Guide SpttiftcatlQDs aDd CommtDtary for

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" Second Edition, 2009

American Association of State Highway and TranspOliation Officials

 I(

PROPERTY OF
Michael Baker Jr. Inc. Library
4301 Dutch Ridge Rd.
Seaver, PA 15009

Copyright 2009, by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. All Rights Reserved.
Printed in the United States of America. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without written
permission of the publishers.

ii
 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
( 2008-2009

Voting Members

Officers:

President: Allen Biehler, Pennsylvania

Vice President: Larry L. "Butch" Brown, Sr., Mississippi
Secretary-Treasurer: Carlos Braceras, Utah

Regional Representatives:

REGION I: Carolann Wicks, Delaware, One-Year Term

Joseph Marie, Connecticut, Two-Year Term

REGION II: Larry L. "Butch" Brown, Mississippi, One-Year Term

Dan Flowers, Arkansas, Two-Year Term

REGION III: Kirk T. Steudle, Michigan, One-Year Term

Nancy J. Richardson, Iowa, Two-Year Term

REGION IV: Rhonda G. Faught, New Mexico, One-Year Term

Will Kempton, California, Two-Year Term

Nonvoting Members

Immediate Past President: Pete K. Rahn, Missouri

AASHTO Executive Director: John Horsley, Washington, DC

iii
 HIGHWAYS SUBCOMMITTEE ON BRIDGES AND STRUCTURES, 2008

MALCOLM T. KERLEY, Chair I(

KEVIN THOMPSON, Vice Chair
M. MYINT LWIN, Federal Highway Administration, SecretGlY
FIRAS I. SHEIKH IBRAHIM, Federal Highway Administration, Assistant SecretGlY

ALABAMA, Jolm F. Black, William F. Conway, George NORTH DAKOTA, Terrence R. Udland
H. Conner OHIO, Timothy J. Keller, Jawdat Siddiqi
ALASKA, Richard A. Prall OKLAHOMA, Robert J. Rusch, Gregory D. Allen
ARIZONA, Jean A. Nehmc OREGON, Bruce V. Johnson, Hormoz Seradj
ARKANSAS, Phil Brand PENNSYLVANIA, Thomas P. Macioce, Harold C.
CALIFORNIA, Kevin Thompson, Susan Hida, Barton J. "Hal" Rogers, Jr., Lou Ruzzi
Newton . PUERTO RICO, Jaime Cabr"
COLORADO, Mark A. Leonard, Michael G. Salamon RHODE ISLAND, David Fish
CONNECTICUT, Gaty J. Abramowicz, Julie F. Georges SOUTH CAROLINA, Barry W. Bowers, Jeff Sizemore
DELAWARE, Jiten K. Soneji, Barry A. Benton SOUTH DAKOTA, Kevin Goeden
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nicolas Glados, L. TENNESSEE, Edward P. Wasserman
Donald Cooney, Konjit "Connie" Eskellder TEXAS, William R. Cox, David P. Hohmann
FLORIDA, Robelt V. Robertson, Jr., Marcus Ansley, Andre U.S. DOT, M. Myint Lwin, Firas I. Sheikh Ibrahim, Hala
Pavlov Elgaaly
GEORGIA, Paul V. Liles, Jr., Brian Summers UTAH, Richard Miller
HAWAU, Paul T. Santo VERMONT, William Michael Hedges
IDAHO, Matthew M. Farrar VIRGINIA, Malcolm T. Kerley, Kendal Walus, Prasad
ILLINOIS, Ralph E. Anderson, Thomas J. Domagalski L. Nallapaneni, Julius F. J. Volgyi, Jr.
INDIANA, Anne M. Rearick WASHINGTON, Jugesh Kapur, Tony M. Allen, Bijan ((
IO'VA, Norman L. McDonald Khaleghi
KANSAS, Kemleth F. Hurst, James J. Brennan, Loren R. WEST VIRGINIA, Gregory Bailey
Risch WISCONSIN, Scot Becker, Beth A. Cannestra, Finn
KENTUCKY, Allen Frank Hubbard
LOUISIANA, Hossein Ghara, Arthur D' Andrea, Paul WYOMING, Gregg C. Fredrick, Keith R. Fulton
Fossier
ALBERTA, Tom Loo
MAINE, David Sherlock, Jeffrey S. Folsom
MARYLAND, Earle S. Freedman, Robert J. Healy NEW BRUNSWICK, Doug Noble
MASSACHUSETTS, Alexander K. Bardow NOVA SCOTIA, Mark Pertus
ONTARIO, Bala Tharmabala
MICHIGAN, Stevcn P. Beck, David Juntunen
SASKATCHEWAN, Howard Yea
MINNESOTA, Daniel L. Dorgan, Kevin Western
MISSISSIPPI, Mitchell K. Carr, B. Keith Carr GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, Kary H. Witt
MISSOURI, Dennis Heckman, Michael Harms N.J. TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, Richard J. Raczynski
MONTANA, Kent M. Barnes N.Y. STATE BRIDGE AUTHORITY, William J. Moreau
NEBRASKA, Lyman D. Freemon, Mark Ahlman, PENN. TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Gary L. Graham
Hussam "Sam" Fallaha. SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
NEVADA, Mark P. Elicegui, Marc Grunert, Todd COMMAND TRANSPORTATION
Stefanowicz ENGINEERING AGENCY, Robelt D. Franz
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Mark W. Richardson, David L. Scott U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS-
NEW JERSEY, Richard W. Dunne DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Paul C. T. Tan
NEW MEXICO, Jimmy D. Camp U.S. COAST GUARD, Nick E. Mpras, Jacob Patnaik
NEW YORK, George A. Christian, Donald F. Dwyer, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-
Althur P. Yannolli FOREST SERVICE, John R. Kattell ( \
NORTH CAROLINA, Greg R. Perfetti

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
(

FOREWORD .............................................. :.................................................................................................................. ix

SECTION 1 INTRODUC'l'ION .......................................................................................................... ;........................ 1

1.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Interdisciplinary Team .................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.2 New Bridges ................................................................................................................................................... I
1.1.3 Existing Bridges ....................................................................................................................... :...................... 2
1.2 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2.1 AASHTO Guide Specification (1991) ............................................................................................................ 4
1.2.2 AASHTO LRFD Bridge Desigll Specificatiolls ............................................................................................... 6
1.3 BASIC CONCEPTS .................................................................................................................................................. 7
1,4 DESIGN ANALySIS ................................................................................................................................................ 7
1.5 FLOW CHARTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................................................. 11

SECTION 2 SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................ 13

Design Provisions

SECTION 3 GENERAL PROVISIONS ................................................................................................................... 19

3.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................................. 19
3.2 APPLICABILITY OF SPECIFICATION ............................................................................................................... 19
3.3 OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION .................................................................................................................... 20
3,4 DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................................................................ 21
3.5 VESSEL TYPE AND CHARACTERlSTICS ......................................................................................................... 23
3.5.1 Barge Vessels ................................................................................................................................................ 23
3.5.2 Ship Vessels .................................................................................................................................................. 26
3.5.3 Special Vessels .............................................................................................................................................. 34
3.6 DESIGN VESSEL ................................................................................................................................................... 34
3.7 DESIGN IMPACT SPEED ...................................................................................................................................... 35
3.8 VESSEL COLLISION ENERGY ............................................................................................................................ 36
3.9 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ONPIER ..................................................................................................................... 39
3.10 SHIPBOWDAMAGEDEPTH ............................................................................................................................ 46
3.11 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON SUPERSTRUCTURE ....................................................................................... 47
3.11.1 Bow Collision ............................................................................................................................................. 47
3.11.2 Deckhouse Collision ................................................................................................................................... 47
3.11.3 Mast Collision ............................................................................................................................................. 48
3.12 BARGE COLLISION FORCE ON PIER .............................................................................................................. 48
3.13 BARGE BOW DAMAGE DEPTH ........................................................................................................................ 52
3.14 IMPACT LOAD COMBINATION ....................................................................................................................... 53
3.15 LOCATION OF IMPACT FORCES ..................................................................................................................... 54
3.15.1 Substructure Design ............................................................................................................................... :.... 54
3.15.2 Superstructure Design ................................................................................................................................. 56

v
 3.16 MINIMUMIMPACTREQUIREMENT ............................................................................................................... 56
3.17 BRIDOE PROTECTION SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................... 57
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................... 58

SECTION 4 DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION ......................................................................................................... 61

4.1 OENERAL .............................................................................................................................................................. 61
4.1.1 Design Method .............................................................................................................................................. 61
4.1.2 Selection of Design Method .......................................................................................................................... 61
4.1.2.1 MethodI.. ............................................................................................................................................ 61
4.1.2.2 Method II ............................................................................................................................................ 62
4.1.2.3 Method III ........................................................................................................................................... 62
4.2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS .................................................................................................................... 62
4.2.1 Channel Layout ............................................................................................................................................. 63
4.2.2 Water Depths ................................................................................................................................................. 64
4.2.3 Water Currents .............................................................................................................................................. 64
4.3 BRIDOE CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................................................................................. 65
4.4 VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................................................................................. 65
4.5 IMPACT DISTRIBUTION ..................................................................................................................................... 65
4.6 DESIONLOADS .................................................................................................................................................... 65
4.7 METHOD I .............................................................................................................................................................. 66
4.7.1 Oeneral .......................................................................................................................................................... 66
4.7.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................................... 66
4.8 METHOD II ............................................................................................................................................................. 66
4.8.1 Oenera1 .......................................................................................................................................................... 66
4.8.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................................... 67 ((
4.8.3 Annual Frequency of Collapse ...................................................................................................................... 69
4.8.3.1 Vessel Frequency (N) ..........................................................................................................................69
4.8.3.2 Probability of Aberrancy (FA) ............................................................................................................ 70
4.8.3.3 Oeometric Probability (PG) ................................................................................................................ 73
4.8.3.4 Probability of Collapse (PC) ............................................................................................................... 75
4.8.3.5 Protection Factor (PF) ........................................................................................................................ 78
4.9 METHOD III ........................................................................................................................................................... 80
4.9.1 Oenera1 .......................................................................................................................................................... 80
4.9.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................................... 80
4.9.3 Dismption Cost ............................................................................................................................................. 81
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................... 84

SECTION 5 SUBSTRUCTURE PROVISIONS ........................................................................................................ 87

5.1 OENERAL .............................................................................................................................................................. 87
5.2 ANALYSIS ............................................................... :............................................................................................. 87
5.3 FOUNDATlONDESION ........................................................................................................................................ 87
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................... 89

SECTION 6 CONCRETE AND STEEL DESIGN ................................................................................................... 91

6.1 OENERAL .............................................................................................................................................................. 91
6.2 REINFORCED CONCRETE .................................................................................................................................. 91
6.3 STRUCTURAL STEEL .......................................................................................................................................... 91 ((
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... :....................................................... 92

yi
 SECTION 7 BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS ........................................................................... 93
7.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................... 93
7.2 DESIGN LOADS ........................................................................................................... ,......................................... 93
7.3 PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS ................... ,', ..... ,..... ,." ................... ,', ........... ,.......... ,................................ 96
7.3.1 Fender Systems .............................................................................................................................................. 97
7.3.1.1 Timber Fenders ....................................... ,............................................................................................ 97
7.3.1.2 RubberFenders .............. ,................................................................................................................... 100
7.3.1.3 COl1creteFenders .................................................................. :............................................................ 102
7.3.1.4 Steel Fenders ...................................................................................................................................... 102
7.3.2 Pile-SuppOlted Systems ............................................................................................................................... 104
7.3.3 Dolphin Protection ....................................................................................................................................... 114
7.3.4 Island Protection ................................................................................................................................. ,........ 126
7.3.5 Floating Protection Systems ......................................................................................................................... 138
7 .4 MOVABLE BRIDGE PROTECTION .................................................................................... ,.............................. 144
7.5 MOTORIST WARNING SySTEMS .............................................................................. ,...................................... 145
7.5.1 Hazard Detection Systems ........................................................................................................................... 146
7.5.2 Verification Devices .................................................................................................................................... 147
7.5.3 Traffic Control and InformationDevices ..................................................................................................... 148
7.6 AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALTERNATIVES ........................................................................................................ 148
7.6.1 Operational Altemalives ............................................................................................................... ,..... ' ........ 150
7.6.2 Standard Navigation Alternatives ................................................................................................................ 150
7.6.3 Electronic Navigation Systems .......................................................................... ,......................................... 151
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................ 152

SECTION 8 BRIDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES ................................................................... 155

8.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................ 155
8.2 LOCATION OF CROSSING ............ ,..................................................................................... ,............................. 156
8.3 BRlDGEALIGNMENT ...... ,................................................................................................................................. 156
8.4 TYPE OF BRIDGE ........................................................................................................................ :.............. ,....... 156
8.5 NAVIGATION SPAN CLEARANCES ................................................................................................................ 156
8.5.1 Horizontal Clearances .............. ,.................................................................................... ,.................... ,........ 156
8.5.2 Vertical Clearances ..................................................................................................................................... 159
8.6 APPROACH SPANS ............................................................................................................................................ 159
8.7 PROTECTION SYSTEMS ................................................................................................................................... 159
8.8 PLANNING PROCESS ......................................................................................................................................... 160
8.8.1 Route Location Study .................................................................................. ,.............................................. 160
8.8.2 Bridge Type, Size, and Location Study ...................................................................................................... 160
8.8.3 Preliminary and Final Design ..................................................................................................................... 161
REFERENCES ....................................................................................... ,.................................................................... 162

Risk Assessment Example

1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 163
1.1 DATA COLLECTION .......................................................................................................................................... 164
I. I. I Published Sources ....................................................................................................................................... 164
1.1.2 Interviews and Correspondence, ....................................................................... ' ......................................... 164
( 1.2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS .................................................................................................................. 164
1.2.1 General Description .................................................................................................................................... 164
1.2.2 Navigation Channel .................................................................................................................................... 167
 1.2.3 Tide Level and Tidal Range ......................................................... , .............................................................. 167
1.2.4 Currents ....................................................................................................................................................... 167
1.2.5 Water Depths............................................................................................................................................... 169
1.3 PROPOSED BRIDGE ALTERNATIVES ............................................................................................................. 169
I(
1.4 VESSEL FLEET CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................................................................... 169
1.4.1 Vessel Categories ........................................................................................................................................ 169
1.4.2 Vessel Traffic Growth ................................................................................................................................. 174
1.4.3 Vessel Transit Speeds ... :............................................................................................................................. 175
1.4.4 Vessel Transit Path ...................................................................................................................................... 175
1.5 VESSEL IMPACT CRITERIA .............................................................................................................................. 176
1.5.1 General Requirements ................................................................................................................................. 176
1.5.2 Extreme Event Load Combinations (Scour) ............................................................................................... 176
1.5.3 Minimnm Impact Load Criteria .................................................................................................................. 176
1.5.4 Maximum Impact Load Criteria .................................................................................................................. 176
1.5.5 Operational Classification ........................................................................................................................... 176
1.6 MINIMUM IMPACT LOAD ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................ 176
1.7 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD I) ANALYSIS .................................................................................... 177
1.8 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD II) ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 180
1.8.1 Method II Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 180
1.8.1.1 Vessel Frequency (N) ........................................................................................................................ 181
1.8.1.2 Probability of Aberrancy (PA) .......................................................................................................... 181
1.8.1.3 Geometric Probability (PG) .............................................................................................................. 181
1.8.1.4 Probability of Collapse (PC) ............................................................................................................. 182
1.8.1.5 Protection Factor (PF) ...................................................................................................................... 182
1.8.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................................................. 184 u
1.8.3 Method II Risk Analysis Snmmaty ................................................................................... :......................... 184
1.9 SUMMARY OF LA 1 PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 186
1.9.1 Vessel Impact Forces .................................................................................................................................. 186 .
1.9.2 Bridge Main Span Alternatives ................................................................................................. , ................. 186
1.9.3 Vessel Bow Overhang Collisions ................................................................................................................ 187
1.9.4 Mast Collisions ........................................................................................................................................... 189
1.10 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE COMMENTS ............................................................................................... 189
2.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF NEW BRIDGES ........................................................................ :........... 189
3.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF EXISTING BRIDGES .......................................................................... 189
APPENDIX A-PASSED-THE-POINT QUERY FOR CARGO CO~1>vIODITY AND VESSEL TRIp DATA (2000) .................... 191
APPENDIX B-METHOD I ANALYSIS: BAYOU LAFOURCHE ....................................................................................... 195
APPENDIX C-METHOD II ANALYSIS: CONCRETE GIRDER OPTION A3 FUTURE FLEET (2053) - EQUAL RISK .......... 20 1

r (

viii
 FOREWORD

( The 1980 collapse of the Sunshiiie Skyway Bridge was a major turning point in awareness and increased concern
about vessel collision and the safety of bridges crossing navigable waterways in the United States. Studies initiated as a
result of this tragedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund research project sponsored by II states and the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) ,vhich developed a proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in evaluating structures for
vessel collision. This effort culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and Commentmy for Vessel Collision Design ofHighway
Bridges (AASHTO, 1991).

The 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification established design provisions for bridges crossing navigable watenvays to
minimize their susceptibility to damage frolll vessel collisions. The provisious applied to both new bridges and to the
analysis of existing bridges to determine vulnerability and potential retrofit. The intent of the AASHTO provisions is to
provide bridge components with a "reasonable" resistance capacity against ship and barge collisions. In navigable
waterway areas where collision by merchant vessels may be anticipated, the Guide Specification requires that bridge
structures be designed to prevent collapse of the superstl1lcture by considering the size and type of vessel fleet navigating
the channel, available water depth, vessel speed, structure response, the risk of collision, and the operational classification
of the bridge.

This Second Edition of the Guide Specification was developed to· incOlporate lessons learned frolll the use of the
original 1991 Vessel Collision Guide Specification; incorporate the CUlTent LRFD Bridge Design methodology; clarify
some of the risk procedure elements; make minor modifications and corrections; and discuss, and incorporate where
deemed necessary, results fr0111 barge and ship collision research conducted since the original vessel collision publication.
The use of the Guide Specification procedures to evaluate existing bridges has been highlighted in this revised edition, and
a new worked example illustrating the vessel collision risk assessment procedures has been provided.

Compared to more mature and established fields such as wind and emthquake engineering, vessel collision design is
in its infancy stages. Although there are a number of impOltant research needs within the discipline, the key areas of ship
impact forces; barge impact forces; risk acceptance criteria; physical protection systems; and aids-to-navigation
improvements should be highlighted as areas of future research.

This Second Edition was prepared by the consulting firm of Moffatt and Nichol. The principal author was Michael A.
Knott, P.E. (who was also the principal author of the original 1991 Guide Specification). Moffatt and Nichol provided
their services under contract to HDR Engineering on behalf of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).

ix
((

I(
 SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION
(
1.1 PURPOSE

In navigable waterway areas, where vessel collision

by merchant ships and barges may be anticipated, bridge
structures shall be designed to prevent collapse of the
superstmcture by considering the size and type of the
vessel, available water depth, vessel speed, and stl1lcture
response. The requirements apply to all bridge types
which cross a navigable shallow draft inland watenvay
or canal with barge traffic, and deep draft waterways
with large merchant ships. The provisions are for normal
merchant steel-hulled vessels (ships and barges) and are
not applicable for waterways whose maritime traffic
consists of recreational or other special vessels
constructed of wood or fiberglass.
The intent of the vessel collision requiretpents is to
establish analysis and design provisions to minimize
bridge susceptibility to catastrophic collapse. The
purpose of the provisions is to provide predictable design
vessel collision effects in order to proportion bridge
components with a reasonable resistance to collapse. The
provIsIOns apply to bridges crossing navigable
waterways which eany waterborne commerce as
established by federal and state agencies. Judgment
should be used when applying the criteria to waterways
in which no defined navigation channel exists and 110
commercial maritime traffic can be reasonably
anticipated.
Bridges over a navigable watenvay meeting the
criteria above, whether existing or under design, should
be evaluated as to vulnerability to vessel collision in
order to determine prudent protective measures. The
recommendations listed below summarize the essential
elements which should be addressed in developing a
program for evaluating bridges and providing pier
protection for vessel collision.

1.1.1 Interdisciplinary Team

Vessel collision evaluations of new and existing

bridges should be conducted by an interdisciplinary team
comprised of structural, geotechnical, and hydraulic
engineers. In special cases where benefit/cost analysis of
risk reduction is required, an economic specialist should
also be· part of the team. Representatives and
coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Army COIPS
of Engineers, and other federal and state agencies as
appropriate for the bridge location should also be
included in the interdisciplinary evaluation.

1.1.2 New Bridges

Vessel collision evaluations of new bridges over

navigable waterways should be conducted in accordance
with this Guide Specification.

1
2 GmDE SPECIFICAT'WNS AND COMMENTARY FOR VF..sSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HWHWA y BRIDGES

The AASHTO Guide Specifications contain three

alternative analysis methods for determining the design ( (
vessel for each bridge component in the structure in
accordance with two-tiered risk acceptance criteria.
Method I is a simple to use semi-deterministic
procedure; Method II is a detailed risk analysis
procedure; and Method III is a cost-effectiveness of risk
reduction procedure (based on a classical benefit/cost
analysis). The Guide Specifications require the use of
Method II risk analysis for all bridges unless special
circumstances exist as described in the code for the use
of Methods I and III. Special circumstances for using
Method I include shallow draft watenvays where the
marine traffic. consists almost exclusively of barges, and
for using Method III include very wide waterways with
many piers exposed to collision, as well as existing
bridges to be retrofitted.

1,1,3 Existing Bridges

Unless an existing bridge was designed in

accordance with the previous 1991 edition of the
AASHTO Vessel Collision Specifications, all remaining
existing bridges over navigable waterways with
commercial barge and ship traffic shonld be evaluated
using a vulnerability assessment in accordance with the
Method II risk analysis procedures contained in this
current guide specifications. The vulnerability
assessments would meet NTSB recommendations to ((
AASHTO, FHWA and other federal agencies for
improved bridge safety based on previous vessel
collision accidents involving bridge failures.
Based on the vulnerability assessment evaluations of
existing bridges within the state system, a screening
process based on the estimated annual frequency of
collapse can be used to identify and rank high risk
bridges, and to prioritize vulnerable structures for
potential rehabilitatioll, retrofit, pier protection
countermeasures, or rep1acement.
AASHTO recognizes the potential that a significant
portion of older bridges crossing navigable watenvays in
the Nation may not meet the risk acceptance criteria for
new bridges contained in the AASHTO Specifications
adopted since 1991. The intent of performing vessel
collision vulnerability assessments on the existing bridge
system is to identify those structures that are particularly
vulnerable to catastrophic collapse. The vessel collision
vulnerability information would provide a framework for
States to be aware of high-risk safety needs reqniring
itmnediate or sholt-term actIon, as well as information to
prioritize and budget for the long-term needs for bridge
rehabilitation or replacement. The risk assessment of the
existing bridges will be used as a part of the
prioritization process and allocation of federal funds.
AASHTO recognizes that the cost of retrofitting the
potentially large number of existing bridges over I (
navigable waterways to meet the risk acceptance criteria
for new bridges may not be realistic based on current
 SECTION i-INTRODUCTION
budget constraints of most State DOTs. However, the
( vulnerability assessments will allow States to identifY
those structures that are particularly high risk and
vulnerable to catastrophic collapse due to vessel
collision. Federal funding may require that such high-
risk bridges receive priority treatment by State DOTs
with options for retrofitting, rehabilitation, installation of
pier protection system countermeasures, or replacement.
1.2 BACKGROUND
Ship and barge collisions with bridges that are
located in coastal areas and along inland waterways
represent a growing and serious threat to public safety,
port operations, motorist traffic patterns, and
environmental protection in many cities throughout the
world. In the 42-year period from 1960 to 2002, there
have been 31 major bridge collapses worldwide due to
ship or barge collision, with a total loss of life of 342
people.
Seventeen of the bridge catastrophes discussed
above occurred in the United States, including the 1980
collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge crossing in
Tampa Bay, Florida, in which 1,300 feet of the main
span collapsed and 35 lives were lost as a result of the
collision by an empty 35,000-DWT(deadweight tonnage)
bulk carrier.
Recent bridge collapses in the United States include
the Queen Isabella Bridge connecting San Padre Island
to the Texas mainland, which was hit by a barge in
September 2001 (8 fatalities); and the collapse of the 1-
40 Bridge over the Arkansas River neal' Webber Falls,
Oklahoma, which was hit by a barge in May 2002 (13
fatalities).
It should be noted that there are numerous vessel
collision accidents with bridges which cause damage that
varies from very minor to significant damage, but do not
necessarily result in collapse of the structure or loss of
life. A recent U.S. Coast Guard study (May 2003) of
towing vessels and barge collisions with bridges located
on the US. inland waterway system during the 10-year
period from 1992 to 2001 revealed that there were 2,692
accidents with bridges. Only 61 of these caused bridge
damage in excess of $500,000 (1,702 caused very minor
damage with no rcpair costs to the bridge), and there
were no fatalities within the study period. The study
concluded that 90 percent of the barge accidents were
related to human performance (78 percent to pilot enol'
and 12 percent to othcr operational factors). Only 5
percent were related to mechanical problems, and for the
remaining 5 percent there waS insufficient information to
assign a cause.
\,
3
Cl.2
Many factors account for the present ship/bridge
accident problem confronting many countries around the
world. One factor is that a larger number of merchant
ships are making more frequent transits past more
bridges. Since 1960, the number of bridges across major
waterways leading to U.S. coastal potts has increased by
one-third. During that same period, the number of vessels
in the world fleet has increased three-fold and worldwide
seaborne tonnage has increased by more than 255 percent
(McDonald, 1983; U.S. Department of Commerce,
1978) .
Other factors include poorly sited bridges. Inade-
quate attention is often given to the bridge's relationship
with waterborne traffic with the resuit that bridges are
placed too near tricky bends or tums in the navigation
channel, or too near waterfi'ont docks where berthing
maneuvers could threaten the bridge. Many bridges today
have inadequate spans over the navigation channel for
the safe transit of modem ships which regularly 'exceed
800 feet in length and 100 feet in width. These narrow
spans leave little room for error on behalf of the
merchant vessel-patticulariy under adverse wind and
hydraulic current conditions. These small spans often
result from economic pressure on behalf of the bridge
owner and designer to minimize the in-place cost of the
substructure and superstructure of the bridge without
regard to the potential for ship impact against the
structure.
Economic pressures have long been recognized as
conflicting with safety. This is true of both the bridge
industry and the maritime industry. In the latter, safety
concerns are often placed second to the maintenance of
ship schedule-with predictably disastrous consequenc-
es. Since masters and pilots are often rated on their
ability to make schedules, they are sometimes velY
reluctant to abort transits into harbors even during
adverse environmental conditions. This may have been
one of the factors involved in the Skyway Bridge
accident, where the pilot on-board the empty inbound
merchant ship attempted to transit under the bridge
during velY low visibility, dense rainfall, and high wind
conditions. The vessel struck an anchor pier of the bridge
located approximately 800 feet from the centerline of the
channel.
A comprehensive literature review of the current
domestic and foreign practice, experience, and research
4 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BUlDGES
1.2.1 AASHTO Guille Specification (1991)
The 1980 collapse of the Suushine Skyway Bridge
was a major turning point in awareness and increased
concern for the safety of bridges crossing navigable
waterways in the United States. Studies initiated as a
result of this tragedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund
research project sponsored by 11 states and the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) which developed a
proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in
evaluating structures for vessel collision. This effort
culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and
Commentmy for Vessel Collision Design of Highway.
Bridges (AASHTO, 1991).
The AASHTO Guide Specification established
design provisions for bridges crossing navigable
watelways to minimize their susceptibility to damage
from vessel collisions. The provisions applied to both
new bridges and to the analysis of existing bridges to
determine vulnerability and potential retrofit. The intent
of the AASHTO provisions was to provide bridge
components with a "reasonable" resistance capacity
against ship and barge collisions. In navigable waterway
areas where collision by merchant vessels may be
anticipated, the Guide Specifications require that bridge
structures be designed to prevent collapse of the
superstructure by considering the size and type of vessel
fleet navigating the channel, available water depth,
vessel speed, structure response, the risk of collision, and
the operational classification ofthe bridge.
It should be noted that damage to the bridge (even
failure of secondary structural members) is permitted by
the code as long as the bridge deck carrying motorist
traffic doesn't collapse (Le., sufficient redundancy and
alternate load paths exist in the remaining structure to
prevent collapse of the superstructure).
When the original 1991 Guide Specification was
developed in the late 1980s, most analysis was done by
hand calculation; therefore, the specification provisions
included some simplifying requirements to minimize the
hand analysis effolt. With modern personal computers
and software programs, the vessel collision risk analysis
procedures can be easily programmed. Therefore, some
of those earlier simplifications have been removed in this
2008 Edition of the Guide Specifications.
findings available on the subject of vessel collision with
bridges was performed during the development of the
Guide Specifications. Particular attention was given to
new research conducted since the initial adoption of the
199 I Guide Specifications, as well as lessons learned
from usel~ of the 1991 specifications.
e1.2.1
Since its adoption by AASHTO in 1991, the Guide
Specification has been used to design numerous new
bridges and to evaluate existing structures for their
susceptibility to vessel collision. Because the code was
published as a "guide specification," its use by the State
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) was optional, not
mandatOlY·
In general, the use of the code was well received in
the engineering community. The major drawbacks in the
early implementation of the specifications involved lack
of experience in collecting the large amount of vessel
fleet data needed to perform the risk analysis for each
bridge, as well as a general unfamiliarity of most bridge
designers (and bridge owners) in directly usiug risk
concepts in structural design.
Historically in the United States, the risk of
stmctural collapse and potential loss of life have been
(and to a great extent still are) buried in various "safety
factors," I'reliability indexes," etc., used in structural
design equations within the design codes. Similar to most I(
countries, the United States has a great amount of
difficulty in dealing directly with engineering risks in a
public environment (and this is reflected in our design
codes). Defining an acceptable level of risk is a value-
oriented process and is by nature subjective. This
subjectiveness and the wide range of public opinion
concerning risk acceptance levels results in an
engineering issue that most bridge designers would
rather not address.
. The vessel collision code is somewhat unique in the
United States in that the acceptable risk of collapse is
clearly stated by the Guide Specifications, and risk
analysis procedures are directly used to design the
structure.
Experience to date has shown that the use of the
vessel impact and bridge protection requirements of the
AASHTO Guide Specifications for planning and design
of new bridges has resulted in a significant change in
proposed structure types over navigable waterways.
Incorporation of the risk of vessel collision and cost of
protection in the total bridge cost has almost always
resulted in longer span bridges being more economical
than ttaditional shorter span structures. This is a
consequence of bridge designs involving longer spans
requiring fewer piers, and therefore fewer pier protection
systems, thus producing lower total (bridge plus
(
protection system) costs.
Experience has also shown that it is less expensive
to include the cost of protection in the planning stages of
 SECTION I-INTRODUCTION 5

a proposed bridge than to add it after the basic span

( configuration has been established with ant considering
vessel collision concems. Typical costs for adding
protection, or for retrofitting an existing b"idge for vessel
collision, have ranged from 25 percent to over 100
percent of the existing bridge costs.

C1.2.1.1 Extreme Event Combinations (Scour)

The 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification

recommended a load combination of vessel impact plus
dead load for bridge design under nltimate (survivability)
conditions. It was not anticipated that scour .(or other
extreme events) would occur simultaneously with vessel
collisions.
It should be noted that the magnitudes and
consequences of individual extreme events such as ship
and barge collisions; scour due to flooding; earthquakes;
ice flows; hULTicane-driven storm sUl'ge and waves;
terrorist attacks, etc., usually govern the design process
for new highway bridges. Ifthe simultaneous occunence
of two or more of these events is considered (for
example, a ship c;ollision or earthquake occurring on a
bridge pier whose foundation had been subjected to scour
during a flood event), the combination of these separate
extreme events will generally result in a dominating load
combination with significant cost consequences.
Design based on superposition of extreme loads (as
cUlTentIy advocated by some engineers and government
agencies) can lead to a significant design increase costing
millions of dollars on each project. Since a simultaneous
occurrence of two or more extreme events with
maximum magnitudes is unlikely~ a rational design
approach must be formulated for llse by bridge.
engineers. Toward this end, the FHWA sponsored a
conference in Atlanta, Georgia, on December 1996,
entitled the "Design of Bridges for Extreme Events." The
conference proceedings contain a collection of papers
dealing with vessel col1ision, scour, and earthquake
design for highway bridges (FHWA, 1996). Concerning
the possible combination of vessel collision and scour,
Nowak and Knott recommended an evaluation of the
following two load cases (Nowak and Knott, 1996):

I. Minimum impact loads associated with a drifting

empty barge breaking loose from its moorings and
hitting a bridge (potentially during stonn and high-
water conditions). The drifting barge impact loads
should be combined with one half of the predicted
long-term plus one half of the predicted shOlt-term
scour. For this load case, long-term scour should be
taken as the sum of the contraction scour portion of
live bed scour and scour due to long-term chmmel
degradation. Short-term scour should be taken as the
short-term portion of the live bed scour associated
with the I OD-year stol'llllflood event.
 6 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAVBRlDGES
1.2.2 AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications,
4th Edition (2007), incorporates the major analysis and
design requirements of the 1991 AASHTO Guide
Specification for Vessel Collision. Unlike the Guide
Specification, for which usage is optional, the vessel
2. Maximum impact loads associated with a ship or
barge tow striking the bridge while transiting the ((
navigation channel under typical waterway
conditions (i.e., not during extreme storm events and
high-water conditions). The vessel impact loads
should be combined with one half of the predicted
long-term scour.
Short-term scour includes contraction, local and live
bed scour in which river or bay bottom material (sand,
clay, gravel, etc.) is removed as a result of increased
water velocities caused by flooding conditions in
conjunction with the overall bridge geometry and
substructure shape on the hydraulic conductivity of the
site.
In the United States, historical data indicates that
merchant ships and barge tows will not transit river and
harbor areas during periods of high water and flood
events which cause abnormal and dangerous water
currents in the navigation channel. During such flood
events, vessels will normally leave the harbor, tie-up at
docks, or anchor in designated areas of the waterway.
Following the passage of the flood stages of the
waterway, and once cun-cnts return to normal levels,
merchant shipping will recommence in the waterway. It
is anticipated that the short-term (live bed) scour areas
near the bridge piers will have been significantly refilled
by sediment tmnspott mechanisms in the waterway by
that time. Note that no records of scour concerns are ((
repOlted on any of the 31 major bridge collapses
mentioned at the beginning of this report.
At limited locations in the United States, live bed
scour conditions do not exist and instead, clearwater
scour conditions may exist. In clearwater scour
situations, up-river site conditions are such that there is
vittually no particulate matter (soil, gravel, etc.) to
transport; therefore, river bed material removed by local
contraction scour is not replaced after flood-level water
velocities subside. Under this special condition, the full
depth of scour should be used in the vessel collision
analysis.
Long-term scour includes aggradation and
degredation scour and refers to scour across the entire
waterway width. This is a permanent site condition with
a magnitude (depth) that increases with time, and is
independent of the presence of a bridge or the structure's
geomelty-this scour will occur regardless of the bridge.
Long-term scour (if it is present at all) is usually a
gradual deterioration of base support across the
waterway.
Ct.2.2
In the LRFD Code, design values of factored load.
combinations were determined using rigorous statistical
analysis procedures and were based on a target beta I (
reliability index of p ~ 3.5. However, the statistical
analysis was performed only for the basic load
 SECTION l-INTRODUCfION
collision requirements are now mandatory for users of
( the LRFD Bridge Design Code.
The vessel collision force in the LRFD Code
(designated as CV) is considered an "Extreme Event II"
load combination, in which a load factor of La is used
for the vessel collision force in combination with the
dead load, 50 percent of the live load, water loads and
stream ·pressure, earth pressure, and friction (no other
extreme events are combined with the vessel collision
force).
1.3 BASIC CONCEPTS
Development of the Guide Specifications has been
predicated on the following basic concepts:
( • hazard to life be minimized,
• risk of bridge service interruption to be minimized,
• importance of bridge to be reflected in required
safety level,
• specifications to accept damage of secondary
structural members provided bridge service can be
maintained,
o specifications to be simple and unambiguous,
• ingenuity of design not to be restricted, and
• provision to be applicable to all of the United States.
1.4 DESIGN ANALYSIS
When the specifications provide for an empirical
formula as a design convenience, a rational analysis
based on a theOlY accepted by the Subcommittee on
Bridges and Structures of the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials, with
( stresses in accordance with the specifications, or by
model testing supported by analysis, will be considered
7
combinations with dead load and live load. Extreme
loads and their combinations were not considered in the
LRFD calibration because of the lack of statistical data
concerning the correlation of such extreme events (vessel
collision, scour, earthquake, etc.). Therefore, the
development of rational design criteria for extreme load
events will require futnre rese(}rch and the collection of
extensive statistical data. Because of the rare nature and
large variability of magnitudes associated with extreme
events, some researchers believe that the current bridge
design methods, statistical analysis models, and
calibration procedures used in the development ofLRFD
load combinations are inappropriate for application to
extreme event design.
The vessel collision force in the LRFD Code
(designated as CV) is considered an "Extreme Event II"
load combination, in which a load factor of 1.0 is used
for the vessel collision force in combination with the
dead load, 50 percent of the live load, water loads and
stream pressure, earth pressure, and friction (no other
extreme events are combined with the vessel collision
force).
C1.3
The basic design philosophy embodied in the
Specifications is that it is possible to design a bridge in a
cost-effective manner which minimizes the risk of cata-
strophic superstructure collapse due to vessel colIision.
Bridges may be designed to resist vessel impact loads in
either the elastic or plastic range, or protected by a bridge
protection system. In the plastic range, significant
damage to the bridge substructure is acceptable
providing that superstructure collapse does not occur and
that the damagc is easily repairable. Structural ductility
and redundancy are important in preventing
superstructure collapse.
One of the basic concepts in devcloping the
Specifications was that it would be applicable to all parts
of the United States with navigable \vaterways, including
the inland waterway system as wen as the coastal areas.
In order to provide flexibility in specifying design
provisions, three alternative methods of selecting the
design vessel (ranging from simple to complex) were
developed. Two operational classifications were defined
to classify bridges according to Social/Survival and
SecuritylDefense requirements.
C1.4
The designer is cautioned that many ofthe equations
in the Specifications for vessel collision analysis were
derived from physical model studies and analysis
methods in which critical assumptions have been made.
Therefore, the implied accuracy of the equations in the
Specifications is limited, and the lise of the equation
results to many significant figures is not warranted.
8 GUIDE SPECU<ICATIONS AND COl\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HTGHWA y BRIDGES
1.5 FLOW CHARTS
Flow charts outlining thc basic steps in the vessel
collision design procedures are given in Figure 1 for
evaluating bridges. Method II shall be used for all bridge
analysis unless the special situations presented in Article
4.1 exist, in which case Method I or Ill, as appropriate,
may be used.
Engineering judgment should be used to round the
equation results to establish design values to be used in
applying the Specification provisions.
C1.5
Method II of the AASHTO Guide Specifications is a
probability-based risk analysis procedure for determining
the appropriate vessel impact design loads for a bridge
struchlre. Using Method II procedures, a mathematical
risk model is used to estimate the annual frequency of
bridge collapse based on the bridge pier/span geometry,
ultimate resistance of the pier (or span), waterway
characteristics, and the characteristics of the vessel fleet
transiting the channel. The estimated risk of collapse is
compared to standard acceptance criteria, and thc bridge
characteristics (span layout, pier strength, etc.) are
adjusted until the acccptance criteria are satisfied. The
Method II procedure is iterative in nature and is normally
performed by specialized computer programs and
spreadshcets.
((
((
 SECTION I-INTRODUCTION 9

(
I I
Applicability of GUidelines
Article 3.2

l Determine Operational Classification

Article 3.3

I
I
I Determine Waterway Characteristics
Articles 3.4 and 4.2
I
I
I I
Determine Vessel Fleet Characteristics
Articles 3.5 and 4.4
I

I I
Determine Vessel Transit Path
Arlicle 4.2.1

I Determine Vessel Transit Speed

Article 3.7

I
I
Preliminary Bridge Design and Layout (New Bridge)
Determine Bridge Characteristics (Existing Bridge)

I Determine Water Depths

Article 4.2.2
I
I
I Determine Vessel Impact Speeds
Article 3.7
I
I
I Select AnalysIs Method
I

I Melhod I
I I
Melhods I! and II!
(See Next Page)
I
I

I Determine Design Vessels

Article 4.7.2
I
I
I Determine Impact Energies
Article 3.8

I Determine Impact Forces

Articles 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.14
I
I
I Evaluate Bridge Response

I
I
Select Protection Option

---j
I I
Revise Structure Design Bridge Design Bridge
for Impact Loads Protection System
Section 7

Figure 1.5-1-Design Procedure Flow Chart

10 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COI\IMENTARY FOR VF..sSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Method II (Risk Analysis)

Article 4.8
((
J
I

I Determine Risk Acceptance Criteria for Bridge

.
Article 4.8.2

I -
I
I Determine Number, Type and Size of Vessels In the DesIgn Fleet (N)
Article 4.8.3.1
I
I
Determine Probability of Aberrancy (PA)
Article 4.8.3.2
I
Determine Geometric Probabl1ity (PG)
Article 4.8.3.3
I
J
Determine Impact Forces
Articles 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.14

I
Determine Bridge Resistance Strengths
Article 4.8.3.4

I
I
Determine Probability of Collapse (PC)
Article 4.8.3.4

I
I
Revise Bridge
Layout andlor
Determine Protection Factors (PF)
Article 4.8.3.5
((
Resistance
Strengths
(New Bridge) Determine Annual Frequency of Collapse (AF)
Article 4.8.3

1
Determine Design Vessels and impact Loads
Article 4,8.2

NO L Method III
I NO
Does Bridge Meet Risk Acceptance Criteria? BenefiUCost (B/C) Analysis
NO Article 4.9
IYES I
New Bridge: Design fOf Impact Loads Develop Bridge
Existing Bridge: Structure Is OK (Meets Criteria) Protection System Option
Section 7
Design Bridge
Protection System I
Sect!on 7
Determfne Present Worth (PW) of the
AvoIdable Disruption Cost
Arlic!e 4.9.2
New Bridge: Revise BrIdge Of Protection I
System to Meet BIC Criteria
NO I Compute BIC for the Protection System
Existing Bridge: Revise Protection
System to Meet BIC Criteria,
Retrofit Bridge, or Bridge Replacement
I Is B/C" 1.0?
I
IYES
I Protection System Is Cost·Effective I
Figul'e I.S-I-Design Procedure Flow Chart-Continued
 SECTION I-INTRODUCTION 11

REFERENCES
(
AASHTO. 1991. Guide Specification and COlllmentmy for Vessel Collision Design 0/ Highway Bridges. American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

AASHTO. 2007. LRFD Bridge Design Specifications and Commentmy. American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

Derucher, K., ed. 1981. "Bridge and Pier Protective Systems and Devices," Con/erel/ce Proceedings, Stevens
Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ.

FHWA. 1996. Con/erence Proceedings, The Design of Bridges for Extreme Events. Federal Highway
Administration, Atlanta, GA.

IABSE. 1993. "Ship Collision with Bridges: The Interaction between Vessel Traffic and Bridge Structures."
Stl1lctural Engineering Document No.4. International Association for Bridge and Stl1lctural Engineering,
Copenhagen, Denmark.

IABSE. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Ship Collision with Bridges and Offthore Structures, 3 Vols. (Introductory,
PreliminalY, and Final Reports). Intemational Association of Bridge and Stl1lctural Engineers, Copenhagen,
Denmark.

Marine Board of the Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council. 1983. "Ship
Collisions with Bridges: The Nature of the Accidents, Their Prevention and Mitigation." Prepared by the Committee
on Ship-Bridge Collisions, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.

McDonald, J. AprillMay 1983. "Bulk Shipping." World Wide Shipping/World Ports, Odessa, FL.

Nowak, A. and M. Knott. 1996. "Extreme Load Events and their Combinations," Conference Proceedings, The
Design of Bridges for Extreme Events, Federal Highway Administration, Atlanta, GA.

Pedersen, P. T. 1993. "Ship Impacts: Bow Collisions," Con/erence Proceedings fi'om the Third International
Symposium on Structural Crashworthiness and Failure, University of Liverpool, UK.

U.S. Coast Guard. May 2003. American Waterways Operators Bridge Allision Work Group. Report ofthe U.S. Coast
Guard-American Waterways Operators, Inc. Safety Partnership, Washington, DC.

U.S. Department of Commerce. May 1976. Analysis o/Bridge Collision Incident. Vols. 1 and 2. Prepared by Opera-
tions Research, Inc., Washington, DC.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration. May 1978. Merchant Fleet Forecast 0/ Vessels in U.S.
Foreign Trade. Prepared by Temple, Barker and Sloane, Inc., Wellesley Hills, MA.
:(

'. (
 SECTION 2

SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS

(

The following symbols and definitions apply to these Guide Specifications.

a bow or vessel damage depth used in Aliicle C3.9 and Figure C3.9-3; acceleration as used in Article
C7.3.2 (in./s2)

a average bow damage depth as used in Equation C3.10-1

aB bow damage depth of standard hopper barge as determined by Equation 3.13-1 (ft)

AF annual frequency of bridge element collapse defined in Article 4.8.3 (number of collapses/year)

as bow damage depth of ship as determined by Equation 3.10-1 (ft)

B loads resulting from buoyancy forces and used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1; beam
(width) of vessel as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 (ft)

BB barge width as defined in Article 3.13 (ft)

BM beam (width) of barge, barge tows, and ship vessels used in Aliicles 3.5 and 4.8.3.3; as shown in Figures
3.5.1-1,3.5.1-2, and 4.8.3.3-1; and as used in Tables 3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-3 (ft)

Bp width of bridge pier used in Figures 4.8.3.3-1 aud 8.5.1-1 (ft)

BR base rate of vessel aberrancy defined in Aliicle 4.8.3.2 (dimensionless)

C channel width as shown on Figures 4.2.1-1, 4.2.1-2, and 8.5.1-1 (ft); vessel coefficient as used in
Equation C7.3.2-1

CB vessel block coefficent (dimensionless) as defined in Equation C3.5.2-1

Cc size of barge based on cargo capacity as defined in Article 3.5 and used in Figure 3.5.1-1 (tonne, ton)

CIl hydrodynamic mass coefficient defined in Equation 3.8-1 (dimensionless)

CV vessel collision force used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1

D loads resulting from dead load and used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1; diameter of
dolphin as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 (ft)

DA avoidable disruption cost as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 ($)

DB bow depth of a ship or barge vessel as shown in Figures 3.5.1-1, 3.5.2-3, 3.5.2-4, 3.15.1-2, and 3.15.1-3,
and in Tables 3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-3 (ft)

DC bridge coUapse disruption cost as defined in Article 4.9.3 and as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 ($)

DE mean draft of an empty vessel (light draft) as shown in Figure 3.5.1-1 (ft); mean draft of a ballasted
vessel as shown in Figure 3.5.2-4 (ft); effective dolphin diameter as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 (ft)

DEB draft of ballasted ship bow as shown in Figure 3.5.2-4 and Tables 3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-3 (ft)

DES draft of ballasted ship stern as shown in Figure 3.5 .2-4 (ft)

DF distribution factor as used in Equation C7.3.2-4

df depth to fixity in Equation C7.3.3-3 (in.)

13
 14 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO~Il\lENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DYBIGN OF HrGHWAY BRIDGES

mean draft of a fully loaded vessel as shown in Figures 3.5.1.-1 and 3.5.2-4 and in Tables 3.5.2-1
through 3.5.2-3 (ft) ( (
D,\{ mean vessel draft as defined in Equation C3.5.2-1 (ft)

Dv depth of vessel as shown in Figure 3.S.1-1 (ft)

DWT size of vessel based on deadweight tonnage as defined in Aliicles 3.S and 3.9 (tonne, ton)

Dx horizontal stiffness as used in Equation C7.3.2-S (kip-in.)

Dy vertical stiffness as used in Equation C7.3.2-6 (kip-in.)

E modulus of elasticity as defined in Equation C7.3.2-4 (ksi); modulus of elasticity of pile section as
defined in Equation C7.3.3-4 (psi); absorbed collision energy as defined in Equation C3.8-3 and as
shown in Figure C3.9-3 (kip-ft)

EB deformation energy as used in Figure C3.12-2 (kip-ft)

EH, EV ~ loads resulting from earth pressure and used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1

F vessel crushing force as defined in Equation C7.3.1.1-1 (kips)

FR friction in load combiuation as used in Equation 3.14-1

F(x) protective stmcture force, as a function of deflection, as nsed in Equation 7.3.1 (kips)

g acceleration due to gravity as used in Equation C3.S-1 (ft/s2); real annual rate of growth of dismption
costs as used in Equation 4.9.2-1 (rate/year)

GRT gross registered tonnage as defined in Article C3.5 (ft')

H ultimate bridge element strength as defined in Article 4.8.3.4 (kips); height of dophin to location of the
plastic hinge as used in Equation C7.3.3-6 and Figure C7.3.3-S (ft)

h distance from the top of the cell to the plane of maximum interlock stress as defined in Article C7.3.3,
used in Equation C7.3.3-2, and shown in Figure C7.3.3-S (ft)

HL depth of barge head-log on its bow as shown in Figure 3.S.1-1 (ft)

Hp ultimate bridge pier resistance strength as defined in Alticle 4.8.3.4 (kips)

Hs ultimate bridge superstructure resistance strength as defined in Article 4.8.3.4 (kips)

I moment of inertia of pile section as used in Equation C7.3.3-4 (in.4)

discount rate used in Equation 4.9.2-1 (rate/year)

Ip moment of inertia of pile as used in Equation C7.3.2-4 (in.')

1" waleI' moment of inertia as defined in Article 7.3.2 (in.')

K equivalent spring constant of pile and fender as used in Equations C7.3.2-1 and C7.3.2-2 (kip/in.)

Ka active earth pressure coefficient as used in Equation C7.3.3-2

KE design impact energy of vessel collision as defined in Equations 3.S-1, C3.8-2, 7.3-1, and C7.3.1.1-1
(kip-ft); kinetic energy as defined in Equation C3.S-1 (kip-ft); ship collision energy as defined in
Equations 3.10-1, C3.10-l, and C3.10-2 (kip-ft); kinetic energy to be absorbed as used in Equations I (

C3.S-3 and C7.3.1-2 (kip-ft); barge collision energy as defined in Equations 3.13-1 and C3.l3-1 b (kip-ft)
 SECTION 2--8YJ\IBOLS AND DEI<'INTIONS 15

Kf spring constant offender as used in Equation C7.3.2-2 (kip/in.)

(
Kp spring constant of pile as used in Equation C7.3.2-2 (kip/in.)

L distance of dolphin from pier as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 (ft); length of pile above fixity as used in
Equations C7.3.2-4 and C7.3.2-5 (in.)

LB length of individual barge as shown in Figure 3.5.1-1 (ft)

LeB length from bow to collision bulkhead for ships as defined in Figure 3.5.2-3 (ft)

LL live load as used in load combination Equation 3.14-1

LOA length overall of ship or barge tawas shown in Figures 3.5.1-2, 3.5.2-3, and 3.5.2-4 and in Tables
3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-3 (ft)

LP length of bridge pier as defined in Figure 8.5.1-1 (ft)

Lw length of vessel at waterline as defined in Equation C3.5.2-1 (ft)

M mass of vessel as used in Articlc C7.3.2 (kip-s2Iin.)

MHW mean high-water level of watenvay as shown in Figures 3.15.1-1 through 3.15.1-3, 3.16-1, C7.3.1.1-1,
and C7.3.1.2-1 (ft)

MIG motorist inconvenience cost due to bridge collapse as defined in Article 4.9.3 ($)

MLW mean low water level as shown in Figures C7.3.1.1-I, C7.3.1.2-1, and C7.3.3-4 (ft)

MSL mean sea level as shown in Figures C7.3.1.3-1, C7.3.3-6, C7.3.3-7, C7.3.4-6, and C7.3.5-1 (ft)

N number of one-way passages of vessels transiting under the bridge as defined in Article 4.8.3
(number/year)

nit modulus of horizontal subgrade reaction as used in Equation C7.3.3-4 (lb/in.3)

NHW normal high water level as defined in Article 1.2.3 of the Risk Assessment Example

NRT net registered tonnage as defined ill Article C3.5 (ft3)

P loads resulting jiom vessel impact and used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1 and
shown in Figures C3.9-2 and C3.9-3; applied force to stl1lcture as used in Equation C7.3.2-1 (kips)

P collision or impact force as defined in Article C4.8.3.4; lateral fill pressure used in Equation C7.3.3-2
(lb/ft')

PE barge collision impact force for head-on collision between barge bow and a rigid object as defined in
Article 3.12 (kips)

P BH ship collision impact force between ship bow and a rigid superstructure as defined in Equation 3.11. 1-1
(kips)

PDH ship collision impact force between ship deckhouse and a rigid superstl1lcture as defined in Equation
3.11.2-1 (kips)

Pur ship collision impact force between ship mast and a rigid superstructure as defined in Equation 3.11.3-1
(kips)

Ps ship collision impact force for head-on collision between ship bow and a rigid object as defined in
Equations 3.9-1 and 3.10-1 (kips)
 16 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMEi'iTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

PA probability of vessel aberrancy as defined in Article 4.8.3 (dimensionless)

I (
PC probability of bridge collapse as determined in Article 4.8.3 (dimensionless)

PF protection factor as determined in Article 4.8.3

PG geometric probability of vessel collision with bridge pier/span as determined in Article 4.8.3
(dimensionless)

PIC port intenuption cost as defined in Article 4.9.3 ($)

PRC pier replacement cost as defined in Article 4.9.3 ($)

P(t) compression phase of impact over time as used in Article C3.9

P(a) mean impact force averaged over damage depth as used in Equations C3.9-1 and C3.IO-1 and as shown
in Figure C.3.9-3 (kips)

P(t) impact force averaged over damage depth as used in Equations C3.9-1 through C3.9-3b and as shown in
Figures C3.9-2, C3.9-4, and C3.9-5

PW present worth of disruption cost as determined in Equation 4.9.2- I ($)

R area of the density function between ±S as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1

/' dolphin radius as used in Equation C7.3.3-1 (ft)

ratio of barge width as defined in Equation 3.13-1; PA correction factor for bridge location as defined in
Equations 4.8.3.2-1 and 4.8.3.2-2a through 4.8.3.2-2c (dimensionless)
((
RBH ratio of exposed superstructure depth io the total ship bow depth as defined in Equation 3.11.1-1
(dimensionless)

Rc PA correction factor for currents parallel to vessel transit path as defined in Equations 4.8.3.2-1 and
4.8.3.2-3 (dimensionless)

RD PA conection factor for vessel traffic density as defined in Article 4.8.3.2 (dimensionless)

RDH reduction factor for ship deckhouse collision force as defined in Article 3. I 1.2 (dimensionless)

RL rake length of vessel bows as shown in Figures 3.5.1-1 and 3.5.2-3 (ft)

Rxc PA conection factor for crosscurrents acting perpendicular to vessel transit path as defined in Equations
4.8.3.2-1 and 4.8.3.2-4 (dimensionless)

S bridge main span length over navigable chaunel as shown in Figure 8.5.1-1 (ft)

SF loads resulting fi'om stream flow forces and used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1

s, shear on interlocks as used in Equation C7.3.3-6 (lb)

Sp veliical pile spacing as used in Article 7.3.2 (in.)

