International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 9, Number 03,2021

International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 9, Number 3, March 2021 (Serial Number 90)
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Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); ★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
University of Nigeria, Nigeria); ★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland); Turkey);
★Ahmed Y. Zohny (Coppin State University, USA) ★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
★Alessandro Vagnini (Sapienza University of Rome, Academy, Ukraine);
Rome); ★Nazreen Shaik-Peremanov (University of Cambridge,
★Ali Bilgiç (Bilkent University, Turkey); UK);
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary); ★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University, Canada);
Philippines); ★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK); Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University, ★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
Poland); ★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK); ★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New Public Policy, Singapore);
Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); Australia);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
Cultures, Morocco); University, India);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA); Canada, Canada);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK); ★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★Léonie Maes (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium); ★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★Lomarsh Roopnarine (Jackson State University, USA); ★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan Cel Mare University of ★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
Suceava, Romania); France);
★Marek Rewizorski (Koszalin University of Technology, ★Xhaho Armela (Vitrina University, Albania);
Poland); ★Yi-wei WANG (Renmin University of China, China);
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 9, Number 3, March 2021 (Serial Number 90)
Contents
Nation-Building
Gender in/Equality in Nation-Building: The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the

Cases of Serbia and Kosovo 97
Adelina Hasani
Identity
Belarusian Identity in the Post-colonial Labyrinths 113

Iryna Shumskaya
Governance
The Role of Traditional Leaders in Governance Structure Through the Observance

of Taboos in Cape Coast, Kumasi and Teshie Societies of Ghana 122
Emmanuel Abeku Essel
International Relations and Diplomacy, March 2021, Vol. 9, No. 03, 97-112
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.03.001
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Gender in/Equality in Nation-Building: The Breakup of

Yugoslavia and the Cases of Serbia and Kosovo
Adelina Hasani
University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey
The ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia was manifested with the rape of women. Rape has been used as the strongest
weapon by nationalist forces where the women’s body has been used as a target to fight the enemy. During the
breakup of Yugoslavia, the “other” was not just based on ethnic identity, but also gendered and sexualized.
However, the nationalism between Kosovo and Serbia were core of the conflict in Yugoslavia, which continued
even after the conflict. In Serbian history the “other” has generally always been the Albanians, who were described
as uncivilized, Easter. For Albanians, “the other” was not only Serbians but the “Slavs” in general who were
described as barbarians and oppressors. The brutality of the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia shows how ethnic hatred
has been provoked in order to construct the new frontiers between the other states. Nevertheless, the assumption of
entering the democratic state did not change the role of women in society significantly. It is noticeable that in the post
conflict societies there is a need to go back to the traditional values. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in both Serbia
and Kosovo societies there was an apparent need to rebuild the nation, which was based on the traditional values of
these two respective countries.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, nationalism, systematic rape, ethnic conflict
Introduction
Yugoslavia was an example to the whole world of how differences can be met and how diverse
nationalities could live together. However, “nobody” supposed that Yugoslavia would end up with crimes on a
mass scale that took place during its breakup. However, among the most significant war crimes that occurred
during the breakup of Yugoslavia were mostly manifested by the rape of women (and men).
The paper will focus on how gender inequality narrative was built in peacetime and how it was
transformed in the armed conflict in Yugoslavia (more specifically in Kosovo), through addressing the rape of
women as a weapon of war. However, in our analysis, we will likewise emphasis how sexual violence was also
used against men, in order to better understand the issues of gender and the logic of sexual violence in
peacetime and in wartime.
During the breakup of Yugoslavia, rape has been used as the strongest weapon by nationalist forces where
the women’s body has been used as a target to fight the enemy. Information about different rape patterns has
been reported for the first time in 1992 after refugees from different regions had the opportunity to tell their
stories. However, the reports that have been published after the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) and Kosovo showed that the rape was a strategy to destroy the enemy by targeting the women’s body.
Adelina Hasani, Ph.D., International Relations, University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey.

98 GENDER IN/EQUALITY IN NATION-BUILDING
The large number of the rape that occurred in Yugoslavia (more especially in the case of BiH) were taking
place and the existence of rape camps, but purposefully utilized spaces where the women, if they were not
killed, were kept and abused (Allen, 1996). Nevertheless, detention of women for sexual slavery was a less
documented phenomenon in Kosovo than in BiH (Brammertz & Jarvis, 2016).
One of the main points of this work is that during the armed conflicts, the women’s body becomes the
main target of the enemy, since the “other” was not just based on ethnic identity, but also gendered and
sexualized. Thus, the rape of women during the armed conflict in Yugoslavia happened for two reasons: Firstly,
the targets of rape were mainly women and, secondly, these women belonged to a particular nation and
ethnicity. Yet, the attempt by raping man during the conflict was to feminize them, which in essence the target
was women’s body. The emphasis of this analysis will be put on the symbolic role that women play in
nationalism; thus enabling us to understand the issues of gender inequality and the logic behind the rape of
women during the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Wartime rapes against both men and women were not perceived as a crime against humanity before the
codification of the International Criminal Tribunal Charters for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (Hilmi, 2007). Actually ICTY and ICTR were the first ever
tribunal in the history of the international juridical system to prosecute wartime rape as a crime against
humanity (Hilmi, 2007). The definition of rape has restricted the elements of the crime to: “(a) a physically
invasion (penetration) of sexual nature, (b) committed on a person (male or female), (c) under circumstances
which are coercive” (Hilmi, 2007, p. 31). There is no doubt that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
influenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Again, for the first time in the history of international legal discourse, rape was
defined in gender-neutral terms in the Tribunals’ case law and in the ICC.
The focus of the paper will be more in the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo to better appreciate the
logic behind the rapes during the conflict in Yugoslavia, as the hostility between Serbs and Albanians is based
before the conflict. As Howard Clark (2000) argued, the core of the Serbian and Albanian relationship has been
characterized by a pattern of domination, Serbs over Albanians or Albanians over Serbs, since Kosovo was part
of the Ottoman Empire. In Serbian history, the “other” has generally always been the Albanians who were
described as uncivilized, barbarians, Islamist, Eastern. Worth noting is that Serbian history recognizes the
Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Nazism as “others” as well. On the other hand, for Albanians, “the
other” was not only Serbians but the “Slavs” in general who were described as barbarians and oppressors.
Nevertheless, it is important to comprehend the connection of both Serbian and Albanian (Kosovo) nationalism
with Kosovo territory.
The 90’s in Serbia were the years of crisis and basic social transformations. Social transformation in
Serbia was also based on the deconstruction of the previous gendered orders. During the breakup of Yugoslavia,
the nation-building process became the ultimate necessity. The nation-building process was based on the
strategies of the traditionalization of women’s identities as well as their roles. The structural connection
between ethnic and gender violence is most clearly seen in the case of Yugoslavia. The brutality of the ethnic
conflicts in Yugoslavia shows how ethnic hatred has been provoked in order to construct the new frontiers
between the other states. Nevertheless, the assumption of entering the democratic state did not change the role
of women in society significantly. It is noticeable that, in post-conflict societies, there is a need to go back to
GENDER IN/EQUALITY IN NATION-BUILDING 99
the traditional values. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in both Serbia and Kosovo societies, there was an
apparent need to rebuild the nation, which was based on the traditional values of these two respective countries.
Nation in Nation State-Building, Nationalism and Gender

Nation-State and Gender
According to Anderson (1997), a nation is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship. Moreover, capitalism and print-technology created the possibility of the new form of “imagined
community” (p. 7). Therefore, nations appeared as the new necessity of modern world. On the other hand,
Anderson (1997) argued that “communities are to be distinguished, not because their falsity/genuineness but by
the style in which they are imagined” (p. 6). Anderson was right by arguing the fact that nations are imagined
communities. However, he also claimed that they would be distinguished, which so far did not happen, they
have only been transformed in accordance with different political needs. On the other hand, Eric Hobsbawm
(1990) thought that nations are constructed; however, he does not completely deny the existence of some sort of
feelings of collective belonging that already exist. Nationalism, as an ultimate idea helped states to create their
nation-states. The normalization of the ideal of nation-states was the vital one; thus, we can find naturalization
of the nation-state in different disciplines and many intellectual variations. On the other hand, the idea of a
social contract has been the core conceptual framework in which generally people in the Western world
understand the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. Based on the classic state theories of
Hobbes, Lock and Rousseau, this implies that an individual consents to give up some of his/her (Pateman, 1998)
rights in order for the state to deliver public goods for the collective benefits.
Appearance of nation-state came up with “rights of men” which provided citizen rights. Since nationalism
is male invention, and nation-states are based on nationalism; women were excluded from the nation-state
building process. Within the logic of nation-state, women have been seen as “patriotic mother”, where they
should educate their children into the values of republican citizenship. Women active in the equal citizen rights
movement who refused to have the passive role in nation-building or denying at all the nation-building, which
is based on male values, and honor. Within the modern nation-building, as Balibar (1988) argued, women were
not just “excluded from public space but also social roles that were assigned to them along with ideologies, the
educational practices, and the corresponding symbolic complexes, were an effective condition of the political
capacity of men, taken collectively” (p. 724). Women have been excluded from public space, nevertheless, their
responsibility towards public space was transformed into the “private space”1 Women’s responsibilities were
considered the following: to give a birth, educate their children, be good wives, and to be ready to die for their
country when it is required. They were considered “patriotic mother” (Hannam, 2007, p. 22) in private space;
therefore, women then would educate their children into the values of the republican citizenship.
Gender and Wartime Sexual Violence
As the oldest known difference, the gender and sex difference is inscribed into language and symbolically
permeates all other dichotomies of thinking and legitimized historical hierarchies.
Gender should be understood not as a “real” social difference between men and women, but as a mode of discourse
which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by their sexual/ biological difference as opposed to their
1
So-called “private space” is socially constructed to marginalized women presence in public life.
economic positions or their membership in ethnic and racial collectivities. (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 9)
Gender as a nation is socially and historically constructed. In order to understand the meaning of the term
“gender”, we should differentiate the meanings of sexes from gender. The difference between sexes is
described in terms of males and females, whereas gender differences are based on femininity and masculinity.
Gender identity and role is not something that individuals are born with, but something built up cumulatively
over time. On the other hand, sex (generally) is the biological condition which children are born with. Nira
Yuval-Davis (1997) had pointed out that it is crucial to understand the discussion on gender as well as on the
relationship between the notions of gender and sex in order to be able to any attempt to analyze the ways
nations of femininity and masculinity are constructed within nationalist discourses. National, gender as well as
sexual differences refers to hierarchical differentiations. As Yuval-Davis (1997) once argued, “nations are
genders and the topography of the nation is mapped in gendered terms feminized soil, landscapes, boundaries
and masculine movements over these spaces” (p. 53). Thus, beside biological reproduction, women’s task
within the nation is also cultural reproduction; while men create and shape the culture, women reproduce the
culture. Considering the importance of culture in the nation-state building, the cultural reproduction of nation
on behalf of women also implies the pressure and control to reproduction the culture that has been shaped and
created by men.
Because of the central importance of social reproduction to culture, gender relations often come to be seen
as constituting the essence of cultures as ways of life to be passed from generation to generation (Yuval-Davis,
1997). Mother/woman represents the culture, the culture that is already created and shaped by father/man.
“Cultural difference has been related to notions of otherness”, therefore, culture should be under men’s control.
However, strict cultural codes of what it is to be a proper woman are often developed to keep women in this
inferior power position (Yuval-Davis, 2003, p. 18).
All nationalisms are gendered, and cannot be understood without a theory of gender power. Subordination
of woman to man was deemed a natural fact. Other forms of social hierarchy could be depicted in familial
terms to guarantee social difference as a category of nature. Nations are frequently figured through the
iconography of familial and domestic space (McClintock, 1993). We see that patriarchal nationalism is the
mirror of patriarchal family of man. Hierarchical relations within family (the social subordination of women
and children) have been presented as natural and familial. Therefore, in a nation, we see the application of it.
Hierarchy within unity is an organic element of historical progress (McClintock, 1993).
The differentiation of nation from the other’s nation is structured based on women’s body, where women
become the symbol of the national reproduction. Women’s role is seen as a passive one in the process of
nation-building, while the men’s role is active in creating the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Although man is the
proper person who has to protect his state/ nation borders, man is equipped with responsibility to fight for the
motherland, which gives him an active role in nation-building. Within nationalist rhetoric, the homeland is
constructed as women/mother and wars are fought to defend the “women and children”. Gender relations are
perceived to be at the heart of nation and nationalism (Yuval-Davis, 2003). Mothers, daughters are presented as
the property of the nation. Therefore, they must be protected by husbands/fathers/sons. Women are perceived as
a property of the nation since they are reproduction of the nation; women who refuse to have children become
potential enemy of the nation (Mostov, 2000). Women often symbolize the collective unity. Julie Mostov (2000)
argued that a single woman presents a potential threat to the nation; a single woman becomes potential suspect
in border transgressions. Since a woman represents the collective morality, man is responsible to protect the
morality of his collectivity. Moreover, all societies have collective memories in which the image of the “others”
and the “rules” how they should be founded (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 47). The “other’s” men are seen
collectively as sexual aggressors, and “our” women become the object of male temptation. In this context, “our
women” are presented as chaste, honorable and in need of protection, which is the function of “our men”
(Alison, 2007, p. 80). On the other hand, “their women” are unchaste and deprived. While the “other’s” women
become enemies as reproducers, “our” women are reminded of their moral duty to bear children for our nation.
Gender roles are crucial role in constructing collective identities as well as emphasizing the difference between
the others.
Wartime Sexual Violence

