV surveillance of the area
d) Duress alarms in restroom and/or public areas to reduce police/emergency response time
e) Structural design/layout that minimizes or distributes congested driver waiting areas
f) Provisions for a remote police substation or presence in the vicinity
g) Sufficient night lighting
b. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations
Airport hotels are often found within or attached to the main terminal building. From a security perspective
they are typically treated no differently than any other commercial activity at the airport. This includes the
need for design considerations where the possibility exists for persons to exit from the hotel on or near the
airside, or to pass contraband from windows. While direct sight lines to active aircraft movement areas are
often a feature of hotel advertising, it is not a particularly desirable amenity when viewed from the security
point of view that considers bullet trajectories from a close-in, publicly accessible, private hotel room.
There may also be typical security design elements to accommodate the hotel’s cash-handling activities and
vendor/supplier traffic at all hours of the day.
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Section D - Terminal
Airport terminals are transition areas in the airport security plan: transition from landside security concerns and
measures to airside security concerns and measures; transition from land based transportation systems to air based
systems; transition in the flow and focus of passenger movement; and transition in the focus and management of airport
operations. This transition function and responsibility of airport terminal planning and design means the participants in
this process must accommodate the variety of activities on both the landside and airside while allowing efficient and
secure methods for transition between them. Due to the inevitable complexity of meeting the functional needs of the
owners, operators, and users of a terminal facility, a combination of transition strategies will be required. Successful
planning and design processes includes the participation of Airport Security Committee, fire protection and law
enforcement personnel, tenants, FAA security officials, and operators in developing the appropriate strategies to meet
the current security requirements and provide the flexibility for future adaptation. This section provides information on
many of the concepts and methods involved in terminal facility security planning and design.
1. Sterile Area
In this document, the term “sterile area” refers to the area between the security screening station and aircraft to
which access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security
program. The primary objective of a sterile area is to provide a holding area capable of preventing persons from
gaining access to weapons after having passed through security screening and prior to boarding an aircraft.
a. All potential access points (doors, windows, gates, etc.) to sterile areas must be lockable or controlled to
prevent bypassing of security screening. Consider limiting the number of access points (e.g. doors, gates,
stairwells, etc.) when designing facilities that will incorporate sterile areas.
b. If unmonitored, access points such as doors and gates must prevent the reentry of any person to the airside
or the unlawful introduction of any unauthorized person or object. Doors must also comply with local fire
and life safety codes, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements, etc. Begin discussions with
local building and/or life safety code officials early to resolve special design circumstances.
c. Sterile areas should be designed and constructed to prevent the passage of articles from nonsterile areas.
For example, avoid links or connections between sterile area restroom plumbing, air vents, drains, utility
tunnels or other fixtures and restrooms in non-sterile areas to limit the possibilities for passage of articles
from one area to another.
d. When planning the construction of nonsterile or public access suspended walkways or balconies over or
adjacent to sterile areas, it is critical to ensure that they will not facilitate the passing or throwing of items
into sterile areas.
e. During planning and layout of sterile areas, consideration must be given to personnel, maintenance and
concessions needs. Specific items for consideration include:
1) Personnel and employee access into the sterile area;
2) Emergency response routes and pathways -These routes should be nonpublic, easily accessible, never
blocked by boxes, bins, or other hazards, and provide clear, quick access for any emergency equipment
needed (stretchers, wheel chairs, explosives detection/transportation equipment, paramedic equipment).
Routes for off-airport response (emergency medical services (EMS), fire) should also be considered.
3) Concessions deliveries and supplies - Concessions and other airport tenants typically receive deliveries
at all times of day. These deliveries are often from companies whose delivery personnel change
frequently and cannot reliably be given keyed or badged access into the sterile area. Where possible,
deliveries of this type should be limited to a nonsterile area and screened via appropriate hand search,
explosives or x-ray detection methods. Concessions are often located within the sterile areas. Develop
strategies for concessions deliveries, concessions storage areas, concessions employee access routes,
and concessions space flow which maintain adequate security levels, prevent obstructions and patron
queuing areas near or in security checkpoint areas, and minimize the occurrence of unbadged and
unscreened delivery and concessions personnel within the sterile area. All such screening should take
place well removed from passenger screening areas.
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f. During construction or modification of facilities, provisions should be made to ensure that any individual
who has not undergone screening is prevented from contact with a screened individual, in the sterile area
before boarding. (ICAO Annex 17)
g. Security of sterile areas is improved, and maintenance and inspection facilitated, by designs to deter the
concealment of deadly or dangerous devices. Built-in fixtures, such as railings, pillars, benches, ashtrays, etc.,
designed to deter and/or hinder the concealment of weapons or dangerous devices are widely available.
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a. General Issues
SSCPs are a critical element of airport terminal security design, and must be included in planning,
design, and engineering considerations from the conception of the project, including early conversations
with airport and aircraft operator representatives. FAA documents, many of which are non-public,
describe performance requirements of security screening checkpoints, including airport and aircraft
operator responsibilities.
As defined in the FAR, security screening is “intended to prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes
of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individual’s person or
accessible property.” SSCPs play a vital role in the screening of visitors, delivery traffic, concessions
delivery personnel, passengers, employees, and their carry-on or personal items. A key challenge in a
successful terminal design is the satisfaction of this role, without imposing overly burdensome real or
perceived obstacles to the operation of the airport. This will avoid a host of problems for the airport and
airlines, including congestion, delays, expensive and complex operations, and unnecessary security risks.
Further, there is a need to design with an awareness of the importance of queuing space with regard to
wheelchairs and other handicapped assistance equipment.
Among the general issues to consider are:
• How to define a “sterile area”: Security regulations listed below should be reviewed thoroughly.
Also, safety and security issues for a particular project may extend beyond satisfying these
regulatory criteria, and should be discussed with the airport and aircraft operator representatives;
• Minimal interruption to traffic flow of air-travelers and others passing through the terminal from
non-sterile areas to sterile areas. This should be considered both in terms of actual delays, and a
perception of unhindered flow of access to the gates;
• Effective deterrent to potential trespassers, both in terms of actual detection of contraband of any
kind, and of creating the maximum perception that security measures are effective;
• Effective deterrent to unauthorized breach of exit lanes at SSCPs for entry into sterile areas;
• Designs which promote screening personnel effectiveness and pride;
• Designs which are cost-effective for the airlines to operate, in terms of equipment, maintenance and
personnel required;
• Designs which use space efficiently and effectively, allowing more space to be available for
operational or revenue-generating uses;
• Flexibility to accept highly specialized equipment that has constantly changing engineering requirements;
• Need for flexibility, both in day-to-day operations, and in long-term changes in passenger load,
equipment use, and operations, including the increasing use of electronic media;
• Effective and secure handling of goods and services other than individuals, required to cross from
non-sterile area to sterile area;
• Protection of the SSCP equipment and staff personal belongings when the checkpoint is not in use.
b. Regulations and Guidelines
The Federal Aviation Regulations governing airport security and passenger SSCPs include:
FAR 107 Airport Security
FAR 108 Airplane Operator Security
FAR 109 Indirect Air Carrier Security
FAR 129 Foreign Air Carrier Operations
There are also FAA advisory circulars that offer more specific technical advice and recommendations,
support documentation such as the RTCA “Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems”, and
international agreements that relate to services provided on aircraft operators from other countries, and to
airport design in other countries.
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These include:
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
Annex 17-4.5 Measures relating to airport design
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC):
DOC 30 - Security Measures at Airports - 2.1.3, Airport planning requirements
Such documents should be reviewed thoroughly, particularly FAR 108. While the regulations do not
define the technical requirements that govern design of SSCPs, they define what must be accomplished
by the design in regulatory terms. They also provide information about how other jurisdictions approach
terminal security. Virtually all FAA regulations can be obtained on the FAA web page, www.faa.gov.
Nonpublic documents such as an individual security plan are available only to those with a need to know,
from the FAA or from the regulated parties.
The airport, as a public institution that is part of a city, state or other governmental entity, may have other
security requirements than those mandated or governed by the FAA. They may also be subject to local,
city and state building codes, mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement, or a joint military
presence on the airport which could strongly affect all areas of security design, from perimeter barriers to
SSCP design, since these determine who enters the secured areas, and where and how.
c. Essential Coordination
Key individuals in the FAA, airport operations, aircraft operator operations, screening companies and
screeners should be consulted at various stages of the SSCP design process. Local community
representatives or officials may be involved as well.
1) FAA
An FAA Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO), or CASFU (Field Unit) supported by an
FAA regional office, will have jurisdiction over the regulatory compliance of each airport security
project. When federal funds are involved, the FAA Airports District Office will also participate in
the coordination process. There will be an FAA person assigned who can help clarify general
requirements. The designer should generally not contact the FAA person directly unless asked to do
so by the airport. The airport operator also has an FAA-approved security program that will provide
more specific guidance as to how security requirements will be accomplished at the airport. The
designer should initiate direct communication with the airport’s security contact person, generally
titled the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) as the best source of information.
FAA will ultimately require a review of the security project at several design stages, and will review
the SSCP design for regulatory compliance.
The FAA’s Integrated Program Manager for checkpoints, based at FAA headquarters, is an
additional resource.
For FAA-funded projects, the design must be approved by the FAA Airports District Office (ADO).
2) Airports
FAR 107 governs airport security responsibilities. The airport will identify a contact person for the
various components of the project. This person may be an outside consultant. The designer should
coordinate early with that designated security person. Depending on whether the project is focused on
planning or on architectural development of the plan, the designer will need to coordinate their design
with the airport, and with a contact person representing the airlines’ requirements. A compromise may
need to be reached between the airport’s desired use of floor space for level of service criteria, and the
aircraft operators’ needs for adequate security screening. The designer will benefit from participating in
discussions with all parties to understand the needs of both airport and aircraft operators.
In many cases, an airport is being planned well before contracts have been signed between the
airport and the aircraft operators. Sometimes the aircraft operator tenants, or their anticipated levels
of service, change after the design process has started. In all cases, provide generous space in the
beginning of the project planning for SSCPs, so that as the design is refined there is adequate room
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for change or expansion. Security equipment and operations now in the developmental stages are
likely to require more space than what is built today. Areas that allow flexible layouts in terms of
mechanical and electrical connection, structural support, and alternative layouts will be of greatest
benefit in both the short and long term.
The location of the SSCP relative to concessions and other airport services should be resolved early
in the process through conversations with the airport representative, as this will affect airport
operations and revenue. Plan for the possible temporary modification and possibly the location of
SSCP operations during heightened security periods. Under certain conditions a SSCP may be
limited to use by ticketed passengers only. In this case it will enhance the airport’s ability to provide
good service if the SSCP is positioned (or can be moved) so that at least some concessions are
located on the nonsterile side of the SSCP.
The airport contact person will represent the airport’s space needs, if any, in terms of providing law
enforcement personnel support at the SSCP, as well as CCTV coverage, duress alarms, etc. The
airport facilities manager should be included in the process.
3) Aircraft Operators
Aircraft operators bear the responsibility for operating SSCPs as described in FAR 108, and should
be directly involved in SSCP planning.
Either an aircraft operator or airport may be the client. In the latter case direct designer
communication with the aircraft operator may sometimes be difficult, especially if the aircraft
operator tenants have not yet been identified, so the designer must rely on the guidance of the airport
contact person for information regarding the aircraft operator’s SSCP needs. Otherwise, the aircraft
operator representative should be a regular contact point for the designer.
Note that the aircraft operators often form a group with one aircraft operator identified to represent
them to the airport. The representative aircraft operator then leases the space, and staffs or contracts
to staff the SSCP and equip it, and bears that cost. The costs are subsequently distributed among the
aircraft operators by contractual agreement. Where possible, the aircraft operators should be
encouraged to include a representative from the screening company as part of the design process.
The designer may need to balance the needs of different parties within the aircraft operator
organizations. The management may see that limiting the cost of the SSCP is often critical.
Simultaneously, the SSCP supervisors and those directly responsible for the performance of the
SSCP may feel that certain space requirements, amenities, layout, and equipment are critical to the
satisfactory fulfillment of their duties. The designer should meet with representatives of both
viewpoints before making planning, design, and engineering decisions. Layouts that provide
effective operations with a minimum of equipment, staffing and operational flexibility, particularly
during high threat periods, while promoting a good work environment, will benefit all parties.
4) Local Community
Most airport design projects involve issues of community concern and acceptance. The architect,
planner, or engineer should be prepared to assist the airport client in preparing material required to
inform or build consensus within the community. In some instances, television and other journalists
have carefully followed the development of particular SSCP design improvements.
Local law enforcement, building code officials, and fire code officials should be solicited to interact
in the development of the SSCP design.
d. Planning Considerations
Each airport and airport terminal building is unique in terms of physical conditions and operational
requirements. Therefore, no single SSCP solution will work for all airports, or possibly even within the
same airport. This section is intended to provide information regarding where and how large a SSCP
should be for a variety of conditions.
The location and size of the SSCP depends, among other things, on the level and type of risk that are
present or anticipated, the type of operations at the airport, the passenger loads, and the character of the
overall design of the airport.
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d) In airports with no regularly scheduled passenger service using aircraft of more than 60 seats,
security screening may not be required. If flights from such airports deplane into a sterile area at
a transfer/hub airport, then the passengers may be screened at the departure airport in
anticipation of entering the transfer/hub’s sterile area. An exception, as noted earlier, is the
international transfer passenger who must be delivered to the international arrivals building, no
matter what the means of arrival or city of origin.
e) The above three scenarios may each be supported by various orientations of the SSCP.
Transfer/hub operations benefit from a SSCP that is located so that passengers can move among
gates along multiple concourses without being re-screened. On the other hand, O&D operations
may suggest SSCPs be located near individual holdrooms, especially if there are few flights a
day, in which case the checkpoint could be closed down during much of the day. Very small
airports often screen directly before boarding a flight, and provide little or no holdroom space;
these SSCPs may be located directly at the door to the airside.
f) Terminals handling international traffic with connections to domestic and international flights
may benefit from SSCPs located near the front door of the terminal, allowing international
passengers to use ticketing functions without being re-screened.
3) Location of SSCPs (Relative to operational type)
Five basic types of SSCPs can be identified, related to their operational type. The two in the widest
use in the United States are the Sterile Concourse Station SSCP and the Holding Area Station SSCP.
a) The Sterile Concourse Station SSCP plan is usually considered the most desirable from the
standpoint of passenger security facilitation and economics. It is generally located in a
concourse or corridor leading to one or several pier(s) or satellite terminal(s) and permits the
screening and control of all employees, passengers, visitors and deliveries passing beyond the
SSCP, and is well suited for transfer operations. It thus can control access to a considerable
number of aircraft gates with a minimum amount of inspection equipment and personnel. Pier
and satellite terminal concepts are well suited for application of the Sterile Concourse Station
SSCP since the single-point entrance connector element facilitates isolation of boarding areas.
This configuration enables connecting passengers to move between concourses and to
concessions without leaving the sterile area, and without being subjected to multiple screening
processes. In general, the more individual SSCP locations that must be installed to serve
multiple locations within an airport, the more redundancy that must be built in to each to handle
their individual peaks. The “centralized” approach in this example creates efficiencies in staff
and equipment. However, in the event of a security breach, locating and isolating the suspect
may be difficult. In extreme cases a security breach may lead to total airport shutdown. Zoning
the building into areas that can be closed off in the case of a security breach can mitigate this.
Sterile Concourse Station SSCP (Transfer/Hub)
Sterile Satellite
Concourse or Sterile
Terminal Concourses
Nonsterile
SSCP (Ticketing)
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b) In the Holding Area Station SSCP plan, screening is carried out at the entrance to an area
designed to hold passengers awaiting a specific flight. Walls or suitable barriers usually define
this area, and access points must be appropriately controlled. Access points leading from this
area to aircraft loading walkways or ramps must remain locked or monitored until boarding
begins, by which time, inspection or screening of passengers and carry-on baggage has been
completed. Holding Area Station SSCPs must be secured when not in use to ensure sterility is
maintained, or searched prior to use. An advantage of the Holding Area SSCP plan is that it may
require fewer personnel and that the SSCPs need only be staffed during the screening process.
However, staffing needs to account for passenger arrival patterns, and seating for passengers
who arrive prior to security personnel should be considered. In case of a security breach,
restoration is relatively easy in the Holding Area Station SSCP plan, and operations at other
gates/holdrooms will not be affected. This plan is more likely to benefit small airports with
fewer gates and more limited screening requirements.
Holding Area Station SSCP (O&D)
SSCP
Nonsterile
(Ticketing)
Nonsterile
Roadway Roadway
Entry
Landside
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d) Mobile Station SSCPs have also been employed at some airports, affording greater flexibility in
meeting short-term increases in passenger throughput.
e) The Sterile Terminal Station SSCP might be used in airports with high-perceived security risk
by installing SSCP at the entrance points to the terminal. This approach requires 100%
screening of visitors, passengers, employees, and their baggage, and any deliveries through the
front door. The advantage is a much more secure terminal facility, but among its disadvantages
is that it requires a great deal of additional equipment, staff and queue space to accommodate
the increase in the amount of people and baggage to be screened. Additionally, in the case of a
breach in security, locating the suspect could be very difficult, as the entire terminal would need
to be searched and rescreened.
Other problems associated with this approach include persons carrying deadly or dangerous
weapons, but who may do so in accordance with FAA regulations. The Sterile Terminal SSCP
Plan, or other terminal plans in which the screening process is encountered prior to arrival at the
ticket counter must accommodate this situation.
Sterile Terminal Station SSCP (High Risk)
Sterile
Terminal
Building
SSCP
Roadway Roadway
Entry
Landside
4) SSCP Size
While vulnerability assessments and operational characteristics, including level of service, play a
large role in determining the location of SSCPs, it is the current and anticipated passenger loads that
ultimately provide the specific information with which the SSCP can be sized and designed.
Calculations for this are located in the SSCP Calculations Section on page 59.
Remember that staff amenities such as a coat room or lunch room, will be in addition to the size
requirements developed from passenger loads.
For general planning purposes, except at very low activity airports where manual search procedures
may be employed, a SSCP will generally include a bare minimum of one walk-through metal
detector and one x-ray device. [Note: Although the FDA’s full technical definition of an x-ray
inspection system, its shielding and its enclosure refers to a “cabinet x-ray,” this document will use
the more convenient abbreviated term “x-ray” throughout.]
Such SSCPs would require a minimum of 150 square feet, plus space for queuing on the nonsterile
side and any required waiting space on the sterile side. This does not include an exit lane, if required,
room for personal belongings, private screening room, or other features described elsewhere in this
section. It also assumes a fairly small length of baggage belt exiting from the x-ray machine, and a
small retrieval area.
