MAIN From Cool Japan to Green Japan: The Challenges of Nation Branding 01

Cool Japan
&
reen Japan
CMIWSREVIEW DEC2013 ISSUE 5
Nancy Snow, Ph.D
Professor of Communications
California State University, Fullerton
From Cool Japan
to Green Japan:
The Challenges of
Nation Branding
Japan, the world’s third largest economy after China and
the United States, projects a soft power to the world that
stems from attraction to its entertainment and popular
culture. Collectively known as “Cool Japan” or Koru Japan
(McCray, 2002; Christensen, 2011; Hayden, 2012), the
industries involved include Japanese fashion (e.g. Harajuku,
Lolita), J-Pop girl groups like AKB48, as well as manga
(comic books), anime (animation), and cosplay (costume
play based on animation characters). Targeted primarily at
a younger demographic overseas, the last three industries
identified are receiving the most focused press attention
in the Cool Japan campaign of recent years (Christensen,
p. 77). It is understood that Japan has both a traditional
and modern culture that attracts global interest, but Cool
Japan has a 21st century edge to its promotion with a
dominant emphasis on global youth culture appeal through
entertainment originating in Japan (Lam 2007).
The Japanese government started to formally adopt a pop
culture approach in its diplomacy to global publics when
it first used the term “public diplomacy” in its Diplomatic
Bluebook 2004 (Nakamura, 2013). To be sure, Japan’s
culture power status began decades earlier. Post-World
War II Japan could not exercise hard power options, so
it relied on soft power agendas (e.g., foreign aid, cultural
diplomacy, person-to-person exchanges), primarily to the
United States and ASEAN member countries. The Japan
Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) program began in
02
1965 and was modeled on the U.S. Peace Corps. To date,
well over 25,000 volunteers between the ages of 20 and 39
have worked in developing countries. Another cornerstone
of Japan’s cultural diplomacy is the Japan Exchange and
Teaching (JET) program. The Japan Foundation was founded
in 1972 to coordinate the country’s cultural diplomacy and
exchange activities. In the mid-1970s, after anti-Japanese
riots took place in Bangkok, Thailand and Jakarta, Indonesia
against then Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, Japan launched
a national image campaign that resulted in the Fukuda
Doctrine pledge to reestablish “heart to heart relations”
with Southeast Asia. The Japan Foundation, with a budget
of over US $150 million, has 19 offices in 18 countries
(including Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Manila)
and continues to pursue a strong cultural diplomacy agenda
that began with the Fukuda Doctrine.
By the mid-2000s, Japan relied on cultural products (Cool
Japan) and cultural diplomacy (Japan Foundation) for
the bulk of its public diplomacy. Despite a slowing of the
domestic economy that began in the 1990s (known as “Lost
Japan” or the “Lost Decades”), Japan’s popular culture still
held a superpower status (Watanabe and McConnell, 2008)
that was marked by an increase in demand for modern
cultural products. A 2002 Foreign Affairs article by Douglas
McCray (“Japan’s Gross National Cool”) helped to inspire
the culture-first approach while Japan was reeling in its first
decade of economic decline.
 MAIN From Cool Japan to Green Japan: The Challenges of Nation Branding 03

Anime has become commercially profitable in Western countries. Since the 19th © hdwpapers.com 2013

century, many Westerners have expressed a particular interest towards Japan and
anime has dramatically exposed more Westerners to the culture of Japan.