Sexual violence is not a phenomenon that appeared just in the wartime period or ethnic conflicts. Sexual
violence is seen also in peacetime. Therefore, it is important to understand the construction of sexual violence
in peacetime and how it is perceived by the power, in order to understand the meanings of wartime sexual
tortures. As Catherine Niarchos (1995) stated,
during peacetime the individual’s body, especially its essences-sexuality reproduction become the symbol of everyday
domination and aggression. Wartime transforms individual bodies into social bodies as seen, for example, in genocidal
rapes or ethnic cleanings, which are thought to purify the bloodlines. (p. 662)
Moreover, rape during the wartime means to terrorize, displace the local population, and force the birth of
children of mixed “ethnic” descent. However, defining rape/sexual violence as male domination over women
stereotypes men as perpetrators and women as victims, rendering rape of men as abnormal and invisible
(Vojdik, 2013). Wartime sexual violence as “masculinized” social practice makes the perpetrators as dominant
while subordinating enemy/other group (Vojdik, 2013). Masculinity theory is important to understand the
social norms of masculinity, which reproduce relation of power between men as an individual and between men
and women (Vojdik, 2013). However, masculinity helps in explaining sexual violence towards both women and
men. Since sexual violence is a type of showing masculinity.
Masculinity/femininity and manhood/womanhood social practices are constructed during the peacetime,
and transformed within armed conflict. Masculinity in peacetime is constructed as a man who is powerful,
sexually dominant, and heterosexual, describing, “real mean” (Vojdik, 2013, p. 946). Raped men symbolically
lose their gender identity as they are constructed in the peacetime to be dominant and are feminized. The rape
of man symbolically represents the powerless victim, who is not able to protect himself as well as his family.
Yet, rape of women is often stigmatized as shameful, particularly in social or religious communities that seek to
regulate women’s sexual purity.
All types of rapes are an experience of power, domination, degradation, and humiliation (Hague, 1997)
either if they are committed in peacetime or in wartime. Almost at all social and cultural level, masculinity is
determined as dominant and femininity as subordinate. Therefore, rapists hold the position of masculinity, and
try to “feminize” their enemy and to show their superiority. There are certain characteristics common to all the
rapes. In the majority of cases, the rapes occurred in view of the others, including those who were forced to
watch (Niarchos, 1995). Many rapes involve sexual torture and sadism. However, describing acts of sexual
abuse in a courtroom is difficult, since rape is still a misunderstood crime.
To sum up, wars are sexualized; “wartime propaganda reinforces the link between war and sexuality and
further objectified women” (Niarchos, 1995, p. 670). Enemy is always someone who tries to rape and murder
“our women”; effort is directed at saving “our women” (Niarchos, 1995, p. 670). Wars are male
domination/male decision; women are war’s victims, their role is symbolic. If women take part in war, she
should act with male values, more preciously she should fight like a man. However, women are not allowed to
judge war’s aftermath (Niarchos, 1995). Warfare is male domination and women are victim of men’s war. It is
clear that in warfare, bodies of women are used in most vulnerable way (they are raped, forced into prostitution,
forcibly impregnated). Rape/sexual violence is happening both in war and peacetime; nonetheless, their aims
are different.
Gender and Nationalism in Serbs and Kosovo During the Breakup of Yugoslavia
Analyzing the brutality of conflicts in former Yugoslavia, we can see how the nationalist discourse was
based on the objectification of women’s body. Conflicts occurred in former Yugoslavia (as the other conflicts
in different palaces) were man-made. Actually, men took part in conflict for many reasons―for honor,
patriotism or brotherhood, in self-defense, for liberation, or to liberate the other. Likewise, nationalist narratives,
used in the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavian, were based in specific gender identity. Women are
simultaneously mythologized as the nation’s deepest “essence” and instrumentalized their “natural” difference
as the nation’s life/birth (Papic, 1989). During Tito’s Yugoslavia “Bratstvo i Jedinstvo” (“Brotherhood and
Unity”) was the core politics which managed to prevent any ethnic escalation. The message of the
“Brotherhood and Unity” was clear, which implies that under the socialism every nation as well as ethnic group
is equal and will be treated equally. Moreover, in Yugoslavia, women and men were equal in the development
of self-managing socialism. Taoists rejected the term “feminist” which they equated with bourgeois activism
and, however, the role of women in socialist Yugoslavia was to contribute to the building of socialism through
the family, work and political activity (Papic, 1989).
The economic crisis occurred in the end of 1980, triggered the nationalist crisis (Sell, 2002). More
precisely, the leaders of Yugoslavia were trying to increase the attention towards nationalism by using different
propagandas, in order to make trivialize the economic crisis. In “newly emerged” nationalist discourse, created
the need for the new gender roles, where the role of women within the system stated to be reformulated.
Basically, women’s political and civil rights that were guaranteed during the socialist Yugoslavia started to be
violated. This was the clear view to see how the women of former Yugoslavia struggled in the 20th century
within the framework of nationalist ideologies. Nationalism is a “man business”; while men are perceived as a
subject, women are perceived as an object. A gender difference between men and women serves to define the
limits of national differences. Moreover, as Dasa Duhacek (2006) argued: “nationalism is sexualized in the case
of Yugoslavia, where women’s bodies have been abused by systematic rape” (p. 117). The ethnic-national
conflict in former Yugoslavia leads us to better understand how the sexual violence becomes as the main
instrument of ethnic escalation. There were different nationalist attempts towards the creation of nation-state in
the territory of Yugoslavia. These nationalist attempts came out with the abuse of women’s bodies.
Nation-building process in the countries of former Yugoslavia resulted in two interdependent forms of
violence against women by demanding the no abortion for insider women and extreme violence against
outsider women.
Politics in Serbia During the 90’s

The rise of nationalism in Serbia after the 90’s was used by displacement of trauma referring to the bad
experience that they had in the Second World War and by criminalizing the Ustasha acts that they did during
the Second World War. Increasing nationalism in Serbia was reflecting on re/traditionalization of social roles
and relationships. Politicians, intellectuals and the Orthodox Church, obviously became closely connected with
the re-nationalization/re-traditionalization process in Serbia. Moreover, during this period, in Serbia, the
“Brotherhood and Unity” which was used in socialist Yugoslavia switched with “all Serbs” in “one” nation
state, where both women’s and men’s identities had to be reshaped in order to fit within a new nationalist
discourse. The economic crisis within the Yugoslavia brought out the new gender roles, especially within
Serbia. Actually, economic crisis in socialist Yugoslavia created a convenient environment where nationalist
politicians can play their scenarios. The main nationalist policy and discourse during the 90’s in Serbia was
re/traditionalisation of gender roles. The popular nationalist discourse used in Serbia was to return women into
the private space where actually they “belong”. The essence of returning women back to the private sphere was
the consequences of deep economic crisis in Yugoslavia.
In the Yugoslavia even before the 90s, Serbian women were perceived as autonomous beings, educated,
engaged in work outside the family with alternative to motherhood. On the other hand, the Albanian women
were perceived as machine of biological reproduction. Bracewell (1996) argued that this role of Serbian women
also fits into a more general oriental discourse, thus setting up a contrast between secular, democratic, and
rational “Western” Serbs and primitive “Oriental” Albanians. However, ironically, politicians in Serbia started
to produce the idea that women should take the role of reproduction of the Serbian nation, while they have
criticized the Albanian women for the same reason; seen as the machine of biological reproduction. As Papic
(1989) mentioned, the nationalist revival of the patriarchal tradition invoked and strengthened the Serbian
nationalist patriarchy, which was very much marked by the features of Milosevic’s rule. Family plays a crucial
role in every nationalism. Hence, one of the aims during the nation-building process is to create the conditions
where nationalist idea will penetrate into families. In Serbia, the role of man/father as patriarch has been
reinforced as the father of the nation. Increasing the awareness that he is the father of the nation and responsible
for educating family members on how to respect authority. Women’s responsibility in patriarchal nationalism is
to give a birth to particular nation. Politicians have begun a crusade calling for a national renaissance among
the Serbs, understood in a very literal sense, as “rebirth”: “The Serbian birthrate has to be increased if the
nation is to survive” (Bracewell, 1996, p. 28). As Serbia continued to have decreasing birth rates, both
politicians as well as doctors in Serbia coined as “the white plague”, Albanian were accused coercing women to
maintain high birth rates (Luci, 2002).
The nationalist instrumentalization of a woman’s body was also confirmed in the new abortion law
adopted by the Serbian parliament in May 1993. The law permitted women to decide on an abortion only up to
10 weeks into their pregnancy, while a commission composed of a physical, a psychologist, and a social worker
would be empowered to take the final decision where women sought abortions between the 10th and 20th
week of pregnancy. Additionally, the initial draft of this law did not recognize rape as a legitimate reason
for abortion (Papic, 1999). Serbian media” pumped out portraits of Albanian women as baby-markers, calling
their offspring “biological bombs”, labeling Albanian families’ life private and backward (Mertus, 1999,
p. 178).
Milosevic became the popular political figure in Serbia by increasing the attention of people on
victimization of the Serbian nation. He became a phenomenon; his pictures everywhere, people familiarized his
image with the new Serb icon. People submitted to him: men and women, old and young, educated and
uneducated. Women would repeat; “he is so beautiful”. Why did the majority of Serbian women side with
Milosevic? (Papic, 1989). The re/nationalization of women’s role in Serbia was based on a love relationship!
The will of these women was to be the mother of the Serbian nation, particularly the mother’s of great warriors
who will be ready to die for the Serbian legacy. On the other hand, there were women in Serbia who constantly
protested against Milosevic regime. Women in Black2 starting from 1991-1996 every Wednesday, silently and
wearing in black were protesting the Milosevic regime in the former Yugoslavia. Most of the Women in
Black’s actions connected to the wars in former Yugoslavia were initiated after the fall of regime in October
2000 (Zajovic, 2014).
Civil Resistance in Kosovo
The Albanian factor in Yugoslavia was under double pressure: the pressure coming from the political
system and pressure that comes with being an ethnical Albanian. However, economic and social reforms in
Tito’s Yugoslavia enhanced women’s political and social position. In 1974, the new Yugoslav constitution
allowed Kosovo status to be equivalent to that of six national republics within Yugoslavia (Macshane, 2011).
The constitution of 1974 brought all entities in a better position (Weller, 2011).
However, the rapidly growing Albanian population leads to increase of the nationalism in Serbia (Luci,
2002). The growing Albanian population was perceived as a threat from Serbs, which also contributed to
increasing the nationalist narrative against Albanians. The relationship between Serbs and Albanians
deteriorated further after the 1981 demonstrations, when Serbia began plans to withdraw Kosovo’s autonomy,
and started propaganda campaigns (Gashi, 2012). Propaganda campaigns in the media against Kosovo
Albanians were described as pressure against Serbs, rapes, destruction of property and even killings from
national hatred. Main propaganda campaigns in Serbia during the 80’s were by representing Albanians as
barbarians who were raping Serbs and Montenegrin women. On the other hand, although most Serbs believe
that police harassment of Albanians thought was wrong; however, they justified their presence, as they believed
that Serbs were being threatened by Albanians (Mostov, 1999). Propaganda campaigns that Kosovo Albanians
were raping Serbian women were not perceived as just a threat to Serbian women; they were perceived as a
threat to the whole Serbian population in Kosovo. Furthermore, the propaganda, which was used by Serbia, was
not just to show that Serbian women were being raped, but also to show Albanian men as beings led by oriental
values, thus they cannot control their libido. Allegations of rape in Kosovo became a “political factor in the
development of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s” (Bracewell, 1996). Representation of Albanian men as a
rapist increased the fear among Serbian women that they will be a rape victim. The figure of Albanians was
portrayed as the rapists of the Serbian nation. Albanian masculinity was challenged by Serbian nationalism.
Reinforcing this figure of rape allegations about actual attempts by Albanians to rape Serbian girls. The important
point in here is that the rape always present just an attempts to do so. A picture of the enemy thus takes shape as an
Albanian who tries to rape Serbian girls but fails in doing. (Salecl, 1997, p. 81)
2
Women in Black are an activist group and antinationalist―antimilitarist network made up of women from different generations
and different ethnic groups. They try to bring visibility to women’s nonviolent resistance to war, nationalism, sexism, militarism,
ethnic homogenization, fundamentalist, xenophobia, homophobia and other forms ofdiscrimination.
80-90’s in Kosovo are known as years of political and juridical oppression towards Albanian population.
However, this decade is also known as a decade of the Albanian resistance in Kosovo. There were two different
types of resistances going on in Kosovo: firstly the nonviolent/pacifist resistance, and then the resistance that
was manifested through armed forces (KLA). The formation of the KLA in the mid-1990’s signaled the return
of the armed resistance that eventually culminated in open warfare and brought the world’s most powerful
alliance into the conflict. Many girls and women participated in KLA; some of them left their studies in order to
become part of KLA. The women who participate in KLA believed that it was necessary for Kosovo to gain its
independence. Women who joined KLA were respected by their local male-comrades. However, Yuval-Davis
(1997) argued that women and men in the military are not homogeneous entities; they are posited differentially
and participate differently in military, as well as in the war. The “normalization” of figure of men as warriors
shows that military is gendered. A woman can be a “good” warrior only if she acts as a man. Women who have
participated in KLA claim to have acted as a real “burre”, which does not denote masculine physical traits,
rather manly characteristics such as the defense of honor. Women have always fulfilled vital and specific roles
in militaries, but have been excluded from the public military domain (Luci, 2002). Constructing the position of
women in the military around the dichotomies of combat/ non-combat and front/ rear positions are results of
ideological constructions of womanhood and manhood in society (Luci 2002). In military, man-valued are
considered as supreme; therefore, as it happened in KLA, women had to prove themselves more than men to
show that they are equal to their male counterparts. On the other hand, men who participated in KLA saw it as
an obligation toward his “wife and children”, which should be his protection.
Being prepared to die for one’s country has been considered to be civic duty, which until relatively
recently has been formally the specific domain of the male citizenship, central in the construction of
masculinities (Vickers, 1998). While women who participate in KLA are perceived as “a woman like a man”,
men are perceived as the hero of the nation.
Gender-Based Violence Against Kosovo Albanians
The ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia was characterized with a large scale of victim of sexual violence. The
torturers choose their victims based on their national and gender identities. Rapes used during the ethnic
conflict in Yugoslavia were a form of “genocidal rape”. However, the fact that genocidal rape has a political
aim does not change the rape victim’s traumatic experience (Hague, 1997). In the recent conflict in Kosovo,
rape has been used almost in the same manner as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Sexual violence in
Yugoslavia has been used as a weapon of warfare. Rape has been tolerated as an inevitable occurrence of war,
an inevitable feature of military conflict like pillage and looting. In the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo,
rape was used as a means of “ethnic cleansing”. Police, soldiers, and paramilitaries raped women throughout
Kosovo; the attacks occurred under a variety of circumstances. The most common circumstances that emerged
from the testimonies of victims of rape and sexual violence and from corroborating accounts provided by
eyewitnesses were rapes in women’s homes, rape during flight from the country, and rape while in detention
(Luci, 2002). Women victims and eyewitnesses also reported rapes that occurred as soldiers and paramilitary’s
extorted money from Kosovo’s attempting to flee the country. However, up until now there has not been any
serious investigation about the number of sexual survives during the Kosovo war. And the number of raped
women during the Kosovo war, which is assumed to be around 20,000, has never been proven. Actually, this
number has been used in public and political discourse after the World Health Organization report was
published, which stated that organizations counted around 20,000-raped women during the Kosovo war (World
Health Organization Kosovo, 2000).
Sexual violence against Albanian women in Kosovo escalated after the first week of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) bombings (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2000). This particular timeline shows
that rape is used as revenge tools against Albanian ethnic group, because the body of a woman represents the
honor of entire Albanian society. Human Rights Watch (2000) had documented that rapes in Kosovo were not
rare and isolated acts committed by individuals, but rather used deliberately as an instrument to terrorize the
civilian population.
Raped women in Kosovo find it very difficult to talk about their experience, due to the fact that Kosovo is
still very patriarchal society. As Helena Smith (2000) claimed:
for rape is not a word that Kosovo women will ever use. This is not Bosnia; there is no cosmopolitan Sarajevo. There
is only provincial Pristine. In the villages and hamlets, where the Yugoslav police, military and Serb paramilitaries
evidently ran amok, rape has yet to enter their ancient lexicon. (p. 1)
In Kosovo, it is easy to speak for women who have been raped during the war in Bosnia, by hiding the reality
that took place in Kosovo. Women in Kosovo became voiceless about their stories; therefore, they try to
describe their reality by exemplifying the rape of Bosnian women. While raped women have little support in
their community, they lose their “purity”, raped men are considered only to give up their masculinity. Raped
men are feminized; they are not considered “real men” anymore. Women who are raped or sexually assaulted
tend to hide this as a sacrifice for the nation. As it has been argued before, violence against women is not
restricted to war; it is known that its roots are well established in peaceful times and thus the use of sexual
violence against women in times of war cannot be understood without understanding preexisting socio-cultural
dynamics (Luci, 2002).
Nevertheless, it is significant to understand how rape is used as a strong weapon during the armed conflict.
Moreover, it is important to understand a position of Albanian women who have been raped during the Kosovo
conflict. They are excluded from their family, because in the Albanian culture rape is not perceived as violence,
but rather seen just as sex. In Islamic tradition, for a woman to be raped means that “she has become an outside
in her own family and community” (Snyder, Gabbard, May, & Zulcic, 2006, p. 190). Women in Kosovo were
raped to be humiliated and subjugate, but foremost to make it less likely that they will ever return to their
homes. It is noted that many cases of rape are unreported, due to cultural values concerning sexual violence and
the stigmatization of victims. As it is used in primordial nationalism, rape occurs as a way to “clean” women
ethnically, by forcing her to give birth to a child with a mixed ethnicity and thus taking away the ethnic men’s
ability to “produce” the nation (Luci, 2002, p. 2).
Gender and Nationalism in Post-conflict Kosovo and Serbia

