1B- STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

MODULE 4
Alfredo M. de Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987
The Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
February 2, 1987.
Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 29 December 1986
ALL STATUTES OF LOCAL APPLICATION AND PRIVATE LAWS SHALL BE
PUBLISHED EITHER IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR IT TO BE EFFECTIVE.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001
The legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval.
The completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide
for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."
Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Publication is an indispensable requirement for the validity and enforceability of
a legislation for its purpose is to give notice, even if it is a constructive one, of
the contents of a legislation that is binding on the persons affected by it.
Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, 1
February 2012
When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that
can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to
be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No.
150947, 15 July 2003
Administrative issuances must be consistent with the Law sought to be applied.
Municipality Of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998
A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control
and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latter’s control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power
or in other legislations.”
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local

chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
 2.The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article

III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, 17 December 1976
Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular, the provision of the latter, in case of conflict, will
prevail.
National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131, 27 August 1969
The provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 13 thereof, explicitly limits the
connotation of each “year”, as the term used in our laws, to 365 days. Civil Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) explicitly ordains that “it shall be understood
that years are three hundred sixty-five days.”
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No.
162155, August 28, 2007
Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No such suit or
proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of
payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may
arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the
return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have
been erroneously paid.

When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days,
of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

"Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,

unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of
twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
PNB v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 134 (1993)
It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of
what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139 [1938]; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was interpreted
to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days a definition
which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al.
(38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code, 1990, p. 46).
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, G.R. No. 28841, 24 July 1983
 Pretermission of holiday - where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, 17 September 1945
CONTINUITY OF LAW.—It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a political
nature, "Law once established continues until changed by some competent
legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph
H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9, citing
Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his
Treatise 011 the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can
be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence
with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final
disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes
place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next
change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to
amend; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change." As courts are creatures of
statutes and their existence depends upon that of the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in
force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A
proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary
in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a
declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. As a
consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one
court be continued by or transferred to another court are not required by the
mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the
"former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no
longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced
therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said
cases may continue the proceedings.
William F. Peralta v. The Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49, 12 November 1945
The government established over an enemy’s territory during the military
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror
over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It
is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil
government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same.
In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far, as it
concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone
determine the legality or illegality of its acts.
Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, G.R. No. L-409, 30 January 1947
1. Citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign.
2. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the
occupier (Hague Convention of 1907).

3. Exercise of rights may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another,

but sovereignty cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension.

4. “Temporarily allegiance” pertains to the relations borne by the inhabitants of

the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them.

5. Political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of
government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation. Examples are crimes against national security (treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to
enemy's country) and against public order (rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty,
illegal possession of firearms).

6. If an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the

military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and
comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary, as a hero, or
submit thereto without becoming a traitor.
CASE TITLE ALFREDO M. DE LEON,et al. vs. G.R NO. 78059
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA
PONENTE MELENCIO-HERRERA DATE: Aug. 31, 1987
DOCTRINE The Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was
ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
FACTS On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana,
Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion,
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election
Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a

Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor
was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government”.

Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be

declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking
over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall
be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.

ISSUE/S Whether the Memoranda of February 8, 1987 is null and void and that
respondents be prohibited from taking over the positions
RULING/S Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on
March 25, 1986, which provided:

"SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under

the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986."
However, since the new Constitution was ratified on Feb. 2, 1987, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by
Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:

"Sec 27.This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its

ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions."

By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed

to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III.

The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8,

1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both
declared to be of no legal force and effect.
CASE TITLE TANADA VS TUVERA G.R NO. L-63915
PONENTE CRUZ, J DATE: DEC. 29, 1986
DOCTRINE ALL STATUTES OF LOCAL APPLICATION AND PRIVATE LAWS
SHALL BE PUBLISHED EITHER IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR IT TO BE EFFECTIVE.
FACTS Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern,
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

In defense, the government argued that while publication was

necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

In the decision of the Supreme Court in this case in April 1985, it

affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees
which are of general application. It ordered the respondents to publish
the said issuances in the Official Gazette.

