Session16 FMCGT21-2

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Financial Contracting

Firms are competing in


• Labor market
• Product market
• Financial market
Financial Contracting
• Uncertainty
• Information and Incentive
• Adverse selection (hidden information)
• Moral hazard (hidden action)
• Agency problem
• Incomplete contract: hold-up problem (commitment problem)
• Incentive to entrepreneur
References
• Akerlof, George A. (1970). "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of
Economics. The MIT Press. 84 (3): 488–500Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of
vertical and lateral integration. Journal of political economy, 94(4), 691-719.
• Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal
of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
• Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of
political economy, 94(4), 691-719.
• Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990). Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of political economy, 98(6), 1119-1158.
• Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1992). An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting. The review of economic Studies, 59(3),
473-494.
• Hart, O. (2017). Incomplete contracts and control. American Economic Review, 107(7), 1731-52.
• Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg, P. (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital
contracts. The review of economic studies, 70(2), 281-315.
• Kaplan, S. N., & Strömberg, P. E. (2004). Characteristics, contracts, and actions: Evidence from venture capitalist analyses. The
Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2177-2210.
• Gompers, P. A., Gornall, W., Kaplan, S. N., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2020). How do venture capitalists make decisions?. Journal of
Financial Economics, 135(1), 169-190.
Hybrid Securities

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Hybrid security
• Convertible Preferred Stock
• Convertible Participating Preferred Stock
• Convertible Preferred Stock with multiple liquidation preference
• Compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS)
• Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares (PNCPS)
• Perpetual Cumulative Preference Shares (PCPS)
• Redeemable Non-Cumulative Preference Shares (RNCPS)
• Redeemable Cumulative Preference Shares (RCPS)
• Convertible alternative reference securities (CARS)
• Secured, Redeemable, Non-Convertible Debentures
• Convertible Bond
• Redeemable preferred stock
• Mezzanine debt
• Warrants
• Mezzanine
• Subordinate debt
• SWORD (stock warrant off-balance-sheet research and development) [biotechnology]

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Convertible preference shares
• Convertible Preferred Stock
• Convertible Participating Preferred Stock
• Convertible Preferred Stock with multiple liquidation preference

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Start up Dream
• XYZ is a Software startup company with owners’ investment of 1 Crore
• XYZ need to raise INR 2 Crore Immediately
• They hired advisory firm to raise fund
• Four VC funds has shown interest in XYZ and given Term Sheet

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Hypothetical Synopsis of Term Sheet of four VC Funds
Alpha Beta Delta Gama
Founder Investment INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore
No of Shares 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Amount of Investment INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore
Convertible Preferred Convertible Participating Preferred Convertible Preferred Stock with
Type of Securities Common Equity
Stock Stock multiple liquidation preference 3X
As decided by
Dividend Noncumulative 7.5% Cumulative 10% Cumulative 10%
BoD
Liquidation Preference X X + Unpaid Divident 3X
Series A share Price + unpaid
Redemption Right None None Series A share Price + unpaid Dividend
Dividend
Antidilution Weighted Average Full Rachet Full Rachet
Stake in Company 40% 35% 30% 25%
No of Share Issued to
666,667 538,462 428,571 333,333
Fund
Compensation
yes Yes None None
Committee
Board Membership 2 out of 5 2 out of 5 1 out of 5 1 out of 5
Voting Rights Pre-Conversion Post Conversion Post Conversion
Conversion Yes Yes Yes
Counsel Expenditure XYZ Fund XYZ Fund 10
Organizational Structure of Venture Capital Investment
• Harvesting Investment
• Effort and small capital • IPO
• Annual Management fee: 2-3% • Leveraged Buyout
• Carried Interest: 20-30% • Acquisition
• Liquidation
• Screen & Evaluate Business Plan General Partners • Distributing Proceeds
• Conduct Due Diligence • Cash
• Negotiate Deals • Public Shares
• Invest Fund