The Japanese government was not the catalyst for the global
youth market embrace of Japanese soft power products like
manga, anime, J-Pop, or J-Fashion, but the state chose to tag
government-led public diplomacy goals to them as a foil to the
rise of China origin Confucius Institutes and regional economic
competition. Hard power may have been a Japanese obsession
from the Meiji era through the end of World War II, but Japan
today seems comfortable with its soft power superpower status
because “cultural diplomacy is agreeable to most Japanese
across the political spectrum: to the left, a non-militaristic
approach to international relations is desirable; to the right, it is
great for the world to appreciate various aspects of the Japanese
culture.” (Lam 2007, p. 355).
As with every nation that emphasizes soft power, there are limits.
In the view of some people, Japan may have appealing comic
books, cartoons, pop groups and animation films, but there is no
direct causal correlation between enjoyment of such products as
a consumer and a change in one’s attitudes toward a nation as
a whole. Not everyone is a fan of such products. Some global
citizens would prefer a Japanese public diplomacy approach that
emphasizes denouncing its imperial past, for instance, correcting
rhetorical setbacks (e.g. “comfort women”) or forging ahead with
better diplomatic relations in the region. In the case of manga
and anime, story themes that are anti-Korean or anti-Chinese
specifically, or utilize sexual and violent content in general, have
a negative blowback effect on the country of origin’s image,
particularly in a region where neighboring countries have deeply
held religious values not exhibited in Japan. But there are other
hurdles for Japan to overcome that include the criticism that
Japan has no global or diverse “voices of Japan” present in its
homogeneous society (e.g. media, culture) and is less attractive
to students seeking institutions of higher learning in the global
marketplace of ideas.
As Lam noted in 2007 (p. 358):
Other limits to Japan’s ‘soft power’ include the lack of a CNN or
BBC-like institution to project is voice globally, the reluctance
of some universities to hire foreign faculty members beyond
language teachers, the relatively closed nature of its society to
foreign immigrants to maintain ethnic homogeneity and social
order, and the fact that Japanese is not a global language.
The best students in Asia would head toward the American
Ivy League and Britain’s Oxbridge but not necessarily the
Universities of Tokyo, Waseda and Keio.
Japan’s global soft power momentum has improved, but not at a
pace that a leading economic and cultural power nation should.
Consider that Japan maintains the worst public debt in the
world, Abenomics-mania notwithstanding, with the government
debt reaching Yen 1,000 trillion ($10.46 trillion) or about twice
its annual gross domestic product in mid 2013 (Warnock and
Nakamichi, 2013) and one can see how internationalization
measures may have floundered. To address its legendary
insular image and lack of globalization, in 2008 the Japanese
government announced an ambitious plan to globalize thirty
leading universities. With an initial budget of 3.2 billion yen
(US $38 million), the originally named “Global 30” project was
designed to increase the numbers of Japanese students going
abroad and the number of global students entering Japan.
 CMIWSREVIEW DEC2013 ISSUE 5
“A masked man takes part in an anti-nuclear power plant protest rally in Tokyo on Saturday,
April 30, 2011. Anti-nuclear plant demonstrations have become more frequent after the
Fukushima disaster. The placard in the background reads: “No nuclear plant.”
As with every
nation that
emphasizes soft
power, there
are limits.
Japan’s stated national goal is to welcome 300,000 foreign
students by 2020, more than doubling the current rate, while
sending the same number of Japanese students overseas.
The program has thus far had very mixed results. Instead of
thirty universities, only thirteen are participating in the project.
All are elite universities and mostly clustered in Greater Tokyo
(e.g. University of Tokyo, Waseda, Keio, Sophia), while smaller
or midsized higher education institutions were not even
considered. It is highly doubtful that the additional seventeen
university slots will ever be filled due to budget cuts (McNeill
2010). Japan’s percentage of foreign students remains at a
stagnant four percent, or approximately 137,000 out of 3.5 million
04
© AP Photo/Junji Kurokawa 2011
(JASSO, 2013), and just five percent of its university faculty is
international. The majority of the foreign faculty is engaged in
English language instruction.1 On top of these dismal figures, the
percentage of Japanese students enrolled as undergraduates
at American universities in the first decade of the 21st century
dropped by one half. South Korea, with a population half that
of Japan, sends more than double the number of students to
universities in America.
Japan’s flagship NHK TV has sponsored NHK Newsline, an
English language version of its Japanese programming, since
2000 but only in 2009 was the format extended to a thirty-
minute primetime news and information program that airs in
some English-speaking countries, including on some public
broadcasting outlets in the United States. Newsline is a top-
rated English language news program in the Asia Pacific region,
but it is not considered a global English language news leader
with the same name recognition of CNN International or BBC.
1 I was no exception when I taught as a Fulbright Professor at Sophia
University in 2012. Though my Ph.D. is in international relations and my
fields of emphasis are global communications and political communication,
I did not teach as an affiliate of the journalism or international relations
departments. Rather, I was affiliated with the English Literature and English
Language departments in order to instruct in the English language. My
specialty fields did not seem to matter as much as my English ability.
 MAIN From Cool Japan to Green Japan: The Challenges of Nation Branding 05

