MODULE 11: PENALTIES A.

Imposable penalties

1. Principal penalties
a. Capital punishment – Sec. 19, Art III of the 1987 Constitution; RA 7659, RA 8177; RA 9346; Art. 40 and
47, RPC; RA 9346
b. Afflictive penalties
i Reclusion perpetua – RA 7659, Art.27, RPC
ii Reclusion temporal
iii Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification – Article 30, RPC
iv Perpetual or temporary special disqualification – Art. 31, RPC v. Prision mayor – Art. 27, RPC
c. Correctional penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44, RPC
i Prision correccional
ii Arresto mayor
iii Suspension
iv Destierro
d. Light penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44, RPC
i Arresto menor
ii Public censure
e. Common penalties – Art. 25, RPC
i Fines – Art. 26 as amended by RA 10951, 39, and 66
ii Bond to keep the peace – Art. 27 and 35, RPC
2. Accessory penalties – Art. 40 to 45, RPC
a. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
b. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
c. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling
d. Civil interdiction
e. Indemnification
f. Forfeiture or confiscation of the instruments and proceeds of the offense g. Payment of costs
3. Subsidiary penalty – Art. 39, RPC See also: RA 10159

B. Application and computation of penalties

1. General rules – Art. 5, 21, 28, 29 (see also RA 10592), 46, 73-77, RPC
2. Specific Rules
a. Complex Crimes - Art. 48, RPC
b. Crime different from that which was intended – Art. 49, RPC
c. Effect of degree of participation and stage of commission – Art. 50-57, 60-61, RPC
d. Additional penalty for certain accessories – Art. 58, RPC
e. Impossible crimes – Art. 59, RPC
f. Effect of mitigating, aggravating, and qualifying circumstances – Art. 62-66, RPC
g. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances – Art. 67 and 69, RPC
h. Minors – RA 9344
3. Indeterminate Sentence Law
C. Execution and service of penalties
1. General rules – Art. 47, 70, 78, and 86-88, RPC
2. Probation Law (PD 968 as amended) See also: RA 10707
3. Suspension of sentence
a. In cases of insanity – Art. 79
b. Minors
i Section 31-35 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC ii. RA 9344 1. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30
October 2006
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006 [Formerly G.R.
Nos. 158660-67]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

ALFREDO BON, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the conviction of
appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his
then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront
a question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge
the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution, 1 we now find it necessary to
determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death
penalty.

The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence
imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was
prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition
of the death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for
attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated
qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

First, the antecedent facts.

I.

Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of
AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-
G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.5 All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been
committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.

Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped
them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who
physically examined them were entered as documentary evidence.

AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had
shared with her grandmother. 6 She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone
in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to
anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in
1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9)
years old.7

AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the
house of her grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time
by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing 9 after having been invited there by appellant to
get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert
his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped. 10

It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, 11 the brutish acts appellant had done
to her.12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and
presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988. 13

BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old,
also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at
her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist
appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat
that he would kill her.14 BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several
occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day. 15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. 16 On that night, she was sleeping beside
her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him
away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a
knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced
her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three
(3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was.
She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with
his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again. 17

It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she
had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her
mother brought her to the police station and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the
hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June
2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her
family.18

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew of the abuses done
on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on the
pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter,
DDD, to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon learning
this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident that BBB confided
to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and
had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually
molested.19

CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she was afraid
that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to
her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided
talking to her since then.20

The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas),
medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and
thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child. These medical certificates were presented in court. 21

The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical
injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly
gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at
"three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr.
Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times. 22

AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries
apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On
direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual
penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she
stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. 23

Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in court that from
1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the
house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the
house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30
in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day. 24

He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw
the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a
smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-
in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC "lazy"
within earshot of other family members. 25

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. 26 The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial
and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC
concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It
further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims
and appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were
automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court
in People v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.