SRC span replacement cost as defined in Article 4.9.3 ($)

S" horizontal waler spacing as used in Aliicle 7.3.2 (in.)

T relative stiffness factor for normally loaded clay, granular soils, silt, and peat as used in Equations
C7.3.3-3 through C7.3.3-5 (in.)
 SECTION 2-SVMBOLS AND DEFL'lTlONS 17

t stopping time as used in Article C7.3.2 (sec); interlock tension as used in Equation C7.3.3-1 (lb/in.)
(
V design impact speed of vessel as determined in Articles 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 (ft/s); impact velosity as used in
Aliicle C7.3.2 (in.!s)

Vc waterway CUlTent component acting parallel to the vessel transit path as determined in Equation 4.8.3.2-3
(knots)

V, shear on centerline as used in Equation C7.3.3-7 (lb)

VT vessel transit speed in the navigable channel as defined in Article 3.7 (ft/sec)

VXC waterway current component acting perpendicular to the vessel transit path as determined in Equation
4.8.3.2-4 (knots)

W displacement weight of vessel as defined in Equations C3.5.2-1, 3.8-1, and C3.8-1, (tonne, ton)

WA water load and stream pressure used in group load combination Equation 3.14-1

WE ballasted displacement weight of vessel as shown in Figure 3.5.1-1 and Tables 3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-3
(tonnes)

WL waterline as shown in Figures 3.5.2-3, 3.5.2-4, and C7.3.4-10

WL fully loaded displacement weight of vessel as shown in Figure 3.5.1-1 and Tables 3.5.2-1 through 3.5.2-
3 (tonnes)

W, deadweight tonnage of largest ship as defined in Article C4.7.2

Ww volume of water (34.4 cubic ft per tonne of saltwater; 35.4 cubic ft per tonne of freshwater) as defined in
Equation C3.5.2-1

X distance to bridge element from the centerline of vessel transit path as shown in Figure 3.7-1 (ft) and
Figure 4.8.3.3-1 (ft); distance to bridge element from the centerline of vessel transit path as shown in
Figure 3.7-1; deflection of protection stmcture due to vessel impact as defined in Equation 7.3-1 (ft)

Xc distance to edge of channel from centerline of vessel transit path as shown in Figure 3.7-1 (ft)

XL distance equal to 3 x LOA fi'om centerline of vessel transit path as shown in Figure 3.7-1 (ft)

Y design life of the bridge (in years) as shown in Equation 4.9.2-1 (typically 75 years for a new bridge);
maximum system deflection as used in Article C7.3.2 (in.)

YN distance from pier centerline to edge of outbound channel as shown in Figure 8.5.1-1 (ft)

Yp offset distance from edge offoundation to pier column as shown in Figures 3.15.1-2 and 3.15.1-3 (ft)

Yw distance from pier centerline to edge of inbound channel as shown in Figure 8.5.1-1 (ft)

(J, impact angle as shown in Figure C3.8-1 (degrees)

'Yf average unit of weight offill as used in Equation C7.3.3-2 and shown in Figure C7.3.3-8 Obif!')

'Yp load factor, 1.25 maximum, 0.9 minimum, used in the group load combination of Equation 3.14-1

I'lp pile deflection due to unit load as used in Equations C7.3.2-3 and C7.3.2-4 (in.lkip)

1] portion of absorbed collision energy to initial collision energy as defined in Equation C3.8-3 and shown
in Figure C3.8-1
18 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

e angle of channel tum or bend as defined in Article 4.8.3.2 and as shown in Figure 4.8.3.2-1 (degrees);
protection angle provided by dolphin as shown in Figure C4.8.3.5-1 (degrees) ( (
angle between channel and bridge centerlines as shown in Figures 4.8.3.3-1 and 8.5.1-1 (degrees); angle
ofintemal friction for granular soils as shown in Figure C7.3.3-7 and Equation C7.3.3-8 (degrees)

frequency as used in Aliicle C7.3.2 (sec-I)

coefficient offriction as used in Equation C7.3.3-6, Article C3.8, and Figure C3.8-1

standard deviation ofnonnal distribution as defined in Article 4.8.3.3

((

(
 SECTION 3
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(
3.1 GENERAL
In navigable waterway areas where vessel collision
by merchant ships and barges may be anticipated, bridge
stmctures shall be designed to prevent collapse of the
superstructure by considering the size and type of the
vessel, available water depth, vessel speed, and structure
response in accordance with the Guide Specification
criteria.
3.2 APPLICABILITY OF SPECIFICATION
These specifications are for the design of· ncw
bridges and for the evaluation of existing bridges to resist
the effect of collision impacts from merchant vessels.
The specifications apply to all bridge types which
cross a navigable shallow draft inland waterway with
barge traffic, and deep draft waterways with large
merchant ships. The provisions are applicable to normal
merchant vessels, either steel hulled ship or barge
vessels.
The specifications are not applicable to special
purpose vessels, wood, or fiberglass constl1lcted vessels,
ships smaller than 1,000 D WT, naval vessels, nor to
recreational vessels. Vessel impact requirements for
bridges located in waterways characterized by significant
usage of these special vessels shall be established by the
Bridge Owner.
The specifications apply to bridges crossing
waterways which have defined navigation channels as
established by federal or state agencies. Judgment must
be used when applying the Guide Specification criterion
to waterways in which no defined navigation channel
exists.
The provisions specified in the Specification are
minimum requirements.
19
C3.2
The Guide Specifications present vessel collision
design requirements applicable to the majority of
highway bridges crossing navigable waterways to be
constructed in the United States. The Specifications were
developed for steel-hulled merchant vessels and barges
and is not applicable to vessels constmcted of other
materials, recreational vessels, or ships smaller than
I,OOODTVT.
The Specifications specify minimum requirements.
More sophisticated design and/or analysis techniques
may be utilized if deemed appropriate by the design
engineer and approved by the Owner.
It must be emphasized at the outset that the
specification of vessel impact loads and bridge protection
requirements cannot be achieved solely by following a
set of scientific principles. First, the causes of vessel
collision are not well understood, and experts do not
fully agree on how available knowledge should be
interpreted to specifY the impact loads for use in design.
Second, in order to achieve workable bridge design
provisions, it is necessaty to simplify the enormously
complex matter of vessel impact occurrence, vessel
impact forces and motions, and bridge response. Finally,
any specification of vessel impact loadings and pier
protection requirements involves balancing the risk of
that impact occurring against the cost to socicty of
requiring that structures be designed to withstand that
loading. Therefore, judgment, engineering experience,
and political wisdom are as necessary as scientific
knowledge. .
The recommended vessel impact methodologies are
the work of the project consultants and are based upon
the best scientific knowledge available in 2007, adjusted
and tempered by experience. Throughout the following
sections, explanations for the various recommendations
are provided as a guide to both the user of the
Specifications and to those who will improve the
Specifications in the fuhlre.
A great deal of future research is required to
understand the complicated processes involved in a
vessel collision with bridge structures. It is expected that
the methodology and key assumptions used in the
Specifications will change with time as the profession
20 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMl\-IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRlDGES
3.3 OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION
An Operational Classification (OC) shall be
assigned for all bridges crossing a navigable waterway
for purposes of determining the risk acceptance and
subsequent design vessels in Articles 4.7.2 and 4.8.2 as
follows:
1. CriticallEssential Bridges
2. Typical Bridges
Bridges shall be classified on the basis of Social/
Survival and Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET)
requirements.
Critical/essential bridges are those that must
continue to function after impact from a design vessel
whose probability of occurrence is smaller than for
typical bridges. The Social/Survival evaluation is
primarily concerned with the need for civil defense,
police, fire department, or public health agencies to
respond to an emergency situation which might exist on
the opposite side of the watenvay. Bridges which provide
the only continuous transportation route for such
emergency situations should be classified as
critical/essential. Bridges which serve as important links
in the STRAHNET should be classified as
critical/essential. Additional guidelines for determining
the operational classification are provided in the
Commentary.
,
gains more knowledge about vessel collision loads,
probability of collision, and bridge response, and as \ (
society gains greater insight into the process of
establishing acceptable risk criterion.
C3.3
The Operational Classification (OC) is used in
conjunction with the acceptable risk criteria to establish
the design vessel used to determine vessel impact
loadings for bridges. Two Operational Classifications are
specified: I) CriticallEssentia! Bridges, and 2) Typica!
Bridges.
The determination of the Operational Classification
is necessarily SUbjective. Consideration should be given
to the Social/Survival and Strategic Highway Network
(STRAHNET) requirements discussed below. Additional
considerations should be the availability of alternate
detour routes and the average annual daily traffic. The
latter consideration provides an indirect means of
assessing the loss of life which might occur in the event
of collapse of portions ofthe bridge superstructure.
The Social/Survival evaluation is largely concerned
with the need for roadways connecting the communities
located on opposite sides of the watenvay. In order for
civil defense, police, fire department or public health
agencies to respond to an emergency situation which
might exist on the opposite side of the waterway, a
continuous route must be provided. Bridges on such ( (
routes should be classified as critical/essential.
Transportation routes to essential facilities such as
hospitals, police and fire stations, and communications
centers must continue to function and bridges required
for this purpose should be classified as critical/essential.
The well-being of the community is another major
concern. Bridges which carry very high volumes of
motorist traffic and those which provide routes to such
facilities as schools, arenas, power installations, water
treatment plants, etc., should suffer little or no damage
and should be classified as critical/essential.
The operational evaluation of a bridge for Social/
Survival significance in an emergency or disaster
situation depends on the range of options available and
the possibility of a bridge being in parallel or series with
other bridges in a roadway newark. Discussion may be
required with highway, civil defense, and police officials.
An example of Social/Survival consequences was
dramatically illustrated by the collapse of the Tasman
Bridge, Hobart, Australia, in' 1975 as a result of a ship
collision. The Tasman Bridge was closed for 33 months
while repairs lvere made to the struchlre. The nearest
alternative river crossing was located 30 miles away.
During the repair time, investigators found an increase in
suicide rates, divorce, bankruptcy, crime, and illness in
the bedroom community on the eastern shore of the
Delwent River which had been severed from all hospital, I(
medical, police, and other social services located in the
City of Hobart on the western shore.
SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS
3.4 DATA COLLECTION
Data shall be collected as appropriate for the
analysis method utilized for the bridge design. Essential
data includes description of the vessel traffic passing
under the bridge, vessel transit speeds, vessel loading
characteristics, waterway and navigable channel
geometry, water depths, environmental conditions, and
bridge geometry.
21
The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) is a
designation given to roads that provide "defense access,
contimiity, and emergency capabilities for 11l0Vements of
personnel and equipment in both peace and war."
STRAHNET includes Routes (for long-distance travel)
and Connectors (to connect individual installations to the
Routes). STRAHNET Routes include all of the Interstate
highways as well as connecting routes to important
military installations, industries and resources which
include:
• military bases and supply depots and National Guard
installations;
• hospitals, medical supply centers and emergency
depots;
• major airports;
• defense industries and those that could easily or
logically be converted to such;
• refineries, fuel storage, and distribution centers;
• major railroad terminals, railheads, docks, and truck
terminals;
• major power facilities and hydroelectric centers at
major dams;
• major communication centers; and
• other facilities that the state considers important
from a national defense viewpoint or during
emergencies resulting from natural disasters or other
unforeseen circumstances.
Bridges serve as important links in the STRAHNET
and such bridges should be classified as critical/essential.
C3.4
Essential data for use of the specification
methodologies includes a description of the vessel traffic
passing under the bridge, vessel transit speeds, and
environmental conditions. Sources for obtaining data on
these items include the following:
• Waterborne Commerce of the United States
(/VCUS), Parts 1 thm 5, Water Resources Support
Center (WRSC), Fort Belvoir, VA. This document
contains statistics on the commercial movement of
foreign and domestic cargo on a calendar year basis.
Included are detailed data by commodity and
number of vessel trips for U.S. harbors and
waterways. The number of vessel trips is arranged
by vessel draft rather than vessel size (D WI) which
is a limitation of these publications.
• Waterbol'lle Transportation Lines of the United
States, WRSC. This document contains information
of vessel operations of American flag vessels
22 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMEl\'TARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HICHWA Y BRIDGES

operating in U.S. waterways on a calendar year

basis. Included are vessel operators and their ( (
addresses; vessel description based on type,
constlUction, net registered tonnage (NRT) length,
breadth, draft, horsepower, vertical clearance, etc.
Also, included is a description of operations, type of
service, principal commodities carried and localities
served. This docutllent is an excellent source of data
for inland waterway barge tow operations. It is of
limited use for ship data since foreign flag vessels
(which constitute the large majority of coastal port
usage) are not included.
• Lock Peliormance Monitoring (LPM) Reports,
WRSC. The report data contains valuable
information on vessels using the inland waterway
system. The data consists of information describing
vessel traffic through locks as well as physical
dimensions of locks, significant weather, and
navigation conditions. Vessel data includes vessel
name, flotilla dimensions, barge types, number, and
tonnage.
• US. Army COIpS of Engineers (USACE) District
Qffices. The Navigation Depal1ment for the local
USACE District may have publications on past or
proposed channel modifications in the waterway
which might contain valuable vessel data statistics.
• US. Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office (MSO). The ( (
local MSO maintains daily alTivalldeparture logs for
the waterways within its jurisdiction. Infonnation in
the logs includes the vessels' names and berths
while in the harbor. This allows a determination as
to whether the vessel called at a facility upstream or
downstream of the proposed bridge site. The
alTivalldeparture log for each vessel trip must be
reviewed, which can be very time consuming.
• Port Authorities. Local port authorities and operators
often maintain logs of vessel trip data for their
waterway area. This data can be useful in developing
vessel freqnency data for the specific bridge
location.
• Pilot Associations. Discussion with local harbor
pilots and towboat operators is essential for
determining vessel operating conditions, speed, and
transit paths for the waterway. The local pilots and
towboat operators are regular users of the waterway
and have valuable information on the local wind and
current conditions, waterway geometly, traffic
density, and vessel transit speeds which are critical
factors in the vessel impact methodologies.
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of the US. Department of Commerce. The
following NOAA documents are available for most I (
watenvays: Tide Tables, Tidal Current Tables, Tidal
Current Chat1s, United States Coast Pilots, Distance
 SECflON 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS
3.5 VESSEL TYPE AND CHARACTERISTICS
The vessel types using the waterway shall be deter-
mined. Vessels shan be classified as either, I) inland
waterway barges, or 2) ships. The first category includes
barge vessels using shallow draft inland waterways,
including the tugs and tows which push/pull them. The
second category includes ships which use deep draft
waterways.
Ship size shall be determined based on the vessel's
deadweight tonnage (DTV1). DTVT is the weight of cargo
that the vessel can cany when fully loaded (I tonne =
2,205 pounds).
The relations between D TVI' and other units of mea-
surements of vessel size which might be encountered by
the designer such as Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT),
Net Registered Tonnage (NRT), and Displacement
Tonnage (TV) are explained in the Commentary.
Barge size shall be determined based on the vessel's
cargo caflying capacity (Cc) in tons (1 ton = 2,000
pounds).
(
3.5.1 Barge Vessels
Typical inland waterway barge and towboat
characteristics are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Figure I
shows detailed characteristics of three common barge
types using the inland watenvays. Variations from these
typical dimensions exist, and the designer should verify
the applicability of the data for the specific waterway and
bridge location being evaluated.
23
Tables, and Nautical Chmis. The Nautical Charts are
palticulariy useful for establishing the chalmel
geometry and water depths in the watenvay.
C3.5
The two basic vessel types identified for use in the
Specifications are ocean-going ships and inland barges.
The basic unit of measurement in defining the vessel size
shan be the vessel's deadweight tonnage (DTV1). This
measurement and others that might be encountered by
the bridge designer are listed below:
• Deadweight Tonnage (DTV1) is the weight of cargo,
fuel, water and stores necessary to submerge a vessel
liOln her light draft to her loaded draft. This tonnage
should not be confused with the weight of the ship.
It is the "dead" weight of the cargo, etc., in
distinction to the "live" weight of the ship.
e Displacement Tonnage (IV) is the weight of the
vessel. The weight of the vessel including fuel,
stores, cargo, etc., when she is floating at her deepest
possible draft is known as the loaded displacement
(TVL)' When the vessel is completely empty, her
weight is known as light displacement (WE)'
• Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) is calculated by
measuring in cubic feet the total internal volume of a
vessel (less celiain exempted spaces) and dividing
by 100. GRT is not a measurement of weight-but
of volume. One "registered" tall, by law, represents
100 ft' ofa vessel's internal space.
• Net Registered Tonnage (NRT) is computed by
deducting fi'om GRT most spaces which are not used
for the calTiage of cargo or passengers. As in GRT,
NRT is a measure of volume and not of weight.
• Deadweight tonnage (DW1) and displacement
tonnage for ships (TV) are expressed in tonnes (2,205
pounds). Deadweight tonnage and displacement
tOlmage for inland barges are expressed in tons
(2,000 pounds). The designer should exercise care
when researching vessel traffic and commodity data
since some Federal, State, and local port agencies
use the short ton (2,000 pounds) to report vessel
cargo statistics.
C3.S.1
Three basic types of barges are in use on the inland
waterway system: hopper (open and covered), deck, and
tank barges. Barge sizes vary widely depending on the
type of cargo and the waterway characteristics (including
navigation locks). The barge data in Tables 1 and 2 were
adapted from (Hupp, 1977). The three typical barge sizes
and tow data shown in Figures I and 2 were based on
24 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND Cm,ll\lENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY DruDGES
Barges arc often towed (pushed) in groups of two or
more; therefore, their dimensions and drafts tend to be
standard in order to provide hydrodynamic efficiency. In
addition, standardized barge dimensions facilitate the
establishment of tow configurations through locks on
river systems. Typical tow configurations are shown in
Figure 2.
research conducted on the inland waterways of Louisiana
(including the Mississippi River) by the consulting firm
of Modjeski and Masters (LaDOTD and FHA, 1985).
The applicability of the Figure I barge sizes should be
verified by the bridge designer for other locations. As an
example, the typical standard hopper barge on the upper
tributaries of the Ohio River is 175 ft by 26 ft due
to locks smaller than the modern standard of 600 ft
by 110 ft.
Barges are pulled/pushed by towboats. Towboats
vary in size by their function and the reach of the inland
waterways system on which they operate. Towboats
typically push tows of 4 to 40 barges between major
terminals and port areas. The larger tows are found on
the Lower Mississippi River below st. Louis where river
width and depth permit their operation (LaDOTD and
FHA, 1985). Tows of 15 or more barges are found on
other major rivers on the inland system. The Missouri,
the upper reaches of the Mississippi, and several tribu-
taries of the Ohio have small locks and/or restrictive
channels which limit tow size to less than 10 barges.
Small harbor tugs are often used to move barges (usually
up to four) within a port or harbor area. The designer
must establish typical tow sizes for the waterwayfbridge
location in order to use the methodology in the Guide
Specifications.
Sources for barge tow data are the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Water Resources Support Center, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, which keep records at all of its lock
( (
locations on barge tow activity, and the American
Waterway Operators, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia, which is
a trade association representing the inland waterway
transpOltation industry. Logbooks maintained at movable
bridge locations by State Departments of Transportation
are often helpful in obtaining statistics on vessel activity
in a waterway_
(
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVJSIONS 25

PLAN

Jumbo Hopper Oversize Tank Special Deck

BM widlh (It) 35 53 72
LB ~ length (It) 195 290 250
HL head log heighl (ft) 2-3 2-3 3-5
Dv ~ deplh of vessel (It) 12 12 17
DB depth of bow (It) 13 13 18
RL ~ bow rake lenglh (ft) 20 25 30
( DL ~ loaded draft (ft) 8.7 8.7 12.5
DE empty [light] draft (It) 1.7 1.7 2.5
Cc ~ cargo capacity (tons) 1700 3700 5000
WE ~ empty displacement (tons) 200 600 1300
WL ~ loaded displacement (tons) 1900 4300 6300
WL waterline

Figure 3.5.1-1-TYI)ical Barge Tow Cllaracteristics

Table 3.5.1-1-TypicaI Characteristics of Barges 011 the Inland 'Vatenyays System

Barge Type Size Length (ft) Width (ft) Draft (ft) Capacity (tons)
Open Hopper Small 120 30 7 630
Open Hopper Standard 175 26 9 1,060
Open Hopper Jumbo 195 35 9 1,700
Open Hopper Oversize 245 35 10 2,400
Covered Hopper Jumbo 195 35 9 1,700
Deck Barge Small 100/150 26132 6 350/600
Deck Barge Jumbo 195 35 9 1,700
Deck Barge Oversize 200 50 9 2,050
Tank Barge Small 135 40 9 1,300
Tank Barge Jumbo 195 35 9 1,700
Tank Barge Oversize 1851290 53 9 2,530/3,740
 26 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HrGHWAYBRlDGES

LOA
• ( (
"I
)~.DJI
III ~

ELEVATION

Average Size of Average Number of Barges

Barge Type Barge in Tow Along the Length of Tow
Jumbo Hopper 35 x 195 3
Oversize Tank 53 x 290 2
Special Deck 72 x 250 I
( (
Figure 3.5.1-2---Typical Barge Configurations

Table 3.5.1-2-Typical Characteristics of Towboats on the Inland "'aterways System

Typical Typical Typical

Towboat Type Horsepower Length (ft) Width (ft) Draft (ft)
Harbor Boat <600 50 16 4 1/ 2
Line Haul 600-1200 78 23 7
Line Haul 1200-2500 120 30 9
Line Haul 2500-4300 146 35 9
Line Haul 4300-8400 160 45 9
Line Hanl >8,400 185 55 9

3.5.2 Ship Vessels C3.5.2 Ship Vessels

Ship characteristics vary considerably depending on
the size, draft, and type of cargo being carried by the
vessel. Figure I contains three broad classes of ships
typical of U.S. waterways. The ship classes include bulk
carriers, product carriers/tankers, and freighter/container
vessels. Figures 2 through 6 and Tables I, 2, and 3
contain data on typical sizes, dimensions, drafts, bow
shapes, and vertical clearances for these ship classes.
Variations from these typical dimensions exist and the
designer should verify the applicability of the data for the
specific waterway and bridge location being evaluated.
In particular the designer should determine if partially
Ship characteristics valY considerably depending on
the size, draft, and type of cargo being carried by the
vessel. The three broad classes of bulk carriers, prodllCt
carriers/tankers, and freighter/container vessels presented
in the Guide Specifications cover the majority of vessels
using U.S. Watelways. Special ships such as passenger
ships, LASH vessels, LNG carriers, and naval vessels are
not included in the data presented in the Guide
Specifications. Data for such special ships will require
additional research and judgment by the designer if they
(
form a significant portion of the vessel traffic in a
particular waterway.
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 27

loaded vessels, due to ch.,mel depth restrictions, use the Whenever possible, the ship characteristics
( waterway, associated with the p.,iicular vessels using a waterway
should be developed by the designer. If such data are not
readily available, the typical ship data shown in Figures
2, 3, and 4, and Tables I, 2, and 3 should be utilized
(Scott, 1985; Scott, 1984; Yokohama Rubber, 1980).
One of the most difficult statistics to obtain for
merchant ships is vertical clearance data. Practically all
published records on ship data do not include this vital
statistic which is so impoliant to bridge designers. The
information in Figures 5 and 6 for ship mast and
deckhouse clearances was developed from scaled vessel
drawings representing over 2,300 merchant ships
provided (Scott, 1985; Scott, 1984). Figure Cl is a plot
of the data for mast height clearances for
freightedcontainer vessels illustrating the typical scatter
in vessel dimensions,
Another difficult statistic to obtain, and one which
significantly affects the vulnerability of a bridge to vessel
collision and vertical clearance requirements, is the
ballasted draft of vessels which "'e transiting the
waterway in either an empty or partially loaded
condition. All merchant ships have the capability to
pump water into special compartments located in the
bow and along the sides of the ship in order to minimize
exposed freeboard and increase the vessel draft for
proper steering and maneuverability when the vessel is
traveling either empty or partially loaded. The degree to
which the ship is baIlasted depends solely upon the
ship's master or pilot's decision given the wind and
current conditions in a particular waterway, Unless
othenvise determined from the actual vessels using the
waterway, a baIlasted ship geometry as shown in
Figure 4 is recommended for design. The ballasted ship
geometry of Figure 4 was based on observations and
discussions with ship operators and pilots.
The ability of a ship to strike a bridge pier or
superstmcture element is limited primarily by the water
depths in the watelway and navigable channel and the
geometry of the bridge and the ship. The determination
of ship draft (loaded and ballasted) and available water
depth are key factors in the vessel impact analysis. In
utilizing the typical ship data in this Article, the bridge
designer should be aware that very large merchant ships
frequently transit U.S. waterways in paJiially loaded
conditions due to draft limitations in the navigable
channel. Modifications to the typical data must be made
to account for such vessels. As an example, an 80,000
DWT bulk carrier with a fully loaded draft of 45.6 ft
would typically transit patiially loaded with a draft of
only 33.0 ft in a channel whose limiting water depth was
35.0 ft. In this condition the mast height and bow height
above the waterline would be 12.6 ft higher than when
fully loaded.
( For vessels transiting in other than a fully loaded
condition, the displacement weight can be estimated by:
28 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

IV = (CB )(Lw )(BM )(Du)

(C3.5.2-1)
rfliv
where:

IV displacement weight of vessel tonnes,

CB block coefficient (dimensionless),

Lw length of vessel waterline (ft),

Du = mean draft (ft),

EM = mean breadth (ft), and

IVw = 34.4 (cubic feet pel' tonne of saltwater); 35.4

(cubic feet pel' tonne of freshwater).

The block coefficient, CB , is the ratio of the

illllllersed section of the vessel to a block having the
same length, width, and depth. CB can be estimated by
substituting IVL and other values for the fully loaded
vessel into Eq. Cl. Using the same value of CB , the
displacement weight of the vessel for other drafts
representing different loading conditions and drafts can
be estimated using Eq. Cl. Setting Lw = LOA is usually
assumed in using Eq. CI since data on Lw is difficult to
obtain. The use of LOA results in no significant elTor in
computing CB alld TV. ((

Deadweight Tonnaga (1000 D\rV1)

Figure C3.5.2~1-Typicall\1ast Height Clearance Data for

Loaded Freighter/Container Ships (see Figure 3.5.2-5)

I (
 SEcnON 3-GENERAL PROV[SIONS 29

(
r= l t
~ :::
:i~::
- - - - -IT ~
/

~ t,- - --==I~-:-:- - - --- -

----- f------ ----
-
-----
-- ----- -----
- - --
_____ J" I_JI
___ J
)-

a. 81 ,OOO-DWT Bulk Carrier (length =855 ft)

b. 67,000-DWTProduct Carrier/Tanker (length =800 ft)

(

c. 22,OOO-DWT Multipurpose Freighter/Container Ship (length =670 ft)

Figure 3.5.2-1-Typica' Ship Profiles
30 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY .FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

I
I
Ballasted Ship I
I• • I

Figure 3.5.2-2-Collullon Ship Bow Shapes

Deckhouse Height

( (
WL

LOA

DB depth of bow
RL rake length of bow =.0.25 DB
LeB length to collision bulkhead ,,0. 1(LOA)
LOA length overall of ship
WL waterline

Figure 3.5.2-3-Typical Ship Bow and Vertical Clearance Dimensions

i (
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 31

WL

LOA

a. Loaded Ship Profile

WL

LOAl2 LOA/2

b. Ballasted Ship Profile

Figure 3.5.2-4-Typical Ship Characteristics

32 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\ll\IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAVBRIDGES

FREIGHTER/CONTAINER
((
.. _..I(Ballasted)
200
190 BULK CARRIER
y.--. __L(LOaded)
~
180 ..~
(Ballasted)
~ 170 --------~~~~+-~--
_(J) 160 L (Ballasted) (Loaded)
.cc
.-
0>:.=
~
150 /-------~------ ---';(L;~d~d)-~
(J)(J) 140
I 10 130
..... -- / r
-------- -----------------
ti$ 120 " TANKER
ro(J)
2:> 110
0 100
..0
ro 90
80
70
a 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

DeadweightTonnage (1000 OWl)

Figure 3.5.2-5-Typical Ship Mast Clearance Heights

180
170 FREIGHTER/CONTAINER

E@:
.2>
Q)
I=
Q)2
(/) ro
55Q)
<l.l
c
~
160
150
140
130
120
110
f
.. -. _ .. _ .. _ .. -.
._..._. _. __L
[
(Ballasted)
"(Loaded) BULK CARRIER
(Ballasted)

(Loaded)
!(

100
.c
"" 90
o >
0
(J).o 80
o ro
70
60
50
40
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Deadweight Tonnage (1000 OWT)

Figure 3.5.2-6-Typical Ship Decldlouse Clearance Heights

 SECfION 3~GENERAL PROVISIONS 33

Table 3.5.2~1~Typical Bulk Carrier Ship Characteristics

(
Fully Loaded Ballasted
Ship Bow
DWT, Length Beam, Depth Draft Displacement Draft Draft Displacement
tonnes LOA, ft BAt, ft DB D L , (ft) rvL , tonnes DEB, ft DES, ft 117E, tonnes
1,000 200 29.2 27.2 14.1 1,500 3.5 7.1 600
3,000 289 41.7 38.2 22.3 4,200 5.6 11.2 1,600
5,000 341 48.9 45.2 21.3 6,800 5.3 10.7 2,600
10,000 459 61.4 57.6 26.6 13,100 6.7 13.3 4,900
15,000 515 70.5 64.2 29.5 19,300 7.4 14.8 7,200
20,000 558 77.8 68.4 31.5 25,500 7.9 15.8 9,600
25,000 577 82.4 70.8 32.2 31,500 8.1 16.1 11,800
30,000 630 89.6 74.1 34.8 37,500 8.7 17.4 14,100
40,QOO 682 99.1 77.8 37.4 49,400 9.4 18.7 18,500
50,000 728 107.0 80.2 39.0 61,100 9.8 19.5 22,900
60,000 771 109.3 83.7 40.4 72,800 10.1 20.2 27,300
80,000 850 120.1 86.2 43.3 95,800 10.8 21.7 35,900
100,000 902 137.8 92.8 52.8 118,600 13.2 26.4 44,500
150,000 1027 146.0 99.7 59.1 174,700 14.8 29.6 65,500

Table 3.5.2-2-Typical Product Carrierffanker Ship Characteristics

Fully Loaded Ballasted

Ship Bow
DWT, Length Beam Depth, Draft Displacement Draft Draft Displacement
tonnes LOA, ft Bu , ft DR DL,ft WL , tonnes DEB, ft DEs,ft WE, tonnes
1,000 187 30.8 25.0 13.8 1,400 3.5 6.9 500
3,000 279 42.0 35.4 19.4 4,100 4.9 9.7 1,500
5,000 335 48.2 41.8 22.6 6,700 5.7 11.3 2,500
10,000 456 62.3 53.6 26.6 13,000 6.7 13.3 4,900
15,000 515 71.2 60.2 29.5 19,300 7.4 14.8 7,200
20,000 561 78.1 65.1 32.2 25,400 8.1 16.1 9,500
25,000 577 83.7 68.7 33.1 31,500 8.3 16.6 11,800
30,000 637 89.2 71.7 34.8 37,500 8.7 17.4 14,100
40,000 692 98.1 75.8 38.4 49,500 9.6 19.2 18,600
50,000 741 105.3 78.5 41.0 61,400 0.3 20.5 23,000
60,000 774 111.5 81.8 42.0 73,200 0.5 21.0 27,500
80,000 853 122.4 83.6 45.6 96,500 11.4 22.8 36,200
100,000 886 128.0 85.0 47.9 119,700 12.0 24.0 44,900
120,000 915 138.9 88.2 50.9 142,600 12.7 25.5 53,500
150,000 955 145.0 90.6 58.7 176,800 14.7 29.4 66,300
34 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Table 3.5.2~3-Typical Freighter/Container Ship Characteristics

( i
(
Fully Loaded Ballasted
Ship Bow
DWT, Length Beam Depth, Draft Displacement Draft Draft Displacement
tOl1nes LOA, ft B}.{, ft DB DL,ft WL, tonnes DEB, ft DES, ft WE, tonnes
1,000 190 31.2 23.0 13.8 1,400 3.5 6.9 500
3,000 282 43.3 39.0 19,4 4,200 4.9 9.7 1,600
5,000 338 50.5 44.9 22.3 7,000 5.6 11.2 2,600
7,000 423 57.7 52.8 24.6 9,700 6.2 12.3 3,600
10,000 472 63.6 58.0 26.9 3,800 6.7 13.5 5,200
12,000 499 65.9 60.8 28.9 16,600 7.2 14.5 6,000
16,000 617 84.3 76.2 30.8 24,800 7.7 15.4 9,300
20,000 643 90.6 80,4 34.4 31,600 8.6 17.2 11,850
24,000 697 98,4 82.0 34.4 36,700 8.6 17.2 13,800
27,000 717 102,4 86.0 36.7 42,200 9.2 18.4 15,800
33,000 863 105.6 86.5 37.7 51,600 9,4 18.9 19,400
49,700 950 106.0 94.8 36.1 77,000 9.0 18.1 28,900
54,500 903 129.2 96,4 41.0 84,500 10.3 20.5 31,700

3.5.3 Special Vessels

A variety of special ship and barge vessels transit

U.S. watenvays. These include ocean-going barges,
dredges, offshore industty transports, jack-up boring
rigs, barge mounted cranes, passenger ships, Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) vessels, and naval vessels. The
applicability of the Specification is limited with respect
to these vessel types and judgment Illust be exercised in
evaluating their influence 011 the vessel collision
problem.

3.6 DESIGN VESSEL C3.6

A design vessel shall be determined for each bridge
element exposed to collision. The design vessel shall be
selected in accordance with the requirements of Article
4.1 using Method II and its corresponding acceptance
criteria in Article 4.8.2 unless the approval of the Owner
and the special situations stated in Article 4.1.2 exist.
Three alternative methods for selecting the design
vessel for collision impact are presented in the Guide
Specifications. Method II shall be used for all bridge
design unless approval by the Owner and the special
situations stated in Article 4.1.2 exist. Methods I, II, and
1II vary from relatively simple to usc to relatively
complex. All of the methods are suitable for manual
computation. A brief overview discussion of each
method is presented below. A detailed discussion of each
method is presented in the Commentary in Section 4.

I. Method I is a semi-deterministic procedure for

selecting the design vessel for collision impact.
Method I is the simplest of the three methods to use,
but is also the most conservative, resulting in higher
impact forces than those developed in Method II.
2. Method II is a probability-based (risk) analysis
procedure for selecting the design vessel for !, (
collision impact. Significantly more complicated
than Method I, Method II requires a relatively large
amount of data to conduct the analysis. The use of
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS
(
3.7 DESIGN IMPACT SPEED
The design impact speed for each exposed bridge
element in the watenvay shall be detennined based on
the typical vessel transit speed within the navigable
channel limits, the distance to the location of the bridge
element from the centerline of vessel transit path, and the
vessel length overall (LOA). The centerline of vessel
transit path shall be determined according to Article
4.2.1. The typical vessel transit speed (VT) shall represent
the typical speed at which the design vessel is transiting
the waterway in the vicinity of the bridge under nonnal
envirOllllentai circumstances. A different transit speed
for inbound and outbound vessels may be required
depending on water current conditions in the waterway.
The design impact speed for each bridge element in
the watenvay shall be determined as shown in Figure 1.
The design impact speed distribution shall be based on
the geometty of the bridge, the navigable channel width,
and the length overall (LOA) of each vessel in the design
fleet.
For ship and barge tows transiting the waterway
under their own power, the primary area of vessel
collision concern is a central region or zone near the
main navigation span of the bridge. The width or
bound81y of this navigation zone used in the vessel
collision analysis is defined as a distance equal to
3 x LOA on each side of the vessel transit path (which
coincides with the channel centerline for most bridges).
For barge tows, the length overall shall be equal to the
total length of the tow including the barges and tug/tow
boat vessel as shown in Figure 3.5.1-2.
The 3 x LOA distance is also used to distribute the
vessel impact speed over each of the piers located in the
navigation zone as shown in Figure 1, where V = design
impact speed; VT = typical vessel transit speed in the
channel; VT\tIN = minimum impact speed (associated with
the CUlTent in the watenvay); x = the distance from
centerline of vessel transit path; Xc = distance to the edge
of chalmel; and XL = 3 x LOA from the centerline of the
vessel transit path.
35
the Method II probability procedures results in a
more realistic assessment of the risk of vessel
collision with a bridge structure, and therefore a
more accurate selection of the appropriate collision
impact loads.
3. Method 1lI is a cost-effectiveness analysis procedure
for selecting the design vessel for collision impact.
The determination of annual frequency of bridge
collapse, AF, requircd in Method III shall be
computed using Method ll. The disruption costs
associated with a potential bridge collapse are
evaluated using standard benefit/cost (B/C) analysis
to determine the cost-effectiveness of bridge
strengthening or bridge protection measures.
C3.7
The selection of the design impact speed is one of
the most significant design parameters associated with
the vessel collision Specifications. Judgment must be
exercised by the designer in determining the appropriate
design speed for a vessel transiting the waterway. The
chosen speed should reflect the "typical" transit speed of
the design vessel under "typical"conditions of wind,
current, visibility, opposing traffic, waterway geometry,
etc. A different vessel speed may be required for inbound
vessels than for outbound vessels given the presence of
currents which may exist in the waterway.
In general, the design speed should not be based on
extrelne values representing extreme events such as
flooding, hurricanes, and other extreme environmental
conditions. Vessels transiting under these conditions are
not representative of the "annual av~rage)) situations
reflecting the typical transit situations.
The use of a triangular distribution of vessel impact
speed across the length of the bridge and centered on the
centerline of the vessel transit path (Figure I), reflects a
departure from previous models of vessel collision risk
assessment. The recommended use of a triangular disttoi-
bution was based on the project consultants review of
accident case histories during development of the Guide
Specifications. While the data is certainly sparse, it
seems clear that aberrant ships and barges which collide
wit11 bridge piers further away from the channel are
moving at reduced speeds than those piers located closer
to the navigable channel limits. Aberrant vessels located
at large distances from the channel are usually drifting
with the current. Aberrant vessels located velY near the
channel are moving at speeds approaching the speeds of
ships and barges in the main channel.
The exact distribution of the speed reduction is un-
known. However, a triangular distribution was chosen
for the Specifications because of its simplicity, as well as
its reasonableness in modeling the abelTanl vessel speed
situation. As shown in Figure 1, the typical vessel transit
speed in the waterway is constant to the edge of the
 36 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMl\lENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OFHIGIlWAY BRIDGES

As a mIl11l11Um, the design impact speed shall be
equal to the yearly meau current for the watenvay
location. In watenvays where seasonal flooding
represents a significant portion of the cutTent activity,
judgment must be used to establish the basis for deter-
mining the minimum impact speed. Judgment must also
be used on the effects of prevailing wind acting in the
waterway and upon the exposed vessel.
channel at which point it decreases to the minimum
design speed value at a dist1nce 3 x LOA from the I (
centerline of vessel transit path. The use of the distance
3 x LOA to define the limits at which the design speed
becomes equal to the water current was based on the
observation that very few accidents (other than drifting
vessels) have historically occurred beyond that boundaty.
Additional discussion of historical accident data is
contained in Article C4.8.3.3.
The 1991 Guide Specifications (Article 3.7 on
Design Impact Speed and Article 4.8.3.3 Geometric
Probability) required the use of a vessel length overall
(LOA) selected in accordance with the Method I criteria
for use in estimating the impact speed and geometric
probability for all vessel classifications. This provision
has been revised in the new Guide Specifications to
allow for the LOA of each specific vessel category to be
used in determining the vessel speed distribution and
geometric probability associated with that specific vessel
categOlY·

1(fJ
t5
ro
Q. VM;, ---------- ------------------,,--~----
E o o ( (
x

Distance from Centerline of

Vessel Transit Path (x)

v = design impact speed (ft/s) x = distance to bridge element from

centerline of vessel transit path (ft)
design impact speed (ft/s)
Xc = distance to edge of channel from
centerline of vessel transit path (ft)
minimum design impact
speed (ftls)
XL = distance equal to 3 x LOA from
centerline of vessel transit path (ft)

Figure 3.7~1-Design Impact Speed

3.8 VESSEL COLLISION ENERGY C3.8

The kinetic energy of a moving vessel to be Equation 3.8-1 in the 1991 Guide Specifications was
absorbed during a collision with a bridge pier shall be developed using the standard relationship for computing
determined by the following: the kinetic energy, KE, of a moving body as:

(3.8-1) KE~ m(V)2 ~ W(V)2

(C3.8-1)
2 2g
where: where:
KE ~ vessel collision energy (kip-ft), ! l
111 mass of the vessel,
SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS
hydrodynamic mass coefficient,
TV vessel displacement tonnage (tonnes), and
v vessel impact speed (ft/s).
The vessel displacement tonnage, TV, equals the
weight of the vessel when empty plus the weight of the
ballast and cargo (DTVI) being carried by the vessel.
The displacement tonnage for barge tows shall equal
the displacement of the tug/tow vessel plus the combined
displacement of the number of barges in the length of the
tow. The number of barges across the width of the tow
are neglected in computing the impact energy of the tow
(and therefore the impact force as well) since they are
assumed to break away upon impact.
The hydrodynamic mass coefficient, CH , accounts
for the mass of water surrounding and moving with the
vessel; therefore, the inertia force from this mass of
water has to be added to that of the vessel. Cll varies
depending on many factom such as, water depth,
underkeel clearance, distance to obstacles, shape of the
vessel, vessel speed, currents, position of the vessel,
direction of vessel travel, stiffness of bridge and fender
systems, and the cleanliness of the vessel's hull
underwater. For a vessel moving in a straight fonvard
motion, the following values of Cll shall be used, unless
determined otherwise by accepted analysis procedures:
1. for large underkeel clearances (2:0.5 x Draft),
CH = LOS
2. for small underkeel clearances (:O;O.lx Draft),
Cll = 1.2S
The nnderkeel clearance is the distance between the
bottom (keel) of a vessel and the bottom of the
waterway. Clf for underkeel clearances between the large
and small limits discussed above may be estimated by
intelPolating.
37
v vessel impact speed,
TV vessel displacement talmage; and
g acceleration dne to gravity (ft/s').
Expressing KE in kip-ft, TV in tormes (I tonne = 2.20S
kips), V in ft/s, g = 32.2 ft/s',and including the
hydrodynamic mass coefficient, CH , in Eq. CI results in
the equation: .
2.20S (CII )(TV)(V)' (Cll)(W)(V)'
KE (C3.8-2)
(2) (32.2) 29.2
Included in this equation is a hydrodynamic mass
coefficient, eH , to account for the influence of the
surrounding water upon the moving vessel.
It is difficult to find a single value for Clf because of
the many factors which influence its magnitude. PlANC
(1984) provides an extensive discussion of the various
investigations which have been conducted to measure
and compute CH associated with vessel berthing and
fender design, and discnsses the wide scatter of the
reported results. On the basis of its investigation, PIANC
(1984) states that unless the designer has good reasons to
adopt other values, to assume Clf to range between 1.S
(for large underkeel clearances) and 1.8 (for small
underkeel clearances) for computing the kinetic energy
associated with ship berthing. These values apply to
ships which are approaching a berthing wharf from a
lateral (broadside) direction. During such lateral motions
a relatively large mass of water moves with the vessel.
For vessels moving in a forward direction however, a
smaller mass of water moves with the vessel, and
therefore the values of CH are smaller than those
encountered in berthing maneuvers.
One of the basic concepts of the Guide
Specifications is that the impact loadings represent the
worst-case, head-on collision situation with the vessel
moving in a forward direction at relatively high speed.
For acceleration in the direction of the ship's length, and
for waterways with large underkeel clearances, a
constant value of Cll = LOS may be used (Sanl and
Svensson, 1980). For waterways with small underkeel
clearances, the 1.05 value was increased by the ratio
(1.8/1.S) to the approximate value of CH = I.2S, which is
similar to the increase in hydrodynamic mass discussed
in the previous paragraph for vessel berthing.
While not a requirement in the Specifications, the
ability to compute the impact energy due to an oblique
collision is often times useful. The collision energy, KE,
to be absorbed by either the vessel or the bridge structure
during a collision event, E, is a function of the impact
angle, 0, and the coefficient of friction, ~, between the
colliding vessel and the bridge stmcture. Research by
Saul and Svensson (1980) indicates the following
relationship:
38 GUlDE SPECIFICATIONS AND C01\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

(C3.8-3)

Values of11 are shown in Figure Cl as a function of

the impact angle and coefficient of friction based on
research by Woisin, Saul, and Svensson.
1.0 ,---r---,----""7,-~-,- ___- V _ - ' 7 0

0.' f---f---t--f-¥---f-+--I--,+-----1

0.' f---f---J-+

0.4 f---f---c~jf-___,,L-t7'-7'-+---+-----1

0.2 f--7D"-7'b.L-7't---+---+-----1

o 30' 45' 60' 75' 90'

a
absorbed coll!s!on energy
initial ship's energy

Coefficient of Friction (IJ)

Steel sleel - 0.15
Steel - concrete - 0.35
Steel - wood - 0.65

Figure C3.8-1-Pol'tion of Collision Energy to Be Absorbed

by the Ship or Bridge Structure in Relation to the Co]Jision ( (
Angle and the Coefficient of Friction (Saul and Svensson,
1980)

Studies on multibarge tow impact forces by the

University of Kentucky (Yuan, Harik and Davidson,
2005) have indicated that counting the barges in the
length of the tow may yield conservative impact forces
using the AASHTO equations, particularly in those cases
where the width of the pier is smaller (approximately 10
percent) than the width of the barge. Where the width of
the pier is about 50 percent of the width of the barge, the
barge impact forces are close to the AASHTO values,
and where the width of the pier is about the same or
greater than the width of the barge, the AASHTO forces
are less than those computed using finite element models
and dynamic analysis. Their research indicates that an
"accordion" type effect occurs where the barges in the
tow length buckle upward/downward-which reduces
the impact energy being transferred to the pier. The
Kentucky studies also indicate that the barges in the
width of the tow do not simply break away on impact,
but stay connected sufficiently to impart some of their
energy in the collision. Interestingly, using dynamic
analysis finite element methods applied to the entire
multibarge tow (flotilla) resulted in overall impact forces
velY similar to the forces derived using the AASHTO ! (
method (i.e., the reduction of the force by barges
buckling in the length of the tow is offset by an increase
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 39

in force caused by the influence of the adjacent barges in

the width oflhe tow).

3.9 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON PIER C3.9

The ship collision equivalent static impact force
associated with a head-on collision with a rigid object
shall be computed by the following for Product
CatTier/Tanker, Bulk Carrier, and Freighter/Container
vessels:
The detenllination of the impact load on a bridge
structure during a ship collision is extremely complex
and depends on many factors such as the structural type
and shape of the ship's bow, the degree of water ballast
carried in the forepeak of the bow, the size and speed of
the ship, the geometry of the collision, and the geometlY

=220(DWTt(~)
P.s
where:
Ps = equivalent static ship impact force (kips),
DWT = deadweight tonnage of ship (tonnes), and
v = ship impact speed (ftls).
A more rigorous generally accepted dynamic
analysis procedure may be used in lieu of the
recommended static analysis procedure. Such procedure
shall be based on an accepted impact force/damage
lengtll relationship established by model testing or
structural analysis. If transient or permanent deflections
or movements of a bridge component are introduced in
the analysis, the force reducing effect must be
documented by a dynamic analysis.
A graphic of ship impact forces computed using
Eq. 1 is shown in Figure 1.
and strength characteristics of the bridge pier.
(3.9-1) European, Japanese, and U.S. experimentation
utilizing physical and mathematical models for collision
tests of various types of vessels have resulted in the
development of several empirical relationships for
estimating the crushing load of a ship's bow, which is an
upper limit for the collision force on the bridge (IABSE,
1983).
Equation 3.9-1 of the 1991 Guide Specifications was
primarily developed from research conducted by Woisin
in Hamburg, West Germany, from 1967-1976 to
generate collision data to protect the reactors of nuclear
powered ships from collisions with other ships (Woisin,
1976). The ship collision data resulted from a total of24
collision tests with 12 pairs of physical ship models at
scales 1:12 and 1:7.5 as shown in Figure Cl. Woisin's
results have been found to be in good agreement with
research conducted by other ship collision investigators
worldwide (IABSE, 1983).
Tracie:

80
350
ShiPSize~
§
I'
70
300 "." ~
W ~ "
0. 60
""
,,<J
°'"
Z 250
~ ~ ,t-
°
0_
50
~
0
u. 200
"'-
ID
,,"""
"". 0§:
U
ro ~ 40
Figure C3.9-1-Elevatioll View of Set-Up for 'Voisin's Ship
0.
§ 150
U
ro .".""" l\fodel Collision Tests at Howldtswcrke-Dcutsche 'Verft,
Hamburg (,Voisin, 1971)
0~
0.
.&
~
<f)
§
0.
30
').o~
,,0
100 :c A schematic representation of the typical dynamics
<f)
20 00 0 '11'
\0.0 of impact force over time is shown in Figure C2 for
Woisin's model tests. An oscillation of the striking mass
50 - 10 2.000 oWl and impact force occurred during the initial phase of the
impact with a duration of 0.1 to 0.2 seconds for a real
0 0 ship. During this phase the amplitude sometimes
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
increased to twice the mean value of the impact force.
Impact Speed (knots) Unfortunately, however, accurate collision force-time
histories were not obtained during the testing due to
Figure 3.9~1-Ship Impact Forces electronic measuring difficulties in the instrumentation
and induced vibrations in the model test set-up. As a
result, it was not possible to evaluate the compression
phase ofthe impact over time, P(t).
40 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO~ll\lENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION·DESIGN OF HU:;IlWAY BRIDGES

f P~, = Maximum Impact Force i(

~
~ P(I) = Average Impact Force -,.
o _ _ -- -- ____________ _____ 1__
~------

LL
1)
~
§

o~------------------------~~
Time (I)

Figure C3.9-2-Schematic Representation of Ship Impact

Force History from Collision Tcsts Conducted by 'Voisin
and Gerlach, 1970

Woisin did compute the mean impact force,P(a),

averaged over the bow damage depth, a, by dividing the
loss in kinetic energy, KE, by the bow damage depth. A
typical plot of impact force and energy over the bow
damage depth is shown in Figure C3.

Impact Force 1'(0) Deformation Resfstan«! ",/'

~--~ ~/
p V

~-~--I-_-J~r==;:i EJasticEnergy
(kips)

E
( (
(kip-fl)
max.P DIssipated Energy
Ed
\\'orkat
Deformation
A(e)

8(fI)

Figure C3.9-3-Impact Force, P, and Energy, E, in

Relation to the Vessel Damage Depth, {/, (,Voisin, 1971)

Based on theoretical and model test results, Woisin

developed the following relationship between the mean
impact force averaged over time, PCt), and the mean
impact force averaged over the damage depth,P(a):

1'(t) = (1.25)1'(a) (C3.9-1)

The major influences affecting the mean impact

force arranged in order of decreasing importance by
Woisin were: 1) ship size (D WI), 2) type of ship,
3) shape and stmcture of bow, 4) amount of ballast water
in the bow, and 5) the impact speed. Due to the varying
influences, a ±50 percent scatter in the ship impact force
was measured as shown in Figure C4. ! (
 SECTION 3~GENERAL PROVISIONS 41

(
50%

ShIp Size (1,000 DWT)

Figure C3.9-4-Avel'age Impact Force, P(t), for Bulk

Carriers (Fl'andsen and Langso, 1980)

The scatter in impact forces about the mean force,

pet), approximately followed a triangular probability
density distribution as shown in Figure CS.