“I AM BACK,
AND SO SHALL
JAPAN BE.”
Shinzo Abe

In the aftermath of the consecutive disasters of an earthquake, and has made nuclear power a national strategic priority since
tsunami, and resultant meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power 1973.
plant, collectively known in Japan as 3/11, public diplomacy
For sixty years, the Japanese government and industry partner
watchers are now scrutinizing the recovery and redemption
Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) managed public opinion in
phase initiatives. These include the early disaster relief
support of an Atoms for Peace approach to the nuclear energy
assistance program by the U.S. Armed Forces program, Operation
option that emphasized safe, clean, and cost-effective nuclear
Tomodachi, and the recruitment of superstar Japanese girl group
energy. Atoms for Peace was a program first popularized
AKB48 in support of municipal bonds (Warnock 2012). But the
during the Eisenhower administration that overlapped the U.S.
less examined dynamic is the rise of public demonstrations
occupation of Japan (1945-1952). While nuclear weapons
and what London’s Economist magazine referred to in 2012 as
symbolized perpetual preparation for war and the Japanese
“nuclearphobia,” which may signal a new era of public resistance
public consistently supported the image of Japan as a peaceful,
democracy after 3/11. How this resistance against the nuclear
nuclear weapons-free nation, the public also accepted Japan’s
village (government-industry) in Japan may impact the country’s
nuclear power industry as a peaceful, safe, clean, and cheaper
global image is a story yet to be told.
alternative to more expensive imported energy sources. At least
The year 2013 marked sixty-eight years since the United that was the policy and opinion narrative before March 11, 2011.
States military dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities Within a few days, the most nuclear-philic soft power superpower
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan’s national policy since then in the world seemed to become a nation of nuclear-phobes.
has been strongly against the use of nuclear weapons in conflict,
This shift in public opinion against nuclear power and doubtful
but pro-nuclear power in energy resources. To many observers,
of its ability to be sustained over time (Belogolova 2013) can
Japan had no choice but to embrace nuclear power. As a nation
be explained by using the theories and investigative methods
that lacks natural energy resources, it chose nuclear power
of propaganda theorist Harold D. Lasswell and journalist Walter
for almost 30% of its domestic energy source (World Nuclear
Lippmann. Both Lasswell and Lippmann are considered founding
Association). Japan must import 84% of all its energy sources
 CMIWSREVIEW DEC2013 ISSUE 5
© hdwallpapers-desktop.com 2013
fathers of the realist critique of participatory democracy.
Lippmann had initially supported muckraking journalists and
even flirted with democratic socialism ideals (Luskin, 1972;
Steel, 1981.) It was in his most famous work, Public Opinion
(1922), still considered the “founding book of American media
studies,” (Carey, 1989, p. 75), that Lippmann showed a marked
pessimism with regard to democratic theory and praxis. He
concluded that society was just too complex for the public to
grasp. The public was particularly vulnerable to a knowledge
barrier between the real world and a “pseudo-environment”
that is not based on direct, experiential knowledge, but
mediated knowledge (Lippmann, 1922, p. 16). As society
advances and becomes larger and more complex, Lippmann
predicted a wider gap between the real world, that only
knowledgeable experts or political leaders can know or are
trained to know, and a bewildered public driven by media
stereotypes, emotional impulses, and irrational acts that lead
to errors in social action. The public’s tendency to stereotype
represents a serious obstacle to participatory democracy:
For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we
define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing
confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has
already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that [which]
06
we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.
(Lippmann, 1922, pp. 54-55)
In his lesser-known follow-up book, The Phantom Public,
Lippmann argued against the conventional notion of democratic,
representative government; namely, that public opinion can
direct the course of popular government. Lippmann states that
the public is a random collection of individuals that can impact
government only through the support of or opposition to the
true agents of change, whom he identifies as political leaders.
It is Lippmann’s less than sanguine view of the public’s role in
public policy that is under examination in what is taking place
in Japan’s public diplomacy after 3/11. Lippmann argued that
public opinion management is not the domain of the public but
rather the responsibility of political leaders from the top down to
the public, what might be called a quasi aristocracy of experts.
Lippmann’s critique of participatory democracy helps to explain
how the Japanese leadership can manage public opinion in an
environment of growing political dissent and protest.
Harold Lasswell remains, decades after his death, the most
influential American political communication scholar in
understanding propaganda, power, and leadership. Lasswell
defined propaganda as “concerned with the management
of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social
suggestions rather than by altering other conditions in the
environment or in the organism.” (Lasswell, 1927, p. 9) He viewed
propaganda in a social context because he accepted that political
leaders may use propaganda on the public at the same time
that they have to manage the public interest propaganda used
against them. In his book, Power and Personality, he explained
this further:
Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are
empowered. They depend upon and continue only so long as
there is a continuing stream of empowering responses. Even a
casual inspection of human relations will convince any competent
observer that power is not a brick that can be lugged from place
to place, but a process that vanishes when the supporting
responses cease. (1948, p.10)
Both Lippmann and Lasswell serve as bookend influences
on a research project that is underway in Japan. As an Abe
Fellow affiliated with Keio University’s Institute for Media and
Communications (MediaCom), I will be studying Japan’s public
diplomacy since 3/11. Specifically, my Abe project will ask two
questions: First, how is the Japanese government political
leadership managing its nuclear power policies vis-à-vis a growing
disengagement and disconnection with the Japanese public?
Second, how is the rise of peace propaganda and participatory
democracy in turn affecting the Japanese government’s public
affairs and public diplomacy goals?
My scholarship examines the management of propaganda,
including nation image management, in democratic societies.
This proposed Abe research fellowship is a natural extension of
my prior research in eight books and my own professional work
experience. I was a U.S. government official during the first two
years of the Clinton administration. As a cultural affairs officer and
educational exchange specialist at the United States Information
Agency (USIA), I became aware of how nations work to frame
 MAIN From Cool Japan to Green Japan: The Challenges of Nation Branding 07