The petitioners now then filed for reconsideration/clarification of that

decision wherein they argued the phrase “otherwise provided”, which
means that publication is not imperative.

ISSUE/S Whether or not publication is an indispensable requirement for the

effectivity of the presidential decrees

RULING/S Yes. As provided in Art. 2 of the Civil Code, “law shall take effect Laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
code shall take effect one year after such publication”

The Supreme Court stated that publication is indispensable in every

case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the former Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective
after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided. The term “otherwise provided” only refers to
the date of the effectivity and not to the requirement of publication.

The Supreme Court also stated that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Therefore, presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by

the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. Only those interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK G.R NO.
Vs 105364
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA
PONENTE KAPUNAN, J.: DATE: June 28, 2001
DOCTRINE The legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon
its approval. The completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in
the clause "unless otherwise provided."
FACTS Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank,
for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans
Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein
petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed
claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said
court in SP-32311

On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent

judge from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility
towards petitioners.

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169

providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank.

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of

PVB, respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of
the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to
order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of
another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their
prejudice.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation
court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to
continue with liquidation proceedings.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the court continue with the liquidation proceedings of
the PVB when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and
reopening?

RULING/S No. Supreme Court in Favor of the Petitioner.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine
Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The
Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes", which was signed
into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which
was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides
in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with
all its branches within the period of three (3) years from the date of the
reopening of the head office.7 The law likewise provides for the
creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the
implementation of the provisions of the same.

Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee

submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary
Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate
Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the
respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be
immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169. The
Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which
approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitation
Committee. Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of
Authority allowing PVB to reopen.

On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of

the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the
respondent judge. As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated
June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order in the instant case
restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the
liquidation of PVB. On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank
opened its doors to the public and started regular banking operations.
CASE TITLE Tanada vs. Tuvera G.R NO. L-63915
PONENTE Escolin, J DATE: April 24, 1985
DOCTRINE Publication is an indispensable requirement for the validity and
enforceability of a legislation for its purpose is to give notice, even if it
is a constructive one, of the contents of a legislation that is binding on
the persons affected.
FACTS Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to
publish and/or cause the publication of the presidential issuances.

Respondents wants to dismiss the case on the ground that petitioners

have no legal standing to bring the instant petition to the court for the
reason that petitioners are not personally and directly affected by the
non-publication of the issuances. The petitioners however, maintain
their argument that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right, and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty they
need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.

The respondents further contend that the necessity to publish laws for
it to be effective does not apply to the presidential issuances stated
because it already contains provisions as to its effectivity.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette of laws, including
presidential issuances, is indispensable for it to become valid and
enforceable.
RULING/S The Supreme Court held that the interpretation given by the
respondents are in line with the construction of Article 2 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines as it has long been ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the legislation does not
provide for its effectivity date but not when the law provides for itself.
However, Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement
of publication, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The purpose of publication is to give the general public adequate notice

of the various laws which would govern their actions and conducts as
citizens and that without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim “ignoratia legis non excusat.
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act 638 provides that: there shall be

published in the Official Gazette...”, that the word “shall” imposes an
imperative duty that must be enforced especially if it will violate the
constitutional right to be informed, thus, non-publication of the
presidential issuances which is of public in nature or of general
applicability would deny the public knowledge of the laws that is
supposed to govern as well as its right to due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must be officially
and specifically informed of its contents.

The Supreme Court declared that presidential issuances of general

application which have not been published have no force and effect.
CASE TITLE Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix G.R NO. 179579
Feeds Corporation,
PONENTE SERENO, J. DATE: 1 February 2012
DOCTRINE When the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
FACTS On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued
CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was
classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2)
country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat
would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
It further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this
procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003,

respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Respondent contended that CMO 27-
2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center.