After the conflict, the successor countries of Yugoslavia entered the period of transition to democracy.
Nevertheless, women’s position during the transition to democracy did not change in practice. However, as
Salecl (1994) argued in her book that “the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe did not bring about
emancipation for all the people: Women are forced to accept even more in the way of patriarchal roles than
they had under the socialist regime” (p. 113). Post-conflict countries of Yugoslavia became more attached to
their traditional and religious values.
Many authors agree that societies recovering from oppression or violent conflict need legal and restorative
approaches, in addressing different levels and dimensions of truth and justice. Truth is the ultimate necessity in
post-conflict countries. If members of one side assert truth that is ignored by the other, their assertion is hardly
a mark of reconciliation, because the truth needs to be shared in indication of some degree of reconciliation
(Fischer, 2011). On the other hand, justice is needed as those who have suffered oppression or atrocities seek
redress (Fischer, 2011).
Building Gender Roles in Serbia
Gender in/equality in Serbia is one of the main issues of contemporary Serbian society. The mechanisms
for the reproduction of the hierarchal relations are deeply immersed in the social structure. Re/construction of
Serbian identity, which began in the late 1980 and intensified during the Slobodan Milosevic regime, had a
negative influence on rebuilding gender roles/identities. The Serbian Orthodox Church supported the violence
of the Milosevic regime in the hope in the creation of the “Greater Serbia”.
The end of Milosevic’s rule was hailed as the rebirth of “democratic” Serbia, and re/normalization of
relations with the rest of Europe. The removal of Milosevic did not represent revolution (in contrast with
expectations), but rather the continuation. The influence of the Orthodox Church in national politics grew in
2004 when Vojislav Kostunica became Prime Minister of Serbia. Kostunica had close relations with the
Serbian Orthodox Church. Under Kostunica’s leadership, the Serbian Parliament passed the Law on Churches.
“The Law on Churches not only gives the SOC extraordinary legal rights and legally legitimizes the church by
recognizing it as historically connected to Serbian culture, but also potentially puts a financial strain on national
and local governments” (Zajovic & Mahuron, 2011, p. 3). Christianity is seen as a very important characteristic
of the Serbian nation, which has always brought cohesion and unification. SOC played and continues to play a
crucial cultural and political role in Serbian society.
Yet, gender has played a critical role in construction of the national identity not only in the nation-building
process, but also in the context of EU accession when the new notions of national identity based on the
principles of liberal pluralism and tolerance emerged. Normative conceptions of gender played a central role
even in the cases where national identities are constructed on the basis of liberal pluralism and human rights.
Nevertheless, the cultural logic of nationalism that instrumentalized particular norms was greatly supported by
SOC (Kahlina, 2013).
However, the Women in Black was great opposition against nationalist groups in Serbia. The Women in
Black has organized different educational programs in order to increase the awareness of gender equality.
These educational activities had a clear impact on creating a critical attitude among women toward the political
misuse of religion, the Serbian Orthodox Church and certain traditional rituals. The Serbian Orthodox Church
refused to have any contact with Women in Black and criticized their activities. Women in Black faced
frequent attacks by non-state actors and fascist organizations, as well as attempts by state institutions to
criminalize the network. For instance,
spokesman of the counter-terrorist unit of the Ministry of Police Radomir Počuča (on March 25th 2014) encourage
hooligans in his Facebook status to attack with Women in Black, following the commemoration of the 15th anniversary of
war crimes of Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanians. (Zajovic, 2014, p. 3)
Building Gender Roles in the Post-conflict Kosovo

Gender identities in Kosovo have been reconstructed and reconfigured through the national institution and
international organizations (Krasniqi, 2007). Kosovo is under UN protection since the following of 1990
conflict. Reconstruction of social, economic, political, and cultural under UN protection had an enormous
impact on restructuring gender roles (Krasniqi, 2007). Nevertheless, since 1999, the majority of the work done
in Kosovo has ignored gender perspective. They mainly have dealt with the origins and conduct of the Kosovo
war and with the nature of post-conflict international rule (Krasniqi, 2007). Women’s war, experiences,
particularly the reality of raped women have been absent from public discussions in Kosovo. Nationalist project
and memory entrepreneurship in Kosovo was based on war memories, where men are basically the main actors.
The reality of raped women is hidden from public discourse, since it has potential to destroy the honor of
Albanian masculinity.
During the 2014, Kosovo started the collection of signatures for a petition to pressure the United Nations
to investigate rapes that took place in Kosovo during the war. The petition was a reaction towards the local
institutions that did not show any support towards raped women since the end of the war. The petition was not
end up unsuccessful.
The president of the Republic of Kosovo, Mrs. Atifete Jahjaga, has decreed the establishment of the
National Council for the Survivors of Sexual Violence during the War on March 5, 2014. The Council
contributed to changing the discourse positively regarding the sexual survivors. However, the main discourses
on women’s rights, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming in Kosovo confirm that gender constructions is
an on-going process (Krasniqi, 2013). Instead of dealing with a past, the political decision-makers in Kosovo
have only focused on looking towards the future. There has been lack of adequate mechanisms to deal with the
past and to provide a better sense of social justice. The post-war situation in Kosovo has provided empirical
evidence that post-conflict reconstruction cannot happen without addressing “the women question”. It seems
that politics of post-conflict Kosovo are based on the perception that only men fought for liberation of Kosovo,
thus they own all the political rights. In the post-conflict Kosovo, there is marginalization of women from
political life, which is ironic, since women have fought for the liberation of Kosovo just like men have.
Patriarchal norms in Kosovo society became even stronger after the war. After the war, the
re/traditionalization of the society was apparent. Usually in post-socialist and post-communist societies, there is
a phenomenon of returning to their traditional values. Re/traditionalization means reconstruction of gender and
sexual roles in society. Women’s participation in state-building process has been minimal because it has failed
to challenge hierarchical power relationship, reinforcing tradition notion of femininity. Nevertheless, women
have continued to be secondary actors in the Kosovo nation-building process. Re/traditionalization of Kosovo’s
society has been challenged with the desire of reconstruction of Kosovar Albanian national identity as
Western/European. It seems that Kosovo’s national identity is positioned between re/traditionalization and
Westernization paradox. This paradox of Kosovo Albanian identity becomes even more apparent, when “the
public face of the nation has to be the Western women with secular look, while in the private realm she has to
be a good mother, daughter and sister” (Krasniqi, 2013, p. 4).
The image of male heroes, particularly after Kosovo conflict, has structured and shaped national collective
memory. On the other hand, it has narrowed women’s experiences and roles where the image of dedicated,
suffering mother emerged as the main national image (Guisa, 2014). Women in Kosovo’s society are not
treated as subjects; they are treated more as “property” of someone. While Kosovo’s nation-building process is
based on men suffering during the Kosovo conflict, women are imagined as “strong” mothers who have
sacrificed their sons/fathers/husbands for national liberation. During the Kosovo conflict, women have been
encouraged to participate in KLA. However, post-conflict period in Kosovo shows how a society dominated by
patriarchal values accomplished to return women in their “private” sphere. Considering the amount of
memorials male statues with the weapons have been circulated in all internal and international media, it has had
a great impact on creating the image that women that did not have a stake in Kosovo’s liberation (Kosovo’s
Women Network, 2011). National project in Kosovo is based on creating memories of the male scarifications
during the war.
The Solidarity Between Serbian and Kosovo Women

Ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia became the cradle of systematic rapes mostly toward women. Hence,
since rape is used as a weapon of war, I would argue that gender justice should be an integral part of social
justice. However, the issue of raped women during the armed conflict has been ignored and excluded from
reconciliation process. Reconciliation must be accompanied by acknowledgement of the past, the acceptance of
responsibility and steps towards re-building trust. Solidarity among women has a significant importance
(particularly in Yugoslavia) in, protecting women’s identity from patriarchal/male dominated nationalism. An
accurate number of crimes committed against women should be provided, because the institutional legal system
does not satisfy justice, at the neither international nor national level. Political elites of the countries of former
Yugoslavia invest effort in getting around justice for their personal political interests.
Women in all successor countries of former Yugoslavia have suffered, although not in the same magnitude.
The network of women in Sarajevo-Belgrade and Pristina was powerful even during the war (Women in Black,
1999). Women who were against Milosevic regime and his oppressive policy were seen as a Serbian enemy
(Zajovic, 2014).
The women’s peace coalition is comprised of the Kosovo women’s network and the Women in Black
Network―and groups from Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Italy, Spain, Israel, etc. (Zajovic, 2014). This
initiative was a result of solidarity, support, as well as cooperation between women from Serbia and Kosovo.
Application of Resolution 1325 in the former Yugoslavia countries led to a better understanding of the
sufferings that women went through, as well as open the new spaces for cross-national women’s solidarity.
Reconciliation between women is significant in order to achieve solidarity that has been harmed from
nationalisms, wars, and propagandas. Reconciliation must be accompanied by acknowledgment of the past, the
acceptance of responsibility and steps towards re/building trust.
Conclusion
The subordination of the women’s position in the nationalism gives us a clear picture of how Serbian and
Albanian women suffered during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Women’s bodies become the target of the
nationalist propagandas between Serbians and Albanians. As we analyzed the terminology, which was used
historically in nationalist discourse in the context of building the nation and nation states, it appeared how it
was based on masculinity, whereas women played a passive or a symbolic role in nationalism. This passive and
symbolic role was determined by male domination.
The brutality of sexual violence, which was apparent during the breakup of Yugoslavia, was the
consequence of nationalism, which rose radically in the beginning of the 90’s. Woman’s political and civil
rights, which were guaranteed during the socialist Yugoslavia, were violated. Systematic rape was used as a
weapon during the armed conflict in the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The significant importance of
the rape during the wartime period is transformation of individual bodies into social bodies, as it is seen, for
example, in genocide rapes or ethnic cleansing.
Since the body of women represents the moral of the society as a whole, it is used to demoralize and
destroy the enemy. Moreover, it is used to terrorize, displace the local population, to force the birth of children
of mixed ethnic descent.
The power that rapist hold allows them to torture and attack or inferior the victim. However, women in
Kosovo were raped not just to humiliate and subjugate, but also to make it less likely that they will ever return
to their homes. It is noted that many cases of rape go unreported, due to cultural values concerning sexual
violence and the stigmatization of victims. As it is used in primordial nationalism, the purpose of rape was to
“clean” women by mixing the ethnicity of the child that will be given birth to, and thus takes away the men’s
ability to “produce” the nation. Serbian police, paramilitary forces against Albanian women, used genocidal
rape. Albanian women have been excluded from their family since the rape is not perceived as violence but as
sex in the Kosovo community. Raped women in Kosovo find it difficult to talk their rape experience. They try
to describe their reality by putting forward the Bosnian raped women. The society, which is constructed in
accordance with patriarchal values, pushed Kosovo women to bear the guilt of being raped during the conflict.
Both Serbia and Kosovo are in the new period of nation-building process. There is no abrupt cut-off
between conflict and post-conflict period in the successor countries of Yugoslavia. Survivors of the conflict are
traumatized and trauma which occurs is generally gendered. Moreover, the transitional justice in these countries
is not based on gender sensitivity. The subordinate position of women in political life remains the same even
after the conflict. More precisely, there is the continuation of patriarchy and masculinity in the present system.
The women’s sufferings during the conflict are ignored by the male leaders, which also shows the lack of
solidarity of men towards women.
The whole experience of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia appeared to show that the system is against the
women. However, the post-conflict period is against women and women’s rights. Women’s sufferings during
the conflict are not recorded and seen as the obstacles to peace building-process. The women’s rights, which
are ignored during and after the conflict, could be solved just with women’s solidarity. Women’s solidarity
should fight against nationalism and militarism, which objectified the women’s body. War did not solve
anything in the successor countries of Yugoslavia; it just left behind the victims of war. The strategy, which
was used in wartime, is built in peacetime.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.03.002
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Belarusian Identity in the Post-colonial Labyrinths
Iryna Shumskaya
Belarusian Enlightenment League of America, New York, USA
The paper focuses on an understudied aspect of the Belarusian identity. The special attention is paid to the key role
of patterns in a collective consciousness, which determine the direction of human behavior and further development.
Some typical mental stereotypes of modern Belarusians are analyzed in the context of Post-Soviet worldview. The
paper emphasizes that the Belarusian society needs to define a clear basis of national idea, language, symbols,
values, and traditions. This sphere becomes the place of power struggle today. The current colonial expansion by
more powerful states is going now on more refined scheme than the previous primitive armed intervention, namely
through cultural expansion and economic dependence of neighboring weaker countries. Interrelations between
Russia and Belarus today are a vivid example. It is necessary to understand that the “Russian World”, that
Kremlin’s propaganda offers to modern neighboring nations, will hold only a dictatorship, militarism, repression,
and suppression of freedom. Today this is the main challenge not only for Belarusian identity but for its
independence as well.
Keywords: Belarus, protests, nationalism, identity, post-Soviet matrix
Introduction
For a long time, Belarus was ignored by politicians and the international academic community or
perceived as a part of the post-Soviet area. But the situation has been changed after the protests against the fake
presidential election in 2020 with its brutal crackdowns by security forces which have seen thousands detained,
with hundreds severely beaten or tortured, and dozen killed. Possessing the most varied and imposing array of
hard and soft power ever assembled in history, the most powerful world leaders nevertheless find themselves
oddly irrelevant and with a sharply circumscribed ability to influence events in Belarus. It happens, in particular,
because the West does not want to get an escalation of conflict with Russia and treats Belarus as a buffer zone.
Belarus has a millennium of history, but the present name of the country and its borders appeared only
quite recently. A Belarusian narrative of history goes back to the Polack and Turau principalities of the 10th
century. Later, they and other lands became parts of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, which subsequently united
with the Kingdom of Poland in the 16th century.
Balto-Scandinavian elements played an important role in Slavonic ethnogenesis of Belarusians. The
legendary trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks, which went down the Dnyapro (Dnieper) River from
Scandinavia to Greece, promoted the development of trade and the interpenetration of cultures (Shumskaya,
2015, p. 5).
In the 18th century, the great European powers partitioned the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The
present day conception of Belarus and its territory first appeared during the Russian Empire’s rule over the
Iryna Shumskaya, Ph.D., Belarusian Enlightenment League of America, New York, USA.
114 BELARUSIAN IDENTITY IN THE POST-COLONIAL LABYRINTHS
lands, an event that over the last two centuries resulted in massive Russia influence over nearly all aspects of
Belarusian life. It was only in the 19th century that the Russian introduced the name “Belarus” as a formal
designation for the territory.
Just as in the 1920s, in the 1990s Belarus was swept by a new wave of cultural emancipation which
emphasized the distinctiveness of national culture. Official state and national symbols which referred to
pre-Soviet Belarusian history were created and approved (the state coat of arms, Pahonia [“Pursue”], was the
coat of arms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and of the Belarusian People’s Republic in 1918, and a
white-red-white flag as a state heraldry legacy from the Belarusian People’s Republic of 1918-1919).
Nevertheless, Belarus, in contrast to, for example, Ukraine, has never consolidated a strong national
identity despite Belarus is far more homogeneous ethnically and linguistically than is Ukraine. The majority of
Belarusians still have a rather weak national identity. Instead, the territory and the state itself became the main
subject of affiliation for them. Inside Belarus, where alternative political subjects and civil society have been
destroyed, no strong advocacy group that might propose an alternative identity can effectively function or push
their agenda.
Even in August-September 2020, sending a clear message against the active involvement of Russian
authorities into Belarus’s domestic affairs or any military intervention not wanting to repeat either the Crimea
or Donbas scenario, many protesters support the continuation of a friendly relationship with Russia including
close economic relations and cooperation. Such vision was also expressed by the members of the Coordination
Council and members of S. Tsikhanouskaya’s team. The same rhetoric we can observe from the teams of other
so-called new opposition leaders: V. Babaryka, V. Tsapkala, etc. Moreover, these politicians called the names
of various political prisoners in Belarus avoiding paying attention to national-oriented protesters.
Despite of the understanding of the importance of sovereignty, the majority of the population of Belarus
still do not want to sever relations with Russia, which just demonstrates the main threats to its sovereignty. The
part of society that did not support the hard anti-Russian rhetoric (but at the same time did not mind Belarusian
national independence at all and could be democratically minded in principle) left the ranks of those mobilized
by Belarusian nationalism, which often meant abandoning politics. But the top place on the list of the reasons
for the failure of nationalist political forces is occupied by the national self-consciousness of the Belarusian
people themselves, or, to be precise, by its weakness.
A Denationalized Nation
Basically, identity can be described as the entirety of how we as individuals or a group view or perceive
ourselves as unique from others.
As Tadeusz Paleczny pointed (2008),
When we use the notion of identity, we always put it next to an adjective; the identity can be individual, collective,
ancestral, family, tribal, caste, ethnic, national, national, civilization, religious, territorial, regional, etc. The socio-cultural
dimension shapes these elements of identity, which are connected with the sphere of values, norms, symbols (language
included), aesthetics, morality, and group bonds. Cultural separateness, the difference of values, norms, behavior, even
desires, is a reflection of the historically different processes of the shaping of social bonds and also of the identity of
individuals. (p. 354)
In the book titled A Denationalized Nation David Marples shows that nationalism did not become a new
ideology of Belarusians after the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and was not able to take the role of a
BELARUSIAN IDENTITY IN THE POST-COLONIAL LABYRINTHS 115
consolidating force of Belarusian society. Marples explains it by the alienation of Belarusians from their own
national idea, which resulted from decades of the Soviet period that became an obstacle on the way to
democratic society (Marples, 1999, p. 52).
George Sanford sees post-communist Belarus as a “combining weak or divided national consciousness
with an insignificant experience of independent statehood” (Sanford, 1997, p. 227). Ed Jocelyn says that in
Belarus “national consciousness is a highly problematic concept”, and that “Belarusian national identity is
fragmented, and its roots lead in different directions” (Jocelyn, 1998, p. 78).
Dawisha and Parrot insist (1994):
Belarus has a shortage of ingredients critical to the construction of a durable nation-state: a vigorous sense of its
distinctive national identity. […] The Belarusian case demonstrates the difficulty of basing a new state on a conception of
the nation as a sovereign people when the core population’s sense of ethnic distinctiveness is comparatively undeveloped.
(p. 75)
From this perspective, existence of an independent Belarusian state seems an exceptional case. As Thomas
Winderl writes (1999), “True enough, Belarus still exists as a sovereign state. But Belarus is definitely an
example where an attempt to establish a strong national identity failed within a short period of time” (p. 94).
Pavel Loika considered the multicultural way of being as the historical destiny of Belarus (2001):
While taking into account the dramatic character of Belarusian history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
associated with our Fatherland being torn between Warsaw and St. Petersburg, between Catholicism and the Orthodox
faith, we should not abjure our ancestors’ achievements. There is no sense in considering only texts written in Belarusian
to be “national”. There are no grounds for granting our neighbors or anyone else the Belarusian cultural values created in
Polish, Russian, and Latin. In general, Belarus both today and in the remote past has had a multiethnic and multilingual
character.
According to Ihar Lialkou (2002),

modern Belarusian society is deeply split. One part of our society is so radically separated from the other that if a
casual observer were to overhear conversations and read articles by the two groups, it could be concluded that they live in
different worlds. Of the parameters that identify a nation, place of residence is the only thing these two groups have in
common. (p. 12)
They differ by language, their historical memory, identity (despite the fact that both call themselves
Belarusians, the meaning is completely different), relations with other nations (dose and distant), their vision of
the country’s future development, etc. It sometimes seems that these two groups would feel more comfortable
in two different countries.
So being between traditional ethnic and civic approaches of identity, Belarusians try to demonstrate “the
third way” and “the meeting point of civilizations”, which aimed to accommodate others and accept them as a
part of its own identity.
Belarusian Language as a Sign of National Identity