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A two-lane SSCP layout with an additional lane for screening of disabled persons, with an 8’ wide
exit lane, would require a minimum of about 1,200 SF. This would include a security desk, but not
space for queuing or a private screening room or personal belongings. Also note that this is based on
an efficient use of space designed around the concept of a closely controlled and tightly spaced
SSCP by an integrated security systems provider. A more open or loosely spaced two-lane SSCP
may require approximately 100 additional square feet. These numbers include only space
requirements up to the end of the SSCP equipment, and not a buffer zone before entering
mainstream concourse traffic. A three-lane SSCP layout would range from 1,500 SF to 1,700 SF for
similar criteria. A four-lane SSCP layout would range from 1,750 SF to 1,950 SF. Note that the two,
three, and four-lane SSCP layouts all incorporate 8’ exit lanes because they are based on a
“componentized” system. Note also that the overall area required may need to be somewhat larger to
incorporate other components listed elsewhere in this section
5) Integrated Terminal Planning
Successful planning, architectural, and engineering design rests on a governing concept. SSCP and
the related flow of people and goods throughout the airport should be a governing force in that
integrated concept. However, it must also serve the larger idea of the layout and design of the
building. The planner, architect, and engineer must look at all of the above planning considerations
thoroughly and consider how the overall flow of people and goods to and from landside and airside
is best accomplished. Early discussions with aircraft operators and the airport, in order to understand
and develop the best flows through the building, are essential in understanding and designing the
right SSCP for each terminal project.
6) Future Changes in Operational Type
At the time of this writing, some airports are not required to have SSCPs, based on the size of the
aircraft being operated and other criteria. However, changes in the governing regulations or in the
nature of airline service to the airport could cause the small airport to meet criteria that impose
requirements for SSCP screening. The designer should ascertain the current and potential
requirements before beginning the planning and design process. Close and early coordination with
the airport, the aircraft operator, and FAA is recommended.
e. Components of the SSCP
SSCPs are usually made up of components that are similar from one installation to the next, whether they
are pieces of equipment or areas of floor space required for an operator or for pedestrian flow. Some
components are nearly universal, such as metal detectors or space for queuing. Others are used more
sparingly, such as explosives trace detection equipment or motion-detecting exit-lane alarm devices. The
intention of this section is to provide a checklist of items that the designer may wish to incorporate into
an overall SSCP design.
While fairly simple conceptual drawings follow, it underscores the point that all elements of the system,
no matter how seemingly insignificant such as tables and chairs, have a design component requiring an
allocation of dedicated space.
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1) Enplaning Direction
The following diagram shows typical components of a SSCP that may be part of the screening
process in the enplaning direction as an individual moves from non-sterile to sterile areas. A detailed
description of each component follows.
Simplified Plan View of a SSCP Metal Detector & X-Ray Area
h
a. Queuing Space
b. Metal Detector
f/g c. Bin Pass-Through
d. X-ray Machine Cabinet
e. Personal Item Retrieval Area
f. Bag Hand Search Area
g. Explosives Trace Detection Equipment
i h. Personal Search Area
i. Barriers
e
Other Areas and Components (not shown in
this diagram):
j. Supervisor’s Area
k. Private Search Room
l. Special Security Room
m. Personnel Private Areas
d n. Closed Circuit Television
o. Data Connections
p. Disabled accessibility codes/clearance
q. Wheel-chair Path
i c b r. Luggage Cart Path
s. Concessions Goods Path
t. Length of Response Corridor
a) Queuing Space
For guidelines to determine the size of the queuing area refer to the SSCP Calculations section on
page 59. Be aware of specific path of travel conflicts: queue should not interfere with other traffic
patterns or cross-traffic patterns. In some airports an attended station before the queue may be
required to check for tickets if only ticketed passengers are allowed through. The SSCP layout can
affect the queue dramatically. For example, a secondary row metal detector can significantly
reduce queue buildup and the space required for queuing.
b) Metal Detector
The metal detector is a walk-through arch for detection of any metallic items carried by the
individual. Depending on the arrangement, two rows of metal detectors may be desired (“primary”
and “secondary” rows), with space for crossing traffic and decision-making between the two.
Control of this in-between space is difficult, but important. Barriers, sometimes with automatic
gates that physically guide people, have been implemented in some SSCPs. Access to the metal
detector may also be restricted in some applications to one person at a time by automatic gates or
other devices. At least a one-meter distance (per ICAO) should separate nearby metal detectors
from each other and from x-ray machines. The secondary row metal detector has the major
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advantage of reducing queues by eliminating the procedure of people passing two or three times
through the primary detector while others wait. It does not at this time appear to increase overall
throughput rate, which is still governed by bag-screening times.
Data connections may be required to a supervisor’s desk or to a remote screening room. Metal
detectors are highly subject to electromagnetic interference, both in the immediate vicinity (wiring
in metal doors, poor shielding on wires between equipment, on gates, in conduit, overhead
lighting, duct work and power transformers) and at longer range (motors of passing trains). Metal
detectors are calibrated according to FAA guidelines. Attempts to recalibrate equipment on an ad-
hoc basis to prevent spurious alarms from electromagnetic interference are a major source of
inaccuracies in the screening process. Therefore, eliminating interference problems is a key aspect
of checkpoint design. Also refer to the RF Section on page 120.
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d) X-Ray Machine
Space requirements for x-ray machines include space for loading bags onto conveyor, area for x-
ray equipment, area for the operator, area for conveyor exiting the equipment; and areas for
secondary inspection. (See the Bag Hand-Search Area on page 51) The x-ray machine is the
largest and heaviest component of the SSCP. Floor structure must be provided or reinforced to
support the weight, and electric power provided.
Transparent or louvered barriers can help to prohibit access to the bag by the passenger
immediately after the bag exits the machine. The intent is to allow the screener to remove
potentially hazardous bags before the passenger does. Future designs may incorporate a shunting
device to keep people from retrieving their bags if they do not pass the x-ray inspection.
Typically monitors are mounted where an operator reviews them, controlling the rate at which the
images flow by. Interpreting the information it presents requires the most concentration and
training from the screener. An ergonomic, distraction-free environment for the screener is highly
desirable. Design interior lighting to avoid screen glare on monitors, and design the operating
space so that bright sunlight through windows does not wash out or produce glare on monitors.
The exit conveyor often has two sections, a slow-running section just exiting the x-ray, and a
faster conveyor to carry bags to where they will be retrieved. A faster and longer second-section
conveyor may be beneficial because it can put bags further past the metal detectors. This is
beneficial because people tend to congregate where the bags end up, and that can impede flow if it
is too close to the metal detectors. In general, the location at which bags from the x-ray machine
end up should be planned carefully in relation to overall flow issues, including especially where
people will be exiting primary and secondary row metal detectors.
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Exit Conveyor
Width: Allow 40”
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Top view
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Table with
room for bag
search
Typical Design Considerations:
Equipment
Top view Side view Note: This data is intended for use in
initial space planning only. It is
based on the IONSCAN® 400 unit
Typical Area for Trace Detection Equipment by Barringer Technologies Inc.
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Two other barriers should be considered. The first would block off the SSCP when it is not in use,
to prevent contraband from being placed during off-hours to facilitate a later breach of security. It
also protects equipment and property from vandalism and theft. The second barrier type may be
incorporated into the airport design to allow portions of the facility to be sealed in the case of a
security breach, thereby reducing the numbers of people and flights affected.
j) Supervisor’s Area
A supervisor, who at a minimum may need a desk with a computer monitor and other
communication equipment, typically monitors each contiguous group of SSCP lanes. The
supervisor’s desk should have good visual contact with all activities in the SSCP area and promote
clear visual and audible communication between the SSCP personnel and the supervisor. Provide
telephone and data connections as well as pathways for current or future security duress/covert
alarms. In some installations, the supervisor’s area is just beyond, or to one side of the SSCP.
Often there is a podium for the supervisor at the edge of the SSCP before the sterile area, and may
be raised for better visibility and communication.
k) Private Search Room
The private search room is an area for searches that must be conducted in private at the request of
the passenger. The private search room should be large enough for three people: the detainee, the
searcher, and a witness. Consider that at least one of these persons may be within a wheelchair.
The room should be in close proximity to the SSCP, have a covert duress alarm, and be accessible
to the disabled. Also consider treating the room with acoustic isolation materials.
l) Special Security Room
Consider that security searches may result in complicated or confrontational situations. All SSCPs
should have some space set aside for a private area to resolve these situations. Larger installations
may have a dedicated room for law enforcement officials to use as a staging area and/or for
conflict resolution.
m) Personnel Private Areas
SSCP personnel typically need an area to keep personal possessions. The security operator may
also require space for staff training and meetings as well as minimal office space.
n) CCTV
Cameras increase a public sense of security, but primarily serve to record activity throughout the
airport, deter burglary, and capture visual records of security breach perpetrators. Images captured
on CCTV are sometimes sent instantly to designated monitors throughout an airport to facilitate
recognition of a perpetrator. In this application, correct placement of one or more cameras in the
SSCP area is critical. For example, a camera that can only show the back view of a person
breaching the SSCP is of very limited value, as opposed to a camera that displays a person’s face
and other identifying characteristics. Additionally, CCTV can monitor unmanned SSCP areas for
greater security.
o) Data Connections
Connections from security equipment to LAN’s, phone lines, and remote screening rooms, from
equipment to supervisor’s desk, from supervisor’s desk to other selected points in the airport. In
the near future, data from all x-ray and trace machines will be collected automatically. Many new
airports install an information infrastructure, to which the SSCP data may be linked. The security
infrastructure may be a separate system from the data infrastructure, with firewalls between them.
A consistency of network protocols and termination equipment will facilitate the usage of
information. This will be an increasingly important element in SSCP design, and should be
considered carefully.
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of the exit travel lane should be considered carefully to support good flow, clear wayfinding, and
enhanced security.
Some airports have incorporated special measures, such as revolving doors or turnstiles, capable
of blocking entry from the public side while permitting egress to those departing the sterile area,
although this must also allow sufficient space for the passage of the person with baggage, as well
as accommodate the disabled.
b) Security Guard Station
A security guard station is an area, often with a table and chair or podium, for a security person to
monitor and deter people attempting to bypass the SSCP by entering the sterile area through the
exit lane from the nonsterile side. The security guard should be located to intercept traffic moving
in pass-on-the-right patterns typical in the United States. The guard station must have
unobstructed view of the exiting flow well before the point of monitoring. This will provide
quicker response and prevention capabilities to reverse flow violations.
Barrier Barrier
Guard Guard
Screening Screening Wall
Wall Wall
Area Area
Breach Breach
attempt attempt
Better: Guard can Not as good: Guard
intercept quickly is restricted by flow
e) Integrated Systems
As in the nonsterile to sterile movement components, there are integrated systems available for
exit lanes. These allow video cameras, sensors, and video monitors, with supporting architectural
elements to be integrated into the overall SSCP systems, with centralized control.
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At some point personal advanced technology scanning may be developed in an acceptable fashion
that would allow a person to walk through the SSCP without being separated from their personal
belongings and bags. In the United States, only in some Customs locations, a person may choose to
be subjected to a low-level x-ray body search in lieu of a hand-search. In the current technology, the
image of the body is a shortened and somewhat fuzzy blur, while metal objects show as hard clear
images. This image can also be used to identify concealed drugs on the body. This technology is not
currently being used in SSCPs due to concerns about privacy and civil liberties. However, products
are being developed to further reduce the specificity of the body in order to gain acceptance for more
general use. This technology may have applications in future SSCP designs, either as stand-alone
units, or as part of the multi-detection hallway design.
d) Supervisor Command Center
Some SSCP designs incorporate a supervisor’s post with visual control and equipment
connections that in essence becomes a command post. It may be elevated above the floor level for
better visibility. It may require a substantial amount of wiring for electronic equipment for
communication within the SSCP and throughout the airport.
e) Remote Screening Room
Portions of the screening process can be automated by use of a remote room or area where security
personnel can assess x-ray and CCTV images and monitor SSCPs. Remote screening rooms are
connected via data and communications connections to one or multiple SSCPs and may result in
benefits such as reduced manpower, less operator distraction, and better capability to share screening
personnel between multiple SSCPs during peak or sporadic periods.
f) Prescreening Preparation Instruction Zone
This zone is an area in front of the SSCP that uses architectural features, simple signage and
instructional videos, and “ambassador” staff to create a calming atmosphere and more efficient
throughput as well as instruct and direct passengers for efficient screening flow.
g) Automated Breach Detectors
Some automated breach detectors already exist in successful airport applications; they use various
technologies such as doppler wave, infrared and others to allow passage in the appropriate
direction while alarming if there is movement through the zone toward the sterile area.
h) Limited Application Explosives Trace Detectors
Variations of Explosives Trace Detectors which are specifically designed for the limited application
of the screening of tickets, boarding cards, documents, or other items handled by passengers.
4) Designing for the Future
Bear in mind that new technologies and new concepts are evolving constantly - larger and faster
equipment for higher throughput at crowded airports, and smaller, slower, but less expensive
equipment for smaller operations. It is important to remain as flexible as possible in the design of
SSCPs and the surrounding area available for them. The designer should work closely with the
appropriate people to find the right balance of initial cost and space use relative to future expansion
needs. Strategies for future expansion should be recorded so that when it is time to implement them,
the future project leaders can work effectively within the framework that was intended in the original
design. The need for this kind of long term design and the recording of it may be discussed with the
client as a scope of work item. Where possible, avoid designs that might limit growth and restrict
future modifications, or ones that would be so expensive or cumbersome that new technology and
innovative ideas would become impractical to employ.
5) Argus
Argus is a concept recently added to the EDS lexicon. Its’ name is drawn from Greek mythology; he is
the all-observant watchman with 100 eyes. In airports, it refers to a set of standards for smaller and less
expensive baggage screening devices that would be particularly appropriate for small and medium
sized airports with relatively low baggage throughput.
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Argus is not a specific machine; it is a set of criteria against which various manufacturers are designing
machines that are significantly less expensive, smaller, lighter, more user friendly, with more flexible
installation options and lower maintenance costs, and yet equally as effective as their larger
counterparts. Machines meeting Argus criteria will be “certified” for EDS operations; however, they
are considerably slower, which is more applicable for low throughput operations.
There are two other potential benefits of an Argus machine. First, it is configured as a one-operator
system, although additional personnel may be necessary to transport bags to and from the machine.
Second, it can be configured as a “one-sided” operation, for example, up against a wall, where the bags
enter and leave the machine through the same portal. This can save a considerable amount of space for
unnecessary baggage belt systems, and may allow machine placements in unique locations not
available to the larger machines.
One of the relatively short-term FAA goals for baggage screening is 100% CAPPS plus EDS for
selectees by 2004, and by the end of 2009 FAA intends to begin implementation of 100% baggage
screening. First Argus deliveries are expected in the latter part of 2002.
f. Personnel and Operations at the SSCP
1) Space Needs for Equipment Operators
The people who staff the SSCP require space in which to operate, and space to move from place to place in
order to fulfill their duties. These spatial needs vary depending on the type of SSCP installation. Some
SSCP designs depend heavily on people to: 1) Monitor each piece of equipment and make on-the-spot
decisions; 2) Provide a human point of contact for persons with questions or difficulties; and 3) Provide
supervision. These SSCPs may require significant space for staff. Other SSCP designs may incorporate
automated instructional and control devices and remote rooms where monitoring equipment and personnel
are located. In these, the immediate checkpoint space required for staff may be significantly less. The
designer should ascertain the staff requirements for the type of design that the airport or aircraft operator
client intends to operate. If that information were not available, it would be better to err on the side of
providing enough space for a fully staffed SSCP. On the other hand, note that staff salaries are often
considered by aircraft operators to be a significant cost, and floor space in airports is usually at a premium.
Thus, the size of the space allowed for the SSCP should be considered carefully.
The actual space requirements for the operator of each piece of equipment can be evaluated by
understanding how the equipment is used. Some of this information is found in the SSCP Components
section on page 46. More refined information should be obtained as the actual SSCP equipment is specified
and laid out. Equipment manufacturers should be happy to provide information on how their equipment is
staffed. Security experts can also provide advice and professional layout assistance.
The scale of operations will have a large effect on how equipment is staffed. Very small operations in
which the pilot may also screen the bags may have no people dedicated solely to the screening process.
Small operations that do have dedicated screening personnel may still have one person doing many
tasks. Very large operations, however, may have personnel in addition to those required for specific
tasks, and those personnel may supervise the SSCP and /or assist persons being screened.
2) Layouts for Operational Efficiency
The decisions that SSCP personnel make are the decisions that determine whether an acceptable level of
detection at a SSCP is maintained or not. Good decision-making is supported by good layout design. Bad
layouts, for example, may include positioning an x-ray screener, who should be concentrating on a
computer monitor with complex visual information, such that his or her field of vision is routinely
interrupted by the activity of persons going through the SSCP. Also, screeners with this role should not
easily be able to be approached for questions or conversation by people other than other screeners. As
another example, the designer should be aware that locating the x-ray machine so that the screener
monitoring that machine is directly adjacent to a bypass lane is likely to result in that screener being
distracted by the activity in the bypass lane, or even being asked to assist with the activity in it.
A common layout for larger SSCPs at the time of this writing incorporates two metal detectors in the
primary row and one behind them, in the secondary row. While the secondary row metal detector has
proved to be effective in reducing queues, the designer may consider replacing the two primary row metal
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detectors with a single one. This should not reduce flow rate, as the action of walking through the metal
detector is one of the quickest actions that a person being screened will undertake. However, it will allow
the screener controlling the primary row of metal detectors to concentrate on one device rather than two,
greatly reducing distractions. The decision regarding whether to use one or two metal detectors in the
primary row per each two x-ray machines should be made in consultation with the client as referred to in
the Essential Coordination section on page 40.
3) Designing for the Process
As in any design problem, a good design must conform to the activity that it supports. Procedures are in
place and being further refined which outline the process that every person and bag must undergo in order to
properly fulfill the goals of the SSCP. It is critical that the SSCP layout support and enhance this process.
For example, as persons to be screened approach the line of metal detectors and x-ray machines in a
contemporary SSCP, there are three discrete components of the process that they may be expected to
accomplish, i.e., divesting (removing small personal items from pockets, etc.), placing larger items on the x-
ray bag belt, and walking through the metal detector. The layout should respond to the fact that divesting
and placing items on the belt are each activities that take a certain amount of time. They also are activities
that should begin well before the person to be screened reaches the metal detector.