narratives. The independent foreign affairs agency agenda

emblazoned on the façade of our federal building was “telling
America’s story to the world.” Such a telling involved a post-
Cold War commercial engagement model to enlarge market-led
democracies in newly industrializing societies, especially those
in the former Soviet Union.
In this project, I am investigating the correlations among the
realist critique of participatory democracy offered by Lippmann,
the power relationship model proposed by Lasswell, and the
public diplomacy and public affairs challenges associated with
the rise of no-nuke and peace propagandists in post-3/11 Japan.
The Japanese government seeks to reduce its dependency on
nuclear power from a pre-11 March 26% to 15% by 2030. Out
of 54 nuclear reactors in operation pre-3/11, Japan has restarted
just two nuclear reactors in the town of Ohi on Japan’s western
coast. Japanese citizens have continued to mount growing
protests, including a permanent anti-nuclear group protest
regularly outside the downtown Tokyo offices of TEPCO.
Peace propagandists who seek immediate shutdown of all nuclear
power plants are not supporting the government’s pragmatic
narrative, and unless the Japanese government can successfully A wind power plant at Izu. Japan is set © Flickr/Seiichi Ariga 2010

explain its policy position to the public’s satisfaction, the protests to focus more on renewable energy
are likely to grow, perhaps leading to a public referendum on such as wind and wave power.
nuclear policy. From a Cool Japan public diplomacy perspective,
this project has immediate policy implications for Japan’s national
image, reputation and prestige, since it will be the host city for the
these first-timers may be motivated by a sense of an awakening
2020 Summer Olympics. The vote in September 2013 hinged
consciousness, a turning point in their public lives that only a
in part on a united front from the Japanese government and
natural disaster and nuclear meltdown fallout like 3/11 could
its people and public protests did not become the dominant
bring.
media frame. Prime Minister Abe made a forceful speech to
the IOC voters in Buenos Aires. He addressed the Fukushima Just as the U.S. population became more questioning of its
Daichi Nuclear Power Plant directly and promised that Japan government’s motives and credibility after 9/11, so are some
had everything in order: Japanese citizens questioning their own government’s credibility,
and much more openly and vocally than in the past. In the case
“Some may have concerns about Fukushima. Let me assure
of Japan, the questioning is not related to invading countries or
you the situation is under control. It has never done and will
a war on terror; instead it is related to an apocalyptic conception
never do any damage to Tokyo.”
of life at its worst and a growing trust gap between citizen and
He added: “There are no health related problems until now, government at best.
nor will there be in the future. I make the statement to you
Consider an email I received from an ex-patriot who has lived
in the most emphatic and unequivocal way.”
and worked in Japan for over twenty-five years. This was during
Abe’s forthright nature invites a spotlight of global attention that the summer of discontent (July 2012) in which over 170,000
Abe’s forthright nature invites a spotlight of global attention that Japanese citizens demonstrated in Tokyo, a larger number
Japan has not had since it was in a mode of victimhood after than the 1960s protests that were against a new security treaty
3/11. Now it is a country on the rebound, although the constant between the U.S. and Japan.
presence of the antinuclear power citizens creates a backdrop
I have begun attending the anti-nuclear rallies with friends.
of concern for both government and industry. What is compelling
And it is amazing to see people of all generations from all
about the Japan case is the composition of the no nukes activists.
over the country gather in an orderly manner, hoping to get
These are not professional persuaders with media training from
the government to listen. As one of my friends said, “We
major PR firms, nor are they the usual suspects who turn up
have experienced the atomic bomb and now the nuclear
regularly at protests. Many nuclear power protesters are first-
disaster in Fukushima. You’d think we would know better.”
time citizen demonstrators (Northam 2012). They are mothers
Lots of people have lost faith in the Japanese government
with children, young people, and the elderly; in other words,