Investment
Venture Fund Exit
Portfolio Companies

• ~ 99% of capital • Value Creation and Monitoring


• Pension Fund • Board service
Limited Partners
• Life insurance companies • Performance evaluation and review
• Corporate; Individuals • Recruitment management
• Assist with external relationships
• Help arrange additional financing
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Valuation
• Pre-money Value is the valuation of aa firm immediately before an
injection of capita occurs

𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒

• Post-money value is the valuation of a company including the capital


provided by the current round of financing

𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

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Example
• XYZ is a Software startup company
• Initial Investment by founders of the company was INR 1 Crore

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

• XYZ need to raise INR 2 Crore immediately

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Funding option 1
• A VC fund “Alpha” has shown interest to invest INR 2 Crore for a 40%
stake. Discuss the claim of owner and VC after exit.

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Series A Common Equity 666,667 20, 000,000 30

𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 50,000,000


𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 30,000,000

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Common Stock
• Perpetual
• No obligation to pay dividend and repay capital
• Represent ownership right
• Entitled one vote per share and future dividend payments on discretion of BoD
• Not convertible into any other type pf security
• No special rights such as anti-dilution provisions, liquidation
preferences
• Owned by founders, management, and employee

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Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

Series A Common Equity 666,667 20,000,000 30

Analyze payoff if company were sold for


Company were sold for Owners Series A Investors
INR 1 Crore
INR 2 Crore
INR 4 Crore
INR 5 Crore
INR 10 Crore

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Funding option 2
• A VC fund “Beta” has shown interest to invest INR 2 Crore for a 40%
stake. Discuss the claim of owner and VC after exit.

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Convertible Preferred
Series A 666,667 20, 000,000 30
stock

𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 50,000,000


𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 30,000,000

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Convertible Preferred Stock
• Convertible preferred stock is a preferred stock that can be converted
into equity at the shareholder’s discretion

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Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

Convertible Preferred
Series A 666,667 20,000,000 30
stock

Analyze payoff if company were sold for


Company were sold for Owners Series A Investors
INR 1 Crore
INR 2 Crore
INR 4 Crore
INR 5 Crore
INR 10 Crore

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Funding Option 3

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Funding option 3
• A VC fund “Beta” has shown interest to invest INR 2 Crore for a 40%
stake. Discuss the claim of owner and VC after exit.

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Participating Preferred
Series A 666,667 20, 000,000 30
stock

𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 50,000,000


𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 30,000,000

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Participating Preferred stock
Participating
Preferred stock

Preferred stock Common stock

Share in remaining
Original investment
proceed

Accrued dividends

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Participating Preferred
• No Dividend
• If the company were sold for INR 50,000,000
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

Participating Preferred
Series A 666,667 20,000,000 30
stock

• Proceeds to Series A=20,000,000 + 40% of 30,000,000


• Proceeds to Owners= 50,000,000-32,000,000=18,000,000
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Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

Participating Preferred
Series A 666,667 20,000,000 30
stock

Analyze payoff if company were sold for


Company were sold for Owners Series A Investors
INR 1 Crore
INR 2 Crore
INR 4 Crore
INR 5 Crore
INR 10 Crore

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Multiple liquidation preference
• Is a provision that gives preferred stockholder s of a specific round of
financing the right to receive a multiple (e.g., 3X) of their original
investment if the company is sold or liquidated.
• It still allows the investor to convert to common stock if the company
does well.

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Multiple liquidation preference
• Multiple liquidation preference is 3X
• If the company were sold for INR 50,000,000

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10


Convertible Preferred with
Series A multiple liquidation 666,667 20,000,000 30
preference 3X

• Proceeds to Series A=20,000,000 * 3


• Proceeds to Owners= None
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Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price

Owners Common Equity 1,000,000 10,000,000 10

Convertible Preferred with


Series A 666,667 20,000,000 30
multiple liquidation preference 3X

Analyze payoff if company were sold for


Company were sold for Owners Series A Investors
INR 1 Crore
INR 2 Crore
INR 4 Crore
INR 5 Crore
INR 10 Crore
INR 15 Crore
INR 25 Crore 27
Anti-Dilution
• Dilution occurs when an investor’s proportionate ownership is
reduced by the issue of new shares.
• Existing investors are primarily concerned with down rounds
Full Ratchets
• If a firm issues stock to a lower price per share than exiting preferred
stock, then the conversion price of the existing preferred stock is
adjusted downward to new lower price