Language policy in Eastern Europe has always been deeply connected to politics and to national identity.
This is also the case in Belarus, though the development of Belarus is quite different from the development of
other Eastern European countries. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, former Soviet States were left
with the task of building a national identity to replace their Soviet one. The new question of national identity
seemed, in the case of many of these former Soviet States, to hinge on questions of language. Belarus stands
apart from the other former Soviet States in that Russian remains dominant language.
In 1986, a team of Belarusian intellectuals even wrote a letter to Gorbachev emphasizing their view on the
importance of the Belarusian language for the integrity of the Belarusian identity:
Language is the soul of a nation, the supreme manifestation of its cultural identity, the foundation of its true spiritual
life. A nation lives and flourishes in history while its language lives. With the decline of the language, culture withers and
atrophies, the nation ceases to exist as a historical organism. (Letters to Gorbachev, 1987; via Brown, 2005).
Initially, like other nationalist groups in the former Soviet States, Belarusian nationalist movements used
language as a means of mobilization, and in January of 1990, at the urgings of the “oppositional elite”
Belarusian was made the official language of the republic in spite of general disapproval among the Belarusian
Soviet authorities. However, the nationalist movement began to lose momentum, and when Belarus did
ultimately declare independence from the Soviet Union. Mark Beissinger (2002, p. 123) indicates that the
August 1991 declaration of independence was largely an acquiescence to external pressures on the part of the
Belarusian Soviet authorities and that “failure to recognize Belarusian independence and continued defense of
the integrity of the USSR (a position that the Belarusian leadership had taken up to that point) would have led
to a gaping strategic opening for oppositional elites”. Prior to this declaration of independence, the majority of
Belarusians had voted to preserve the USSR in the referendum held by M. Gorbachev in March of 1991. As
such, unlike in other Soviet States, independence was achieved due to external pressures, and not due to the
nationalist tides so characteristic of the other Soviet countries.
During last 25 years the Belarusian language was losing its importance as a sign of national identity of
Belarusians. The share of those who advocate Belarusian to be the only official language in Belarus is almost
equal to the share of those who want to see Russian as the only official language.
The Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) asked the question on
differences between Belarusians and Russians in their surveys. Dynamics of answers since 2002 was essentially
insignificant (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Dynamics of answering the question: “How Belarusians differ from Russians?”, % (more than one answer is
possible).
National identity even in the most liberal interpretation includes realization of own singularity,
distinguishability from others, even those, who are very close and nice, a realization of own collective “us”,
which does not include others, even if the attitude towards them is very good.
In the surveys conducted between 2002 and 2006 the most popular variant of national identity’s markers
was the Belarusian language. However, you may notice, how from one survey to another it was losing its
ground as a quality which differentiates Belarusians and Russians. In the last survey it yielded the palm to
differences in culture, traditions, and history.
Many researchers noted the role of the Belarusian language as a means of “symbolic communication”, as a
sign of national identity. But as a matter of fact, for Belarusians language is not the main identifier of their
difference from Eastern neighbors anymore. However, this process did not lead to a weakening of realization of
differences in general. This happened at the cost of strengthening of other identifiers such as culture, traditions,
and history. As a result, Belarusians began to realize that they are different from their Eastern neighbors to even
a greater extent.
According to the surveys made by IISEPS, those, who think that Belarusians differ from Russians by
psychology and appearance, are ready to resist an armed invasion to the greatest extent. Among those, who
suppose, that the difference is in the language, the share of those, who are ready to fight, is the same as among
those, who see the difference in culture and traditions. However, among those, who emphasize linguistic
difference, the share of those who would greet an invasion is the lowest. It is quite natural, that respondents,
who see no difference between Belarusians and Russians, are the least prone to resist an intervention from
Russia.
Correlation between the characteristic under study and preferred status of official languages is quite
enigmatic. As it was possible to suppose, adherents of Belarusian language officiality are most prone to the
rejection of Russian intervention. However, the typical characteristic of the adepts of Russian monolingualism,
despite the expectations, is not the readiness to greet “polite people” with flowers, but a contrast
attitude—among them the number of those who are ready to adapt to the situation is the smallest, while the
number of adherents and opponents of resisting is nearly equal. Indifferent people are the most inclined to
greeting such course of events (IISEPS, 2014).
In general, the linguistic repertoire of Belarusian society should be analyzed, not in terms of vacillation
between two languages (Russian and Belarusian), but as a component of general post-colonial reality.
In the Trap of Post-Soviet Matrix

The first years after the declaration of independence in 1991 was the worst period of the economic crisis
that began in the late 1980s in the former USSR. Meanwhile pro-Soviet and pro-Russian forces, primarily
grouped in so-called “force structures” (such as KGB) and who enjoyed strong support from outside, did not
abandon hope to change the trajectory of history and involved themselves in incessant, secret and open, work
among the population. This “work” was most gratefully accepted by the older generation, Soviet veterans of
World War II and pensioners, for whom the USSR was the country of their youth and the unexpected changes
brought only poverty and want (Ohana, 2007, p. 19). It is worth noting that at that time those people made up
almost one third of the working population. All of these factors were the main reason for the victory of
Aliaksandar Lukashenka in the first free presidential elections in 1994.
Majority of Belarusian population still have a mentality burdened by significant residues of the Soviet era,
which have shaped it decisively. Importantly, this mentality is not rooted in historically relevant
self-identification of Belarusian people with national awareness and Belarusian as their mother tongue. Their
self-identification owns heavily to the mentality of Soviet, Russian-speaking apolitical citizen, living in the
BSSR and counting upon a certain level of social needs. Weak and by no means self-evident national history,
permanent state of occupation by foreign powers and only incipient and episodic experience of state
independence (in 1918)—all these important moments, in a certain sense even decisive factors of the entire
Belarusian politics, including the contemporary situation.
When discussing the culture sector in Belarus one is immediately confronted with an important duality,
there are two culture sectors in Belarus. On the one hand, there is the “official” or state-sponsored culture sector.
This sector includes commercial and state-funded culture producers that serve the neo-Soviet state ideology, in
other words, the prolongation of Lukashenka’s dictatorship. On the other hand, there is what is increasingly
referred to as the “counter-culture”. This is the independent cultural sector and includes all forms of cultural
production that do not conform to the “official” line proposed by the state culture sector or that dare to
demonstrate critical liberty and freedom of expression. While the official culture is associated with propaganda
and servility, the independent “counter-culture” is associated with resistance and change. And, while some
incidences of overlap or inter-penetration of these culture sectors can be observed, they exist at two extremes
and are diametrically opposed to each other. In the understanding of those involved, the official culture is
protected but servile. The counter-culture is suppressed, but free.
The official culture can be identified by several characteristics. In the first place, it is a product of the
official ideology of the Lukashenka’s regime. This has its roots in Soviet pan-Slavism. In the 1990s the regime
attempted to justify its efforts to create a state union between Belarus and Russia through the active promotion
of Russian language culture and Soviet iconography, the ethnic affinity of the Belarusian nation with the
Russian nation and the active suppression of Belarusian language culture. The nation building project has been
focused on the creation of a Belarusian identity in the image of the leader and has not led to any rehabilitation
of Belarusian language culture. Rather the opposite. Those who favor working through the Belarusian language
are suppressed and marginalized.
Lovaz and Medich noted (2006),
It’s clear that the official Belarusian culture is morally corrupt and moribund. Typical products of the official culture
include folk culture (folk dancing, music and arts and crafts), soap opera style TV series, Russian language “chick-lit”
style reading material (romance novels, etc), mass pop entertainment, especially Russian language pop-music and, of
course, the production of the state media. Importantly, the official culture promotes “home grown” Russian language
cultural production, mostly in the field of pop-music and entertainment. This should be distinguished from the importation
of mass cultural and especially entertainment products from Russia. As one respondent put it, the Belarusian regime a.
produces its own ideologically charged cultural and entertainment products in the Russian language and b. uses the
imported Russian mass cultural products to “cover the gaps” that appear due to the insufficiency of the domestic cultural
production. (p. 46)
At the same time, the counter-culture is everything which the official culture is not: dynamic, modern, free,
experimental, and creative. It is characterized by the use of the Belarusian language, its attitude of resistance to
the regime (through which is has become intimately bound up with the democratic opposition) and its value
based approach to its production, including its European outlook. Its typical products include rock music and
literature in the Belarusian language, innovative, experimental contemporary art and theatre, satire and a variety
of forms of political comedy in the conditions when freedom of speech and expression is not respected.
Post-Soviet Aesthetics vs. the Search for Distinctivity

Belarusian society is weighed down with different taboos (about politics, religion, history, Belarusian
identity, human relations including sexuality, and so on). The counter-culture tries through its art to address
these taboos. In so doing, it becomes taboo of and in itself—the simple act of doing something which is
considered “non-traditional” or outside of mainstream norms makes it suspect, something to speak about in
whispers. In practical terms, for the visual arts, other related genres and in music, this means to engage in
aesthetic conflict—to confront the post-Soviet aesthetic with its own moral bankruptcy and to destroy it in the
eyes of its audiences and to open up to modern and foreign influences from the contemporary art scene.
In this time of polarization, some cultural actors continue to believe they can maintain a neutral position,
neither supporting nor opposing the Belarusian regime. But, any artist that has attempted to position themselves
as independent or as “apolitical” has sooner or later been faced with having to choose between “towing the
party line” and some form of punishment. An excellent example of this is pop-culture, which in many contexts
is considered as mere entertainment, with no political value or objective. But, in Belarus it has become an
important political instrument in the hands of the regime, which uses it to present its own version of reality to
the masses.
Sometimes Belarusian artists choose a provocative performance art that often takes form of extreme acts
as their political language. They are depicting the growing protest movement against the autocratic leader
Alexander Lukashenka amid widespread allegations of election fraud and police brutality.
For example, in February 2020 the Belarusian artist Alexei Kuzmich burned his installation “540”, which
he exhibited at the National Center for Contemporary Arts, blindfolded, took off his shirt and pierced his bare
chest with a pin with the Belarusian Republican Youth Union badge. He timed his action to coincide with the
entry into force of amendments to the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Countering Extremism”. In August
2020, on Election Day, Kuzmich held a rally dedicated to the presidential election. It took place at a school in
Minsk, where one of the polling stations was located. Kuzmich left the voting booth wearing a loincloth. On his
chest, he had a ballot paper with a phallic symbol drawn on it and stood in a cross position. After the elections,
Kuzmich was blocked in his apartment and detained. On September 1, 2020, he left Belarus and currently lives
in France (BelarusFeed, 2021).
Rufina Bazlova, a Belarusian artist based in Prague, has been using the red-white color scheme and
concept of traditional embroidery known as vyshivanky to create protest art that she posts on Instagram. She
told Czech Radio that vyshivanky is both “a coded history of the people” and a way “to ward off bad spirits”
(Kishkovsky, 2020).
Today, Belarusians live in an independent state called Belarus. But the authorities together with a part of
the new opposition have long sought integration with Russia, present Soviet history and morality, as well as,
Russian mass entertainment, as Belarusian culture, and make all this an obligatory tenet of the state ideology.
Modern Belarus is characterized by a strong alliance with Russia and a weak national identity, a
Soviet-style economy, and a Soviet-era mentality among the bulk of its population and elites. So far, Russian
support has provided the regime with stability but has also weakened its motivation to democratize and build a
competitive economy (Shraibman, 2018, p. 28). So Belarusian identity is still unformed on the one hand and
based on the post-Soviet mentality of the population on the other hand. But, nevertheless, the effectiveness of
the use of cultural methods and forms (theatre, films, literature, music) for the purposes of civic education is
doubtless.
Conclusion
The idea of nations as victims of communist and authoritarian regimes is at the center of collective
memory and has become a characteristic feature of Eastern European national discourses, one that appeared
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Identity played a major role in these anti-imperial movements, and those
identities were often self-consciously anti-imperial.
Despite the weakness of national identity, Belarusians should be seen as an Eastern European nation that
has more in common with Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine. In this context, the history of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania and the Commonwealth of Poland become significant in the creation of Belarusian traditions and the
foundational elements of Belarusian identity. During these historical periods, Belarusians had more in common
with Poles and Ukrainians than with Russians, which underscores that Belarusians are a European people and
nation, one with a European history.
The Belarusian government may be concerned about what they see as a pressure from the East, but they
will not run the risk of restricting access to Russian TV channels, nor are they keen to balance them with other
information sources. Though they believe they have the situation under control, this close connection between
Belarus and Russia is a real problem, especially now, when Kremlin officially supports illegitimate Belarusian
president.
The only strong ideological alternative to Putin’s “Russian World” idea is the nationalism promoted two
decades ago by Belarusian opposition. It turns out that this nationalism is a viable concept after all, despite new
leaders still did not include it into its own rhetoric.
References
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.03.003
D DAVID PUBLISHING
The Role of Traditional Leaders in Governance Structure