Layout designs which position small divesting bins well before the metal detectors will encourage people to
think about divesting and to begin the divesting process in time to have it completed when it is their turn to
go through the metal detector. Be aware that this would require someone to replenish bins as they are used.
This may not be economically feasible, but it may dovetail well with the concept of a person in front of the
SSCP dedicated to assisting and directing people, which may enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
SSCP. The designer may consider conveyor belts with a somewhat longer “presentation length” on the non-
sterile side, which would allow more time for people in line to begin placing bags on the belt.
4) Architectural Design to Support Intuitive Processes
On a very basic level, the architectural materials and lighting can play a key role in encouraging the
successful operation of the SSCP. A floor color or material, for example, creating a large “entrance mat”
area in front of (on the nonsterile side of) the metal detectors and x-ray machines can clearly mark the
area that is intended for queuing. By using a different floor material or color in front of (on the non-sterile
side of) the exit lane, it may become more intuitive to those on the non-sterile side that they are not
supposed to go through the exit lane. Other material, spatial, or lighting clues may be used to reinforce
the paths that the operation of the SSCP has defined as desirable.
5) Signage
Simple and effective signage can be used to direct and instruct users of the SSCP, to reduce confusion,
increase speed and level of service. Signage should be kept very simple and must be integrated with
the overall terminal signage program. Video monitors could be used to illustrate the three steps of
divesting, loading bags on the conveyor, and walking through the metal detector in much the same way
as they are used on aircraft to illustrate emergency safety procedures.
6) Space for Personal Belongings
Accommodation should be made regarding personal belongings and space set aside for breaks for the
SSCP staff. Typically, they do not have another location within the airport that they can identify as
theirs. For both practical reasons and reasons of morale, enough space should be given to secure coats
and other personal belongings. A break room or break area should be incorporated. However, this area
should not be in view of the public as persons desiring assistance may not be pleased to see staff taking
a legitimate break if they feel they should be being served.
g. SSCP Calculations
This section presents calculations used to determine the number, size and configuration of required SSCPs.
• Growth factors for anticipated future increases in traffic and the accompanying increases in expanded
terminal space should also be considered by the planner, bearing in mind that there are typically
several years lag time between conceptual terminal design and actual construction, and that FAA
estimates between 3%-5% annual passenger growth.
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• The planner’s calculations must also adjust estimates of peak hour volumes for situations where split
operations, multiterminal operations and multiple SSCP may serve to distribute peaks, either evenly or
unevenly, throughout various terminals and/or concourses.
• Similar calculations and formulas are used by International Air Transport Association (IATA) and planners
in the United Kingdom’s Department of Transport document “Aviation Security In Airport Development”.
1) Planning Passenger Volume
Airports experience very large variations in demand levels over time which can be described in terms of:
• Annual variation over time
• Monthly peaks within a particular year
• Daily peaks within a particular month or week
• Hourly peaks within a particular day
Many airport terminals are busy for various time segments in a day, and have no traffic for some other
periods during the day. In order to determine the number of SSCPs, annual or daily demand does not
provide sufficient information. There is a need to capture the levels of demand on the SSCPs for the peak
periods during the planning day. However, the choice of the planning day is important. It is not advisable
to select the planning day as the busiest day of the entire year since that will oversize the facility,
resulting in underutilization and high design and building costs.
One commonly used technique is to identify a peak hour for which the facility is to be designed and
compute the total passenger volume for that period. The peak hour volumes typically range from 10%
to 20% of the daily volume. There are several methods to determine the design load on the SSCPs, and
the list below identifies four methods1:
a) Typical Peak Hour Passengers (TPHP)
b) Busy Day/ Peak Hour (BDPH)
c) Standard Busy Rate (SBR)
d) Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
1
Ashford, Norman, H. P. Martin Stanton and Clifton A. Moore, Airport Operations, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, 1997.
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0.25
0.20
TPHP Percentage
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 100,000,000
Annual passengers (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 1 FAA Recommended Relationship for TPHP Computations from Annual Figures
b) Busy Day/Peak Hour (BDPH)
IATA suggests the Busy Day/Peak Hour method for design and planning purposes. The “busy”
day is defined as the second busiest day in an average week during a peak month. An average
weekly pattern of passenger traffic is calculated for that month. Peaks associated with special
times such as national holidays, festivals, fairs, special events are excluded. The busy day data can
be obtained from the airport tower log. Once the aircraft movements are obtained, passenger
volumes can be plotted by time-of-day with appropriate load factor assumptions. This will lead to
the selection of peak hour and corresponding passenger volume within that 60-minute period. The
detailed security checkpoint planning will then be based upon the busy hour passenger volume.3
Take care that calculations are not skewed by airline scheduling anomalies, such as the common
practice of multiple airlines scheduling their first flight of the day at 6:59 a.m. or 7:59 a.m. in
order to be the first one listed in the reservations computers.
2
USDOT – FAA Advisory Circular. Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities, 4/22/1988.
3
IATA, Airport Development Reference Manual, 8th edition, 1995.
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4
Measuring Airport Landside Capacity, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Spec. Report 215, Washington, D.C., 1987.
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In this example, L=1,380 indicates a constant arrival pattern where people arrive to the SSCP with
1,380/60=23 people per minute. However, this will not be the case in many airports. Figure 2 shows
three different arrival patterns, all of which have the same arrival rate of 1,380 passengers per hour.
Passengers
Passenger Arrival Rate to SSCPs
Per Minute
50
B - Typical Arrival C - Busy Hub Arrival
40
30
20
10
A- Constant Arrival
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Minutes
Figure 2 Different Arrival Rates to SSCPs - All Cases with 1,380 passengers per hour
Case A assumes a constant arrival pattern where arriving passengers are spread uniformly. This
results in a constant demand on the SSCPs with 23 passengers per minute.
Case B is more realistic by assuming random arrivals where the per minute rate changes between
10 to 40 passengers per minute, with the same total of 1,380 passengers arriving in an hour.
Case C also has variation in the number of passengers arriving per minute, but also with a total of
1,380 passengers arriving in an hour. However, in this case, the arrivals peak in the middle of the
peak hour.
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b) Number of Checkpoints
The required number of x-ray processing stations are:
P * (1 − T ) * (1 + k ) * r * B
N x − ray =
X*f
c) Example
P = 1,200 passengers per hour
T = 50% of passengers transferring within the secured area
k = 15% of enplaning passengers to account for other traffic (meeters/greeter, well
wishers, employees and vendors.)
r = Demand scale factor of 1.2
f = SSCP utilization factor of 0.9
X = 700 bags per hour
B = An average of 1.5 bags per passenger
1,200 * (1 − 0.50) * (1 + 0.15) * 1.5 * 1.2
N x −ray = = 1.97 = 2
700 * 0.9
This formula results in 2 x-ray devices, which could be served by a common metal detector, and a
secondary manual search station staffed accordingly.
5) Number of Checkpoints – Holdroom (X-Ray + Metal Detector)
This section presents security checkpoint sizing formulas where SSCPs are placed at the entrance of
the holdroom. In this scenario, the terminal concourse is not secured, and passengers clear security
only at the gate holdroom. It is assumed that a combination of x-ray belt and metal detector is used to
check baggage and passenger, respectively.
a) Required parameters
M = Maximum number of passengers on a departing flight handled at the gate holdroom.
T = Transfer/through percentage
k = Percentage of enplaning passengers to account for other airport traffic
r = Demand scale factor between 1 and 1.5
f = SSCP utilization factor
X = X-ray belt service rate in bags per hour
B = Number of carry on bags per passenger
G = Duration of time (in minutes) that holdroom is open. This is typically reflected by the
difference between the time of arrival of the first passenger to the holdroom and the
time when the last passenger is on board.
b) Number of Checkpoints
The required number of x-ray processing stations are:
M * (1 − T ) * (1 + k ) * r * B
N x − ray =
X * f * (G / 60)
c) Example
M = 340 passengers
T = 10% (The percentage of through passengers that remain on board)
k = 0% (Only passengers holding boarding ticket/cards are allowed in the holdroom)
r = Demand scale factor of 1.2
f = SSCP utilization factor of 0.9
X = 800 bags per hour
B = An average of 1.5 bags per passenger
G = The gate is open for 50 minutes prior to the departure
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Q N = Lminutes * Wtarget
b) Example
Let’s consider the example provided earlier that required 2 x-ray processors:
P = 1,200 passengers per hour
T = 50% of passengers transferring within the secured area
k = 15% of enplaning passengers to account for other traffic (meeters/greeter, well
wishers, employees and vendors.)
r = Demand scale factor of 1.2
Wtarget = Tolerable wait time of 5 minutes
The effective demand per minute is given by L:
1,200 * (1 − 0.5) * (1 + 0.15) * 1.2
Lminutes = = 13.8
60
With target maximum waiting time of Wtarget=5, the number of people expected to queue in front
of the SSCP is given by QN:
Q N = 13.8 * 5 = 69
With two x-ray machines, there will be two queues each with approximately 35 passengers.
5
Kleinrock, Leonard, Queuing Systems, Volume II: Computer Applications, John Wiley & Sons, 1976.
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7) Other Research
The impact of a specific SSCP layout can be analyzed in detail through analytical modeling techniques
such Network Analysis, Queuing Theory, and Simulation.6,7 The Network Analysis and Queuing
Theory approaches have the drawback of making unrealistic assumptions regarding the arrival rates
and service time distributions. Simulation however, can account for the actual system under
consideration and provide detailed information regarding the passenger waiting times, queue lengths,
and level of service in terms of area per passenger around SSCPs.
The reader is also referred to Appendix B, Airport Security Flow Modeling, for additional information.
h. Typical SSCP Layouts
So far, this section has approached SSCP layout in terms of broad overall issues, with detail on each
component. The following section shows how the detailed components can be assembled into functional
SSCPs.
Many physical pieces of equipment, and the people to staff them, are brought together in the SSCP to
achieve the goal of enhancing air travel safety by detecting and preventing the passage of contraband. This
goal is achieved in essence by designing a set of procedures for detection and for dealing with detected
objects. The physical components and staff of the SSCP are simply the means to carry out the designed
procedure. As such, it is critical in the layout of SSCPs to understand the elements of this procedure in
order to design correctly.
While remembering that ultimately the SSCP is about, for, and run by people, it may be helpful in some
respects to think of it as an assembly line, in which certain procedures take place in an orderly, repetitive
way. The benefits of this are that security staff are less likely to make mistakes when they know exactly
what to do and in what order, people being screened are more likely to be prepared if there is a procedure
that they understand, and security supervisors can more easily monitor activities if out-of sequence
activities can be recognized against the background of a well-defined process.
Having established that the SSCP layout must be designed closely in accordance with a well-defined
process, it must be said that such a process has not at this time been fully put in place. Most SSCPs do have
effective means in place of detecting contraband. However, this goal could be achieved more quickly,
efficiently, and cost-effectively with a better-defined and more universal process. Until a more universal
process comes into use, the designer should work closely with the airport, airlines, and other parties to
understand what process will be used for security screening, and design accordingly.
A host of airport operators, aircraft operators, security services providers, airport engineers and planners,
architects and designers, and security design specialists have been working for the past several years on
various SSCP installations, and a relatively consistent model for the SSCPs being built today has emerged.
Therefore, although every installation is different, it is possible to outline a layout that demonstrates many
of the features that are in common use in new or recently remodeled installations.
While reviewing the following SSCP layouts, remember that very small and very large airports may have
operations that are not well served by them. Also, many airports were designed before the principles of
today were being applied, and these SSCPs may not have space for the different functions and best spatial
relationships.
While reviewing the following SSCP layouts, keep in mind that:
• There should be consideration of at least two lanes at each SSCP to accommodate equipment
failure in one of the lanes;
• Each SSCP should be capable of rapid expansion to additional lanes and/or moving to additional
locations to permit the unimpeded processing of large numbers of peak-period passengers. These
additional facilities can be closed when not needed.
6
Ashford, Norman and Paul H. Wright, Airport Engineering, 3rd edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
7
Chambers, Edward V.C et. al., A Systems Analysis Procedure for Estimating the Capacity of an Airport: System Definition, Capacity Definition
and Review of Available Models, Research Memo 27, Council for Advanced Transportation Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, 1975.
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Layout A
SUPERVISOR’S PODIUM
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
ADA OPN’G
8’ HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
QUEUING
AREA
Features of Layout A:
Two metal detectors side-by-side in the primary row provide redundancy if one malfunctions. This is a very
common layout. Usually one staff person is monitoring both primary metal detectors. If there is an alarm and the
staff person did not see which machine went off, there can be a delay while the situation is clarified. See Layout B-1
for a potential SSCP layout with one metal detector for each two x-ray machines.
A metal detector in the secondary row reduces queues on non-sterile side of SSCP by allowing those who “fail” at
the primary row metal detector to move forward instead of backing up and holding up the line. Note the location of
the secondary metal detector relative to the end of the conveyor belt where bags will be picked up. Avoid SSCP
layouts that require a person to go backwards from the secondary to pick up bags.
A “Bin Pass-Through” beside each metal detector provides a place for people to place small items. The designer
should check whether the process called for includes this, or whether all items are required to go through either the
metal detector or the x-ray machine. Bins are being developed that could allow small articles to go through the x-ray
machine. The time that people spend “divesting” on the non-sterile side, and the time they spend “re-vesting” on the
sterile side of the metal detector is significantly higher than the time spent actually walking through the arch and is
one of the larger delays that have been observed. Another part of the process that requires significant time is
unloading of bags onto the x-ray machine conveyor belt. See Layout A-1 for a possible solution for reducing
divesting and layout time.
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Layout A-1
VIDEO
MONITORS
PODIUMS
“WELCOME MAT”
Layout A-1: Preparation area before metal detectors could ease SSCP confusion and speed process.
Podiums with pass-through bins set beside the queues as people approach the SSCP from the non-sterile side may be
used to allow early divestiture, which has the potential to reduce delays significantly. A common delay is caused by
someone realizing late that they need to divest, and holding up the line as they do so.
A SSCP staff person would be required to replenish the bins. However, such a person could be performing several
general assistance tasks such as with strollers and wheelchairs, and provide information and instruction, thereby
significantly increasing the level of service and throughput rate of the SSCP.
Creating a “welcome mat” by using floor and ceiling patterns, lighting, and limited greeting and instructional
signage could ease the screening process by giving clear clues as to what is required and when.
Video monitors could be installed that illustrate, just as the videos do now on aircraft, the three basic steps of
unloading bags, divesting small objects, and stepping through the arch. By seeing it on the video, people have a
clearer idea of what is expected and have something to watch while waiting.
Potentially, longer feed conveyors could allow more people to load before reaching the actual metal detection arch.
On the other hand, be aware that most people are very reluctant to step through the arch until they see their bags
actually pass into the body of the x-ray machine.
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Layout A-2
SUPERVISOR’S PODIUM
SINGLE
SECONDARY
ROW M.D. W/
GUIDE WALLS
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
8’ HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
NOTE: ADA ACCESS IS
REQUIRED IN ALL
LAYOUTS
Layout A-2: Extended higher speed conveyors move retrieval point away from metal detectors.
Longer conveyors running at a fairly high speed on the exiting side of the x-ray machine could place bags further
away from the metal detectors. The benefit is that the tendency of people to stand while they put back on their
various bags and personal items, and to wait for other members of their party, would occur further down and out of
the way of the secondary metal detector and personal hand searches. The flow of people who have passed through
the primary metal detectors and are trying to walk straight on into the concourse would not be impeded.
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Layout A-3
QUEUE FOR
BAGS
Layout A-3: Angled or offset retrieval areas move process out of flow stream.
Angling or offsetting the retrieval areas may be another way to create areas for people to stand in while they put
their bags and belongings back together and wait for friends. The idea is to create clear pathways for flow, and to
create offset areas for activities that receive stopping, like eddies out of the flow of the main stream.
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Layout A-4
SUPERVISOR’S PODIUM
SINGLE
SECONDARY
ROW M.D. W/
GUIDE WALLS
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
FAST
LANE
8’ HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
QUEUING
AREA
A separate SSCP lane for people without bags could provide a higher rate of throughput for the lane.
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Layout B
SUPERVISOR’S PODIUM
EXIT LANE
8’ HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS ONE METAL ONE METAL
BARRIERS DETECTOR DETECTOR
In some other countries a single metal detector in the primary row is used with a single in the secondary row. There
is some loss of redundancy if the first unit goes down, but the second can be used in that case. The benefits are, first,
that the staff person monitoring the primary row can be much more efficient because there is no confusion about
which arch in the primary row has alarmed.
Secondly, there is a significant reduction in the width needed for the overall SSCP. It is still governed by the bypass
lanes around the secondary metal detector, but there is a gain.
Thirdly, the airlines would need to buy and maintain one less piece of equipment.
The reduction from two to one metal detector in the primary row is often perceived as something that could cause
delays. However, the act of walking through the arch is by far the fastest in the entire process. It is unloading of
bags, divesting, “re-vesting,” and retrieving bags that govern delays.
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h) The receiver side of metal detectors should not be placed within 4 feet of any public address
speakers as coils inside the speakers create electromagnetic interference.
i) Surface vibrations can be expected to have an adverse effect upon metal detectors. Baggage carts,
subway trains, and heavy truck traffic are all common sources of vibration that could have a
negative impact.
2) Site Preparation for X-ray Systems
While x-ray systems are not as sensitive to outside interference as metal detectors, it is useful to
consider the following when determining the best location for this equipment. These recommendations
have also been used by the U.S. Marshal’s Service in its Court Security program.
a) Evaluate the condition of the building’s electrical system as electrical noise from one part of the
building will travel through wiring and interfere or damage electronic equipment. Loose
connections result in arcing. System evaluation could include transformers and switchboards,
bonding and grounding networks to the circuit breaker panels, the switches, the receptacles to all
of the wiring in between all of these points.
b) Ensure equipment will be served by compatible power sources. Determine what types of electrical
equipment are powered from the circuit breaker panel closest to where equipment will be installed.
If this panel has large demand loads that repeatedly turn on and off, consider selecting a different
circuit breaker panel or installing a new panel or subpanel. If the panel directory is not marked or
improperly marked, the machine could easily be connected to an incompatible power source.
c) Prior to using existing electrical circuits, determine what else shares the circuit. Installation of
dedicated circuits for x-ray machines is recommended. Depending on the distance of the circuit
between the circuit breaker box and the receptacle, radio frequency interference (RFI) will often
cause operational problems.
d) X-ray machines will not operate properly when site temperatures are too high or too low. Control of
temperature and humidity is a factor for consideration of security screening station locations. If the
x-ray machine will be exposed to elements, consider taking precautions to protect and weatherize.