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Example
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price
Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 666,667 20,000,000 30
Series B Convertible Preferred 500,000 10,000,000 20

Full Rachet

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price


Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 1,000,000 20,000,000 20
Series B Convertible Preferred 500,000 10,000,000 20

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Anti-Dilution
• Weighted Average
• Less harsh than full rachet
• If few new shares are issued, the conversion price will not drop too much

𝐴+𝐶
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = × 𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐴+𝐷
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒,

𝐴= 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 (round B)

𝐶 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (round B)

𝐷 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑

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Example
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price
Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 666,667 20,000,000 30
Series B Convertible Preferred 500,000 10,000,000 20

Full Rachet

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price


Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 1,000,000 20,000,000 20
Series B Convertible Preferred 500,000 10,000,000 20

Weighted Average
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price
Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 722,222 20,000,000 27.69
Series B Convertible Preferred 500,000 10,000,000 20
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Example
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price
Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 666,667 20,000,000 30
Series B Convertible Preferred 1 10 20

Full Rachet

Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price


Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 1,000,000 20,000,000 20
Series B Convertible Preferred 1 10 20

Weighted Average
Owners Security Shares Investment Share Price
Owners Common 1,000,000 10,000,000 10
Series A Convertible Preferred 666,667 20,000,000 30
Series B Convertible Preferred 1 10 20
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Why firms use convertible securities to raise
external capital
• Conversion feature serves as a sweetener to investors
• Benefits issuers through a coupon or dividend rate that is lower than that for
the nonconvertible counterpart
• Conversion provision sets up “delayed equity” to be sold at a price
higher than the current stock price

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Rationales for Hybrid
• All financial contracting confronts three fundamental problems
• Uncertainty
• Information asymmetries
• Agency cost
• Generally Preferred stocks
• Cheap debt and cheap equity
• Low coupon than straight debt
• Conversion price is higher than current Market Price
• Reduce adverse selection
• Asymmetric information between firm’s insiders and outsiders
• Unlike straight bond and equity, hybrid offers considerable flexibility
• Debt Vs Equity (Cash flow Vs ownership rights)
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What is "preferred" about
preferred stock?

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Dividend
• Cash available for distributions during the year must be used to meet
promised payments to preferred shareholders before any common
dividends can be paid.
• Meaningless
• Corporations being financed with venture capital money are rarely able to pay
dividends to their venture capital investors
• To be effective
• Cumulative
• Meaningless because low probability that the portfolio company w ill w ant to pay a common
dividend before convertible preferred stock is converted in an acquisition or automatically in IPO
• To make effective
• Requiring company to pay accumulated preferred dividend before common stockholder receive any
liquidity o their investment
• Incorporate accumulated but unpaid dividend into the liquidation preference and treat
acquisition as liquidation
• Adjust the conversion ratio to reflect accumulated but unpaid dividend

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Liquidation preference
• Applies during liquidation or acquisition
• Preferred stock has right to get a certain amount before the common stock
gets anything
• Meaningless
• Dominant input in early-stage technology companies is human capital
• Generally they don’t have physical assets; they subcontract capital intensive operation like
manufacturing
• Participating or multiple liquidation
• Redemption Preference
• Allocation of control
• Convertible preferred stock facilitates the separation of control and cash flow right
• More board seats but 25% profit from IPO

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• Dividend and liquidation preference of convertible preferred stock
• Incentive and signaling
• Make unattractive for low-quality owners and managers