On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight
(8) death sentences imposed on appellant. 28 The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:

We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from
the findings of the trial court except in at least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was
anchored mainly on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and
credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve
the private complainants. It was established with certitude that the accused on several occasions
sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were proved by the
victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate
in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the
witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to her and her sister. 29

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In
these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively.
According to the appellate court, it could not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that
appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated
rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the
pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was
then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative. 30 Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified
rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.

Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief 31 before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites
inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant
observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000.
BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002,
this time she stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents'
house (and not at her grandmother's), the accused passed through a window, entered their room and raped her
again.32 Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her
rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes
while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.

It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these
inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was
testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:

We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details.
They bear no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which accusedappellant was
convicted.[34] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming
inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape
victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was
testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more
often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her
narration was less than letter-perfect.[ 35] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-
known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which
a witness answers questions."[36]37

Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of her
two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the People 38 filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor
creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:

[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6, 2001, with
respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards the place of commission—house of her parents
or house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top – 3 minutes or half-minute. But she
 remained consistent in her declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her
vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she felt something came out from him. He was able to
rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she took the
witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many acts of
sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she was first raped by her
uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and
1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own
house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission – accused's house or victim's
house – is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa
Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x 39

In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial and alibi. These two
defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime
cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough
for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise
demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. 40

In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2) kilometers away when the
rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of
reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sister's house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then
returned to his sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.

Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. 41 The defenses of
denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator. 42 In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant,
positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the
credibility of such identification.

It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers
nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than
the averment that he did not know anything about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense
considering the evidence against him.

Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his
deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating
experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by
her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges
against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-
in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim's family would dare
encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against
a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed. 43

Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight
and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.44 The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or
indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such
countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.

The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in this case. The
minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant were aptly established

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages of the victims
when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as
documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open
court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' father, and
thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.

Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified,
considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents
to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of
a fabricated charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation
produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she would report the
incident.46

At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G
and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.

It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly
by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show
that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum
of AAA. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:

Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were eleven years old?

A – Yes, Mam. [sic]

Q – What was that?

A – He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my
vagina. [sic]

Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?

A – No, Mam. [sic]

Q – Why?

A – It was painful, Mam. [sic] x x x x

Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?

A – Many times, Mam.48 [sic]

AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.

Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When
was the last time that this sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle?

A – June 11, Mam. [sic]

Q – What year?

A – June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?

A – He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]

Q – And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you? A – He

was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic] x x x x

Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?

A – Painful, Mam. [sic]

Q – And what did you do when you feel painful?

 A – I cried, Mam. [sic]

Q – When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any? A – He

did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?

A – No, Mam.49 [sic]

In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA declared:

It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed pain may be deduced
from the sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of
pain. It is well-settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict
for consummated rape since the slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in
People v. Campuhan, the term "slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be
sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female
organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina (the
stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the
crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the slightest
penetration, more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed
consummated.

We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert
his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from
further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered
cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's
penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule that
the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the
pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x x x 50

It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for
there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to
the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however slight, is not completed. 51

The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of
Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.

II.

We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The
sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view
of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of
the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the

guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when
appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in
recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53

III.

The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be
the more challenging but interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
as maximum," for each count of attempted rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the
time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes
the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:

ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. 54

What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape? Article 266B of the
Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x 55

The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of
age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61
and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to
the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules
shall be observed:

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale
prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 56 x x x x

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of
this question. The provision reads:

Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or
more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given
penalty:

The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1

1. Death

2. Reclusion perpetua

3. Reclusion temporal

4. Prision mayor

5. Prision correctional

6. Arresto mayor

7. Destierro

8. Arresto menor
 9. Public censure 10. Fine57

xxxx

Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal,
which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion
temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.

At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose of the
prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege
granted under the same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per
the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence. 58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-
imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty without minimum or maximum periods. 59

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum
penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such
sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning
the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the
penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant
should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining
penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision
mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

IV.

Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant,
but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to
make the following qualification.

Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two different frames of
reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep.
Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was
provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as
an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified
bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present;" 60 kidnapping or detention "for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;" 61 destructive

arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated under the
law.

On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several crimes, including
murder,63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by
"reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was
unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."

There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and
attempted felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on accomplices
and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of
two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the enactment
of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to death."

The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs
from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for
qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of
death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal." 67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused,
who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted
rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice
Davide, explained:

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by
two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the
rape if it had been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT 69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-
law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph thereof provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two
degrees than death. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO
may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. 70

This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and
death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed
for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties … the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, in
passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua
to death" if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than " reclusion
perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single
indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty
next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated
scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.

It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment
of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent
readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was
"reclusion perpetua to death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had no
occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter on penalties
downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some
commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single
indivisible penalty of death.

The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear
no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or
frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death."

Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."

V.

If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had
been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such
downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those
penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
 Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor, 71 among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue
of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads,
"all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general
repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive
orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are
inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.

Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as
they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of
them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for
attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the
convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the
statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by
death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.

On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor
necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as
to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all,
the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the
death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.

On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism,
limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of
employing either a liberal or a conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative
mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muñoz,72 a
decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.

If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual
executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead
"insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would have been no room for doubt that only those
statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of
Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress
did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.

But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346
was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any
effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.

VI.

There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.

Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say
X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping.
Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was
abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted
by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion
perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal.
Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains
unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the
death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the
same penalty as the principal.

It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously
punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law
in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step
that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly
oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law
itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention
to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals
and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and
Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that
would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act
No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would
have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion
temporal as an accomplice.

Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are
justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter
penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less
justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive
the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice.
Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition
that Congress has the power to will it so.

Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies
which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death
would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage
would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion
perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on
both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we
recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated
stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death,"73 such as murder, which may be
frustrated.

Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their
attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently
imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted
felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty. 74 If it were to be insisted that Rep.
Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject
attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.

It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some
attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious
and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the
legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential
theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not
only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would
be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from
oversight.

VII.

The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no
similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the
death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative
amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.

Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of
appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples,
Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be
consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference
to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an
anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in
sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of
simple kidnapping.

The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the reference to
"death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.

There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive" interpretation
of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the
principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system—a uniform
system of jurisprudence.75 "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x
x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure the
rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-

legislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the
later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated
scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of
penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.

It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the
state and liberally in favor of the accused. 77 If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial
justice.78 The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. 79 It is this philosophy of caution before the
State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of
Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been necessary had Rep. Act
No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the
corresponding modification of penalties other than death, dependent as these are on "death" as a measure
under the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress,
and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies
we had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged,
perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not speak well
of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately,
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a
reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws,
and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.

VIII.

One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of the penalties
other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muñoz,80 decided in 1989.
Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact
"a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no expression of "such a
requirement… in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least

clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there
was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty." 82

It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would
Muñoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties
other than death?

It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found guilty of murder, which under the Revised Penal Code,
carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not
attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence
previous to Muñoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion
temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that purpose. Muñoz
rejected this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this
conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as
1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muñoz.83

It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly settling the question now befacing us, as the legal
premises behind Muñoz are different from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muñoz inquired into the effects
of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act
No. 9346 on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muñoz may have pronounced that the
Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the
correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346.
Otherwise framed, Muñoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with the express prohibition of
the imposition of the death penalty Congress has unequivocally banned the same.

Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided that
"[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual
imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and
applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time
Muñoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1),
Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may
nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as
Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muñoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course,
the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the
Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes." Yet it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from
recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep.
Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.

The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a
corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination
as to whether such corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No.
9346, and not the Constitution.

For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the
word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article
71. Muñoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was
relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder.
Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of
"death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act
No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of
the penalty of death.