In general, the designer should become fully familiar with the engineering requirements of SSCP
equipment as noted above, and design accordingly.
j. SSCP Blast Protection
Consider the use of dividers from floor to ceiling between the deplaning passengers and the SSCP. This
could help mitigate the blast effect of the accidental detonation of a small explosive. Glass could also be
placed between the security supervisor's desk and the x-ray machine.
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3. Public Areas
a. Public Lobby Areas (Ticketing, Bag Claim, Rental Car)
1) Security can be greatly improved by limiting the number of access points, and taking measures to
monitor via CCTV all access points (to include conveyor belts) through which direct or indirect access
from public areas to the airside can be obtained.
2) Consider ways of both visually and physically differentiating between public and sterile or non-public
areas in terminal design to prevent entry by unauthorized persons. Security will be further advanced if
planners consider building in a capability to secure or close down areas not in use. In airports with
multiple checkpoints, each checkpoint must have an open/closed status. Closed status should eliminate
movement of all unauthorized persons and objects from nonsterile to sterile areas.
3) When selecting architectural and other built-in fixtures and furnishings (e.g., trash receptacles, benches
or seats, pillars, railings) for the terminal, planners are urged to avoid those likely to facilitate the
concealment of explosives or other dangerous devices, or those likely to fragment readily, such as
aggregated cement/ stone trash containers. This will also help reduce costs associated with monitoring
such areas during high security threat periods. Other fixtures are already in wide use and are typically
streamlined and easy to maintain. When possible, deny hiding places to those who would conceal
explosives, incendiary devices or weapons in terminal facilities. Typical hiding places in the past have
been restrooms and public lockers, closets, utility rooms, storage areas, stairwells, and in recesses
housing fire extinguisher or fire hose storage cabinets. Closets and utility rooms should be locked
when not attended.
4) If assessments by airport security officials or a prior history of incidents indicate an airport is at increased
risk of explosive attacks, planners of new facilities would be well advised to seek advice from structural
and explosives experts on methods of minimizing the effects of blast in the public areas. Computer based
blast analysis models (See Appendix C) and numerous manual reference tables and formulas are
available to provide various levels of specificity to the determination of structural data and limitations.
5) A growing circumstance involves situations where passengers might check in for an airline flight at a
remote location such as a downtown or hotel ticket office, a cruise ship terminal, or might have taken
advantage of an electronic ticketing option, in which checked baggage might not be handled in the
usual fashion at the lobby ticket counter. Architects and planners must consider accommodating the
potential requirement of maintaining the security of checked baggage arriving through non-traditional
airport processes, perhaps through such approaches as additional curbside check-in locations. This
concept is one of “chain of control” in which control of the baggage must be maintained throughout
the system; from the moment the passenger relinquishes it to the point where they regain it again. This
remote check-in concept is addressed in further detail in the Remote Check-In section on page 105.
6) Minimal seating in ticketing lobbies will reduce congestion, encourage passengers to proceed to the
gate areas, and facilitate the monitoring and patrolling of this area during periods requiring increased
security and search measures.
Careful consideration should be given to the needs of international or high-risk aircraft operators who
may have to apply extended security measures during the passenger check-in process. In some cases,
additional space is required to support aircraft operator interviews of passengers and x-ray or search of
baggage prior to issuance of boarding gate passes. Additional queuing space may also be required.
b. Public Emergency Exits
1) Exiting requirements for public assembly buildings such as airport terminals are specifically established
including required widths and separation distances. Building code required exits might compromise
optimal security planning. Often, the need and location of public emergency exits will cause doors to be
located and equipped such that the public has unlocked, free access to secured areas. In all cases, these
doors must be equipped with local and/or monitored alarms that can be heard and responded to quickly
by security or airport personnel. The need and location of such emergency exits must be coordinated
closely with the local Fire Marshall and/or Code officials. Their involvement early in the planning and
design process will reduce conflicts due to misinterpretation of FAA or local building code requirements.
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2) Whenever possible the building should be designed such that emergency exits leading into secured
areas can be minimized, and such that exitways avoid moving persons from a lower to a higher level of
security area (i.e. from non-sterile to sterile or from sterile to SIDA/AOA). Likewise, exiting screened
individuals should be kept separate from unscreened individuals when possible. This may minimize the
need to fully rescreen all persons in the case of an emergency or false alarm. Designers should also
prevent the capability for individuals to be able to enter secured areas undetected during an emergency
by traveling in the reverse exiting direction through emergency exits.
3) Consider designing a system in which emergency exit doors utilize push-type panic bars with 15-30
second delays (where allowable, perhaps in conjunction with smoke or rate-of-rise detectors tied to a
central monitoring system) until the door opens. Use of delays, use of CCTV monitoring, and use of
door alarms which are tied into the ACAMS can drastically reduce incidence of false alarms and the
need for officer dispatches.
c. Security Doors vs. Fire Doors
Security and safety sometimes do not mix well, as airport experience has shown in the security treatment of
airport fire doors leading to the secured area from sterile areas. If the door is not a fire door the answer is
simple: lock it. The problem arises when an emergency egress door allows occupants to discharge into a
secured area. Locking an emergency door is illegal In many airports, the use of delayed egress hardware
has been proposed to restrict nonemergency exit by passengers; door releases could be delayed from 10-30
seconds to as much as 45 seconds. However, local fire codes and risk management units may not allow use
of these devices. Among the examples of problems is the first-time international passenger who may or
may not speak English and would believe the door is locked, or may not understand the English signs that
advise that the door will open after the delay.
The issue is being addressed industrywide, but independently due to different jurisdictions and different fire
codes. The on-going effort seeks agreement from the fire protection and life safety professionals that there
is an acceptable way to lock the doors for security purposes that does not raise the level of risk for
passengers or visitors in times of smoke, fire or panic.
This document does not yet have a design-based solution to offer, other than the already-stated concept of
keeping the number of AOA access points to an operational minimum, and wherever possible having the fire
doors open into non-secured areas so that a delayed release is not required. The challenge to resolve this
dilemma is not an easy one, and the ultimate solutions arrived at may or may not be interchangeable from one
airport to another. Until a common solution is developed, this critical issue will require close coordination
among the planner, designer, airport and FAA security officials, and the local fire code officials.
d. Concessions Areas
1) Concessions are a major source of airport revenue and are typically located throughout an airport
terminal facility. Typically it is advantageous to the airport to make concessions areas accessible to the
broadest possible range of visitors and passengers. As such, trends in recent years are moving towards
locating more concessions in the sterile areas, close to the passenger holdrooms or to place concessions
in one large group prior to the screening checkpoints.
2) In designs where the majority of concessions are within the sterile area, it can be advantageous to
design the concession layout in such a way that temporary, alternate locations for the screening
checkpoints can be used during heightened security periods that will remove the concessions areas
from the sterile area and minimize risk.
3) Regardless of where concessions goods checkpoints are located within the terminal (sterile vs. non-
sterile), all concessions require the movement of personnel, merchandise and supplies (products, food
stuffs, beverages, money) from delivery/arrival to the point of final use. Some concessions will require
intermediate storage and processing areas within the terminal as well. The planning and design of the
delivery and personnel access routes used are very important.
4) Concessions at an airport are often varied in both function and operation. They may be as simple as a
shoeshine stand, automated floral dispensing machine or art/memorabilia display case, or as complex
as a restaurant with multiple daily deliveries from various suppliers and varied types and location of
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storage. Thus, multiple security strategies will be required depending upon the type and location of the
concession, its delivery and storage requirement, its service circulation (trash, money-handling, storage
access), and its individual security requirements (duress alarms, CCTV, ATM security, bank/money
personnel escorts).
5) Due to such a variety in concession types and operations, concessionaires or a designated
representative should be involved in the design and coordination process with the airport owner and
airport security personnel. Since concession companies and types frequently change, designers are
encouraged to plan for not only the existing, known concessions, but also for general concession space
use based on airport patterns and future trends. The needs for advertising concessions, cleaning
contractors and private (nonairport) maintenance and repair crews should also be considered in the
overall security strategy and design.
6) Critical concessions design and planning considerations include the ability to screen both personnel
and deliveries, the security badging and/or escort needs of delivery personnel, the routes of delivery
and areas of access that unscreened personnel and deliveries may have access to, and the frequencies of
that access. Since delivery personnel frequently change, and/or since some deliveries may even require
armed escort in order to complete their deliveries (alcohol, bank/ATM, U.S. Mail) the design
considerations (access point locations and types, loading dock phone, locations of concessions storage
and mail areas) which complement these procedural issues can often minimize the security risks with
proper coordination. A key security risk when deliveries are escorted into the sterile or other security
areas is that the delivery persons may be left unattended, or left to “find their own way out.” While this
is a procedural problem, early coordination and planning can provide for design-related solutions such
as a manned visitor/escort sign-in/out station which requires both the escort and escortee to be present
both entering and exiting. If the accommodation for such a station is not accounted for or considered in
the design phase, it is very difficult to execute later on.
7) Design elements to consider include: separate concessions storage areas in public or non-secured/low-
risk areas, design/use of a separate loading dock/concessions screening area for personnel and/or
packages, location of concessions and/or public mail areas outside of security areas, simplification and
shortness of the delivery access routes and the quantity of security access points which must be used
(an “escort-friendly” design), visitor/escort sign-in/out stations, and careful planning of which
concessions should be within security areas based on their delivery and personnel requirements.
e. Public Lockers
Public lockers have historically been used to conceal explosive devices in airports and other transportation
terminals around the world. From a security viewpoint, the required location for unmonitored public
lockers is within sterile areas beyond the security screening stations.
1) If placement in sterile areas is not possible, consider locating lockers so as to minimize the damage or
injury that could result from an explosion. Some airports have constructed blast barriers around lockers
in areas accessible to the unscreened public. There are locker designs that vent explosions upward
rather than outward, requiring the architect to examine the surrounding ceiling and support structures.
2) Consider structural design styles that would vent explosive forces away from congested locations to
minimize damage and injury. EOD response personnel are a good source of advice on this topic. Also
consider the need to provide supervised storage facilities in lieu of lockers in the event of increased
security measures.
3) Public storage lockers can be designed to facilitate search of these lockers under bomb threat
conditions. An evaluation of various available locker designs is recommended to ensure that the
lockers selected will facilitate an EOD search with master keys or an electronic release. Consider also
potential space for an x-ray inspection of lockers or their contents.
4) Consideration may be given to surveillance cameras and video recorders for the locker areas.
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f. Left Luggage
Left luggage facilities (primarily in the public areas of the terminals, before passenger screening) should be
provided with appropriate x-ray/EDS equipment to verify baggage before storage. CCTV surveillance and
duress alarm provision should also be considered. If the facility deploys a sterile terminal operational mode,
then such equipment is clearly not required. It should be noted that in some sterile terminal schemes only
checked luggage is screened on entry and thus such facilities should not accept hand luggage that has not
been screened.
g. VIP Lounges/Hospitality Suites
Some airports feature VIP lounges and/or airline hospitality suites, both of which are frequently located
beyond security screening stations in sterile areas. Security considerations for both types of facility should
recognize the need to restrict unauthorized access to the secured areas, air operations area and other areas,
as well as the need for space for monitored baggage holding facilities while passengers may be otherwise
occupied for several hours.
h. Observations Decks
Outdoor terminal observation decks are strongly discouraged in today's security environment. Where they
already exist, it is recommended they be closed to public access unless the architecture allows a practical,
effective and unobtrusive way to fully enclose or isolate the public from the airside, and particularly from
the secured area. There may be alternate opportunities to provide public areas for viewing of airside
activity, particularly in newer terminals that employ significant expanses of glass windows.
i. Vertical Access
Restrict the traveling public from access to the airside though elevators, escalators and stairwells, which
may otherwise provide them appropriate access to public spaces (e.g., an elevator which goes up to a VIP
lounge, but not down to an airside access point.).
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4. Nonpublic Areas
a. Service Corridors, Stairwells and Vertical Circulation
1) Terminal design responds to the variables of its program and operation. Secure sterile areas and similar
zones of security may not strictly adhere to horizontal or vertical configurations. Service corridors in
an airport not only serve to enhance aesthetics by concealing service and delivery personnel, but
actually can increase airport efficiency by providing clear, unobstructed pathways where airport
personnel can quickly and efficiently traverse the terminal without risking delay or inconvenience due
to the often hurried, and preoccupied airport passenger. Thus, service corridors may transit a portion or
the entire length of the terminal. Where possible these corridors should not cross boundaries of secure
areas. If crossings are unavoidable, these transitions should be minimized and controlled.
2) Service corridors may also be used to minimize quantity and type of security access points. If access
by similar personnel or tenant areas (such as airline ticket offices or concessions storage areas) are
grouped into a common service corridor prior to entering a security area, then only one or two security
points are needed rather than one per tenant.
3) The planning and design of airport non-public service corridors should also consider their placement
and use by airport emergency personnel and law enforcement. While use of service corridors by
emergency and law enforcement agencies is not a security requirement, proper corridor placement and
design characteristics can enhance response times as well as allow for private, nondisruptive transport
of injured persons or security detainees. As aviation laws are changing to make flights safer, there is
greater potential for in-flight violations (threats, violence, public disturbance) that increasingly require
security escorts of persons for questioning and/or holding. Law enforcement trends encourage use of
an accessible nonpublic corridor/pathway from the boarding/deplaning gate area to the police area
and/or police parking area.
4) Vertical circulation and stairwells are more difficult to control than corridors. They typically provide
access to not only multiple floors, but often multiple security levels as well. In particular, fire stairs
typically connect as many of the building’s floors/levels as possible. Since they are located primarily to
meet code stated separation requirements and provide efficient egress of the facility, they are not often
conveniently located with regards to security boundaries or airport operation. Thus, additional nonfire
stairs, escalators and elevators are often needed as well.
5) When coordinating stairwells and vertical pathways, care must be taken with regards to security
treatments and boundaries. Since many of these vertical pathways function as not only emergency, but
also service pathways, the quantity and type of security treatments should be minimized. In addition, as
with any fire exit, allowable door equipment and delays must be carefully coordinated with the local
code and building officials.
b. Airport Personnel Offices
Airport personnel will require office space throughout the terminal facility depending on the office’s
function. Types of airport personnel offices typically located within an airport terminal include
administrative and aviation department offices, maintenance department offices, law enforcement,
badging/ID offices and security force offices and substations, as well as airline and tenant (including
government agency) offices.
1) Office areas are best located close to the primary activity of the personnel within the office. Thus there
may be various office areas, within various security areas, depending upon the preferences of the
airport and the airport’s design. Office areas should be located and connected via corridors and vertical
circulation as necessary to minimize the amount that the office personnel will need to cross security
boundaries in their daily activities. Likewise, office spaces should be planned with their need for
visitors and public access in consideration, as well as the likelihood that those visitors might be
inadvertently left unattended or unescorted.
2) Considerations should be given as well to the use of satellite police, ID or first aid offices that allow
for easy public access and possibly more efficient response times.
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3) Other than the considerations of whether office areas are within security areas, or how frequently
office personnel will cross security boundaries, the security of the office areas themselves is often a
security concern. When airport authority/administration offices are located within a terminal, these
areas are often desired to be equipped with security equipment and/or patrols. Since it is typically more
cost effective and efficient to use the same security system, these areas usually require security door
treatments, duress alarms, and connection to the airport operations center and monitoring equipment.
4) Additional potential design considerations within airport personnel office areas include: security of
airport personnel and financial records, security of access control and badging/ID workstations,
security of ID badge stock and records, safe and money storage areas, and computer server and
equipment areas, especially for security-related facilities such as the access control system.
c. Tenant Spaces
There is no fixed rule on whether tenant spaces might require tie-in to the access control system. This
necessitates early discussions with each tenant, and perhaps a representative of the tenant community as a
whole, to look at such protection requirements as money-handling operations, overnight operations, late
night or early morning concession deliveries, etc.
d. Law Enforcement & Public Safety Areas
ICAO Standards (Annex 17), FAR 107, FAR 108, and other regulatory guidance encourage the provision
of supporting facilities for security services at airports serving civil aviation.
1) Public Safety or Police Offices
a) Office space for airport security or law enforcement personnel should be provided in or near the
terminal building, and be sized after thorough discussions with police officials.
b) Police facilities in the terminal complex should be planned to allow public access to a controlled
greeting area which will be protected with considerations to mitigate the effect of a detonated
device and/or small arms fire. This might include ballistic materials, laminates, window tinting,
and concrete bollards/planters to prevent vehicular penetration.
c) Satellite police facilities can be distributed throughout the terminal to reduce vulnerability to a
single point of attack.
d) Physical infrastructure should include adequate space (in no particular order) for:
i) Briefing/work room
ii) Training classroom/offices
iii) Property/evidence room(s)
iv) Conference rooms—can be part of command post/operations room(s)
v) Holding cells
vi) Possible satellite locations
vii) Private Interrogation/Witness Statement room(s)/area
viii) Physical fitness area in conjunction with lockers, showers, and restrooms
ix) General storage areas
x) Secured arms storage
xi) Kitchen/lunchroom facilities
e) Areas requiring access for public and tenants but protected with adequate controls are:
i) Administrative offices
ii) Security ID badging
iii) Lost and found
iv) SIDA/tenant training rooms
v) Medical services
f) Consideration must be given to electrical, fiber optic and other utility supply and routes to/from
the police areas. Special considerations should be given to the amounts of supply conduit in order
to accommodate future expansion in this era of rapidly increasing security requirements.
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houses the dogs’ handlers. While a set-aside training area would also be helpful, it is common for K-9
teams to undertake training exercises at such areas of the airport as parking lots, cargo ramps, baggage
make-up and bag claim areas, to maintain a realistic training environment.
5) The designer must consider providing as much isolation as possible from airport noise and odor
sources, especially jet fuel fumes, since the dog’s sense of smell is critical to its mission. The
administrative area should also have secured storage for live or dummy explosives test and training
items; these areas should be coordinated with ATF regulatory requirements for storage of explosives.
Also consider reasonable proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units, as well as
adequate parking nearby for K-9 transport vehicles.
f. Security Operations Center (SOC)
A Security Operation Center (SOC) is an area that is typically the central point for all airport security
monitoring and communications. Just as each airport is unique in its layout and security requirements, each
airport’s SOC is unique in its features, staffing, and method of operations. Likewise, from airport to airport,
the title of the area serving as a SOC may vary. The most common of these titles include: Airport
Communications Center, Airport Operations Center, and Security Control Center.
1) An SOC can provide multiple communications options to the airport operator including police, fire,
rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert, off-airport emergency assistance and a secure
communications channel. The SOC can serve as the point of integration of all security features and
subsystems of the airport security system. Complete and timely detection information can be received
at the SOC and used to initiate a prioritized and semi-automated assessment and response.