On 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision, granting the petition
and the subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. The trial court found that
petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed

to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.
The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since
the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other
importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of
notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE/S Whether or not Court of Appeals’ memorandum, CMO 27-2003 is in
violation of right to due process and substantive rights when it was
issued.
RULING/S YES. The Petition has no merit. Considering that the questioned
regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as
explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter
be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law,

an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be

observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its

applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.

Therefore, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the

issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
CASE TITLE Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs G.R NO. 150947
Michael J. Lhullier Pawnshop Inc.
PONENTE Chief Justice Davide Jr. DATE: July 15, 2003
DOCTRINE Administrative issuances must be consistent with the Law sought to be
applied
FACTS On 11 March 1991, CIR Jose U. Ong issued Revenue Memorandum
Order (RMO) No. 15-91 imposing a 5% lending investor's tax on
pawnshops.

On 11 September 1997, pursuant to these issuances, the Bureau of

Internal Revenue (BIR) issued an assessment notice against Lhuillier
demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax in the sum of
P3,360,335.11 for 1994 inclusive of interest and surcharges.

On 3 October 1997, Lhuillier filed an administrative protest with the

Office of the Revenue Regional Director

Its protest having been unacted upon, Lhuillier, filed a Notice and
Memorandum on Appeal with he Court of Tax Appeals invoking
Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act
of 1997.

Upon due consideration of the issues presented by the parties in their

respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA
decision on 20 November 2001.

Lhuillier likewise asserts that RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are
not implementing rules but are new and additional tax measures, which
only Congress is empowered to enact. Besides, they are invalid
because they have never been published in the Official Gazette or any
newspaper of general circulation.

ISSUE/S Whether or not RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 is valid.
RULING/S We rule in the negative.

Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances:

the legislative rule and the interpretative rule. A legislative rule is in
the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on
the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its

applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of
law.

RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be viewed simply as
implementing rules or corrective measures revoking in the process the
previous rulings of past Commissioners. Specifically, they would have
been amendatory provisions applicable to pawnshops. Without these
disputed CIR issuances, pawnshops would not be liable to pay the 5%
percentage tax, considering that they were not specifically included in
Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR
did not simply interpret the law. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have
been ignored.
CASE TITLE Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. G.R NO. G.R. No. 127820
Realty Corporation
PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J. DATE: July 20, 1998
DOCTRINE A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations. The power of eminent domain is lodged
in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control
and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations.”
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2.The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
FACTS Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95,Series of 1993,
the Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels
of land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque. Allegedly the
complaint was filed "for the purpose of... alleviating the living conditions
of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project." Acting on petitioner's motion, said court
issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to
15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
The private respondent filed its answer containing affirmative defenses
and a counterclaim the trial court then issued its August 9, 1994
Resolution which nullifies its February 4, 1994 order and dismissing
the case.

The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration and transfer of

venue which was denied by the trial court

The Court of Appeals also affirmed to the trial court's decision and
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S Whether or not a resolution approved by the municipal council has the
same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

Whether or not the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal

of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved.

RULING/S Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council

for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially
complies with the requirements of the law” because the terms
"ordinance" and "resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.". The Court disagrees. The
power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other
public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed
"through the law conferring the power or in other legislations."

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the
mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

The court was not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms
"resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance
is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain

through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language
of the previous Local Government Code.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a

derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly,
the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution" under
BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict construction.

Eminent Domain is not Barred by Res Judicata. Court holds that the
principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases
and proceedings cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State,
dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered
even by a prior judgment or res judicata.Thus, the State or its
authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right
by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal
requirement.

Petition is hereby DENIED

CASE TITLE BAGATSING vs. G.R NO. L-41631
RAMIREZ
PONENTE MARTIN, J. DATE: DECEMBER 17,
1976
DOCTRINE Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the
general statute treats in particular, the provision of the latter, in case of
conflict, will prevail.
FACTS On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 7522, “AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF
PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS
OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” The petitioner City
Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15,
1974.