The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's
intent to retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to
construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the
"death penalty", as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a means
of retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court
can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional
due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have
ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as
"nothing but blather in search of meaning." 84 In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty,
the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.

Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for both terms embody the
operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the graduated
scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the
death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act
No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory
provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.

We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death
penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such
conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1),
Article III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty
once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion,
Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death
penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.

Following Muñoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of
the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization
of the death penalty during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as
being "in a state of hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened — then it died; because the sovereign people,
through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that
day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a
means of depriving liberty.

Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not acknowledge that
Muñoz lacked legal justification when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No.
9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong.
Muñoz properly stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep.
Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law
jurisprudence.

IX.

Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified
the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act
No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the
increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes. 86 The categorization of certain crimes as
"heinous", constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also
influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes.
Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous
crimes.

It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act
No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes.
True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what
remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special
category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil
indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes. X.

Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the
corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the
effects of these rulings.

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty
for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of
"death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of " reclusion perpetua to death," as
often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the
latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier
observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to
persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would have
warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[ 87] x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep.
Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to
those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its
enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there
may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced
sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such convicts,
especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under
law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public
Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and
acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the
death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the
downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For
the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for
parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one
degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently,
we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as
pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.89

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence 90 in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of
consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no
possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case
Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further
ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.

For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby
SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of
attempted rape. In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of
attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00
as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
2. People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 25 May 1994
[G.R. Nos. 108172-73. May 25, 1994.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn statement 1 taken on 16 February 1991, Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen years old, charged
her natural father, Accused Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape committed against her on 12 February 1991.
She revealed therein that she was first raped by him when she was only nine years old, or, as disclosed in a
handwritten note at the left-hand margin of her sworn statement, "noong Nov. 26, 1982 . . . at naulit ng
maraming beses."

On 19 February 1991, Chanda, assisted by her mother, Ofelia Austria-Lucas, filed two separate sworn criminal
complaints for rape 2 and for attempted rape 3 against her father with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-18465 and Q-91-18466, were subsequently assigned to
Branch 104 of the said court.

The accusatory portion of the complaint for rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 reads:

"That on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime thereafter in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
violence and intimidation did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
the undersigned CHANDA LUCAS Y AUSTRIA, who was then nine (9) years old, now 17 yrs. of age, against her
will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New
Civil Code."

while that for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 reads:

"That on or about the 12th day of February 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, commence the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt
acts by then and there taking advantage of complainant’s tender age and innocence, by then and there putting
his hand inside the panty of the undersigned and mashing her vagina while his other hand was pressing her
nipples and at the same time kissing her on the lips, face and neck, thereafter accused placed himself on top of
her but said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the said offense of rape by
reason of the fact that the brother and sister of the undersigned was awakened and shouted upon the accused,
a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the said accused, that the aforesaid act of the said accused
was done against the will of the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded
to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code."
The cases were jointly tried after the accused had pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. 4 The prosecution
presented as witnesses the complainant herself; her sister, Cynthia; and Dr. Emmanuel Aranas. The defense
presented only the accused.

Complainant Chanda Lucas, who was born on 2 June 1973, 5 testified that their house at 23-X Daropa Road,
Baesa, Quezon City, has only one bedroom. On 26 November 1983, she was sleeping in the bedroom with her
brother and sisters. Their mother did not sleep in their house at that time. At about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., she
awoke and realized that her father was removing her panty and shorts. He cautioned her to keep quiet. Then,
her father, who was already naked, went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina. She was
hurt but did not resist because her father threatened to kill her. Only her older sister Cynthia witnessed the
incident. Chanda reported the incident to her mother and her aunt but the former did nothing. When her aunt
said that her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree. 6
The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities. Since then, her father had been
repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not around. The last assault on her womanhood
occurred on 12 February 1991 when she was already seventeen years old. Before he had sex with her at 3:00
a.m. on 12 February 1991, he first moved her brothers and sisters, who were sleeping in the same room with
her, to another place. She did not resist because he had a balisong with him and told her that he can take her
life anytime. After the sexual assault, he stood up holding his balisong 7 and again said that she has only one life
and that he can take it anytime.