2) A successful SOC typically consist of multi-bay console, video displays, monitors, controllers, and
communications connections (telephone, intercom, and radio), all of which have significant design
implications for floor space, cabinet space, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths.
Rear access to console facilitates easier installation, maintenance and update of console equipment and
systems.
3) Connecting all airport security sensors to the SOC facilitates verification of the operability of each of the
sensors. Sensors can periodically be commanded to go into alarm states, with the response checked by the
SOC. This feature could effectively guard against an adversary tampering with or disabling the sensors.
4) The SOC location will have a significant effect upon its utility. Ideally, it would be located close to the
Airport Emergency Command Post, and in a secure area. From the standpoint of cabling
interconnections, a relatively central geographic location serves to maintain reasonable cable lengths to
all the detection devices in an airport security system that report alarms to the SOC. In addition, if a
facility or facilities other than the SOC handle the airport’s nonsecurity communication functions
(information, paging, telephones, maintenance dispatch, etc.), co-location or geographical placement of
the SOC and the other facilities should be considered such that cabling, equipment, maintenance, and
emergency operations can be installed and operate in a cost-effective manner.
5) Other communications functions, equipment and operational areas may be co-located with the SOC.
Consider the merit and operational impact of consolidating the following functions within or adjacent
to the SOC:
a) Airport Emergency Command Post
b) Information Specialists for customer information lines, courtesy phones, airport paging
c) Airport Police and/or Security Department
d) Monitoring of public safety, duress or tenant security alarms
e) Access terminals for law enforcement informational systems such as CAD, NCIC or others
f) Fire Alarm monitoring
g) Weather Monitoring/Radar/Alert systems
h) Landside/Terminal Operations
i) ID Badging Department
j) Maintenance Control/Dispatch or Alarm Monitoring (includes energy management of HVAC systems)
k) Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information Display (BIDS) systems
l) Direct phone lines to ATCT tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
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All new or remodeled facilities impacting the FIS area at airports-of-entry require written prior
approval.
Approvals granted by USCS are in writing and executed for each facility by the appropriate Customs
port director on behalf of headquarters.
All approvals for APHIS, INS, PHS, and FWS shall be obtained from their national headquarters.
Local representatives of these agencies are not authorized to grant final approval for drawings on new
or remodeled facilities.
The USCS and the INS have prepared documents that provide technical standards for airport
authorities, operators, contractors, or architects planning new or remodeled airport facilities in the FIS
area. These technical standards should be obtained prior to any facility design.
The U.S. Immigration And Naturalization Service document, entitled “Technical Standards For INS
Passenger Processing At AirPorts-Of-Entry,” may be obtained from the INS, Headquarters and
Engineering Division, Office of Administration, 425 I ST., NW, Room 2060, Washington, DC 20536.
Telephonic inquiries can be made at (202) 514-3110; Fax (202) 514-0579.
The USCS document, entitled “Technical Standards For Customs Passenger Processing At Airports”
may be obtained from the U.S. Customs Service, Office of Finance, Fixed Assets Services Group;
6026 Lakeside Blvd., Indianapolis, IN 46278.
3) Applicable Laws and Regulations
There are a number of statues, rules and regulations which have specific application to the INS,
Customs and other FIS processes at airports, and that often can create additional, and sometimes
differing, security requirements to be coordinated early with the security design team. Those in force at
the time of this writing are found in the Federal Inspection Service Area Laws and Regulations section
of Appendix F; the reader should take note that all such rules, regulations and statues are subject to
change, especially where changing levels of security are concerned.
j. Loading Dock & Delivery Areas
Loading docks and delivery areas are very active areas at airport terminals. Maintenance personnel,
vendors and suppliers, delivery vehicles, and many others use this area daily. Many of these people are not
badged or known to the airport security personnel or system. Of necessity, this area must provide access to
points of delivery within the terminal. These could be tenants, concessionaires, airlines, or airport staff.
Control of this area and the people and goods being brought into the terminal facility requires a well
thought-out security strategy. Depending on the locations of the dock areas and potential delivery
recipients, various methods of security control may be implemented.
1) Security strategies should allow efficient functioning of the area and be relative to the location and
access of the dock and the risk assessment at the particular airport. Access control of doors, personnel
monitoring by badged airport delivery recipients, screening of delivered merchandise, and CCTV
monitoring are all potential methods of control.
2) In addition to the security concerns regarding personnel and materials entering the terminal via the
loading dock, the safety and security of the loading dock area itself is also a concern. Since large
delivery trucks and vehicles are frequently left unattended, parked directly adjacent to the terminal
building, considerations for controlled and/or physical vehicle inspection may be warranted. In
addition, general CCTV monitoring of the area can alert security personnel to vehicles that have been
left for extended periods. A parking area that is distanced from the actual loading dock/terminal
building for extended parking of service and delivery vehicles should be considered.
3) Another advantage of controlling vehicle access to the terminal loading dock is the reduction of
unnecessary cars and vehicles which may attempt to use the loading dock area as a general parking
area. The fewer and more controlled the vehicles are which are left unattended adjacent to the terminal,
the safer the terminal will be from risk of vehicle bombs. In addition, during heightened security
conditions, physical inspection of all delivery vehicles approaching the terminal might be required. As
such, considerations for at least temporary vehicle inspection points should be made.
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Dogs/K-9 Teams
• If there is no on-site K-9, specify non-critical area for temporary K-9 use
• Rule of thumb: a 4- by - 8-foot indoor pen, attached to an outdoor fenced exercise run
• Plumbing and drainage is important; the concrete floor can be epoxy coated for ease of cleaning
• Fresh air circulation, dry environment, without mildew or dampness
• The dog area should be secured, and sufficiently isolated from casual public contact
• Provide areas for veterinarian services and training activities
• Isolation from noise and odor sources, especially jet fuel fumes
• Secured storage for explosives test and training items; coordinated with ATF
• Consider proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units
Security Operations Center (SOC)
• Consider multiple communications options to police, fire, rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert,
off-airport emergency assistance and a secure communications channel
• Locate close to the Airport Emergency Command Post (CP), in a secure area
• For cabling interconnections, a central geographic location maintains reasonable cable lengths
• SOC has implications for floor space, cabinets, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths
• Rear access to console for maintenance and update.
• Consider space requirements of consolidating all functions within the SOC:
Information Specialists for customer information phones, paging;
Airport Police and/or Security Department
Fire Alarm monitoring
Landside/Terminal Operations
ID Badging
Maintenance Control/Dispatch (includes total energy management of HVAC systems)
Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information (BIDS) systems
Direct phone lines to ATC tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
Automatic Notification System for emergency response recall of personnel
Airport Radio and Personnel Paging Systems
Recording Equipment
• Plan an alternate site capable of supporting the basic operation.
• A direct view of the airside and the isolated parking position is desirable.
• Space Needs
Space for Crisis Management Team’s Operational Group and Negotiators
Refer to Airport Emergency Plan and Airport Security Program for optimum space
Advisory Circular 150/5200-31A on airport emergency planning can assist
• Other Considerations
Raised flooring is an option for installation of ducts and cable paths.
CP electrical power must be uninterrupted
Vehicular access to the CP necessary
Controlled parking for support vehicles and key CP vehicles
Provide space for kitchenette and rest rooms.
Family Assistance Center – designated space in the case of an accident or incident.
FIS Areas
• FIS areas are designed toward very different law enforcement and security situations
• FIS agencies publish a separate document that provides their additional security design guidelines
required within their operational spaces
• Reference FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5360-13
Loading Dock & Delivery Areas
• Access control and badging
• Package screening
• CCTV
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c. Applicable Regulations
The type of airline operation must first be determined. Once the type of operation is known, the applicable
regulatory references should be reviewed to establish current and potential requirements. This research
should include discussions with aircraft operators, the airport, and local law enforcement agencies
regarding their individual security policies and procedures.
1) Domestic, Scheduled Routes and Public Charters by U.S. Airlines
FAA regulations and guidance documents should be thoroughly reviewed, including FAR 108; the Air
Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) for tenant airlines; the airport’s own security program;
any applicable FAA policy guidance such as the FAA’s most current Position Paper on Checked
Baggage Security, and any proposed or pending notices of proposed rulemaking.
2) International Routes
Determination of any security requirements for aircraft operators serving international routes are quite
similar to those imposed upon aircraft operators serving domestic routes, while there are certain
additional requirements and restrictions that the designer should discuss with the aircraft operators
serving these routes. Each aircraft operator will differ somewhat in the manner in which it implements
its security requirements.
If there are no current or future operations by FAR 108 governed aircraft operators anticipated at the
facility, then review the requirements of each tenant aircraft operator Foreign Air Carrier Model
Security Program (FACMSP).
d. Concept of Operations
In the past, the function of a baggage handling system was basically to move baggage from the ticket
counter or curbside check in area to the bag room, where baggage was sorted and distributed to
individual flights. The introduction of an EDS screening capability into the baggage handling process
adds another level of complexity to the operation.
Prior to designing systems with an EDS capability, it is absolutely necessary to prepare a concept of
operations for the proposed installation. This concept must define the baggage screening requirement,
the process by which the baggage moves from baggage check-in to the EDS, the process of EDS
screening, the process of handling baggage believed to be suspect, and the process by which
passengers and their suspect bags are rejoined to facilitate baggage resolution.
After determining design options, modeling can be used to test the viability of any inline design
options by identifying the true operational impact on the baggage handling system (BHS)
e. Critical Design Factor – Peak Bag Flow
1) The eventual goal for both the FAA and other international organizations is 100% screening of
checked baggage. In order to avoid premature obsolescence, the ability to do this should be included in
any new construction or major renovations. On an interim basis, alternative screening options are
allowed. To match the most suitable interim measure(s) with the project, the primary deciding factor is
the size of the operation. The peak hour bag flow should be determined both for current operations and
near-term (5-10 years) projected levels. Additional information on bag flow should be gathered to
pinpoint the flow throughout a peak day. This information can be used to model the bag flow with
various configurations.
2) The best design option to accommodate security will consider many operational and procedural
factors; however, of prime concern is the number and type of bags that must be screened. These two
factors should be viewed both separately and in the context of their inter-relationship. For example, an
anticipated high level of baggage to be screened will dictate the provision of sufficient space and
equipment to accommodate large numbers of bags over a given time period, while the type of baggage
may vary among airlines or airports based on the nature of passengers being served. A commuting
domestic business traveler is likely to carry routine items in smaller carry-on luggage, while travelers
to less developed parts of the world often carry complex, highly compacted and irregular luggage
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requiring very time and labor intensive screening procedures. Various combinations of these factors
must be considered, as they will drive different design and procurement decisions.
a) Domestic Airlines
i) Near term - Checked bags belonging to “selectees” identified by Computer-Assisted
Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS). Check with local airlines for average number of
passengers selected, or actual bag count if available.
ii) Long term – Phase-in of 100% baggage screening at an FAA certified level of explosives
detection is to begin, provided equipment is available. The list of equipment or alternative
procedures available for use may be obtained from the affected aircraft operators or the airport.
b) Foreign Aircraft Operators
Since the methods of identifying passenger baggage requiring additional screening (“selectee
bags”) varies from airline to airline, check with tenant airlines to determine both the total peak
number of bags expected as well as the total number or percentage of bags that need to be
subjected to a higher level of detection. Until such time as screening of all checked baggage is
required, FAA requires that selectee bags be cleared by a certified EDS or bag match.
3) Establishing the peak throughput for screening is the first step.
a) Domestic Airlines
Prior to 100% screening, peak bag throughput is determined by multiplying the peak number of
originating baggage times the airline’s average CAPPS-generated selectee rate. All transfer
baggage that has not been subject to FAA-approved security measures must also be included. For
purposes of this discussion we shall assume that a minimum of 25% of these bags will alarm at the
first level of inspection. For inline systems where alarm resolution is not done at this first step, the
baggage will be subject to further inspection by a succeeding level of EDS. The actual percent of
alarms can be greatly affected by local conditions and designers should obtain an estimate from
the airline(s) using the system.
For 100% screening applications all originating bags will be screened and approximately 25% of
these will need to be routed to a succeeding level of EDS. All transfer baggage that has not been
subject to FAA-approved security measures must also be included. Again, the actual estimate of
alarms should be established through communication with the airline(s).
b) Foreign Aircraft Operators
All originating bags will be screened with EDS equipment. At the least, selectee bags and alarms
from first level screening must be routed to EDS. The percent of alarms and selectees vary widely
among aircraft operators and markets, and therefore must be determined through communication
with the airline(s).
4) Other aspects of the operation which affect bag load should be considered, including:
a) Typical advance arrival time for check-in of the passenger group
b) The timeframe and number of transfer bags to be handled
c) Minimum connect times
d) Duration of the peak period(s)
f. Explosives Containment
Under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for potential "suspect" bags (i.e. those which give such
an indication when screened by whatever arrangement of x-ray and/or EDS equipment is deployed at that
location, and cannot be cleared), to be placed and transported in an explosives containment device (threat
containment unit, or TCU) to a safe location for examination/disposal. If this option is selected, access
routes either from the baggage handling area, or from the public areas, as appropriate, need to be identified
and clearances and turning radii verified.
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HUB SCREENING
FOR ONE OR MORE AIRLINES
In this design the BHS first diverts outbound checked luggage to an area that houses the scanning equipment. This
Hub is located prior to the sorter system. Within the Hub, the scanning equipment is clustered together and fed by a
dedicated, intelligent baggage distribution system. If cleared, the bag goes into the sortation system. If not, it may be
routed to the next level of screening or reconciled with the passenger. A terminal complex may require one or more
Hubs to handle bag flows and space limitations. A Hub minimizes impact on the BHS system. The concept’s
lifecycle costs are significantly reduced compared with most other options because the number of operators is
reduced. Regardless of the specific type or combinations of systems deployed, this design minimizes total security
infrastructure investment while maximizing operational flexibility and robustness. Both bag load sharing and
diversion around systems or BHS systems with maintenance failures are easily accomplished. The ability to easily
distribute the luggage to available machines in the system allows for utilizing the full system capacity during peaks.
This leads to a requirement for less equipment and infrastructure. This design also allows for easy implementation of
new technologies in the future. A possible disadvantage is that this configuration is dependent upon reliable bag
tracking capability. Even if bag tracking were not planned for other purposes, it would be needed to support the
security system.
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SORTER SCREENING
FOR ONE OR MORE AIRLINES
This concept takes advantage of the BHS master sorter and positions security equipment after the baggage enters the
sorter. All checked bags are tracked on to the sorter and then diverted to scanning equipment placed either on side
loops off of the sorter or in the center of a circular, racetrack sortation system (similar to Hub screening but with the
sortation function incorporated). After screening, the luggage is returned to the sortation system with the bag
security status updated for each bag. Essentially, the sorter functions as a large queuing conveyor coupled with
security system logic that distributes the luggage load. This design also allows for fewer systems and flexibility for
dealing with out-of-service equipment, new technology and changing security threat levels. This configuration
requires a reliable tracking system.
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Clearances
A rule of thumb is to add 39 inches to each side of the machine footprint for maintenance access. This clearance is
typically not required at the entrance and exit ends of the machine. Additionally, some models currently require
clearances above the machines. The actual, minimum footprint will vary in size and shape depending on clearance
required to open doors and slide out internal components. Check with the manufacturers for details pertinent to their
models.
Ramps & Conveyor Belts
A. Standalone – In this freestanding configuration no belts are required. Space must be allocated for both infeed
and exit ramps.
B. Exit-End Integrated – Allocate space for an entrance ramp and conveyor needed to tie-into an outbound bag
handling system.
C. Fully Integrated – Allocate space for conveyors as needed for the chosen design configuration. See prior
sections for descriptions of options and discussion on configuration options, queue conveyors and load sharing.
Certain models also require use of a luggage-positioning adapter in front of the EDS.
Operator Workstation
The actual console and monitors that are used to operate the equipment vary. Establish a footprint based on standard
ergonomics for any workstation with a single chair and desktop area minimally 36 inches wide. The work area is
typically multilevel to accommodate a console at desk height and raised monitors.
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b) Environment
The tolerance levels of any equipment or system for electrical interference, heat, cold, humidity
and particulate matter must be identified and accommodated.
c) Maintenance
i) Access at machine and belt systems – NFPA clearance and parts
ii) Provision for associated maintenance space including parts storage
d) Power
i) Clean Power
ii) Backup Power – Secondary supply and UPS
iii) Electrical Interference – Dedicated circuits and RF reader positioning
iv) Optimum positioning of power supply conduits and outlets
e) Communications
i) Is a direct alarm or voice line to police department desired?
ii) Is a data line for remote equipment maintenance or other data transfer required?
iii) Is a voice line for operator or maintenance technician use required?
iv) Determine optimal positioning of communications cables.
f) Baggage Search Areas
The areas where alarm resolution via trace and/or physical search is accomplished with the
passenger present are referred to as baggage search areas.
i) Where should these areas be located? Issues to consider:
(a) Privacy for opening luggage
(b) Proximity to equipment or passengers’ most likely location (minimizes reconciliation time)
(c) Travel distance and route for transport of suspect bag to search room
ii) Space and other layout considerations
(a) Power for explosives trace detector equipment
(b) Adequate light, HVAC, security
(c) Sufficient space to accommodate at least one security person and one passenger, trace
equipment, and inspection of luggage on a surface of the correct operator height
(d) Access for local airline or EOD alarm resolution procedures that may include access by
robot retrieval units and/or threat containment units (TCU), and space for unit storage
(e) Ability to secure the area and the equipment when not in use
g) Operator positioning
i) Next to machine(s) or in a remotely located control rooms
ii) Lighting, heating, cooling and ventilation, considering machine, operator and public BTUs
iii) If operators are visibly separated from the machine, consider making CCTV images at the exit
and entrance ends of the machines viewable in the operator room
iv) Need for communication between operator and person at machine to resolve issues
v) Electronic communications between machines and operator consoles
h) Need for Contingency Plans/Redundancy
i) Positive Passenger Bag Match
ii) Diversion of bags to/from machines
iii) Recirculation of bags
iv) Adequate capacity and throughput on inline systems
i) Installation
i) Sizing the openings into the areas where equipment will be located, or timing the placement
of machines prior to construction of enclosing structures, can eliminate cost and problems
associated with getting the equipment into place. Consider including the ability to remove the
equipment, replace or relocate equipment as needed or during heightened threat conditions.
Check manufacturer specifications for necessary turning radius and other clearances.
ii) Floor loading and protection considerations during machine transit must be considered.
