STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

MODULE 1
1. David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of martial law under 1973 Constitution
have the binding force as statutes in accordance to Presidential
Proclamation 1081.
2. Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
Any amendment to, or revision of the Constitution may be proposed by
the Batasang Pambansa upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or by a constitutional convention. Any amendment to, or revision of, the
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by the majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment of revision.
3. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.―One of the primary and basic rules
in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no departure
4. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
It is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting
of the whole. What is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill will be produced. To insist that a revenue statute must
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not
only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.”
5. In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534
Limitations on the Legislative Power:
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes,
continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
 reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in
the Supreme Court

The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys

at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. The power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree.
6. Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, [October 8, 2019]
1. Limitation of Legislative power on the manner of passing a law. Only
a bill can become a law. Before a bill becomes a law, it must pass
three readings on separate days, unless the President certifies that its
enactment is urgent.

2. The power to appropriate funds can only be made through a law, and
the power to enact a law is purely a legislative power.
7. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
‘Separation of Powers’ – Any provision of the law that authorizes
Congress (or its members) to execute or implement law or governmental
policies, which in its nature is vested upon the powers of the Execuitve
branch, violates the principle of separation of powers and is consequently
deemed unconstitutional.
8. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562
SCRA 251
Separation of powers is a legal doctrine under constitutional law which
separates the three branches of the government being the executive,
legislative and judicial. This is a system to keep the checks and balances
to keep each branch’s certain powers in check and balance the other
branches.
9. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 19671, October 18, 2011, 659
SCRA 270
The Constitutional mandate of when the local and national elections are
to be held is synchronous to the ARMM elections.
CASE TITLE PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID vs. G.R NO. G.R. No. 171396
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
PONENTE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J DATE: May 3, 2006
DOCTRINE Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of martial law under 1973
Constitution have the binding force as statutes in accordance to
Presidential Proclamation 1081.
FACTS On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary
of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of
Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo
issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017
on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
ISSUE/S WON PP 1017 is constitutional?
RULING/S The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic as it did not have the
requisites under the moot and academic principle.

An important provision from PP 1017 is as follows:

“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

This provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII
which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary

function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before
assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the
effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others,
“execute its laws.” In the exercise of such function, the President, if
needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including
the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and
Local Government.

Moreover, Under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292

(Administrative Code of 1987), the president cannot issue decrees
similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and
binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in
the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law
under the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar

as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.”
CASE TITLE Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. G.R NO. L-44640
Sanidad, Petitioner vs. Honorable
Commission on Elections and
Honorable National Treasurer
PONENTE Martin, J. DATE: October 12, 1976
DOCTRINE Any amendment to, or revision of the Constitution may be proposed by
the Batasang Pambansa upon the vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. Any amendment to, or
revision of, the Constitution shall be valid when ratified by the majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment of revision.
FACTS On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1991 calling for national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies. The purpose of the said
assembly is to resolve the issues of existence and effectivity of martial
law.

Twenty two days after or on September 22, 1976, President Marcos

issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031
amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 299.

On September 27, 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad amd Pablito V. Sanidad,

father and son filed prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without the force and effect of
Presidential Decree No. 991 and 1033, insofar the amendments to the
constitution.

On September 30, 1976, another petition for Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction was filed by Vicente M. Guzman, delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to proposed
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
the Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was

filed on October 05, 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, Raul Gonzales Jr., and
Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decree relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

The proposed amendments of was submitted in such a short of time

for the deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity: to lift the Martial Law,
the President need not to consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-yearolds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
 constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years old of age and above.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for the
respondent Commission on Elections, that the petitioners have no
standing to sue the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial
cognizance of the court. The General Solicitor General also asserts
that the state of transition period, only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constitute power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the constitutionality of P.D Nos. 991, 1031 and
1033 justiciable?
2. Whether or not the President possess power to propose
amendments to the constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the
proposals by the people during the present stage of the
transition period under, the environmental circumstances ?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
within the time frame allowed thereof a sufficient and proper
submission?
RULING/S 1. Yes, 7 Justices held that the issue of the constitutionality of
P.D’s are justiciable while the three Justices held the view that
the question is political.
2. Upon the second issue the 7 Justices voted in affirmative, while
the 2 Justices voted in the negative. Associate Justice
Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from
the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the
Executive during the period of crisis, thus raising serious doubts
as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
3. Upon the third issue the 6 Justices view that there is a sufficient
and proper submission of proposed amendments for ratification
by the people. The 2 Justices expressed the hope, however that
the period of time may be extended.