On the morning of 16 February 1992, in the company of her mother and uncle, she reported the incident to the
police in their area. The police investigator questioned her and her sworn statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. In
the afternoon of that day, she submitted to a medical examination at Camp Crame and a medical certificate was
issued. 8

Cynthia Lucas Viado, the elder sister of Chanda, testified that she witnessed the incident of 26 November 1983.
She was then thirteen years old while Chanda was only nine years old. She saw his father on top of Chanda,
then she closed her eyes and covered her face with a blanket. She reported the incident and the fact that she
saw blood on the underwear of Chanda to her aunt Neneng and her mother; the former was very angry upon
learning of the incident but the latter did not believe her; at that time, her mother loved her father dearly. 9 On
cross examination, Cynthia declared that her father intended to sexually abuse her on 26 November 1983 but
because she resisted, her father instead raped Chanda. She was not able to help Chanda because she was afraid
of her father. Their brother and another sister were not aware of the incident and they did not wake them up
because they were ashamed of their neighbors. 10

Dr. Emmanuel Aranas testified that he examined the complainant on 16 February 1991 at the Crime
Laboratory Services at Camp Crame pursuant to a letter-request 11 from Capt. Jaime Q. Peralta of the Central
Police district, Quezon City. His examination of her genitalia disclosed healed lacerations, but he could not
determine when the lacerations were inflicted or sustained. He concluded that the complainant has had several
sexual experiences and was no longer a virgin. 12 He issued a written report of his findings. 13 On cross-
examination, he declared that he found no sperm on the organ of the complainant and that there were no signs
of recent trauma or physical injuries on her.

On the witness stand, the accused testified that he and Chanda’s mother, Ofelia Austria, are not married;
however, since 1969, they had been living together as husband and wife until 1972, when he was detained for
alleged gunrunning and when Ofelia and the children moved to Cotabato. They were reunited in 1977. He
denied having raped his second daughter, Chanda, and alleged that the brothers and sisters of Ofelia,
particularly Leonardo Austria, were all angry at him and instigated the filing of the fabricated charges against
him. He further declared that Ofelia was angry at him because he intervened in guiding the life of Chanda. He
could not recall anymore where he was on 26 November 1983. However, on 12 February 1991, he and Ofelia
quarreled about Chanda’s frequent late arrivals from school and, because of the quarrel, he "physically harmed"
both of them.

On 28 October 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision 16 in the two cases finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18465, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA plus all the accessory penalties provided by law.

In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18466, the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law.

Accused is ordered to pay the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as actual and moral damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency."

On 4 November 1992, the accused filed a notice of appeal. 18 In his brief submitted to this Court, he alleges that
the trial court erred:

"I
. . . IN GIVING UNMERITED VERACITY TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNPERSUASIVE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.

II

. . . IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-18466 INASMUCH AS THE SAME IS
MORE SERIOUS THAN THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

III

. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-18465

DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." 19

As to the first assigned error, the accused asserts that the conduct of his daughters, Chanda and Cynthia, after
the alleged first sexual abuse casts doubt on their credibility. It is hard to believe that if Chanda were indeed
raped by him when she was only nine years old and repeatedly thereafter, she would report the abuses only
when she was seventeen years old. Several remedies were available to her and she had relatives who could
extend their help. 20

He also contends that the testimony of Cynthia is not convincing; it was contrary to human experience and
conduct for her to simply close her eyes and cover her face with a blanket upon witnessing the rape of her
younger sister by their own father instead of helping Chanda. If she was afraid of her father at that time, she
could have convinced Chanda to temporarily leave their house and seek shelter with her relatives. It was also
unnatural for her to abandon Chanda when, as she claims, she fully knew the bestial tendencies of her father.
21 As to his wife, Ofelia, he attributes of her an ulterior motive when she consented to the filing of the charges
against him. Except for the souring of their relationship which ended in their separation, he finds no possible
explanation why Ofelia believed Chanda’s report on the 12 February 1991 incident when she, Ofelia, refused to
heed Chanda and Cynthia’s report concerning the 26 November 1983 incident.