On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market

Vendors, Inc. commenced a Civil Case seeking the declaration of
nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 before the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b)
the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment
of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d)
the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September
30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock
and animal products. After due hearing on the merits, respondent
Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring Ordinance
No. 7522 of the City of Manila invalid, and therefore, null and void, on
the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of
publication under the Revised City Charter. The ordinance in question
was not published at all in two daily newspapers of general circulation
in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in
the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the
legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision,

stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax
Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before instituting an action in court.

On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion which

prompted the petitioners to present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S  Whether it is the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or the Local
Tax Code that should govern the publication of the tax ordinance.
 Whether or not the ordinance in question is intra vires.
RULING/S Yes. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975,
has been validly enacted by following the guidelines for publication
provided by the Local Tax Code.

There's an apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City

of Manila and the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax
ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. The Revised
Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment
of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers
of general circulation in the city, while the Local Tax Code only
prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or
publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local
government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or
premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government.

Where a special statute refers to a subject in general, which the

general statute treats in particular, the provision of the latter, in case of
conflict, will prevail.

The fact that one is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as
the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which
the general statute treats in particular. That exactly is the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of

“ordinance” in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to
“ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in
particular.

In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of

the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses
its continuity when it approaches the realm of “ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. There, the Local
Tax Code controls. Here as always, a general provision must give way
to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially
true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later
than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of
Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax
Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973.
CASE TITLE NATIONAL MARKETING CORP v. G.R NO. 28841
TECSON
PONENTE CONCEPCION, C.J. DATE: August 27, 1969
DOCTRINE The provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 13 thereof, explicitly
limits the connotation of each “year”, as the term used in our laws, to
365 days. Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) explicitly
ordains that “it shall be understood that years are three hundred sixty-
five days.”
FACTS On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI
Manila) rendered a decision in a civil case wherein it ordered herein
respondents Miguel Tecson (Tecson) and Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., Inc. (Alto) to pay jointly and severally therein plaintiff Price
Stabilization Corporation (PRATRA) the sum of money with interests,
attorney’s fees and costs. Copy of the decision was served upon
Tecson and Alto on November 21, 1955.

Ten years after, on December 21, 1965, herein petitioner National

Marketing Corporation (NMC), as successor to all of PRATRA’s
properties, assets, rights, and choses in action, filed with CFI Manila
another civil complaint against respondents Tecson and Alto for the
revival of the judgment earlier rendered. Tecson moved for the
dismissal of the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription of action. CFI ruled in favor of Tecson and dismissed the same
stating that decision became file on December 21, 1955 and the revival case
was filed exactly on December 21, 1965, thus, pursuant to Article 13 of the
Civil Code which provides that a year is a period of 365 days, more than 10
years have passed. NMC forgot that 1960 and 1964 are both leap years,
hence, when the revival case was filed, it was 2 days too late.

Pursuant to Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code, an action upon a

judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the aright of
action accrues, which in the language of Article 1152 of the same Code
“commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has
become final.” In the case, the decision became final on December 21,
1955 or 30 days from the notice of judgement as after it was received
by Tecson and Alto, no appeals took place. The issue is thus confined
to the date which 10 years from December 21, 1955 expired.

On appeal, NMC alleged that it was on December 21, 1965 because

“a year means a calendar year” and since what is being computed is
the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of
computation. NMC furthered stating that when it is not a leap year,
December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year; and
the contention that the extra year in a leap year is not a day of the year
only because it is the 366th day is erroneous as it must belong to the
year it falls, thus, on a leap year, 366 days constitute 1 year.
 Meanwhile, holding to the decision of the CFI, Tecson contests the
contrary maintaining that when the law speaks of years, Article 13
provides that “years are of 365 days each”. Applying the same, 1960
and 1964 being leap years with February having 29 days in both years,
10 years of 365 days each or a total of 3,650 days from December 21,
1955 expired on December 19, 1955.