The proposal of the amendments through Presidential Decree

1033 undertook by the President.
CASE TITLE FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL G.R NO. 202242
AND BAR COUNCIL,
SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR
PONENTE MENDOZA, J. DATE: April 16, 2013
DOCTRINE It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.―One of the
primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
FACTS  The Judicial Bar Council is composed of 8 member of which two
are from the Congress having half vote each.

 On the JBC Resolution en Banc 2000-2001, the two

representative of the Congress (Senator Francis Escudero and
Congressman Neil Tupas, Jr.) were given full vote each.

 Respondent assails that the JBC should only be composed of 7

members as per the provision of Sec. 8 (1) Article 8 of the 1987
Constitution.

 Respondent on the other hand defends, that by theory,

Congress is bicameral. Congress is composed of two
chambers, namely the Senate and the House of Representative,
hence the two seat. Bicameralism in Congress is permanent and
mandatory as per the provisions of Section 1 Article 6 of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the Congress entitled with two seats in the Judicial Bar
Council?
RULING/S No. Bicameralism of the Congress is provided for in Sec 1 Article 6 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that “the legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives”. However, Section 8 (1)
Article 8 of the constitution provides that:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

Section 8 (1) Article 8 is clear and unambiguous and does not need
any further interpretation.

The provision provides for the creation of a JBC and its composition
where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux
of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is

unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission
intended that the Congress may designate only one (1) representative
to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have done so.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that

where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
CASE TITLE Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance G.R NO. 115455
PONENTE Mendoza, J. DATE: August 25, 1994;
Oct. 30, 1995
DOCTRINE It is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this because a bill originating in the House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may
be a rewriting of the whole. What is important to note is that, as a result
of the Senate action, a distinct bill will be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute must be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.”
FACTS A total of 10 separate petitions were filed before the Supreme Court
assailing the the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (R.A. 7716)
or the Expanded Value Added Tax Law which seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The petitioners aver,
among other things, that R.A. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives but a mere consolidation of two distinct bills
(H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630) which is violative of the constitution
particularly Article VI, Section 24 which provides, “all appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.”

Petitioners Tolentino et. al aver that although admittedly, H. No. 11197

was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and thereafter was sent to the Senate where after first reading
it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, the Senate
did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead, the Senate pass
its own version of the same, S. No. 1630, which it approved on May 24,
1994. Further, Tolentino contends that what Senate committee should
have done was to amend H. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill
and substituting it with the text of S. 1630 as it will result as that "the
bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the House bill."
ISSUE/S Whether or not R.A. 7716 is unconstitutional on the contention that it
did not originate from the House of Representatives?
RULING/S NO, the contention is unmeritorious. The enactment of S. No. 1630 is
not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to
a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On
several occasions, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills,
which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the
enrolled bills. Simply put, it is not uncommon that Senate passed
revenue laws which were also the result of the consolidation of House
and Senate bills.

It is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this because a bill originating in the House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may
be a rewriting of the whole. What is important to note is that, as a result
of the Senate action, a distinct bill will be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute must be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.” It would also be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the State.

There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.

11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (amendment by substitution) and on the
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case, the result are two bills on the same subject. What
the constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems; while the senators, who are elected at large,
are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.

R.A. 7716 is CONSTITUTIONAL.

CASE TITLE In Re: Cunan G.R NO. 94 Phil. 534
PONENTE Diokno, J. DATE: March 18, 1954
DOCTRINE Limitations on the Legislative Power:
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
equal responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law.
The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes, continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter
and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority
and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested
in the Supreme Court

The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys

at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. The power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of
law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The
function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree.
FACTS The Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 (RA No. 972) was passed by Congress
and became a law without the signature of the President on June 21,
1953. The said RA provided two possible ways for the unsuccessful
post-war candidates to be admitted to the Bar:
 Lowering the passing rate in each respective year from 1945-
1955 provided that the candidate did not obtain a grade below
fifty per cent in any subject
 Partial passing of examination at an indefinite interval of the
candidates who obtained 75 in any bar subjects

In lieu of the approval of RA 972 several unsuccessful aspiring

candidates filed a petition invoking the said law for their appeal.
ISSUE/S Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional?
RULING/S RA 972 is PARTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sec. 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 - 1955, is valid and shall

continue to be in force, in conformity with Sec. 10, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Sec. 1 referring to the examinations of 1946 - 1952 is unconstitutional

because of the following reasons:
  candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952 are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law
 judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of
the said candidates is the sole responsibility of the court
 Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar, the Supreme
Court has primary and inherent prerogative to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in
the practice of law according to existing rules
 pretended classification is arbitrary and undoubtedly a class
legislation

Sec. 2 is unconstitutional because it is not expressed in the title that

will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of section 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary
to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and
annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article
1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
CASE TITLE Ang NARS Party-List, represented by G.R NO. 215746
Congresswoman Leah Priimitiva G.
Samaxo-Paquiz, and Public Services
Labor Independent Confederation,
represented by its General Secretary
Annie E. Geron vs. The Executive
Secretary, The Secretary of Budget
and Management, and The Secretary
of Health
PONENTE Carpio, J. DATE: October 8, 2019
DOCTRINE 1. Limitation of Legislative power on the manner of passing a law.
Only a bill can become a law. Before a bill becomes a law, it
must pass three readings on separate days, unless the
President certifies that its enactment is urgent.