Anent the second assigned error, he contends that he could not be validly convicted of rape in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18466 under a complaint for attempted rape only. He cites the rule that when the offense proved is more
serious than that charged, the accused can only be convicted of the offense charged.

The appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays that the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465 be affirmed in toto. However, it submits that the accused can be convicted only of attempted
rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466. The appellee argues that the trial court correctly gave credence to the
testimony of Chanda as it is "positive, straightforward and clearly revelatory only of the truth of the facts she
experienced, without any dubious motive shown why she would bear false witness against appellant." 22 The
reaction which the accused expected of Chanda after the first rape and which she did not so manifest does not
necessarily lead to a conclusion that she fabricated her story. As Chanda’s father, he exercised absolute
authority and moral influence over her. Moreover, at the tender age of nine, she was totally helpless and
defenseless. And regarding the imputed motive of Chanda’s mother, the same is too trivial to prompt her to
falsely charge him with a grave crime.

The first and third assigned errors raise a question of fact which hinges on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The second involves a question of law.

In rape cases, this Court has been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only to persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.

Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court.
Accordingly, in the appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court accords due deference to the trial court’s
views on who should be given credence since the latter is in a better position to decide the question of the
credibility of witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The trial court’s findings concerning the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and
respect and will be sustained by the appellate court unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the
case.

After a careful examination of the records and the evidence, we are unable to find any cogent reason to disturb
the finding of the trial court that the accused raped his daughter, Chanda, on 26 November 1983 and 12
February 1991.

As regards the first charge, there is, however, a variance between the evidence presented and the allegations of
the complaint. The complaint in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 charges the accused with the crime of rape
committed on 26 November 1982. Both Chanda and Cynthia, however, testified that the incident took place on
26 November 1983. 25 The accused offered no objection to such evidence. Consequently, the variance was not
fatal to the prosecution.

In United States v. Arcos, 26 this Court ruled:

"Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may
be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was not committed at the
precise time or placed alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the
filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of the limitations, and at a place within
the jurisdiction of the court. (U.S. v. Smith, and cases cited, 2 Phil. Rep., 20)."

The unobjected testimony of another date of the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18465 could even be the basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the evidence. 27

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court also provides:

"SEC. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance and form, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.

x x x"

Chanda was less than twelve years old when she was raped by the accused on 26 November 1983. Since she
was born on 2 June 1973, she was then exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days old.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in
the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

x x x"

The third paragraph is known as statutory rape of the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of
age. 28 Otherwise stated, carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction as the presence of any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 335 is not required. 29

As found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, the accused had carnal knowledge of his
daughter Chanda — then below twelve years old — on 26 November 1983. We are not persuaded by the
arguments of the accused that if indeed she were raped on that date and several times thereafter, she should
not have kept her silence until she was seventeen years old since she had all the available remedies for redress
as well as relatives who could help her. The equanimity or the wisdom of more mature persons cannot be
expected from a young and immature girl like Chanda. We have said before that the workings of a human mind
when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and that people react differently to various situations. 30
In addition to her tender age and immaturity, Chanda was, to say the least, a victim of unfavorable
circumstances not of her own making. These prevented her from exposing earlier the evil deeds of her father.
All that she could proudly claim was a beautiful name — Chanda.. She had no decent home. Her father and her
mother were not married and were untrammeled by the bonds of lawful wedlock. When she was born, her
father was under detention for gunrunning and it was only when she was four years old (1977) when he
rejoined his "family." Since then, all the members of the family slept in one room.
Chanda had no choice of another home, for its does not appear that another was available to the family or that
she was prepared to leave it because she had the means to face life alone or that a kind soul had offered her
shelter. She was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only "home" her natural parents could provide,
for she was entirely dependent upon them.