175,000

150,000
At 70% Fractile,
~
-::-:. 125,000
P s = 220(DWl)112

] 100,000

1i
E
Probability
Density
Function

Ship Size (1,000 DWl)

Figure C3.9-S--Pl'obability Density Function of Impact

Force Showing 70 Percent Fractile Used for P s (Frandsen
and Langso, 1980)

From Woisin's data the following basic equation for

the mean ship impact force was developed for bulk
carriers larger than 40,000 DWT colliding with a rigid
body at a speed of approximately 16 knots (Saul and
Svensson, 1980):

pet) ~0.88 (DWT)II2±50%,inMN (C3.9-2a)

where MN is meganewtons, or in U,S. customary units:

pet) ~198(DWT/12 ±50%, in kips (C3.9-2b)

Subsequent review of the test data by Woisin during

the development of the Guide Specifications resulted in a
42 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COi\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

reduction factor for impact speeds between 8 and 16

knots as follows: I(

(C3.9-3a)

where pet) is in meganewtons (MN) and the speed, V, is

in knots, or in U.S. customary units:

pet) =198(DWTr(~ )±50% (C3.9-3b)

where p(t) is in kips, and the speed, V, is in ft per

second.
Equation 3.9-1 of the 1991 Guide Specifications was
developed from Eq. C3.9-3b with the following
modifications as recommended by the project
consultants:
Rather than allowing a ±50 percent scatter in forces,
a single force is recommended using the 70 percent
fractile of the force distribution as shown in Figure
C5. Using a 70 percent fractile, for a given design vessel,
the number of smaller ships with a crushing strength
greater than the 70 percent ji-actile force of the design
vessel would be approximately equal to the number of
larger ships with a crushing strength less than the 70
percent fractile force of the design vessel (Frandsen and
((
Langso, 1980). Using the 70 percent fmctile results in an
approximately II percent increase in the mean impact
force as follows:

(See Eq. 1.)

where the 70 percent fractile force is designated, Ps, with

the units of kips, and the speed, V, is in ft per second.
This is the specification equation shown in this Article.
\Voisin's limitations on size of vessel, type of vessel,
and a minimulll impact speed of 8 knots were not
imposed. In order to provide flexibility to the designer in
estimating ship impact forces for vessels smaller than
40,000 D WT, speeds less than 8 knots, and vessels other
than bulk carriers, it is recommended that the
extrapolation of Eq. I be used until future research
results are available. It should be noted that the use of
Eq. I for very low speed levels may under estimate the
actual force levels. Future research in this area is needed.
Equation I represents a 70 percent fractile impact
force and its use implies that this force will be used to
evaluate the bridge response to impact and to size mem-
bers to resist the impact forces. Values and the use ofthe
maximum impact force, Pmax• (where
Pm", = 2.0 [P(I) J) are not included in the Guide
I (

Specifications. For most applications, the time duration

 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 43

of the maximum impact force (0.1 to 0.2 seconds) is too

( brief to cause major problems to the structure, and
therefore the use of the 70 percent fractile force is the
most appropriate for desigu.
The design impact force computed from Eq. 1 is
applied as an equivalent static load to the bridge. Since
the model testing used to derive Eq. I were based on
dynamic tests, its use incorporates some of the influence
of the ship dynamics in its empirical formulation. The
authors believe the use of dynamic analysis of the
shiplbridge collision problem is usually not warranted
because of insufficient data on impact load histories and
the wide scatter of the impact force values. Prucz and
Conway (1990) provide procedures for including
dynamic analysis for ship collision with bridge piers
assuming various types of impact load history functions.
It also should be noted that Eq. I does not contain a
reduction factor to reduce the impact force associated
with ships traveling ballasted, or partly loaded. Even
though the mass of the ship affects the impact force,
Woisin determined that the reduction in impact force due
to reduced mass is offset by the increase in impact force
caused by a stiffer bow due to the presence of water
ballast in the ship's forepeaklbow tanks. This filling of
the bow tanks on ballasted ships causes the forces to
increase because of the water's incompressibility in the
enclosed portion of the bow. This results in the impact
force for either a loaded 01' ballasted ship of the same
DWTbeing essentially equal.
Equation I applies to impact forces associated with
collisions by Tanker/Product Carriers, Bulk Carriers, and
Freighter/Container vessels. Although Tanker/Product
Carrier and Bulk Carrier vessels usually have relatively
soft, deformable bows as compared to the relatively hard
rigid bows of Freighter/Container vessels, the total
average collision forces given by Eq. I for
TankerlProduct Carriers and Bulk Carriers remains
unchanged because the larger contact area and the
broader deck and bottom structure in the bow counteract
the local softening.

C3.9.1 AASHTO Comparison with Eurocode

Other than AASHTO, the only major international

design code that contains provisions for vessel collision
is the European Standard (Eurocode). The current
provisions for vessel collision are contained in Eurocode
I-Actions on Structures-Part 1-7: General Actions-
Accidental Actions, prEN 1991-1-7, Final Draft dated
September 2005. The Eurocode is similar in principle to
the overall philosophy of the AASHTO LRFD bridge
code. For vessel collisions the Eurocode provides for
general (deterministic) forces for typical barge and ship
collision situations, as well as procedures for performing
detailed analysis based on probabilistic analysis and
dynamic modeling methods. The level of risk acceptance
for accidental actions (including vessel collisions) is
ultimately determined by the Owner or national
44 GUlDE SPECIFICATlONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HrGHWAy BRIDGES

government, however a probability value ofp ~ lxl0-4 is .(

recommended in the code as a representative acceptance ( _
value in determining the risk that the accidental action
might occur. This Eurocode risk acceptance value is the
same as the I in 10,000 year CriticallEssential Bridge
acceptance criteria found in the AASHTO vessel
collision requirements.
Recent investigations associated with the Great Belt
Bridge in Denmark (Larsen 1993, and Pedersen 1993),
have indicated that the maximum ship impact force over
time should be considered in the vessel collision analysis
and protection system design, rather than the average
impact force over time recommended by the AASHTO
Specifications, and in Eurocode I, Part 2.7 which had a
similar equation which resulted in only slightly higher
ship impact forces. Sophisticated time-domain computer
finite element analysis studies and low strain rate
(essentially "static") physical model tests of ship bows
conducted by Pederson in Denmark, have indicated a
time-history behavior different than that measured by
Woisin (Figure Cl). It is possible that the differences
indicated in Figure Cl are attributable to the dynamic
versus static methods used in the physical model tests.

fl:,
Q)
e0 B
((
u..
U
'"
0.
.§

Time (I)

Figure C3.9.1-1~Coll1parison of Ship Impact Force

Time Histories by 'Voisin (A), and recent
research by Pedersen (B).

The consequences of using the maximum impact

force for design are significant, since the impact force is
approximately twice the average value. A comparison of
typical ship impact forces (taken from Table Cl. in the
cutTent Eurocode based on Pedersen's equations) with
similar forces from AASHTO are shown in Table Cl.
The forces in this table are based on an impact speed of
10 knots, with the Eurocode ship impact forces based on
Pederson's equations for computing the maximum
impact force.

I (
 SECTION3~GENERALPROVISIONS 45

Table C3.9.1-1-Compal'ison of Ship Impact Forces

(
Eurocode AASHTO

Ship Displacement Impact Impact

Description Tonnage Force Force
tonnes (kips) (kips)
Small Shiv 3,000 6,750 . 6,900
Medium 10,000 18,000 12,300
Ship
Large Ship 40,000 54,000 25,800
Very Large 100,000 103,500 41,300
Ship

A significant difference between the Eurocode and

the AASHTO code is that the Eurocode recommends that
the quasi-static impact forces in Table C1 (which include
the dynamic effects of the colliding ship, but not in the
structure) be increased by multiplying by an appropriate
dynamic amplification factor. The Eurocode
recommends a dynamic amplification factor of 1.3 for
frontal (head-on) impacts and 1.7 for lateral impacts. The
recommended Eurocode lateral impact forces for ship
collision are based on a value equal to 50 percent of the
head-on impact force (similar to AASHTO).
Recent research using state-of-the-art numerical
finite element model (FEM) simulations of ship
collisions against a concrete bridge pier have been
cal1'ied out by the Tongji University, Shanghai, China.
The simulations computed dynamic impact forces for a
head-on collision of a 50,000 ton bulk carrier against a
rigid wall vs. time, compared with the estimated
equivalent static loads from the various formulas
mentioned above. Naturally, the simplified code
equations call only give rough estimations for impact
loads. The AASHTO and Eurocode equivalent loads
appear to lie on the safe side when compared with
Tongji's calculated dynamic values, whereas the
Pedersen equation gives about double those values.
m,-----------------------------,
............. ~~.~;~~.~:~~ . ..................................... .

T810002.1·99 for., co 1.0

Z
;,. ,w Eurocode
@
~

j '"

T810002.1·99 for., = 0.3

Tlme(s)

Figure C3.9.1-2-Dynamic Ship Collision Force vs. Time

for a Rigid 'Vall Impact to Simulate Equivalent Static
Loads
46 GUJDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HlGHWAY BRIDGES

Further Tongji calculations have also shown that the

simulation of a ship collision against an elastic bridge
pier on piles, reduces the peak value of the collision
force by about 50 percent compared to that against a
rigid wall (Figure C3), (Svensson, 2006).

160 TB10002.1-99 lor 11 = 1.0

-.-.-.-.-.---.-.-.--.-.--.---.----~.-.---.---.-.-.
Z 120
6-
~
~ 80
t
AASHTO's

:~
8

2 3 4 5 6
Time (s)

Figure C3.9.1-3-Comparison of Ship Collision Force vs.

Time for Rigid 'Vall Impact and Flexible Pile Cap Impact
with Codified Collision Forces

3.10 SHIP BOW DAMAGE DEPTH C3.10

The depth of the ship's bow crushed during impact The average bow damage depth, a, is computed
with a rigid object shall be computed by: based on impact force averaged against the work path, ( (
P(a), rather than averaged against impact duration,
as ~1.54 ( KEJ
P, (3.10-1) 1'(1), such that:
KE
a~-- (C3.IO-I)
where: Pea)

as ~ ship damage depth (ft), For a constant level of impact energy, KE, the ship
bow damage depth increases for lower values of the
KE ~ ship collision energy (kip-ft), and
average impact force, P(a). In order to provide a level
Ps ~ equivalent static ship impact force (kips). of safety consistent with the 70 percent fractile used to
compute the design impact force, P s, the bow damage
depth, as, should be estimated as:

(1.25)(1.l1)KE
(C3.10-2)
(0.9) P,

where the factor 1.25 accounts for the increase in average

impact force over time versus damage depth, the factor
1.11 accounts for the increase in impact force due to the
70 percent design fractile, and the factor 0.9 represents
an increase in the damage depth (II percent) to provide a
similar level of design safety as that used to compute P s.
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PRovrsroNs 47

( 3.11 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON C3.11

SUPERSTRUCTURE
Limited data exists on the collision forces between
ship superstructure (bow, deckhouse, and mast) and
bridge superstructure elements. Forces developed during
the 1970 Great Belt Bridge Investigation in Denmark for
deckhouse collision . with a bridge superstructure
(Cowiconsult, 1981) were:

PDH = 1,200 kips for the deckhouse collision of a 1,000

D WT freighter ship;

PDH 6,000 kips for the deckhouse collision of a

100,000 DW'Ftanker ship.

Based roughly on these values, the empirical

relationship of Eq. 3.11.2-1 was developed for selecting
superstructure collision design impact values for deck-
house collision.
Very little data on mast impact forces exist in the
published literature. Eq. 3.11.3-1 was developed by
estimating the impact forces based on bridge girder and
snperstl11cture damage from several historical mast
impact accidents.

3.11.1 Bow Collision

The ship collision impact force between the bow of

the design ship and an exposed superstructure shall be
computed by:

(3.11.1-1)

where:

PBH = ship bow impact force on the exposed

superstructure (kips),

RBH = ratio of exposed superstructure depth to the total

bow depth (Article 3.5.2), and

Ps ship impact force from Article 3.9.

3.11.2 Deckhollse Collision

The superstructure coHision impact force between

the deckhouse of the design ship and an exposed
superstructure shall be computed by:

(3.11.2-1)

where:

PDl{ = ship deckhouse impact force (kips),

48 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLlSION DESIGN OF HlGHWAY BIUDGF..s

RDH = reduction factor, and

Ps ship impact force from Article 3.9.

For ships greater in size than 100,000 DWT,

RDH = 0.10. For ships smaller than 100,000 DWT, RDU
shall be computed as:

RDH =0.2-( DWT )0.10 (3.11.2-2)

100,00

3.11.3 Mast Collision

The superstructure collision impact force between

the mast of the design ship and an exposed superstructure
shall be computed by:

(3.11.3-1)

where:

PMr = ship mast impact force (kips), and

PDH = ship deckhouse impact force from Eq. 3.11.2-1.

3.12 BARGE COLLISION FORCE ON PIER C3.12 I(

The barge collision impact force associated with a The barge collision impact force determined by
head-on collision shall be determined by the following: Eq. la or Ib was developed from research conducted by
Meit~Dornberg in West Germany in 1983 on behalf of
For aB < 0.34, the Water and Shipping Directorate Southwest-Saar
District. The experimental and theoretical studies
PB = 4112( an) (3.12-la)
performed by Meir-Dornberg were performed to study
the deformation force and the deformation when barges
For aB:2: 0.34, collide with lock entrance stmctures and with bridge
Pn =[1349+11O(aB )] (3.12-lb) piers. Meit~Domberg's investigation also studied the
direction and height of climb of the barge upon bank
slopes and walls due to skewed impacts and groundings
where: along the sides of the waterway (Meil~Dornberg, 1983).
Meir-Dornberg's stndy included dynamic loading
Pn equivalent static barge impact force (kips),
with a pendulum hammer on three barge bottom models
in Scale I :4.5, static loading on one bottom model in
EB barge width (ft), and
Scale I :6, and numerical computations. The results for
an barge bow damage depth (ft). the standard European Barge, Type I1a (Figure CI) are
shown in Figure C2 for barge deformation and impact
A graphic of barge impact forces computed using loading. No significant difference was found between the
Eqs la and I b is shown in Figure 1. static and dynamic forces measured during the study.
Using metric units of meganewton (MN) for force,
PB, and meter (m) for bow damage length, a., Meir-
Dornberg developed the following equations:

For aB < 0.1 m,

I (
PB =60(aB ),in MB (C3.12.l-la)
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 49

For aB" 0.1 m,

( 5 PB =6+l.6(aB ),inMB (C3.12.1-lb)
20
Convelting these equations to U.S. custommy units
4 yields:
'in
Z 15 ~ For aB< 0.34 ft,
e- ci
o
PB =41l2(aB ),inkips (C3.12.1-2a)
~ ~3
0
u. ~ For aB" 0.34 ft,
1:5 0
u.
'""- 10
.5 1:5 2 Po =1349+1I0(aB ),inkips (C3.12.1-2b)
~ '"
"-
.5
e>
The European Barge Type IIa has a bow width x
'"'"
~
e> depth dimensions of 37.4 x 15.4 ft which compares
5
'"'" 1
relatively closely with the Jumbo Hopper Barge bow
dimensions of35.0 x 13.0 ft as shown in Figure 3.5.1-l.
The Jumbo Hopper Barge size is the most frequent barge
o 0 size utilizing the U.S. inland watenvay system. Due to
o 2 4 6 8 10 12 their similar barge bow shapes, the Guide Specifications
Impact Speed (knots) recommend using the Meit~Dornberg results for
computing the impact load for U.S. inland barges with a
Figure 3.12-1-Barge Impact Forces width of35 ft.

!::t. .m.mnmmnm............ .~
~
f 154 ft

I. 250Aft ~

B-·-·-·-·-·-·-·~·jEHI
Figure C3.12-1-Dimensions of European Barge Type lIa
(Mcil"-Dombel'g, 1983)

21000

""' ,~

';00
15000

,,~

>i:
"-
Q"
15(03
moo
I~"
''''
1000
woo

;00 wo,

10 12

8 S (feel)

Figure C3.12-2-Bal'ge Impact Force (PBJ and Deformation

Energy (EB) Versus Damage Length (aB) for European
B.rges Types II and II. (l\'leir-Dornberg, 1983)
50 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COi\Il\IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

C3.12.1 Recent U.S. Barge Research

( (
Since the AASHTO Guide Specification's adoption
in 1991 and its use in analysis and design of bridges for
vessel collision in the past 15 years, the Specification has
spurred a variety of research projects to better understand
the mechanics associated with barge collisions on
bridges located on the inland waterway system. Of
particular note is recent research conducted by FDOT
(Bollmann) and the University of Florida (Consolazio,
Cook, Hoit, and McVay, 2006); and recent research
conducted by the KYDOT and the University of
Kentucky (Harik, Yuan and Davidson, 2005). The
research by these institutions reflect the need for the
development of dynamic analysis programs and
procedures to estimate barge impact forces, rather than
the use of quasi-static forces as currently included in the
LRFD and Guide Specifications for collision forces.
A key research program recently completed by
FDOT and the University of Florida (UF) involved the
use of full-scale barge impact testing on several bridge
piers of the st. George Island Bridge across Florida's
Apalachicola Bay. The existing bridge was being
replaced by a new bridge, so two of the abandoned
bridge piers (a channel pier with a relatively massive
mudline foundation, and an approach pier with two
waterline footings) were studied in three different
structural configurations in a full-scale test program
which included ramming a small 600-ton barge against ( (
the piers at various speeds (some with the supel~tl1lcture
in-place and others with the superstructure removed) and
measuring a wide variety of responses in the stnlCture
and soil using extensive measurement and recording
systems. The final UF repOlt entitled Barge Impact
Testing of the St. George Island Causeway Bridge
(March 2006) is a valuable addition to the understanding
of barge impact behavior. Following the test program,
UF and FDOT have developed a bridge analysis software
program (FB-MultiPier) that is cOlll1nercially available
and can perform a dynamic analysis of barge impacts in a
matter of minutes. Other commercially available
stmctural analysis programs have also been lIsed in the
bridge design industlY to model the dynamic behavior of
bridges under vessel collision impacts.
Based on the UF test data from the St. George
Bridge pmgram, several general observations can be
made in comparing the measured barge impact forces
with those predicted by the AASHTO equations. For
relatively stiff piers with pedestal type substructures
exteuding from underwater pile-supported footings
buried under the mudline, the measured impact forces
ranged from 50 percent to 100 percent of the AASHTO
force (with most measurements near the 50 percent
level). For relatively flexible piel~ with the footings at or
above the waterline and supported by piling extending I (
through the water column into the soil below, the
measured impact forces ranged from 100 to 130 percent
of the AASHTO forces (with most measurements near
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 51

the 130 percent level). The test results indicate that the
(
dynamic response of the structure and the stiffness of the
underlying soil are key components in the development
ofthe barge impact force transmitted to the pier.
The UF barge test data also indicated that the
differences in load effects (e.g., displacements, shears,
moments, etc.) that arise from application of AASHTO
static loads versus the dynamic loads of the test data
were, in some cases, even more pronounced than the
differences in load magnitUdes. The differences
identified in the UF research were attributed to dynamic
effects. Some of the effects relate to increased levels of
response due to the inetiia (or momentum) of the
structure once it has been accelerated, while others
involve short-term restraint of displacements that are
associated with inertia resistance (e.g., of the bridge
superstl1lcture). Interestingly, the study indicated that
even though there were differences in the measured
forces versus AASHTO, that static analysis performed
using the AASHTO loads appear to yield foundation
design forces that are consistent with results obtained by
more refined analysis teclmiques (e.g., dynamic analysis
combined with experimentally measured dynamic loads).

C3.12.2 AASHTO Comparison with Eurocode

A comparison of typical barge impact forces (taken

from Table C3 in the Enrocode) with similar impact
forces from AASHTO are shown in Table CI below. The
AASHTO forces in this table are based on a 35 x 195 ft
barge at a speed of6 knots. The Eurocode barge forces in
Table CI are based on different sized barges and
displacement tonnages than the United States, and the
impact speed associated with the forces are not clearly
stated (though a footnote in the Enrocode indicates that
the impact speed should be approximately 5.8 knots plus
the speed of any current).
52 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Table C3.12.2-1-Compal'ison of Barge Impact Forces

Eurocode AASHTO

Barge Tow Displacement Impact Impact

Description Tonnage Force Force
(tOllS) (kips) (kips)
Class Vb- 3,000 - 6,000 2,250 1,850
Tow+2
Barges (2 xl)
Class VIa- 3,000 - 6,000 2,250 2,270
Tow+2
Barges (I x 2)
Class VIb- 6,000 - 3,150 2,270
Tow+4 12,000
Barges (2 x 2)
Class VIe- 10,000 - 3,825 2,685
Tow+6 18,000
Barges (2 x 'll
Class VII- 14,000 - 4,500 2,685
Tow+9 27,000
Barges (3 x 3)

In AASHTO, the displacement tonnage for a single

35 x 195 ft barge is approximately 1,900 tons, therefore
two barges would be 3,800 tons, and three barges would
be 5,700 tons. The AASHTO code only counts the
number of barges in the length of the tow (the barges in ((
the width of the tow are assumed to break away quickly
upon impact and are not included in the kinetic energy
and force computations). A comparison of the Eurocode
barge impact forces and the AASHTO barge impact
forces are in general agreement based all forces
computed using the displacement tonnage, however the
Eurocode forces are higher for the Imger tow sizes-
probably because the barges in the width of the tow are
included in the Eurocode force computation.
A significant difference between the Eurocode and
the AASHTO code is that the Eurocode recommcnds that
the quasi-static impact forces shown in Table CI (which
include the dynamic effects of the colliding barge, but
not in the stmcture) be increased by multiplying by an
appropriate dynamic amplification factor. The Eurocode
recommends a dynamic amplification factor of 1.3 for
frontal (head-on) impacts and 1.7 for lateral impacts. The
reconnnended Eurocode lateral impact forces for barge
collision are based on a value equal to approximately 50
percent of the head-on impact force (similar to
AASHTO).

3.13 BARGE BOW DAMAGE DEPTH C3.13

The barge bow damage depth shall be computed as: The relationship for barge damage depth, aB, was

aB
KE )112 ]
~ [ ( 1+ 5672 -I
(10.2)
RB (3.13-1)
developed from the same research conducted on barge
collisions by Meir-Dornberg as discussed in Aliicle I \
C3.12 above. From the test data, Meir-Dornberg devel-
oped the following equation for barge deformation, aB,
 SECTION 3~GENERAL PROVISIONS 53

where: and impact defonnation energy, EB, using metric units of

meters (m) and meganewton-meters (MN-m):
an = barge bow damage depth (ft),

KE = barge collision energy (kip-ft), and (C3.13-la)

ratio of BB where BE = barge width (ft). Converting this equation to U.S. customary units and
35 substituting the kinetic impact energy, KE, for the
deformation energy yields:

KE
aB = [(1+ 5672 )"2 -I] 10.2 (C3.l3-lb)

where as is in ft, andKE is in units of kip-ft.

3.14 IMPACT LOAD COMBINATION C3.14

The vessel impact loading for each bridge The vessel collision impact forces are combined
component shall be computed as: with those fi'om other loads and the group loading
combination is the sarne format as that used in the
Extreme Event II = current AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications
rp (D+EH +EV)+0.5LL+ (2007).
(3.14-1) The intent of the Guide Specification vessel impact
1.0TVA+l.OFR+I.OCV design loadings is to prevent superstructure collapse with
its resulting potential loss of life arId disruption of
where:
motorist traffic. Under the group loading ofEq. I, partial
yp load factor, 1.25 max., 0.9 min., or local failure of bridge elements may occur provided
that sufficient redundancy exists in the limit state of the
D dead load, remaining stmcture to safely support the superstructure
in service for such a time that appropriate repairs are
CV = vessel collision impact force, completed.
The factors shall be selected to produce the total
LL = live load, extreme factored force effect. For the load combination,
both positive and negative extremes shall be investigated.
EH = horizontal earth pressure, Where one force effect decreases another effect, the
minimum value shall be applied to tile load reducing the
EV = vertical eat1h pressure, force effect.
Where a load increases the stability or load-canying
FR = friction, and
capacity of a component or bridge, the minimum value of
the load factor for that load shall also be investigated.
TVA = water load and stream pressure (includes
For example, a load combination where there is no LL on
buoyancy).
the bridge may produce a more extreme effect on a
substructure element then if O.5LL lVere included. In such
Each component of the stmcture shall be designed to
cases, no LL should be used in the evaluation of the
withstand the forces resulting from each load combina-
stmctural member. Typically, the Owner or Designer
tion according to the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
may determine that not all of the loads in a given
Specifications (2007), current edition adopted by
combination apply to the situation under investigation.
AASHTO. In addition, the stmcture shall be designed for
the extreme event limit state given by Eq. 1 and the
requirements of this Guide Specification.
Under the application of the limit state in Eq. I, the
piers, substructures, and connections to the
superstmcture shall be propOliioned to prevent the
collapse of the superstnlChlre using material resistance
factors and other requirements in AASHTO (2007).
Damage or local collapse of substructure and
superstructure elements is permitted to occur provided
that: I) sufficient redundancy of the remaining structure,
54 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO;\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

or multi-load paths, exist in the ultimate limit state to

safely prevent superstmcture collapse; 2) the design ! (
vessel has been completely stopped or redirected so that
110 significant damage to the superstlUcture will result;
and 3) the structure element can be visually inspected
and repaired in a relatively straightfonvard manner.
As an alternative, pier protection may be provided
for the bridge structure to eliminate or reduce the
extreme event limit state effects in Eq. I to acceptable
levels.

3.15 LOCATION OF IMPACT FORCES C3.1S

Applying the vessel impact forces to the structure

based on the stmcture geomelty and the geomelty of the
ship or barge is an important consideration of the Guide
Specification requirements.

3.15.1 Substructure Design C3.1S.1

For subst11lcture design, the design impact force
shall be applied as an equivalent static force to the
impacted nose of the substructure in a direction parallel
to the alignment of the centerline of the navigable
channel. Fifty percent of the design impact force shall be
applied to the side of the substructure in a direction 90
degrees to the centerline of the navigable channel. These
substructure impact forces shall not be taken to act
simultaneously.
All portions of the bridge pier or substmcture
exposed to physical contact by any portion of the design
vessel's hull or bolY, shall be proportioned to resist the
applied loads in accordance with these Guide
Specifications. The bow overhang, rake, or flair distance,
of ship and barge vessels shall be considered in
determining the portions of the pier and substructure
exposed to contact by the vessel. Unless determined
othenvise by a detailed investigation of the actual vessel
traffic using the waterway, the typical data in Article 3.5
shall be used to determine the bow overhang distances.
Crushing of the vessel's bow causing contact with any
setback portion of the pier or substmcture shall also be
considered.
The design impact force shall be applied to the pier
in accordance with the following criteria:
Two cases must be evaluated in designing the bridge
substructure for vessel impact loadings: 1) the overall
stability ofthe substructure and foundation assuming that
the vessel impact acts as a concentrated force at the
waterline, and 2) the ability of each member of the
substructure to withstand any local collision force associ-
ated with a vessel impact.
The need to apply local collision forces on bridge
piers and substnlCture exposed to contact by overhanging ( (
portions of a ship or barge's bow is well documented by
accident case histories. The Sunshine Skyway Bridge
(which collapsed in 1980 due to a ramming by a
ballasted 35,000 DWT bulk carrier) collapsed as a result
of the ship's bow impacting a pier cohuml at a point 42 ft
above the waterline as shown in Figure C1. Ship and
barge bow rake lengths (overhangs) are often large
enough that they can even extend over protective fender
systems and contact vulnerable bridge elements as shown
in Figures C2 and C3. Bow shapes and dimensions Vaty
widely and the designer may need to perform special
studies to establish vessel bow geometlY for a particular
waterway location. Typical bow geomelLy data is
provided in Al1icle 3.5.

1. The design impact force shall be applied as a

concentrated force on the substructure at the mean
high water level of the waterway to design the
substructure for overall stability as shown in
Figure 1.
2. The design impact force shall be applied as a vertical
line load equally distributed along the ship's bow
depth to design the pier and substructure for local
collision forces as shown in Figure 2. The ship's (
bolY shall be considered to be raked forward when
determining the potential contact area of the impact
force 011 the pier or substructure. For barge impact,
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 55

the local collision force shall be taken as a vertical

( line load equally distributed on the depth of the head
block as shown in Figure 3.

~ A
1 1
,--

/~S
/

"'
/
r MHW

'--LoadedIBallasted Draft
, h\V ~'" ,"'-::IIl\\\~ , .,
Figure 3.15.1-1--Ship Impact Concentrated Force on Pier
(for Foundation Design and Overall Stability) + 1.10

Pedestal

Figure C3.15.1-1-Collapse of Picr 2S of the Sunshine

Skyway Bridge Subsequent to Impact by the Bow Overhang
of the l\f/V Summit Vcnture
LoadedlBaliasted Draft

Figure 3.15.1-2-Sl1ip Impact Line Load for Local Collision I---- Centerline
'I Bridge
Force on Pier (for Stnlcture Check and Design) Ship Bow
Overhang

' - 1 Pier! J--y [

Fender =.1 I~ ~I-~~~-~- /

I Centerline 1 \ -~1~----~-,
-.l_~~nnel _ _ _ _J~,~~I- ----~-~
,
1
Fender:;, I

~ 1 Pier: ~
Loaded/Empty Draft Figure C3.15.1-2-Plan of Ship Bow Overhang Impacting
Pier Behind Fender
Figure 3.15.1-3-Barge Impact Line Load for Local
Collision Forcc on Pier (for Structure Check and Design)
56 GUIDE SP~CIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISlON DESIGN OF HIGIlWAy BRIDGES
3.15.2 Superstructure Design
For superstructure design, the design impact force
shall be applied as an equivalent static force transverse to
the superstructure member in a direction parallel to the
alignment of the centerline ofthe navigable channel.
3.16 MINIMUM IMPACT REQUIREMENT
All bridge elements in a navigable waterway
crossing located in design water depths (Ariicle 4.2.2)
equal to or greater than 2.0 ft for which these
specifications are applicable (Article 3.2), shall be
designed for vessel impact. The minimum design impact
force for pier design shall be computed using an empty
hopper barge drifting at a speed equal to the yearly mean
CUlTent for the waterway location. The empty hopper
barge characteristics shall represent the typical barge size
using the waterway. A single 35 x 195 foot barge with an
empty displacement of 200 tons would be typical for
most waterways. The drifting barge impact force shall be
applied to the bridge according to Article 3.15, or as a
broadside collision force as shown in Figure I. The
minimum design impact force for superstructure design
in deep draft waterways, shall be the ship mast impact
force in Article 3. 11.3.
Figure 3.16-1-Bl'oadsidc Barge Impact on Pier
=1
+ Barge
-----
~~'
Ferluer.-----o.
:00
Pier
'//" ,,,,v / .. '/
Figure C3.1S.1-3-Elcvation of Barge Overhang Impacting
Pier Behind Fender
C3.1S.2
The ability of various portions of a ship 01' barge to
impact a span or superstructure element depends on the
available vertical clearance under the stmcture, the water
depth, vessel type and characteristics, and the loading
condition of the vessel. Article 3.5 contains typical vessel
characteristics and clearance data, and Articles 3.11 and
3.12 present the span collision forces associated with the
bow, deckhouse, and mast portions of ship and barge
vessels.
C3.16
A l111l111llUlll impact requirement from an empty
barge drifting in all waterways and the mast impact of a
drifting ship in deep draft waterways was established for
bridges crossing navigable waterways because of the
high frequency of occurrences of such collision accidents
in U.S. waterways. Due to impact from a drifting dredge
vessel broken loose during a storm, the 1990 collapse of
an approach portion of the Bonner Bridge across Oregon
Inlet, North Carolina, exemplifies the need for
establishing minimum impact criteria.
(
 SECTION 3~GENERAL PROVISIONS 57

3.17 BRIDGE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

(
Bridge protection systems may be provided to
reduce or eliminate the exposure of bridge components
to vessel collision. Bridge protection system design shall
be in accordance with the requirements of Section 7.
58 GUiDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO;\IMENTARYFOR VESSEL COLLISIONDJ<:SIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

REFERENCES

AASHTO. 1989. Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, 14th Edition. American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials Washington, DC.

AASHTO. 1991. Guide Specification and COlllll1entGlY for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges. American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

AASHTO. 1994. LRFD Bridge Design Specifications and COl1ll1lelltOlY. American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, Washington DC.

AASHTO. 2007. LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, 4th Edition. American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

Consolazio, G. R, R. A. Cook, A. E. Biggs, and D. R. Cowan. "Barge Impact Testing of the st. George Island
Causeway Bridge--Phase II: Design ofInstrumentation Systems." Stmcturcs Research Report No. 883, Engineering
and Industrial Experiment Station, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, April 2003.

Consolazio, G. R., R. A. Cook, and M. C. McVay. "Barge Impact Testing of the st. George Island Causeway
Bridge--Phase III; Physical Testing and Data Interpretation." Structures Research Report No. 2006/26868,
Engineering and Industrial Experiment Station, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, March 2006.

Consolazio, G. R. and D. R Cowan. 2003. "Nonlinear Analysis of Barge Crush Behavior and its Relationship to
Impact Resistant Bridge Design." Computers and Structures, Vol. 81, Nos. 8-11, Gainesville, FL, Pl'. 547-557.

Consolazio, G. R., G. B. Lelrr, and M. C. McVay. 2004. "Dynamic Finite Element Analysis of Vessel-Piel~Soil
Interaction During Barge Impact Events." In Transportation Research Record 1849, Journal of the Transportation
Research Board, Washington, DC, 1'1'.81-90.

Consolazio, G. R., J. L. Hendrix, M. C. McVay, M. E. Williams, and H. T. Bollman. 2004. "Prediction of Pier ((
Response to Barge Impacts Using Design-Oriented Dynamic Finite Element Analysis." Transportation Research
Record 1868. TranspOltation Research Board, Washington, DC, 1'1'.177-189.

Consolazio, G. R. and D. R Cowan. 2005. "Numerically Efficient Dynamic Analysis of Barge Collisions with
Bridge Piers." ASCE Joumal of Structural Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 131, No.8, New York, NY, Pl'. 1256-1266.

Cowiconsult, Inc. September 198\. "Sunshine Skyway Bridge Ship Collision Risk Assessment." Report prepared for
Figg and Muller Engineers, Inc., Tallahassee, FL.

Davidson, M. T. Simplified Dynamic Barge Collision Analysis for Bridge Pier Design. M.S. Thesis, Department of
Civil and Coastal Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, August 2007.

Florida Bridge Software Institute. 2002. FB-PIER User's Manual. University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

Florida Bridge Software Institute. 2007. FB-1'vIULTIPIER User's ]VIanlial. University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

FHWA. 1996. Conference Proceedings, The Design ofBridges for Extrellle Events. Federal Highway Administration,
Atlanta, Georgia.

Frandsen, A. G. and H. Langso. Febmary 1980. "Ship Collision Problems, Great Belt Bridge, International Enquiry."
IABSE Proceedings, Copenhagen, Denmark, Pl'. 31-80.

HNTB. December 1980. "Sunshine Skyway Bridge-Report onlnspectiol1 and Evaluation of the Four Main Piers."
Prepared by Howard, Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff, Inc. for the Florida Department of TranspOliation,
Tallahassee, FL.

Hupp, R. C. 1977. "Transportation Facilities on the Inland Waterways." Proceedings ji'OI11 the 2nd International
Waterbol'l1e Transportation COIiference, ASCE Urban Transportation Division, New York, NY, Pl'. 490-505. ((
 SECTION 3-GENERAL PROVISIONS 59

International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering.1993. Ship Collision with Bridges-The Interaction
( beMeen Vessel Traffic and Bridge Structures. IABSE Structural Engineering Document No.4.

IABSE 1983. IASBE ColloquiulII on Ship Collision with Bridges and OJfthore Structures. 3 Volumes (Introductory,
Preliminary, and Final Reports). Larsen, O.D. ed. 1993. International Association for Bridge and Stmctural
Engineering, Copenhagen, Denmark. -

McVay, M. C., S. J.Wasman, and P. J. Bullock. 2005. "St. George Geotechnical Investigation of Vessel Pier
Impact." Engineering and Industrial Experiment Station, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL.

Meier-D6rnberg, K. E. 1983. Schiffskollisionen, Sicherheitszonen und Lastannahmen rue die Bauwerke der
BinnenwasserstraBen (Ship Collisions, Safety Zones, and Loading Assumptions for Structures on Inland Waterways).
VDI-Berichte No. 496 (in German), DUsseldorf, Germany, pp 1-9.

Modjeski and Masters Consulting Engineers. July 1985. "Criteria for the Design of Bridge Piers with Respect to
Vessel Collision in Louisiana Waterways." The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development and the
Federal Highway Administration, New Orleans, LA.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. "Tide Tables; Tidal Current Tables; Tidal CUlTent Charts; U.S.
Coast Pilots; Distance Tables and Nautical Charts." National Ocean Service, Rockville, MD.

Nowak, A. and M. Knott. 1996. Extreme Load Events and Their Combinations. FHWA COIiference Proceedings, the
Design ofBridges for Extreme Events, Atlanta, Georgia.

Pedersen, P. T. 1993. "Ship Impacts: Bow Collisions." COIiference Proceedings ji'Olll the Third intel'llational
Symposium on Structural Cras/nvorthiness and Failure, University of Liverpool, UK.

Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses. 1984. Report of the intemational Commission for
Improving the Design ofFender Systems. Brussels, Belgium.

Pmcz, Z. and W. B. Conway. 1990. Ship Collision with Bridge Piers-Dynamic Effects. TranspOliation Research
Board Paper No. 890712. Transportaion Research Board 69th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.

Saul, R. and H. Svensson. February, 1980. IABSE Proceedings on the TheOlY of Ship Collision against Bridge Piers,
Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 51-82.

Scott, R. 1985. Standard Ship Designs, Bulk Carriers and Tankers. Fairplay Publications Ltd., London.

Scott, R. 1984. Standard Ship Designs, DI)' Cmgo, Container and Ro--Ro Vessels. Fairplay Publications Ltd.,
London.

Svensson, H. November 2006. Protection of Bridge Piers Against Ship Collision. Presented at the International
Conference on Bridge Engineering Challenges in the 21" Centmy, The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Civil
Division, Hong Kong.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Waterborne Commerce of the United States (WCUS). Parts 1-5, Water Resources
Support Center (WRSC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Waterborne Transportation Lines of the United States. Water Resources Support
Center (WRSC), FOlt Belvoir, VA.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Lock Peljormance Monitoring (LPlYl) Reports. Water Resources SliPPOli Center
(WRSC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

U.S. Coast Guard. May 2003. USCG-AWO Safety Partnership. Report of the U.S. Coast Guard-American
Waterways Operators Bridge Alison Work Group, Washington, DC.

Woisin, G. 1976. The Collision Tests of the GKSS, Volume 70. Jahrbuch del' Schiffbautechnischen Gesellschaft,
Berlin, Germany, pp. 465-487.
60 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS Al\'D COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Woisin, G. and W. Gerlach, 1970. On the Estimation a/Forces Developed ill Collisiolls Between Ships and Offthore
Lighthouses. IALA Conference, Stockholm, Sweden.

Woisin, G. 1971. Ship-Structural Investigation/or the Safety a/Nuclear Powered Trading Vessels, Vol. 65. Jahrbuch
der Schiffbautechnischen Gesellschaft, Berlin, Gennany, pp. 225-263. .

Yuan, P. 2005. Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Multi-Barge Flotillas Impacting Bridge Piers. Ph.D.
Dissertation, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, May 2005.

Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. 1980. Yokohama Pneumatic Rubber Fenders, Catalog No. CN031S-02E. Tokyo, Japan.

((

! \
 8ECTION4

DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION

(
4.1 GENERAL C4.1

The requirements of this Section shall control the
design vessel selection for collision impact analysis of
bridges in navigable watenvays.
Three alternative design methods, designated as
Methods I, II, and III, are presented in Section 4 to
provide the designer flexibility in determining the design
vessel for ship/barge collision. Method II shall be used
for all bridge design unless the special situations
presented in Article 4.1.2 of the Guide Specifications
exist.

4.1.1 Design Method

Three alternative design methods are presented in

this Section to determine the design vessel for collision
impact analysis of the bridge. Method II and its corre-
sponding acceptance criteria in Article 4.8.2 shall be
used for all bridge design unless the approval of the
Owner and the special situations stated in Article 4.1.2
exist.

4.1.2 Selection of Design Method

4.1.2.1 Method I

Method I is a simple semi-deterministic procedure

for selecting the design vessel for collision impact. The
procedure is calibrated to nornmlly fulfill the Method II
acceptance criteria in Article 4.8.2. However, the
procedure is less accurate than Method II and should be
used only in simple and uncomplicated situations.
Situations in which Method I may be used include:

• Shallow draft waterways where the marine traffic

consists almost exclusively of inland barges;
• Waterways where the distribution of vessel sizes
(DW1) using the channel is small (i.e., the vessels in
the waterway are almost all the same size); and
• Watenvays in which accurate vessel traffic data is
unavailable or difficult to obtain.
Situations in which Method I should not generally
be used include:

• CriticallEssential Bridges,
• Deep draft watelways where large merchant ships
comprise a significant portion of the total vessel
traffic, and
• Watenvays where the distribution of vessel sizes
(D 11'1) valY over a wide range of vessel types and
sizes.

61
62 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\Ii\1ENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESlGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

4.1.2.2 Method II

Method II is a more complicated probability-based

( (
analysis procedure for selecting the design vessel for
collision impact.
This method must be used in all situations where a
proper documentation of ftrlfilIment of the acceptance
criteria in Article 4.8.2 is required.

4.1.2.3 MethOli III

Method III is a cost-effectiveness analysis procedure

for selecting the design vessel for collision impact.
This method may be used in cases where it is not
economical or technicalIy feasible to design the bridge
shucture to comply with the acceptance criteria in
Article 4.8.2.
A prerequisite for using Method Jll is that the annual
frequency of bridge collapse is computed ill accordance
with Method II and brought to the attention of the
Owner.
Situations ill which Method III may be considered
include:

• Existing bridges which are evaluated for vulnerabili-

ty to vessel collision and potential bridge protection
retrofit measures; or
• Bridges crossing very \vide waterways resulting in
many piers exposed to vessel collision.
((

4.2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS C4.2

The typical vessel transit path in the waterway

where a bridge crossing occurs must be determined by
the designer. The approximate track of the vessels can be
estimated based 011 actual observations of vessels using
the waterway, discussions with the pilots and vessel
operators using the waterway, or estimated based on
experience. The location of the centerline of the vessel
transit path is very important since it serves as the origin
for the distribution of vessel impact speed (Aliicle 3.7),
impact distribution (Atiicle 4.5), and the geometric
probability (Article 4.8.3.3).
The water depth should be measured from the
existing mudline to mean high water. It is recognized that
this represents an approximation of the actual maximum
water depth at a bridge pier. River flooding and periods
of extreme high-water levels due to tropical and extra-
tropical storms may cause water depths to significantly
exceed that computed using "mean" high-water levels.
Using mean high-water rather than extreme high water is
recommended because of the use of annual averages with
respect to the statistics on vessel frequency and accident
data in developing the basic framework of these Guide I (
Specifications. In those situations in which seasonal
flooding or storms represent a significant portion of the
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 63

yearly high-water activity, judgment must be used to

establish the design water level.
Design values for water CUlTents at the bridge
location should be selected based on the same philosophy
discussed above for establishing design water levels. The
design water currents should represent atmual average
values rather than the occasional extreme values which
could occur under special circumstances.
In those sitnations in which seasonal flooding or
storms represent a significant portion of the yearly water
current activity, judgment must be used to establish the
design current values. For most waterways, the 2 percent
flow line elevation is usually available from statistical
data and represents the elevation at which the water can
be expected to be at or higher 2 percent of the time.

4.2.1 Channel Layout

The geometlY of the navigable channel that the

bridge crosses shall be established for the waterway
including the centerline of the navigable channel. The
possibility of future modifications to the channel
(deepening, widening, realignment, etc.) should be
considered. The centerline of the typical vessel transit
path under the bridge shall be determined. One of the
following two situations usually exists:

I. For bridge and channel geometry where vessels can

( only transit one-at-a-time under the bridge, or for
those bridge locations where vessels are prohibited
fi'om meeting or passing in the vicinity ofthe bridge,
or for bridges located where vessels would rarely
meet or pass in the vicinity of the bridge, the
centerline of vessel transit path shall be taken as the
centerline of the navigable channel as shown in
Figure I.
2. For most other bridges, the navigable channel shall
be divided into two equal halves representing in-
bound and outbound traffic, respectively. The vessel
transit path of inbound vessels shall be taken as the
centerline ofthe inbound half of the channel, and the
vessel transit path of outbound vessels as the center-
line of the outbound half of the channel as shown in
Figure 2.
The vessel transit path shall be determined by the
designer for any special channel or vessel operating
situations not covered by Items I and 2 above.
64 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO;\ll\IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

c
C/2

LChanne' & Vessel Trans1t Centerline

,, '(Inbound & Outbound)
,
! i !

---it----~+---~--~~---~--
I I.
, , I
I , I Bridge Pier (Typ.)
I I
I
!
J, !
Ve ssel
1
I ' ,
I , I
I I

Figure 4.2.1-1-Single Transit Path in Channel through

Bridge

I Cl4

I
Cf4
c
Cf4 Cf4

LChanne' Centerline
I
I ! ! ! i
! I I L'n~und Vessel CenterlIne
iI---~--+-
Outbound Vessel
:--f-~:+-m---&-
Centerll~e ! ! ! j ~
___ Bridge Pier (Typ.)

i I I I
!
Vessel (Typ,)

Figure 4.2.1-2-Passing Vessel Transit Paths in Channel

through Bridge

4.2.2 Water Depths

The design water depth for each pier and span ele-
ment in the waterway shall be determined. As a mini-
mum, the design water depth shall be computed from the
bottom of the waterway to the annual mean high water
level.
In waterways where seasonal flooding represents a
significant portion of the high-water activity, judgment
must be used to establish the design water level.
The ability of a vessel to strike a pier or span shall
be determined based on the design water depth at the
location of the bridge element, and the draft of the
vessel.
The water depth at the pier should not include shOlt-
term scour. In addition, the water depth should not just
be evaluated at the specific pier location itself, but also at
locations upstream and downstream of the pier-which
may be shallower and would potentially block certain
deeper draft vessels from hitting the pier.

4.2.3 Water Currents

Water currents at the bridge location shall be re-

solved into currents in the direction of vessel movement I(
and crosscurrents that act perpendicular to the direction
of vessel movement.
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 65

4.3 BRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS

(
The alignment and location of the bridge in the
waterway shan be determined. The bridge pier and span
geometry, including the horizontal and vertical clear-
ances of each pier and span member, shan be established.

4.4 VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS

Vessel types, sizes (in DWl), loading condition

(loaded, partly loaded, or banasted), speed, and number
of annual passages for each type shan be determined for
the waterway and bridge location. Inbound and outbound
vessel characteristics shan be determined.
Barge and ship characteristics shan be based on the
actual vessels using the waterway, or estimated from the
data provided in Article 3.5.1 for barges and Article 3.5.2
for ships.
Vessel characteristics and the design vessel selection
shan include consideration of the possibility of a growth
in vessel frequency, distribution, and size over the design
life of the bridge as a result of channel improvements in
the waterway, or an increase in commerce on the water-
way.

4.5 IMPACT DISTRIBUTION C4.5

The impact loads from the design vessel determined
( in accordance with Method I, II, or III shan be applied to
the bridge structure for a distance of three times the
length overan of the vessel (3 x LOA) on each side of the
centerline of the inbound and outbound vessel transit
paths in the navigable channel.
Portions of the bridge structure located outside of
the 3 x LOA distance on each side of the vessel transit
path shan be designed in accordance with the minimum
impact loads in Article 3.16.
The LOA shan be based on the dimensions of a
vessel selected in accordance with the Method I criteria
in Atticle 4.7.2. The LOA for impact distribution is the
same dimension used in Article 3.7 for vessel impact
speed and is a constant for Methods I, II, and III. For
barge tows, LOA shan be equal to the combined length of
an barges in the tow plus the length of the tug/tow vessel
as shown in Figure 3.5.1-2.
Based on historical accident data, the primary area
of concern for vessel collision with a bridge structure is
within the central area near the navigable channel. This
central area is defined as an area within a distance
3 x LOA on each side of the inbound and outbound
vessel transit paths in the chaImel as discussed in Article
C4.8.3.3. Beyond the central area, bridge elements
should meet the minimum impact requirements of Article
3.16. Within the central area, a design speed in
accordance with Article 3.7, and a design vessel in
accordance with Method I, II, or III, must be determined
in order to establish vessel impact design forces for the
bridge.

4.6 DESIGN LOADS

The impact force and energy for the selected design

vessel using Method I, II, or III, shan be determined in
accordance with Section 3.

(,
66 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
4.7 METHOD I
4.7.1 General
Method I is a semi-deterministic analysis procedure
for determining the design vessel. Method I requires a
minimum amount of input data for the vessel and water-
way characteristics.
4.7.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria
The design vessels shall be selected based on the
bridge operational classification, vessel characteristics,
bridge geometlY, and water depths in accordance with
the following acceptance criteria:
• Critical/Essential Bridges. The design vessel size
shall be determined such that the annual number of
vessel passages that involve vessels larger than the
design vessel amounts to a maximum of 50 vessel
passages, or 5 percent of the total number of
merchant vessels per year which could impact the
bridge element, whichever is smaller.
• Typical Bridges. The design vessel size shall be
determined such that the annual number of vessel
passages that involve vessels larger than the design
vessel amounts to a maximum of 200 vessel passag-
es or (l0 percent of the total number of merchant
vessels per year which could impact the bridge ele-
ment, whichever is smaller.
4.8 METHOD II
4.8.1 General
Method II is a probability-based analysis procedure
for determining the design vessel. Method II requires a
significant amount of input data for the vessel, bridge,
and watenvay characteristics. An idealized mathematical
model describing the bridge and the vessel traffic transit-
ing through the bridge is used to estimate the probability
of bridge collapse and to determine the design vessel
impact forces for elements of the bridge structure.
C4.7
( (
C4.7.1
Method I is a semi-deterministic analysis procedure
for selecting the design vessel. The intent of Method [ is
to provide a simple, conservative procedure for
determining the design impact loads without having to
deal with the large data collection and analysis require-
ments of Methods II and Ill.
C4.7.2
The framework of the Method I acceptance criteria
was based on the ship impact criteria for bridge design
stated in the Common Nordic Regulations (1980)
currently in use in Scandinavian countries. The following
is quoted from these regulations (Nordic Road
Engineering Federation, 1980):
"For waters difficult to navigate the design vessel
size shall be determined such that the number of
ships that are larger than the design vessel amounts
to a maximum of 50 ships or 10 percent of the total
number of ships.
For waters easy to navigate the design vessel size
shall be determined such that the number of ships
that are larger than the design vessel amounts to a ((
maximum of 200 ships or 20 percent of the total
number of passing ships.
The design vessel size must not be taken less than
(0.05)Wo, where Wo is the deadweight tonnage of the
largest ship, using the sea lane."
The values quoted above for 50 ships and 200 ships
were used for the CriticallEssential and Typical bridge
operational classification categories, respectively. The
Guide Specification project consultants considered the 10
percent and 20 percent values to be too high in the
Nordic Code and lowered the values to 5 percent and 10
percent for the Critical/Essential and Typical operational
classification categories, respectively.
C4.8
C4.8.1
TIle use of any risk analysis method involves the
complex organization of a large body of data into a series
of computations based on statistical and probability
procedures. Values must be determined for a large
number of parameters, often with the designers' judg-
ment as the primmy basis of the estimate. Because of
this, the outcome of the analysis can be influenced by the ! ~
design engineer and its integrity depends on the design
engineer's experience and abilities.
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION
( The Method II procedure for selecting the design
4.8.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria
The design vessels shall be selected based on the
bridge operational classification, vessel, bridge, and
waterway characteristics in accordance with the follow-
ing acceptance criteria for the total bridge:
• Critical/Esselltial Bridges. The acceptable annual
frequency of collapse, AF, of critical/essential
bridges shall be equal to, or less than, 0.01 in 100
years (AF~ 0.0001).
• Typical Bridges. The acceptable annual frequency of
collapse, AF, of typical bridges shall be equal to, or
less than, 0.1 in 100 years (AF~ 0.001).
The acceptable annual fi"equency of bridge collapse
for the total bridge as determined above shall be
distributed over the number of pier and span elements
located within the waterway, or within the distance
3 x LOA on each side of the inbound and outbound
vessel transit paths if the waterway is wide. This results
in an acceptable risk criteria for each pier and span
element of the total bridge.
The design vessel for each pier or span element shall
be chosen such that the annual frequency of collapse due
to vessels equal to, or larger than, the design vessel is
less than the acceptance criterion for the element.
67
vessel is a probability-based, risk-analysis method.
Method II was developed to minimize the number of
judgment calls that the designer must make during the
analysis. In order to do this, various empirical relation-
ships based on experience and judgment were developed
for the Guide Specifications.
C4.8.2
Establishment of risk acceptance criteria for use in
Method II for vessel collision with bridges was one of
the most difficult elements of the Guide Specification
development. A comprehensive literature search and
consultation with risk analysis experts was conducted
during the Guide Specification development.
Risk can be defined as the potential realization of
unwanted consequences of an event (Rowe, 1983). Both
a probability of occurrence of an event and the
magnitude of its consequence are involved. Risk
estimation is the process used for controlling such risks
and arriving at an acceptable level of risk. Defining an
acceptable level of risk is a value oriented process, and is
by nature subjective (Rowe, 1977). Risk estimation
purports to be value free, but when rare events (such as
ship collisions) are treated, very large levels of
uncertainty exist and value judgments of engineers are
sometimes uscd in the absence of hard data. It must be
noted that the estimated risk cannot be fully equated with
actual risk because probability and consequence
estimates that make up a risk estimate may be inexact.
There are many approaches to evaluating risks to
determine acceptability (Philipson, 1983). The most
important of these can be grouped into two broad
categories: 1) risk comparison approaches, and 2) cost-
effectiveness of risk reductioll. Risk comparison was
used to establish the Method II acceptance criteria, and
cost-effectiveness of risk reduction to the Method III
acceptance criteria.
Figures Cl and C2 are typical of the type of risk
comparison data available in the literature for risks
associated with natural events and engineering projects.
One of the objectives of the Guide Specifications was to
establish a simple criterion defining a single level of risk
acceptance for superstructure collapse for each of the two
operational classification categories, which could be
easily understood and used by bridge designers.
Based on the data available concerning risk compari-
sons and their judgment, the Guide Specification project
consultants established an acceptance criterion of AF =
0.0001 per year for critical/essential bridges, and AF ~
0.001 per year for typical bridges for bridge collapse
associated with vessel collision.
The critical/essential bridge acceptance criterion,
AF~ 0.0001 per year, is the same criterion recommended
by Modjeski and Masters (1985) for vessel collision in
Louisiana waterways. This acceptance criterion has been
68 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

used for several recent long span bridges, including the

Annacis Island Bridge near Vancouver, Canada
(Sexsmith, 1983). As seen in Figure C2 which depicts
the risk of failure of selected engineering projects, all
AF= O.OOOI(i.e., I x 10-4) is equivalent to the risk of
failure of dams.
The typical bridge acceptance criterion, AF = 0.00 I
per year exceeds the risk of failure of foundations and is
equivalent to the risk of failure of fixed drill rig stmc-
tures as shown in Figure C2.
10

. f Talrnadoe;

1/10
~ ~ I-Total ttural
~,
~1-furrlcanes

11100 ? Earthquakes ~,~,~:-

111000

1/10,000

1/100,00 o~ I- Meteors

1/1,000,000 "<
ili0,OOO,OD 0
10 100 1000
~ 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Fatalities

Figure C4.8.2-1-Risk of Fatalities from Natural Events

(Whitman, 1984)

10

,~
:r15 ""
~
g u
.g
"e
m
~
0
n.