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Section E - Architecture
Architectural design and airport security design interact on a fundamental level in almost every aspect of the facility.
But there are certain specific instances where these two design focuses are particularly joined. These instances
typically are where the security system is collecting or monitoring information and where the system is processing
and using the information.
Security system data is collected principally at transitions of security boundaries such as doors and gates and
monitored through wall or ceiling mounted CCTV cameras or various types of screening equipment such as that
which is located at checkpoints. Security information is processed through system or network hubs in telecom rooms
and utilized in the security system control room. The architectural design of these locations must be carefully
coordinated with security system design.
In addition there are other security considerations that architectural planning and design should understand and
incorporate where possible.
1. Physical Boundaries
Airport terminals vary in usage and configuration so the implementation of FAA mandated security measures
can take many forms in response to airport planning and programming issues. One criteria that is common to all
is the requirement for a physical boundary between differing levels of security such as between non-sterile to
sterile areas. Building enclosures and partitioning typically provide most of this separation. Large assembly type
facilities such as terminals have architectural issues of openness, spatial definition, and circulation.
Architectural planners and designers have been innovative in successfully blending the requirements to create
secure facilities.
For further discussion on specific design aspects of boundaries and barriers such as walls and doors, see the
Boundaries and Access Points section on page 16.
Areas which are unmonitored or which are accessible to unscreened public must meet higher levels of security
boundary than monitored areas such as security checkpoints. Where boundaries are solid (floor to ceiling)
security strategies are primarily concerned with access points through the boundary. Boundary surfaces must be
capable of preventing the passage of objects or weapons through the boundary.
Where the boundary surface is not the full height of the opening, the boundary must be capable of preventing
objects or weapons from being easily passed over or through the boundary and across security levels.
At security checkpoints there is more flexibility if there is a means of closure for the entire checkpoint area. In
such instances divider walls and railings must be substantial enough to direct passenger and public movement
and refuse passenger contact across the security boundary. Boundaries may also be used to contain passengers
on the sterile side of a security checkpoint for a brief distance to reduce the impacts of a security breach as well
as to provide a visual or psychological deterrent to keep unauthorized out of and away from nonpublic areas.
2. Bomb/Blast Analysis
Bomb/blast analysis can play a critical part in the architecture of an airport terminal or other building. It is
important that considerations for blast-resistant design as well as design features that reduce risk and injury due
to a bomb blast, or limit available areas to conceal a bomb, be considered early in the design or renovation.
Both architectural methods for blast-resistance and tools for bomb/blast analysis are rapidly changing. Further
information and discussion is contained in Appendix C – Blast Analysis.
3. Limited Concealment Areas/Structures
This topic has been touched on previously Public Areas section on page 78 under Terminal. The concept is
intuitive in that wall configurations, built-in fixtures, freestanding elements, and furnishings should be designed
to deter the concealment of parcels containing explosives or other dangerous devices. This is particularly
applicable to public nonsterile areas such as ticket lobbies or baggage claim areas.
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Spaces that provide access from such public areas like storage or custodial rooms should have locking doors.
Areas that of necessity are accessible, such as restrooms, should also be designed to minimize the ability to
conceal dangerous devices.
Where structures with concealable areas are unavoidable, consider designs that are easily, quickly and safely
searchable. Coordinate furnishings and structure design with local security, search, and threat response agencies
to assure the design meets their requirements and needs. Reduced search times can minimize airport downtime,
passenger inconvenience, and negative publicity.
4. Operational Pathways
Efficient terminal facilities do much more than move persons and baggage through the various spaces. A
tremendous amount of activity must occur in support of passenger activities for the whole to function smoothly.
Much of the support activity occurs in areas and pathways that are out of public view and which preclude public
access. Aircraft operator and airport personnel need access to the various functions of the terminal on a
continual basis and at a sometimes-hectic pace. Concessions within the terminal must have a means of
delivering supplies and materials to the various locations without impacting passenger circulation. Airport
system monitoring and maintenance functions need to occur away from passengers whenever possible.
Access to and security of service corridors and nonpublic circulation pathways requires coordination of the
architectural program, aircraft operator functions, and terminal security design. Use of corridors that provide
access to multiple levels of security in the terminal should be avoided but, if necessary, particular attention must
be placed on the control of access to the corridor. Access points should be minimized.
Vertical circulation can be particularly problematic since building functions and levels of security are often
stacked. Code required exit stairs often double as service corridors requiring particular attention to security
strategies along these corridors. Exit stairs should only egress to public areas. Automatic exits to AOA levels
must be avoided. Elevators have very similar issues. Public elevators should not cross levels of security. Service
elevators invariably access all levels. Security control of service elevators is either linked to elevator controls or
elevator lobbies. This security strategy must be coordinated but not compromised by efficient deliveries to
concessionaires and other airport tenants.
Airport police and other law enforcement entities also have need of secure nonpublic corridors. LEOs have
increasing incidences of escorting persons from aircraft or various public areas of the building to the terminal
police holding areas. This transport or escorting of persons should be along nonpublic corridors. Terminal
police stations should have direct access to the service corridor system for this transport. Likewise airport police
stations should have direct access to nonpublic parking areas if vehicular transport becomes necessary.
5. Minimal Number of Security Portals
Architecture should be designed to group access pathways and minimize the number of security portals. This
can be done with use of service corridors & stairwells that channel personnel from various areas, prior to
entrance into the SIDA or other security area.
Architectural planning and design can reasonably develop areas of security within the terminal and develop
boundaries between them. The dynamics of airport operation require that all boundaries have strategies for
transition across or through them. The best method is to minimize the number of access points to those that are
necessary. If possible, collect nonpublic circulation prior to access through a security boundary similar to a
public checkpoint. Code-required public exit pathways should be from higher to lower levels of security when
possible. If code-required exits must egress to an area where higher security is imposed, such as from
holdrooms to the SIDA, architectural design should accommodate control and monitoring by the security
system.
Avoid any type of automatic door in a security boundary. In some instances function may require an oversized
entry such as a coiling door through a security boundary. The operation of such an entry should be interlocked
with the security system so that security clearance is required to open the door and closure is automatic after a
programmed delay.
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To maximize the cost-effectiveness and life of a security system, not only an emergency maintenance plan,
but also a planned maintenance and outage plan should be used and maintained. Tracking equipment age,
service record, and reliability can allow airports to replace equipment prior to unexpected failure and allow
for replacement of problematic equipment and models with more reliable and cost-effective ones. In
addition, periodic upgrade and/or system evaluation can assure the best models and options are being used
for security, maintenance and operating costs.
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b. Coverage/Equipment Placement
While much of this has been discussed within the earlier sections of this document, a summary of types of
locations at an airport which often involve CCTV coverage is included here for ease of use:
1) Terminal 2) Site
a) Terminal Apron a) ACAMS Access Points
b) ACAMS Access Points b) ACAMS Alarm Points
c) ACAMS Alarm Points c) ACAMS Duress/Convenience Alarms
d) ACAMS Duress/Convenience Alarms d) Runways, Taxiways and Airfield (for
e) Security Checkpoint Areas emergencies, threat periods and/or perimeter
f) Public Lobby Areas surveillance)
g) Roadway and Curbside Baggage Areas e) Cargo/GA/FBO Ramps
h) Loading Dock/ Police Parking f) Public/Employee Parking Areas
i) Administrative and Tenant Areas
j) Bag Handling/Claim Areas
k) FIS Areas
c. Procedures and Personnel
In order for the CCTV system to be as functional as possible, it must be user-friendly. Systems should not
be designed which require monitoring personnel to continuously view more than four (4) monitors. The
more simultaneous pictures an operator is required to view, the lower the success rate that they will notice a
problematic situation. In addition, planning for CCTV integration with access points and alarms can often
reduce police response requirements and security risk.
To maximize the cost-effectiveness and life of a CCTV system, not only an emergency maintenance plan,
but a planned maintenance and outage plan should be used and maintained. Tracking equipment age,
service record, and reliability can allow airports to replace equipment prior to unexpected failure and allow
for replacement of problematic equipment and models with more reliable and cost-effective ones.
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a. Network Availability
Networks supporting mission-critical communications must be highly reliable and available. In the
presence of equipment and cable faults, such as power outage of network switches and broken cables, the
communication should be designed to continue without interruption. To ensure high network availability,
airport design and construction shall take into account the potential for network redundancy. Specifically:
1) Dual (or multi-) network cabling may be considered to interconnect mission-critical computing
equipment and platforms. The dual network cables may be laid along different paths to minimize the
chances of being damaged at the same time.
2) Redundant network equipment, such as repeaters, switches, routers and power supplies, should also be
considered. Separate wiring closets may be allocated to host the redundant equipment and be placed in
a distance far apart to reduce the chances of all the equipment being damaged at once due to explosion,
fire, or some other event or natural disaster.
b. Network Security
1) Networks should be secured from unauthorized access. Unauthorized access can take many forms:
a) Unauthorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems that normally
allow access to authorized individuals;
b) Un-authorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems that normally
do not allow access;
c) Un-authorized individuals gaining access to the network through external connections such as
modems, or wire-taps;
d) Authorized individuals gaining access to portions of the network they are not authorized for;
e) Un-authorized individuals gaining access with authorized individual’s passwords or access codes;
f) Authorized individuals failing to log off or re-secure their access points or computers, leaving
unauthorized individuals free, undetectable access.
2) While more a procedural than a design concept, encryption does have important design aspects for
securing a general network. The resulting multi-levels of password protection and limited access
required, including the physical design showing which controlled access points lead to and from what
secured areas, must be designed and custom programmed for network-wide security to be effective,
and must be written into the specifications and bid package. Likewise, shared vs. dedicated fiber is also
a design/cost issue, which must be examined in depth with the main telecommunications or IT
designer. For example, it must be determined whether dedicated cabling is sufficiently secure, or
whether having security data multiplexed through the main system onto a shared fiber is still
considered sufficiently "dedicated" and safe to provide the desired level of comfort.
c. Network Accessibility
Wide-Area Network (WAN) connectivity may be part of construction considerations for Internet and/or
Virtual Private Network (VPN) access. The network cabling should take into account the need for WAN
connectivity and special cases where the airport may or may not provide shared networking services among
different airlines and airport organizations.
d. Information Storage Availability
Storage systems for mission-critical file servers and databases must be highly reliable and available. In
presence of equipment faults, such as disk malfunctions and power outages, the storage system must
continue to function, providing information access. To ensure high availability storage systems, airport
design and construction should take into account storage redundancy and back up. The storage redundancy
may be achieved by mirroring storage devices in different locations via local area networks. This requires
the airport construction to pre-allocate separate facilities for redundant storage system equipment. The
distance between the storage system rooms shall be long enough to reduce the chances of all the rooms
being damaged at once due to, for example, explosion, or fire.
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5. Future Rough-Ins/Preparations
This is one area where proper and comprehensive early planning can significantly reduce future construction
costs. For example, where it is known that a future terminal expansion, additional concourses and/or gates, new
buildings, or expanded or relocated security screening points will be built in the not-too-distant future, it may be
prudent to include sufficient extra conduit, pull strings, cable or fiber, terminations, shielding and other rough-in
elements to those locations in an earlier construction job. This has the added benefit of avoiding a future need
for tearing up and repairing walls or floors, digging trenches, and pulling cable.
6. Telecom Rooms
It is beneficial to design all telecommunications rooms, termination closets, wire rooms, etc., in as short and
direct a line as possible to each other. In the case of multi-level buildings, consideration should be given to
locating the rooms such that they are vertically "stacked" immediately above each other to minimize the
distance and labor involved in making connections among them.
In addition, due to the distance limitations on certain secondary wiring technologies, specifically Cat5 cabling,
secondary telecom rooms need to be distributed throughout the terminal so as to provide adequate coverage for
both planned and future applications
There should be sufficient working space for maintenance personnel, and there should be enough room to
accommodate all reasonable future expansion requirements. This should include panel space for cable
terminations, switches and relays, remote field panels, remote diagnostic and management computer stations,
and power service with redundancy and/or emergency back-up capability as appropriate.
Special consideration should be given to providing adequate clearance to access the equipment, HVAC (some equipment
is quite heat generating) and local UPS to power equipment in the event of a power failure. At one designated main
telecom room, space should be allocated for infrastructure operating staff and system administrators to work, and have a
small maintenance and spares storage area. These rooms should have controlled access, preferably automated.
Telecom rooms that require tenant access should have a clearly defined tenant area: potentially separated from
the airport-controlled area by a physical barrier, or appropriate rack arrangement.
7. Radio Frequency (RF)
There are three broad considerations when RF-based communications or devices are introduced to an airport
environment: 1) Is it the most efficient and cost effective way to accomplish the necessary tasks; 2) will it
require infrastructure support which is not necessary with other modes of communication, and 3) will it
interfere with other operational elements, including aircraft and air traffic communications, security operations,
or general administrative data transfers. To answer those questions, the designer must consider the sources of
RF, and the systems that might be affected by targeted or random RF emissions.
a. Environmental Considerations include:
1) Electromagnetic Environment
a) Licensed and unlicensed equipment
b) Cell Phones
c) Portable devices such as pagers, computers)
d) Metal detectors
e) Power Generators
f) Power lines
2) Physical Environment
Physical environment can effect communications to a greater or lesser extent depending primarily on
the frequency of the system in use, and to a lesser extent on the communications protocol.
a) Weather considerations
b) Temperature
c) Rain
d) Snow
e) Dust and dirt
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b. Regulations
In their broadest sense, regulations will have to be considered, since there are specific operational ranges of
frequencies for many different kinds of equipment, and just as many different kinds of operational
protocols for the data that is being communicated over them, any one of which may have the potential for
interfering with any other one, or with other non-RF but mission-critical communications at the airport.
1) FCC; this might include an airport information service broadcast in the AM band.
2) FAA Spectrum Management (Division Code ASR) will assist in determing the frequencies to be used
both in ATC and in airport operations, which leads the designer toward decisions on antennae
placement, cables and routing, and whether some functions might remain hard-wired.
c. Installation Considerations
Once the RF decision has been made, there are numerous engineering aspects to be considered when
determining whether the operational benefits will outweigh the installation and continuing maintenance
costs as well as the potential liabilities inherent in the possibility of interference. These include:
1) Antenna – Location, mounting, and directional/omni-directional considerations
2) Other collocated or local transmitters, including those external to the airport, which have the potential
to “interact” with airport RF communications systems
3) Obstructions
4) Coverage areas (and dead spots)
5) Robustness of Link
6) Time criticality
7) Mobile or Portable
8) Shielding
9) Effect, if any, on ATC communications
d. Communications
1) Access to Main communication bus
2) Network Access Security
e. Other Considerations
When contemplating the safety and security aspects of the design of an airport facility, whether it is a large
new terminal complex or a simple renovation of a few gates on a concourse, one must consider the impact
on both the existing security infrastructure and on the need to integrate the present or future expansion
security requirements into the existing system. It is not a simple matter of adding another set of wires for an
additional card reader or CCTV camera; particularly where electronics and computers are concerned. There
will be such issues as electronic and software compatibility; power and data programming capacity of the
system to accommodate additional devices; aesthetic, economic and security concerns of routing new
conduit through existing public, sterile and operational spaces. It will also require appropriate coordination
and phasing to accomplish these things within the overall project management plan so that the security
design and installation is neither the cause nor the victim of construction delays. Among the important
elements which can affect, or be affected by design considerations in this context are:
1) Landside Systems: LANs, access control, CCTV, metal detectors, x-ray and EDS systems, use of RF
identification tags on bags or vehicles; radio communications of ATCT, aircraft operators and airport
operations; high voltage power distribution systems; remote and automated environmental controls; heavily
shielded, metallic or reflective structures; or antenna systems for cellular phones, taxi dispatch, etc.
2) Airside Systems: All of the above, plus the airside effects of such things as metallic fences and
reflective structures or active electronic systems on navigational aids and emergency communications.
3) Interference: It is worth repeating here that the concern is two-way – new security designs can interfere with
an existing system, or can themselves be interfered with by the existing system(s). It would be prudent to
undertake a thorough engineering analysis of the potential effects on all such systems early in the design
process. While no interference is desirable, there may be instances in non-critical systems where a certain
level of interference is tolerable, or at the very least, due to cost considerations, may be manageable.
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4) Encryption: While encryption is not necessarily a solution to interference (which we shall define for
purposes of this document to include the possibility of interception and/or intentional disruption), the
designer must understand the criticality of the system and consider the need for an added layer of data
protection by encryption. This might entail the need from the designer for special wiring, antennas and
mounts, etc.
f. Wireless LANS
One development in this area is the deployment of wireless LANs operating mainly in the 2.5GHz range.
These LAN utilize the unlicensed portion of the RF spectrum and employ spread spectrum techniques for
transmission. They have become a cost effective addition to a laptop or a PDA, and airlines have deployed
such systems in their VIP lounges. Of more serious concern for security is that some airlines/airports use
"legacy" versions of these products. In addition the cost effectiveness of such systems may encourage an
access system design to deploy these where conventional cabling is impractical. It is strongly recommended
that any security application, or application with security related data, that use these systems within this
frequency range must consider adequate protection of the sensitive data.
g. Considerations Related to the Use of Radio Frequency ID (RFID) Devices for Security
In the future, it may be common to use RFID tags or other RFID equipment as an integral part of the security
system. In some airports, RFID is used to track selectee bags in the inspection process. Early planning and design
efforts can facilitate the successful application (or eliminate many potential problems) of RFID devices.
1) Antenna Pointing and Equipment Placement
This topic also relates to the “judicious selection of electronic/electrical systems”. That is, thinking
about what options exist for systems like: belts, automatic doors/gates, HVAC, power distribution,
communications, ATC, etc. as an entire system before selection. Granted much of this is dictated (i.e.
radars, communications ATCT radios, etc.) but much of it (especially inside the airport
building/terminal) is arbitrary. Related to this is placement of the equipment.
An example from experience: A major airport needed help to determine why certain trace explosives
detection equipment at certain checkpoints seemed to degrade at certain times of the day and then
return to normal performance. With a spectrum analyzer it was determined that these systems were
being interfered with by the low frequency signal emitted from the auxiliary power generation station
directly below the checkpoint. These generators would turn on mid-morning and stay on until late
evening every day, to provide extra air conditioning power. It was recommended to move the trace
equipment, which would have created other problems, or add low frequency chokes to the internal
trace system’s pc power lines. The latter was done and the problem was solved.
This relates to antenna pointing in a similar way. Do not put things in a location and/or orientation that
maximizes the potential for co-site interference. By simply analyzing the details of the specifications
of each and every electronic or electrical system one can quickly determine positioning and orientation
options that fully support operational and structural requirements, but also reduce the likelihood of
mutual interference.