Through the Observance of Taboos in Cape Coast, Kumasi and
Teshie Societies of Ghana
Emmanuel Abeku Essel

National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
The specific objective of the study was to identify the role of traditional leaders in Cape Coast, Kumasi and Teshie
in the governance structure of their societies through the observance of taboos. It was to have a good understanding
of what constitutes governance and good governance in the context of the indigenous set-up; to assess the current
nature of governance related taboos; and to evaluate the impact of contemporary society on taboos and the
consequence of any impact of contemporary society on the taboos on indigenous governance. The research was
guided by Creswell’s knowledge on research paradigm to describe a researcher’s philosophical view and
conceptualization of reality. The research adopted mixed method approach in achieving the objective of the
research by obtaining empirical data for the research questions. Two sets of instruments were adopted for data
gathering. The first instrument was an interview guide that was used to solicit structured data from the respondents
in order to elicit more candid and objective replies. The second instrument was a questionnaire, which was used in
order to gather the exact responses relevant to the research from participants. The study found out that traditional
rulers occupy unique position, hence in order to maintain certain standards to please their subjects on whose
authority they rule, they cannot avoid observing taboos. It further showed that the Chieftaincy institution is an
institution that cannot be done away with. It is recommended that both citizens and non-citizens in these traditional
societies should be made to appreciate, respect and observe taboos associated with taboo days as a means to
promote unity, peace and governance.
Keywords: traditional authorities, taboos, governance, societies, observance
Introduction
Chieftaincy is one of the few traditional institutions in Ghana that has still survived despite the influx of
Western cultures and their consequent disregard and contempt for some Ghanaian customs. Traditional African
governing institutions are varied. Chieftaincy is considered as a male dominated sphere in Ghana. Skalnik
(2004) argued that, because chiefs serve as custodians and advocates of the interests of local communities
within the larger political system, chieftaincy can provide the foundation on which to create new mixed
governance systems. Chieftainship systems, for the most part, converge with consensual systems at the
grassroots level. Chiefs at the grassroots level are accountable to chiefs at the higher level and seldom have the
Emmanuel Abeku Essel, PhD Student, Society and Governance Department, National University of Public Service, Budapest,
Hungary.
THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 123
ability to subvert the interests of the nation. Taboos and governance have been accepted as one force in the
sense that a community’s governance cannot be firmly achieved without taboos. Odotei and Hagan (2002)
postulated that if one is installed as a chief, his credibility as a chief may be challenged if the said person does
not swear. Since governance is about legitimacy, the sworn oath gives leadership legitimacy. It follows that his
acts remain legal to the degree that a chief adheres to the oath of office. It is very clear that non-compliance
with the oath of office is similar to breaking a taboo and breaking a taboo is often a violation of the law. As
mentioned earlier, a leader may lose credibility on a violation of any of the laws enshrined in the office oath
and thus will not rule again. The basic laws giving legitimacy and governing the actions of the leader in relation
to the governed have been violated. Elements of good governance are contained in the exchange of taboos in
the chief’s council of state between a chief and the governed by their representatives. Despite the fact that the
idea of good governance is perceived by development actors in various ways, there is increasing agreement that
it includes more than just the government institution itself. The development community is currently pursuing
creative solutions to overcome local development and poverty alleviation problems, decentralization, and local
governance, and increase the efficacy of aid transfer. Local government refers to a polycentric structure in
which a range of players are involved in the decision-making process of local public bodies (Denters, 2011).
Democratic decentralization is also linked to the ideals of governance, such as political engagement,
responsiveness and transparency (Blair, 2000; Smith, 2007).
Traditional law or government has found manifestation in ways such as religious leadership, linear
leadership, extended family leadership, and leadership (Assimeng, 1996; Ray & Reddy, 2003; Bekoe, 2007).
According to Mukyala-Mukiika (1998), there is some form of duality of authority at the local level of
governance. One form of authority consists of people who derive their legitimate right to govern from the fact
that they have been elected and regard the people as a collection of individuals, each with a set of specific
rights. Traditional institutions present the platform on which traditional authorities express their authority.
These institutions in turn form the leadership structures within individual communities. Their roles and
functions ensure that people comply with rules, norms and beliefs. Despite several years of Western domination,
the decisions about governance and sustainable development still rest on traditional institutional concepts
because the powers of traditional authorities are best expressed in these institutions. As has been rightly stated
by Kendie and Guri (2004), the inability to reduce the growing incidence of poverty and underdevelopment
could be attributed to the tendency of formal development organisation’s approach to local knowledge systems
and practices without recourse to including indigenous knowledge.
Traditional authorities in Ghana, however, are referred to as “chiefs” by the generic name (Boaten, 1994;
Ray & Reddy, 2003). Scholars who have enriched our knowledge of traditional rule in Ghana include
Bentsi-Enchil (1971); Fynn (1974); Ollennu (1977); Arhin (1985); Gyekye (1996); Kendie and Guri (2004);
and Odotei and Awedoba (2006). These authors generally agree on two main forms of traditional rule. These
two major classifications are the centralized political system (cephalic societies) and acephalic societies, or
what is described as the 'lost decentralized' political system. Abotchie (2006) suggested that the pre-colonial
indigenous administration in cephalic societies in Ghana was bureaucratic in that there were highly formalized
systems or procedures within the chiefs’ hierarchy. Traditional bureaucracy had elements of decentralization
and citizen participation (Lutz & Linder, 2004). Arhin (1985) argued that “the assumption of these powers put
an end to the traditional states as independent, political communities” (p. 89). As a result, the Sovereign Kings
and other office-holders have been transformed by the European masters into leaders or traditional leaders.
124 THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Governance and the Observation of Taboos

Taboo can be applied in two ways, that is to say, a narrower sense of tradition or solely religious use,
whereas a wider sense reflects its use in socio-economic and political contexts (Boamah, 2015). In a narrow
context, the phrase “a set of religious or religious prohibitions established by the traditional religious authorities
as instruments of moral motivation, guidance and means to protect the sanctity of the sanctuaries and,
nevertheless, the well-being of their worshiping communities” has been tabooed (Boamah, 2015). In Ghana, for
example, some people take a conservationist approach and claim that cultural values and taboos have played a
positive and important role in grassroots cultures and continue to indirectly affect contemporary culture. To
date, some of the taboos have been structured to support the economy and efficiency at the personal and
communal levels (Osei, 2006). To add to the dialogue on the importance of the institution of leadership in
Africa, Abotchie (2006) summarized the positions of leaders in Ghana as leaders, chief priests, agents of
creation, markers of identity, as well as custodians of stool lands and property, and sees these various roles as
embodiments of people’s values, dreams, concerns and ambitions. As a result of democratic governance,
Ghanaian chiefs have lost a large part of their duties to the central government. However, chiefs also have
significant roles to play in Ghanaian communities. In view of the many components of leadership in
maintaining good governance and growth, the institution and its mandates and limitations have been well
enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana since independence. Taboos linked to the leadership
have not been entirely wiped out, but some have been retained, some have been changed, whilst some have
been toned down to please all and sundry in a given community. According to Sarpong (1977), the effects of
breaking the taboo may have a whole civilization and a person, both mystical and physical.
While taboos defy categorisation, it is observed that grouping them is of benefit to the understanding of
taboos. Based on the observations made by Brempong (2006) that taboos were symbols of leadership and Busia
(1968) that taboos influenced the actions of chiefs, it can be inferred that taboos are clearly encapsulated and
include some of the elements of good governance as advocated by the World Bank and used in the governance
of indigenous societies. In alluding to the fact that the life and thought of the African revolve around taboos,
one is not far from right. Governance is one unique area where this is well manifested, where all those who
matter in leadership, such as chiefs, queen mothers, priests, priestesses, and family heads avoid having a
dysfunctional relationship with the supernatural through strict taboo observation. As a consequence of taboos,
such imbalances cause misery not just for the leaders but also for the communities they rule. Africans still
practice and observe elements of their faith, including taboos, despite the decline in values and adherence to
Africa Traditional Religion (ATR). Depending on the perspective from which governance is perceived, this can
differ from the administrative efficiency and the quality of basic services to the population at one end of the
continuum through to ideals of democratic decision-making and participatory growth somewhere in the middle,
and a human rights-based approach to development at the other end. This is mirrored in the way different donor
and support organizations interpret the term. In the sense of this paper, good governance refers to the careful
manner of governing, guiding or directing citizens. While governance was part of Ghanaian cultures, it appears
to the researcher’s best knowledge that the aspect of taboos and governance has been left unattended. Questions
on what is the current essence of governance-related taboos? Are the taboos still being followed? What is their
place in indigenous governance at the moment? What is the influence of modern culture on these taboos? As
not many studies have been carried out using the three research areas, they request to be answered to shed light
on contemporary traditional governance of African societies, such as the Akan, Fante and Ga Societies of
Ghana. This study seeks to identify the role of traditional leaders in governance structure through the
observance of taboos in Cape Coast, Kumasi and Teshie societies of Ghana
Study Area and Methodology