.,
n.

c
c
,
E
-0
'"
«

Lives Lost 10 100 1,000 10,000

Coslin$ 1M 10M 100M 1B 10 B

Consequence of Failure

Figure C4.8.2-2-Risk of Failure of Selected Engineering

Projects (Whitman, 1984)
I l
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION
( 4.8.3 Annu.l Frequency of Collapse
The atmual frequency of bridge element collapse
shall be computed by:
AF = (N)(PA)(PG)(PC)(PF) (4.8.3-1)
where:
AF = annual frequency of bridge element collapse due
to vessel collision;
N a111m.l number of vessels classified by type,
size, and loading condition which can strike the
bridge element;
PA = probability of vessel aberrancy;
PG = geometric probability of a collision between an
aberrant vessel and a bridge pier or span;
PC = probability of bridge collapse due to a collision
with an abenant vessel; and
PF = adjustment factor to account for potential
protection of the piers from vessel collision due
to upstream or down stream land masses, or
other stmctores, that block the vessel.
AF shall be computed for each bridge element and
vessel classification. The summation of all element AFs
equals the annual freqnency of collapse for the entire
bridge stmcture.
4.8.3.1 Vessel Frequency (N)
A vessel frequency distribution shall be determined
for the bridge site. The number of vessels, N, passing
under the bridge based on size, type, and loading
condition and available water depth shall be developed
for each pier and span element to be evaluated. De-
pending on waterway conditions, a differentiation
between the number and loading condition of vessels
transiting inbound and outbound may also be required.
The vessel frequency distribution for vessels should
be developed and modeled using D WT classification
intervals appropriate for the waterway vessel traffic.
Guidelines are provided in the Commentary.
69
C4.8.3
Various types of risk assessment models have been
developed for vessel collision with bridges by research-
ers worldwide (IABSE Colloquium). Practically all of
these are based on a similar form of Guide Specification
Eq. I, which is used to compute the annual frequency of
bridge collapse, AF, associated with a particular bridge
element. Summation of AF for each element in the bridge
results in the AF for the entire bridge as a whole. The
inverse of the AF (i.e., IIAF) is equal to the retom period
(in years).
C4.8.3.1
Sources for obtaining vessel frequency data are dis-
cussed in Article C3.4. In order to use Method II, a
determination of the number of vessels (NJ and their size
(DW1) must be made for each bridge element to be
evaluated. The number of vessels that could strike a pier
or span is based on the water depth and the draft of the
vessel. Ballasted as well as loaded vessels should be
inclnded in the analysis.
The designer must use jndgment in developing a
distribution of the vessel fi'equency data based on
discrete groupings or categories of vessel size by DWT. It
is recommended that the DWT intervals used in
developing the vessel distribution not exceed 20,000
DWT for vessels smaller than 100,000 DWT and not
exceed 50,000 DWT for ships larger than 100,000 DWT.
An example of vessel distribution is shown in Table Cl.
In developing the vessel distribution, the designer
shonld first establish the number and characteristics of
the vessels using the navigable waterway under the
bridge. Since the water depth limits the size of vessel that
70 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESlGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

could strike a bridge element, the main channel vessel

frequency data should be modified as required based on (
the water depth at each bridge element.

Table C4.8.3.1-1-Vessel Frequency Data for the Dame

Point Bridge, Jacksonville, Florida (1984 Fleet) (Greiner
Engineering Sciences, Inc., 1984)

Number of Annual
Transits (n)
Vessel Type DWT Loaded Ballasted
Barge (Ocean) 15,000 73 73
Barge (Ocean) 25,000 67 67
Barge (Ocean) 35,000 81 81
Barge (Ocean) 50,000 66 66
Freighter/Container 10,000 170 0
Freighter/Container 18,000 360 0
Freighter/Container 26,000 28 0
TankerlBulk CaITief 20,000 67 67
TankerIBulk Carrier 30,000 139 139
TankerlBulk CatTier 40,000 78 78
TankerlBulk CatTier 60,000 25 25

Note: Ocean-going barges and the tankerlbulk carriers transit

one-way loaded and one-way empty or ballasted.
Freighter/Container ships transit loaded in both
directions.

4.8.3.2 Probability of Aberrancy (PA) C4.8.3.2

The probability of aberrancy, PA, is a value related
to the statistical probability that a vessel will stray off-
course and threaten the bridge. Vessel aberrancy is
usually a result of pilot error, adverse environmental
conditions, or mechanical failure. Values of PA vary
widely.
The most accurate method of determining PA for a
particular bridge site is based on historical data on vessel
collisions, ramming, stranding and groundings in the
watelway, and the number of vessels transiting the
waterway during the period of accident reporting. From
this data, PA can be computed.
In lieu of the above method, PA can be estimated for
the bridge/waterway location by the following:
(4.8.3.2-1)
where:
PA probability of aberrancy,
BR aberrancy base rate,
RB correction factor for bridge location,
Rc correction factor for current acting parallel to
vessel transit path,
The probability of aberrancy, PA, (sometimes re-
ferred to as the causation probability) is a measure of the
risk that a vessel is in trouble as a result of a pilot error,
adverse environmental conditions, and/or mechanical
failure. Examples ofthese factors are listed below.
1. Human Errors:
0 inattentiveness on board the ship,
0 lack of reactivity (drunkenness, tiredness),
0 misunderstanding between captain/pilotlhelms-
man,
0 incorrect interpretation of chatt or notice to
mariners,
0 violations ofmIes of the road at sea, and
0 incorrect evaluation of current and wind condi-
tions, etc.
2. Adverse Envirollmental Conditions:
0 poor visibility (fog, rainstorm),
0 high density of ship traffic,
0 strong current or wave action,
0 wind squalls,

Rxc = conectioll factor for crosscurrents acting per- 0 poor navigation aids, and
pendicular to vessel transit path, and 0 awkward channel alignment, etc.
SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 71

conection factor for vessel traffic density. 3. Mechanical Faillires:

Based on historical accident data from several u.s. o mechanical failure of engine,
waterways, the base rate, BR, can be estimated as o mechanical or electrical failure of steering, and
follows:
BR ~ 0.6 x 10-4 o other failures due to poor equipment, etc.
For ships
For barges BR ~ 1.2 x 10-4 An evaluation of accident statistics indicates that
human errors and adverse environmental conditions are
The conection factor for bridge location, RB , can be the primary reasons for accidents rather than mechanical
estimated based on the relative location of the bridge in failures. In the United States, an estimated 60 percent to
either of three waterway regions shown in Figure las: 85 percent of all vessel accidents have been attributed to
human error.
1. Straight Region: For a bridge located in a straight
The most accurate procedure for determining PA is
region:
to compute it using long-term vessel accident data
(4.8.3.2-2a) (groundings, collisions, stranding, and ramming) in the
watelway, and statistics on the frequency of shiplbarge
2. Transition Region: For a bridge located in a transi- traffic in the waterway during the same period of time.
tion region, RB can be computed by: Table CI lists values of PA developed from accident data
for various waterway and bridge locations worldwide. As
indicated in Tablc CI, the aberrancy rate for barges is
(4.8.3.2-2b)
usually two to three times that measured for ships in the
same waterway.
where: Since the determination of PA based on actual
accident data in the waterway is often a difficult and
e ~ angle ofthe turn (degrees) time-consuming process, an alternative simpler method
for estimating PA is provided in the Guide
3. Turn/Bend Region: For a bridge located in a turn or Specifications. Eqs. 1 through 4 are empirical
bend region, RB can be computed by: relationships based on historical accident data. The
comparison between the predicted PA value using these
equations and the value determined from the accident
(4.8.3.2-2c) statistics in Table Cl is generally in fair agreement,
although exceptions do occur.
Note that the procedure for computing PA using
The correction factor, Rc, for currents acting parallel Eq. I should not be considered as being either rigorous
(i.e., along track) to the vessel transit path in the water- or exhaustive. Several influences, such as wind, visibility
way can be computed by: conditions, navigation aids, pilotage, etc., were not
directly included in the method because their effects
Rc ~(l+ VcJ
10 (4.8.3.2-3) were difficult to quantifY. Indirectly these influences are
included because the empirical equations were developed
from accident data in which these influences had a part.
where: It is anticipated that future research will provide a
better understanding of the probability of aberrancy and
Vc ~ current component parallel to vessel path (knots)
how to accurately estimate its value. An ongoing
The cOlTection factor, Rxc, for crosscurrents acting
(unpublished) study on vessel accident statistics for the
perpendicular to the vessel transit path in the watelway proposed Great Belt Bridge in Denmark questions the
use of grounding and ramming accident data to predict
can be computed by:
the probability of aberrancy associated with bridge
(4.8.3.2-4) collisions, and is trying to develop an alternate method of
estim.ating aberrancy values. Future research is also
needed to identifY methods of reducing the probability
where:
of aberrancy in a waterway in order to reduce the risk
Vxc ~ CUlTent component perpendicular to vessel path of collision with a bridge structure. The implementation
(knots) of advanced vessel traffic control systems using
automated surveillance and warning technology should
significantly reduce the probability of aberrancy in
navigable waterways.
72 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VF..sSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

The correction factor for vessel traffic density, R D , in

u
the waterway in the immediate vicinity of the bridge can
be estimated by determining whether the bridge is in
either a low, medium, or high density area as defined
below:
Low Density, RD ~ 1.0-vessels rarely meet, pass,
or oveliake each other in the immediate vicinity of the
bridge.
Average Density, RD ~ 1.3-vessels occasionally
meet, pass, or overtake each other in the immediate
vicinity ofthe bridge.
High Density, RD ~ 1.6-vessels routinely meet,
pass, or ovel1ake each other in the immediate vicinity of
the bridge.
Turn Reglon

Straight Region
Transition Region

a, Turn In Channel

Beru::l Reg]()n
((
3,000'

Transition Region

Transition Region

b. Bend in Channel

Figure 4.8.3.2~1-'Vaterway Regions for Bridge Location

I (
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 73

Table C4.8.3.2 l-8ulllmary of Probability of Abcrrancy, PA, Values

w

Probability ofYessel
Aberrancy
Locality Type of Data (x 10-4)
Dover Straits-Collisions (MacDuff, 1974) Statistics 5 to 7
Dover Straits-Groundings (MacDuff, 1974) Statistics 1.4 to 1.6
Japanese Straits-Groundings (Fujii et al., 1974) Statistics 0.7 to 6.7
Japanese Straits-Collisions (FlUii et aI., 1974) Statistics 1.3
Worldwide (Maunsell and Patiners, 1979) Statistics 0.5
Tasman Bridge, Australia (Leslie, 1979) Estimate 0.6 to 1.0
Great Belt Bridge, Denmark (Cowinconsult, 1978) Estimate 0.4
Sunshine Skyway Bridge, Florida (Greiner Engineering Sciences, 1985) Statistics 1.3 (Ships)
Statistics 2.0 (Barges)
Atmacis Island Bridge, Canada (CBA/Buckland and Taylor, 1982) Estimate 3.6
Francis Scott Key Bridge and William Preston Lane Bridges, Maryland Statistics 1.0 (Ships)
(Greiner Engineering Sciences, 1983) 2.0 (Barges)
Dames Point Bridge, Florida (Greiner Engineering Sciences, 1984) Statistics 1.3 (Ships)
4.1 (Barges)
Laviolette Bridge, Canada (Ol"einer Engineering Sciences, 1984) Statistics 0.5
Centennial Bridge, Canada (Greiner Engineering Sciences, 1986) Statistics 5.0
Louisiana \Vaterways (philipson, 1983) Statistics 0.8 to 1.9 (Ships)
1.5 to 3.0 (Barges)
Gibraltar Straits-Strandings, Morocco (Modjeski and Masters Consulting Statistics 2.2
Engineers, 1985)
Gibraltar Straits-Collision, Morocco (Modjeski and Masters Consulting Statistics 1.2
Engineers, 1985)

( 4.8.3.3 Geometric Probability (PG) C4.8.3.3

The geometric probability is defined as the
conditional probability that a vessel will hit a bridge pier
or span given that it has lost control (Le., it is aberrant) in
the vicinity of the bridge. Based on a review of historical
bridge collision data, a normal distribution shall be
utilized to model the aberrant vessel transit path near the
bridge as shown in Figure 1. The standard deviation, cr,
of the nonnal distribution shall be assumed equal to the
LOA of the vessels in the design fleet. The LOA dimen-
sion for the normal distribution is the same value used in
Article 3.7 for impact speed and Article 4.5 for impact
distribution.
The location of the mean of the standard distribution
shall be equal to the centerline of the vessel transit path
determined in accordance with Article 4.2.1. In the
computation of AF, the value of PO shall be computed
based on the width (beam), B u , of each vessel classifi-
cation categOlY, or it may be computed for all classifi-
cation intervals using the Bu of a vessel selected using
Method I as discussed above.
As shown in Figure I the value of PO for a pier
represents the area in the normal distribution bounded by
the pier width and the width of the vessel on each side of
the pier.
The geometric probability, PO, is defined as the
conditional probability that a vessel will hit a bridge pier
or span given that it has lost control (i.e., it is aberrant) in
the vicinity of the bridge. The probability of occnrrence
depends on a great number of factors such as:
• geometry of the watenvay;
• water depths ofthe waterway;
• location of bridge piers;
• span clearances;
• transit path ofthe vessel;
• maneuvering characteristics and size of vessel;
• location, heading, and velocity of vessel;
• rudder angle at time of failure;
• environmental conditions;
• width, length, and shape of vessel; and
• vessel draft (loaded or ballasted).
The methods used to determine PO varies signifi-
cantly among researchers. Models to compute PO as
developed by Fujii (Fujii and Shiobana, 1978; Fujii et
aI., 1984), MacDuff (1974), Cowiconsult (l987a and b),
74 GmDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Knott (1983; 1985), and Modjeski and Masters (1985)

Bridge r "eolerllr,e of Bridge Pier were evaluated during the Guide Specification I(
Bu= Width of Ship development. Their methods rauge in use from relatively
Bp = Width of Pier simple (Fujii) to complex (Cowiconsult). A combination
of the best features from each of these models was
developed into a relatively straightforward risk model for
the Guide Specifications.
The geometric probability, PG, is computed based
on a normal distribution of vessel accidents about the
centerline of the vessel transit path as shown in Figure I.
The use of a normal distribution is based on historical
Normal
Distribution ship, bridge accident data, although it must be recognized
that the number of data points in the data base are very
few from a statistical point of view. By definition 68.3
percent of all collisions occur within one standard devia-
tion (a) of the mean, 95.5 percent within two standard
I-----'~f-· i!'ler",.elk," Path to deviations (2a), and 99.7 percent within three standard
Centerline of Pier deviations (30') for a normal distribution. The Guide
Specifications recommend that 0' = LOA of the design
Figure 4.8.3.3 l-Geomctric Probability of Pier Collision
w
vessel for computing PG, and that bridge elements
beyond 3a from the centerline of the vessel transit path
of the largest vessels in the design fleet not be included
in the analysis (other than the minimum impact
requirement).
Table CI provides the accident data used to develop
the recommended value of 0' = LOA. The use of LOA as
the standard by which a is computed, was a
recommendation by the project consultants and is consid- I(
ered preferable to criteria based on channel width, or by
simply using a fixed distance for a, since the value of PG
is influenced by the size of the ships and barges passing
under the bridge.
The 1991 Gnide Specifications (Article 3.7 on
Design Impact Speed and Article 4.8.3.3 Geometric
Probability) required the use of a vessel length overall
(LOA) selected in accordance with the Method I criteria
for. use in estimating the impact speed and geometric
probability for all vessel classifications. This provision
has been revised in the new Guide Specifications to
allow for the LOA of each specific vessel category to be
used in determining the vessel speed distribution and
geometric probability associated with that specific vessel
category.
The accident data in Table Cl primarily represents
ship vessels. Although barge accidents occur relatively
frequently in U.S. waterways, there has been little
published research concerning the distribution of barge
accidents over a waterway_ Until such data and research
become available, the Guide Specification project
consultants recommend that the same a = LOA devel-
oped for ships be applied to barges with the barge LOA
equal to the total length of the barge tow, including the
towboat.

I \
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 75

Table C4.8.3.3-1-CoIllJlutation of Standard Deviation for

( Normal Distributlon ofHistol'ic Collisions with Bridges

I Bridge Name x !(x-xml I

Sidney Lanier 0.57 0.325
Tasman Bridge 1.47 2.161
Fraser River Bridge 0.31 0.096
Benjamin Harrison 0.69 0.476
Tingstad Bridge 0.33 0.109
Second Narrows RR 0.43 0.185
Second Narrows RR 0.66 0.436
Alma (Tjom) Bridge 0.89 0.792
Sunshine Skyway 1.31 1.716
Newport Bridge 1-.07 1.145
Sorsund Bridge 0.82 0.672
Ollterbridge (NY) 0.78 0.608
Outerbridge (NY) 0.52 0.270
Ollterbddge (NY) 0.50 0.250
Richmond/San Rafael 2.13 4.537

S ~ 13.778
where:
(j = standard deviation, and

V2 V2
(J [
~ s/(1I-1) J ~ [13.778/14J ~ 0.992

where:

x ratio of the approximate vessel impact distance

from centerline of vessel transit to the LOA of
the vessel,

XI/I mean of distribution = 0.0, and

n number of collisions ~ 15.

4.8.3.4 Probability of Collapse (PC) C4.8.3.4

The probability of bridge collapse, PC, once a
bridge element has been struck by an aberrant vessel is a
function of many variables, including vessel size, type,
forepeak ballast and shape, speed, direction of impact,
and mass. It is also dependent on the ultimate lateral
capacity of the pier, Hp , and span, Hs, to resist collision
impact loads. Based on damage sustained during ship-
ship collisions, which have been con'elated to the bridge-
ship collision situation, PC shall be computed as follows:
For 0.0" HIP < 0.1, PC shall be computed as:
(4.8.3.4-1a)
For 0.1 " HIP < 1.0, PC shall be computed as:
\,
(4.8.3.4-lb)
The probability that the bridge will collapse, PC,
once it has been stmck by an aberrant vessel is very
complex and is a function of the vessel size, type,
configuration, speed, direction, mass, and the nature of
the collision. It is also dependent on the stiffness,
resistance, and stability characteristics of the bridge pier
and span to resist the collision impact loads.
The Guide Specification methodology for estimating
the probability of bridge collapse was derived from stud-
ies performed by Fujii in Japan (1978) using historical
information about damage to ships colliding at sea. The
curves in Figure Cl are reproduced from Fujii's paper
where the following definitions are used:
x the damage rate is defined as the ratio between
the estimated damage cost to the ship (excluding
the loss of cargo) and the estimated valne of the
ship
76 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
For HIP> 1.0
(4.8.3.4-lc)
where:
PC = probability of collapse;
H = ultimate bridge element resistance, Hp or Hs
(kips); and
P vessel impact force, Ps, PB, PBf{) PVH, or Fur
(kips).
Figure I is a plot of the above probability of collapse
relationships. From Figure I, the following results are
evident:
• in cases where the pier or span impact resistance
capacity exceeds the vessel collision impact force of
the design vessel, the bridge collapse probability
becomes zero;
• in cases where the pier or span impact resistance is
in the range 10 to 100 percent of the collision force
of the design vessel, the bridge collapse probability
varies linearly between zero and 0.10;
• and in cases where the pier or span impact resistance
capacity is below 10 percent of the collision force,
the bridge collapse probability varies linearly be-
tween 0.10 and 1.0.
y GRT ratio is defined as the ratio between GRT
of "the other ship" to the ship to which x is
related
To equate Fujii's results with the size ofthe collision
force,p, a damage rate is defined as:
x=~ (C4.8.3.4-I)
Pmax
For x = 1.0, the actual impact force,p, is the same as
the maximum possible impact force, and the vessel has
been totally damaged.
The damage to bridge piers is estimated based on the
information on ship damage since damage for collisions
with bridges is relatively scarce. Cowiconsuit (1987a and
b) developed the probability density function shown in
Figure C2 for the relative magnitude of the collision
force using Fujii's results and the following assumptions:
• The pier is considered as a large collision object
relative to the ship (i.e., the GRT ratio y = 10 to
100).
• The relative magnitude ofthe collision force (pIp,,",)
is related to the damage rate, x.
• From Figure CI for plPmox ;:, 0.1, the probability is
approximately 0.1. ((
• The probability density function for plpmv. has been
simplified to be uniform in each of the intervals 0 to
0.1 and 0.1 to 1.
The distribution function, F for P/Pmax ~ XO ) shown in
Figure C2b was derived by integratingffrom the upper
end in Figure C2a. Figure 1 in the Guide Specification is
the same as Figure C2b except that the nomenclature for
the terms was changed to agree with the Guide Specifi-
cation terminology.
( (
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 77

1r--------.---------,--------~
(

-s::
~
ai'
ro
0:: 0.1
Q)
Ol y > 32
ro 10-32
E
ro 3.2-10
0
Q
1-3.2
G
c 0.01
Q)
:J
0- +
2!
LL
0.32-1
Q)

:6roo
m
0:: 0.001 0.032-0.1
Q) 0.1-0.32
> o
""
ro
:;
E o
:J
U @
y < 0.032
( O.0001~----;;_h----__,,1_;;__---____:i
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
Damage Rate,x

a. Cumulative Relative Frequen<¥, F(x,y), of the Damage

Rate for Various Values of the Gross Ratios

G
c ><1 1.--.--.---.--.
Q)
:J Y'>7 ci'
00
~ 0.1 ~ 0.1
LL
Q)
~ Ol
ro
~ 0.01 E 0.01
ro
~ o
Q)
o
~ 0.001 Ol 0.001
~ !!!
Q)
:;
~
8E 0.0001
0.0'\'0"-01""0".O\oO"1-'0,,-i.ofi1t----Ooh.1;---:1
1
0.0001 ",,--'!-;'---:i--*---;;i,
0.01 0.1 10 100
Damage Rate, x Gross Tonnage Ratio, y

b. Damage Rate as Function c. Average Damage Rate

ofGRT Ratio and GRT Ratio

Figure C4.8,3.4~1-Fujii's Distrubutlon Functfon for Damage Rate to Ships (Fujii, 1978)
78 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CnMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
1.0
0.5
0.1
0.1 0.5 1.0
Ultimate Bridge Element Strength
Vessel Impact Force
Figure 4.8.3.4-1-Probability of Collapse Distribution
4.8.3.5 Protection Factor (PF)
The purpose ofthe protection factor is to adjust AF
for fuU or partial protection of selected bridge piers
against vessel collisions due to protection measures
(dolphins, islands, etc.), existing site conditions such as a
paraUel bridge protecting a bridge from impacts in one
direction, a feature of the waterway (such as a peninsula
extending out on one side of the bridge) that lllay block
vessels from hitting bridge piers, or a wharf structure
near the bridge that may block vessels from a certain
direction.
Area 0.9
Area 0.1
0.1 p/P rnax
a. Probability Density Function for RelatIve Magnitude
of the Collision Force
((
0.1
b. Distribution Function for plp max Exceeds a Given Level
Figure C4.8.3.4-2-Distribution Function for Relative
l\fagnitude of the Collision Force for Ships (CowiconsuIt,
1987a and b)
C4.8.3.S
The concept of the protection factor was indirectly
included in the 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification, but
presented some confusion. The inclusion of PF in this
Guide Specification clarifies the concept and makes it
explicit. The recommended procedure for estimating
values for PF are shown ill Figure CI which illustrates a
simple model developed to estimate the effectiveness of
dolphin protection all a bridge pier.
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 79

PF should be computed as:

(
PF ~ 1 - (% Protection Providedll00) (4.8.3.5-1 )

If no protection of the pier exists, then PF ~ 1.0. If

the pier is 100 percent protected, then PF ~ 0.0. If the
pier protection (for example a dolphin system) provides
70 percent protection, then PF would be equal to 0.3.
Values for PF may vary from pier to pier and may vary
depending on the direction of the vessel traffic (i.e.,
vessel traffic moving inbound versus traffic moving
outbound).

DE ~D+O.75(B)

e ~ sin-1 [DE/(2)L ]
where
8 Protection angle provided by dolphin,
D Diameter of dolphin (ft)
B Beam (width) of vessel (ft)
L Distance of dolphin from pier (ft)

DE Effective dolphin diameter (ft)

a. Plan of Dolphin Protection

90° 60° 30°60630° 60° 90°

(3a) (2a) (a) (a) (2a) (3a)

where
DA Avoidable dismption cost ($)
R Area of the density function between ±S
DC ~ Dismption cost ($)

b. Normal Distribution of Vessel Collision Trajectories

around Bridge Pier (0' assumed = 30°)

Figure C4.8.3.5-1~Illustrative lHodel of the Protection

Factor (PF) of Dolphin Protection around a Bridge Pier
80 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

4.9 METHOD III C4.9

((

4.9.1 General C4.9.1

Method III is a cost-effectiveness analysis procedure The Method III procedure was developed for those
for determining the design vessel. Method III can also be situations in which risk criteria alone might be inade-
used to determine the design capacity of bridge members . quate in establishing the acceptable risk levels for a
or indicate the appropriate level of protection for the bridge. These situations might include bridges crossing
bridge. In celtain cases, the risk acceptance criteria velY wide waterways with many piers exposed to vessel
defined in Methods I and II cannot be fulfilled dne to un- collision, and the retrofit of existing piers found to be
reasonable or prohibitively high costs. These cases might vulnerable to vessel collision. For these types of circum-
include bridges crossing very wide waterways with many stances the economics associated with the cost-effective-
piers exposed to vessel collision, the retrofit of existing ness of risk reduction can be brought into consideration.
piers found to be vulnerable to vessel collision, 01' piers One aspect of this type of approach is the benefit/cost
located in very deep water. (B/C) analysis, where the cost of protection is compared
For those situations, the economics associated with against the benefits of risk reduction. Figure Cl indicates
the cost-effectiveness of risk reduction using Method III the typical relationship between the risk cost (also termed
can be used to determine the design vessel, the design the exposure cost) and the cost of risk reduction.
resistance of bridge members, or the appropriate level of
protection for the bridge. No Risk Reduction

As Low as Practicable Range

Best Practicable Technology

8estAvaiiabJe Technology
Zero Tolerance ((
Measured zer0l:=;;=:;::::~~~~====;;;,:..
Absolute Zero
Cost of Risk Reducllon-+-

Figure C4.9.1-1-Typical Critcria for Acceptance Levels of

Cost-Effcctiveness of Risk Reduction (Rowe, 1983)

4.9.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria

The design vessel and the design resistance of the

bridge 01' the type of protection to be provided shall be
selected based on a cost-effectiveness acceptance criteria
(such as a benefit/cost analysis) where the cost of bridge
strengthening or bridge protection systems is compared
against the benefits of risk reduction.
The analysis methodology used to test economic
feasibility and desirability shall be a conventional
benefit/cost, B/C, ratio calculation in which the present
worth of avoidable disruption cost, PW, for each year of
the analysis period is compared against the total present
worth of the costs to build, maintain, and operate the
protection system 01' bridge strengthening required to
provide those benefits. The present worth of the costs
and benefits of the protected bridge shall be computed
over a specific time period in order to identify
incremental costs and benefits attributable to the
protection system. The present walth is the cumulative
present value of a series of costs and benefits occurring
over time, and is derived by applying to each cost or
benefits in the series an appropriate discount factor,
which converts each cost or benefit to present value. All
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 81

costs, benefits, and other values shall be expressed in

constant dollars. Growth of the disruption cost over time
shall be considered in the analysis.
The approximate benefit used to compare against the
cost of strengthening, retrofitting, or adding a pier
protection system to a bridge can be estimated as
follows:

PW = (AF)(DC)[(1 + g)/(i- g)J(I-[(1 + g)/(l+it)

(4.9.2-1)
where:

PW = present worth ofthe dismption cost,

AF = almual frequency of bridge collapse,

DC = disruption cost associated with bridge collapse,

g real annual rate of growth of disruption,

costs (as a decimal, 2 percentlyr = 0.02),

discount rate (as a decimal, 4 percentlyr = 0.04),

and

Y design life of the bridge (years).

In addition to the benefitlcost (B/C) ratio, other mea-

sures of cost-effectiveness may also be included in the
economic analysis such as, net present value (NPV),
payback period, and rate of return (ROR). Cost-effective-
ness of a protection system is indicated by a B/C ratio
greater than 1.0, a NPV greater than zero, a payback
period which occurs during the usefhllife of the project,
or a ROR greater than the discount rate.

4.9.3 Disl'Uption Cost C4.9.3

The disruption cost associated with bridge collapse The disl11ption cost, DC, determined in accordance
can be computed as: with Eq. I of the Guide Specifications, represents the
estimated losses associated with the collapse of a bridge
DC=PRC+SRC+ MIC+PIC (4.9.3-1) due to vessel collision. Evaluating the cost factors in
Eq. 1 requires the establishment of accident scenarios for
where: each pier or span element of the bridge risk analysis. For
DC disruption cost, each pier or span element which collapses as a result of a
vessel collision, it must be determined which adjacent
PRC pier replacement cost, pier or span elements would also be destroyed or
damaged. The level of damage to bridge elements
SRC span replacement cost, located away from the immediate area of vessel impact is
primarily a function ofthe structure type and continuity.
MfC motorist inconvenience cost, and As an example, for some types of long span bridges,
the loss of the anchor pier would be sufficient to cause
PIC POlt interruption cost. severe damage and collapse of the entire main span unit.
When computing the disruption cost of the collapse of
Additional costs such as environmental, business, such an anchor pier, the cost and losses associated with
social, and loss of life costs may often be incurred in a the entire main span unit would be required. Table CI
catastrophic bridge collapse. Since these costs are illustrates the estimated dismption cost associated with
82 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSELCOLLTSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
usually subjective and therefore difficult to estimate,
they are normally not included in computing DC.
Pier replacement costs (PRC) and span replacement
costs (SRC) are those costs associated with the replace-
ment of bridge piers and spans damaged by a given
accident. For each pier and span component, an estimate
of PRC and SRC shall be made including the damage
caused to adjacent piers and spans caused by the
collapsed bridge element. For bridges with a high level
of continuity, damage to one pier/span component may
require the repair/replacement of portions of the structure
located relatively far away from the collapse location. An
estimate of the length of bridge outage required to repair
or replace the damaged structure must be made for each
pier/span component.
Motorist inconvenience costs (},IIC) include costs
incurred by motorists who would be forced to use a
detour route for the period of bridge outage. For toll
bridges, it also includes revelmes lost by the owner.
Estimates of MIC require identification of detour routes,
collection of traffic volume data, and calculation of
incremental vehicle operating costs using prescribed
AASHTO standard methodologies. In some cases, the
MIC costs can be quite large-particularly if there is no
nearby alternative route, or if the bridge repair time is
lengthy.
Port intenuption costs (PIC) include costs associated
with the temporary closurc of port facilities caused by
bridge debris in the navigable ship/barge channel.
Intermption of port commerce in a busy U.S. waterway
for even a short period of time can cause very large
disruption costs. The computation of POlt interl1lption
costs requires knowledge of merchant shipping operation
limitations, marine transport cost structures, cargo values
and the capabilities of alternative port facilities. Factors
to be included in estimating PIC are:
• The duration of navigable channel blockage (how
long it would take to clear wreckage and reopen the
channel);
• The number of vessels calTying calgoes that would
be delayed or trapped due to the bridge collapse, and
for what lcngth of time;
• Cargoes that would be foregone (rerouted to other
ports, or shipped by alternative modes); and
• Opportunities that may exist for establishing a
temporary channel under adjacent undamaged spans
of the bridge, and if so, which vessels could and
would use such a channel.
The discount rate, i, is used to bring back future
costs and benefits to present value. For future costs and
benefits calculated in constant dollars, only the real cost
of capital should be represented in the discount rate.
The rate of growth of disl1lption costs, g, accounts
for increasing disruption costs over time due to increas-
the collapse of one of the main piers of the Dame Point
Bridge (in Florida), a cable-stayed structure with a 1,300-
((
ft main span (Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc., July
1984).
Table C4.9.3-1-l\faill Pier Collapse Disruption
Cost Example (Greiner, Jnly 1984)
Disruption Costs
Cost (1984 Constant $)
Item Yem~1987 Yeal~2037
PRC $ 8,948,000 $ 8,948,000
SRC 27,038,000 27,038,000
PIC 21,000,000 21,000,000
MIC 75,810,000 375,480,000
DC $132,796,000 $432,466,000
The pier and span replacement costs (PRC and SRC)
should be based on estimates of the costs to rebuild the
bridge components which would be destroyed in the
accident scenario. Included in PRC and SRC should be
the costs associated with debris removal fro111 the water-
way, and engineering and construction inspection costs.
The disruption cost must include any motorist incon-
venience costs, MlC, which may occur with bridge
outage. In some cases, these costs can be quite large,
particularly if there is no nearby alternative route or if the
repair time is lengthy. The detour costs are typically
found in two main categories: I) additional vehicle
operating costs incurred by motorists who must take a ((
longer, lllore congested, or less efficient route; and
2) lost revenues for toll bridges. Estimates of MIC
require identification of detour routes, collection of
traffic volume data, and calculation of incremental
vehicle operating costs, using standard methodologies
prescribed by AASHTO (1977). Future growth in
motorist traffic must be considered in the analysis since
it can have a significant impact on the disruption cost as
illustrated in Table Cl.
Another factor in Eq. I for which a detailed accident
scenario is required is the port interruption cost, PIC.
The importance of a major seaport's contribution to the
regional economy is well documented. In terms of jobs
and income created in direct, indirect, and port related
iudustries, the average U.S. seaport can be found to add
nearly a billion dollars per year to the economy of its
region. An interruption of port comlllerce such as would
occur with bridge wreckage in a navigable channel can
create an enormously adverse economic impact.
The key factors to be considered in the estimation of
PIC are discussed in this Article. The establishment of
the port interruption scenario requires an understanding
of merchant shipping operation limitations, marine
transport cost structures, cargo values, capabilities of
altemative port facilities, and several other factors. Even
at that, there are some costs which are celiain in principle
I (
to occur, but which are not easily quantified. Therefore,
the value of PIC should always be conservative in the
analysis.
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION
ing vessel traffic under the bridge due to port growth,
( and to increasing motorist traffic on the bridge due to
growth in the community. The influence on g for
motorist traffic can be computed using future ADT
volumes estimated for the bridge. The influence due to
port growth can be estimated based on historical long-
term port growth for the lVatenvay, or from other
procedures.
83
Other costs which are not easily quantified include
environmental, business, social, and loss of life costs.
Since subjective value judgments lead to widely differing
costs for these categories, they are usually not directly
included in the disruption cost analysis. For these disrup-
tion categories, qualitative consideration and judgment
must .be exercised to include these concerns in the
decision-making process.
 84 GUlDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISlON DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

REFERENCES

AASHTO. 1977. A Manual on User Benefit Analysis of Highway and Bus-Transit Improvements. American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

CBAlBuckland and Taylor. July 1982. Annacis Island Bridge, Report No. 3-Ship Collision Risk Analysis. Final
Report prepared for the British Columbia Minisuy of Transportation and Highways, Victorica, BC Canada.

Cowiconsult, Inc. July 1978. Evaluation of Risks in Case of Ship Coliisions with Ihe Great Belt Bridge. RepOlt to
Statsbroen Store B",lt, Copenhagen, Denmark (in Danish, unpublished).

Cowiconsult, Inc. 1987a. General Principles for Risk Evaluation of Ship Collisions, Strandings, and Conlacl
Incidents. Technical Note (unpublished).

Cowiconsult, Iuc. 1987b. Siudy of Proleclion of Bridge Piers Against Ship Collisions and Evalualion of Collision
Risks for a Bridge Across Ihe Siraits of Gibraltar. Report No.7, prepared for the Societe Nationale d'Etudes du
Detroit, Rabat, Morocco.

Fujii, Y. and R. Shiobara. 1978. The Estimation of Losses Resulting from Marine Accidents, Volume 31, No.1.
JoumalofNavigation. Royal Institute of Navigation, Cambridge University Press, Great Brilian.

Fujii, Y., H. Yamanonchi, and T. Matui. 1984. Survey of Vessel Traffic Management Systems, Paper No. 45.
Electronic Navigation Research Institute, Chofu, Tokyo.

Fujii, Y., H. Yamanouchi, and N. Mizuki. 1974. The Probability of Stranding. JOll/'l1al of Navigation, No. 27. Royal
Institute of Navigation, Cambridge University Press, Great Britian.

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. December, 1985. Pier Protection for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge Replacement-
Ship Collision RiskAnalysis. Prepared for the Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, FL.

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. 1983. Study of Pier Proteclion Systems for Bridges. Prepared for Mmyland
Transportation Authority, Baltimore, MD.

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. December, 1984. Ship Collision Risk Analysis for the Laviolette Bridge. Prepared
for the Canadian Coast Guard, Department of Transport, OUawa, Canada. .

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. March 1986. Ship Collision Risk Analysis for the Centennial Bridges, Chatham,
New Brunswick. Prepared for the Canadian Coast Guard, Department of Transport, Ottawa, Canada.

Greiner· Engineering Sciences, Inc. July 1984. Bridge/Vessel Safety Siudy for the Dames Point Bridge, Jacksonville,
Florida. Prepared for Sverdrup and Parcel, Inc., Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Jacksonville, FL.

IABSE. 1983. IABSE Colloquium all Ship Collision wilh Bridges and Offshore Siructures, 3 Vols. (Introductory,
Preliminaty, and Final Reports). International Association for Bridge and Stmctural Engineering, Copenhagen,
Denmark.

Nordic Road Engineering Federation. 1980. Load Regulalions for Road Bridges. NVF Report No.4 (in Norwegian),
Norway.

Knott, M., and D. Bonyun. 1983. IABSE Colloquium On Ship Coliision Against Ihe Sunshine Skyway Bridge,
Preliminary Report. Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 153-162.

Knott, J., D. Wood, and D. Bonyun. "Risk Analysis for Ship-Bridge Collisions, ASCE Coastal Zone '85." Presented
at the Fomih Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, Baltimore, July 30--August 2, 1985.

Leslie, J., N. Clark, and J. Segal. 1983. IABSE Colioquililn on Ship and Bridge Collisions-The Economics of Risk,
Preliminary RepOlt. Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 417-426.
rl.
MacDuff, T. September 1974. "The Probability of Vessel Collisions." In Ocean Indusll}'.
 SECTION 4-DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION 85

Maunsell and Patiners (PTY) Ltd., Brady P. J. E. September 1978. Second Hobart Bidge: Report on Tasman Bridge-
Risk oj Ship Collision and Methods oj Protection. Report to Joint Committee on Second Hobart Bridge and Depart-
ment ofMaill Roads, Tasmania.

Modjeski and Masters Consulting Engineers. July 1985. CriteriaJor the Design oJBridge Piers with Respect to Vessel
Collision in Louisiana Watel1l'ays. The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development and the Federal
Highway Administration.

Philipson, L. 1983. IABSE Colloquium all Numerical Risk Acceptability and Mitigation Evaluation Criteria,
Preliminary Report. Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 401-408.

Rowe, W. D. 1977. An Anatomy oJRisk. John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.

Rowe, W. D. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Acceptable Levels oj Risk Jar Technological Undertakings, Introductory
RepOli. Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 183-198.

Sexsmith, R. G. 1983. IABSE ColloquiulII on Bridge Risk Assessment and Protective Design Jar Ship Collision,
Preliminary Report. Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 425-434.

Whitman, R. February 1984. Evaluating Calculated Risk in Geotechnical Engineering. ASCE Joul1lal oJGeoteelmical
Engineering, Volume 110, No.2. American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA.

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( (

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 SECTIONS

SUBSTRUCTURE PROVISIONS
(
5.1 GENERAL CS.1 GENERAL

This Section includes substructure requirements
related to the design of new bridges and for the
evaluation of existing bridges. The requirements consider
bridge substructures assessed to resist vessel impact
loading without causing superstructure collapse.
It is further assumed that, for evaluation of existing
bridges, the substructure has becn adequately designed
for each load combination according to the established
edition of the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications and the AASHTO StaJIdard Specifications
for Highway Bridges, when the substl1lcture was built.
This Section's requirements are not applicable to the
design of sacrificial substl1lcture protection systems.
The Section 5 requirements for bridge substructure
design under vessel impact are parallel to the design
provisions in the CUlTent AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications (2007). In addition to (AASHTO, 2007),
the data presented by Garcia (1990) and the project
consultants' experience were used to develop the
substructure design provisions.
The requirements for substruchlre design in
Section 5 are applicable only to the design of bridge
substmctures to withstand vessel impact loading without
causing collapse of the superstructure. The requirements
are nol applicable to the design of sacrificial protection
stl11ctures which are presented in Section 7.

5.2 ANALYSIS

To achieve a cost-effective design, the substl1lcture

and superstructure may be analyzed as a unit, thus
allowing adjacent substructure elements to paIiicipate in
resisting the vessel impact force. Sound principles of
structnral mechanics must be followed in this analysis.
Only positive connections of the superstl1lcture to the
substl1lcture shall be considered effective. All structural
components and their connections in the load path must
be adequately proportioned to withstand the impact
force.

5.3 FOUNDATION DESIGN

The requirements for design of new bridge

foundations to resist vessel collision, CV, is as specified
in Section 10: Foundations in theAASHTO LRFD Bridge
Design Specifications (2007). The vessel collision force,
Cv, is included in the Extreme Event II Limit State load
combination given in Section 3: Loads and Load Factors
of the LRFD Specifications (AASHTO, 2007).
For evaluation of existing bridge substructures, the
designer shall use sound engineering principles to ensure
that structure collapse is prevented. Extreme event,
strength or service limit state can be used to evaluate the
effect of vessel impact forces for any foundation element
which cannot be visually inspected and repaired in a
relatively straightforward manner.
If strength limit state is used, the capacity of an
axially loaded pile shall be limited to the strength of the
pile as a structural element or the strength of the
foundation material, whichever controls. If analysis
indicates that piles will be loaded in tension by vessel
impact forces, the designer must determine that the piles
as installed have adequate pullout resistance.
Transient foundation uplift or rocking involving
separation from the subsoil of an end-bearing foundation
pile group or the contact area of a foundation footing is

87
88 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VFBSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HrcHWAY BlUDGES

pennitted under vessel impact loading provided tbat

sufficient consideration is given to structural stability.
Consideration shall be given to the magnitude of
foundation settlement that the bridge can withstand wben
subjected to vessel impact loading.

I(

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 SECTION S-8unSTRUCTURE PROVISIONS 89

REFERENCES

AASHTO. 2007. LRFD Bridge Design Specifications. American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials, Washington, DC.

Garcia, A. M. 1990. A State's (Florida) Approach to Ship Impact Design. Presented at Transportation Research Board
69th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.

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((

( (
 SECTION 6

CONCRETE AND STEEL DESIGN

(

6.1 GENERAL C6.1 GENERAL

This Section includes stmctural requirements related
to the design of new bridges and for the evaluation of
existing bridges. The requirements consider only
structural elements assessed to resist vessel impact
loading without causing superstmcture collapse.
It is further assumed that, for evaluation of existing
bridges, the stmctural elements have been adequately
designed for each load combination according to the
established edition of the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications and the AASHTO Standard Specifications
for Highway Bridges, when thc structure was built.
This Section's requirements are not applicable to the
design of sacrificial substructure protection systems.
The design requirements for vessel collision forces
are specified in the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications (2007). For new bridges, the designer
should folIow the provisions for material resistance
factors and other requirements stated ill the
specifications.
Similarly, the requirements in AASHTO (1983-
1988) for the formation of plastic hinges in concrete or
steel members, shall also apply to bridge members
subject to vessel impact forces in which plastic hinges
are allowed to form as discussed in Section 6.
The reqnirements for concrete and steel design in
Section 6 are applicable only to the design of new and
the evaluation of existing bridge members to withstand
vessel impact loading without causing collapse of the
superstructure. The requirements are not applicable to the
design of sacrificial protection structures that are
presented in Section 7.

6.2 REINFORCED CONCRETE

Design and constmction of cast-in-place monolithic

reinforced concrete or prestressed, precast, concrete
( colunms, pier footings, and connections shall conform to
the requirements of the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design
Specifications (2007) and to the additional requirements
ofthis Section.
The extreme event, service, or strength limit states
may be used to evaluate existing bridge stmctural
elements.
If plastic hinges are to form in columns, consider-
ation shall be given for adequate confinement at all
plastic hinges locations. The minimum transverse rein-
forcement requirements and spacing of such reinforce-
ment and splices shall be in accordance with Article
S.10.11.4.ld of the LRFD Bridge Design Specifications
(AASHTO,2007).

6.3 STRUCTURAL STEEL

Design and construction of structural steel elements

and connections shall conform to the requirements of the
LRFD Bridge Design Specificatiolls (AASHTO, 2007)
and to the additional requirements of this Section.
The extreme event, service, or strength limit states
may be used to evaluate existing bridge structural
elements.

\.

91
92 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

REFERENCES

AASHTO. 1983-1988. Guide Specifications/or Seismic Design a/Highway Bridges (including Interim Specifications
I(
through 1988). American Association of State Highway and TranspDliation Officials, Washington, DC.

AASHTO. 2007. LRFD Bridge Design Specifications, 4th Edition. American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, Washington, DC.