NMC appealed the CFI ruling to the Court of Appeals, which, certified
the same to the Supreme Court on the ground that the only question
raised on the appeal is one of law.
ISSUE/S Whether or not in interpreting Article 13 of the Civil Code, a year is
limited to 365 days?
RULING/S YES. The provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 13
thereof, explicitly limits the connotation of each “year”, as the
term used in our laws, to 365 days. “When the laws speak of
years, months…, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each;…”

Prior to the enactment of the Republic Act 386, the controlling rule is
that of Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides
“month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.” However,
as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Del Rosario,
“with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act
386)…, we reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in
accordance with which, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-
day month… and NOT the solar or civil month,” with the particularity
that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned “months, days or
nights, “ours (Philippine Civil Code) has added thereto the term
“years” and explicitly ordains that “it shall be understood that
years are three hundred sixty-five days.” Thus, Article 7 of the Civil
Code effectively repealed Section 13 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

For the court to rule otherwise is to nullify act of Congress and to revive
the repealed provision which in effect is a judicial legislation. If some
members of the Court are inclined to think that that this legislation is
not realistic for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice
and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy of the Revised
Administrative Code, the same may be done through legislative
process, not by judicial decree.
CASE TITLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R NO. 162155,
REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official capacity as
Revenue District Officer or Revenue
District No. 049 (Makati) vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,
INC.
PONENTE CORONA, J. DATE: August 28, 2007
DOCTRINE Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - No such suit or
proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or
credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment
was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously
paid.

When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be

understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from
sunset to sunrise.

"Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of

thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case
it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from
sunrise to sunset.
FACTS A petition on certiorari for review seeks to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and resolution denying
reconsideration.

Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group, Inc., on March

11, 1999 applied for a refund or credit on the income tax paid in 1997.
He explained that the real estate industry slowed down due to increase
in labor cost, materials, difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
collecting receivables. According to Yap’s claims, the company
suffered a loss of ₱71,879,228 that year with that it should not be liable
for income taxes but nonetheless paid ₱26,318,398.32. The revenue
officer required the respondent to submit additional documents to
support the claim which respondent complied with but the claim was
not acted upon.

On April 14, 2000, petition for review was filed with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). However, the Court ruled that it was beyond the two-
year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax
credit based of Section 229 of the NIRC, the right to claim such started
on April 14, 1998. The tax court also applied Article 13 of the Civil Code
stating that the two-year prescriptive period was equivalent to 730 days
but respondent’s petition was filed 731 days after the final adjusted
 return was filed which is beyond the reglementary period.

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA with the reason that the rule of a year is 365 days even if that
particular year is a leap year. April 15, 1998 to April 14, 2000 should
be counted as 730 days. Petitioner claimed that tax refunds should be
strictly construed against claimants since in nature it is an exemption.
ISSUE/S Whether April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000 marks the two-year or 730-
day prescriptive period considering that April 14, 1998 was the date on
when the respondent filed the final adjusted return and that the year
2000 was a leap year.

Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code was repealed by EO

292’s Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I or the Administrative Code of
the 1987.
RULING/S The Supreme Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly
repeals a prior law, the new law shall apply, thus the petition was
denied. With this case, Article 13 of the Civil Code states that that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each which was repealed by EO
292’s Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I or the Administrative Code of
the 1987 stated that a year shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months disregarding the number of days in a month. Hence, the court
decided that April 14, 2000 is when the two-year prescriptive period
ends and that the final adjusted return was filed within the reglementary
period.
CASE TITLE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. G.R NO. G.R. No. 98382
THE COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE MELO, J DATE: May 17, 1993
DOCTRINE It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p.
660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails
with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38
Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1990, p. 46).
FACTS There were two lots located In Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan which was
under the names of Dela Cruz siblings Epifanio. Delfin and Maria. The
said lots was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank by Ephifanio
which was guaranteed by three different promissory notes. The first
two promissory notes were not paid hence, it is legal and proper to
foreclose the lots in questioned due to their failure to pay the said
promissory notes.
On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of the bank (PNB)
presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the two
mortgaged lots before the Sheriff's Office at Malolos, Bulacan;
accordingly, the two lots were sold or auctioned off on October 20,
1961 with the PNB as the highest bidder for P28,908.46.Final Deed of
Sale was executed and issued a Certificate of Sale in favor PNB, which
was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Deeds.
Epifanio Dela Cruz did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two
lots, thus, PNB sold the lots to spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina
de Vera in a Deed of Conditional Sale.
ISSUE/S Whether Philippine National Bank complied with the requirements of
weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages?
RULING/S NO. The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were
published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 108). The
date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and 12,
1969 are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No.
3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be "published
once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently,
defendant-appellee bank failed to comply with this legal requirement.
The Supreme Court has held that:
"The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication
of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable
(Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. 1058, G.R. No. 42589, August
31, 1937 and October 29, 1937). Interpreting Sec. 457 of the
 Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18(c) of Rules of
Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in Campomanes vs.
Bartolome and German & Co. (38 Phil. 808, G.R. No. 1309,
October 18, 1918), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without
the notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
induced thereto by the judgment creditor, the sale is
absolutely void and no title passes. This is regarded as the
settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may be
elsewhere (Borja vs. Addison, 14 Phil. 895, G.R. No. 18010, June
21, 1922).
. . . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage
foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements
constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and
that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale (59
C.J.S. 1314)." (Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278,
November 8, 1988; 167 SCRA 16, 23-24).
It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p.
660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days—a definition which dovetails
with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38
Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the
interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at last
two weeks" in some newspaper that:
. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the
first day's publication from the computation, and the cases above
cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ.
Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;
the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as
sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period for
the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3,
1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until
April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was
both theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day
of the third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law.
Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time
and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it
begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).
CASE TITLE RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO G.R NO. L-28841
vs.
THE HON. CONCEPCION B.
BUENCAMINO and HON.
JUSTINIANO CORTEZ
PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J. DATE: June 24, 1983
DOCTRINE Pretermission of holiday - where the day, or the last day, for doing any
act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done
on the next succeeding business day.
FACTS On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the
City Court an information for slight physical injuries allegedly
committed by Yapdiangco on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho
Ching.

On September 10, 1965, Yapdiangco moved to quash (annul or set

aside) the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information
having been filed on the sixty first day following the commission of the
offense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed.

On September 14, 1965, the City Court of Quezon City denied the
motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and
considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading
falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding
business day, the action had not prescribed.

After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Court,

Yapdiangco filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
ISSUE/S Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause
which interrupts the prescription of an offense.
RULING/S No. The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the
computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of
tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc.

They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to
prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss
of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation
of law.

Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday
or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next
working day. Prescription has automatically set in.
The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the
last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

The petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted.

The questioned order of the respondent court is SET ASIDE.
The motion to quash is GRANTED and the information before the city
court is DISMISSED.
CASE TITLE CO KIM CHAM v. EUSEBIO VALDEZ G.R NO. L-5
TAN KEH
PONENTE FERIA, J DATE: September 17,
1945
DOCTRINE CONTINUITY OF LAW.—It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a
political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change
of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III,
Summary section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.)
As the same author says, in his Treatise 011 the Conflict of Laws
(Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can be no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with
the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the
final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a
change takes place, and when changed it continues in such changed
condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to amend; in spite of change of
constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by
legislative act creates a change." As courts are creatures of statutes
and their existence depends upon that of the laws which create and
confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not
being of a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of
sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until
repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts
are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may
continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of
the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. As a
consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings
pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court
are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty.
They are necessary only in case the "former courts are abolished or
their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order
that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases
may continue the proceedings.
FACTS The petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued
on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of
the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
 military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same
respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court,
contends that the government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City
of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed
"the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the
Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the
Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public
officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their
duties as before."

ISSUE/S
(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;
(2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General
Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations
and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has
invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said
courts; and
(3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated
by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and
continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines,
may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the
Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and
Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were
reestablished in the Islands.