Antenna pointing also is strongly related to the choice of system to perform a function. In general
higher frequency systems tend to have more directional antennas and hence their radiation emission
and susceptibility can be better predicted/controlled. Also, the 'outside of the physical building' RF
environment is much more unpredictable and hence efforts should always be taken to 'isolate' as much
as possible internal-to-the-building RF from external-to-the-building RF.
2) Choke Effects Integral to Construction
This can be simple to address, but tough to implement. Modifications to construction practices that do
not increase cost or compromise structural integrity certainly can be designed into the airport, but the
decision to do so must be made early.
It is recognized, especially at the lowest electronic frequencies (such as generator resonance, etc.) that wave
lengths are very long and actually often are matched to terminal openings such as passageways for baggage
handling equipment. If one were to connect with subsurface metallic rods, I-beams, and. the metallic pillars
and beams that surround these openings, an effective RF choke can result at certain frequencies.
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Well designed Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are examples of technology that provide encryption over
certain communication channels. However, this is not the extent of the problem; the user terminals, backups,
and storage devices all might consider encryption products that are user-friendly and maintainable.
2) Authentication
Digital signatures should be carried on all communications, especially those containing sensitive
security data such as threat information or police response activity. Perform careful design of control
functions, so unauthorized people cannot affect critical operations.
3) Integrity
Use communications protocols and software packages that assure integrity and provide digital signatures.
Well designed Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are examples of technology that provide this.
Apply commercially maintained "virus scanning packages." This is not a one-time effort - the
maintenance contracts are essential, as are processes to distribute and install security patches.
4) Scalability
Upgrade and maintenance processes are a major issue; this is true not only of the information
management systems but also of the entire security infrastructure. They must be a planned part of the
architecture because threats against both the database and the physical facilities change continually,
and often not compatibly – addressing the threat against one might increase the vulnerability to
another. For example, system maintenance is a particularly opportune time for someone to
unintentionally or otherwise disable existing security features.
Multilevel security and “smart alarm” management with multiple priorities so that a sea of concurrent
alarms does not overwhelm the human monitor are also considerations.
5) Availability
One area the early design can address is the physical separation of redundant security channels, both
communication and computing (co-located computers are subject to correlated damage, e.g., fires).
Similarly, it is valuable to consider logical separation of redundant computing/communication systems
(firewalls), opto-isolated communications, and conditioned, redundant power.
d. Data Transport Vulnerabilities
This section pertains to data transport and not to physical transport.
1) Most telecommunications in the United States today are handled using Common Channel Signaling
(also known as "System 7"), and go through fiber optics. There is an illusion that this all amounts to a
very secure means of transporting data; it is an illusion because:
a) The protection is from RF eavesdroppers (of the microwave links of yesteryear) only.
b) Signaling via System 7 is extremely vulnerable to software "bugs", as was recently evidenced
when most of Washington DC's long distance telecommunications stopped functioning as a result
of a single mistyped symbol in the SS7 protocol code.
c) Most all fiber optic lines use Synchronous Optical Network protocols (SONET) that are managed
remotely through networks that use packet data, which, in turn, are usually straight-ASCII
formatted and hence vulnerable to intrusion and faked addresses.
2) Approaches to mitigate the issues include developing technical means to utilize this infrastructure
securely despite its inherent vulnerabilities. This can be done through a combination of:
a) Encrypting sensitive data prior to being shipped through SS7/Fiberoptics. This is the essence of
well-designed VPNs.
b) Path diversity (redundancy) - Sensitive data will be shipped through two diverse paths.
3) Communications media includes fiber optics, coax, twisted pair, and RF. Selection tradeoffs on media
include cost, performance, ease of installation and maintainability, and security. Fiber is possibly the
highest performer, and hardest on which to eavesdrop, but the rapidly changing technology landscape
suggests that the cost and performance factors outweigh security issues.
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Such assumptions are valid as a starting point in the United States as well, and are addressed in considerable
detail in the two charts and the blast computer-based analysis and mitigation model discussed in Appendix C of
this U.S. document. The UK goes on to note that:
“There are no practical measures that can be taken to strengthen a terminal structure to withstand totally the
blast of such an explosive device. Measures that can be taken are discussed (later), but the following is a
reasonable assessment of the effect on the two main types of structure from a typically sized vehicle bomb.”
Distance of bomb Effect on building of modern frame construction Effect on building of load
from building bearing masonry construction
Within 5 m Severe façade damage, possible local collapse in Total collapse
some buildings
5-10 m Severe façade damage in some buildings near bomb Major collapse
10-15 m Moderate façade damage Damage beyond repair
“Windows may be broken at distances up to 120 meters, however, the distance up to which glass falling from
buildings may occur is 60 meters. Unprotected normal, annealed glass will break and cause a hazard to the
occupants of a building for distances up to 50 meters from the seat of the explosion.”
These observations are very similar to those found in the two blast mitigation charts found in Appendix C of
this U.S. document, and provide some parameters within which – or beyond which – the airport architect and
designer must make some serious structural and anti-blast decisions.
The UK document suggests that such decisions might include (or exclude) the use of anti-shatter film where re-
glazing an entire facility is impractical. “This will reduce the distance at which unprotected normal annealed
glass will break and cause a hazard to the occupants of a building from 50 meters to 30 meters from the seat of
an explosion.”
It should also be noted that while the UK document makes several recommendations for both permanent and
moveable bullet-proof screening in certain areas, which might also be deemed to act as anti-blast protection, a
U.S. architect or designer might find such installations to be excessive except in the case of very specific and
very high known threat and risk such as might be found in police facilities or cash handling areas.
4. Lighting The UK document makes several recommendations regarding lighting and CCTV visibility similar to
recommendations made in the U.S. document, and reinforces a very important point in both:
“Cameras and lenses need to be matched to the type of lighting installed, but the average figure of illumination
to act as a deterrent is 5 lux.” While there are certainly numerous possible variants to this recommendation, the
core points remain the same: (a) cameras and lenses are of no value without appropriate lighting, and (b)
appropriate lighting is, in and of itself, a significant deterrent.
5. Space Requirements of the Passenger Search Area
In addressing this topic, the UK queuing recommendation suggests that “passengers without checked bags
should have a minimum of 0.6 m2 space per person”, and space for those with “large proportions of checked
baggage...should be increased to 0.8m2.” While these are not unreasonable guidelines, they are based on UK
conditions and assumptions of passenger flow, utilization and processing rates of 90% or less, etc., and would
need adjustment from site to site in the United States There are numerous complex formulas available in the
U.S. to assist the designer in such calculations.
In examining the UK formulas, we discover that while they use quite similar types of data to those used in the
U.S. formulations, and indeed, quite similar formula structures, their specific values often differ significantly
from the assumptions made in the United States. For example, the formula that determines how many x-ray
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machines are needed at a gate search operation is based, among other things, on an assumption of a first call to
board the aircraft 50 minutes before flight time. The U.S. standard for domestic flights is much lower, and thus
might suggest in the same formula a need for more x-ray machines and/or more space. This also underscores the
point that UK and other European formulas tend to be biased toward international traffic, presumably lending
strength to the need for a bit more time, and perhaps more space, to clear a departure.
While in theory any such formula should remain an accurate predictor independent of the values plugged into it,
there are certain assumed UK constants that may or may not comport with U.S. constants. The U.S. reader
should look to the accepted U.S. formulas.
A similar analysis applies to the UK formula for manual search positions per x-ray machine (secondary manual
search), which in the U.S. would translate to both hand-wand and trace detection search. The mathematical
process for determination is quite similar to our own, but may be based on throughput assumptions of different
equipment, meeting different governmental certification criteria, different methods of determining the
proportion of bags requiring a secondary search, different fleet mix, and different policies and procedures which
determine the amount of time required for each such search. This is not to suggest such a formula is invalid;
only that it must be viewed and used in its proper environment.
The same holds true for the equation that determines queue area. It is a function of the maximum queue size
(passengers) and the layout of the queue, and provides results in both number of passengers and length of
queue, as well as area in meters squared, assuming a typical queue width of 1.2 meters. Again, this and other
UK assumptions are not implied to be inaccurate, but may be based on fundamentally different passenger
service operations and regulatory requirements for screening procedures. It is valuable for the designer to look
at the UK processes and to understand how they have been derived, but they may or may not apply to a terminal
design in a U.S. environment.
6. Screening Office Accommodation
The UK document provides some suggested space assignment values to support security operations, which are
“a function of the number of staff carrying out security throughout the terminal complex, e.g., central search,
staff security, access control, etc. It will also depend on the extent to which offices are located centrally or
adjacent to security points.” We add that in the U.S., security responsibilities are divided among the airports and
airlines, which brings about a major consideration as to whether the space allocations are attributed to the needs
of, and within the boundaries of, space controlled by the aircraft operator or the airport, and how the controls of
those spaces are designed to accommodate throughput, ingress and egress, and necessary operational paths of
travel.”
The UK suggests the following values as a guide:
Administrative Office Area 25-30m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
Operational Office 20-25m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
Locker room area 100m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
Rest room area 25-35m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
The UK goes on to state that “in general, the higher the flow, the lower amount of space needed for a given
level of demand, e.g., for 1000 passengers per hour 35m2 of rest room area would be required, but only 75m2
would be required for a terminal with 3000 passengers per hour.
“The above areas are typically “back of house” and are usually located close to the main security search
location. Additional “front of house” space may need to be included for confiscations/ supervisor’s desks (5 m2)
NOTE and a search booth of at least 2.5m by 2.5m for a full physical body search (approximately 7 m2) if these
cannot be provided as part of adjacent operational office accommodations.”
NOTE: Once again, excerpts of the UK document are intended to illustrate that issues facing airport security
designers and architects are similar worldwide, but nonetheless must accommodate local differences. The reader is
referred directly to the UK document for detailed information on their formulas and recommendations.
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PART IV
APPENDICES
PART IV
APPENDICES
DISCLAIMER
The following appendices and supplementary materials provide additional information in support of the guidelines
and recommendations contained throughout this document. Like the underlying document, these appendices are not
intended to contain regulatory or mandatory language, except as they might make occasional informational reference
to external documentary resources. This document is expected to have a multi-year useful life, and therefore might
occasionally refer to information that has since been superceded, amended or modified. In such cases, the reader is
referred to the most recent version of those resources for further guidance. The various analytical models are
presented in summary form, and are intended only as an introduction to the actual models that are available both
from government and private industry sources, each of which might approach the analytical process from somewhat
different perspectives. The object of this document is not to provide the designer or architect with a definitive
solution to each site-specific problem; nor to specifically endorse any product or approach. Rather, it is to make the
reader aware of the existence of various opportunities available for gathering additional information, and to provide
the reader with a broader frame of reference for a better-informed and balanced decision–making process.
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APPENDIX A
AIRPORT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL
– AN INTRODUCTION
APPENDIX A
AIRPORT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL –
AN INTRODUCTION
Section A - Summary
The model is a tool for performing a security vulnerability analysis to develop comparisons among alternative
approaches to security design measures.
The tool and documentation is free for use at any airport, but will require some specialized training of an airport
person with significant knowledge of the airport’s security system, policies and procedures.
Section B - Background
The FAA's 1998 Airport Vulnerability Assessment Project brought about an industry-developed airport vulnerability
assessment model that uses quantitative methods to thoroughly evaluate various common vulnerabilities found at
many U.S. airports, and the effect each might have on maintaining the security of the facility. The process selected
for use by FAA is known as SAFR, which stands for Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk.
During the last quarter of FY99, the FAA conducted field trials of an improved SAFR tool at 6 domestic airports of
varying sizes. These assessments were performed by FAA Special Agents who were trained by the contractor in the
use of this tool. The results of the field trials were very encouraging, with wide acceptance by the airport
participants. The findings from the assessment process were viewed as useful, understandable and most of all well
focused. It is available (through FAA’s Civil Aviation Security office) to airport planners, designers and architects
to be used in concert with airport security personnel to assist in determining the parameters of facility design
characteristics necessary to meet various security requirements.
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APPENDIX A
AIRPORT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
For further information on use of this tool, call the FAA Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ, Section AAR-510
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APPENDIX B
AIRPORT SECURITY FLOW MODELING
APPENDIX B
AIRPORT SECURITY FLOW MODELING
Section A - Introduction
Successfully integrating new security equipment and/or procedures into an airport environment requires
consideration not only of the reduction in risk provided by the changes, but also the impact on airport operations.
Computer simulation models can provide airport planners and security professionals the ability to examine the
impact of new security measures before they are implemented, and thus provide an opportunity to fine-tune the
performance of equipment, procedures, and configurations before they are introduced into the airport environment.
Additionally, because flow models can be used to estimate the effects of factors such as operational throughput rates
and other performance parameters, they can be used to influence the development of new security equipment, from
concept through development to deployment.
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APPENDIX B
AIRPORT SECURITY FLOW MODELING
Section C - Conclusions
Flow models can be used to provide important information to airport and security planners. Any of the alternatives
above can be used to obtain good results. Selection of which alternative is best depends on the specific needs of the
planner.
The FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center will continue to support the advancement of flow model technology
as applied to airport simulations through ongoing assessments and evaluations of commercial off-the-shelf software
packages, development of specific security checkpoint flow models, data collection and model verification studies,
and other related efforts. Interested parties should inquire periodically to obtain up-to-date results of these efforts
(contact the FAA Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ, AAR-510, Security R&D Laboratory, Telephone (609-485-
4295).
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APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
– AN INTRODUCTION
Section A - Background
Blast/FX was developed to meet the needs of security and engineering professionals concerned about the threat of
explosions to facilities and their occupants. Studies and statistics indicate the threat from terrorist bombing is not
likely to go away soon. The FBI reports that bombings are the most common tactic employed by terrorists,
accounting for over 75% of terrorist acts committed in the United States since 1982. A recent report by the National
Research Council also concludes, “Attacks against civilian buildings pose an unquantifiable but real threat to the
people of the United States.”
Blast/FX is a computer model used to determine the effects of explosives against facilities and the people in those
facilities. Blast/FX is a self-contained software package that allows you to model and analyze:
• Facilities or portions of a facility that might be affected by a blast.
• Explosive devices that might be used against the facility.
• People in the facility.
For many engineers and designers, particularly in the United States, the need to assess the risks to buildings from
explosions represents a new, and often imposing requirement. However, by analyzing the relationships between
blast, structural response, and the response of exposed individuals, it is often possible to reduce risks to more
acceptable levels. Blast/FX allows analysts to create a representation of the structure they are concerned about, place
individuals in the facility at realistic locations, specify the explosive device(s) of concern, and estimate the effects of
such devices in terms of structural damage and casualties. This information is meant to aid in developing plans and
procedures for reducing the risks associated with such events
Blast/FX is intended for use by security and engineering specialists concerned about the threat of explosions to
facilities and their occupants. By using Blast/FX, analysts can quickly and efficiently:
• Develop a model of their facility, including its relevant structural and architectural details.
• Add people and assets at locations in and around the facility.
• Specify explosive devices that might be of concern.
• Analyze scenarios that combine facility, people, assets, and explosive devices into any number of what-if
investigations.
Blast/FX analyses can be used to answer security improvement questions, evaluate alternative designs and facility
layouts, and assist in establishing explosives threat security policies and procedures.
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix C-1
APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
For buildings, the extent and severity of damage is shown in color-coded 2D and 3D views. Color categories quickly
let you see the percent of damage expected to the structure's components as a result of the blast. There is also a
textual summary report.
For personnel, you get similar 2D and 3D views, with persons identified as likely to have been fatally injured,
seriously injured (requiring hospitalization), slightly injured (not requiring hospitalization), and unharmed. Again,
there is also a textual summary report.
Also, for those with special interests, Blast/FX let's you examine detailed blast environment and hazard severity
information. For instance, you can examine things like the peak magnitude of the over-pressure pulse, the number of
fragments per square foot, the probability of fatal injury due to flying glass, and numerous other parameters.
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix C-2 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
Unrelated to the Blast/FX model, the following pages show two different examples of simple blast effect estimators
that can be used to assess standoff distances or evacuation distances for different types of vehicle bombs.
ATF
Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard and Evacuation Distance Tables
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix C-3
APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix C-4 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-1
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-2 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-3
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-4 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-5
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-6 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-7
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-8 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-9
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-10 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
Equipment failure
Section F - Personnel and Operations at the
• Queuing space should not block other
Security Screening Checkpoint:
terminal circulation or screening lanes
Space Needs for Equipment Operators:
• Screening station should be capable of
• Designs depend on people moving to:
rapid expansion for peak-periods
Monitor each piece of equipment and
make on-the-spot decisions • Adequate prevention of electromagnetic
Provide an immediate point of or physical interference
contact for questions or difficulties • Sufficient space so that passengers retain
Provide supervision line of sight with their baggage
• Provide space for a fully staffed SSCP • Ability to seal off a concourse and SSCP
during nonoperational periods
Layout for Operational Efficiency:
• Good screening decision-making is Configuration and Placement of SSCP
supported by good layout design • Physical separation of persons who have
• Bad layouts may interrupt screener’s field and have not been screened
of vision • Floor to ceiling barriers
• Screeners should not be approachable • Protect the security equipment against
• Separate x-ray monitors and bypass lane tampering when not staffed
• Common Layout - 2 metal detectors in • Ensure that unscreened persons do not
primary row, one in the secondary row enter the sterile area via the exit lane
• Guards, revolving doors, turnstiles or
Design for the Process: electronic discriminators
• Every person and bag must be screened
• Three discrete process components: Section G – SSCP Calculations
Divesting Review text for full description of calculations
Placing items on the x-ray bag belt used to determine the number, size, and
Walking through the metal detector configuration of required SSCPs
• Position small divesting bins well before Remember to add growth factors
the metal detectors Adjust peak hour volume determinations for
• Consider conveyor belts with a somewhat multiple and/or split SSCPs
longer “presentation length” Planning Passenger Volume
• Assure that variations over time are
Architectural Design to Support Intuitive
considered
Processes:
• Choice of the planning day is important
• Architectural materials and lighting can
• Peak hour volumes typically range from
improve operation of the checkpoint
10% to 20% of the daily volume
• Unique floor color or material can create
• Methods to determine the design load:
“entrance mat” area
Typical Peak Hour Passengers
• Different floor material/color in front of
(TPHP)
exit lane may discourage entry attempts
Busy Day/Peak Hour (BDPH)
• Other material, spatial, or lighting clues The Standard Busy Rate (SBR)
may reinforce the paths of travel Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
Space for Staff Belongings and Break Area Section H – Typical SSCP Layouts
SSCP Space Requirements Review the text for various layouts and
• Screening personnel diagrams
• Law enforcement officers Section I – SSCP Technical Details
• Security equipment and tables Site analysis and preparation for x-rays and
• Private manual search area metal detectors is critical
• For manual search procedures - 1 metal Section J – SSCP Blast Protection
detector and 1 x-ray device minimum Consider strategically placed barriers for blast
• Consider at least two lanes for: protection of persons and equipment
Elevated security
Peak periods
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-11
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-12 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-13
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
Dogs/K-9 Teams
• If there is no on-site K-9, specify non-critical area for temporary K-9 use
• Rule of thumb: a 4- by - 8-foot indoor pen, attached to an outdoor fenced exercise run
• Plumbing and drainage is important; the concrete floor can be epoxy coated for ease of cleaning
• Fresh air circulation, dry environment, without mildew or dampness
• The dog area should be secured, and sufficiently isolated from casual public contact
• Provide areas for veterinarian services and training activities
• Isolation from noise and odor sources, especially jet fuel fumes
• Secured storage for explosives test and training items; coordinated with ATF
• Consider proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units
Security Operations Center (SOC)
• Consider multiple communications options to police, fire, rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert,
off-airport emergency assistance and a secure communications channel
• Locate close to the Airport Emergency Command Post (CP), in a secure area
• For cabling interconnections, a central geographic location maintains reasonable cable lengths
• SOC has implications for floor space, cabinets, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths
• Rear access to console for maintenance and update.