(l
 SECTION 7
BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS
7.1 GENERAL
This Section contains the requirements for the
design of bridge piers and spans to protect them from
collapse due to vessel collision. As discussed in
Section 3, the bridge elements can be designed to
withstand the impact loads, or a fender or protection
system can be developed to prevent, redirect, or reduce
the impact loads to non-destructive levels.
7.2 DESIGN LOADS
The design vessel for each substmcture or super-
structure element shall be determined by Method II
unless the special situations in Article 4.1.2 exist for
using Method I or Method III. The design impact force
and energy associated with the design vessel shall be
computed in accordance with Section 3 requirements.
93
C7.1
The development of bridge protection alternatives
for vessel collisions generally follow three approaches:
1. reduction in the annual frequency of collision events
(for example, by improving navigation aids near a
bridge);
2. reduction in the probability of collapse (for example,
by imposing vessel speed restrictions in the
waterway); and
3. reduction in the disruption costs of a collision (for
example, by physical protection and motorist
warning systems).
Since modifications to navigation aids in the
waterway and vessel operating conditions are normally
beyond the designer's ability to implement, the primary
areas of bridge protection to be considered by the
designer are physical protection and motorist warning
systems.
The requirements of this Guide Specification
provide two basic protection options to this bridge
designer. The first involves designing the bridge to
withstand the impact loads in either an elastic or plastic
manner. If plastic, the design must insure that the super-
stmcture does not collapse by incorporating redundancy
in the structure, or by other means. The second option
allows the designer to provide a protection system of
fcnders, pile-supported structures, dolphins, islands, etc.,
to either reduce the magnitude of the impact loads to
within the allowable strength of the bridge pier or spans
or to independently protect the bridge elements.
The Guide Specification requirements for either of
these two options are general in nature since the actual
design procedures that could be utilized Vaty con-
siderably in the engineering profession. Tlus is particu-
larly true for plastic design. Since little information is
available on the behavior of the plastic deformation of
materials and stmctures during the type of dynamic
impacts associated with vessel impact, assumptions
based 011 experience and sound engineering practice must
be substituted. In this Section of the Commentary, the
various types of protection systems cOlmnonly used for
bridges will be discussed, and case histories of their use
will be presented.
C7.2
The Guide Specification requires that exposed
bridge elements either be designed to withstand the
required impact forces without bridge collapse, or that
physical protection be provided.
The ability of adequately designed bridge piers to
withstand major collision forces was dramatically
94 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
The design impact force shall be applied to the
bridge elements as an equivalent static force. The impact
force shall be applied in accordance with Article 3.15.
If the bridge cannot safely withstand the design impact
loads, a protection system must be developed to reduce
the bridge loads to an acceptable level, or to absorb the
loads before they reach the bridge
illustrated by the 1981 collision of a fully loaded 31,800
DWToil tanker (MN Gerd Maersk) with one of the main ( (
tower piers of the Newport Suspension Bridge crossing
Nanangansett Bay, Rhode Island (Kuesel, 1983). As
reported by Kuesel, the ship stmck the pier head-on with
an estimated speed of six knots (approximately 10 ft/s)
while navigating in a dense fog. The bridge pier was
relatively undamaged whereas the ship's bow was
crushed in approximately 11 ft. Figure Cl depicts a
profile of the surface spalIing damage caused by the
ship's bow impacting the pier. The ship came to a
complete stop after crashing into the pier and then drifted
off. Although the vessel took on some water through
sprung plates, no oil was spilled, and the ship was never
in danger of sinking.
Supporting a 1,600-ft main span, the Newport
Bridge main piers were located in water depths of
approximately 98 ft. The concrete piers which supported
the steel towers were of "Potomac Type" caisson
construction, founded on 512 steel H-piles driven into
sands that fill the glacial gorge under the bay. Using Eq.
3.9-1, the estimated average impact force on the pier
would have been approximately:
Ps = 220(31,SOOt(10/27)= 14,500 kips
This compares very favorably with the average
impact force, P s, computed by dividing the ship impact
energy by the measured bow cmshing depth, aB, of 11ft.
The displacement of the ship, W, was approximately
45,000 t01111es. Since the underwater keel clearance of
45 ft is greater than 0.5 x Draft (23 ft), the hydrodynamic
coefficient, CH , equals 1.05. FromEq. 3.S-1:
KE = (1.05) (45,000) (10) 2/29.2 = 161,000 kip-ft
and
Ps= KElaB = 161,000111 = 14,600 kips
As noted in Article C3.9, the instantaneous
maximum force level might have been 50 to 100 percent
greater than this.
The Newport Bridge cxample illustrates that it is
possible to design bridge piers to withstand relatively
large impact forces with only minimal damage.
( (
 SECTION 7~BRTDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 95

( ).
I
f

Qj
~
OJ Tower
(f)

28' 11111111011111 :

0
~
"c0 Pedestal

11' ~
,
I~
'7 17
I IV
Approximate limit
of damage (spalling)
to depth of
3/4" to 2"
OJ
c
'13
I
~11/
~r 7
'" 0.0

~/r
LL

-ii' '-~-
~
~/
OJ
~ Distribution
"
c Slab
0
0
-15'
.;.
J
~

~
~ - Approximate area
"'"
-,
of torn and bent
stiffeners on steel

~
Qj
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OJ jacket plating
(f)
Qj
'E
OJ
Shaft Lm." 1#,
.=
.$
~
"c
0
0 tt Approximate bay
-Q?' bottom, ' \
J
~c /I r
8 It?1:; /I
I
Piles Elevation
South Face - Pier 1E

Figure C7.2-1-Damage to the Newport Bridge Main Pier after Collision with the l\IN l\'laersk
96 GUlDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COi\IMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
7.3 PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Physical protection systems are protective structures
provided on a bridge to fully or partially absorb the
design impact loads. The protective structnres may be
located directly on the bridge (such as a bridge pier
fender), or independent of the bridge (such as a dolphin).
The geometric configuration of the protective structure
can be developed to deflect or redirect the aberrant vessel
away from the bridge. The protective structure geometry
should be developed to prevent the rake (overhang) of
the design vessel's bow from striking and causing
damage to any exposed portion of the bridge above the
protective structure with the protective structure in its
deflected or collapsed position.
Protective structures shall be designed in accordance
with accepted engineering practice using either energy
or force-acceleration (F = mal methods. Protective
structures designed using energy methods shall be in
accordance with:
KE = IF(x)d< (7.3-1)
where:
KE = kinetic energy of design vessel (kip-ft), and
F(x)= protective structure force, F (kips), as a function
of deflection, x (ft).
Protective structnres shall be designed in accordance
with one of the following sets of alternative criteria:
• The total design impact energy, KE, shall be
absorbed by the design vessel. The impact energy
shall be absorbed by the elastic and plastic defor-
mation (crushing) of the vessel's bow. The bridge or
protective structure shall be designed to withstand
the design impact loads without significant damage
or collapse.
• The total design impact energy, KE, shall be
absorbed by a protective system. The impact energy
shall be absorbed by the elastic and plastic
deformation of the protection system structure
without causing significant damage or collapse of
the bridge. The vessel absorbs no energy, and no
significant vessel damage occurs,
• The design impact energy is absorbed both by the
vessel and the protective system. The impact energy
is absorbed by the elastic and plastic deformation of
both the ship and the protective structure without
causing significant damage or collapse of the bridge.
The analysis and design of bridge protection struc-
tures requires the use of engineering judgment to arrive
at a reasonable solution. In the following sections, the
various types of protective structures commonly used for
bridges will be briefly discussed.
C7.3
The Guide Specification requirements were
developed to provide bridge protection from a head-on
impact of an aberrant ship or barge vessel. Eccentric
impacts in which a significant part of the vessel's impact
energy is absorbed by the vessel rolling, yawing, and
swaying in the water is not specified since the eccentric
loads will be less than those associated with a head-on
collision at relatively high speeds.
The current practice in the design of protective stmc-
tures is almost invariably based on energy consid-
erations. It is assumed that the loss of kinetic energy of
the vessel is transformed into an equal amount of energy
absorbed by the protective structure. Regardless of the
design of the protective structure, the work done by the
structnre will be in accordance with Eq. 1. The kinetic
impact energy is dissipated by the work done by bending,
shear, torsion, and displacement of the members of the
protective structure.
Design of protective stl1lctnres is usually an iterative
process in which a trial configuration of a protective
structure is initially developed. For the trial stl1lcture a
force vs. deflection, F(Y) vs. x, diagram is developed via
analysis or physical testing and modeling. The area under
the F(,) vs. x diagram is the energy capacity of the pro-
tective system. The forces and energy capacity of the
protective structure is then compared with the design
vessel impact force and energy to see if the vessel loads ((
have been safely withstood.
If the protective structure's force resistance is higher
than the vessel impact force, then the vessel's bow will
crush and the impact energy will be primarily absorbed
by the crushing of the vessel's bow. If the vessel impact
force is higher than the protective st111cture's resistance,
then the impact energy will be primarily absorbed by the
deflection and crushing of the protection system.
For the case where both crushing of the bow aud
deformation of the protective stl1lcture are to be included
in the design, the designer must determine the portion of
the impact energy to be appOliioned to the vessel. The
percentage of the energy absorbed by the vessel in such
an analysis is VCIY complex, and judgment must be
exercised based on theoretical analysis, physical model
studies, and experience.
As an example, for the protective dolphins for the
Sunshine Skyway Bridge discussed in Article C7.3.3, 20
percent of the total impact energy was absorbed by
crushing approximately 4 ft of the vessel's bow during
the initial 0.3 seconds of the dolphin collision. This was
estimated based on the conservation of linear momentum
given the mass of the ship and dolphin, the initial speed
of the ship, and the crushing strength of the ship bow.
The remaining 80 percent of the impact energy had to be
absorbed by the deformation of the dolphin structure.
 SECTION 7-BRlDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS
( 7.3.1 Fender Systems
Fender systems for bridge protection usually
include, bnt are not necessarily limited to those fenders
constructed of timber, lubber, concrete, and steel.
( expression into Eq. 7.3-1 and integrating results in:
7.3.1.1 Timber Fenders
Timber fenders are composed of vertical and hori-
zontal timber members in a grillage geometry attached to
the face of the bridge pier or erected as an independent
structure adjacent to the pier. Energy is absorbed by
elastic deformation and crushing of the timber members.
Because of their relatively low cost, timber fenders have
frequently been used on bridge projects for protecting
piers from minor vessel impact forces. However, for the
relatively large collision impact loads associated with the
design vessels in these Specifications, the resulting
97
C7.3.1
Historically a wide variety of fender systems have
been developed to absorb the belihing forces and
energies associated with ships and barges belihing and
mooring against docks and wharfs. Types of typical dock
fendering systems include: floating camels, timber pile
and timber frameworks, concrete piling, rubber fender
systems, gravity fenders, hydraulic and hydraulic-
pneumatic systems, steel spring type fenders, and
pneumatic and foam-filled fender systems. Manufacturer
and vender catalogs are available for a wide variety of
fender types to facilitate the design process. References
provide detailed analysis of these types of systems and
how they can be used on bridge piers to provide a level
of protection from ship collisions (U.S. Coast Guard,
1981; Demcher and Heins, 1979; PIANC, 1984). The
fender design procedure is usually based on Eq. 7.3-1
where force vs. deflection diagrams are generated by
analysis, or by physical testing. The fender is then sized
to absorb the impact energy and forces.
As an example, a fender whose characteristics can
be described as a linear spring can be modeled as:
(C7.3.l-1)
where, k is the stiffness of the fender. Substituting this
(C7.3.1-2)
For a given value of KE and deformation, x, the re-
quired fender stiffness can be computed; or for a given
stiffness, the required deformation to absorb the energy
can be computed.
In general, fender systems are adequate to absorb the
collision energy and loads associated with medium to
small vessels at low impact speeds and at oblique angles.
For larger vessels and higher impact speeds, other types
of protection are usually required. Exceptions occur for
those bridges with very massive pier structures and high
shear and overturning resistance.
C7.3.1.1
Timber fenders are frequently used for bridge
protection because of their relatively low cost and good
energy absorption characteristics. Timber fenders are
also placed on most other types of protection systems,
such as pile-supported stmctures and dolphins, in order
to provide a rubbing and anti-sparking surface to avoid
metal-to-metal contact with steel-hulled vessels. This is
particularly important for protective stmctures with
exposed steel elements such as plates, walers, and bolts.
In 1970 an accident involving loss of life occurred in
98 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
timber fenders would have to be extremely large and
might be uneconomical in most circumstances.
POlt Arthur, Texas, in which a fender system with steel
walers was hit by a gasoline barge. The barge of gasoline
was ripped open on the steel fender works igniting the
fuel (Heming, 1981). It is important that all exposed steel
hardware (bolts, plates, etc.) be either countersunk or
placed behind the timber fender.
An example on the use of a framed timber protection
system is discussed by Yiu for the main piers of the
Commodore John Bany Bridge, a cantilever tmss bridge
with a main span of 1,644 ft near Bridgeport, New
Jersey, crossing the Delaware River (Yiu, 1981). The
timber system shown in Figure CI was developed
to resist a "large" ship impact under the following
conditions:
• Case I-Impact speed of 1.5 knots at a IO-degree
angle to transverse axis of pier
• Case II-Impact speed of 6 knots at a IO-degree
angle to transverse axis of pier
• Case III-Impact speed of 6 knots head-on with the
longitudinal face of the pier
Designed using the kinetic energy method, the
analysis found that neither the ship or fender system
were damaged in a Case I collision; that the fender would
suffer damage during a Case II collision; and that the
fender system would collapse under a Case III collision.
Under Case III, the bridge pier would safely resist the ((
resulting impact force computed by:
F=KE/x (C7.3.1.1-1)
where F is the vessel cnlShing force (pier impact load),
KE the kinetic energy of the collision, and x was taken as
the 5 ft-8 in. depth of the six-layer timber cribbing
framework.
(~
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 99

MAIN PIER PLAN AT EL. +12.0

timber EI. +12.00

\
Max. H.w. EI. +8.50

1011 X 811
HP14x73
M.H.w. EI. +3.00

M.L.W. EI. -2.40

EI. -6.00
EI. -8.00

1" Base Plate

Exist. Fender
Anchor Inserts
for 1" i bolts
..L----j~~

TYPICAL SELECTION A-A

Figure C7.3.1.1-1-Timber Fender System on the Commodore John Barry Bridge, New Jersey (yui, 1981)
100 GUIDE SPECIFlCATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESiGN OF HIGHWAY BruOGES
7.3.1.2 Rubber Fenders
Rubber fenders are commercially available in a wide
variety of extruded and built-up shapes. Impact energy is
absorbed through the elastic deformation of the rubber
elements either in compression, bending, shear
deformations, or a combination of all three.
C7.3.1.2
I(
The high elasticity inherent in lubber results in
relatively high energy-absorption characteristics for
rubber fender systems. When compared to timber, rubber
fenders also have the advantage of low maintenance cost,
high durability (lifespan several times that of timber
fenders), superior physical and chemical prope!iies
(resistant to aging, oil, friction wear and tear, water and
marine bore attack), plus ease of handling (Heming,
1981). A disadvantage is their relatively high initial cost
when compared to timber fenders.
An example on the use of rubber fender systems for
bridge piers is provided by Shintaku for pier-mounted
rubber fenders on the main piers of the new Passyunk
Avenue Bridge over the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Shintaku, 1981). The design conditions
were for a 23,000 DWT ship traveling at 5 knots and
impacting the fender line at an angle of 27 degrees. The
impact energy to be absOl'bed by the fender system was
computed to be 3,720 ft-kips. The analysis assumed that
the energy would be absorbed by the deflection of four
rubber arch fenders as shown in Figure Cl. The impact
reaction force resulting from the fender deflection to be
applied to the pier was estimated to be approximately
2,400 kips.
((
i\
SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PnOVISIONS 101

..... CONC.PIER
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PARTIAL PLAN OF MAIN PIER

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Figure C7.3.1.2-1-Rubber Fender System ofPassyuuk Avenue Bridge, Philadelphia (Shintalw, 1981)
102 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\IMENTARY FOR VJ<:SSEL COLLISlON DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
7.3.1.3 Concrete Fenders
Concrete fenders consist of hollow, thin-walled,
concrete box structures attached to the bridge pier.
Usually, a timber fender is also attached to the outer face
ofthe concrete box fender. Impact energy is absorbed by
the buckling and crushing of the concrete walls
composing the fender system.
7.3.1.4 Steel Fenders
Steel fenders consist of thin-walled membranes and
bracing elements composed in a variety of box-like
arrays and assemblies attached to the bridge pier. Impact
energy is absorbed by compression, bending, and
buckling of the steel elements in the fender. Timber
C7.3.1.3
Crushable concrete box fenders offer an effective
method of absorbing vessel collision energy. By varying
the box dimensions, wall thickness, and geometric layout
of interior walls and diaphragms, a wide range of energy
absorption capabilities can be achieved. The primaty
drawback to the fender is the difficulty in analyzing the
structure's energy absorption characteristics while under-
going plastic deformation.
A crushable concrete box fender with timber facing
strips was developed by Greiner for fenderings on the
Francis Scott Key Bridge: a 1,200-foot continuous truss
span which crosses the harbor channel into Baltimore,
Matyland. Figure Cl shows a typical section of the box
fender. Crushing of the hollow concrete box is the
primary mechanism of energy absorption of this type of
system. In 1980, the ship MN Blue Negoya struck one
of the main piers when a mechanical failure caused loss
of steering (Greiner, 1983). The ship drifted head-on into
the pier destroying the concrete box fender and impaling
its bow on the A-frame pier columns. Only minor
surficial spalling of the concrete occulTed on the main
pier columns due to the vessel bow overhang. In stopping
the ship, the concrete and timber fender was totally
destroyed and had to be replaced.
5'·2" 4'-10'
Concrete Pier
+12.0
+2.0
\ R,I"f~,"" Concrete Box
Figure C7.3.1.3-1-Cl'ushable Concrete Box Fender on the
Francis Scott Key Bridge IVlain Piers, Baltimore, MD
C7.3.1.4
Steel-framed fenders provide an efficient means for
absorbing relatively high-impact energies due to their
I (
elastic and plastic deformation properties. Primaty
disadvantages to steel fenders are their susceptibility to
corrosion in saltwater envirolllnents and the possibility of
 SECTION 7-BRlDGE PIWTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 103

facing should be attached to the steel fender to prevent
( sparks resulting from direct contact with steel-hulled
vessels.
metal-to-metal contact with steel-hulled vessels carrying
flammable cargo, Timber facing, concrete encasement,
and special coatings for steel members can significantly
reduce these problems.
A framed steel fender system (also referred to as
a multi-cell type buffer) has been developed in Japan
for protection of bridge piers as shown in Figures Cl and
C2. The research by Namita and Nakanishi discusses the
method of energy absorption by the inelastic deflection
of the framed steel structure (Namita and Nakanishi,
1983). A computer program utilizing inelastic large
deformation analysis for a steel truss framework was
developed to compute the strain euergy absorbed by the
fender stmcture during the process of collapse. Using
this approach, Matsuzaki and Jin developed the framed
fender system desigu specifications for the main piers of
the Bisan-Seto Bridge with a 3,600-ft suspension span
near Honshu, Japan (Matsuzaki and Jill, 1983). The
fender shown in Figures Cl and C2 was analyzed using
mathematical and physical models. The fender was
developed to withstand an 8 knot impact of a 500 gross
registered ton (GRT) fishing vessel. The impact force
was approximately 800 kips and the impact energy
approximately 7,500-ft-kips. The interior of the framed
fender can be filled with dense foam to further improve
its energy-absorption properties.

Horizontal Plate

Longitudinal Rib
BRIDGE PIER
Cross Frame
Cross Beam
Cross Beam
Longitudinal Rib
Horizontal Plate
Cross Frame
Horizontal Plate

Horizontal Plate
,, ,, ,,
11 Longitudinal Rib
,\, ,,\ !, !,
11
,11, 1!
,, 11 Outer Plate

Figure C7.3.1.4-1-Framed Steel Fender System fot' Bisan-Seto Bridge, Japan (Namita and Naimllishi, 1983)

(
.104 GUIDE SPECIFlCATIONS AND Co.MMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESlGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
Fy =Pc
lL.
U=T
I
---, 0
Figure C7.3.1.4-2-Load-Deformation Relationship of}"1'3med Steel Fender 'Vall
7.3.2 Pile-Supported Systems
Pile-supported structures can be used to absorb
collision impact loads. Pile groups connected together by
rigid caps provide one method of generating high levels
of protection resistance to vessel impact forces. Free-
standing piles and piles connected by relatively flexible
caps are also used for bridge protection. The pile grollps
may consist of vertical piles, which primarily absorb
energy by bending, or batter piles which absorb energy
by compression and bending. As a result of the high
impact design loads associated with vessel collision,
plastic deformation and crushing of the pile structure is
permitted provided that the vessel is stopped before
striking the pier or the resulting impact is less than the
resistance of the pier and fonndation.
The pile-supported protection stmctures may be
either free-standing away from the pier or attached to the
pier itself. Fender systems may be attached to the pile
structure to help resist a portion of the impact loads.
Timber, steel, or concrete piles may be utilized depend-
ing on site conditions, impact loads, and economics.
Bridge Pier
Ship
C7.3.2
Single-standing piles or pile groups of wood, steel,
and concrete have long been used for vessel mooring
operations. These structures are designed to elastically
resist the mooring and berthing forces impalted by
merchant vessels. In contrast to. mooring operations in
which the relatively low impact energies can be absorbed
elastically by piles, the far greater energies associated
with ship collision can usually only be absorbed by
plastic deformation and cmshing of the pile structure.
After the collision, all or parts of the destroyed structure
usually require replacement.
P. Tambs-Lyche discusses an example of a pile-
supported protection system used for the Troms," bridge
in Norway which has a main span of 260 ft (Tambs-
Lyche, 1983). The main piers of the bridge were
originally protected by concrete piles suppOlting a rigid
concrete beam as shown in Figure Cl. In separate acci-
dents, the western fender was destroyed by a collision
with a 10,000-DWT vessel in 1961, and the eastern
fender was destroyed by collision of a 1,560-DWT are
ship in 1963. The capacity of the original fenders was
estimated to stop a 10,000-DWT ship drifting at a speed
of 1 knot.
Following these accidents, an investigation recom-
mended that the protection system be replaced with a
stronger pile-sUppOlted structure capable of stopping a
12,000-DWT ship impact at a speed of 8 knots. The
construction costs were so expensive, however, that the
Norwegian Bridge Administration decided to reduce the
protection criteria to stopping a 7,000-DWT ship at
8 knots and to require vessels larger than this to use an I. (
alternate navigation channel available in nearby Sandnes
Sound. The new protection structure shown in Figure C2
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 105

( was constructed in 1975 and consists of a ring- shaped

rigid concrete beam encircling the pier with the beam
supported by steel pipe piles filled with concrete. The
clearance between the inside face of the concrete ring
and the main columns varied from approximately 17 to
23 ft.
As part of the Tasman Bridge pier protection investi-
gation in Australia, Maunsell and Partners evaluated the
pile-supported system shown in Figures C3 and C4. The
system consisted of eight 10-ft diameter prestressed con-
crete piles tied together by a rigid cap beam. During the
design impact of a 35,000-DWT ship at 8 knots, the piles
would form plastic hinges at the top and bottom to
absorb the impact energy t!nough rotational deformation
(Maunsell and Partners and Brady, 1978).
The Rosario-Victoria crossing of the Parana River in
Argentina is a cable-stayed bridge with a main span of
1,150 ft. All piers in the Parana River rest on
approximately 100-ft deep pile foundations. The vessel
impact study resuIted in a governing design ship of
43,000 DWT, with a speed of 9 knots, and a computed
impact force of 26,500 kips. The study took into account
a variation of the water level of up to 20 ft and local
scour of up to 40 ft, resulting in a potential total free
length of pile reaching up to 138 ft. With the specific
geotechnical and hydraulic situation the foundations
themselves could not be designed to withstand the high
impact forces economically within the elastic range.
Therefore, pile-supported systems, designed as sacrificial
stmctures by exploiting their plastic capacities, were the
appropriate solution as shown in Figure C5. The
independent pile-supported concrete beams, around the
foundations of the Orinoco River in Venezuela, shown in
Figure C6 is another example. (Svensson, 2006).
Demcher developed the following dynamic analysis
method for the design and analysis of pile-supported pro-
tective stmctures (Demcher and Heins, 1979). The
analysis assumes that the pile and fenders remain in the
elastic range, and that the ship is a non-deformable rigid
body. The pile stmcture/ship system is modeled as a
spring and weight and a distribution factor, DF, is intro-
duced into the spring constant to account for the
influence of walers and adjacent piles in the stmcture
(Figure C7). Assuming a fender attached to the pile
structure, Demcher's method yields:

(C7.3.2-1)

K
(Kp)(Kf) (C7.3.2-2)
(Kp+Kf)
where:

P applied force to structure (kips),

106 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

K equivalent spring constant of pile and fender

(kip/in.),

Y maximum system deflection (in.),

C vessel coefficient,

Kp spring constant of pile (kip/in:), and

Kf spring constant of fender (kip/in.).

The stiffness of a cantilevered pile with a unit lateral

load on top can be computed by:

(C7.3.2-3)

"'-p -
-
[3ElL 3) DF
p
(C7.3.2-4)

where:

/>'p pile deflection due to unit load (in.lkip),

L length of pile above fixity (in.),

E modulus of elasticity (ksi),

I(
moment of inertia of pile (in.'), and

DF ~ distribution factor.

The vessel coefficient, C, accounts for the

eccentricity, configuration, and hydrodynamic mass
coefficient of the vessel. For head-on impact, C ~ CH as
defined in Article 3.8. The distribution factor, DF,
developed by Demcher (I 979) can be computed as:

DF ~ [-6.0 x 10- (Dx) + F ]L- O.006

7
(C7.3.2-5)

where:

F~-3.5 x 10 -13 (Dy) 2 +3.1 x 10-7 (Dy) + 0.335

(C7.3.2-6)

Dy vertical stiffness ~ EIISp,

Sp vertical pile spacing (in.),

Dx horizontal stiffhess = EII/Sw,

lw waler moment of inertia (in.4), and

horizontal waler spacing (in.). I I.

The maximum system deflection, Y (in.), and
frequency, A., can be computed as:
 SECTION 7-BRTDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVrSIONS 107

y VI)" (in.)
(

where:

V impact velocity (in.!s), and.

M mass of vessel (kip-s'lin.).

The acceleration, G, and stopping time, t, can be

determined as follows:

a VA, (in.!s')

t (1[12),,) (sec)

i
I
 108 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

'''~'~ ""'"'" \
Original Fender,

u:::::; -
I
or:
I
==- . =i
I
~ T"'u
I
_ ---b=~.=:=

21 May 1963

((

Channel

Elevation View

.'.I
~ Main Columns
:. ___ Western Fender

SIS "Gloria" -10.000 DWT

Channel 21 November 1961
/

., ~ ~'"m '",""'
Troms0 Bridge

Plan View

Figure C7.3.2-1-Detail of Destroyed Pile~Supported Fender of the Tl'omso Bridge due to a 1963 Ship Collision
SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 109

Main Columns Fender "Ring"

(m'"f"~d ~ (m'7 WOO""'

r" I"
,.-, ,t ', ,
,
L'" .1-- . f - -
1 II I I
:1' -:1:. -=- '1-- . "J
" V'
- I
-
I I
1
I
I I
I I
I
ef- I
1. , .
.~ •• '" 'J '" ., . ; .' .1'.: I' .!' :.11 :
!,' • 0' •• ••••

:'1.) I. r: :r1-:· .: :. :-d?:· .. :~ :l-·f·:'! ;.::; .:) ::·.:r ::1;1.:·: :": :>: ;.:
: " • # I ',~. • f .. ' .,'

'•;!::::' :' :. :
. . .. .... I II I .. 1'1 : . . '1"1 .. '. ·1. '. " .. "I ,... rill..... .. ..
.....
:'.' :· .. :. ". ··.. 1··· ":.' ...;; ::1·1 .. ·· .':: Y.·. ........ :, ... : .
.. ·1.1·1 f'.. I : " .11 .......... ·I'I···.IT(.I·· ..... .
f·::.··.· J,:J .... [. '.'.'
J, .•,','. ",
·L·J······:[··,:::::··
: ." J ... ' ·,··t·J.l·)...
" (,ll.·, .... -: .. : ...•.
:.'• : :.. ,'.'l ,, .',
'.'• ',' ~ •• '. ,,,
• .,', ...... , • " * •• 0'

I Steel Pipe
, 900 x 20, st. 52-3

Channel
(60 meters wide)

Figure C7,3.2-2-Pile-SUllPOl'ted Protection System for the Tromso Bridge, Norway (All Units Are Metric)
 110 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND CO;\lMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HlGHWAy BRlDGES

3-m Diameter
Prestressed Piles \ (
o 0

Existing Bridge
Pile Cap

Fender 0 Beam

65m

Figure C7.3.2-3-Plan of Pile-Supported Pier Protection System Evaluated for the Tasman Bridge, Australia (All Units
Are Metric)

- -
l ~
II II II II

((

8 Knots ----~

- - =>
Ship 35,000 Tonnes / - ,;'

Displacement /- ~;;~~~v;\--~~~~---=;~\l_~-f-~~;;~~;;~7f-r~1-i~
I I I I
I I I I
/ / I I
I I I I
I I Plastic I I
I I Hinges / /
-----;;==-----J-ti--'-f-1--------c1-I__----j_ - I I
//""R'~ /II / /1\'-)