RULING/S
1. Yes. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all
acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto
 governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of
those governments remain good and valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American
and Filipino forces.
2. No. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the
phrase "processes of any other government" as used in the
above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of the
Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void
thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation.
3. Yes. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of
the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by
the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the
proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the
Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American
and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was
restored.

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon

that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it
is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated
by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore"
unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said
laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that
they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a
declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws.
Unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. As a
consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings
pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court,
are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty.
They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or
their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order
that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases
may continue the proceedings.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to
continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political
complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of
mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
CASE TITLE William F. Peralta vs. The Director of G.R NO. G.R. No. L-49
Prisons
PONENTE Feria, J. DATE: 12 November 12,
1945
DOCTRINE The government established over an enemy’s territory during the
military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of
war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all
restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether
such government be called a military or civil government. Its character
is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it
is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far, as it concerns
the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone
determine the legality or illegality of its acts.
FACTS Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged
with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in Section 1 of
Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and
penalized by section 2(a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was
found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced
to served on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7
promulgated of the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Constitution and laws of the said Republic.

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the
Court of Special and Executive Criminal jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 “was a political instrumentality of the military forces of
the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are
repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America,
and therefore, null and void ab initio,” that the provisions of said
Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and “the petitioner has been
deprived of his constitutional rights”; that the petitioner is being
punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the
Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and “ that the penalties
provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided by
the Revised Penal Code.”
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction and the summary procedure adopted is valid.
2. Whether or not the sentence of imprisonment during the Japanese
military occupation is valid. If valid, what is the effect of the punitive
sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth government.
RULING/S 1. It is well established in International Law that “The criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory
finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure are defined in the
military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary
courts and authorities of the occupied district.” The so-called
Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality
of the belligerent occupation, had therefore the power or was
competent to create the Court of Special and Executive Criminal
Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not the court
is political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency
charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling under its
jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political
complexion, or not depending upon the nature or character of the
law so applied.

With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No.

7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the
conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to
the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate the law providing for such procedure. No objection can
be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts
of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused
under the Constitution, because the latter was not in force during
the period of the Japanese military occupation.

2. It was within the power and competence of the belligerent

occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly,
which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated
by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life
imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are
defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and
penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties,
as new crimes and offenses demanded military necessity, incident
to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by
the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of
occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its
operations.

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of

Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner,
 imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and
valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of
which the petitioner was convicted.

3. All judgment of political complexion of the courts during the

Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the
islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying
that doctrine, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a rime
of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to
be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the
Philippines by General Douglas McArthur.

It may not be amiss to say in his connection that it is not necessary

and proper to invoke the proclamation of Gen. McArthur declaring
null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines under which the petitioner was
convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of
said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner
under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had
already become null and of no effect.

It is, therefore, held that the punitive sentence under consideration,

although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid
ipso facto upon the reoccupation of the Island and the restoration
of the Commonwealth Government.
CASE TITLE LAUREL VS MISA. G.R NO. L-409

PONENTE - DATE: January 30, 1947

DOCTRINE 1. Citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign.

2. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not

transferred to the occupier (Hague Convention of 1907).

3. Exercise of rights may be destroyed, or severed and

transferred to another, but sovereignty cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension.

4. “Temporarily allegiance” pertains to the relations borne by the

inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the
military government established over them.

5. Political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and

obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in
abeyance during military occupation. Examples are crimes
against national security (treason and espionage; inciting to
war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's
country) and against public order (rebellion, sedition, and
disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms).

6. If an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally

by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and
die if necessary, as a hero, or submit thereto without
becoming a traitor.

FACTS Petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on
a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article
114 of the Revised Penal Code.

He stated the following reasons:

1. The sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
thereto was then suspended
 2. There was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE/S 1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during

military occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code?
RULING/S The Court denied his petition for habeas corpus.

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory

occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is
not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended
allegiance.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of
form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged
with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.