(or perhaps they did not have it to begin with). Even the
they represent a mainstream demographic that is far removed
housewives in my neighborhood are full of distrust and
from radical activists. This makes it much harder for pro-nuclear
worried about the future for young Japanese.
advocates from inside government or industry to demonize the
opposition or mark them as extremists. “The opposition is us” If what this ex-patriot is describing is accurate, then both the
is the democratic propaganda context here. Further, many of Japanese government and industry leaders like TEPCO will
 CMIWSREVIEW DEC2013 ISSUE 5 08

Morning Musume is one of the most successful Japanese pop idol girl groups, © yonasu.com 2013

dubbed as part of “Cool Japan” brand to gain foreign influence and exploiting
Japan’s commercial capital of cultural industry—a form of Soft Power.

have to work overtime to engage the public and win back some notwithstanding. Japan won over many hearts and minds in
of that lost trust. A public affairs narrative that puts emphasis 2011 when the world watched a nation deal with a massive
on sober explanation of scientific data or economic security 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a deadly tsunami and a
is not likely to be effective at winning what is becoming a very nuclear power plant meltdown that is still leaking radiation. In
public disagreement. Compare the ex-patriot’s observations the two years since 3/11, Japan has continued its gratitudinous
to this quote from Yoshihito Iwama, a spokesman for Nippon attitude in its relations toward the world, but troubling trends
Keidanren (Japan Business Federation). “If Japan decides to persist. Japan was once the world’s leading donor of official
stop all nuclear power, we will not have a stable and inexpensive developmental assistance (ODA), but is now in 18th place
source of electricity. The cost of everything will go up by at least worldwide for gross national income assistance, based on United
20 percent. Our economy will suffer” (NPR, 2012). Nations’ recommended standards (Kakuchi 2013). Now instead
of reading how generously Japan gives we are more likely to hear
So how will Japan reconcile pre-3/11 Cool Japan with the
about troublesome regional tension with China or South Korea
emerging No Nukes Green Japan? It is too soon to say for sure,
and the need to buttress Japan’s military defenses. Likewise,
but patterns are emerging. A new public diplomacy in Japan
Japan’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party which, except
seems to be growing out of the immediate post-3/11 recovery and
for four years, has held power in Japan since 1955, remains on
renewal phase to consider non-zero-sum (i.e., win-win) solutions.
the defensive about Japan’s wartime atrocities and enforced
One such solution is to unite Cool Japan and Green Japan with a
sexual slavery in the region, making its apologies to its neighbors
major emphasis on science and engineering in Japan to create
continually ring hollow (Dudden 2008).
alternative energy sources for a post-Fukushima era. With Tokyo
2020 seven years away, Japan could revive the Future City of On September 7, 2013 Japan was awarded the 2020 Summer
Games in Tokyo over the other two finalists, Istanbul and Madrid.
Tomorrow, a city that has the world’s best in public transportation,
the world’s safest and fastest intercontinental transportation The Tokyo bid was a win after losing to Rio, Brazil for the 2016
(shinkansen); the best technology and science available for a Summer Games. It was also a symbolic show of support for a
sustainable environment; a model of how to respond to an aging nation committed to rebuilding and rebranding itself economically
and low fertility society; and a model for how to serve as an after the Great East Japan Earthquake and that had shown
exemplary “bridge nation to Asia.” Such an approach would its gratitude to the world’s people for their support after 3/11.
require more public participation and public oversight in JapanA successful Congressional hearing of Caroline Kennedy’s
than is currently in place. presidential nomination to be the first female ambassador to
Japan followed this good news for Japan. As of this writing,
Japan remains a most important strategic partner to the
Kennedy was expected to be in Japan in late 2013.
United States, a regional leader in Asia, and a world economic
powerhouse, China’s second largest economy place
 MAIN From Cool Japan to Green Japan: The Challenges of Nation Branding 09