I
I
I
I I
Silt I/
~~~~_(P-_I~ __ ~~U-JL~L-_____-~i ___~_
Rock

Figure C7.3.2-4-Section of Pile-Supported Picr Protection System Evaluated for the Tasman Bridge

(
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 111

(
,
" 1
1;-
. , j

I
n n
// : II

"
// I, II
II
// II
/
I, H
II
/i" I, "II
I,
\
1\1
/U ;- T i 1
, ,
ITBB
' I"
II'
,
, "
, :J"\il +5.51GM MLW

! ~
~'
Iii 1,1
I I I I ' ,"
j
'r
Ii I
" , ~
I
. '"11"·1·1"1 '.--,'.'/0.'
(
- ' .. --;;',-.">', " '" .. "'. ','-' "C"> " ,•••,;:;-

II /1 II II II II III II II II II II II II II

I:::
II II

1111
II II II II II II II II II

I:::::::::::::::::
111111111111111111 I:::::::
II II II II

11111111
"',;.'"C'
,;,'"C'
';"';
';"','"":',:',(:'";:
'C",i~-',:T:;,,""<l+l-++*r"'(:''":(
-~,;:;( -;(:< Iii:; 11 J 1;( i-.; I: I':: I( Iid;( -;(
j; t'J([;.: \::;;:Y.:;( :''-::\(:;.: ;1:'1:<1:.: ;(:";';;';'; ';(';(:;;';(';:.
1111 1111111111111/111/ 11111111
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II
1111
HH
I:::::::::::::::::
111111111111111111
11111111
11111111
uu 111111111111111111 11111111
uuuuuuuuu [J[J[J[J

"A-Jl
(
m
---w----Dw- -f- I
aa8----
o
o
0
0
001 o 0

o oj 0 0
fl 0
-

00
I 0 0, l:l 0 J,

Figure C7.3.2-S-Pilc-Supported Protection System for the Rosario-Victoria Bridge, Argentina

112 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\IlHENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLTSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

GRUNDRISS

SCHNITTA-A
C@@j)

[(

Figure C7.3.2-6--Pile-SuPPol'ted Protection System for the Orinoco Bridge, Venezuela

 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 113

( M, V I

a. Single Pile Elevation

M, V

8\,/
--

( L

--
Elevation
Sp ,
5@Sp
,

I I I I

PLAN

b. Multiple Pile Fender Structure

Figure C7.3.2-7-Typical Pile-Structure Geometry for Del'uchel"s Dynamic Analysis

114 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLTSIONDESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
7.3.3 Dolphin Protection
Large-diameter dolphins may be used for protection
of bridge piers. Dolphins are typically circular cells
constructed of driven steel sheet piling. filled with rock
or concrete, and topped by a concrete cap. Dolphins may
also be. constructed of precast concrete sections, or
precast entirely off-site and floated into final position.
Driven pilings are sometimes incorporated in the cell de-
sign. Design procedures for dolphins are usually based
on an estimate of the energy changes that take place
during the design impact loading. Energy-displacement
relationships are typically developed for the following
energy-dissipating mechanisms:
e crushing of the vessel's bow
• lifting of the vessel's bow
• friction between the vessel and the dolphin
• friction between the vessel and the river bottom
• sliding oflhe dolphin
• rotation of the dolphin
• defonnation oflhe dolphin
Deformation of the vessel/dolphin system is assumed to
follow a path of least energy. For each potential dis-
placement configuration of dolphin and vessel, a
deformation path can be developed. Deformation stops
when all the kinetic energy of the impact has been
absorbed. For purposes of design, it is recommended that
the maximum dolphin deformation be limited to less than
one-half the diameter of the cell. Under design loading
conditions, the cell is permitted to undergo large plastic
dcformation and partial collapse.
C7.3.3
Large-diameter dolphins have frequently been used
in the U.S. and Canada for protection of bridge piers,
dock structures, and for mooring of relatively large
vessels. Timber or rubber fenders are usually placed on
the. outer perimeter of the dolphin to act as an anti-
sparking surface to prevent metal-ta-metal contact in the
event of collision with a steel-hulled vessel carrying
flammable products. Existing examples of dolphin
protection in the United States included: the Outerbridge
Crossing, New York; the Betsy Ross Bridge across the
Delaware Bay; the Dame Point Bridge in Jacksonville,
Florida; and the Sunshine Skyway Bridge across Tampa
Bay, Florida.
The circular shape of the dolphins can help deflect
aberrant vessels away from the pier. The cell should,
however, be designed for the maximum loading case of a
head-on impact. If the dolphin is stronger than the vessel,
then the vessel will absorb most of the impact energy
through the crushing of its bow. If the dolphin is weaker
than the vessel, then the dolphin absorbs most of the
energy by large translational (sliding) and rotational
deformations. An example of the former situation
occurred in 1986 when a small 200-ton fishing vessel
rammed one of the massive 60-ft diameter dolphins on
the Skyway Bridge. The vessel was severely damaged
and sank almost instantly whereas the dolphin was
completely undamaged. An example of the latter situa-
tion occurred during the 1979 ship collision with the
Outerbridge Dolphin No.4, which is discussed later in
this Article.
A balance between the cost and safety associated
with these two conditions is usually sought during design
since the larger the dolphin the higher the construction
cost; and the smaller the dolphin the increased risk that
the vessel will not be stopped before hitting a bridge pier.
Figure Cl illustrates the case where the collision energy
is absorbed by both the cell and the ship. For those situa-
tions where large plastic deformations are permitted, it is
recolllmended that the maximum displacement of the top
of the dolphin be limited to one half of the cell diameter
under the design impact. In addition, the sheet piling
should be embedded a sufficient distance into the water-
way bottom that they will not pull out past the mudline if
the dolphin rotates.
Design computations for dolphins are usually based
on a consideration of the energy changes that take place
during an impact. Force-displacement relationships are
typically developed for the following forces:
• crushing of the vessel's bow
• lifting of the vessel's bow
• friction between the vessel and the dolphin ( (
• friction between the vessel and the bay bottom
 SECTION 7~BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 115

( • sliding of the dolphin

\
• rotation ofthe dolphin

~_ _ _---,DoIPhin af

l
impact

r-- l
Dolphin before impact--~ I I

I
I
Ship , ..-tlt---. eI
I
I
I
I
tij---
Figure C7.3.3-1~Collision Energy Absorbed by Dolphin Rotation and Sliding, and by Crnshing of Vessel Bow

The area under the force-displacement diagram

equals the energy absorption capacity of the item. It is
assumed that the deformation of the ship/dolphin system
will follow a path of least energy. For each configuration
of dolphin and ship impact, a deformation path can be
developed. Deformation stops when all the impact
energy has been absorbed.
Case histories of several dolphin protection systems
for bridges are presented below:
In 1961, a 45-ft diameter mooring dolphin located in
the Port of Philadelphia was struck head-on by a loaded
35,OOO-DWT ore carrier at an estimated speed of 8 knots
(Ostenfeld, 1965). The dolphin was located in 36 ft of
water and was constructed of steel shcet piling filled with
sand and gravel and topped with a 4-fi thick concrete
cap. The top of the dolphin extended 12 fi out of the
water and had a timber fender on the outside. The upper
4 ft of the sheet pile interlocks were welded throughout
the circumference. The sheet piling extended
approximately 20 ft into the river bottom. As a result of
the collision, the dolphin tilted over, the top moving
12 ft, but without being overturned. The sheet piles on
the outside, near the point of impact, were lifted up and
the piling on the opposite side of the cell buckled due to
compressive forces. The welded connections of re-
inforcement on the inside of the sheet piles broke. The
bow of the ship was crushed in several feet with the
\ shape of the deformation matching the circular dolphin
\ shape.
Rama and Englot described the dolphin protection of
the Outerbridge Crossing the Arthur Kill waterway near
116 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

New York City (Rama, 1981; Englot, 1988). Constructed (

in 1928, the steel cantilever tmss bridge has a main span ( .
of 750 ft with the main piers located in approximately
35 ft of water. Figures C2 through C4 show the bridge
and dolphins used to protect the stmcture. Originally, the
bridge had only a timber fender on the main piers;
however, subsequent to a minor collision of a 10,000-
DWT tanker in 1960 with one of the main piers, the
Bridge Owners (the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey) decided to construct the dolphin protection
shown in Figure C3. Similar to the Philadelphia mooring
dolphin, the Outerbridge Crossing steel sheet pile
protection cells were 45 ft in diameter, filled with coarse
sand, and topped by a 5-ft thick concrete cap (Figure
C2). The pilings were driven 8 ft through organic silt and
14 ft into a consolidated sand and gravel layer underlying
the river bottom. As seen in Figure C3, the south side of
Pier "D" is protected by a cluster of three dolphins
because of its geometric vulnerability to ship collision
from that direction.

Concrete Cap
1 - - - - - 45' Dia
Timber Fender
+8.5

Mean Low Water 0.0

Steel Sheet Piling

Sand
Fill

Mudline
-35

Organic Silt
--43

Consolidated
Sand & Gravel
-57
------

Figure C7.3.3~2-Typical Dolphin Protective Cell 011 the Outcrbddge Crossing, New York
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 117

( '.,

'\
'"

~ \.>
~
i;
£ ii:

\~
---1--
\
I ''I'V~ Replaced \
t Cofferdams

\ - c : : : r g e d Pla;;-

Channel .\
PLAN

Centerline
--Pier

Centerline
r of Bridge I I
~------_--_~I----+------------------------~
'0 I,--+~
38 FaceO:~h\
9!.'~'.
ftto Timber
Existing 55 ft 551\ ~ Damaged Cofferd am (Cell No.5)
Fender ~. +--- -~ 45-ft Diameter
i'D' 22.5 ft
-U~m~
\, ' - Cofferdam (Cell No.3)

New Cell 60-ft Diameter " " - Abandoned Cofferdam (Cell No.4)
BeloW Surface
92 It
• Replacement Cofferdam (Cell No.4)

ENLARGED PLAN

Figure C7.3.3-3-Plan of Dolphin Protection System for the Onterbridge Crossing oftbe Al'thul' Kill 'Vaterway, New York

i.
118 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

In 1979, the dolphin protection system was put to

the test when a loaded 45,000-DWT tanker stmck Cell
No.4 head-on in front of main pier "D" at an estimated
collision speed of 2.5 knots. The collision took place
during dense fog conditions and while the vessel was
proceeding upstream under a two-tug escort. Only the
center dolphin was hit during the impact, and the ship
continued fonvard 50 ft before it was dragged to a stop.
The ship suffered only minor damage to its bow (unlike
the 1960 collision in which a 100-ft long gash was torn
in the ship's hull). An inspection after the accident
revealed that the steel sheet piling of Dolphin No.4 had
burst open, spilling out sand, and that the piling on the
ship impact side had been pulled out. The remaining
pilings of the cell were bent over at the river bottom. The
45-ft diameter by 5-ft thick concrete cap was found
completely intact but displaced 50 ft due to the collision.
After two years of delay due to processing the necessary
environmental permits, a replacement cell was
constructed in front of the destroyed Cell No.4.
In 1987, the dolphin protection of the same main
pier of the Outerbridge Crossing was again tested when a
48,000-D WT tanker collided with and destroyed Cell
No.5. The cell was 45 ft in diameter and similar to Cell
No.4 described above. Damage to the cell is shown in
Figure C4. The top of the cell was displaced laterally
approximately 15 ft. Englot (1988) identified three basic
dolphin deformations due to ship impact with the cell:

1. The sheet pile shell elongates in tension on the side

being impacted and buckles or crushes in compres-
sion on the opposite side, as the side walls also
deform in shear, all commensurate with the lateral
displacement of the concrete cap that serves as a
rigid diaphragm and remains essentially intact.
2. Upon impact, the local inward compression of the
sheet pile wall displaces the sand filling, resulting in
hoop tension forces on the sheet pile interlocks and
pressure on the underside of the cap. As deformation
and rupturing of the cell wall occurs, sand is lost at
the perimeter of the cap. During the 1979 and 1987
collisions, Englot states that the concrete cap
remained lodged within the sheet pile cell and was
pushed down below the water.
3. Local rupturing of the steel sheet piling at the point
of vessel impact also controls the level of damage to
the impacting vessel.

Following the 1987 collision and destruction of

Dolphin No.5, the Port Authority declared an emergency
situation and immediately brought a contractor on board
to construct a new 60-ft diameter cell around the
destroyed 45-ft diameter cell as shown in Figure C3. By
placing the new cell in the same location as the originally I "
permitted structure, and given the emergency nahlre of
the construction, the Port Authority was able to quickly
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 119

( complete a replacement cell for the vulnerable pier

within eight months after the accident.

Concrete Cap
Elevation-6
(Concrete Cap) 7
?-'

Approximate LOCatiOl:.-----r/" (
of Cell After Damage ( Elevatlon-12
I '"
.'-f.!". ) (Concrete Cap)

r,'" ~ "- Cell Prior to Damage

Elevation-14.5
(Concrete Cap) ..",;,.
Elevalion-20 ""--. .....-- .-:JSSlt.
(Concrete Cap) 'IJJ&Cj
Sh'Ip p
PLAN i"°lZ, !.
'lJJPqC{

Cell Prior to Damage

-,,-, ~'~ -------1

M.L.w.

Concrete '-

Approximate location . . Approximlate River

of Cell after Damage Bottom

Gash In Steel Sheet Piling Cell

(Area of Impact from Vessel)

ELEVATION

Figure C7.3.3-4-Damage to Dolphin No.5 oftlte Outcrbridge Crossing due to Ship Collision in 1987

The Sunshine Skyway Bridge pier protection system

developed by Greiner, Inc. for the Florida Department of
Transportation utilizes a combination of dolphin and
island protection as shown in Figure C5 (Greiner, 1985).
The main piers are protected by islands whereas the five
approach piers on each side of the main piers are protect-
ed by a dolphin system. The use of dolphins to protect
the high-level approach piers was a result of the risk
analysis which indicated that the high-level approach
piers were vulnerable to a catastrophic vessel collision.
Figure C6 is a typical cross-section of the Skyway dol-
phins. The 60-ft diameter cells were designed to
120 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HrGHWAy BruDGES

withstand a collision from either a loaded 23,000-DWT

or an empty 87,300-DWT bulk carrier; the 54 ft-4 in.
diameter dolphins from impacts with a loaded 25,000-
DWTbarge, or an empty 70,000-DWTvessel; and the 47-
foot diameter cells to withstand impacts from a loaded
15,000-DWT barge or an empty 35,000-DWT ship. All
design impact speeds were, 10 knots. The Skyway sheet
piling were driven t11rough a sand overburden (10-40 ft
thick) and then 5 to 10 ft into a stiff limestone stratum
known as the Hawthorne Formation.
Utilizing the information from some of the previous
dolphin collisions discussed above, the Skyway dolphins
incorporated several modifications to the one shown in
Figure C2. Knott recol1Ul1ends that the key to a dolphin's
ability to absorb a major ship collision is to tie the top of
the sheet piling rigidly together with the concrete cap
(Knott, 1986). This is accomplished by using high-
strength sheet pile interlocks, welding the steel sheet pile
interlocks together near the top of the cell, and by
enclosing the top of the dolphin with a thick reinforced
concrete cap with the reinforcing steel penetrating
through holes in the sheet piling. A thick concrete wall
encircles the top side of the cell with additional re-
inforcing steel to help cany the high hoop stresses that
occur during the collision. These structural details
effectively "fix" the top of the dolphin causing a rigid
diaphragm which holds the cell together during the 1- to
3-second collision impact interval. After a major
collision, the cell would be destroyed and would require
I(
replacement.

_ 250' ~I
Artificial Island Protection
Berm I

-j-"---i----t-B'ffilfr!¥.I-+-;;;;:~"O ~ ~ ~
I
'5~
1o""'T
t i f ~
-
\' 0
0
12N 3N 4N 5N 6N
j
fm
~ I§ I 00 I ,00 0v ° 0,
,fj~.
ti'§
- w
I &,0
~ 60' D'Ia
'-------y---'
54'-4/1 Dia 47' D'la
E ~ 0 Dolphins Dolphins Dolphins
I/J
'0

~ iii
(!)(g
o, 100
I
" ,
200
,

SCALE 1 :200

Figure C7.3.3-5-Dolphin and Island Protection System Plan for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, Tampa Bay

I(
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 121

( Navigation Light
Elevation 15.0
mi~~~~~~nw- Timber Fender System
MSL Elevation 0.00 ~-C(,"cl'ete Wall and Cap

Elevation -5.00 --'-m

Steel Sheet Piles

Elevation -30± .I~-'-,-='+-- Crushed Stone FiJI

r-- Existing Bay Scour Protection
/ Bottom

Overburden J
I
"'-- Hawthorne Formation--z
Diameter
Varies

Figure C7.3.3-6-Typical Dolphin Details for the SUJlshine Skyway Bl'idge

Although never built, the typical dolphin shown in

Figure C7 was developed for protection of the Zarate-
Brazo Largo Bridges in Argentina (Saul and Svensson,
1983). Located in IOO-ft deep water, the dolphins
consisted of an approximately 85-ft diameter precast
concrete hollow cylinder that was suppOlted by a ring of
6.5-ft diameter drilled concrete shafts. The walls of the
dolphin were approximately lOft thick and were also
partially hollow. The top cap of the dolphin was
triangular shaped to help deflect aberrant vessels away
from the bridge piers behind the cells. The design vessel
for the dolphin system was a 20,OOO-DWT vessel
impacting at 4 knots.
Methods for designing steel sheet pile dolphins have
been developed by Parkinson and Heins for cells that
stay in the elastic range (Parkinson, 1981; Heins, 1981).
Dolphins which act elastically are analyzed for two
general requirements: I) internal stability (such as
interlock tension, interlock slippage, and shear failure of
the cell), and 2) extemal stability (such as sliding and
overturning) under vessel impact. Figure C8 and the
elastic analysis method presented below are summarized
from Parkinson's paper.
The maximum interlock tension in a steel sheet pile
dolphin is typically computed by:

(C7.3.3-1)

p = h )(h)(Ka) (C7.3.3-2)

where:
122 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

t interlock tension (Ib/in.),

p lateral fill pressure (Ib/JY),

r dolphin radius (ft),

Yf average unit weight of fill (lb/ft3),

II distance from the top of the cell to the plane of

maximum interlock stress (ft), and

Ka active earth pressure coefficient.

The distance, II (ft), from the top of cell to the plane

of maximum interlock stress is equal to a third of the
distance up from the plane of fixity of the piles, where a
plastic hinge develops from the lateral loading. Parkinson
recommends the distance from the mudline to the plane
of fixity be computed by:

df = (3.I)T (C7.3.3-3)

T = {EI/III1)115 (C7.3.3-4)

where:

df depth to fixity (in.),

T relative stiffness factor for normally loaded

clay, granular soils, silt, and peat (in.)
I(

E modulus of elasticity of pile section (psi),

I moment ofinertia of pile section (in.'), and

IIh modulus of horizontal sub grade reaction

(Ib/in. 3).

For fixity of the pile to develop, the piles should be

embedded to a minimum depth, dmim of:

(C7.3.3-5)

The effect of vessel impact on the dolphin interlock

tension is unknown; however, work by Shroeder and
Maitland indicates that increases in interlock tension due
to lateral loads are on the order of 25 percent at the
mudline (Shroeder and Maitland, 1979).
Lateral loads on dolphins are also resisted by the
shear resistance in the sheet pile interlocks. The shear on
the interlocks, Sf, can be computed by:

(C7.3.3-6)

where:
!(
H = height of dolphin to the location of the plastic
hinge (ft), and
 SECTlON 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISlONS 123

coefficient of friction (approximately 0.3 for

( steel-on-steel).

Several different theories exist regarding the failure

mechanism of the fill material in the cell (Parkinson,
1981). The Ve!iical Shear Method (Terzaghi, 1945) and
the Horizontal Shear Method (Cunllllings, 1957) are the
two most widely used. The Terzaghi method as modified
by Slu'oeder will be presented below. The veliical shear
on the centerline of the dolphin cell can be determined
by:

Vs =3kf/2b (C7.3.3-7)

where:

V, shear on centerline (lb),

M resisting moment (ft-lb), and

b equivalent width of a rectangular cell

(approximately = 1.71~ (ft).

The maximum resisting moment, flifmax., (the moment

capacity of the cell) can be estimated by:

(C7.3.3-8)

where Cjl = angle of internal friction of the fill

material.

Using the relationships presented above, the

designer can estimate the size dolphin required to
elastically resist the vessel impact force without damage
to the cell. For large impact forces and energies, the
elastic method will result in very large protective
dolphins. For those cases, the designer should consider
the use of plasticllarge defol1llation sacrificial dolphin
structures which would have to be replaced after a major
collision.
124 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BIUDGES

Timber fenders 0.25 x 0.25

Distance 0.25
+0.9.08 Top of Platform
/j\ a=20°
t---r-l---t;1IT~~~==~,el>'II"te1=20mm
111,,;1-;-
____-'-[-cHAT +4.44
[ MSL+1.10

=t:-::1l;===~l~LAT +0.50
to.DO
* /
/ I
I
I
\
\
\

BI/

:1 L~:E2d----2.00 o:cou:::::ection Section B-B

Detail A 58.50

Timber fender

:(
Plan

HAT+4.44 6.58 Top of r.vliinrl,,, ~ +9.08

l +3.58
MSL+1.10~

LAT+0.50 J ±O.OO

Scour protection
from boulders
Present River Bed
-31.00
-27.00 Top of piles

-33.00 Bottom
of cylinder

--.L -70.00 Bottom of piles

Section A-A
Figure C7.3.3-7-Dolphins Evaluated for Use 011 the Zarate-Bmzo Largo Bridges, Argentina (All Units Are :Metric)
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 125

(
2r

Vessel
_.'::' :::., . . . . . :.::
Impact t Porous
Granular
,'~ ,
'. ' ~ 'V
Fill r-""'=~_~----

h <P,Yt ~
-Flat Web
H Sheet Steel
Piling Shell
PT of Maximum
Interlock Tension ,,-:-:- I-
.. H ,.
" 3 ..
.. "';;.
' '
;
Mudline
d, ... ' , ...
.......
~.,

dmlo
Plane ofJ
"
Fixity " - - Plastic Hinge

( a. Typical Dolphin Cell

Shear Planes

I
I I I

/
~j II 1;/
I I ,
/ / / .
I;' I. I
// ~l I,ft
----~~~d,',' / / I
/ I
:.~'. / I ,.;.
,',' I t ' . . I / ) ~" '.. '.'
Plastic Hinge
ItZ:a:-o~:~-' -I ~
b. Vertical Shear Failure of Dolphin Cell

Figure C7.3,3-8-Typical Dolphin Structure Geometry for Elastic Analysis

126 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGUW AY BRIDGES
7.3.4 Island Protection
Protective islands around vulnerable bridge piers
provide highly effective vessel collision protection.
Islands typically consist of a sand or rock core which is
protected by outer layers of heavy rock armor to provide
protection against wave, currents, and ice actit?I1s. The
island geometlY should be developed in accordance with
the following criteria:
1. Vessel impact force transmitted through the island to
the bridge pier must not exceed the lateral capacity
of the pier and pier foundation.
2. Island dimensions are such that vessel penetration
into the island during a collision will not result in
physical contact between the vessel and any part of
the bridge pier.
The requirement of Item 2 above is particularly
critical for empty or ballasted ships and barges which can
slide up on the slopes of an island and travel relatively
long distances before coming to a stop. In sizing the
island, consideration must also be given to the overhang,
or rake, distance of a ship's or barge's bow which should
be added to the required stopping distance of the vessel.
The design of the surface armor protection of the islands
for wave and CUlTent attack shall be based on method-
ologies used for mbble mound breakwater design
established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Shore
Protection Manual.
The following items have been identified as sources
of energy absorption/dissipation during a vessel impact
with an island:
1. Ship
o Change in potential energy of the ship due to
change in the vertical position of its center of
gravity
o Crushing of the hull ofthe ship
2. Water
o generation of water waves and turbulence
3. Island
o Change in potential energy of island material
o Displacement, shear and compaction of the
island material
o Friction between the ship and the island
o Generation of shock waves in the island
o Crushing of pm1icles of island material
C7.3.4
r(
\
The construction of protective islands around
vulnerable bridge piers is considered by most investi-
gators to provide the highest level of ship collision
protection. The islands typically consist of a sand or rock
core which is protected by outer layers of heavy rock
armor to provide protection for the island against waves
and currents.
Protective islands have been provided for bridge
protection against vessel caIlision on a number of U.S.
and worldwide bridges. Recent projects that have
incorporated protective islands include the Sunshine
Skyway Bridge, Florida; the Baytown Bridge across the
Houston Ship Channel, Texas; the James River Bridge
near Richmond, Virginia; the Laviolette Bridge on the St.
Lawrence Seaway, Canada; the Annacis Island Bridge
near Vancouver, Canada; and the Orwell Bridge, Great
Britain.
Design methodologies for protective islands reported
in the literature usually involve a combination of mathe-
matical modeling and scale physical model tests per-
formed for the specific bridge under consideration
(Havno and Knott, 1986). The results of the physical
model tests are used to calibrate the mathematical model
assumptions conceming the interaction between the col-
liding ship and the island. The island geometry is
developed to fulfill the following two conditions:
1. The ship impact force that is transmitted through the
island to the bridge pier must not exceed the lateral
desigu capacity of the pier and pier fOUlldation.
2. The island dimensions are such that the ship pene-
tration into the island during a collision will not
result in physical contact between the vessel and any
part ofthe bridge pier.
The requirement of Item 2 above is particularly
critical for empty or ballasted ships and barges which can
slide up on the slopes of an island and travel relatively
long distances before coming to a stop. In sizing the
island, consideration must also be given to the overhang,
or rake, distance of a ship's or barge's bow which should
be added to the required stopping distance of the vessel.
Design of the surface armor protection of the islands for
wave and current attack should be based on the criteria
for mbble mound breakwater design according to the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Shore Protection
Manual (USACE, 1984).
Fletcher (1983) describes the following items which
dissipate or redistribute energy during a vessel collision
with an island:
 SECTION 7-BRlDGE PROTECTION DES.IGN PROVISIONS 127

Inclusion of these items in a design analysis is diffi- 1. Ship

( cult since their effects are only pattially understood;
I o Change in potential energy of the ship due to
however, simplifying assumptions are made. Physical
change in the vertical position of its center of
model studies, as well as mathematical simulations, are
gravity.
usually performed when protective islands are designed.
o Cmshing ofthe hull of the ship
2. Water
o Change in potential energy of the water dis-
placed by the ship
o Generation of water waves and turbulence
3. Island
o Change in potential energy of island material
o Displacement, shear and compaction of the
island material
o Friction between the ship and the island
o Generation of shock waves within the island
o Crushing of particles of island material
The inclusion of these items in a design analysis is
difficult since their effects are only partially understood;
however, simplifying assumptions and engineering
judgment (such as that shown in Figures CI and C2) are
made. Experimental model tests are usually performed as
a check of the validity of the mathematical assumptions.
The most extensive tests conducted to date on island
protection were performed by the Danish Hydraulic
Institute (DR!) in a consortium with Danish investigators
for a proposed bridge crossing the Great Belt in Denmark
during the late 1970s (Brink-Kjaer and Brodersen, 1982).
The mathematical modeling was relatively complex since
all degrees of freedom of the vessel were allowed as well
as the three-dimensional geometry of the island. A
computer program solving the numerous simultaneous
equations was developed for solution of the collision
forces and intrusion into the island. The mathematical
model was calibrated and verified from the results of
approximately 500 tests using 1:94 and I :79 scale
models of the islands and 250,000-DWT, 150,000- DWT,
and 50,000-DWTship models. Sample results of the test-
ing for the Great. Belt Bridge islands arc shown in
Figures C3 through C5 (Brink-Kjaer and Brodersen,
1982). One of the major conclusions of the study was
that the island shape should be developed to maximize
the deflective characteristics of an impact since the
horizontal collision forces between the vessel and the
stmcture decreases rapidly when the vessel is deflected,
and that the horizontal force ultimately transferred to the
bridge pier is also reduced.
128 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VF"-sSEL COLLISION DES.IGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Bridge Pier

r Protective Island Vessel after Collision

B

- [
Vessel before
Collision

----
.-
\

rMUdline

W Ship's displacement
B :::: Ship's buoyancy
R W - B :::: reaction at bow
F ;:: Friction force from bow sliding on island
H Horizontal impact force distribution
L IntrusIon distance into island

Figure C7.3.4-1-Vertical Distribution of Ship Impact Force through Protective Island

cos 90 a 1X
<p
[

Island Slope

Figure C7.3.4-2-Hol'izolltal Distribution of Ship Impact Force through ProtecHve Island"

 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESlGN PROVISIONS 129

( MN F90 MN F,
I

0
50 50
Jl~
F9a
I -+-
40 40
30 7.9 30
20 e •
6.5
8.1
(
8 mfs 20 8 mfs

10
10.~ 8.0. :.3 '-=- Initial Collision 10
7.5 ~.8 6.7 Speed (mfs)
e e
0 0
-40 -20 0 20 40 m -40 -20 0 20 40 m
MN
70

60
Fa

o Bridge Pier
MN
70

60
Fj
~F
~essel
j

50 ~ Fa 50
6.7
40 40
8.1
8 mfs
30 30 8 mfs
(

20 20

10 8.1
,( 10
\'
0 e 0 e
-40 -20 0 20 40 m -40 -20 0 20 40 m

'I
I;
/1/ Track of Bow
/

Figure C7.3.4-3-Island Collision Forces on Vessel and Bridge Pier from Impact of 150,OOO-DWT Tanker with 32.S-ft
Draft, Great Belt Bridge Model Results (All Units Are Metric)
 130 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Plan of View
Line of Symmetry

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ 7.9
Berm
~~--------------~-----------8
~~---------- __ ~~ __--__---------8 Initial
---------- ------------u 8
Speed,
m/s
Z-~----------~~--------------------8
_________________ 8
8

Slope LEGEND
- - - - - - Track of Bow, Hydraulic Model
_____ Track of Bow, Mathematical Model
Line of Symmetry

Figure C7.3.4-4---Great Belt Bridge Island Test Results for Bow Track of 250,000-DWT Tanker with a 32.8-ft Draft (All
Units Are Metric)

400,-________________________- .

Rigid Bow

300

z ;'
6 I "
~ I ""
~ 200 I "" ;-

-
(ij
c
o
N
·c
/
I
I
1\
Deformable Bow
",
. . . .."

o
I I
I
100 I
I
1

o o" 2 4 5 6 7

Time (s)
Figure C7.3.4-$------.Compal'ison of Island Horizontal Forces for Rigid and Deformable Bow l\Jodels of 250,OOO-DWT Tanker
Head-on Collision, Great Belt Bridge Study (All Units Are Metric)
 SECTION 7-BRlDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 131

( Physical and mathematical models of collisions with

islands were also performed during the design of the pier
protection system for the new Sunshine Skyway Bridge.
A cross-section of the Skyway islands is shown in
Figure C6. Located in approximately 30 ft of water, the
protection was designed to stop or deflect a lO-knot ship
collision from either a loaded 23,000-D WT bulk carrier
with a 30-ft draft, a 87,300-DWT bulk carrier partly
loaded to a 30-ft draft (61,000-ton displacement), or an
empty 87,300-DWT bulk carrier (20,000-ton
displacement) that had been trimmed such that the draft
at the bow was level with the water surface. The experi-
mental set-up for the testing performed by Hydro
Research Science, Inc. is shown in Figure C7. Typical
results liOln the physical model testing are shown in
Table CI. As presented in the table, loaded vessels are
stopped on the slope of the island whereas empty vessels
can slide on top of the island for a considerable distance
(Hydro Research Science, 1984).
The mathematical model utilized for the Skyway
island described by Ravno and Knott (1986) was an
extension of the DR! Great Belt computer model to
include additional research results developed in the eady
1980s as well as the Skyway physica1111odeling. A plot
of measured versus computed collision results is shown
in Figure C8 where the results are reasonably close.
However, since the physica1111ode1 results were used to
calibrate the mathematical model, the comparisons were
expected to be close. Figure C9 shows an example of the
mathematical simulations performed for the Skyway
Bridge.
Physica11110deling performed for the Orwell Bridge
protection islands in England is described by Fletcher, et
a!. The project consists of 1: 100 and 1:50 scale models of
the design vessels that were:

1. Loaded 11,000-ton displacement ship with 19.7-ft

draft.
2. Vessel (1) ballasted to 9,000-ton displacement with
a 16.4-ft draft.
3. A 1,000-ton displacement vessel with 6.6-ft draft.
132 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

I 51 ' Varies 35'

STONE CLASSES
I I I I I I TYPE AVG. WT. (tons)
(69' max., 1'-6" min.) I 5.0
II 2.0
III 0.5
+8.0 Crest
IV 0.1
I Elevation III
/0.0 MSL
I
I IV
Centerline Sand Fill
I-+-Pier Mudline Elevation Quarry Run
I /-30± Core

Concrete Armor Mat . /

? 10 20 ~o
SCA~E: /30 '
Figure C7.3.4~6-Sunshine Skyway Bridge Protective Island Typical Section

Photography Bridge Pier & Island Models

Tower
Modeled
Tide & Current Generators
Instrumentation Bathymetry
40' Movable
Platform
Wave Generator

Wave Absorber

Basin Filter &

Recirculating
Systems _____""_""

60 It x 200 It "".--~.:;
Wave-Tidal Basin

Movable Tow
Structure

/
;< /
Wave Height Gauge
'Locations (Approx.)

Figure C7.3.4-7-Physical Model Test Layout for Ship CoJlisions against the Sunshine Skyway Bridge
 SECTION 7-BRlDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 133

( Table C7.3.4-1----Sample Results of 1:50 Scale Model Impact on Skyway Bridge Protection Island
I
Test Impact Ship Ship Impact Force on Intrusion in
No. Angle (0) Speed (knots) Force (kips) Pier (kips) Island (ft)
87,300-DWTShip Partly Loaded to 61,000 Tons with a 30-ft Draft
5 0 9.5 20,500 220 --45
7 0 11.6 25,960 856 -35
8 0 13.3 31,430 1,103 -25
12 0 10.2 24,600 243 --40
13 30 11.3 36,890 863 -31
18 30 8.2 24,600 568 --45
19 45 9.5 38,260 1,229 --40
20 45 12.0 40,990 2,169 -27
21 45 15.9 71,050 3,486 -5
87,300-DWT Ship Ballasted to 20,000 Tons with a O.O-ft Bow Draft
I 0 8.6 6,720 154 32
2 0 9.2 8,962 290 42
4 0 13.7 9,410 418 104
14 30 10.3 8,510 649 45
15 45 8.6 5,830 717 35
16 45 11.2 10,310 1,130 37

LEGEND
i- 5°36'07.2"
,I
I
Berm Intrusion is Measured
_ Bridge from Top of Slope
Centerline

0° Impact is Parallel to
Ship Channel for Local
Island Test

I
"
134 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COi\Jl\fENTARYFOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Ffoundation (measured and computed)

Fship

1.0 x MEASURED
x x DHI (Great Belt Bridge)
x li x • HRS (Skyway Bridge)
0.5
x x
x
0.24
0.2 x
0.16
/Computed
0.10

o
0.05

o
•
·0
0.02
••
49
14 23 44 42 13
0.01 47 9 32 24 46 6 6 2 os 39
0.16 22 2124 7 8 Test no,
1920 computed Ratio
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
Ffoundation IFship
Figure C7.3.4-S-Comparison of Great Belt and Sunshine Skyway Island Collision Test Results ((
800

600

400
Island Slope

200
45°

-200
Pier

feet -800 -600 -400 ~200 o 200

Figure C7.3.4-9-Mathematicall\lodel Result of an Empty, Trimmed, 85,OOO-DWT Vessel Impacting the Skyway Bridge
Island at 10 Knots in Extreme High 'Vater
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 135

( +4
E
17 WL + 3.5 c'
Test Speed, E
No. mls :J

3 4.32
Boat Floating
Island Slope Z------,I-J------1 +2
1il
0
c:
7 4.37 »
at Rest ~
Z
El Position of Point P
0 <J)
>
7 0
.0
Vessel Position 3
Vessel Position '"
Qj
-2 .>
<J)
after Impact ...J

31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47

Horizontal Distance, m

Figure C7.3.4-10~Physicall\fodel Results of 11,OOO-Ton Vessel Impact with the Ol'well Bridge Protective Island (All Units
Are Metric)

14.5 m at 1 in 29 Slope Level

I I
Two Layers Precast Single Layer of Tripods
Concrete Tripods 450 nominal
(
---~-----
500 mm Fill Type C
500 mm Fill Type C PIER
Fill Type A
150 mm Fill Type 8

Figure C7.3.4 w ll-Protective Island Typical Section for the Overall Bridge, England
136 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGffiYAY BRIDGES

Shipping

ELEVATION

((
Protection Island

Shipping Channel

PLAN

Figure C7.3.4-12-Phm and Elevation of Annacis Island Bridge Protection Island System, Vancouver, Canada
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 137

All collision speeds were equal to 8 knots. Typical

( results of the testing is shown in Figure CIO. The tests
indicated that the distance penetrated by a vessel
increases as its speed is increased and as the water level
relative to the top of the island is increased. It was also
found that the shallower draft 1,aDO-ton vessel penetrated
further than the larger deep draft vessels. The final
design of the island section is shown in Figure CII for
the Olwell Bridge (Fletcher, May, and Perkins, 1983).
The island protection for the recently completed
Annacis Island Bridge is shown in Figure C12.
Described by Sexsmith, the design vessel was a 60,000-
DWT vessel impacting at 12 knots with a collision
energy of 885,200 ft-kips. By placing the tower piers of
the 1,500-ft main span near the river's edge, the
designers were able to extend the adjacent riverbank out
and around the new piers to create the protective
embankment (Sexsmith, 1983). This same approach has
also been used recently for the new James River Bridge
in Richmond, Virginia and for one of the main piers of
the new Dame Point Bridge in Jacksonville, Florida.
The primary means of collision energy absorption
with an island system is the deformation and displace-
ment of the island materials. Deformation of the ship's
bow will also occur, however, the deformation is
expected to be considerably less than would occur with
either a dolphin system or fenders mounted on a rigid
pier. Due to the relatively gentle nature of an island
( stopping a vessel, it is usually the method favored by
ship masters, pilots, and environmental agencies
concerned about toxic spills resulting from a ship
accident.
The primalY disadvantage of island protection
results from potential adverse impacts to the river/bay
environment. The islands can create a serious restriction
or blockage in the waterway resulting in increased water
currents, scouring, and adversely affecting the flushing
characteristics of a waterway. Sometimes the bottom of
the waterway is an environmentally sensitive habitat and
objections over the necessary filling become a major
issue. This argument is often offset by the benefits
gained by the rip-rap armor protection creating an
artificial reef environmentally advantageous to many
invertebrate and fish species. Depending on the site
conditions of the project, the materials cost of the island
sand/rock core and rip-rap armor layers can either be
relatively inexpensive or velY expensive.
138 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES
7.3.5 Floating Protection Systems
Various types of floating protective systems have
been used and may be considered by the engineer.
Several of these systems include:
• Cable Net Systems-vessels are stopped by a system
of cables anchored to the waterway bottom and
suspended by buoys located in front of the bridge
piers.
• Anchored Pontoons-large floating pontoons
anchored to the waterway bottom in front of the
piers absorb vessel impact.
• Floating Shear Booms-floating structures anchored
to the watenvay bottom that deflect aberrant vessels
away from piers and absorb impact energy.
Special consideration for corrosion protection must
be made for all systems involving underwater steel
cables and anchorages.
Special considerations shall be given to function and
vulnerabilityldurability of floating systems during winter
time in waters subject to icing or ice drift.
Floating systems are vulnerable to being ovenidden
by vessels with sharply raked bows.
C7.3.S
Floating protection systems are usually considered
for pier protection against ship collisions where the water
depths are too deep for other types of protection systems
to be economical. The basic theory of floating protection
systems is to absorb the ship's energy with small forces
and large deformations using high-strength cable tension
members. The various types of cable systems which have
been repOlted in the literature fall into two categories:
1) elastic energy conversion systems, and 2) plastic
energy conversion systems.
For temporary protection of a drilling rig in the
Akashi Channel, Japan, the elastic cable system shown in
Figure Cl was developed in 1973 (Oda and Kubo, 1983).
Located in l60-ft water depths, the device was designed
for 2,000-DWT ships impacting the cables at 9.7 knots at
an angle of 15 degrees. A similar system, shown in
Figure C2, has been proposed for use on the Honshu-
Shikoku Bridge crossing the Akashi Strait to protect
against impacts from 1,000-DWT vessels. Energy is
absorbed primarily by the weight of the anchors sliding
on the bay bottom.
After the 1975 collapse of the Tasman Bridge in
Hobart, Australia, due to a collision from the vessel SIS
Lake Illawara, the design engineers developed the elastic
cable protection system shown in Figure C3. Although
never built, the system was designed to stop a ship of
35,000-DWT at a speed of 7.8 knots. After a relatively ((
forceless deformation of about 100 ft, the nylon anchor
cables can be stretched by roughly 35 percent of their
980-ft length creating a resistance force of 790 kips per
cable (Maunsell and Partners, 1978). The elastic
potential energy capacity, PE, of two nylon cables
would be:
FE ~ (112)(0.35)(980)(2)(790) ~ 270,970 ft-kips
This is greater than the estimated 217,000 ft-kips of
kinetic energy associated with the colliding ship.
One of the few cable systems that has actually been
built protects the Taranto Bridge that crosses the Mare
Piccolo waterway in Italy (Saul and Svensson, 1983).
The bridge has two navigation spans of 500 ft with a
total of six piers in approximately 40-ft water depths.
Shown in Figure C4, the plastic cable system is designed
to stop 15,000-DWT ships at a speed of 6 knots. The
colliding ship will be decelerated at 0.66 fIIs 2 over a
distance of 100 ft through a retaining force of 720 kips.
As shown in Figure C4, the arrestor on the surface
consists of chains spanning between support buoys
which, in turn, are anchored to concrete foundations on
the bay bottom nsing chains. The ship's energy is
absorbed by the five lead anchors located on each chain.
The 16.4-ft long dampers consist of a steel pipe in which (I
a drawbar absorbs energy through the plastic
deformation of the lead filling in the pipe. Full-size
SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 139

model testing of the dampers was performed to measure

their energy/force characteristics. A plot of energy, force,
and velocity versus the stopping distance of the ship is
shown in Figure CS.
Drawbacks to the use of cable systems include
concerns over corrosion, adjustment of cable lengths if
bay bottom depths scour .or if there are large tide height
fluctuations, uncertainty of the interaction of the soil and
anchor sliding, and blocking of the watenvay for
recreational uses. As shown in Figure C6, however, the
primary disadvantage involves the possibility that the
cable will slide off the ship's bow and under the vessel
without capturing the ship or barge (Maunsell and
Partners, 1978).
A type of floating protection system, termed an-
chored pontoons, has been proposed for consideration for
bridge protection. Anchored pontoons consist of a
floating stmcture that is held in place by fastening michor
cables on the underside of the floating stmcture. This
eliminates the problem of cable capture discussed
previously with cable systems. An example of this type
of system, shown in Figures C7 and C8, that was
proposed for the Zarate-Brazo Largo Bridge in Argentina
(Mondorf, 1983).
The cables of the floating pontoon structure are an-
chored into the sea bottom using weighted blocks, piles,
or other types of methods. Similar to cable systems, the
impact is absorbed by either elastic or plastic deforma-
tion of the cables and anchor system. In addition, fenders
on the floating pontoon can absorb part of the impact
energy. A disadvantage of the floating pontoon system is
its susceptibility to displacement or damage during
severe storms. This would be similar to the anchored
concrete pontoons of the Hood Canal Bridge near
Seattle, Washington where 13 largc segments of thc
structure sank during a severe storm in 1979. Currently,
there have been no known uses of this system for use as
pier protection for bridges.
 140 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISlON DESIGN 01" HIGHWAY BruDGES

8.5m 10.2 m
LH Chains 1'<-'"'1 -.l MSL

L
Link Diameter 95 mm
Break Load 920'1'

E Pneumatic Rubber Fenders

o Diameter 2.0 in. Length 5.0 m
c5
l!)
Anchor Chains

ELEVATION

Sub-Buoy Main Buoy

Drilling Rig

PLAN
Figure C7.3.$-1-Cable System Protection of Temporary Drilling Rig in the Akashi Chanuel, Japan

Bridge Pier

Main Buoy
r------w~crl!rT-.r-~~L,_._~
(fJ\ ..'

Figure C7.3.5-2-Cable System Protection Proposed for the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Piers across the Akashi Straits, Japan
 SECTION 7-BruDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 141

Tasman Bridge Nylon Cables

)
PE-Jacket
Tension Cables
'I
Arrestor Cable \
\ 11'.
I I
t
•
O~
1-
"
\\11
\' rIf Foamed 0.20
--t
Tension Sinker

Nylon Cable l I
I
I
II I 'I' I
I I I
I I I
Polyurethan
Nylon
Steel ~ables
I
1 ,l, t A
Casing
Anchor Bloc~ I r I I I
Anchor Chain "'0\ ·n· A .!A}. ~! ). ~-! },·.1 ~,
f1nnr-i'F:=-:===-:=~I~
E!~~------3Y3
~
N
Anchor .----'. .'
Alternate B .....j IT
1.00 m
Position of Section A-A Floating Arrestors
Stopped Ship
300m

TensionAnchor~Z:=======::::==:::;:;::;::=>;p::2~:;-
'Cable----;
/'
POSitioning Anchor Tension Sinker Concrete Anchor Block

Figure C7.3.5-3-CabJe System Evaluated for Use on the Tasman Bridge, Australia (All Units Are Metric)

Buoy
/
1
{ I
-/ I 5m

= .-~~.

Arrestor Cables with

Buoyancy Cylinders

~~--=-"1). ..
Buoys
LZ/ Anchors

. -.
'--"

Regular Position
During Collision

I Figure C7.3.5-4--Cable System Protecting Piers of thc Taranto Bridgc across the l\'lal'c Piccolo, Italy (All Units Are IVIetric)
142 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BlUDGES

Damper No.
$: ((

n
I II III IV V »~

l l
2'E
<1>Z
<=2
w~
3.20 '
80

Z Damping Force
62.40,.._ _ 60 3
n. ~

~
~o .s
LL
Ol
40 2~
'"
~ 1.60
0
~
co ~

0.80 20 1

o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Distance s (m)
Figure C7.3.5-5-Fol'cc, Speed, Energy Relationships orthe Taranto Bridge Cable Protection System (All Units Are Metric)
((

,1
,
------ '~~------ '-:
-------------- -,-----.
;n
--=-- ~ ~
7

a b c d
Bulbous Bow Bulbous Bow Raking Bow Pontoon Bow
does not pass probably does not may pass over may pass over
over arrestor pass over arrestor arrestor arrestor

Figure C7.3.5-6-Cablc Capture ofVcssel Depends upon the Shape ofthe Vessel Bow
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 143

(
Centerline A J
Pier /11249 248 247
12' 12' A
I I I \ 12'ffi12' 12,A12'

+----+i : \---/~-.-t-t
'
I D II
I
I
I
-:,-=+' -
Floating I
\ Buffer I
I
\
\I
\I
I \
\
Fencing Lines

Ii'.
I

' i I "',',

,.1" t,,~
Fender Line

I \ '\ 1\ .."'..-"/\ .. ~ '~"I\

1\
1 \
~{,.. =~~~~r~ing
Buoys

I
I IV\.\ t / \ t Counterweights

f Ii
I /1 \
/ \\\ / \.! ,.,","" u""
I

j: \/
~i
\i.LI
( I
240
II
I
I III Retainer Anchors

o 50 100 150 200 250 m

Figure C7.3.5-7-PIan of Anchored Pontoon (Floating Buffer) Protection System Evaluated for Use on the Zarate-Brazo
Largo Bridge, Argentina (All Units Are l\'1etl'ic)

MWL

-30

Firm Sand
-70
A-A
:sz..
o 50 100m

Figure C7.3.5-8-Section of Anchored Pontoon (Floating Buffer) Protection System for the Zal'ate-Brazo Largo Bridge (All
Units Are Metric)
 144 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

7.4 MOVABLE BRIDGE PROTECTION C7.4

Movable bridges are paliiculariy susceptible to The special Guide Specification requirements for the
interrupted service as a result of vessel collision because protection of movable bridges were developed because
even minor impact on the substructure or superstmcture of the numerous accidents that have occurred on these
cau cause mechanical equipment to jam or fail. Movable bridge structures. Many of the movable bridges in the
. bridge piers which house mechanical equipment or United States. were designed and built in the late 1800s
support movable machinery should be fully protected and early 1900s when both the frequency and size of
from vessel contact by aberrant vessels. vessels using the waterways were very small compared
There should be no contact of the vessel with the to the ship and barge vessels of today. As a result of their
pier when the protection system is in the fully deformed relatively naITow horizontal spans, and the increase in
position and the vessel has been stopped. Special size and frequency of vessels in most waterways today,
consideration must be included for the overhang of raked many movable bridges have a relatively high risk of
bows on ships and barges. vessel collision. The machinelY in most movable bridges
The navigation spans of all movable bridges should is relatively sensitive to impact, vibrations, and
provide a protection system which prevents vessels from deflections in both the substructure and superstructure.
laterally contacting the pier or navigation chamlel As a result, even minor (non-catastrophic) vessel impacts
superstructure while the vessel is transiting through the can dismpt the bridge operations causing bridge closure
bridge. There should be no contact between the vessel until repairs are made. The requirements of the Guide
and the pier or span while the protection system is in the Specification were developed to give designers specific
deformed position. guidelines in protecting these stmctures.
The superstructure of the movable spans on bascule
and swing bridges should be fully protected when they
are in an open position. The protection system along the
sides of the navigation channel should prevent contact
between the vessel and the span in the open position.
This is a special concern for bascule bridges in which the
movable span leaves in the open position may overhang
the pier and are vulnerable to contact by a vessel's
((
superstlUcture.
Electrical power cables, including submarine cables,
should be positioned and suppolied so as to be fully pro-
tected from damage by impact from marine traffic.
Bascule bridge spans are subject to impact damage
by marine vessels ,vhen spans are in either the open or
closed position. Bascule leaves, when in the full open
position, should be designed such that an aberrant vessel
cannot come into contact with the structure. Although it
is impractical to design closed bascule leaves such that
marine vessel contact cannot occur, leaf designs should
minimize the resultant leaf damage from impacts
occurriug when the bridge is in the closed or patiially
open position.
The bridge tender's house should be located such
that marine vessel impact will not endanger the bridge
tender or bridge controls and operating system.
Mechanical, hydraulic, or electrical systems should
not be located on walls susceptible to vessel impact.
Precautions should be taken to locate andlor protect drive
systems, such as hydraulic systems, drive gearing,
motors, and electrical power and control systems from
possible damage due to direct or indirect impact damage
frOlll marine vessels.
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTlON D.ESIGN PROVISlONS 145

Drive systems for movable bridges should be evalu-

( ated to identify single point failures that may result fi'om
impact damage. Consideration should be given to
providing redundant system elements that cannot be fiIlly
protected against impact damage, criticaVessential items
should be conveniently replaceable.

7.5 MOTORIST WARNING SYSTEMS C7.5

Motorist warning systems may be nsed on bridges to The greatest loss of life in catastrophic ship/bridge
minimize the loss of life which may occur in the event of collisions has resulted from the continuation of highway
a catastrophic collapse of a bridge during a vessel traffic after the span has been severed. Following the
collision. Motorist safety system components can be investigation of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge collapse,
grouped into three categories of fimction: 1) devices to the National Transportation Safety Board recommended
detect hazards, either environmental or man-made, that standards be developed for the design, performance,
2) devices to verify hazards or problems, and 3) devices and installation of systems to detect highway bridge span
to control traffic and/or pass information to drivers. The failures and to warn motorists (NTSB, 1981).
motorist safety system for a bridge should be developed The FHWA issued a technical advisory in 1983
using the appropriate items from three separate describing the investigation and results of the warning
categories that will interact to address the specific systems evaluated for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge by
problems anticipated on the bridge. the Florida Department of Transportation. The Guide
Specification provides data for the designer to consider
in developing a motorist warning system for a bridge
structure (FHWA, 1983). Experience in the effectiveness
motorist warning systems for vessel collision is limited.
The system initially installed on the Sunshine Skyway
Bridge had to be modified, and some portions removed
due to vibrations from the bridge setting off t11se alarms
and deterioration of electronic components in a harsh
coastal environment.
One example of an effective warning system is the
Tasman Bridge in HobaIi, Australia. The Tasman Bridge
collapsed due to a ship collision in 1975. Because the
cost of protection for the structure was so expensive, the
Bridge Authority decided to constl1lct a second bridge
crossing upstream of the Tasman to act (essentially) as a
backup bridge in the event of a future collision with the
Tasman Bridge. Although vulnerable to a vessel
collision, a motorist warning system was installed to
protect the public motorists (Leslie, Clark, and Segal,
1983). The restored bridge, which carries 50,000 vehicles
per day, has computer-controlled traffic lights on gantries
for control of traffic in peak hours. This system was
modified to enable the bridge to be used in a manner
similar to a railroad at-grade crossing. In peak road
traffic periods, ships are not permitted to navigate the
bridge. At all other times, the bridge deck is completely
cleared of all traffic while a ship passes beneath the
bridge. The traffic delay is about three minutes.
146 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COi\ll\IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

7.5.1 Hazard Detection Systems

As they relate to shiplbridge collision hazards,

devices in this functional category include the following:

o Ship Impact Vibration Detectors-Placed on bridge

piers, these vibration sensors would be capable of
distinguishing between normal structural vibrations
and movements associated with substantial ship
impacts.
o Continuity Circuils-This electrical system would
utilize pairs of conductOl~ terminating with end-of-
line devices attached to the bridge superstructure.
Collapse of some portion of the bridge deck would
interrupt the circuit continuity.
o VHF Radio Lillk-The use of this device would be
in advance of imminent danger, as foreseen by the
pilot or master of a vessel that had, for instance, lost
steerage. If the mariner anticipated a possible
ship/bridge collision, he would radio the bridge toll
booth personnel, or other appropriate agency, via
VHF channel 16 (marine emergency channel) in
order to halt motorist traffic on the bridge.
Either of the first two of the above devices could
activate traffic controllinfonnation systems automatically
or through a machine-mau-machine interface with the
human intermediary verifying hazards before intenupting ((
traffic.
VHF radio units are readily convenient in the deck-
house of virtually every merchaut vessel. The use of such
a system would reqtlire the iustallation of a relatively
inexpensive VHF set in a bridge toll plaza, or other
appropriate agency, and would require continued
monitoring by the Owner's personnel who could make
appropriate traffic control decisions.
Detectors for other than ship collision hazards in-
clude:

• Weather instrumentation, patiicularly to measure

wind velocity, and
• Electronic loops in the bridge deck to detect non-
movement of traffic, indicative of a disabled vehicle
or a traffic accident.
The wind velocity data can be used in conjunction
with criteria to restrict high surface exposure vehicles, to
close the bridge to traffic altogether, or both. Detection
by the loops of traffic stoppage can automatically
activate traffic control/information systems or can alert
bridge personnel to verify problems and take appropriate
action.
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 147

( 7.5.2 Verification Devices

I
Virtually any detection device can be electronically
linked to traffic control/infOlmation equipment to auto-
maticaJly warn or stop traffic. Theoretically, such
automatic links are relatively simple in design; however,
in actual practice, considerable difficulty can be
experienced with false alarms and unnecessary interrup-
tions oftraffic.
In many instances, agencies implementing motorist
safety systems have opted to place a "verification"
function into the systems whereby initial alerts from the
detection equipment are checked by personnel before
traffic control actions are taken. Included among possible
verification methods are:

• Closed Circuit Television (CCTI1-Permanently

installed, rotational, remote controIled, closed circuit
cameras can be placed strategically to allow
personnel at a monitor site to view the bridge main
span, the ship channel, the roadway, or any other
feature desired.
• Visual Delineation-In this relatively simple system,
the top of the bridge parapet or guardrail would be
fitted with a series ofreflectors or lights. A collapse
of a pOliion of the bridge superstructure would ap-
pear to system control personnel as a discontinuity in
the series of delineators.
• Motorist Call Boxes-Numerous states have imple-
mented systems of motorist aid call stations along
roadways and bridges in recent years. Among
systems in place are code radio transmitting devices
on which the motorist selects push-button options
specific to the type of assistance desired; telephone
systems that allow two-way conununication between
the motorist and system control personnel or law
enforcement dispatchers; and two-way radio
communication providing similar service as tele-
phone systems, but without dependence on phone
company lines.
Using either of the first two of the above systems,
alarms received from ship accident detector systems can
be verified and decisions made as to appropriate action to
be taken. However, there are difficulties and short-
comings to any verification system, including the re-
quirement to establish a monitoring site or sites;
maintaining skilled, salaried personnel on an around-the-
clock basis; and technical problems of using eery for
visual verification in darkness or low visibility.
When visual pictures can be acquired via eeTY, it
is often difficult to determine the specific type of assis-
tance required (e.g., tow vehicle, ambulance, fire-rescue).
148 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLTSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

7.5.3 Traffic Control and Information Devices

Whether the hazard detector device infonnation is

used automatically or is manually verified, the ultimate
function of a motorist safety system is to appropriately
control traffic or inform motorists of hazards. The
following devices can be used to accomplish this
function:

• Variable Message Signs-Virtually any message can

be transmitted via this device, including warnings of
catastrophic bridge failure, environmental hazards,
traffic congestion, constl11ction/maintenance
activity, etc.
• Flashing Beacons-Used in conjunction with
standard format warning signs Cdiamond-shape,
black legend and border, yellow background), this
device can be used to bring attention to a warning
message.
• Movable Gates-Usually fitted with flashing red
lights and an audio al31m Csiren or bell), this device
can be lowered across traffic lanes to halt motorists
Cas at railroad crossings).

7.6 AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALTERNATIVES C7.6

Improvements in navigation within the navigable
channel at a bridge location will often result in a
significant reduction in the vulnerability of a bridge to
vessel collision. Since 60 to 85 percent of all vessel
collision accidents are attributed to pilot error, it is
impOliant that all aspects of the bridge design, siting, and
aids to navigation with respect to the navigation channel
be carefully evaluated with the purpose of improving or
maintaining safe navigation in the waterway in the
vicinity ofthe structure.
The bridge designer is velY limited in his ability to
require any modifications that affect operations on a
navigable waterway since the responsibility and authority
for implementing such navigation improvements within
the U.S. waterways belongs to the U.S. Coast Guard.
Regardless of the question of design responsibility, the
following discussion will highlight various aspects of
navigation alternatives that should be considered in light
of vessel collision with bridges.
Si1lCe 60 to 85 percent of all vessel collision acci-
dents are attributed to pilot enol', it is important that all
aspects of the bridge design, siting, and aids to naviga-
tion with respect to the navigation channel be carefully
evaluated with the purpose of improving or maintaining
safe navigation in the waterway in the vicinity of the
stmcture. The bridge designer is very limited in his
ability to require any modifications that affect operations
on a navigable waterway since the responsibility and
authority for implementing such navigation improve-
ments within U.S. watelways belongs to the U.S. Coast
Guard and is protected under Federal Regulations. In
some states, the State Government has the responsibility
to license and regulate s'1te pilots on merchant vessels,
and through this responsibility can exercise some regula-
tmy privileges affecting navigation within its
jurisdiction.
Of the operational alternatives listed in the Guide
Specification, the implementation of radio-telephone
communication between the ship and bridge operators
and toll personnel is one of the most effective and least
expensive alternatives toward improving the safety of
bridges. High-intensity light beacons, sound devices, and
placement of a RACON device on the bridge are alter-
natives that the bridge owner can implement. RACON
devices are typically mounted on the bridge at the center-
line of the navigable channel. The RACON sends out a
signal that is received by the merchant vessel's radar
causing an image to appear on the radar screen
identifYing the bridge centerline location to the mariner.
 SECTION 7-BRIOGE PROTECI:ION DESIGN PROVISIONS 149

This allows the vessel's pilot to know the location of the

( navigable channel under the bridge even in severe
weather conditions.
The use of advanced navigation systems for vessels
transiting under a bridge structure has shown significant
reductions in the probability of aberrancy by pilots under
simulator .conditions (CAORF, 1984).These include both
advanced shore-based VTS systems with real-time
sUlveillance capabilities as well as small portable
navigation units carried on board by the master or pilot
ofthe vesse!'
An example of the later is described by Knott (1986)
where, as part of the Skyway Bridge pier protection
project, the Florida Department of Transportation con-
ducted a feasibility study for a portable, lightweight,
differential LORAN-C receiver to be c31Tied on board
vessels in Tampa Bay by the local harbor pilots. The
units would provide digital information to the pilot
regarding his vessel's position and also a visual display
on an electronic map. A shore-based receiver would also
monitor the vessel's position tln'ough the pilot's unit and
would initiate motorist warning devices on the bridge to
stop traffic if the vessel went out of the navigation
chatme!' Although feasible on an engineering and
technology basis, the system has not been implemented
due to unresolved legal issues concerning liability.
A totally shore-based remote sensing system lias
been proposed for use on bridges to stop motorist traffic
( on a bridge structure if the vessel is on a collision path
with the bridge (Greneker, Eaves, and McGee, 1981).
Greneker proposed his system for the Sidney Lanier
Bridge near Brunswick, Georgia, following the bridge's
collapse and loss of life due to a vessel collision in 1972.
150 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLlSIONDESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

7.6.10peratiollaIAltel'Jlatives

Operational alternatives should be considered as a

means of improving safety near bridges, reducing the
consequences of a collision, or reducing the required
level of pier protection. Some of these alternatives are:

• imposing speed limits for vessels

• mandatOlY pilotage requirements
• mandatory tug assistance requirements
• minimum weather standards to transit under the
bridge
• restrict vessel passage during high currents
• restrict large vessels to daylight transits only
• require empty vessels to take on ballast for a
mininmtU draft
• impose traffic separation schemes
• impose advanced VTS systems (Vessel Traffic
Service)
• require radio-telephone communication between
ship and bridge persOlmel

7.6.2 Standard Navigation Alternatives

Altematives to be considered include:

• Placement of ranges on inbound/outbound channels

near the bridge
• Additional buoys and buoy placement near the
bridge
• Radar reflectors and lights 011 all buoys near the
bridgde
• High intensity light beacons on the bridge structure
• Sound devices (fog horns) on the bridge
• RAeON device on the bridge structure main span at
the centerline of the channel for improved radar
image on the vessel
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTlON DESIGN PROVISIONS
7.6.3 Electronic Navigation Systems
/
I
The use of advanced navigation systems for vessels
transiting under a bridge stmcture have shown significant
reductions in the probability of aberrancy by pilots under
simulator conditions. These include both advanced
shore-based radar VTS systems with real-time sur-
veillance capabilities as well as small portable navigation
units carried on board by the master or pilot ofthe vessel.
151
C7.6.3
Following the terrorist attacks upon the United
States on September II, 2001, the USCG has required
that all foreign ships entering the U.S. waterway system
be equipped with a variety of advanced electronic
navigation aids and tracking systems. These
requirements do not extend to domestic barge tows on
the inland waterway system. An argument could be put
fOl1h that the use of such advanced navigation aids may
reduce the risk of vessel collision with bridges and
should be accounted for in the computation of the
probability of aberrancy (PA).
Currently, no studies have been performed to
analyze and document the potential reduction in PA due
to such electronic aids-to-navigation. If a case can be
made at a particular waterway and bridge site that
improved electronic navigation aids would reduce PA,
then such a factor could be used in the equation-
provided it is approved by the Owner (these type of
changes based on the Owner's approval are allowed in
the Guide Specification).
As an example, such a reduction was recently used
in the design of a new cable-stayed bridge in South
America. The thought process proceeded as follows:
I) approximately 60-90 percent of all accidents are
caused by pilot error (a value of 70 percent was chosen
for the analysis); 2) the Bridge Owner firmly believed
that improvements to electronic navigation would result
in a decrease in the rate of pilot elTor-however, there
were no studies or data to really support this belief or
what the reduction should be; 3) though no actual data
existed, the design team believed, and the Owner agreed,
that the pilot error rate could be conservatively reduced
by 30 percent using electronic aids; therefore 0.3 x 0.7 =
0.21 was used to reduce the ship accident rate by 20