Study Areas
Figure 1. Maps of the Study Areas (Source: Author’s own construct, 2019).
The study was conducted at Cape Coast in the Central Region, Kumasi in the Ashanti Region and Teshie
in the Greater Accra Region. Cape Coast is the capital of the Central Region Cape Coast as shown in Figure 1
is found within Longitudes 1°1′ to 1.41′ W of the Greenwich Meridian and Latitudes 5°20′ N. The Cape Coast
Metropolis has 40,386 households with a total household population of 140,405. With this, 3.5 persons per
household constitute the average household size. Historically, chiefs have been at the forefront of traditional
governance over the years to the satisfaction of many, the effective exercise of their executive, legislative and
judicial functions. The chiefs are the custodians of the land and trust the culture of the people. The future of the
institution is in the hands of the governed, who continue to show respect and trust in the institution in the face
of a number of challenges.
Kumasi on the other hand is bounded on the north by the Brong Ahafo Region, on the east by the Eastern
Region and on the south by the western and central regions. It lies between Latitudes 6°30′ N and 6°45′ N, and
Longitudes 1°35′ W and 1°45′ W. The study area is covered by topographic map sheets 0602A4 and 0602C4,
and covers an area of approximately 55,558.17 hectares (ha). Kumasi is Ghana’s second biggest city. It is a
highly populated town only comparable to Accra (the capital town of Ghana). Between 1990 and 2000, its
population almost tripled to more than a million (Ghana Statistical Service, 2005). Traditional authorities
remain strong in Kumasi, which is the seat of the Asantehene—effectively the king of the Asante. In practical
terms, the main lever of power which the Asantehene possesses is that of land allocation, a process which is
exercised through a network of local chiefs. According to the folk tale, the Ashanti passed from generation to
generation. They became the overlords, who later became the Ashanti/Akan Empire. The Ashanti have been
able to effectively govern their territories through a complex governance system that has taken into account
different aspects of their cultural backgrounds. An example of this would be if a township was captured during
the war, instead of killing or removing the chief from power, the Ashanties would make the losing chief pledge
to their allegiance to the Ashanti kingdom. In the Ashanti culture, a written constitution was established that set
order and customs in stone.
Teshie is a coastal town in the Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipality of the Greater Accra region in Ghana
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2005). Teshie lies west to Ga Mashie, Osu and La and east of Nungua and Tema. It
directly shares borders with La and Nungua. The community is composed of inhabitants from almost every part
of the Ga-Dangme State. Teshie is thus, a community of mixed people with the majority, coming from La. The
rest of the inhabitants are people from Nungua, Tema, Lashibi, Ga Mashie, Osu, and Prampram. This
characteristic of the last Ga town, being a settler-community, is evident in the indigenous names of the
inhabitants in the various principal houses (Wei) that make up the five quarters of Teshie.
Methodology
The study is a mixed method research based on qualitative and qualitative data using semi-structured
interviews. According to Miller and Salkind (2019), case study research requires gathering multiple forms of
data to develop in-depth understanding of an issue. The study focused mostly on chiefs who are the key players
in traditional governance in the study areas as the unit of analysis to ascertain the current developments in the
practice. The use of mixed approaches as distinct from either qualitative or quantitative methodology is
increasing in importance and this technique has been more generally accepted with the publishing of a variety
of texts dealing directly with mixed methodologies (Creswell, 2003; Greene & Caracelli, 1997; Tashakkori &
Teddlie, 2003). Centered on the overall purpose of the analysis and the research priorities established, the
researcher used a mixed method in the case research approach to the factors of taboo and governance in Ghana.
Rocco et al. (2003) indicated that experiments using mixed approaches for this purpose are “explicitly finding
synergistic gains from the integration of both post-positivist and constructivist paradigms. The fundamental
premise is that science is better when it incorporates research paradigms, so a fuller interpretation of human
phenomena is obtained” (p. 21). In this research, a mixed method approach was used as a triangulation to
validate and check quantitative data (from questionnaire surveys and site observations) with qualitative findings
(from interviews). Its purpose was to complement the findings of the questionnaire in situations where the
questions posed during the interviews varied from the questionnaire.
Data Collection and Sampling Techniques
The study used both primary and secondary data. These data were collected in using the structured
interview guide and a questionnaire. The respondents include traditional leaders, traditional
priestesses/priestesses, family heads and community leaders in Cape Coast, Kumasi and Teshie. Using the
snowballing and purposive sampling techniques, the three study areas were divided into smaller areas relative
to the targeted chiefs, priestesses/priestesses, family heads and community leaders. A total of 85 participants
were used for the analysis. The reason for using this technique was that the researcher has been granted the
freedom to pick respondents who, in his view, are sources of appropriate data that will satisfy the objectives of
the analysis (Sarantakos, 1998; Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). The traditional leaders were selected regardless of
the role they hold in the group. With the traditional rulers, the researcher picked all of them from the research
areas in each community, as each of the research areas was of paramount importance with its own Omanhene
(paramount chief). Brempong (2006) argued that it was a taboo that shaped a chief (what he should be). The
chief/king must have an aura of tradition. He must have charm as well as a picturesque figure, too. Since
leadership in these communities is a sacred obligation, all these characteristics cannot be accomplished without
being guided by taboos. Among the traditional priests and priestesses in the research regions, there is a state
priest for each of the traditional councils. Like the chiefs, the heads of the family often protect family property
by mobilizing family members to protect family property, particularly land. They are custodians of all family
land, and in conservative cultures it is a sacred obligation for all forms of property to be properly disposed of
for the good of both the living and future generations.
In line with the study by Bryman (2007), descriptive analysis was utilized. For categorical data, frequencies
and percentages (%) were used to describe each variable for the population. Demographic information from the
questionnaire was analysed using descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages, and where data was
organised into frequency counts and converted into percentages, means and standard deviations were used for the
research questions. But, qualitative data from interviews were grouped thematically and analysed.
Results
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Table 1 shows the ages of the respondents to the questionnaire. None of the respondents for the research
was below 18 years of age. Of the respondents chosen for the research, only 2 (2.4%) were between the ages of
60 and above, 31 (36.5%) were also between ages 20 and 29, 34 (40.0%) were between the ages of 30 and 39,
14 (16.5%) were between 40 and 49 years of age while 4 (4.7 %) were between 50 and 59 years of age. The
below age ranges indicate that all the respondents chosen for the research were matured enough to know the
topic under discussion. It was therefore hoped that the true information would be given due to their maturity.
Out of a total of the 85 respondents chosen for the research, 24 representing 28.2% were junior high school
graduates, 14 representing 16.5% were diploma holders. It is clear from the research that the academic
attainment of the respondent is dominated by people with a degree. The implication here is that if educational
qualification is anything to go by and also if it has a corresponding effect on development, then, it could be said
that the knowledge base of the participants was high.
Table 1
Age of Respondents
Frequency Percentage (%)
20-29 years old 31 36.5
30-39 years old 34 40.0
40-49 years old 14 16.5
Age
50-59 years old 4 4.7
60 years old and above 2 2.4
71-80 years old 1 4.5
MSLC 2 2.4
JHS 24 28.2
SHS 12 14.1
GCE O-level 4 4.7
Educational status
GCE A-level 1 1.2
Diploma 14 16.5
1st degree 25 29.4
Postgraduate 3 3.5
Source: Field Survey (2019)
The respondents had an adult work force with a mean age of 33.42 with the minimum age at 20 and
maximum age at 60 years old. It however had a standard deviation of 926.19. The bulk of the respondents
belonged to the 30-49 years age group (see Table 1). If the distribution is done in terms of “youthful” (20-29
years old), “active” (30-49 years old), and “retiring age” (50-60 years old) groups, it would be seen that only
36.47% respondents fall within the “youthful” age group, 56.47% fall within the “active” age and 7.06% within
the “retiring” age group.
Indigenous Understanding of What Constitutes Governance and Good Governance?
The result in (see Table 2) revealed that traditional governance contributes to participants’ understanding
of what constitutes governance and good governance. Most of the statements that pointed to governance had
mean scores between 1.8 and 1.9 which indicates a moderate response. Participants agree that governance is
about how people are to behave in a given society, decision-making processes rest in the hands of those
involved in governance, actors in governance are accountable to the people of the community as well as leaders
are encouraged to make tough decisions that are in the interest of the people. Again participants’ knowledge on
governance is based on the statement that those in charge of governance are chosen from a particular lineage in
the society (M = 2.14, SD = 1.09) indicating a positive response which supports the fact that participants know
what constitutes good governance and who those actors of governance are. The results also indicate that
participants have knowledge of governance (M = 2.12, SD = 0.918) and this further proves that the participants
are aware of what constitutes governance in their societies.
Table 2
Traditional Governance
Statement—I know that: M SD
Chiefs are in charge of governance in my area 1.95 0.872
Governance is about how people are to behave in a given society 1.80 0.799
Those in charge of governance are chosen from a particular lineage in the society 2.14 1.09
Chiefs and family heads are involved in the politics of the society 1.94 0.777
Decision-making processes rest in the hands of those involved in governance 1.80 0.799
Taboos are associated with the position of being an actor in governance in the society 2.40 1.3
Actors in governance obtain their authority from different sectors 2.12 0.918
Actors in governance are accountable to the people of the community 1.94 0.904
Actors are committed to the safety and security of the people in the community 1.86 0.789
Leaders are encouraged to make tough decisions that are in the interest of the people 1.75 0.815
Source: Field survey (2019).
The Current Nature of Governance Related Taboos in the Three Societies

Table 3 shows that out of a total of 85 respondents who responded, 54.1% agree to the view that their
governance personalities can be tabooed, while 11.8% disagreed with the view that the elders are those who train
people to be in positions to govern people. On the other hand, 52 (61.2%) agreed with the statement that to be an
actor of governance, one has to be respected and held high in the society, with 7.1% being in disagreement with
the statement. The mean score calculated for the statement is 1.86 (SD = 0.693) indicating a positive response.
38.8% of the respondents indicated that they strongly agree against 5.9% who disagree that the assertion that
when they break a taboo, they have to face the repercussions of it. On that same view, 51.8% agreed while 3.5%
strongly disagreed. On the whole, the mean score of the statement was 2.93 (SD = 1.275). Furthermore, it was
realized that, governance is about how people are treated in their societies. This is evident in their responses as
42.4% agreed while 3.5% strongly disagreed. However, 28.2% were in disagreement with the statement with
25.9% strongly agreeing. The mean score of 2.09 (SD = 0.826) depict that respondent rated the statement
positively. For the statement “specific taboos are for specific people”, 50.6% agreed while 20.0% disagreed but
21.2% strongly agreed. Using mean scores and standard deviation values proves that there are governance related
taboos in the three societies.
Table 3
Taboos and Governance
Response
Statement
N SA A D SD Mean Std. dev.
Governance is about how people are treated
85 22 (25.9) 36 (42.4) 24 (28.2) 3 (3.5) 2.09 0.826
in their societies
The elders, chiefs and clansmen are in
85 27 (31.8) 31 (36.5) 26 (30.6) 1 (1.2) 2.01 0.824
charge of governance in the society
To be an actor of governance, one has to be
85 24 (28.2) 52 (61.2) 6 (7.1) 3 (3.5) 1.86 0.693
respected and held high in the society
A governance personality can be tabooed 85 18 (21.2) 46 (54.1) 14 (16.5) 7 (8.2) 2.10 0.837
The elders are those who train people to be
85 26 (30.6) 46 (54.1) 10 (11.8) 3 (3.5) 1.88 0.747
in positions to govern people
Specific taboos are for specific people 85 18 (21.2) 43 (50.6) 17 (20.0) 7 (8.2) 2.15 0.852
When I break a taboo, I have to face the
85 33 (38.8) 44 (51.8) 5 (5.9) 3 (3.5) 1.74 0.726
repercussions of it
Role of Taboos in the Contemporary Indigenous Governance