• Consider space requirements of consolidating all functions within the SOC:
Information Specialists for customer information phones, paging;
Airport Police and/or Security Department
Fire Alarm monitoring
Landside/Terminal Operations
ID Badging
Maintenance Control/Dispatch (includes total energy management of HVAC systems)
Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information Display (BIDS) systems
Direct phone lines to ATC tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
Automatic Notification System for emergency response recall of personnel
Airport Radio and Personnel Paging Systems
Recording Equipment
• Plan an alternate site capable of supporting the basic operation.
• A direct view of the airside and the isolated parking position is desirable.
• Space Needs
Space for Crisis Management Team’s Operational Group and Negotiators
Refer to Airport Emergency Plan and Airport Security Program for optimum space
Advisory Circular 150/5200-31A on airport emergency planning can assist
• Other Considerations
Raised flooring is an option for installation of ducts and cable paths.
CP electrical power must be uninterrupted
Vehicular access to the CP necessary
Controlled parking for support vehicles and key CP vehicles
Provide space for kitchenette and rest rooms.
Family Assistance Center – designated space in the case of an accident or incident.
FIS Areas
• FIS areas are designed toward very different law enforcement and security situations
• FIS agencies publish a separate document that provides their additional security design guidelines
required within their operational spaces
• Reference FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5360-13
Loading Dock & Delivery Areas
• Access control and badging
• Package screening
• CCTV
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-14 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-15
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-16 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-17
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-18 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-19
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-20 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix D-21
APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
Section III-I – Beyond Our Borders: Aviation Security Design in the U.K. Checklist
None
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix D-22 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY*
*For the purposes of this document only – these definitions are not to be taken as regulatory in nature. They are for
the purpose of clarity as they are used in this document, and are subject to change. Other definitions may apply in
other contexts.
ABIAP Airport Border Integrity Antiterrorism Program
A/C Advisory Circular
ACAMS Access Control and Alarm-Monitoring System
Access Control A system, method or procedure to limit and control access to areas of the
airport. FAR 107 requires certain airports to provide for such a system.
ACCSP Air Carrier Standards Security Program (ACSSP or SSP) - the detailed,
nonpublic document an aircraft operator regulated under FAR 108, must
implement in order to meet FAA’s minimum security standards. FAA must
approve the document in order for it to be valid.
Adaptive Intelligent Screening This method of EDS baggage screening involves active communication
between the levels of screening and bag handling system so that, in addition to
selectee bags, other bags are routed to EDS equipment or screened at the
highest-level detection equipment on a bag-by-bag basis.
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
ADO (FAA) Airports District Office - the office responsible for approval of airport
projects involving federal grants assistance and enforcement of FAR 139
airport certification processes.
ADPM Average Day Peak Month
Air Carrier A person or company undertaking directly by lease, or other arrangement to
engage in air transportation. Also known as Aircraft Operator.
Aircraft Loading Bridge An aboveground device through which passengers move between an airport
terminal and an aircraft. (Often referred to by the brand name Jetway)
Aircraft Operator A person or company undertaking directly by lease or other arrangement to
engage in air transportation. Also known as Air Carrier.
Aircraft Stand A designated area on an airport ramp intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
Airline An air transportation system including its equipment, routes, operating
personnel, and management.
Airport Command Post An area that is set aside to house or facilitate the command and control of a
particular activity.
Airport Operator Any person or organization operating an airport.
Airport Ramp Any outdoor area, including aprons and hardstands, on which aircraft may be
positioned, stored, serviced, or maintained.
Airside Refers to those sections of an airport beyond the security screening stations and
restricting perimeters.
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix E-1
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
AOA Air Operations Area - That portion of the airport designed and used for
landing, taking off or surface maneuvering of aircraft, and adjacent areas, but
not including SIDAs or secured areas.
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture)
ARFF Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting - A term used to identify the facility,
operation or personnel engaged such activities.
ASC Airport Security Coordinator - An individual designated by an airport
operator to serve as the primary contact for FAA for security-related activities
and communications.
ASP Airport Security Program - The Airport’s written program, approved by
FAA, which outlines all relevant security policies, procedures and system
features that the airport intends to meet.
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCT Airport Traffic Control Tower
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (U.S.)
ATO Airport Ticket Office - A place at which the aircraft operator sells tickets,
accepts checked baggage, and through the application of manual or automated
criteria, identifies persons who may require additional security scrutiny. Such
facilities may be located in an airport terminal or other location, e.g., curbside
at the airport. It would not include skycap operations that only accept checked
baggage, nor would it include locations performing the same full range of
functions but located off the airport.
AVSEC Aviation Security Contingency Measures
Baggage Claim Area Space, typically located in the passenger terminal building, where passengers
reclaim checked baggage.
Baggage Makeup Area Space in which arriving and departing baggage is sorted and routed to
appropriate destinations.
BDPH Busy Day/Peak Hour – Calculation method for screening point peak volume.
BHR Busy Hour Rate – Calculation method for screening point peak volume.
BHS Baggage Handling System
BIDS Baggage Information Display Systems
BMA Baggage Makeup Area
Boarding Gate That area from which passengers directly enplane or deplane the aircraft.
BOCA Building Officials Code Authority
CAD Computer-Aided Dispatch
CAPPS Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
Cargo Any property carried on aircraft other than stores or baggage.
Cargo Area All the ground space and facilities provided for cargo handling. It includes
airport ramps, cargo buildings and warehouses, parking lots and roads
associated therewith.
Carry-on Baggage All property remaining in the possession of passengers that is to be hand-
carried onto aircraft for transportation.
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix E-2 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
CASFO Civil Aviation Security Field Office - The FAA office responsible for the Civil
Aviation Security activities within a specific geographic area of an FAA Region.
CASFU Civil Aviation Security Field Unit
CCTV Closed Circuit Television (System)
Certificate Holder An aircraft operator subject to FAR 108 holding an FAA operating certificate and
engaged in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations (or both).
The term is also sometimes applied to a “certificated airport”, which refers to an
airport’s operational certification by FAA pursuant to FAR Part 139
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
Checked Baggage Any property tendered to or accepted by a certificate holder from a ticketed
passenger for transportation in the cargo/baggage hold of an aircraft.
Civil Aviation Security Division The FAA office responsible for the Civil Aviation Security activities for an
entire FAA region.
Concourse A passageway for persons between the principal terminal building waiting area
and the structures leading to aircraft parking positions.
Consortium An FAA-encouraged airport security committee made up of persons and
organizations having a direct interest in the security decisions being made and
their impact on the airport security environment. Participants might include
airlines, concessions, other tenants, FBOs, and FAA representatives, among
others. A consortium is an advisory panel and a broad-based resource for airport
security matters; it is not empowered to make decisions or issue directives.
CP Airport Emergency Command Post – Location on an airport where
coordination and management for airport emergencies occurs.
Crisis Management Team A group of individuals involved in managing a crisis to prevent, or at least
contain, a crisis situation from escalating, jeopardizing safety and facilities,
attracting unfavorable attention, inhibiting normal operations, creating a
negative public image, and adversely affecting the organization's viability.
Curbside Check-in An area normally located along terminal’s vehicle curb frontage where
designated employees accept and check-in baggage from departing passengers.
Designed to speed passenger movement by separating baggage handling from
other ticket counter and gate activities. Allows baggage to be consolidated and
moved to aircraft more directly.
DOE Department of Energy (U.S.)
Downstream Refers to airport areas beyond security screening checkpoints.
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EDS Explosives Detection System - a system designed to detect the chemical
signature of explosive materials, where the FAA has tested the system against
pre-established standards, and has certified that the system meets the criteria in
terms of detection capabilities and throughput.
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal - To render safe either improvised or
manufactured explosive devices by the use of technically trained and equipped
personnel.
EMS Emergency Medical Services
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix E-3
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ETD Explosives Trace Detector – As used in this document, a device that detects
tiny amounts of particle and/or vapor forms of explosives. In a different
context of passenger scheduling, ETD means “estimated time of departure”.
Exclusive Use Area That part of an AOA for which an aircraft operator has agreed in writing with
the airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility under an
approved security program.
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.)
FACMSP Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program - an FAA-approved security
program as required by 14 CFR Part 129.25. The FACMSP is the security
program most often used by scheduled passenger or public charter foreign air
carriers landing in or taking off from the United States.
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation (U.S.)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FBO Fixed Base Operator
FCC Federal Communications Commission (U.S.)
FDA Food and Drug Administration (U.S.)
Federal Security Manager FAA agent who is the local point of contact for aviation security at Category X
airports.
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.)
FIDS Flight Information Display Systems
FIS Federal Inspection Services (U.S.) - APHIS, FWS, INS, PHS, USCS
FWS Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S.)
GA General Aviation - That portion of civil aviation that encompasses all facets
of aviation except aircraft operators holding a Certificate of Conveyance and
Necessity from the FAA and large aircraft commercial operators.
GSEM Ground Services Equipment Maintenance (Facility)
GTSA Ground Transportation Staging Area – Location where taxis, limos, buses
and/or other ground transportation vehicles are staged prior to the terminal.
Hijacking The exercising, or attempt to exercise, control over the movement of an aircraft
by the use of force, threats, or other actions, which if successfully carried out,
would result in the deviation of an aircraft from its regularly scheduled route.
Hub An airline terminal and airport used to transfer passengers to and from a large
number of connecting flights.
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning
IATA International Air Transport Association
IAB International Arrivals Building
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization - a specialized agency of the
United Nations whose objective is to develop the principles and techniques of
international air navigation and to foster planning and development of
international civil air transport.
ICBO International Conference of Building Officials
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix E-4 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix E-5
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix E-6 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
Taxiway A paved surface over which aircraft taxi to and from a runway, a hangar, etc.
Terminal A building or buildings designed to accommodate the enplaning and deplaning
activities of aircraft operator passengers.
Threat A threat is any indication, circumstance or event with the potential to cause
loss of or damage to an asset. It can also be defined as the intention and
capability of an adversary to under take actions that would be detrimental to
U.S. interest. There are six primary sources of threats: Terrorist, Criminal,
Insider, Foreign Intelligence Service, Foreign Military, Environmental; as
defined by the CIA’s Analytical Risk Management Program
TCU Threat Containment Unit - any of a wide variety of devices intended to be
used to contain wholly or in part the blast effects of an explosive device. TCUs
may be stationary, or may be part of a system by which an explosive device
may be transported.
TMS Terminal Management System
TPHP Typical Peak Hour Passengers – Calculation method for screening point peak
volume.
TSP Tenant Security Program - An arrangement permitted under FAR 107.113.
The airport operator and a tenant (other than an aircraft operator regulated
under FAR 108 or 129) may enter voluntarily into an agreement in which the
tenant assumes responsibility for certain requirements under FAR 107;
however, only the airport operator may provide law enforcement support.
Under a Tenant Security Program (TSP) the airport must take on the inspection
and compliance role normally performed by the FAA. The FAA, in turn, will
oversee the airport’s conduct of the program.
UK United Kingdom
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
USCS United States Customs Service
USPS United States Postal Service
Vulnerable Area Any facility or area on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or otherwise
rendered inoperative would seriously impair the functioning of an airport.
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide-Area Network
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix E-7
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix E-8 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE:
FAA and other sources/agencies listed below periodically update many of the documents referenced in this
bibliography, as well as many rules, regulations, statutes and codes. These updates sometimes change the entire
document, but more often the changes are only in segments as new information becomes available. The reader
should be certain when seeking guidance from such referenced documents that he/she is obtaining the most current
version from the source. Further, it is possible that due to the constantly changing nature of the industry and the
regulatory environment that some portions of the updated guidance may differ or conflict with the recommendations
offered herein.
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix F-1
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix F-2 Airport Planning, Design and Construction
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
States Customs Service (USCS), is responsible for the border integrity oversight of the Federal Inspection Service
(FIS) area at air Ports-of-Entry (POE).
1. Section 233(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
Section 233(b) of the INA requires the transportation line or their agent, the Airport Operator, to “provide and
maintain at its expense suitable landing stations, approved by the Attorney General...[and that] no such
transportation line shall be allowed to land any alien passengers in the United States... unless such stations are
thereafter maintained to the satisfaction of the Attorney General.”
2. Title 8 part 234, section 4 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): International Airports for Entry of Aliens.
Title 8 part 234, section 4 of the CFRs entitled “International Airports for Entry of Aliens,” states in part,
“[i]nternational airports for the entry of aliens shall be those airports designated as such by the Commissioner
[of INS]. An application for designation of an airport as an international airport for the entry of aliens shall be
made to the Commissioner [of INS]… An airport shall not be so designated by the Commissioner [of INS]
without such prior approval and designation, and unless it appears to the satisfaction of the [INS] Commissioner
that conditions render such designation necessary or advisable, and unless adequate facilities have been or will
be provided at such airport without cost to the Federal Government for the proper inspection and disposition of
aliens, including office space and such temporary detention quarters as may be found necessary. The
designation of an airport as an international airport for the entry of aliens may be withdrawn whenever, in the
judgment of the Commissioner, there appears just cause for such action.”
3. Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 235(a)(3) of the INA states that “[a]ll aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission
or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by
immigration officers.”
4. Section 271 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 271(a) of the INA states “[i]t shall be the duty of every person, including the owners, masters, officers,
and agents of vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or international bridges or toll roads…to prevent the landing
of such alien in the United States at a port of entry other than as designated by the Attorney General or at any
time or place other than as designated by the immigration officers. Any such person, owner, master, officer, or
agent who fails to comply with the foregoing requirements shall be liable to a penalty to be imposed by the
Attorney General of $3,000 for each such violation, … [and] (b) [p]roof that the alien failed to present himself
at the time and place designated by the immigration officers shall be prima facie evidence that such alien has
landed in the United States at a time or place other than as designated by the immigration officers.”
5. Presidential Decision Directives
The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) series is used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national
security matters. See Appendix 1 for pertinent PDDs that are applicable to the Border Integrity Antiterrorism
Programs.
a. Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council (PDD/NSC) 29--Security Policy Coordination
(27 September 1994)
The PDD 29 directs that “security policies, procedures and practices be adapted to current economic,
political and military conditions and that security policies and services realistically apply to the actual
threat.”
b. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 9, Alien Smuggling:
The PDD 9 states that “[t]he U.S. government will take the necessary measures to preempt, interdict and
deter alien smuggling into the U.S. Our efforts will focus on disrupting and dismantling the criminal
networks, which traffic in illegal aliens. We will deal with the problem at its source, in transit, at our
borders and within the U.S. We will attempt to interdict and hold smuggled aliens as far as possible from
the U.S. border and to repatriate them when appropriate. We will seek tougher criminal penalties both at
home and abroad for alien smugglers. We will seek to process smuggled aliens as quickly as possible. At
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Recommended Security Guidelines for June 2001
Airport Planning, Design and Construction Appendix F-3
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
the same time, we will also attempt to ensure that smuggled aliens detained as a result of U.S. enforcement
actions, whether in the U.S. or abroad, are fairly assessed and/or screened by appropriate authorities to
ensure protection of bona fide refugees.”
c. Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism
The PDD 39 states, in part, that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur
domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such
terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate
means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend
and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate
such attacks. “
d. Presidential Decision Directive 62, Combating Terrorism
The PDD 62 creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century.
It reinforces the mission of the many United States agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it
also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from
apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security (and therefore border
integrity), enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of
America's economy. The directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that the threat of
terrorism in the 21st century is met with the same rigor as that of military threats in this century.
e. Presidential Decision Directive 42, Organized Crime
The PDD 42 declared international crime a threat to the national security interest of the United States. The
President ordered the Departments of Justice (of which INS is a part), State and Treasury, the Coast Guard,
National Security Council, Intelligence Community, and other federal agencies to step-up and integrate
their efforts against international crime syndicates and money laundering.
In response to the PDD 42 a comprehensive package of legislation was formulated to substantially assist
U.S. law enforcement agencies in their efforts against drug traffickers, terrorists, and other international
crime syndicates as well as to counter money laundering. The International Crime Control Act of 1996
("ICCA") was sent to the United States Congress on September 27, 1996. The ICCA was devised to
enhance the United States’ ability to go after violent international criminals by vigorously investigating and
prosecuting them, taking their money, and depriving them of their ability to cross America's borders and
strike at its domestic institutions.
f. The White House International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) dated May 12, 1998
The ICCS addresses the increasing threat by providing a framework for integrating all facets of the Federal
government response to international crime. This first-ever strategy reflects the high priority accorded
international crime by the Federal Government and builds on such existing strategies as the National Drug
Control Strategy and the Presidential Directive on alien smuggling, counter-terrorism and nuclear materials
safety and security. ICCS initiative 6 entitled “Border Law Enforcement” states, in part that a program shall
be developed “to enhance border law enforcement through the deployment of advanced detection
technology and investment of new resources.”
g. Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure
PDD 63 builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection. In October 1997, the Commission issued its report calling for a national effort to assure the
security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as
telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.
PDD 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce
a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. The President's policy sets a
goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, and
significantly increased security to government systems by the year 2000.
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June 2001 Recommended Security Guidelines for
Appendix F-4 Airport Planning, Design and Construction