percent for the risk analysis (i.e., a reduction factor of 0.8
was applied to the FA equation).
152 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

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Protected Structures, Introductory Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 147-164.

CAORF. 1984. "An Investigation of the Relative Safety of Alternative Navigational System Designs for the New
Sunshine Skyway Bridge." Prepared by the Computer Aided Operations Research Facility for the Florida Department
of Transportation, Tallahassee, FL. '

Cummings, M. September 1957. "Cellular Cofferdams and Docks." Journal of the Watel1l'ays and Harbor Division,
ASCE, Vol. 83, No. WW3, Paper No. 1366. American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, pp. 13-45.

Derucher, K. N., and C. P. Heins. 1979. "Bridge and Pier Protective Systems." Marcel Deckker, Inc., New York.

Englot, J.P. May 1988. "Collision Protection of Arthur Kill Bridges." Proceedings of the New York ASCE Sectton
Structures Conference. American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA.

FHWA. Febmaty II, 1983. "Pier Protection and Warning Systems for Bridges Subject to Ship Collisions." Technical
Advisory T 5140.19, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of TranspOliation, Washington, DC.

Fletcher, M. S., R. W. P. May, and J. A. Perkins. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Pier Protection by Man-Made Islands
for Ol1l'ell Bridge, u.K., Preliminaty RepOlt, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 327-333.

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. 1983. "Study of Pier Protection Systems for Bridges." Prepared for the Matyland
Transportation Authority, Baltimore, MD.

Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc. December 1985. "Pier Protection for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge
Replacement-Ship Collision Risk Analysis." Prepared for the Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee,
FL.
((
Greneker, E. F., J. L. Eaves, and M. C. McGee. 1981. "Bridge Ship Collision Electronic Detection and Early
Warning: Possible Prevention Through Advanced Knowledge." Proceedings of the Bridge and Pier Protective
Systems and Devices Conference, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ.

Havno, K. and M. Knott. 1986. "Risk Analysis and Protective Island Design for Ship Collisions." IABSE Symposium
all Safety and Quality Assurance of Civil Engineering Structures, Tokyo, Japan, September 4--6,1986.

Heins, C. P. December 1981. "Design of Dolphins Subjected to Vessel Impacts." Proceedingsjrom the Bridge alld
Pier Protective Systems alld Devices COllference, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, pp. 79-93.

Heming, W. C. December 1981. "Fendering Problems in the Third Coast Guard District." Proceedings jimn the
Bridge and Pier Protective Systems alld Devices COllference, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ.

Hydro Research Science, Inc. June 1984. "Sunshine Skyway Bridge Pier Protection Project-Physical Hydraulic
Model Study." Prepared for Greiner Engineering Sciences, Inc.!Florida Department ofTrausportation.

Knott, M. 1986. "Pier Protection System for the Sunshine Skyway Bridge Replacement." Proceedingsji-om the Third
Annual International Bridge Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, June 2-4, 1986.

Kuesel, T. R. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Newport Bridge Collisioll, Preliminary RepOlt, Copenhagen, Denmark,
pp.21-28.

Leslie, J., N. Clark, and J. Segal, 1983. IABSE Colloquiulll on Ship alld Bridge Collisions-The Economics of Risk,
Preliminary Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 417-426.

Matsuzaki, Y. and H. Jin. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Design Specificatioll ofBuffer Structure, Preliminaty RepOlt,
Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 345-352.,
I(
Maunsell and Partners PTY LTD and Cpt. P. J. E. Brady. 1978. "Tasman Bridge-Risk of Ship Collision and
Methods of Protection," Tasmania, Australia.
 SECTION 7-BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 153

( Maunsell and Partners and P. J. E. Brady. 1978. "Second Hobart Bridge-Risk of Ship Collision and Methods of
I Protection." Technical Report prepared for Department of Main Roads, Tasmania, Australia.

Mondorf, P. E. 1983. "Floating Pier Protections Anchored by Prestressing Tendons." IABSE Colloquium, Preliminary
Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 361-370.

Namita, Y. and H. Nakanishi. 1983. "Analysis of Framed Buffer Structure Around Bridge Pier." IABSE Colloquium,
PreliminGlY Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 319-326.

NTSB. 1981. "Ramming of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge by the Liberian Bulk CalTier Summit Venture." Marine
Accident Report NTSB-MAR-81-3, Tampa Bay, FL, May 9, 1980, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, DC.

Oda, K. and S. Kubo. 1983. "Collision Prevention Device of Floating Guide-Line Type." IABSE Colloquium, Preli-
minGlJ'Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 391-389.

Ostenfeld, C. 1965. "Ship Collisions Against Bridge Piers." IABSE Publications, pp. 233-277.

Parkinson, F. H., III. "Dolphins, Cells and Platforms." Conference Proceedings, Bridge and Pier Protective Systems
and Devices, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, December 1981, pp. 264-2.

Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses. 1984. Report of the International Commission for
Improving the Design ofFender Systems. Brussels, Belgium.

Rama, H. E. "Pier Protection of Staten Island." Conference Proceedings, Bridge and Pier Protective Systems and
Devices, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, December 1981, pp. 125-129.

Saul, R. and H. Svensson. 1983. "Means of Reducing the Consequences of Ship Collisions with Bridges and
Offshore Structures." IABSE Colloquium, IntroductOlY Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 165-179.
(
Sexsmith, R. G. 1983. "Bridge Risk Assessment and Protective Design for Ship Collision." IABSE Colloquium,
PreliminGlY Report, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 425-434.

Shintaku, T. "A Study of a Particular Fendering System." Conference Proceedings, Bridge and Pier Protective
Systems and Devices, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, December 1981, pp. 114-124.

Shroeder, W. L. and J. K. Maitland. July 1979. Cellular Bulkheads and Cofferdams. Joumal of the Geotechnical
Engineering Division, ASCE, Vol. 105, No. GT-7, Paper No. 14713, Reston, VA, pp. 823-837.

Svensson, H. 2006. "Protection of Bridge Piers against Ship Collision." The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers
Civil Division, International Conference on Bridge Engineering Challenges in the 21" Century, Hong Kong,
November 2006.

Tambs-Lyche, P. 1983. "Vulnerability of Norwegian Bridges Across Channels." IABSE Colloquium, PreiiminGlY Re-
port, Copenhagen, Denmark, pp. 47-56.

Terzaghi, K. 1945. "Stability and Stiffness of Cellular Cofferdams." Transactions, ASCE, Vol. 110, Paper No. 2253.
American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, VA, pp. 1083-1202.

USACE. 1984. "Shore Protection Manual." Volumes I and II. Waterways Experiment Station, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Washington, DC.

USCG. 1981. "Bridge Protection Systems and Devices-Final RepOli." Report No. CG-N-I-81, U.S. Coast Guard,
Office of Navigation, Washington, DC.

Yiu, C. "Innovative Fender Design." Conference Proceedings, Bridge and Pier Protective Systems and Devices,
Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, December 1981, pp. 161-174.
((

,(
 SECTIONS

BRIDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES

S.l GENERAL eS.1

This Section provides general guidelines for The plalUling data for new bridges in Section 8 of
planning a new bridge crossing a navigable waterway. the Guide provides guidance to the bridge designer based
These guidelines are based on historical bridge all historical accident data and experience. Judgment
accident data and represent recommendations from the must be exercised in determining the appropriate use of
viewpoint of minimizing vessel collision with bridges the guidelines and their application to a particular bridge
only. Other constraints, including costs, roadway site.
geometry and aligmnent, and environmental impacts, In general, the use of the Guide Specifications
may result in different bridge geometries than those requirements and planning guidelines will result in
recommended in this Section. relatively long span and high clearance bridges to reduce
the risk and consequences of a vessel collision. Using
cost-effectiveness techniques, the higher cost of longer
span bridges with a lower present worth of avoidable
disruption costs, must be balanced against the lower cost
of shorter span bridges with a higher present worth of
avoidable disruption costs. The minimization of the sum
of the cost of bridge protection and the present value of
the avoidable disruption cost is one method of providing
an optimal bridge solution for vessel collision as
described by Sexsmith (1983).
The geometry and water depths of the waterway are
a significant planning consideration for bridges. Water
depths may be such that vessels cannot impact piers
beyond the navigation channel without running agronnd;
( therefore, shorter approach spans could be used that
otherwise may not have been advisable.
The horizontal span clearance data in Article 8.5.1
was developed primarily from studies performed by
Shoji and Iwai (1985), and Shoji and Wakao (1986).
Figure C8.5.1-1 shows the relation between ship length,
LOA, and main span length, S, for actual ship/bridge
accident data. From Figure C8.5.1-1 it can be seen that
bridges with main spans less than approximately 300 feet
are relatively vulnerable to collision by even small ships.
The relationship between the colliding ship's size, DWT,
and the main span, S, for bridge accidents is shown in
Figure C8.5.1-2. From Figure C8.5.1-1, it can be seen
that tile probability of ship collision with the bridge is
increased when the main span is less than two or three
times the ship length. The bridge accident data included
in Figure C8.5.1-2 is shown in Table C8.5.1-1 (Shoji and
Wakao, 1986).
Research reported by Shoji and Iwai (1985)
indicates that environmental conditions of current and
wind can be a major indirect cause of vessel accidents for
bridges if the main piers are located near the edge of the
navigable channel within a distance less than two or
three times the width of the pier. This is caused by the
flow of the current or wind which must curve around the
pier. These curved flowlines can induce transverse forces
on a passing vessel causing it to deviate from its original
course.

155
 156 GUlDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGltWAY BIUDGES

8.2 LOCATION OF CROSSING

The location of a bridge crossing a navigable water-

way is a key factor in determining the risk of vessel
collisions.
To the extent possible, bridges should be located in
straight regions of the navigable waterway and away
from bends and turns. Bridges located near or in
turnslbends will have a higher probability of vessel
collision as discussed in Article 4.8.3.2.

8.3 BRIDGE ALIGNMENT

Bridges crossing navigable waterways should be

aligned perpendicular to the direction of vessel traffic
passing through the bridge and perpendicular to the
direction of cunent flow wherever possible. Skewed
bridge alignments, and those which are located ill regions
where crosscurrents exist, have a higher risk of vessel
collision.

8.4 TYPE OF BRIDGE

The type of bridge crossing a naVigable waterway

should be selected to minimize the risk of vessel
collision in accordance with the requirements of these
Guide Specifications.
The primary area of vessel collision risk to the
bridge is the region near the navigable waterway as
modeled by the normal distribution discussed in Article
4.8.3.3. Within this area (3 x LOA on each side of the
inbound and outbound centerline of vessel transit paths),
the bridge type should be developed to minimize the
number of piers supporting the superstructure, and to
maximize the horizontal clearances between piers and
the vertical clearance to the superstructure.

8.5 NAVIGATION SPAN CLEARANCES

8.5.1 Horizontal Clearances

Figure 1 depicts the typical relationship between a

vessel transiting the waterway and the main (navigation)
span of a bridge. Using historical vessel collision data,
the following guidelines for planning the navigation span
of a new bridge have been developed:

• Bridges with main spans, S, less than two or three

times the design vessel length, LOA, are patticularly
vulnerable to vessel collision.
o Bridges with main spans, S, less than two times the
channel width, C, are particularly vulnerable to
vessel collision.
• Piers located less than two or three times the pier
width, Bp , from the edge of channel, YN and Yw, are
particularly vulnerable to collision.
 SECTION 8-BRIDGE PnOTECTlONPLANNING GUIDELINES 157

• The centerline of the navigable channel should

coincide with the centerline of the main span. The
maximum offset between the centerline of the
channel and main span length, S, of the bridge
should not exceed 10--15 percent. .

Lp
Ir- - I
---- ,- --
-- - -- --_ - m"~rid~:------- ___-.
... ......

--- -------
- -- _. <t

_-----------
_--------------------------- 0
a
watel'N ,/- - - - - -
1----- -- - f-- ---- -------1¢
0) _----------------
...... ---- -~-~ ---"'---
------- -- --
. -~-~ ~-
_~-~-~-~ S\1\? -
-~-~-~-~ _... --_ ...... ----------_ ... --
-}
... -_ ...... -_ ......... ___ I 1-- --
-

d:
(.
r 1-. -
Lp

Figul'e 8.5.1-1-Bl'idgeI\Vatenvay Planning Geometry

Table C8.5.1-1-Main Span Versus LOA for Historical Bridge Collisions (Sltoji and Wakao, 1986)

Date of Main
Accident Bridge Name Location Span (ft) LOA (ft)
1963 Sorsund Norway 328 354
1972 Sidney Lanier USA 246 571
1975 Fraser Canada 384 656
1977 Benjamin Harrison USA 236 613
1977 Tromso Norway 262 134
1979 Second Narrows RR Canada 498 574
1980 Almo (Tjom) Sweden 912 564
1980 Sunshine Skyway USA 860 610
1981 Jordfallet Sweden 144 157
158 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS Ai'lO CO:l\Ii\IENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLlSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

700

525

350

175

o
o 400 800 1200 1600
Main Span, S (ft)

Figure C8.5.1-1-Colliding Ship's LOA Versus Main Span ofBddge(s) (Shoji and Walmo, 1986) (

50000
o Actual Data
0' Deduced Data

40000
o 0
0'

30000
o
o 0

20000

o
10000 o
0'

o
o 400 800 1200 1600
Main Span (ft)

Figure C8.5.1-2-Collidiug Ship's Size (D/V1) Versus Main Span ofBddge(s) (Shoji and Iwai)
 SECTION 8-BRlDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES 159

8.5.2 Vertical Clearances

I Vertical clearances for a proposed bridge should be
established to permit the passage of the vessel using the
waterway with the highest vertical clearance require-
ments traveling in a ballasted condition at periods of high
water levels. The vertical clearance requirements shall be
established from data on the actual and proposed vessels
using the waterway, and through coordination with the
U.S. Coast Guard. Typical vertical clearance heights for
ship mast and deckhouses are shown in Figures 3.5.2-5
and 3.5.2-6. Typical veriical clearance heights for a
ship's bow can be determined from the bow height and
draft data in Figure 3.5.2-4 and Tables 3.5.2-1, 3.5.2-2,
and 3.5.2-3.

8.6 APPROACH SPANS

Approach spans and their supporting piers should be

established using the requirements of these Guide
Specifications. Based on historical ship collision data,
twice as many accidents have occurred with approach
piers as have occurred with the main piers and navigation
spans.
The use of the Guide Specification criteria will
usually result in an increase in approach span lengths in
order to minimize the number of piers located in the
central area of vessel collision vulnerability.
(
8.7 PROTECTION SYSTEMS

The cost associated with protccting a bridge fr0111

catastrophic vessel collision can be a significant portion
of the total bridge cost and must be -included as one of
the key elements in establishing a bridge's type, size,
location, and geometry.
The following protection alternatives should be
evaluated in order to develop a cost-effective solution to
a new bridge project:

8 Design the bridge piers, foundations, and super-

structure such that the vessel collision impact force
and energy can be withstood.
8 Design a pier fender system to reduce the impact
force and energy to a level below the capacity of the
pier and foundation.
o Locate piers in shallow water, out-of-reach from
large vessels in order to reduce the magnitude of the
impact force and energy for design of the pier.
• Protect piers fi'Oln vessel collision by means of
protective islands) dolphins) or other stmctures
which are designed to redirect, withstand, or absorb
the design impact force and energy.
 160 GUIDE SPECIFlCATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

8.8 PLANNING PROCESS CS.S

Vessel collision with highway bridges crossing
navigable waterways is only one of a multitude of factors
involved in the planning process for a new bridge. The
designer must balance a variety of needs including
political, social, and economic in arriving at au_ optimal
bridge solution for a new crossing. Depending on the
waterway characteristics and the type and frequency of
motorist and merchant vessels using and passing under
the bridge, the vessel collision factor may range from
insignificant to very significant in the bridge planning
process.
The AASHTO Guide Specifications requirements
for vessel colIision design have provided a rational
methodology for determining the risk of vessel collision
with bridges, and for the development of structures with
improved resistauce to catastrophic collapse due to ship
and barge impacts. Currently, Bridge Engineers'
experience using the AASHTO vessel collision codes has
been reasonably positive.
It is recognized that vessel collision is but one of a
multitude of factors involved in the planning process for
a new bridge. The designer must balance a variety of
needs including political, social, and economic in
arriving at an optimal bridge solution for a proposed
highway crossing. Due to the relatively high bridge costs
associated with vessel collision design for most
waterway crossings, it is important that additional
research be conducted to improve our understanding of
vessel impact mechanics, the response of the structure,
and the development of cost-effective protection
systems.

8.8.1 Route Location Study

The potential for vessel collision should be a key

factor in performing route location studies for a new
bridge crossing. The guidelines for crossing location aud
bridge alignment iu Articles 8.2 and 8.3 should be ((
followed to the extent possible.

8.8.2 Bridge Type, Size, and Location Study

For a given route across the waterway, a bridge type,

size, and location (T, S, and L) study should be
performed which includes a detailed evaluation of the
potential for vessel collision with the structure. Alter-
native bridge types, sizes, and geometrics should be
evaluated based on planning, engineering, and economic
factors. The provisions of Section 8 and the flow charts
in Section 1, provide a basis of incorporating the vessel
collision loads in evaluating alternative bridge
configurations in the T, S, and L study. All of the basic
decisions regarding bridge type, layout, clearances, pier
locations, design loads, and bridge protection method
should be determined during the T, S, and L study and
before detailed preliminary and final design of the
structure begins.
The goal in the T, S, and L study is to develop the
least cost total structure--including protection costs.
After the development of a protection system for
a particular bridge, a comparison should be made
between the total cost of the proposed alignment and
span lengths with protection, to the total cost of an
alternate structure with revised bridge characteristics
(i.e., longer spans, stronger piers, alternate alignment,
etc.). The methodology is an iterative process using the
flow chart procedures iu Article 1.5.
 SECTION 8-BRIDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES 161

( 8.8.3 Preliminary and Final Design

The preliminaty and final design phases are per-

fomled based on the design criteria of the selected
structure established during the T, S, and L study. The
impact forces determined in Sections 3 and 4 are applied
to the bridge structure or protection system (Section 7) as
one of the AASHTO group loading conditions. Minor
refinement of the design criteria and the use of model
studies to evaluate design assumptions usually occurs in
the preliminary design phase of the project.
162 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

REFERENCES
(
(
Sexsmith, R. G. 1983. IABSE Colloquium on Bridge Risk Assessment and Protective Design for Ship Collision.
Preliminary Report, pp. 425--434.

Shoji, K. and A. [waL [985. Presentation of Marine Stmc(ures Against Ship Collision. Presented at the Internationa[
Symposium Ocean Space Utilization, Tokyo, Japan.

Shoji, K. and T. Wakao. 1986. On the Ships Waterways Passing Through Bridges. Presented at the Water FOlum,
San Francisco, CA.
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
(
1.0 INTRODUCTION

The bridge risk assessment example discussed below is based on a recent project (2004) by the Louisiana Depmiment
of Transportation and Development (LADOTD). FHWA appreciates the permission of LADOTD to use one of their
projects in this repOlt to illustrate the use of the AASHTO vessel collision provisions.
The risk assessment example project represents highlights from the vessel impact stndy condncted as part of the
consultant design services for the proposed LA Route I Improvements Project that includes a High-Level Bridge over
Bayou Lafourche near Leeville, Louisiana. The proposed high-level bridge would replace an existing bascule bridge that
was part of a roadway system that was too low to meet fhture evacuatiol1ueeds if the area were shuck by a hurricane.
The existing two-lane LA I Bridge over Bayou Lafourche was opened to traffic in April 1970. The structure is a
vertical lift bridge which provides a horizontal navigational opening of 125 ft between the faces of the timber fender
system (Figure I). In the closed position, the bridge has a vertical clearance of 40 ft, and in the open position, the bridge
has a vertical clearance of 73 ft. The annual number of bridge openings has varied only slightly over the past four years,
with 3,689 openings recorded in 2000; 3,711 openings in2001; 3,965 in 2002; and an estimated 3,473 openings in 2003.
The bridge is located near the intersection of the Southwestern Louisiana Canal with Bayou Lafourche, and has been
hit by merchant vessels (barge tows and shrimp boats) relatively frequently dne to strong crosscurrents which exist in the
waterway. All of the collisions have been relatively minor to date.
The vessel impact stndy was condncted to evalnate the type, size, and frequency of merchant vessels using Bayou
Lafourche in the vicinity of the proposed bridge; to develop associated impact loads in accordance with the Method I and
Method II criteria of the AASHTO Vessel Collision Design Gnide Specification; and to recommend design criteria for
consideration by the Bridge Design Team. A number of different bridge type and span layouts were considered by the
Design Team. The example below contains the results of the risk assessment of one ofthe alternatives.

Figure I-I-Existing LA 1 Lift Bridge over Bayou Lafourche (View Looking South in Outbound Vessel Direction)

163
164 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

1.1 DATA COLLECTION

((
1.1.1 Published Sources

The first step in the vulnerability (risk) assessment process is to collect data concerning the waterway characteristic,
the vessel fleet using the waterway, and the characteristics of the bridge (either proposed or existing). The data collection
process is usually the most time-consuming part of the risk analysis. It must be conducted in a thorough manner since the
input values determined from the data collection will be used for the risk assessment. If the input data is incomplete or
incorrect, the risk evaluation will be flawed and could result in incorrect conclusions to be used by the Bridge Owner (as
in the old analysis adage "garbage in, garbage out"). The data collected will come 11"01n a variety of disparate sources and
it must be assessed and organized into a meaningful, coherent representation of the waterway, vessel fleet, and bridge
characteristics. For the LA I Project, waterway characteristics and vessel fleet data used in the vessel impact study were
collected from the following sources:

o Publication: Waterborne Commerce of the United States (WCUS), Patt 2-Watenvays and Harbors, Gulf Coast,
Mississippi River System and Antilles, for calendar year 2001, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water Resources
Support Center (WRSC), New Orleans, LA.
o Publication: Waterbol'lle Transportation Lines of the United States, 2001, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Water
Resources Support Center (WRSC), New Orleans, LA.
o Passed-the-Point Query for Cargo Commodity and Vessel Trip Data at the bridge location (River Mile Point 11.0) in
the Bayou Lafourche and Lafourche-Jump Watenvay for the year 2000, compiled by the U.S Army Corps of
Engineers, Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center (WCSC), New Orleans, LA (Appendix A).
• Nautical Chart 11365, Barataria and Bayou Lafourche Watenl'ays, 17th Edition, October 2002, U.S. Depaltment of
C01mnerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Washington, DC.
• Publication: U.S. Coast Pi/at, Gulf of Mexico. Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands, 30th Edition, Vol. 5, 2003, U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Ocean Service, ((
Washington, DC.
o LA Route 1 over Bayou Lafourche-Phase III Scour Report, September 2002, prepared by an AlE consultant for
LADOTD.
1.1.2 Interviews and Correspondence

Additional vessel operating information and data on vessels transiting the waterway in the immediate vicinity of the
existing LA I Lccville Lift Bridge were collected by telephone discussions with eight maritime organizations that included
Port Commissions/Authorities, pilot associations, tug and barge tow operators, and businesses located on Bayou Lafourche
and in the region.
General information concerning the existing LA 1 Lift Bridge and navigation issues in the waterway were collected
by telephone discussions with the following State and Federal organizations:

1. LADOTD District Maintenance Office (Accident Reports)

2. U.S. Coast Gnard (USCG) Marine Safety Unit (Houma)
3. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 8th District Bridge Administration (New Orleans)
4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Lafayette)
5. LA 1 Bridge at Leeville (Existing Lift Bridge Tenders)

1.2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS

1.2,1 General Description

The LA 1 Bridge at Leeville is located approximately 11 miles above the entrance of Bayou Lafourche with the Gulf
of Mexico. The Southwestern Louisiana Canal crosses the bayou just north of the Leeville Bridge. A plan view of the I(
waterway in the immediate vicinity of the bridge is shown in Figure I. The project location map was taken from the
NOAA navigation chart covering the project area and includes the existing navigation channels, and aids-to-navigation.
 RlSK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 165

( The general description of the Bayou Lafourche waterway and navigation channel discussed below was taken primarily
I from information contained in the U.S. Coast Pilot.
Marine facilities associated with the Port of Fourchon are located approximately 7 miles below the LA I Bridge at
Leeville, and are spread out along a distance of approximately 4 miles above the Gulf entrance of the Bayou and the
intersection of Pass Fourchon and Belle Pass. The Greater Lafourche Port Commission administers Port Fourchon. The
port is the base of a large fishing fieet, offshore exploration and production, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP)
operations, and some shipping interests.
Bayou Lafourche was formerly an outlet of the Mississippi River near Donaldsonville (70 miles above New Orleans),
but is now blocked off from the river by a levee. The Bayou extends from Donaldsonville in a SE direction for 94 miles
and empties into the Gulf at Belle Pass. The Intracoasial Waterway (lCW) crosses the bayou at Larose, about 23 miles
upstream of the Leeville Bridge.
Numerous shrimp boats are based at Leeville, as well as at Golden Meadow, GalliatlO,.and Larose (towns located
upstream of the Leeville Bridge). Crewboats based at Leeville operate out of the Bayou to offshore oil wells. There are
seafood eatmeries and shipyards along the bayou, and oil company terminals and wharves at Leeville. There is
considerable commerce on the bayou in seafood products, sugar, petroleum products, cement, lumber and piles, clays and
drilling mud, liquid sulfur, sand and gravel, oil well pipe, machinery and supplies, caustic soda, chemicals, and general
cargo. There are numerous private warehouses, wharves, and marine railways along the bayou, and the banks of Bayou
Lafourche are densely settled along the greater pmt of its length. On the lower part of the bayou there is considerable
commerce in oil barges.

(
166 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\ll\n:NTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Figure 1.2.1-1-Pl'oject Location Map

 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAi\IPLE 167

1.2.2 Navigation Channel

(
Bayou Lafourche is navigable to Thibodaux, about 63 miles above Belle Pass Entrance. The bayou above this poiut is
closed by a dam. In August 2001, the controlling Federal project depth was 12 ft in the bar channel through Belle Pass; in
1996,9 ft to Leeville; then 6 ft to the junction with the ICW at Larose; in 1989-1993,4 ft to Matthews; and then 3 ft to
Thibodaux.
In November 1998, it was reported that the following depths (much over the Federal project depths), existed in the
lower part of Bayou Lafourche: 20 ft in Belle Pass and the POlt Fourchon area; then 12 ft to Leeville; then 9 ft to Golden
Meadow; and then 8 ft to the junction with the ICW at Larose.
Other than at bridge and floodgate locations, the navigation channel width is the same as the width of the bayou
(subject to water depth and vessel draft), with the exception of defined channel widths at each bridge and floodgate
location.
A bayou floodgate stmcture is located about six miles above Leeville near Golden Meadow. The NOAA chart reports
a depth of water over the sill of 9 ft, and a horizontal clearance of 56 ft, which limits the maximum size of barges and
other vessels that transit Bayou Lafourche between Golden Meadow and the ICW.
The Southwestern Louisiana Canal connects Barataria Bay with Timbalier Bay and provides a protected inside
passage for shallow-draft recreational/fishing boats and occasional small barge tows. The canal crosses Bayou Lafourche
at the location of the LA I Bridge at Leeville. Approximately 20 years ago (1982), it lVas repOlted that with a favorable
tide about 6 ft of water depth could be carried through both Caminada Bay, the East and West Approaches, and Little
Lake. In October 1992, the controlling water depth in the canal was only 2.5 ft from Caminada Bay to Leeville; then in
1982,6 ft was reported from Leeville to Little Lake (except for shoaling at the West Entrance).

1.2.3 Tide Level and Tidal Range

The LA I Bridge at Leeville is in a section of Bayou Lafourche that is tidally influenced, particularly by tidal flows
moving through the Southwestern Louisiana Canal. An estimate of the mean tide level and maximum tidal range at the
existing bridge were developed in the Phase III Scour Report (2002) prepared for LADOTD. According to the Scour
report, the mean tide level at Leeville is approximately Elev. 1.6 NGVD, the spring tide range is approximately 1.0 foot,
( and the maximum tide range is approximately 1.8 ft. The report also noted that both the mean tide level and range are
increasing at the project site due to the rapid rise in relative sea level currently occurring in the Barataria and Terrebonne
Basins.
The vessel collision analysis is based on a water level associated with mean high water (MHW). For the analysis
contained in the report, a normal high water (NHW) level ofElev. 2.5 was provided for use by the Bridge Design Team. It
is assumed that the normal and mean high water levels are equivalent at this project location. It should be noted that the
elevation for MHW is consistent with the maximum tidal range discussed in the previous paragraph.

1.2.4 CmJ'cnts

Currents in Bayou Lafourche near the Leeville Bridge are heavily influenced by water flows through the manmade
Southwestern Louisiana Canal (SLC). These flows sometimes cause strong rip currents and crosscurrents acting on vessels
transiting through the navigation channel at existing bridge, and has been a significant factor in the relatively numerous
collisions with the bridge (particularly from shrimp boat owners who are not familiar with the complex currents in the
area). As stated in the Scour RepOlt, the original SLC was a perpendicular crossing of Bayou Lafourche, with an older
(long since demolished) LA Route 1 bridge alignment crossing the western canal with a low-level fixed span, and
providing a navigation opening for vessels through a movable swing span structure. A cutoff canal was provided to allow
the western canal barge traffic to access the swing span, but the straight crossing remained open. When the old low-level
swing bridge was replaced with the current vertical lift bridge, the western leg of the SLC was plugged (filled) and another
cutoff channel was constmcted just south of the bridge, allowing the use of a single vertical lift span over a single
waterway.
An evaluation of waterway currents and bridge scour associated with normal tidal circulations and for the 1DO-year
storm event were developed in the Scour Report for the existing LA I Lift Bridge. Figures I and 2 are reproduced from
this report and depict the current velocity and directions associated with the normal tide and with the 1DO-year storm
event. The figures also indicate the water currents estimated for the LA 1 Lift Bridge when it opened in 1970, as well as
the currents modeled for the existing conditions (2002). Added to these figures for comparison purposes as part of this
vessel impact study was the alignment and approximate pier locations of one of the proposed high-level bridge
alternatives.
The SLC enters Bayou Lafourche northeast of the bridge and then exits southwest of the highway crossing. As shown
in Figures I and 2, the flow of water follows a distinct "S" shaped path, with the "thalweg" (center of flow associated with
 168 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\lMENTARYFOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

the deepest palt of the channel) located west of Existing Lift Pier I (the westernmost tower pier of the vertical lift bridge).
The high currents estimated for the years after 1970 when the Leeville Lift Bridge opened have caused a general scouring /
of the waterway and an increase in waters depth in the bayou near the SLC and bridge site. Significant local scour has also
occurred around the existing bridge piers, patticularly Pier 1, and the structure is considered one of the State's most
essential bridges due to scour potential associated with major st01lll events. The result of the historical scour in the bayou
near the bridge area has been a shifting of the thalweg toward the western bank of Bayou Lafourche and a lowering of the
potential cunent magnitudes dueto the increased water depths.
Currents caused by the Southwestern Louisiana Canal are due to the delays in tide between Barataria Bay on the east
and Terrebonne Bay to the west. Water rushes through the canal (usually east to west) due to valying water levels between
the two major bays. The currents are strongest during ebb (falling) tides.

(~

YR 2002 RESULTS YR 1970 RE:'UL.T

Figure 1.2.4-1-Cul'rent Velocity Magnitude and Direction for Normal Tide Circulation

Figure 1.2.4-2-Cul'l'ent Velocity Magnitude and Direction for IOO-Year Storm Event
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 169

As shown in Figure I, currents associated with the normal tide cycle equal OA--{).6 ft per second (ftls) [0.24-0.36
( knots (kts)] for the fastest flow near the bridge and 0.0--0.2 ftls (0.O--{).12 kts) for piers located in the slack water areas of
the waterway. These current values seem low compared to the perceived currents by mariners and those reported in local
newspaper articles.
The design water current for the vessel impact analysis is normally set equal to the annual mean current (i.e., the
annual averaged maximum flood/ebb current); however, because of the limited hydraulic and hydrologic (H&H) data
available at this early stage of the bridge design process, and the information obtained from mariner interviews, it was
recommended that more conservative current values of 1.0 knots for currents parallel to the channel and a current of 1.5
knots for crosscurrents acting transverse to the channel be used for the proposed high-level bridge analysis.
It should be noted that subsequent to the initial scour analysis, which was based on a 2-D H&H model of the channel
alone, a more definitive H&H analysis was later conducted that included the efTects of overbank flow in the low-lying
areas adjacent to the bayou. This later H&H analysis revised the flow depths and velocity vectors associated with the
currents in the channel from the initial scour report, which in turn required adjustments to the vessel impact study. The
sample problem is based on the initial scour report and illustrates the procedures on how the H&H data is used in the
vessel collision analysis, however the situation discussed above also illustrates the essential nature of accurate H&H/scour
modeling and the need to correctly analyze the currents in the waterway at an early stage in the design development
process.

1.2.5 Water Depths

The physical ability of a vessel to strike a bridge pier is based on the available water depth at the location of the pier,
and the draft of the vessel. For example, a downbound loaded tanker barge with a 9.0-foot draft would run aground before
it could strike a pier located in 6.0 ft of water (although the same barge transiting upbound empty with a 2.0-ft draft could
potentially strike the pier).
For the vessel collision study, the existing mudline elevation at the centerline of each pier was based on hydrographic
surveys at the site. Design water depths were then determined from the lvlHW water level to the mudline at each pier
location. For the high-level main piers, the water depth was taken at the edge of the footing near the channel (since the
footings are relatively wide and are located near a steep "drop-off' area of the mudline). Judgment was also used in the
selection of the design water depth at the main piers to account for the soft, silty material which is usually present on the
river bottom. A vessel under power has the ability to "plow" through the soft material and impact a pier in water depths
less than the vessel draft.

1.3 PROPOSED BRIDGE ALTERNATIVES

The overall project consisted of designing two parallel high-level bridge stmctures to replace the existing lower-level
veliical lift bridge. Initially, only the southbound bridge would be built and would be designed for two-way traffic on a
two-lane roadway. The new bridge will be located on an alignment north of the existing LA 1 Lift Bridge. The Bridge
Design Team developed alternatives of varying bridge types, main spans and approach span layouts for consideration by
LADOTD. For illustrating the AASHTO Guide Specification procedures in this report, only the results of one of the
options (Concrete Girder Alternative-Option A3) will be discussed below.
Concrete Girder Alternative-Option A3: Consisted of a concrete girder main span of 350 ft over the navigation
charlllel; two anchor spans of 260 ft each; and approach spans of 135 ft for the central portion of the overall bridge
crossing Bayou Lafourche. A plan and elevation of this alternative is shown in Figure 1.4.1-1. A layout of this option on
an aerial photograph of the site depicting the existing and proposed navigation channels and clearances is shown in Figure
1.4.1-2. The horizontal clearance between the main span footings is approximately 280 ft. The vertical clearance is a
minimum of 73 ft above lvlHW between the footings. The pier footings adjacent to the navigation spans are skewed to be
parallel to the proposed channel (although the pier colunllls remain transverse to the bridge alignment).

1.4 VESSEL FLEET CHARACTERISTICS

1.4.1 Vessel Categories

Information about the number of vessel trips and the commodities transported on Bayou Lafourche was obtained from
reports prepared by the Waterborne COlll111erce Statistics Center (WCSC), U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
entitled Waterbome Commerce of the United States (WCUS), Part 2-Watel1l'ays and Harbors, GI/If Coast, Mississippi
River System alld Antilles, for calendar year 2001. For the LA 1 Bridge at Leeville, a special "Passed-the-Point" quelY was
conducted by the WCSC for LADOTD based on waterborne C0111merce data for the year 2000 (Appendix A). Utilizing
specialized software, the stafT at WRSC was able to extract general vessel data and tonnage for the actual vessels trausiting
170 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESrGNOF HIGHWAY BRlDGl<:S

the watenvay at the location of the proposed bridge (River Mile Point II). Additional information about the sizes and (
types of vessels using Bayou Lafourche was obtained from telephone intetviews with selected marine operators, shipyards (
and port facility managers currently using the waterway, as well as supplemental data obtained from the U.S. Coast Guard
and LADOTD bridge tenders at Leeville ..
Based on the collected data, the vessel fleet and annual frequencies shown in Tables I and 2 were developed for use in
the vessel collision analysis. The vessel fleet data in these tables include the size and physical characteristics of the
vessels, as well as the direction of travel and the number of upbound/downbQund transits made in a typical year. The
vessel fleet was organized by vessel size into eight barge classifications and nine ship classifications. These classifications
were further organized into loaded and light (empty) vessel conditions for both the upbound and downbound directions.

Table 1.4.1-1-Fleet Characteristics

Single Barge Tow
Vessel or Vessel
Single Vessel Capacity Displacement,
Vessel Vessel Size, (f\) Draft, ft) DWT, Barge Tow Size Tug Size, (ft) LOA, Beam, (tannes)
lD Type Description Length x Width Loaded Light (tonnes) # Wide x # Long Length x Width X Draft (ft) (f\) Loaded Light
I Barge Barge Tow 264 x 50 9 2 2,860 I x I 72 x 30 x 7 336 50 3,640 780
Barge Barge Tow 210 x 44 9 2 1,990 I x I 72 x 30 x 7 282 44 2,630 640
Barge Barge Tow 195 x 35 9 2 1,480 I x I 65 x 24 x 6 260 35 1,910 430
Barge Barge Tow 160 x 42 8 2 1,270 I x I 65 x 24 x 6 225 42 1,700 430
5 Barge Barge Tow (2X) 150 x 30 8 2 707 I x 2 50 x 20 x 5 350 30 1,986 572
Barge Deck Barge 140 x 40 5 2 370 I x I 50 x 20 x 5 190 40 820 450
Barge Barge Tow 140 x 35 7 2 780 I x I 50 x 20 x 5 190 35 1,060 280
8 Barge Deck Barge 120 x 30 4 2 140 I x I 50 x 20 x 5 170 30 470 330
Ship Offshore Supply 185 x 42 11 5 925 - - - - - 185 42 1,696 771
Vessel
10 Ship Offshore Supply 165 x 36 9 4 590 - - - - - 165 36 1,060 470
Vessel
11 Ship Supply Boat 145 x 36 8 4 414 - - - - - 145 36 828 414
12 Ship Crew Boat 125 x 24 9 4 300 - - - - - 125 24 539 239
13 Ship Utility Boat 100 x 28 8 4 222 - - 100 28 444 222 (~
14 Ship Shrimp Trawler 90 x 28 12 5 350 - - - - 90 28 600 250
15 Ship Crew Boat 65 x 18 5 2 70 - - - - - 65 18 116 46
16 Ship Shrimp Trawler 60 x 18 6 2 86 - - - - - 60 18 129 43
17 Ship Shrimp Tmwler 30 x 9 4 2 II - - - - - 30 9 22 II

Table 1.4.1-Z-Vessel Fleet Annual Trip Frequency (Existing Fleet 2003)

Anllual Number of Trips (N)
Downbound Unboulld
Vessel Vessel
ID Type Description Loaded Light Total Loaded Light Total Total
1 Barge Barge Tow 30 30 30 30 60
2 Barge Barge Tow 90 90 90 90 180
3 Barge Barge Tow 50 30 80 30 50 80 160
4 Barge Barge Tow 40 150 190 150 40 190 380
5 Barge Barge Tow (2X) 280 10 290 10 280 290 580
6 Barge Deck Barge 270 80 350 80 270 350 700
7 Barge Barge Tow 70 200 270 200 70 270 540
8 Barge Deck Barge 250 50 300 50 250 300 600
9 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 300 300 200 100 300 600
10 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 300 300 200 100 300 600
11 Ship Supply Boat 900 900 800 100 900 1,800
12 Ship Crew Boat 300 300 200 100 300 600
13 Ship Utility Boat 900 900 700 200 900 1,800
14 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,200 1,200 900 300 1,200 2,400
15 Ship Crew Boat 600 600 400 200 600 1,200
16 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,800 200 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 4,000
17 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,300 200 1,500 1,000 500 1,500 3,000
Totals 8,680 920 9,600 5,920 3,680 9,600 19,200
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPI,E 171

( -'"
I»'I>1"YJt ~ .~
~ Q

(ij'I'H'Yll

l---==-lI!..... - -_oobs'7~~

l---==c1I~."•.;·t- ___
w~~~

l-~l---==~II!""'---_oo_~~~~
..

Figure 1.4.1-1-Bayou Lafourche: Bridge Plan and Elevation-Concrete Girder-Option A3

172 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

((

Figure 1.4.1-2-Bayou Lafourche: Aerial Plan-Concrete Girder-Option A3

 RISK ASSESSiUENT EXAMPLE 173

Barge tow size for vessels between Leeville and Larose are limited by the floodgate stlUctures on Bayou Lafourche to
( a maximum length of 350 ft (including the tug length), a maximum width of 54 ft, and a draft of 9 ft. Most of the barge
tows in the watenvay are single barges, with the exception of barges in the 150 x 30-ft size which are pnshed two at a time
(in-line). Principal cargoes carried by barges headed in a downbound (southward) direction in the bayou near Leeville
include distillate fuel oil, metallic salts, clay and refractory materials, non-metallic minerals, water and ice, and machinery.
Principal cargoes carried by upbound (northward) barges include clUde petroleum, distillate fuel oil, clay and refractory
materials, waste and scrap, and. machinery. Barges are pt!shed by tugs that typically vary in size from 600-1,800
horsepower. An elevation of a typical barge tow approaching the proposed High-Level Bridge main span is shown in
Figure 3.
The principal "ship-type" vessels in the waterway include offshore supply vessels (OSY), crew boats, utility boats,
mini-snpply boats, and shrimp trawlers. Images of typical barges and vessels similar to those that transit the bayou near the
Leeville Bridge are shown in Figure 4.
As shown in Table 2, the total number of estimated transits for the existing vessel design fleet is 19,200 trips per year
(about 52 trips per day). This total fleet consists of 3,200 barge tow transits (17 percent) and 16,000 transits (83 percent)
by OSY, crewboats, supply boats and shrimp trawlers combined. The "ship-type" vessels can be further broken down into
7,800 trips by larger vessels with lengths of90 to 185 ft, and 8,200 trips by relatively small craft vessels with lengths of30
to 65 ft (41 percent and 43 percent of the total trips per year respectively).

MHW EL. 2.5

2' Draft

Main Pier
TYPICAL EMPTY BARGE TOW
(1800 HP Tug + 210 x44 Hopper Barge)

MHWEL. 2.5\

Main Pier
TYPICAL LOADED BARGE TOW
(1800 HP Tug + 210 x 44 Hopper Barge)

Figure 1.4.1-3-Typical Barge Tow and l\fain Pier Elevation

 174 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COl\li\1ENTARYFOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) Deck (Lift) Barge

Barge Tow Crewboat ((

Shrimp Trawler

Figure 1.4.1-4-Images ofTypicnl Vessel Types

1.4.2 Vessel Traffic Growth

Information about the total cargo tonnage for Bayou Lafourche was obtained from weus publications for the 14-year
period fium 1987 to 2001. A plot of the tonnage history is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, the total tonnage
has generally increased on the river over the past 14 years, and this trend is expected to continue. For the purpose of
forecasting vessel traffic growth over the next 50 years (to 2053), an evaluation of the historic tonnage data was
performed. The tonnage in the waterway increased at an average annual rate of 13.2 percent for the 14-year period from
1987 to 2001, an average annual rate of 10.9 percent for the la-year period from 1991 to 2001, an average annual rate of
5.9 percent for the 5-year period from 1996 to 2001, and an average annual rate of 1.4 percent for the 4-year period from
 RIsKAsSESSl\IENT EXAMPLE 175

1997 to 2001. These historical growth rates indicated that the waterway has matured in recent years and that the rate of
{ growth has slowed down.
For purposes of the vessel impact analysis, a long-term sustained growth rate of 2.0 percent per year was selected. At
this rate over a period of 50 years, the annual tonnage in the watcrway should increase by 269 percent. For comparison
purposes, it should be noted that this growth rate is slightly higher than the 1.5 percent rate that was selected several years
ago for the vessel collision analysis for LADOTD bridges crossing the Atchaf.11aya River near Morgan City. For the future
vessel traffic on Bayou Lafourche near Leeville, it was assumed that the existing vessel fleet would be used with an
adjustment made to the annual number of vessel trips. Therefore, a growth factor of 2.69 was used to increase the number
of transits of the existing fleet (2003) to estimate the number of transits of the future fleet (2053).

7,000

a0
0
6,000
~w
...
5,000
./
~
~

(/)
c 4,000
~
6 3,000
OJ
/
~
ro
0
2,000
./
-
ro
~ 1,000
~ /'
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

(
Year
Figure 1.4.2-1-Bayou Lafourche and Lafourche-Jump \Vatenvay: Historical Tonnage

1.4.3 Vessel Transit Speeds

A "No Wake Zone" exists in Bayou Lafourche neal' Leeville; therefore all vessels are transiting the bayou near the
bridge at relatively low speeds. Based on discussions with the ship and barge operators using the river (and their
experience passing through the navigation opening of the existing bridge), the typical vessel speeds are 3-5 mph (2.6-4.3
knots). However, this speed can be faster, particularly during times of high ebb (falling) tides with their faster currents.
The following values were used for the vessel impact analysis:

Downbound Vessels (Barges and Ships) 5.0 knots

Upbound Vessels (Barges and Ships) 4.0 knots

These speeds represent the normal operating speeds of vessels transiting the navigation channel and passing through
the bridge during mean high water conditions. The vessel impact speed used for each pier design is a reduced value of the
chaunel transit speed shown above, based on the distance of the pier from the centerline of the vessel transit path in the
channel and the length overall (LOA) of the vessel. For use in the impact analysis, a speed of 1.0 knot was selected as the
minimum value for vessels located a distance of3 x LOA from the channel.

1.4.4 Vessel Transit Path

Vessels transiting the existing LA I Lift Bridge follow the centerline of the navigation channel which is centered
between the two tower piers; therefore, the centerline of vessel transit path for the proposed LA I Bridge has been set
equal to the centerline of channel (also the centerline of the main span) for all vessel categories. The centerline of vessel
transit path is used for the distribution of vessel impact speed in the vessel impact analysis.
 176 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS Al~D COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HlGHWAyBRIDGES

1.5 VESSEL IMPACT CRITERIA

1.5.1 General Requirements

The vessel impact loads for the proposed LA I High-Level Bridge were developed in accordance with the general
requirements of the following docnment:

AASHTO. 2009. Guide Specification and Commen/my/or Vessel Collision Desig;z oj Highway Bridges, 2nd
Edition. American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington DC.

In addition to the AASHTO Guide Specification general requirements, the procedures and references discussed below
were also incorporated in the vessel impact study.

1.5.2 Extreme Event Load Combinations (Scour)

The combination of vessel impact forces and scour were established in accordance with the recommendations of the
paper Extreme Events and Their Combinations by A. Nowak and M. Knott, FHWA Conjerence Proceedings, The Design
of Bridges for Extreme Events, December 1996, Atlanta, Georgia. According to this reference, the combination of vessel
impact and scour are evaluated for two load cases: 1) minimum impact loads associated with a drifting empty hopper barge
breaking loose from its moorings and hitting the bridge (potentially during stonn and high water conditions); and
2) maximum impact loads associated with a ship or barge tow striking the bridge while transiting the navigation channel
under typical watenvay conditions (i.e., not during extreme storm events and high water conditions).

1.5.3 Minimum Impact Load Criteria

Minimum impact loads associated with a drifting empty 195 x 35 hopper barge should be applied to all piers in the
waterway exposed to potential collision. The drifting barge impact speed should be set equal to the estimated I DO-year
flood event current values at each individual pier location. The impact loads should be combined with one half of the
predicted long-term scour plus one half ofthe predicted short-term scour. For the purpose of evaluating the combination of ((
vessel collision loads plus scour, long-term sCOur should be taken as the sum of the contraction scour p01tion of live bed
scour and scour due to long-term channel degradation. Short-term scour should be taken as the short-term portion of the
live bed scour associated with the 100-year stonn/flood event.

1.5.4 Maximum Impact Load Criteria

Maximum impact loads associated with a ship or barge tow impacting the proposed bridge while transiting the bayou
were developed using Method I and Method II design procedures for all piers within the 6 x LOA Navigation Zone (which
includes the first six piers on each side of the channel centerline). The navigation zone is defined as the primary zone of
potential bridge collisions due to loaded and light vessels transiting the bayou. The maximum impact loads should be
combined with one half of the predicted long-teml scour.

1.5.5 Operational Classification

The Method I and Method II impact loads for the proposed high-level bridge were developed in accordance with the
risk acceptance criteria of the "criticaVessential" bridge operational classification (I.e., a I in lO,OOO-year retum period of
bridge collapse due to vessel collision). It should be noted that the risk criteria for criticaVessential bridges is significantly
greater than those associated with typical bridges (which only need to meet a I in I,OOO-year return period), and usually
results in impact loads associated with the largest vessels transiting the waterway. '
The criticaVessential classification was due to the vital importance of the LA 1 Bridge at Leeville to the Region. The
road is part of the National Highway System (NHS) and is the only hurricane evacuation route in the area. LA 1 also
serves as the only highway access to residences and recreation areas, work-related and shopping commutes, shipping of
seafood harvested in the region, SUppOlt services to the offshore drilling services, and access to emergency health and
police services.

1.6 MINIMUM IMPACT LOAD ANALYSIS

In accordance with the vessel impact design criteria discussed above, all bridge piers in the bayou and approach
waterways located in water depths equal to or greater than 2.0 ft should be designed for the minimum impact force
 RISK ASSF..sSMENT EXAMPLE 177

associated with an empty 195 x 35-ft hopper barge drifting into and striking the bridge. The displacement of the empty
( barge is approximately 270 tons.
The design water current for the vessel minimum impact analysis should be set equal to the average current associated
with the 1DO-year storm event for each of the proposed piers exposed to the drifting barge. Thc H&H analysis necessary to
establish these values were conducted by others at a later point in the design process. A general magnitude of the currents
near the proposed bridge can be seen from Figure 1.2.4-2, which is an overlay of the proposed bridge on top of the 100-
year storm event model results used to evaluate scour at the existing lift bridge in 2002 for LADOTD. As seen in Figure
1.2.4-2, the western approach piers and eastern main pier are in current areas ranging from 0.0-1.0 ft/s, and the western
main pier is in an area of approximately 2.0--{).0 ftfs (for the YR 2002 results). Table 1 contains the impact force for the
drifting barge associated with different 100-year event current speeds. The water level for the drifting barge minimum
impact design condition should be equal to the water level associated with the laO-year storm event.
The minimum impact load should be applied to the bridge as both a head-on impact, as well as a broadside impact, as
required by Atiicle 3.16 of the AASHTO Guide Specification. All portions of the bridge exposed to physical contact by
any portion of the drifting barge's hull or bow (including the bow overhang) should be propOliioned to resist the applied
loads. As a head-on impact, the bow overhang can contact any portion of the bridge 11.3 ft above the waterline. As a
broadside impact, the side of the barge hull can contact any pOliion of the bridge 2.0 ft below the waterline. The broadside
impact case is particularly impOliant for pile bent structures with the outside pile battered away from the bridge. In fact,
several recent watenvay bridges using pile bent cOllstmction have been designed so that the outside pile is a sacrificial
element, with the remaining portion of the pier (primarily the bent cap cantilever) designed to safely support the bridge
deck under an ultimate load condition with no live load on the outside lane near the collision.

Table 1 6-1-Minimum Impact Force (195 x 35 Drifting Hopper Barge)

Water Current Sneed Impact
knots ftfs Force (kips)
0.6 1 33
1.2 2 130
1.8 3 292
2.4 4 518
3.0 5 807
3.6 6 1157
4.1 7 1391
4.7 8 1403
5.4 9 1417
6.0 10 1433

The minimum impact loads should be combined with one half of the long-term plus one half of the short-term (100-
year) scour.
The portion of the proposed bridge within the central 6 x LOA navigation zone near the channel will be subjected to
the higher vessel impact loads discussed below.

1.7 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD 1) ANALYSIS

Method I of the AASHTO Guide Specification is a relatively simple semi-deterministic procedure for selecting a
design vessel for collision impact loads. The procedure is less accurate (and usually more conservative) than the Method II
analysis procedures and is, therefore, not recommended for the final design of critical/essential bridges. However, the
Method I procedures are useful in defining the boundaries ofthe navigation zone used in the Method II risk analysis. The
Method I procedures are also useful in providing a quick initial assessment of the magnitudes of the impact forces while
the input data for the significantly more complicated risk analysis procedures are being collected and analyzed. As part of
the LA I project, the Vessel Impact Study Team provided the Bridge Design Team with an initial assessment of the
Method I forces for the existing fleet early in the design process for use during conceptual design of bridge alternatives.
The design vessel for a critical/essential bridge is equal to the 50th largest vessel passage (determined by impact
force), or five percent of the total vessel fleet, whichever is smaller. Based on the trip frequency data in Table 1.4.1-2, the
50th vessel transit criteria controls for Bayou Lafourche. Therefore, the design vessel is equal to the 50th largest vessel in
the fleet that can transit the waterway. As the waterway depth changes from deep water in the channel to shallow water
near the shoreline, some of the vessels begin to go aground (their drafts are too deep for the water depth). For this reason,
the 50th vessel is selected for each water depth in the waterway. The determination of the Method I forces and design
vessels for Bayou Lafourche are shown in Appendix B.
178 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Figure 1 depicts the impact force and the associated design vessel for the various regions of Bayou Lafourche.
Figure 1 also includes the impact force and design vessel for both the existing fleet (2003) and the projected future fleet
(2053).
The width or boundary of the navigation zone used in the vessel collision analysis is defined as a distance equal to
3 x LOA on each side ofthe vessel transit path (which also coincides with the centerline ofthe channel and the main span).
The 3 x LOA distance is also used to distribute the vessel impact speed over each ofthe piers located within the navigation
zone.
As shown in Figure 1, the largest barge tows become the design vessels for Bayou Lafourche. For the existing fleet,
the 210 x 44 barge tow (loaded) controls in the deeper water, and the same barge empty controls in the shallower water on
the bridge approaches. For the future fleet (2053), the 264 x 50 barge tow (loaded) controls in the deeper water, and the
same barge empty controls in the shallower water on the bridge approaches. For any bridge alternative, the Method I
impact force becomes the value of the impact force at the pier locations based on Figure I.

I(
 .-~ -~

P (kips)
METHOD I DESIGN FORCES
264 x 50 BARGE
i
i
A ~ -,_~
(LOADEDJ

~
264,50 BARGE 3000 / I /
2629 ki 2581 KIps 264 x 50 BARGE '!l
*
D_~___
----0-- EXISTING VESSEL FLEET FORCES (2003)
(LOADED) _ -0- - - - 2171 (EMPTY)
- -0< - FUTURE VESSE L FLEET FORCES (2053)
;;
i:l

_eo, ~'
R

--- ------~----l ,~~

2630ki" ____ /2233k",! '/ 210'44BARG)

-'.', "". F
1885kiPS~ -~I.
~I , - .
~ 288~iPS ~
GE (EMPTY) BARGE
2223ki" , ---1
I
11769k1" I I 'I- ......... ...... --1 445 kips
I
,I• "II I .

,~
I
!i
• 210 x 44
BARGE
AREA PROTECTED BY ' 1778 k'"
(LOADED) ,
I , _ / _... ;:::t"/
ADJACENT LAND MASSES
iI , I , I
I' I, ,I I. ,
x(it)
i I x(ft)

EAST OF
300 200 •
I
100 a 100 i 200 300 460 i 560! 600! 700: 800 i 900 10·00
WEST OF
CHANNEL P2 P3 P4 26H 27H 28H 29H CHANNEL
CENTERLINE CENTERLINE

IMPACT FORCES vs. DISTANCE FROM CENTERLINE OF CHANNEL

125;r.
CHANNEL
, CENTERLINE
20 I CHANNEL
15 I
I
I,
10
5 I ... !MHW EL +2.50'

...
a : >< I
-10
-15 j /'-MUDUNE
-20
-25
!
-30
-35
-40
-45 P2 P3 P4 26H 27H 28H 29H
-so
NOTE: PIER LOCATION FOR CONCRETE OPTION B SHOWN
DESIGN WATER DEPTH ELEVATION

LA1 OVER BAYOU LA FOURCHE

Figure 1.7-1-Method I Design Forces: LA lover Bayou Lafourche (All Options)

~
180 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

1.8 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD II) ANALYSIS

((
Method II of the AASHTO Guide Specification is a probability-based risk analysis procedure for determining the
appropriate vessel impact design loads for a bridge stmcture. Using the Method II procedures, a mathematical risk model
is used to estimate the annual frequency of bridge collapse based on the bridge pier/span geometry, ultimate pier strength,
waterway characteristics, and the characteristics of the vessel fleet transiting the channel. The estimated risk of collapse is
compared to standard acceptance criteria, and the bridge characteristics (span layout, pier strength, etc.) are adjusted until
the acceptance criteria are s a t i s f i e d . · .
The Method II procedure is iterative in nature and normally requires a computer program to perform the analysis. For
the LA I High-Level Bridge project, an Excel spreadsheet program was developed by the Vessel Impact Stlldy Team
based on the AASHTO Guide Specification, and. was used to perform the Method II risk analysis. Sample input and
analysis results for the program are shown in Appendix C for the concrete girder alternative for the future fleet, equal risk
evaluation. The primary bridge characteristics required for the risk analysis are the location, footing width, and ultimate
lateral strength of each pier within the navigation zone. For footings not oriented parallel to the navigation channel, the
footing width is increased by the angle of the skew the footing makes with the channel.

1.8.1 Method II Methodology

The annual frequency of collapse of each bridge pier in the navigation zone is computed by the following equation:

AF = (N) (PA) (PG) (PC){PF) (l.8.1)

where:

AF annual frequency of pier collapse due to vessel collision,

N annual number of vessels classified by category and loading condition which can strike the pier,

PA probability of vessel aberrancy,

PG geometric probability of a collision between an aberrant vessel and the pier,

PC probability of bridge collapse (based on the ratio of the vessel impact force and the ultimate lateral strength
of the pier), and

PF adjustment £1ctor to account for potential protection of the piers from vessel collision due to upstream or
down stream land masses that block the vessel.

The annual frequency of collapse of the total bridge (actually the portion of the bridge within the navigation zone) is
obtained by summing the AFs of each pier in the analysis. The inverse of the annual frequency of collapse (lIAF)
represents the return period (in years) of the failure event. A risk acceptance criterion was developed for each pier based
on the total bridge acceptance criteria as shown in Table I.

Table 1.8.1 ~l-Risk Acceptance Criteria

Risk Acceptance Alternative
Return Period in Years Per Pier (l/A.£)
Equal Distributed
Pier No. Risk Risk
2 Main Pier (E) 60,000 40,000
3 Main Pier 0V) 60,000 40,000
4 Anchor Pier (W) 60,000 80,000
96H Approach Pier (W) 60,000 80,000
97H Approach Pier (W)
98H Approach Pier (W) 60,000 80,000
60,000 80,000
Total Bridge (AF) 10,000 10000
 RISK ASSESSl\JENT EXAMPLE 181

1.8.1.1 Vessel Frequency (N)

(
The number of vessels that could potentially strike a pier is based on the available water depth at the pier and the
actual draft of the abelTant vessel. Barges and ships transiting near the LA I Bridge at Leeville with drafts deeper than the
available water depth will run aground before contacting the bridge, while those with drafts less than the water depth have
the ability to strike the pier. The design water depth for each pier is calculated as the distance from mean high water
(MHW) to the bayou bottom (mudline). The number of vessel trips (N) used for the Method II analysis is shown in Table
1.4.1-2 for the existing (2003) fleet. The "N' values in Table 1.4.1-2 were increased by 2.69 for the future fleet (2053) to
account for the long-term growth in the watenvay estimated for the next 50 years.

1.8.1.2 Probability of Aberrancy (PA)

The probability of aberrancy (PA) is a measure of risk that a vessel is in trouble and may stray off-course as a result of
pilot error, adverse environmental circumstances, or mechanical failure. The most accurate procedure for determining FA
is to compute it using long-term vessel accident data (groundings, collisions, and rammings) in the waterway and statistics
on the frequency of barge traffic during the same period of time. However, since long-terll! accident data for Bayou
Lafourche was not available, the AASHTO Guide Specification altemate procedure for estimating PA was utilized based
on the following equation:

(1.8.1.2)

where:

BR aberrancy base rate (0.6 x 10-4 for ships, and 1.2 x 10-4 for barge tows),

RB correction factor for bridge location,

Rc correction factor for currents acting parallel to vessel transit path,

Rxc correction factor for crosscunent acting perpendicular to the vessel transit path, and

Rn correction factor for vessel traffic density.

The aberrancy base rate (BR) was developed from historical accident data on several U.S. waterways. For Bayou
Lafourche, the higher barge base rate was also used for all shrimp trawlers passing the bridge.
The correction factor for bridge location (RB ) is computed based on the relative locatioll of the bridge in one of three
waterway regions (straight, transition to a turn, and within a turn). The navigable section of Bayou Lafourche at the LA I
Bridge is within a-long turn of approximately 50 degrees. This corresponds to a value of RB ~ 2.11.
The conection factor for currents acting parallel (Re) to the vessel transit path were based on a current of 1.0 knots,
and resulted in Rc ~ 1.1.
The correction factor for crosscurrents acting transverse (Rxe) to the vessel transit path were based on a crosscurrent
of 1.5 knots, and resulted in Rxc ~ 2.5.