Out of a total of 85 respondents, 38.3% agreed that without taboos, the society cannot be governed while
17.6% disagreed to the issue. However, 35.3% strongly agreed with 8.2% strongly disagreeing. The mean score
calculated yielded a result of 1.99 (SD = 0.932) indicating a positive response to the fact that respondents’ thinks
without taboos, the society cannot be governed. With 44.7% respondents strongly agreeing that taboos are good
for every society, 15.3% strongly disagreed with this assertion. On the contrary, 41.2% agree that taboos put
people in check in the society, which is very true because if one is not checked in the society, he/she may do
things abnormally. Nine point four percent rather remained in disagreement to this statement because they felt
this is not right to use taboos to check them in the society. Again, 43.5% of respondents agree that taboos are
attached to governance positions in the society while 14.1% disagreed. However, 30.6% strongly agreed while
11.8 strongly disagreed. With a mean score of 2.07 (SD = 0.961) respondents again positively responded to the
statement. Most of the respondents agreed to the fact that the importance of taboos has been made clear to them
in the society, there are mechanisms in place to check whether an offence is committed willfully or not,
punishment meted out to offenders are justified in the society and punishment can be redeemed. This supported
the assumption that taboos play any role in the contemporary indigenous governance of the research areas.
Table 4
Role of Taboos in the Contemporary Indigenous Governance
Response
Statement
N SA A D SD Mean Std. dev.
Taboos are good for every society 85 38 (44.7) 24 (28.2) 13 (15.3) 10 (11.8) 1.94 1.039
Taboos put people in check 85 40 (47.1) 35 (41.2) 8 (9.4) 2 (2.4) 1.67 0.746
When I break a taboo willfully,
85 25 (29.4) 48 (56.5) 9 (10.6) 3 (3.5) 1.88 0.730
I will suffer the consequences
When I break a taboo unwillfully,
85 15 (17.6) 44 (51.8) 22 (25.9) 4 (4.7) 2.18 0.774
I will suffer the consequences
The importance of taboos has been
85 24 (28.2) 40 (47.1) 16 (18.8) 4 (4.7) 2.12 1.358
made clear to me in the society
There are mechanisms in place to check
whether an offence is committed 85 20 (23.5) 32 (37.6) 21 (24.7) 12 (14.1) 2.29 0.986
willfully or not
Punishment meted out to offenders are
85 18 (21.2) 51 (60.0) 9 (10.6) 7 (8.2) 2.06 0.807
justified in the society
Punishment can be redeemed 85 15 (17.6) 44 (51.8) 21 (24.7) 5 (5.9) 2.19 0.794
Without taboos, the society cannot be
85 30 (35.3) 33 (38.8) 15 (17.6) 7 (8.2) 1.99 0.932
governed
Taboos are attached to governance
85 26 (30.6) 37 (43.5) 12 (14.1) 10 (11.8) 2.07 0.961
positions in the society
Discussions
The powers of the chiefs, during the post-colonial era, were restricted to dealing with customary matters and
playing an advisory role, and they were banned from politics despite their loyalty to the colony as Tangwa (1996)
suggested that traditional African leadership and government structures can be interpreted as a harmonious
marriage between autocratic dictatorship and popular democracy. But despite all the challenges that have been
thrown at the chieftaincy institution, it retains the legitimacy it has held since the pre-colonial period to a
significant extent: as representative of its people history, culture, values, religion and sovereignty. Chiefs as
agents of development in their respective communities cannot be overemphasized. This goes to confirm the
assertion of Owusu (1997) and Blom (2002) who contend that the people of the king are well aware of the
duties which he owes to them, as they are of the duties which they owe to him, and are in a position to put
pressure on him to discharge those duties. This, they do, by providing security in the areas, justice and
mobilisation of the people to undertake communal labour for the execution of development projects. In reality,
Lule (1995) argued that the establishment of traditional leaders as part of the cultural heritage of African people
is an integral part of their fundamental right to culture. This explains why development becomes stalled in the
areas where there are no substantive chiefs or there are protracted chieftaincy disputes. Even the land to be
released for development must come from the chief, who is traditionally the custodian of the stool land in
his/her, area of jurisdiction. This chapter deals with the results from the analysis of the interviews from the
research areas. The aura of sacrality associated with the chief is embedded in the historicity of the chiefly office
which is linked to the ancestors of the land whose stool the chief occupies. Traditional Akan chieftaincy
institution is mostly based on the kingship system. Under this, the head of the family who is also the leader of
the community is said to have derived his position from the link between the living and the departed ancestors
who are also themselves the founders of the kingship group. For a person to be selected and installed as a chief
in the Ga Society, the person should be from one of the three royal houses among which the privilege rotates.
Components and principles such as sovereignty and minority rights, and acceptance of their relevance to
conventional indigenous governance approaches, are significant (von der Porten, 2012).
Traditional authority is built up by roles, customs and practices that are accepted into the ritual of life.
Certain things do occur because they used to happen that way (precedent). Traditionalism in this regard is then
seen as a psychic attitude-set for habitual workaday life and the belief in everyday routine as an inviolable form
of conduct. The domination resting upon this basis is called traditional authority. Those who for some reason of
birth or ritual selection represent the traditional custom inherit authority and position as a commodity invested
in them and they are not to be challenged. In this traditional set-up, the legacy of passing it on is mostly
encouraged from one generation to another.
Traditionally, the functions of traditional leaders include, among others, leading tribal government,
maintaining local culture, leading ceremonies, applying customary law, granting or confiscating land,
confiscating stolen cattle and promoting the wellbeing of their communities. Traditional leaders have somehow
lost some of their traditional functions but rather fulfil modern functions such as, inter alia, advising central and
local government, assisting in development planning and implementation. Chiefs have long been central to
Ghanaian society. The Ghanaian constitutions provide evidence of this continuing trend. Even the most radical
constitution did not abolish chieftaincy.
One major reason why traditional leaders continued to exist in this critical time is that their existence is
deeply rooted in the culture of their people. They are much more closely associated with culture or the tradition
of their people. They are the mediators; they are the mouthpieces of civilians who are unable to express
themselves, and above all leaders of leaders. Even in pre-colonial times, the tribe was in some sense a category
of interaction. Among other things, tribal loyalties explain certain divisions, oppositions, alliances, and modes
of behaviour between, and towards, different human groups. This solidifies the loyalties that each man has to
his tribe. Today, the tribe is still being seen as a category of interaction, but it operates within a different, and
much wider, system. Social changes have given tribal loyalties a new importance and a new relevance.
While generally, the taboos are adhered to and hence maintaining the prestige of the institution of
chieftaincy and ensuring good governance, the few taboos, which are broken by some of the chiefs, are
threatening the sanctity attached to the chieftaincy institution. This has implications for governance. The
research revealed that among three societies, people who breached taboos were detected through eye witness
account. However, in a situation where acts point to the fact that a taboo has been breached and culprit cannot
be detected or nobody reports about the act, the culprit can be detected through divination by the state priest
and should this method be used to arrest the culprit, the penalty slapped on the culprit is usually expensive. On
the part of leaders who breach governance taboos, respondents were of the view that often it is difficult to know
except a whistle blower informs the community or the elders. Some also had the position that since political
office is always under contestation, contestants are always on the lookout for a breach on the part of a leader to
bring charges for his removal.
The analytical view of the leadership does not discriminate between the various styles of chieftaincies and
the different hierarchies under the same types. In comparison, this perspective has neglected to understand what
democracy and transparency really mean to diverse societies and individuals around the world. Nor does the
latter line have some grounding in the face of other inquiries. Chiefs are responsible for religious functions,
land custody, communal well-being, participatory grassroots government and conflict resolution (Mireku, 1991;
Pobee, 1991; Owusu, 1997). Customary institutions are often blamed for being undemocratic, particularly on
the grounds that the freedom to select one’s own leaders is a basic and fundamental human right in
contemporary democracy. This is the case because the leadership is more or less “a caste in which only birth
members can postulate the role of chiefs” (Ribot, 2002, p. 69). “Elected leaders, on the other hand, receive their
legitimacy by way of a popular vote” (Molotlegi, 2002, p. 1). The problem here is then that, as long as the rule
of law is founded on heredity and ascription, it is fundamentally undemocratic. The likelihood of rural citizens
having the right to choose which institutions or persons to govern is immediately omitted. Traditional leaders
derive their claim of legitimacy, authority and, therefore, sovereignty from their pre-colonial origins, while the
contemporary African state is the founder and descendant to the forced colonial state. Proponents of traditional
leadership structures claim that these institutions cannot be literally legislated out of existence or simply
confined to the traditional social domain, separate from the new world of civil society (Owusu, 1997; Blom,
2002; Senyonjo, 2004).
Keeping of taboos ensured good harmony between the visible and therefore the invisible world. Those
found guilty of great moral or legal violations are made to undergo ritual cleansing as a way of ethical or
ontological purification and transformation. People gave the impression to remember that behind prohibitions
laid truth meaning of taboos—preserving harmony and well-being in and of the community: Life and its quality
was seen as crucial and therefore the society applied a spread of methods to preserve it and transmit it,
especially through taboos. While well-being virtues include modernization, democratization qualitative
education, and demanding consciousness, the well-being vices include dependency, bribery and corruption,
unwarranted military interventions, dictatorships and therefore the abuse of human rights, etc. Consequently, if
one could show that a given set of taboos, promote some well-being, virtues and help diminish some well-being
vices, one would have shown by implication that some taboos promote development and harmonious living.
The uniqueness of the chieftaincy institution in Ghana is that almost every community has a chief. Chiefs
are considered important stakeholders in government and are frequently selected to serve on the country’s
sensitive committees and boards at different levels. Despite the official exclusion of chiefs from the
Autonomous government system, a number of chiefs in Ghana have justified their importance and prestige by
undertaking numerous development projects, in particular the promotion of education, health and
environmental conservation. They (chiefs) offer leadership and protection, peace and security for their people.
As traditional heads, chiefs are the first port of call, even by politicians when on campaign tours. The chiefs
represent the spiritual embodiment of the people, mediating between the living and the dead (Busia, 1968).
However, it may be argued that the chieftaincy institution impedes the pace of development because it reduces
the relevance of the state within the areas of social services (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005; Osaghae, 1987).
Furthermore, because of the hereditary nature of chieftaincy, it renders it incompatible with democratic
governance, which needs competitive elections mutually of its cornerstones (Ntsebeza, 2005). The chief, as
traditional ruler, make sure that resources are wisely exploited in order that generations yet unborn can have
access to those resources.
Leadership is an epitome of tradition in Ghana’s democratic system. Ghana is only one of several
countries where younger governance practices have developed authorities. While chieftaincies are often seen as
outdated institutions, there are few signs that their significance is decreasing. Surveys reveal significant and
persistent support for traditional authorities and institutions in a variety of African countries, including Ghana
(Holzinger, Kern, & Kromrey, 2016). Traditional authority is still strong, particularly in rural areas, where
village chiefs and elders still have important roles to play. Chieftaincy institutions are highly important whether
they can complement or replace poor or non-existent state institutions. Their organizational structure varies by
tribe or territory, but in general, the villages belong to subdivisions, divisions and, finally, paramountcies.
Traditional authorities are indispensable, because they form a major part of the country’s history, culture,
political and governance systems. The institution of chieftaincy is a basic vehicle for mobilising people for
development. It also serves as the most effective link between the people at the grassroots level and the central
government. Chieftaincy constitutes crucial resources that have the potential to promote democratic governance
and to facilitate access of rural communities to public services. However, understanding the dynamics of
traditional authorities entails distinguishing between the social positions of the chiefs and that of the elders in
providing some protection for the interests of their communities in order to maintain the legitimacy of their
leadership. Chiefs have been the unifying factor not only in their communities but also the nation as a whole.
Although, some people may hold a different view and would not consider this potential, there is evidence to
suggest that service delivery in rural areas has been smoother in areas where government structures had good
relations with traditional leaders, than in areas where relations were not good (Miller, 1968). Good governance
can only materialise through the articulation of indigenous political values and practices and their
harmonisation with modern democratic practices (Ayittey, 2002). Understanding the dynamics of traditional
authorities entails distinguishing between the social positions of the chiefs and that of the elders in providing
some protection for the interests of their communities in order to maintain the legitimacy of their leadership.
The chief frequently acts as a spokeswoman for his culture and for the outside world. It has been
recognized that the decision-making position of the Leader is indispensable. It initiates change, implements
technologies and methods for community growth. As a disturbance handler, he solves disagreements between
separate groups in his families. This is consistent with the studies by Boafo-Arthur (2006), Lutz and Linder
(2004) which show that customary courts are said to be common and often resorted to because they are readily
available, inexpensive, quick and comprehensible. It was also founded that the chief's bargaining position is
just as critical as that of representing his group in achieving agreements with other parties. These positions
underpin the argument that the Chief has a vital role to play in the municipal government. It must be noted
explicitly that the administration of localities in the country would be difficult if it is left alone in the hands of
central and local government officials without the help, motivation and protection of the country's
representatives. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that, without the successful involvement of the chiefs,
it would be difficult for the central government to produce the growth programmers as set out in its agenda.
Traditional authorities have long been mindful of the need for those who exert political authority to receive the
active approval of the men and women over whom they exercise influence.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The study investigated the Role of traditional leaders in Governance structure through the observance of
taboos in Cape Coast, Kumasi and Teshie societies of Ghana. From the results of the study and the discussion
that proceeded, it can conclude that taboos play an important role in the traditional African society and keep to
exercise its influence on the modern society as well. They help people to preserve moral rules that were helping
them, as individuals and as communities, to live a peaceful and harmonious life. Again, chieftaincy is not based
on high satisfaction with the way chiefs perform their tasks. People can simultaneously support the institution
of chieftaincy and be highly critical of the performance of certain chiefs or certain tasks. Individuals or clans
who heed taboo rules are expected to be blessed with protection, good health, fertility, wellbeing and long life;
whereas those who breach taboos are invoking the ancestors’ anger and will be punished.
It can further be concluded that the Akans, Fantes and the Ga’s are uniquely structured as far as their
tradition and culture is concerned. This is so clear in their traditional administrative system as well as their
beliefs and practices which promote unity and cooperation among them. With the observation of taboos in the
three traditional societies with particular reference to chieftaincy, it was found out that traditional rulers occupy
a unique position, therefore chiefs are expected to observe taboos in order to maintain certain standards to
please their subjects. Taboos remain the prime factor of guiding principles of moral conduct towards the
exploitation of natural resources in the community. Thus, the practice of taboos among the people of the three
traditional societies remains very strong because it reinforces the communal values of solidarity, identity and
unity among the people.
It is recommended that both citizens and non-citizens in these traditional societies should be made to
appreciate, respect and observe taboos associated with taboo days as a means to promote unity, peace and
governance. This can be done by establishing cultural centers in the various communities to educate people
about the need to uphold cultural values such as taboo days in the area.
Furthermore, the district assembly in collaboration with the traditional council of the traditional areas
integrate the cultural values into policies and programmes by coming out with by-laws to guide the citizens
towards proper governance structures with the aim of strengthening grassroots governance.
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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Gender in/Equality in Nation-Building: The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the

Belarusian Identity in the Post-colonial Labyrinths 113

The Role of Traditional Leaders in Governance Structure Through the Observance

Gender in/Equality in Nation-Building: The Breakup of

Keywords: Yugoslavia, nationalism, systematic rape, ethnic conflict

Adelina Hasani, Ph.D., International Relations, University of Ankara, Ankara, Turkey.

Nation in Nation State-Building, Nationalism and Gender

Wartime Sexual Violence

Politics in Serbia During the 90’s

Gender and Nationalism in Post-conflict Kosovo and Serbia

Building Gender Roles in the Post-conflict Kosovo

The Solidarity Between Serbian and Kosovo Women

Belarusian Identity in the Post-colonial Labyrinths

Keywords: Belarus, protests, nationalism, identity, post-Soviet matrix

According to Ihar Lialkou (2002),

Belarusian Language as a Sign of National Identity

In the Trap of Post-Soviet Matrix

Post-Soviet Aesthetics vs. the Search for Distinctivity

The Role of Traditional Leaders in Governance Structure

Emmanuel Abeku Essel

Keywords: traditional authorities, taboos, governance, societies, observance

Governance and the Observation of Taboos

Study Area and Methodology

The Current Nature of Governance Related Taboos in the Three Societies

Role of Taboos in the Contemporary Indigenous Governance

Conclusions and Recommendations

Senyonjo, J. (2004). Traditional institutions and land. Retrieved from: http://www.federo.com/Pages/TraditionalInstitutionsandland.htm

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