Aerial view following the second explosion at the Fukushima nuclear plant. Experts forecast © AFP/Getty Images 2011

radioactive particles from Fukushima would reach U.S. coastal waters in 2014 thus to
brand Japan as an environmental leader is crucial to invigorate the country’s image.

The Japan Olympics are still some way off, but their symbolic It is noteworthy to see from this enthusiasm for Kennedy’s
power will loom over the Abe government’s efforts to work with appointment that there is no mention of Japan’s economic
TEPCO to clean up the continuing disaster of Fukushima. In the revival (Abenomics) or national security ties to the United States.
meantime, Japan will likely embrace the culture-first approach that Kennedy’s strengths in education and culture will become her
Kennedy offers as the daughter of Camelot. At her U.S. Senate personal brand in Japan, but even she will have to address some
hearing on September 19, 2013, Kennedy was warmly received yet unknown crises on the horizon for which she will not be fully
by both Republicans and Democrats who fondly remembered prepared. Her name recognition alone has created a buzz that
her father and his brother, Senator Ted Kennedy. The take-away may well extend her honeymoon period longer than any of her
for many Japanese observers was undoubtedly similar to what predecessors. The Kennedy mystique is especially appreciated
a Tokyo friend wrote me in an email after watching the hearing in a country that prides itself on its cultural superiority.
gavel-by-gavel:
Unless and until Japan gets a firm hold on the Fukushima crisis
I hope and believe she will bring a fresh air to Japan and work and works out how it will fuel its energy, a culture-first approach
for the further improvement of Japan-U.S. relationship and to public diplomacy will be insufficient to ready global publics for
the promotion of the exchange programs of various fields, 2020. Cool Japan is juxtaposed with an open question about
including students and citizens between two nations. I also Japan’s lack of public participation in politics. A recent op-ed
expect that she will encourage Japanese people, especially by Colin P.A. Jones (2013) in the Japan Times points to the
young women, to become more independent and strong. Fukushima dilemma:
As you said, there are not so many active, intellectual and
Japan is supposedly a democracy, so in theory a responsibility-
powerful women in Japanese political field and international
shirking government is ultimately the people’s problem — and
affairs fields. I believe we need more women like Sadako
responsibility — just as much as the nuclear disaster and all
Ogata and late politician Fusae Ichikawa.
the nation’s other problems are. Of course, the people have a
The other thing I was happy to learn about Caroline is that she plentiful supply of other targets to blame until enough of them
had visited Japan with her uncle Ted when she was a 20-year- come to that realization.
old and was deeply affected by Hiroshima. She mentioned that
The Japanese government must now use the momentum from
her father had hoped to the first sitting president to make a visit
its Olympics win to ask the world to step in and help it overcome
to Japan, so she will pursue his ideals as an ambassador. She
a disaster that was first man-made, then natural, and then man-
also visited Japan for her honeymoon. That is fantastic.
made again.
CMIWSREVIEW DEC2013 ISSUE 5 010

There should also be a Fukushima legacy -- how not to

manage nuclear power plants built along earthquake-prone
seacoasts. The world must now test Abe’s assurances
to the IOC that the situation will soon be under control.
The time for rhetorical assurances is over. (We’ll have to
hold our breaths that no repeat 9.0 magnitude undersea
earthquakes occur.)
In 1964, Tokyo unveiled itself as a global economic
miracle a mere two decades after the end of World War II.
In 2020, Tokyo should unveil its nation brand as a global
environmental leader. Now that would be really cool,
Japan.

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Nancy Snow can be contacted at

nsnow@fullerton.edu