The correction factor for vessel traffic density (Rn) in the immediate vicinity of the bridge is determined by whether
the stlUcture is located in a low, medium, or high density area. Because of the narrow width of the bayou, the many marine
facilities along its bank, and the numerous small craft transits among the larger barge tow transits, a "medium density" was
used withRD ~ 1.3.
Based on the above values, PA ~ 9.0 x 10-4 was computed for barge tows and shrimp trawlers in the waterway, and
PA ~ 4.5 x 10~ for all other "ship-type" vessels.

1.8.1.3 Geometric Probability (PG)

The geometric probability (PG) is the conditional probability that a vessel will hit a bridge pier given that it has lost
control (i.e., it is aberrant) in the vicinity of the bridge. The method of computing PO is based on a normal distribution
curve, with a mean at the centerline of the vessel transit path, and one standard deviation (0) equal to the LOA (length
overall) of the vessel. The geometric probability of collision is equal to the area under the llormal distribution curve as
bounded by limits that are the vessel centerline locations for conditions in which the sides of the vessel contact either side
of the pier. For the proposed LA I Bridge, the centerline of vessel transit path coincides with the centerline of the
182 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLlSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

navigation channel. Therefore, the normal distribution for PG is also centered between the bridge piers that define the ((
main channel.

1.8.1.4 Probability of Collapse (PC)

The probability of bridge collapse (PC) once an aberrant vessel has struck a pier is a function of many variables
including vessel size, type, bow shape, speed, direction of impact, and mass. It is also dependent upon the ability of the
ultimate lateral pier strength to resist the collision impact loads. Based on historical accident data, the probability of
collapse is computed according to the ratio of ultimate bridge resistance (lI) to the vessel impact force (P) as follows:

For HIP between 0.0 and 0.1, PC is computed as:

PC ~ 0.+9(0.1-[H/PJ) (1.8.1.4-1)

For HIP between 0.1 and 1.0, PC is computed as:

PC ~ (1-[H/PJ)/9 (1.8.1.4-2)

From the above equations, the following observations are made:

• In cases where the pier impact resistance exceeds the vessel collision impact force of the design vessel, the bridge
collapse probability becomes zero.
• In cases where the pier impact resistance is in the range of 10 percent to 100 percent of the collision force of the
design vessel, the bridge collapse probability varies linearly between 0.0 and 0.10.
• In cases where the pier impact resistance is below 10 percent of the collision force, the bridge collapse probability
varies linearly between 0.10 and 1.0. ((
For the LA I Bridge the bridge element strength (lI) is based on the factored horizontal resistance of the pier where the
vessel bow contacts the bridge substructure (pier footing, column, or pedestal). A light (empty) barge may have the
tendency upon impact to ride up on the footing and contact the lower section of the pier column, as shown in
Figure 1.8.1.5-1.

The barge tow and ship impact forces (P) used in the analysis were computed in accordance with the AASHTO Guide
Specification criteria for each vessel based upon its size, displacement, and speed.

1.8.1.5 Protection Factor (PF)

The protection factor is used to model the protection provided to bridge piers due (0 upstream or downstream land
masses (or other waterfront structures) adjacent to the bridge that would block an aberrant vessel from striking a bridge
pier (regardless of the actnal water depth at the pier itself). The general procedure used to compute PF was based on the
methodology shown in the AASHTO Guide Specification (Figure C4.8.3.5-1) for estimating the reduction in annual
frequency due to pier protection structures (such as large diameter dolphins).
As an example, studying the Concrete Girder Option for Bayon Lafourche as shown on the aerial view in Figure
1.4.1-2, it can be seen that Pier 4 is completely protected from downbound vessel impacts due to the existence of a small
island immediately north of the pier. For the existing fleet risk analysis (2003) a value of PF ~ 0.0 was used to model all
downbound vessels, and a value of PF~ 0.15 was used to model all upbound vessels. As seen in Figure 1.4.1-2, adjacent
landmasses provide significant protection to Pier 4 from upbound vessel transits, but there is still a window of opportunity
for a pier collision due to the small "cove" or waterway south of the pier that connects to Bayou Lafourche. It should be
noted that all of the approach piers on the eastern side of the bayou are protected by adjacent landmasses, and are not
exposed to collision by vessels normally transiting the channel (although this may not be true for the separate drifting
barge condition previously discussed).
In evaluating PF for the future conditions of the waterway, it was decided to allow for potential long-term scour and
westward migration of the bayou as well as minor shifting of the existing shoreline. For the western approach piers, the ((
existing island protecting the piers was removed from the risk analysis for the future condition by using a water depth of
4.0 ft to 1110del the region in front of the piers exposed to potential collision by downbound vessels. In Appendix C, in the
table entitled "Pier !D: 4--Annual Fl~quency of Collapse (AP) Computations," for the future fleet (2053) it can be seen
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 183

that PF ~ 0.10 for all downbound vessels, and that PF ~ 0.20 for upbound vessels (versus PF ~ 0.0 and 0.15 for the
{ existing condition discussed above). In the future the westem piers would be exposed to potential collision by empty barge
tows and certain categories of shallow draft ships.
DECK \

GIRDERS-

BOW DEPTH: 13.0'

LOADED DRAFT: 8.7"-9.0'
EMPTY DRAFT: 1.7"-2.0'
HEAD LOG HEIGHT: 2.0'-3.0'

PIEROOLUMN

EL. 13.8 (EMPTY) \

EL. 6.5 (LO'AD:ED) -l'" \

( r-----.----------------- --1

EMPTY BARGE

MHW EL. 2.5

LOADED BARGE

PILES (TYP.)

TYPICAL ELEVATION
(

Figure 1.8.1.5-1-Barge Impact Schematic

184 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLlSION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRlDGES

1.8.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria

The Method II acceptance criteria for a critical/essential bridge classification is an annual frequency of bridge collapse
equal to, or less than, AF ~ 0.0001 (i.e., a return period of 1 in 10,000 years). This does not imply that the structure is
expected to last 10,000 years; but rather during the normal design life of the bridge (e.g., 100 years), the risk of it
collapsing due to a collision by a vessel in the design fleet (Table 1.4.1-1) within the design life of the bridge will be velY
small. .
According to the AASHTO Guide Specification, the acceptable annual frequency of collapse should be distributed
over the number of piers exposed to collision within the 6 x LOA navigation zone (equal to 3 x LOA on each side of the
channel) based on the length of the Method I design vessel. The selection ofthe level (percent) of the acceptable risk to be
assigned each pier is left to the judgment of the designer. For example, the risk may be uniformly distributed over each
pier in the navigation zone; or alternatively, piers located nearer the channel may be assigned a lower (or for that matter a
higher) risk than piers located ftlliher away from the channel. This flexibility in assigning the risk allows the designer to
develop cost-effective groupings of standard pier footing sizes and foundation alternatives for the stmcture.
Based all the risk analysis results for the LA I High Level Bridge alternatives over Bayou Lafourche, six piers are
exposed to potential collision (the two main piers and four approach piers all the western side of the channel). As pad of
the study, two risk acceptance criteria distributions were evaluated for use, as shown in Table 1.8.1-1.

1.8.3 Method II Risk Analysis Summary

The results of the Method II analysis for the vessel impact design forces determined for each pier of each bridge
alternative for both the existing fleet (2003) and the future fleet (2053) are shown in Tables I and 2 on the following
pages. For comparison purposes, the impact force from the Method I procedure are also shown in these tables. As
presented in the table, the impact forces from the risk analysis are close to the maximum values in the watenvay due to the
high standards of the critical/essential bridge acceptance criteria, and the relatively large number of barge tows in the
watelway. The Method II impact forces for the existing fleet (2003) are slightly lower than the ftlture fleet (2053)-as one
would expect because ofthe differences in the annual number of transits (N).
The procedure used to compute the Method II design impact force for each pier was to back-compute the required pier
resistance strength (H) needed to meet the pier acceptance criteria for bridge collapse shown in Table 1.8.1-1. This value ((
of"H' thell becomes the theoretical design impact force for the pier and its foundation.
In addition to an estimate of bridge collapse, Method II can also provide an estimate of the annual frequency of the
bridge being hit by the vessels in the fleet (this includes contact from all vessels whose impact may be relatively minor and
may not cause significant damage). A comparison of the estimated number of contacts per year between a vessel and the
two main piers of the bridge is shown in Table 3 for the Concrete Girder Altemative. It should be noted that as long as the
piers have been designed for the Method II design impact forces, the estimated return period of bridge collapse will be 1 in
10,000 years. The data in Table 3 represents an estimate of how often the bridge will be hit (not collapse) and l~presents
impacts causing relatively minor damage (if any at all). As shown in Table 3, it is estimated that contact from all aberrant
barge tow in the existing (2003) fleet would occur approximately 0.4 times per year (once every 2.5 years). As seen in this
table, most of the potential impacts would be due to the large number of smaller boats/ships (such as shrimp trawlers) in
the waterway, with a collision estimated to occur 0.8 times pel' year (once every 1.25 years) for the Concrete Alternative.
Combining both vessel categories results in an estimated vessel/pier contact of 1.2 times per year for the Concrete Girder
Altemative. As shown in Table 3, these values go up when the future (2053) fleet is considered.

( (
 RISK ASSESSi\lENT EXAMPLE 185

Table 1.8.3~1-LA lover Bayou Lafourche Impact Force Comparison Concrete Girder Option A3-Existing Vessel Fleet (2003)
I Method I Design Method II Design Impact Forces (kips)
Impact Forces
Pier ID Pier No. Description (kips) Distributed Risk Equal Risk
1 2 Main Pier (E) 2,225 2,232 2,299
2 3 Main Pier (W) 2,200 2,232 2,299
3 1 Anchor Pier (E) - - -
4 4 Anchor Pier (W) 1,260 1,470 1,401
5 95S Approach Pier (E) - - -
6 96S Approach Pier (W) 940 964 905
7 94S Approach Pier (E) - - -

8 97S Approach Pier (W) 620 140 113

9 93S Approach Pier (E) - - -
10 98S Approach Pier (W) 302 100 100
11 92S Approach Pier (E) - - -

12 99S Approach Pier (W) 288 100 100

Table 1.8.3-2-LA lover Bayou Lafourche Impact Force Comparison Concrete Girder Option A3-Futul'e Vessel Fleet (2053)
Method I Design Method II Design Impact Forces (kips)
Impact Forces
Pier ID Pier No. Description (kips) Distributed Risk Equal Risk
1 2 Main Pier (E) 2,630 2,416 2,446
2 3 Main Pier (W) 2,603 2,416 2,446
( 3 1 Anchor Pier (E) - - -
4 4 Anchor Pier (W) 1,546 1,680 1,661
5 95S Approach Pier (E) - - -
6 96S Approach Pier (W) 1,265 1,118 1,097
7 94S Approach Pier (E) - - -

8 97S Approach Pier (W) 983 530 442

9 93S Approach Pier (E) - - -
10 98S Approach Pier (W) 700 100 100
11 92S Approach Pier (E) - - -
12 99S Approach Pier (W) 419 100 100

Note: Blank entry denotes minimum impact force.

Table 1.8.3-3-Estimated Frequency of Vessel/Bridge Contact (Combined Main Piers)

Average Number of Vessel/Bridge Contacts Per Year
Existing Fleet (2003) Future Fleet (2053) .
Main Piers Barges Boats/Ships Total Barges Boats/Ships I Total
Alternative A3 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.0 2.0 I 3.0
186 GUiDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTAHV FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

1.9 SUMMARY OF LA 1 PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

1.9.1 Vessel Impact Forces

Vessel impact forces for the existing and future vessel fleets were developed in general conformance with the
AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specification. For the maximum impact forces, it was recommended the Method II
design impact forces should be used for the design of the high-level bridge over Bayou Lafourche. It was recommended
that the forces associated with the future fleet (2053) and the equal risk acceptance criteria (Appendix C) should be used
for final design. The maximum impact load combinations should be in accordance with AASHTO Guide Specification
Aliicle 3.14 and should be combined with one-half of the predicted long-term scour.
The minimum impact force for the drifting barge sihlation should be applied to all piers exposed during the 100-year
storm event. The minimum impact load combinations should be in accordance with AASHTO Guide Specification
Article 3.14 and should be combined with one half of the predicted long-term SCOUl' plus one half of the predicted short-
term scour associated with the 100-year storm event. The results of the future H&H analysis to be conducted for the
LADOTD will be used to establish the water height and current speeds needed to determine the impact forces for the
drifting barge event.
For final substructure design, the design impact force should be applied as an equivalent static force transverse to the
substmcture in a direction parallel to the alignment of the centerline of the channel. Fifty percent (50 percent) of the
transverse load should be applied as a longitudinal force to the substmctnre. These transverse and longihldinal forces
should not be applied simultaneously. For pier footings that are skewed with respect to the channel, the impact forces
should be resolved into components acting on each face of the footing.
All portions of the bridge pier or substmcture exposed to physical contact by any portion of the design vessel hull
(ships or barges) should be propOliioned to resist the applied loads in accordance with the design criteria stated above and
the requirements of the AASHTO Guide Specification (Article 3.15). Both head-on and broadside impacts should be
considered. The bow overhang ofthe barge should be considered in determining the portions of the pier exposed to contact
by the vessel. As shown in Figure 1.8.1.5-1, the empty barge bow may extend over the top of the proposed footing and
could slide over the footing during a collision. Therefore, the pier column should be designed for the loads appropriate to
this condition. Alternatively, the footing depth could be increased, the top and bottom of the footing raised, or other
measures taken to prevent contact between the barge bow and bent column. ((
If prestressed concrete pile bent construction is used for the approach bridge substructure design, it was recommended
that the outside pile be designed as a sacrificial element and the remaining portion of the pier (primarily the bent cap
cantilever) should be designed to safely support the bridge deck under au ultimate load condition with no live load on the
outside lane nearest the collision.
In setting the bottom of footing elevations, consideration should be given to potential low water levels in the bayou
that might expose the piles supporting the footing to contact by aberrant vessels with low freeboard (such as a loaded
barge).

1.9.2 Bridge Main Span Altematives

To minimize the risk of future catastrophic collision, it was recommended that the minimum clearance between the
footings of the main span should be at least two times the reqnircd width of the USCG approved navigation chamlel. For
the existing LA I Lift Bridge, the existing permitted channel width is 125 ft; therefore, the proposed bridge should have a
minimum clearance of 250 ft. Both of the concrete and steel alternatives evaluated by the Bridge Design Team met this
minimum criterion with 2S0-ft and 310-ft clearances between the footings, respectively. The proposed bridge would have a
significant improvement in horizontal clearance as compared with other existing bridges over Bayou Lafourche between
Leeville and Larose. In accordance with the requirements of an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) prepared for the
project, it was established that a 73-ft vertical clearance over the navigation channel should extend from MHW to the
underside of the bridge for the entire distance between the faces of the footings.
It was recommended that the main pier footings adjacent to the navigation channels should be aligned parallel to the
skew of the channel. For the Bayou Lafourche structure, the skew of the proposed channel and footings would be set equal
to 20 degrees. It was also recommended that the corners ofthe main pier footings should be "clipped" 45 degrees to avoid
having a shmp comer adjacent to the channel. The corners of footings are usually the primary impact locations from
aberrant vessels; therefore, "flattening" the corner would help distribute the impact load and reduce potential spalling of
the footing, as well as minimize potential damage to the vessel. Clipping the corners (a minimum of 3-4 ft) would also
improve the water flow around the piers and reduce some of the potential scour.
It was recommended that a nominal fender protection system be placed around the upstream and downstream faces of ((
the main pier footings, as well as the footing sides facing the navigation channel. The proposed fender system consisted of
a layer of 10 x 10-in. low-maintenance plastic "lumber" lValers (made from recycled materials) spaced at 2-ft centers
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 187

( against the concrete footing with a continuous 2-in. thick panel of ultra high molecular weight (UHMW) polyethylene
plastic covering the outside surface of the walers. The UHMW panel is a very low-friction material and would minimize
potential damage to the footing by reducing the contact pressures between the concrete footing and the steel hull of the
vessel. The panels also come in a variety of colors, and a color can be selected to improve the visibility of the footing to
passing vessels (particularly at night and in low visibility conditions), thus reducing the risk of collision. The fender
system will also minimize potential damage to the vessel (particularly small crafts that might occasionally bump against
the pier),

1.9.3 Vessel Bow Overhang Collisions

As previously discussed, all portions of the pier or substmcture exposed to physical contact by any portion of the
design vessel's hull should be proportioned to resist the applied loads. For the proposed Bayou Lafourche Bridge, the
design vessel for the maximum impact force on the pier footing (future fleet, equal risk criteria) would be the 264 ft x 50-ft
barge tow. However, some of the ship categories that have a smaller impact force also have the potential to contact the pier
column at a higher elevation above the footing than the design barge tow. The potential ship impacts would be due to
the higher height above water of their respective vessel bows as compared to barges, and due to the bow overhang (or flair)
of the ship vessels. These potential bow overhang collisions are shown graphically in Figure I for the Bayou Lafourche
main pier.
Based on the available watcr depth and bridge pier geometry, the largest ship that could hit one of thc main pier
columns on Bayou Lafourche would be the 185 ft x 42-ft Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) transiting empty. The geomelty
of the OSV bow is shown schematically in Figure I. The maximum impact force, P, of the OSV 185 ft x 42-ft ship
equaled 1,857 kips for a downbound empty vessel striking one of the main piers. The impact force was taken from the
Method II risk analysis table in Appendix C entitled "Pier ID l-Armual Frequency of Collapse Computations, Pier No.2,
Main Pier (E), Downbound." For stl1lctural analysis and design of the pier colunm, the impact force should be converted
into a line load distributed over the depth of the vessel bow. Because the available water depth at each of the approach
piers is relatively shallow, only the main piers are exposed to potential collision by an aberrant ship's bow.
188 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Note: P/D::: Vessel Impact Une Load

for Local Collision Force on
Pier Column
Girders--
P =: Vessel Impact Force

DB =: Bow Depth

R =: Bow Overhang (Flair)

Pier Column--

Strut

Schematic Bow Shape

185'x42'Offshore \
Supply Vessel (OSV)
((

Strut

To ofFootin
o EI. 9.5
'" p
"
Cl

R=20'
Piles (Typ.)

Typical Elevation - Bayou Lafourche (Main Piers)

Figure 1.9.3-1-Ship Bow Overhang Impact Loads

 RJSK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 189

1.9.4 Mast Collisiolls

(
I
It was recommended that the exposed edges of the superstructure outside girder, and the sides of the main channel
piers, should be designed for mast collisions from aberrant shrimp boats. There had been a relatively large number of mast
accidents with the existing bridge caused by the extended booms of shrimp trawlers (who must lower their fishing net
booms to fit under the 73-foot vertical clearance of the bridge). It should be anticipated that these types of mast collisions
would continue to occur (though at a lower frequency) with the proposed bridge structures. The forces associated with
mast collisions are easily quantified, but they are rarely catastrophic and usually only cause relatively minor damage. As a
guideline, the AASHTO Guide Specification recommends a mast collision force equal to 2 percent of the vessel impact
force (for small ships). For the larger 90 x 28-ft shrimp trawler transiting Bayou Lafourche, this results in a mast impact
force of approximately 26 kips. The Bridge Design Team should consider options to minimize potential heavy spalling of
concrete corners during a mast collision. These may include heavy chamfering of exposed corners and additional stirrup
reinforcing steel, use of an imbedded steel or high density plastic angle, or other alternatives. The protected areas for mast
collision should include the outside edges of the outer superstructure main span concrete girders and the sides of the main
span concrete piers that face the navigation channel.

1.10 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE COMMENTS

The purpose of the risk assessment example was to provide a worked vulnerability assessment nsing the AASHTO
Guide Specification Vessel Collision provisions. The example included the data collection phase and the thought process
used in conducting the risk analysis and determination of the vessel impact forces for design of the proposed structure. The
example discussed above was a condensed version of the highlights of an extensive vessel collision analysis conducted for
the bridges, and should be considered as illustrative only in its procedures and recommendations for the proposed bridge
replacement project.

2.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF NEW BRIDGES

Vulnerability (risk) assessments of new bridges are conducted similar to the example assessment shown in Section 1.
( Data is collected on the waterway and vessel fleet characteristics. The bridge is categorized as either a "critical/essential"
or "typical" bridge for purposes of establishing the risk acceptance criteria. Method I is used to generate initial valnes of
impact forces across the waterway. The bridge designers then develop alternate bridge type, size and location for use in the
analysis (including span and pier locations). Based all the number of piers in the 6 x LOA analysis area, an acceptance
criteria is established for each pier in the waterway (the total of all piers is equal to the overall risk acceptance criteria of
either a "critical/essential" or "typical" bridge). The equation for AF is then back-solved for each pier to determine the
theoretical ultimate pier strength required to meet that pier's acceptance criteria. The design vessel for that particular pier
then becomes the vessel in the fleet category which is the closest match to the theoretical impact forces.
If the cost or consequence of designing the piers to the impact force for the alternate is too high or unacceptable, then
the spans and pier locations can be adjusted and another risk assessment is conducted. This trial process continues until an
acceptable design solution is achieved. Sometimes, the use of pier protection structures are required (pile-snpported
structures, large diameter dolphins, or protective islands) for major bridges crossing navigation channels with large
merchant ships. For inland waterway bridges, the foundations and piers for new bridges can usually be cost-effectively
designed to withstand the design forces associated with barge tow impacts.
A typical method of conducting the AF analysis is shown in Appendix C for the example problem. The analysis was
conducted ntilizing a spreadsheet which included tabs for the vessel fleet characteristics, vessel fleet annual trip frequency,
typical vessel transit speeds, bridge pier infolTIlation, a tab for computing AF for each pier included in the analysis, and
finally a summary of the AF for the entire bridge. Others have programmed the AASHTO vessel collision risk analysis
procedures using MathCAD and similar programs. A copy of a Vessel Impact Analysis MathCAD program developed by
Henry Bollmann for the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is available at the FDOT website
www.dot.state.fl.us/structures/progJib.shtm.

3.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF EXISTING BRIDGES

Vulnerability (risk) assessments of existing bridges are conducted using the same procedures utilized for new bridges.
The important difference is that existing bridges have fixed pier locations and a corresponding ultimate resistance strength
to lateral forces (snch as a vessel collision impact). An accurate assessment of the ultimate impact resistance strength for
( each of the bridge piers exposed to collision is usually the most difficult part of the risk assessment. Push-over analysis
(typically used in assessing bridges for earthquake vulnerability) can be used, as well as a variety of existing structural
analysis programs (static, quasi-static, and dynamic) to estimate the ultimate pier resistance strength.
190 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HiGHWAY BRIDGES

Particularly useful for vessel collision analysis has been the software program FB-Pier developed by the FDOT and
the University of Florida, Bridge Software Institute, which is a 3D finite element pier analysis program with full soil-pile (!
interaction analysis features. Recently, the Bridge Software Institute updated the program to FB-MultiPier which allows
the dynamic analysis of the entire bridge (all piers) including the superstructure. Information on these software programs is
available at hltp:llbsi-web.ce.ufl.edu. Other public domain structural analysis programs have also been used in the bridge
design industry to model the dynamic behavior of bridges under vessel collision impacts.
Once the pier resistance strength is known, the AF for each pier and then for the entire bridge can be determined. The
AF is then compared to the acceptance criteria associated with the structure (either "critical/essential" or "typical") to
evaluate the degree in which the existing bridge meets the AASHTO Guide Specification criteria used for new bridge
design.
Conducting a VUlnerability assessment of the risk of vessel collision for all existing bridges crossing a State's
waterway system would allow a DOT to gain an understanding of the overall vulnerability of the bridge system, as well as
ability to rank existing bridges from most vulnerable to least vuhlCl1lble. Those bridges or particular piel~ found to be
particularly vulnerable to collapse could then be programmed into the DOT's plans for retro-filting, protection or
replacement.
An example of such a statewide assessment was conducted by the LADOTD. Based on in-house maintenance records
and recommendations from its District offices, the LADOTD established a list of the top 60 bridges crossing waterways in
the State that had potential vulnerabilities, or represented major traffic corridors in Louisiana. The Department divided the
list into two 30 bridge contracts and engaged two consultants to perfol1n a vulnerability (risk) assessment of each bridge.
The result of the assessment helped the LADOTD identify those bridges with potentially high risk and to incorporate an
appropriate response into the long-range State transportation plan. One interesting finding of the LADOTD study was that
relatively few bridges were vulnerable to collapse on the inland waterway system where the impacts were mainly from
barge tow collisions (most of the existing bridge piers were sufficiently "robust" and sufficient redundancy existed in the
stmctures that the probability of collapse were within the AASHTO Guide Specification criteria for new bridges).
It is interesting to note that FDOT has established a design vessel fleet for sections of each waterway in the State.
Once a bridge location is known, the fleet data is automatically incorporated into the MathCAD risk analysis program
discussed above.

((
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 191

(
APPENDIX A

RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE

P ASSED-THE-POINT QUERY FOR

CARGO COMMODITY AND VESSEL TRIP DATA (2000)

(DATA COMPILED BY TIlE USACE WATERBOR1'lE COMMERCE CENTER)

(
192 GUIDE SPECIFICATlONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

I(
FriNo'l12OO2
Paga 1

2070 BAYOU lAFOURCHE AND LAFOURCHE-JUMP WATERWAY, LA

Section Included; LocItpQrt, LA to Gulfof Mexico, 50 m~es. MaIntaIned Depth: BarChanno1, 28 fee!; Jelly Channel, 27 feel; Mouth to 3 mUes, 27
fee~ to lockport, 9 feel TIdal range to 3 feel at mean hlgher hIgh water.

Project redefined between MILE 11 and MILE 11

(SHORT TONS)
(IN THOUSANDS)
(· .. ·2000....)

_Mile ","",tic Domestic Domestic

CoastwIse Coasl\"lse Internal Inlernal
Through Th<oogh Th_h Through
COMMODITY TOTAL Upbound Do\\nboond Upbourn! Doi'.T1bound

TOTAL 2,439,051 2 807 1,630

2100 Crude Petroleum 152 152

2330 Dls~IT<lte Fuel Oil 402 o '9 443
2350 lube OIl & Greases 0 0 0
3216 MetalITc Salls 63 1 61
3282 Pigments & PaInts 0 0
3299 Chern, Products NEe 10 2 6
4322 Umestona 2 2
4331 Sand & Gravel 12 12
4782 Clay &. Refran. Mal. 100 o 69 121
4900
5190
5220
Non--Melal, Min. NEe
Paper Products NEG
Cement & Cooctete
397
0
5
9
0
1
''''04
5360
5370
J&S Bars & Shapes
1&8 PIpe & Tuba
1
9 , 1
6
5390 PrilTl8ry I&S NEG 0 0

-
0
5400 Feb. Melal Products 11 o 2 9
6887 Groceries 1 1 1
Water & Ice 276 1 34 241
7110 Machlnery (Not Elee.) 529 o 194 335
7400 Manufac. Wood Prod. 1 0 1
7900 Manufac. Prod. NEC 0 0

2070 BAYOU LAFOURCHE AND lAFOURCHE-JUMP WATERWAY,LA

((
(ConUnued)
Sec~on Included: Lockport, LA 10 Gulf of Mexico, 50 miles. Maintained Depth: Bar Channel, 28
feet; Jetty Channel, 27 feet; Mouth to 3 rnlles, 27
feet, to Lockport, 9 feet. TIdal range to 3 feel at mean higher high water,

Project redefined bel\voon MILE 11 and MILE 11

(SHORT TONS)
(IN THOUSANDS)
( ....2000 ....)

Domestic
""'""'"
Coasl'l'ilse
Through
DonwsUc
Coastwise
Through
Internal
Through
Domestic
Internal
Through
COMMODITY TOTAL Upbound DoI'mboUnd Upbound Downbound

6900 Waste and Scrap NEe 307 307

 ~ ~

~
~
Fri Nov 12002
2070
---PASSED THE POINT FOR MILE 11.0
BAYOU LAFOURCHE AND LAFOURCHE-JUMP WATERWAY, LA
Page 1
~;;
FOREIGN 2000 Trips and Drafts of Vessels
o ~

Self Propelled
Foreign Upbound R
E
I Self Propelled
Foreign Downbound
'"5:'
~

Vessels NonwSe!f Propelled Vessels G

N
Vessels Non-Self Propelled Vessels
~
Pass Pass
Drnft & DO' Towboat or & DO' Towboat or DO'
(feet) Cargo Tanker Tugboat Dry Cargo Tanker Other Tota! Cargo Tanker Tugboat Cargo Tanker Other Total
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tot::l! 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0

...
?;l
 -
'E.
Fri Nov 1 2002 ---> PASSED THE POINT FOR MILE 11.0 Page 2
2070 BAYOU LAFOURCHE AND LAFOURCHE..JUMP WATERWAY, LA
DOMESTIC 2000 Trips and Drafts of Vessels
o
Domestic Upbound M Domestic Downbound
E
Self Propelled Non-Self S Self Propelled Non-Setf
Vessels Propelled Vessels T Vessels Propelled Vassels
I
Pass C Pass
Draft & Dey Towboat or & Dey Towboat or Dey
(feet) Cargo Tanker Tugboat D!),Cargo Tanker Other Total Cargo Tanker Tugboat cargo Tanker Other Total
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0 2 0 0 0 64
15 39 8 0 0 0 0 47 44 1 0 0 1 0 46
14
13
265
149
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
273
149
292
284
9
53
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
317
337
~
12 150 0 27 0 0 0 177 207 0 24 0 0 0 281 1il

§
11 324 0 0 0 0 0 324 361 0 1 0 31 0 393
10 185 0 8 0 0 0 193 300 0 14 2 2 0 318
9 396 0 51 0 5 0 452 708 0 53 22 73 0 856
8 412 0 72 4 32 0 520 1,365 0 93 18 32 0 1,508
7 1,245 0 150 20 20 0 1,435 ?i
1,704 0 159 199 4 0 2,066 >-
~
6 823 70 361 8 35 1 1,298 1,633 8 384 63 13 1 2,102
5 563 23 114 1 60 0 761 441 23 126 106 10 0 706
4 771 0 203 73 75 0 1,122 621 0 264 138 30 0 1,053 00
3 122 0 0 44 109 0 275
2 2,323 0 3 793 237 0 3,356
127
10
0
0
14
4
248
133
35
327
0
0
424
474
'Z
1 0 0 0 2 12 0 14 o 0 0 0 51 0 51 "
@
Total 7,767 101 997 945 585 10,396 8,209 94 1,154 929 609 10,996
;::
~
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::1
~
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f:5
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~
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~
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 195

(
APPENDIXB

RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE

METHOD I ANALYSIS: BAYOU LAFOURCHE

196 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Method I Analysis
LA 1 over Bayou Lafourche
J
Ranking of VessellmQact Forces
EXISTING VESSEL FLEET (2003)
Direction
Vessel Upbound or Loaded Draft Impact Number ofTrips
Rank Type Downbound or Empty (It) Force (k) N LN
1 264x50 Barge Tow Downbound Loaded 9 2,629 30 30
2 210x44 Barge Tow Downbound Loaded 9 2,233 90 120
3 185x420SV Downbound Loaded 11 2,091 300 420
4 264x50 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 2,047 30 450
5 160x42 Barge Tow Downbound Loaded 8 1,988 40 490
6 160x42 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 8 1,867 150 640
7 210x44 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,795 90 730
8 195x35 Barge Tow Downbound Loaded 9 1,758 50 780
9 140x40 Deck Barge Downbound Loaded 5 1,733 270 1,050
10 160x42 Barge Tow Downbound Empty 2 1,723 150 1,200
11 160x42 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,686 40 1,240
12 185x420SV Upbound Loaded 11 1,673 200 1,440
13 185x420SV Upbound Empty 5 1,673 100 1,540
14 165x360SV Downbound Loaded 9 1,670 300 1,840
15 140x40 Deck Barge Upbound Loaded 5 1,668 80 1,920
16 140x40 Deck Barge Downbound Empty 2 1,650 80 2,000
17 195x35 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 9 1,625 30 2,030
18 140x40 Deck Barge Up bound Empty 2 1,612 270 2,300
19
20
140x35 Barge Tow
150x30 Barge Tow (2X)
Downbound
Downbound
Loaded
Loaded
7
8
1,591
1,580
70
280
2,370
2,650
((
21 140x35 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 7 1,509 200 2,850
22 195x35 Barge Tow Downbound Empty 2 1,453 30 2,880
23 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Upbound Loaded 8 1,442 10 2,890
24 140x35 Barge Tow Downbound Empty 2 1,418 200 3,090
25 195x35 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,417 50 3,140
26 145x36 Supply Boat Downbound Loaded 8 1,399 900 4,040
27 140x35 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,394 70 4,110
28 165x360SV Upbound Loaded 9 1,336 200 4,310
29 165x360SV Upbound Empty 4 1,336 100 4,410
30 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Downbound Empty 2 1,293 10 4,420
31 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Downbound Loaded 12 1,286 1,200 5,620
32 120x30 Deck Barge Downbound Loaded 4 1,270 250 5,870
33 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Upbound Empty 2 1,245 280 6,150
34 120x30 Deck Barge Downbound Empty 2 1,237 50 6,200
35 120x30 Deck Barge Upbound Loaded 4 1,230 50 6,250
36 120x30 Deck Barge Upbound Empty 2 1,209 250 6,500
37 125x24 Crew Boat Downbound Loaded 9 1,191 300 6,800
38 145x36 Supply Boat Upbound Loaded 8 1,119 800 7,600
39 145x36 Supply Boat Upbound Empty 4 1,119 100 7,700
40 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 12 1,029 900 8,600
41 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 5 1,029 300 8,900
42 100x28 Utility Boat Downbound Loaded 8 1,025 900 9,800
43 125x24 Crew Boat Upbound Loaded 9 953 200 10,000
44 125x24 Crew Boat Upbound Empty 4 953 100 10,100
45 100x28 Utility Boat Upbound Loaded 8 820 700 10,800
46 100x28 Utility Boat Upbound Empty 4 820 200 11,000 ( \
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 197

( Method I Analysis
I LA 1 over Bayou Lafourche

Ranking of Vessellm~act Forces

EXISTING VESSEL FLEET (2003)
Direction
Vessel Up bound or Loaded Draft Impact Number of Trips
Rank Type Downbound or Empty (It) Force (k) N :EN
47 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Downbound Loaded 6 638 1,800 12,800
48 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Downbound Empty 2 638 200 13,000
49 65x18 Crew Boat Downbound Loaded 5 575 600 13,600
50 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 6 510 1,000 14,600
51 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 2 510 1,000 15,600
52 65x18 Crew Boat Upbound Loaded 5 460 400 16,000
53 65x18 Crew Boat Upbound Empty 2 460 200 16,200
54 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Downbound Loaded 4 228 1,300 17,500
55 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Downbound Empty 2 228 200 17,700
56 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 4 182 1,000 18,700
57 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 2 182 500 19,200

I
'.
198 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWA yBRIDGES

Method I Analysis i(
LA 1 over Bayou Lafourche

Ranking of Vessellm[!act Forces

FUTURE VESSEL FLEET (2053)
Direction
Vessel Upbound or Loaded Dralt Impact Number of Trips
Rank Type Downbound or Empty (It) Force (k) N l:N
1 264x50 Barge Tow Down Loaded 9 2,629 81 81
2 210x44 Barge Tow Down Loaded 9 2,233 242 323
3 185x420SV Down Loaded 11 2,091 807 1,130
4 264x50 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 2,047 81 1,211
5 160x42 Barge Tow Down Loaded 8 1,988 108 1,318
6 160x42 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 8 1,867 404 1,722
7 210x44 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,795 242 1,964
8 195x35 Barge Tow Down Loaded 9 1,758 135 2,098
9 140x40 Deck Barge Down Loaded 5 1,733 726 2,825
10 160x42 Barge Tow Down Empty 2 1,723 404 3,228
11 160x42 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,686 108 3,336
12 185x420SV Upbound Loaded 11 1,673 538 3,874
13 185x420SV Upbound Empty 5 1,673 269 4,143
14 165x360SV Down Loaded 9 1,670 807 4,950
15 140x40 Deck Barge Upbound Loaded 5 1,668 215 5,165
16 140x40 Deck Barge Down Empty 2 1,650 215 5,380
17 195x35 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 9 1,625 81 5,461
18 140x40 Deck Barge Upbound Empty 2 1,612 726 6,187
19 140x35 Barge Tow Down Loaded 7 1,591 188 6,375 ((
20 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Down Loaded 8 1,580 753 7,129
21 140x35 Barge Tow Upbound Loaded 7 1,509 538 7,667
22 195x35 Barge Tow Down Empty 2 1,453 81 7,747
23 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Upbound Loaded 8 1,442 27 7,774
24 140x35 Barge Tow Down Empty 2 1,418 538 8,312
25 195x35 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,417 135 8,447
26 145x36 Supply Boat Down Loaded 8 1,399 2,421 10,868
27 140x35 Barge Tow Upbound Empty 2 1,394 188 11,056
28 165x360SV Upbound Loaded 9 1,336 538 11,594
29 165x360SV Upbound Empty 4 1,336 269 11,863
30 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Down Empty 2 1,293 27 11,890
31 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Down Loaded 12 1,286 3,228 15,118
32 120x30 Deck Barge Down Loaded 4 1,270 673 15,790
33 150x30 Barge Tow (2X) Upbound Empty 2 1,245 753 16,544
34 120x30 Deck Barge Down Empty 2 1,237 135 16,678
35 120x30 Deck Barge Upbound Loaded 4 1,230 135 16,813
36 120x30 Deck Barge Upbound Empty 2 1,209 673 17,485
37 125x24 Crew Boat Down Loaded 9 1,191 807 18,292
38 145x36 Supply Boat Upbound Loaded 8 1,119 2,152 20,444
39 145x36 Supply Boat Upbound Empty 4 1,119 269 20,713
40 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 12 1,029 2,421 23,134
41 90x28 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 5 1,029 807 23,941
42 100x28 Utility Boat Down Loaded 8 1,025 2,421 26,362
43 125x24 Crew Boat Upbound Loaded 9 953 538 26,900
44 125x24 Crew Boat Upbound Empty 4 953 269 27,169
45 100x28 Utility Boat Upbound Loaded 8 820 1,883 29,052 fl.
46 100x28 Utility Boat. Upbound Empty 4 820 538 29,590
 RISKASSESSi\lENT EXAi\IPLE 199

( Method I Analysis
LA 1 over Bayou Lafourche

Ranking of VessellmQact Forces

FUTURE VESSEL FLEET (2053)
Direction
Vessel Upbound or Loaded Dralt Impact Number ofTrips
Rank Type Downbound or Empty (It) Force (k) N 2:N
47 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Down Loaded 6 638 4,842 34,432
48 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Down Empty 2 638 538 34,970
49 65x18 Crew Boat Down Loaded 5 575 1,614 36,584
50 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 6 510 2,690 39,274
51 60x18 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 2 510 2,690 41,964
52 65x18 Crew Boat Upbound Loaded 5 460 1,076 43,040
53 65x18 Crew Boat Upbound Empty 2 460 538 43,578
54 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Down Loaded 4 228 3,497 47,075
55 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Down Empty 2 228 538 47,613
56 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Loaded 4 182 2,690 50,303
57 30x9 Shrimp Trawler Upbound Empty 2 182 1,345 51,648

I
(

\
200 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Method I Analysis
LA 1 over Bayou Lafourche

Water Dist from East! Impact

Depth Centerline West of Upbound or Loaded! Design Vessel Force
(It) of Channel (It) Centerline Downbound Empty Description* (k)

Existing Fleet (2003)

2-7 846.0 East Up E 210x44 Barge Tow 288
7 159.8 East Up E 210x44 Barge Tow 1,778
8 157.5 East Own L 160x42 Barge Tow 1,960
9+ 154.5 East Own L 210x44 Barge Tow 2,223
9+ 62.5 East Own L 210x44 Barge Tow 2,233

2-7 846.0 West Up E 210x44 Barge Tow 288

7 219.1 West Up E 210x44 Barge Tow 1,769
8 213.1 West Own L 160x42 Barge Tow 1,911
9+ 207.3 West Own L 210x44 Barge Tow 2,171
9+ 62.5 West Own L 210x44 Barge Tow 2,233

Future Fleet (2053)

((
2-9 1008.0 East Up E 264x50 Barge Tow 350
2-9 154.5 East Up E 264x50 Barge Tow 2,031
9+ 154.5 East Own L 264x50 Barge Tow 2,636
9+ 62.5 East Own L 264x50 Barge Tow 2,629

2-9 1008.0 West Up E 264x50 Barge Tow 350

2-9 207.3 West Up E 264x50 Barge Tow 2,022
9+ 207.3 West Own L 264x50 Barge Tow 2,581
9+ 62.5 West Own L 264x50 Barge Tow 2,629

* Design Vessel Based on the 50th vessel criteria for a Critical Bridge Classification
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 201

( APPENDIXC

RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE

METHOD II ANALYSIS: CONCRETE GIRDER OPTION A3

FUTURE FLEET (2053)-EQUAL RISK

I
 N
VESSEL FLEET CHARACTERISTICS S
Single Vessel Barge Tow or Vessel
Vessel Vosso! DescrIption Sinqle Vessel Size Draft(ft) Capadty Barco TowSiz0 TuqSize Lengt/1 B,= Displacement (t~nn~s)
10 Type Len~th (ft) x WJC!th (ft) Loaded Ught OWT (tonnes) # Wide x # lonq len!=lth (ft) x Width (ft) x Draft(ft) LOA(ft) 1ft) Loaded Uqht

, , , ,
1 Bar 0
Ba e
Bar eTow
Ba GTow
264
, 50 9 2 2,860 1
, 1 72
, 30
, 7 336 50
44
3,640 780
2 210
, 44 9 2 1,990 1
, 1 72
, 30
, 7 282 2,630 640
3 Bal):l0
Sa e
Ba oTow 195
, OS 9 2 1.480 1
, 1 65
, 24
, 6 260 35 1,910 430
4 Bar cTow 160
, 42 8 2 1,270 1
, 1 65
, 24
, 6 225 42 1.700 430
5 Sa"
Ba ,
Bar eTow (2X 150
, 30 8 2 707 1
, 2 50
, 20
, 5 350
190
30 1,986 572
6 Deck Sa e 140
, 40 5 2 370 1
, 1 50
, 20
, 5 40 820 450
7 Bar e
sa"
Bar eTow
Deck Barqa
140
, 35 7 2 780 1
1 , 1 50
, 20
, 5 190
170
35 1,060 280
8
Offshore Su I Vessel
120
, 30 4 2 140 1 50 20 5 30 470 330
9 Shi
Offshore Su [ Vessel
185
, 42 11 5 925 NfA NfA NfA NfA NlA 185
165
42 1,696 771
470
10 Shl
So J Boat
165
, 36 9 4 590 NfA NfA NfA NfA NlA
145
36 1,060
11
12
Shl 145
, 36
24 9
8 4
4
414
300
NlA NfA NfA NfA NfA
NfA 125
36
24
828
539
414
239
Cl
Shi Crow Boat
Utill Boat
125
, NfA NfA NfA NfA
100 S
13
14
Shi
ShiR. Shrim Trawler
100
90 x
28
28
8
12
4
5
222
350
NfA
NfA
NfA
NlA
NlA
NlA
NfA
NlA
NfA
NfA 90
28
28
444
600
222
250 :;;
15 Shi Crew Boat 65 , 18 5 2 70 NfA NfA NlA NlA NfA 85 18 116 46 rq
16 Shi Shrim Trawler 60 , 18 6 2 86 NfA NfA NfA NfA NlA 60 18 129 43
17 Shi Shrim Trawler 30 , 9 4 2 11 NfA NfA NfA NfA NlA 30 9 22 11 o'"
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 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 203

f VESSEL FLEET ANNUAL TRIP FREQUENCY

(Existing Vessel Fleet - 2003)

Annual Number of Trips (N)

Vessel Vessel Description Downbound Upbound
10 Type Loaded Light Total Loaded Light Total Total

1 Barge Barge Tow 30 30 30 30 60

2 Barge Barge Tow 90 90 90 90 180
3 Barge Barge Tow 50 30 80 30 50 80 160
4 Barge Barge Tow 40 150 190 150 40 190 380
5 Barge Barge Tow (2X) 280 10 290 10 280 290 580
6 Barge Deck Barge 270 80 350 80 270 350 700
7 Barge Barge Tow 70 200 270 200 70 270 540
8 Barge Deck Barge 250 50 300 50 250 300 600
9 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 300 300 200 100 300 600
10 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 300 300 200 100 300 600
11 Ship Supply Boat 900 900 800 100 900 1,800
12 Ship Crew Boat 300 300 200 100 300 600
13 Ship Utility Boat 900 900 700 200 900 1,800
14 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,200 1,200 900 300 1,200 2,400
15 Ship Crew Boat 600 600 400 200 600 1,200
16 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,800 200 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 4,000
17 Ship Shrimp Trawler 1,300 200 1,500 1,000 500 1,500 3,000
Totals: 8,680 920 9,600 5,920 3,680 9,600 19,200
204 GUIDE SPECIFICATIONS AND COMMENTARY FOR VESSEL COLLTSIONDESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES

TYPICAL VESSEL TRANSIT SPEEDS (

I

Typical Vessel Transit Speeds (knots)

Vessel Vessel Description Downbound Upbound
10 Type Loaded Light Loaded Light

1 Barge Barge Tow 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0

2 Barge Barge Tow 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
3 Barge Barge Tow 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
4 Barge Barge Tow 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
5 Barge Barge Tow (2X) 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
6 Barge Deck Barge 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
7 Barge Barge Tow 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
8 Barge Deck Barge 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
g Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
10 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
11 Ship Supply Boat 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
12 Ship Crew Boat 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
13 Ship Utility Boat 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
14 Ship Shrimp Trawler 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
15 Ship Crew Boat 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
16 Ship Shrimp Trawler 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
17 Ship Shrimp Trawler 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0

Note: Minimum Speed (Drifting with Current) = 1.0 knot

=
Authorized Navigation Channel Width 125.0 feet (same as existing bridge)

BRIDGE PIER INFORMATION

I Actual l a:o~~ CL ' from

Pier Pier Description Water Depth Exposed Pier Impact
10 No. Main Span (ft) Transit Path (ft) at MHW (ft) Width (ft) Resistance (k)

1 2 Main Pier (E 140.0 131.6 18.0 48.0 ~,446

2 3 Main Pier (1/ 140.0 131. 39.0 48.0 ~,446
3 1 Anchor Pier. 0) 435.0 408.1 1.8 48.8 300
4 4 Anchor Pier ( if) 435.0 408. 4.0 48.8 1661
5 95S ,Pier (E) 563.0
~
2.7 34.2 00
6 96S ,Pier :W 570.0 4 342 1097
7 94S ,Pier IE 691.0 649.3 3.3 34.2 100
8 97S ,Pier 'IV 705.0 662.5 4.0 34.2 442
9 93S , Pier IE
~~
819.0 3.3 34.2 100
10 98S ,Pier 'IV 840.0 4.0 34.2 100
11 92S ,PierCE 947.0 889.9 3.3 34.2 100
12 99S ,Pier (W) 975.0 916.2 2.5 34.2 100

Note: Water depth taken at centerline of pier unless the pier footing is wide and near a dropoff. in which case
the water depth is taken at the edge of footing nearest the channel.
 ~~
PIER 10: 1 - ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE fAA COMPUTATIONS

~
PierlD: 1
Pier No.: 2
Description: Main Pier (E) l::
Vessel Direction: Upbound \{:
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Vessel I Vessel t'l
10
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PierlD: 1
Pier No.: 2
Description: Main Pier tE)
Vessel DirectIon: Downbound

Vessel I Vessel Vessel

Size

• Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 ~ Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche

'"'"
'"
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PierlD: 2
PIER ID: 2" ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS '"
Pier No.: 3
Description: Main Pier 0N)
Vessel Direction: Upbound

Vessel I Vessel
PF

Cl
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PierlD: 2 ~
Pier No.: 3 i::
Description: Main Pier (W)
"z
Vessel Dlroction: Downbound
>'
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Vessell Vessel Vessel
~

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8
ItJ

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:;
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LA1 over &lyou lafourche i"
";;:
Cl

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PIER ID: 3 ~ ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS

~
PierlD:
Pier No.:
3
1
~
Description:
Vessel Direction:
Anchor Pief (E)
Upbound
I
z
Vessell Vessel "to
~
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Pier 10: 3
Pier No.:
Description: Anchor Pier (E)
VEr",sel Direction: Downbound

Vessel I Vessel Vossel

* Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 ~ Future Vessel Floet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche

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 ...,
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PIER 10: 4· ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AFt COMPUTATIONS co
PierlD: 4
Pier No.: 4
Description: Anchor Pier (IN)
Vessel DIrection: Upbound

Vessel I Vessel

g{
a
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r;,

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8
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PiertD: 4 ~
Pier No.:
Description:
Vessel Direction:
4
Anchor Pier (IN)
Downbound
"~
;:!
Sneod (@ Pier (kts\ Imnact FofCG Pier (k Vossel Trins IN\ PC
VessetTrip
Annual Frenu(iln ofColianse (Af::.'.
::l
~
Voosol Vessol Vassal (@ Growth
10 Typ, Size Loaded Light Loaded Light Loaded Light PA PC Loaded Light PF Factor Loaded Light Total Cumulative
1 Bar (') Bar eTow 3.54 3.54 2,383 2,022 A· a 0.00090 0.0561 0.0337 0.0198 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
-<
O' a
~
2 Bsr e Bar eTow 3.23 3.23 1,989 1.762 0.00090 0.0462 0.0183 0.0063 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
3 Bar e Bar eTow 3.07 3.07 1.548 1,389 o· 30 0.00090 0,0376 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000

"'"
4 Ba , BarneTow 2.74 2.74 1.763 1.204 o· 150 0.00090 0.0314 0.0064 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
5
6
Bar e
Bar e
BarqeTow 2X
DeckBar e . 3.60
2.:17
3.60
2.27
1.422
1,592
1.229
870
O·
O·
10
80
0.00090
0.00090
0.0455
0,Q190
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.10
0.10
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
g

~
7 Barqe B~_rg~Tow 2.27 2.27 1.413 543 o· 200 0.00090 0.0179 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
8 Barne Deck Bar e 1.90 1.90 762 451 o· 50 0.00090 0.0107 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2,69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
9 Shi Offshore Su I Vessel 2,19 2.19 915 915 o· A· 0.00045 0.0177 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.6B 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
10 Shl Offshore Su I Vessel 1.80 1.80 600 600 o· O· 0.00045 0.0101 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
11
12
Shl
Shi
S, I Boat
Crew Boot
1.28
1.00
1.28
1.00
359
238
359
238
O·
O·
O·
O·
0.00045
0.00045
0.0048
0.0013
0.0000
0,0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.10
0.10
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000 'r;;"
13
14
Shi
Shi
Utili Boat
Shrim Trawlar
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
205
257
205
257
o·
O·
o·
o·
0.00045
0.00090
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.10
0.10
2.69
2.69
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000 ~
15 Shi Crew Boat 1.00 1.00 115 115 o· a 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000 ~
16 Shi Shrirn Trawler 1.00 1.00 128 128 o· 200 0,00090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000
17 Shi Shrirn Trawler

Denotes Vessel th<'lt has run aground

1.00 1.00 46 46 O· 200 0.00090 0.0000 0.0000

Concrete Girder Option A3 ~ Future Vessel Fleet (2053)

LA1 over Bayou Lafourche
0.0000 0.10 2.69 0.000000 0.000000

Total All Vessels;

Return Period (yrs):
0.000000

0'.000000
.
0.000000

Ia'"
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i!1
PIER 10: 5 -ANNUAL FREqUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS ~

i
PierlD; 5
Pier No.: 9SS
Description: Approach Pier (El
Vessel Direction: Upbound ~

~
..;
Vessell Vessel t'l
~
~

PierlD: 5
Pier No.: 955
Description: Approach Pier (El
Vessel Direction: Downbound

Vessel I Vessel Vessel

* Donotes Vossol that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 ~ Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche

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~
 N
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PIER ID: 6 - ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS

'"
PierlD: 6
Pier No.: 968
Doscription: Approsch Pier (W)
Vessel Direction: Upbound

Vessel I Vessel

Cl
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i'5

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Pier 10: 6
§
~
Pier No.: 968
Description: Approsch Pier ryv) ~
-;
Vessol Direction: Downbound

~
Vessel I Vessel Vessel
~
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9
1=
:;;
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.. Denotes VO"...soJ that has run oground Concrote Girder Option A3 - Future Vessel Floot (2053)
"'~"
o:l
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche
S
Cl
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~.
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00
PIER ID: 7 - ANNUAL FREqUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AE) COMPUTATIONS
Pier 10:
Pier No.:
7
948
"~
00
Description:
Vessel Direction:
Approach Pier (E)
Upbound
t:i
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PF

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Pier 10: 7
PIer No.: 948
Description: Approach Pier (E)
Vessel Direction: Downbound

~ Denotes Vessel tlD.t has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 - Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche

--
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 ..,
~
PIER ID: 8 -ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS
Pier ID: 8 '"
Pier No.: 97S
Description: Approach Pier 0N)
Vessel Direction: Upbound

Vessel Trip
Vessel Vessel Speed @ Pt(;)r (kts) Impact Force @),. PIer (k) Vessol Trips (N) PC GrolMth Annual Frequen of ColI$:pse (AF)
10 Type Description Loaded U!<ht Loaded U!<ht Loaded Ught PA PG Loaded Light PF Factor Loaded U!<ht Total Cumulative
1 Bar e Bar sTow 2.10 2.10 2.106 1.279 0- 30 0.00090 0.0144 0.0878 0.0727 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002
2 Barge Bar sTow 1.70 1.70 1,784 697 O· 90 0.00090 0.0071 0.0836 0.0407 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000002 0.000002 0.000004
3 Bar e Bar eTow 1.49 1.49 1.399 361 O· 50 0.00090 0.0042 0.0760 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000004
4 Be e Bar sTow 1.06 1.06 855 183 O· 40 0.00090 0.0018 0.0537 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000004
5 Be e Bar sTow 2X 2.18 2.18 1.265 1,015 O· 280 0.00090 0.0122 0.0723 0.0627 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000016 0.000016 0.000020
6 Be e Deck Barqo 1.00 1.00 368 170 O· 270 0.00090 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000020
7 Bar e Bar eTow 1.00 1.00 475 106 o· 70 0.00090 0.0004 0.0078 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000020
Cl
8 Bar e DeckBa e 1.00 1.00 211 125 O· 250 0.00090 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000020
9
10
Shi
Shi
Offshore SUIJ:Ply Vessel
Offshore Su I Vessol
1,00
1.00
1.00
1,00
418
334
418
334
O·
o·
O·
O·
0.00045
0.00045
0.0003
0,0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.03
0.03
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000020
0.000020 ~
en
11 Shi Su I Boat 1.00 1.00 280 280 o· o· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000020
;;:
12 Ship Craw Boat 1.00 1.00 238 238 O· o· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.03 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0,000000 0.000020 n
13 Shi Utili Boat 1.00 1.00 205 205 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.03 2,69 0.000000 0.000000 0,000000 0.000020
14
15
16
17
Shi
Shi
Shi
Shi
Shrim Trawler
Crew Boat
Shrim Trawler
Shrimp Trawler
1,00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1,00
1,00
257
115
128
46
257
115
128
46
o·
o·
O·
O·
O·
200
1000
500
0,00090
0.00045
0.00090
0.00090
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
2.69
2.69
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000

Total All Vessels:

0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000

0.000020
0.000020
0,000020
0.000020
0.000020
I
iji
>
Return Period (yrs): 50,528 ill
6'
Pier 10:
Pier No.:
8
97S ";:
Description: Approach Pier f:N) ~
~
Vessel DIrection: Down bound

Vessel Trip
PC
~
Vessel Vessel Vessel Soeed @, Pier (kts) Imoact Force @ Pier (k) Vessel Tries (N) GrolMth Annual Fmouenc of Collaose (AR
ID Type Size Loaded Lij:lht Loaded Liqht Loaded LiQht PA PG Loaded Llqht PF Factor Loaded Llqht Total Cumulative
1 Bar e Bar eTow 2.46
1.94
2.46
1.94
2,167 1.754 O·
o·
0 0.00090
0.00090
0.0144
0.0071
0.0885
0.0840
0.0831
0.0565
0.01
0.01
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
;;:
~0-
2 Bar e Bar eTow 1.809 900 0
3 Bar e Bar eTow 1.66 1.66 1,410 444 O· 30 0.00090 0.0042 0.0763 0.0005 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
4 Bar e Bar eTow 1.08 1,08 888 190 O· 150 0,00090 0.0018 0.0558 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
5 Bar e Bar eTow 2X 2.57 2,57 1.305 1,194 O· 10 0.00090 0.0122 0,0735 0.0700 0,01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
6 Bar e Deck Bar e 1.00 1.00 368 170 o· 80 0.00090 0,0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
7
8
9
10
Bar e
Bar 0
Shi
Shi
Barge Tow
Deck Ba e
OffshoreSu I Vessel
Offshore Su I Vessel
1.00
1,00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
475
211
418
334
106
125
418
334
o·
O·
O·
0-
200
50
0-
O·
0.00090
0.00090
0,00045
0.00045
0.0004
0,0001
0.0003
0,0001
0.0078
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.01
0,01
0.01
0.01
2.69
2.69
2.69
2.69
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
f
'='
~
11 Ship S.lI.e.etL Boat 1.00 1.00 280 280 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000
12 Shi Crow Boat 1.00 1.00 238 238 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
13 Shi Utili Boat 1,00 1,00 205 205 O· o· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
14 Shi Shrimp. Trawler 1.00 1.00 257 257 o·
O·
O· 0.00090 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 0,01 2.69 0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0.000000
0,000000
0.000000
0.000000
;;
15 Shi Crow Boat 1.00 1.00 115 115 0 0.00045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69

~
16 Ship Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 128 128 O· 200 0,00090 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 0.01 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
17 Shi Shrim Trawler 1,00 1.00 46 46 O· 200 0.00090 0.0000 0,0000 0,0000 0.01 2,69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000

Total All Vessels: 0.000000 '"

>
Return Period (yrs): 4,785,796
'"
Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 - Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche ~
~

~.
~
 ~

g
PiorlD: 9
PIER 10: 9 - ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) COMPUTATIONS
'r:;"
>

~
PiarNo.: 93S
Description: Approach Pier (E)
Vessel Direction: Upbound
~.,
Vessel I Vessel OJ
~
~

PiOf ID: 9
Pier No,: 935
Description: Approach Pier (E)
Vessel Direction: Downbound

Vessel I Vessel Vessel

* Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 - Futuro Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA.1 over Bayou Lafourche

'"w
~
 N
I;:
PIER ID: 10 - ANNUAL FREqUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AE) COMPUTATIONS
Pier 10: 10
Pier No.: 988
Description: Approach Pier 0N)
Vessel Direction: Upbound

Vessel I Vessel Growth

ID Factor

C'l
c:
~
~
,."r;
~
~

>-
"'"
Pier 10:
Pior No.:
10
98S
~
~
;;
Description: Approach Pier 0N)

~
Vessel Direction: Downbound

Vessel
10
I Vossel Vessel
Size ~
<
~
E"
9
's:"
~

8
"c?;;
a
z
o
"e::
gJ
~
~
~ Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 - Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche
Cl
1:1

~
 ~
~
~-

PIER ID: 11 • ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AFl COMPUTATIONS ~

PierJD; 11 "
PiorNo.:
Description:
92S
Approach Plor (E)
Vessel Direction: Upbound
i
[!!
Ve$€lI Vessel Speed@ Pier (kts)
Vessel Trip '"
~
Impact Force @ Pier (k) Vossel Trips (N) PC Gmwth Annual Freouen r:i Collapse (API
ID Type Description Loaded Li!=)ht Losded Li!=jht Loaded Li!:jht PA PG Loaded Li!=Jht PF Factor loaded' Li!=jht Total Cumulative
1:'1
1 Barqe Bar eTow 1.37 1.37 2,007 555 O· 30 0,00090 0.0030 0.5516 0.0911 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 ~

~
2 Ba e Bar, eTow 1.00 1.00 1,170 242 O· 90 0.00090 0.0008 0.2304 0.0651 0.00 2.69 O.OOODOO 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
3 B<)rge Barge Tow 1.00 1.00 853 163 O· 50 0.00090 0.0003 0.0981 0.0428 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
4 Bar e Bar eTow 1.00 1.00 760 163 O· 40 0.00090 0,0001 0.0965 0.0428 0.00 2.69 0,000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
5 Ba , Ba eTow 2X 1.49 1.49 1,208 476 O· 280 0.00090 0.0029 0.2550 0.0878 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0,000000 0.000000
6 Bar e Deck Bar e 1.00 1.00 368 170 o· 270 0.00090 0.0000 0.0809 0.0458 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0,000000 0.000000
7 Sac e Bar sTow 1,00 1.00 475 106 O· 70 0.00090 0.0000 0.0877 0.0062 0,00 2,69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
8 Bar e Deck Bar e 1.00 1.00 211 125 O· 250 0.00090 0.0000 0.0585 0.0221 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
9 Shi Offshore Su I Vessel 1.00 1,00 418 418 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0845 0.0845 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
10 Ship Offshore Supply Vessel 1.00 1.00 334 334 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0778 0.0778 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
11 Shi So I Boat 1.00 1.00 280 280 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0714 0.0714 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
12 Shi Crew Boat 1.00 1,00 238 238 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0645 0.0645 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
13 ShI Utili Boat 1.00 1.00 205 205 O· O· 0,00045 0.0000 0.0569 0.0569 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0,000000 0,000000 0.000000
14 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 257 257 O· O· 0.00090 0.0000 0.0679 0,0679 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
15 ShI Crew Boat 1,00 1.00 115 115 o· 200 0.00045 0.0000 0.0145 0.0145 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
16 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 128 128 O· 1000 0.00090 0.0000 0.0240 0.0240 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
17 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 46 46 O· 500 0.00090 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000

Total All Vessels: 0.000000

PIer 10: 11
Pier No.: 92S
Description: Approach Pier (E)
Vessel DIrection: Downbound

Vessel I Vessel Vessel

~ Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option A3 ~ Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou Lafourche
N
~

'"
 PIER 10: 12· ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE IAF) COMPUTATIONS
~
Pier 10:
Pier No.:
12
99S
'"
Description: Approach Pier (W)
Vessel Direction: Upbound

lesw! Trij:
vessell Vessel Is )d (Q) Pie~ 1m ct Force @l Pier Vessel Tri N PC Growth IInnual (AF)
I
10
sa;:qfr=
Type
-Efarge
B:I;I~~ ~argeTOw
.iQht
1.29
Loaded
1.998
Light
548
270
Loaded
0*
Light
30
PA
'.00090
1.00090
PG
0.0025
0.0006
Loaded
0.5496
0.2304
ught
0.0908
Factor Loaded
0.000000
Light
0.00000 o.Oo'Oci
0.0000
0.0981 0.0000
0.0965 0.0000
T.2o 0090 0.0024 0,2517 U.UOf 1.000000
Deck 36a ).00090. 0.0000 0.0809 0,052 1,000000 '.00000
.000001
e<
<:l

~
00090 0,0315 000000 .00000u
_ Ofu 0.084 ,000000
S
1! Off~ ~,OOO 00000o '.000000 ~
0.0714 ).000000 0.000 en
"" t:i
0.0645 ).000000 0.000
n
~ D.0569 ),000000 o.OOC

I
0.0679 ).000000 O,OOC
200
1000
O.l
O.C +- O,01~

0.02<
).000000
).000000
O.OOC
O.OOC
~ ).000000 0.'

Total All Vessels:

,."'
,turn Period (vrs): El
Pier 10: 12
g
Pier No.: 99S ~
Description: Approach Pier 0N) ~

~
Vessel Direction: Downbound

Vessel Trip
Vessel
10
Vessel
Type
Vessel
Size
Speed (CD_ Pier (kts)
Loaded Ught
Impact Force @ Pier (k)
Loaded Ught
Vessel Trips (N)
Loaded Light PA PG Loaded
PC
Light PF
Growth
Factor
Annual Froquonc
Loaded Ught
of Collapso (AF)
Total Cumulative ~
o·
~
1 Bar e Bar - Tow 1.39 1.39 2.009 632 0 0.00090 0,0025 0.5520 0.0935 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 Barge Barge Tow 1.00 1.00 1,170 270 O· 0 0.00090 0.0006 0.2304 0.0700 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
3
4
BElr e
Ba €I
Bar €I Tow
BElr eTow
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
853
760
182
182
o·
O·
30
150
0.00090
0.00090
0.0002
0.0000
0.0981
0.0965
0.0500
0.0500
0.00
0.00
2.69
2.69
0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000
0,000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 !'l"'
Ba , Bar eTow 1.54 1.212 573 O· 10 0.00090 0.0024 0,2573 0.0917 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 rl
5 1.54 o
6 Bar e OeckBar €I 1.00 1.00 368 190 O· 80 0.00090 0.0000 0.0809 0.0527 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
7 Bar e Bar eTow 1.00 1.00 475 119 O·
O·
200 0.00090 0.0000 0.0877 0.0173 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000
E
~
8 Bar e Deck Bar e 1.00 1.00 211 140 50 0.00090 0.0000 0.0585 0.0315 0.00 2.69
9 Shi Offshore Su I Vessel 1.00 1.00 418 418 O· o· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0845 0.0845 0,00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
10 Shi. Offshore Su I Vessel 1.00 1.00 334 334 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0778 0.0778 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1::1
"''"~
11 Ship Supply Boat 1.00 1.00 280 280 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0714 0.0714 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
12 Shi Crew Boat 1.00 1.00 238 238 o· O· 0,00045 0.0000 0,0645 0.0645 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
13 Shl Utili Boat 1.00 1.00 205 205 O· O· 0.00045 0.0000 0.0559 0.0569 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 I
14 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 257 257 O· o· 0.00090 0.0000 0.0679 0.0679 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0,000000 0.000000 o
",
15 Ship Crew Boat 1.00 1.00 115 115 O· 0 0.00045 0.0000 0.0145 0.0145 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
16 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1.00 128 128 O· 200 0.00090 0.0000 0.0240 0.0240 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 S
17 Shi Shrim Trawler 1.00 1,00 46 46 O· 200 0.00090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 2.69 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 ~
Total All Vessels:
Retum Period (yrs):
0.000000
.
'~"
Denotes Vessel that has run aground Concrete Girder Option p;J - Future Vessel Fleet (2053)
LA1 over Bayou lafourche
'""i'l
~

~.
 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE 217

( ANNUAL FREQUENCY OF COLLAPSE (AF) • SUMMARY

(EQUAL RISK DISTRIBUTION ALTERNATIVE)

(
(( )

I(