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Term Sheet Negotiation: Rich Vs King Approach
• Two motivation of start up
• Building wealth (Rich)
• Ready to give up equity, board representation, and voting rights so that they can attract
best resources
• Valuable slice of the economic pie
• Importance of term
• Valuation
• Liquidation preference
• Anti dilution
• Dividend rights
• Maintaining control (King)
• Bootstrap venture and take money from investors who allow to retain control
• Importance of term
• Board composition
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Hypothetical Synopsis of Term Sheet of four VC Funds
Alpha Beta Delta Gama
Founder Investment INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore INR 1 Crore
No of Shares 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Amount of Investment INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore INR 2 Crore
Convertible Preferred Convertible Participating Preferred Convertible Preferred Stock with
Type of Securities Common Equity
Stock Stock multiple liquidation preference 3X
As decided by
Dividend Noncumulative 7.5% Cumulative 10% Cumulative 10%
BoD
Liquidation Preference X X + Unpaid Divident 3X
Series A share Price + unpaid
Redemption Right None None Series A share Price + unpaid Dividend
Dividend
Antidilution Weighted Average Full Rachet Full Rachet
Stake in Company 40% 35% 30% 25%
No of Share Issued to
666,667 538,462 428,571 333,333
Fund
Compensation
yes Yes None None
Committee
Board Membership 2 out of 5 2 out of 5 1 out of 5 1 out of 5
Voting Rights Pre-Conversion Post Conversion Post Conversion
Conversion Yes Yes Yes
Counsel Expenditure XYZ Fund XYZ Fund 40
Term Sheet Negotiation

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Term Sheet
• Green Flag
• Simple
• Little downside protection
• Pain vanilla convertible preferred stock
• Yellow Flag
• Milestone
• Complicated terms
• Reg flag
• To many milestone
• Clauses that take control from founders
• Important
• Personal chemistry and reputation of VC fund
• Take advice from lawyers
• Who will be on board is more important than VC firm

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Term Sheet Negotiation
Gama
Founder Investment INR 1 Crore
No of Shares 1,000,000
Amount of Investment INR 2 Crore
Convertible Preferred Stock with multiple
Type of Securities
liquidation preference 3X

Dividend Cumulative 10%

Liquidation Preference 3X

Redemption Right Series A share Price + unpaid Dividend

Antidilution Full Rachet


Stake in Company 25%

No of Share Issued to Fund 333,333

Compensation Committee None

Board Membership 1 out of 5


Voting Rights Post Conversion
Conversion Yes
Counsel Expenditure Fund
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One more Example

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XYZ Ltd.
• XYZ is a Software startup company
• XYZ need to raise INR 5 Crore Immediately
• Two VC fund shown interest—Alpha and Beta
• Both VC funds have given Term Sheet

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Alpha VC Fund Beta VC Fund
Amount of Investment INR 5 CR INR 5CR
Type of Securities Convertible Preferred Stock Convertible Participating Preferred Stock
Dividend Noncumulative 7.5% Cumulative 10%
Liquidation Preference 3X 1.5X
Redemption Right None Series A share Price + unpaid Dividend
Antidilution Weighted Average Full Rachet
Pre money valuation 15 CR if sales > 1 CR or 5 CR 10 CR
Counsel Expenditure XYZ Beta
Compensation
Control by Alpha None
Committee
Voting Rights Pre-Conversion Post Conversion
Conversion Yes Yes
Board Membership 2 1
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Term Sheet Negotiation
Beta VC Fund
Amount of Investment INR 5CR
Type of Securities Convertible Participating Preferred Stock
Dividend Cumulative 10%
Liquidation Preference 1.5X
Redemption Right Series A share Price + unpaid Dividend
Antidilution Full Rachet
Pre money valuation 10 CR
Counsel Expenditure Beta
Compensation
None
Committee
Voting Rights Post Conversion
Conversion Yes
Board Membership 1
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Other Instrument
• Redeemable preferred stock
• Redeemed for face value at the choice of the investor
• Sometimes called straight preferred
• Gives the investor an exit if IPO or sale is not materialized
• Mezzanine debt
• Low priority than senior debt but high interest rate
• Warrants
• Right to purchase shares at pre-determined price
• Generally issued with preferred stock or bonds.

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