2. The power to appropriate funds can only be made through a law,

and the power to enact a law is purely a legislative power.
FACTS On October 21, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo approved
R.A. No. 9173, where Sec 32 provides for the minimum base pay of
nurses working in public health institutions which should not be lower
than SG 15 prescribed under the Compensation and Classification Act
of 1989. On June 17, 2009 the President signed the Joint Resolution
No. 4, modifying the salary grade of entry level nurses from SG 10-SG
11 and the E.O. No. 811 for its implementation. Representative Paquiz
wrote letters to the DOH and DBM Secretary inquiring about the non-
implementation of Sec 32 of R.A. 9173 and to the DOJ Secretary for a
legal opinion regarding the issue. Unsatisfied with the replies Rep
Paquiz and other petitioners filed a petition for certiorari assailing the
validity of EO 811 specifically Section 6 with prayer for the court to
compel the respondents to implement Sec 32 of RA 9173 “Philippine
Nursing Act of 2002”.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Senate and House of
Representatives and EO No. 811 amended Section 32 of the Philippine
Nursing Act of 2002?
RULING/S The court rendered the provisions of Joint Resolution No. 4 and EO
No. 811 void and unconstitutional thereby not amending the Philippine
Nursing Act of 2002.

Laws can be repealed only by a subsequent law. A joint resolution

although having the same force and effect as a bill when approved by
the Congress and President, is not a separate law and cannot amend
prior laws. Thus, the amendatory language set in Joint Resolution No.
4 cannot revise the salary grades in the Salary Standardization Law or
any other law or provisions of a law without passing a bill. It can only
amend other resolutions that are inconsistent with its provisions. With
respect to EO No. 811 the court did not grant the prayer of the
petitioners to compel the respondents to implement Sec 32 of R.A.
9173, the Courts has only the power of interpreting laws applying the
separation of powers it is the sole duty of the Congress to appropriate
public funds and until a bill is not passed, R.A. 9173 remains to be
unfunded.
CASE TITLE Belgica v. Ochoa G.R NO. 208566
PONENTE Perlas-Bernabe, J. DATE: Nov. 19, 2013
DOCTRINE ‘Separation of Powers’ – Any provision of the law that authorizes
Congress (or its members) to execute or implement law or
governmental policies, which in its nature is vested upon the powers of
the Execuitve branch, violates the principle of separation of powers and
is consequently deemed unconstitutional.
FACTS The Pork Barrel or formally known as the “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” (otherwise known as PDAF) is the discretionary
funds allocated through the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA)
for members of the Philippine Congress which main utilization is for the
funding of programs and/or projects intended for their constituents.
On the other hand, the Office of the President has its own version of
the Pork Barrel which its distinct difference from the Congressional
Pork Barrel is that it has its own source of funds not included in the
GAA. Said funds come from: (a) the Malampaya Funds (from the
Malampaya Gas Project) and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
(PAGCOR earnings).

In July 2013, allegations for corruption with the regard the Pork Barrel
funds were exposed by whistle blowers lead by Benhur Luy. The
expose centered on the facilitation of Janet Lim Napoles in helping
lawmakers channel their Pork Barrel funds into fake NGO’s (non-
government organizations) to make it appear that legitimate projects
are being funded but are in fact going into spurious and non-existent
projects. Consequently, the Commission on Audit looked into the
matter and its findings concurred with the exposes of Luy and his
companions. Subsequently, Greco Belgica and several others filed
varying petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional?

2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional?

RULING/S 1. Congressional pork barrel system is not constitutional.

As its main role and function, Congress is solely vested with

legislative power by the Constitution. The corollary power to
appropriate funds is invested in both the Lower and Upper
Houses of Congress as a whole. The controversy that some
members of Congress allocated their PDAF to projects they
identified, is in violation of the rule on ‘non-delegability of
legislative power’.

2. Presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

PD 910 which created the Malampaya Fund and as well as PD
1869 which amended PAGCOR’s charter are adequate laws
that satisfied the requirement/s of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution in relation to the legality and constitutionality of the
President's dispensation of the Presidential pork barrel.
CASE TITLE Abakada Guro Party List (formerly G.R NO. 166715
AASJS) officers/members Samson s.
Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano,
Romeo R Robiso, Rene B. Gorospe
and Edwin R. Sandoval, Petitioners,
vs HON. Cesar V. Purisima, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance,
HON. Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr., in his
capacity as Commissioner of Bereau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. Alberto D.
Lina in his Capacity as Commissioner
of Bureau of Customs, Respondents.
PONENTE Corona J. DATE: Aug. 14, 2008
DOCTRINE Separation of powers is a legal doctrine under constitutional law which
separates the three branches of the government being the executive,
legislative and judicial. This is a system to keep the checks and
balances to keep each branch’s certain powers in check and balance
the other branches.
FACTS Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers seek for the prohibition in
preventing the respondents from implementing the effectivity of RA
9335 also known as the Attrition act of 2005.

RA 9335 grants, for the officers and employees of Bureau of Internal

Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), rewards and
sanctions to those officials who exceed their annual revenue targets.
RA 9335 covers officials and employees of BIR and BOC who are at
least six months in service, without regard to their employment status.

The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of RA 9335 promulgated

by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR and the Civil Service Commission will
be approved by a Joint Oversight Committee specifically made for this
purpose.

Petitioners assail multiple grounds on the constitutionality of the

provision under sec 12 of RA 9335. One of which is the creation of a
congressional oversight committee which was said to violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.
ISSUE/S Whether or not the joint oversight committee is violative of our
constitution
RULING/S No, the congressional oversight committee’s task in approving the IRR
of RA 9335 is declared to be unconstitutional.

In the case of Macalintal v COMELEC: “the power of oversight

embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.”

It is worth noting that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional in

itself, but rather necessitated for the reason that it is inherent to the
checks and balances of a democratic government.

However, to forestall the danger of encroachment “beyond the

legislative sphere” in a joint congressional oversight committee such
as in the immediate case, the constitution provides for two basic
constraints on congress. The congress may not vest upon itself with
either executive or judicial power. And when exercising its legislative
power, it must follow the procedure provided for in the constitution.

With that said, any post-enactment congressional measure such as in

the immediate case should be limited to scrutiny and investigation
which shall be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and

the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant

to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto gives power to the congress in discerning an IRR’s

approval or disapproval where the IRR either comes from the President
or an administrative agency. This destroys the system of separation of
powers because it diverts to congress the enforcement or application
of its own laws.
CASE TITLE Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate G.R NO. 19671
PONENTE Brion, J. DATE: Oct. 18, 2011
DOCTRINE The Constitutional mandate of when the local and national elections
are to be held is synchronous to the ARMM elections.
FACTS There were several petitions that were consolidated into this single
case, mainly questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No.
10153. RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the ARMM
(which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August
2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily
assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.

Petitioners argue that RA No. 10153 amends RA 9054, which is an

Organic law, therefore they argue that RA No. 10153 requires to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
pursuant to Constitution.

The petitioners also contended that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the
ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the synchronization of the ARMM regional
elections with the national and local elections is mandated in the
Constitution
2. Whether or not RA 10153 amends RA 9054.
3. Whether or not the holdover provision is RA 9054 is
constitutional
4. Whether or not COMELEC has the power to call for special
elections in ARMM.
5. Whether or not the power of the President to appoint OICs
violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices.
6. Whether or not the appointment power granted to the President
exceed the President’s supervisory powers over autonomous
regions.
RULING/S 1. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections, and that also
includes the ARMM elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national
elections, the intention can be inferred in Secs. 1, 2, and 5 of
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The SC ruled that RA 10153 does not amend RA 9054. RA 9054

reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections only. It does not provide the date for the succeeding
 regular ARMM elections. RA 10153 does not amend RA 9054
since these laws do change or revise any provision in RA 9054
.
3. Unconstitutionality of the holdover position: SC ruled that the
clear wording of Sec 8 Art X of the Constitution expresses the
intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices; ARMM officials are also local officials,
therefore they are also bounded by the three-year term limit
prescribed therein.

4. SC also ruled that the COMELEC has no authority to hold

special elections because under the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881), COMELEC has the power to postpone elections to
another date, but this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law.

5. The SC ruled on petitioners’ contention on the power of the

President to appoint OICs to take place of the elective officials
of the ARMM creates a fundamental change in basic structure
of the government, and thus requires compliance with the
plebiscite requirements embodied in RA 9054. The SC ruled that
Sec 3 of the RA 10153 does not change the basic structure of
the ARMM.

6. On the last issue, the SC ruled that it is an overly restrictive

interpretation of the President’s appointment power. The power
of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
with law”.