Verily, she was completely under the moral ascendancy and control of her father and the fear alone of a harsher
life outside such a "home" and of what her father would do if she would expose his evil deeds, made her suffer
in silence for a long time the excruciating pains his assaults inflicted upon her. Then too, although she told her
mother about the abuse committed by her father on 26 November 1983, 31 her mother only got angry but did
not do anything. Chanda must have felt despair at such indifference.

Her delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities is thus understandable and does not affect her
credibility. We do not believe that she would fabricate a story of defloration against her own father, make
public her painful and humiliating experiences which are better kept in secret or forgotten, allow her private
parts to be examined, and eventually bring to shame her own family and jeopardize her chances of marriage
unless she was not telling the truth and was motivated by nothing but the desire to obtain justice for the
grievous wrongs committed against her.

There was a consummated rape on 12 February 1991. According to Chanda’s testimony, at 3:00 a.m. that day,
the accused , who had a balisong with him, laid down beside her, threatened her that she had only one life
which he can take away any time; removed her shorts and panty and then moved on top of her and inserted
"his organ to her organ." Thereafter, he stood up holding his balisong and reiterated his earlier threat.

Considering, however, that the complaint for this incident subject of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 charges the
accused with the crime of attempted rape, then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in his second assigned
error and concurred in by the Office of the Solicitor General, he cannot be convicted of consummated rape.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that" [w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved." The offense
charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the offense that was
proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of attempted rape only. The penalty
for attempted rape is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that provided by law for rape. 34 The
accused is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for attempted rape he may be
sentenced to a penalty whose minimum should be within the range of prision correccional and whose maximum
should be within the range of prision mayor, taking into account the modifying circumstances. The alternative
circumstance of relationship provided for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated against
the accused considering that the offended party, Chanda, is his descendant. In crimes against chastity, such as
rape, relationship is aggravating. 35

Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty of reclusion
perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years. There is, however, no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of
converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific period — minimum, medium, and
maximum — and including it in the table provided therein showing the duration and the time included in
each of the periods.

It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not make
explicit its intention to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which provides:
"ART. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty
prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing
articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed and forming one period of
each of the three portions."

may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one
[1] days to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each composing a period. The periods
of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:

minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months

medium — 26 years and 8 months and 1 day to 33 years

and 4 months

maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. Q91-
18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion perpetua.

Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q91-
18466 to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

There should also be awards for damages in each of the two cases.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
modifications indicated above. As modified:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, Accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4)
years Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

Costs against the Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.
3. People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 9 January 1995 G.R. Nos.

108172-73 January 9, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the decision in this case, promulgated on 25 May 1994, the First Division touched on the nature of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in the light of Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 1 which amended Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code by specifically fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years and one (1) day
to forty (40) years. It opined that since no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code
was made, the said laws has not made explicit an intention to convert reclusion perpetua into a divisible
penalty. Nevertheless, it applied Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code 2 and stated:

Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one
[1] day to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions with each composing a
period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:
minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months
medium — 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4
months
maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua.

It then modified the challenged decision of the trial court by changing the penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
18465 from reclusion perpetua, as imposed by the trial court, to "imprisonment of 34 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion perpetua."

In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on 28 June 1994 which was not opposed by the
accused-appellant in his comment, the appellee asks the Court to correct the duration of the maximum period
of reclusion perpetua from thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as stated in
the decision, to thirty-three (33) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

Since the issue of whether the amendment of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by Section 21 of R.A. No.
7659 has made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty is one of first impression and of sufficient importance, the
First Division referred the motion for clarification to the Court en banc. The latter accepted the referral.

After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes
that although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.

R.A. No. 7659 is a consolidation of Senate Bill (SB) No. 891 3 and House Bill (HB) No. 62.4 SB No. 891 seeks to
amend Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by inserting therein what are to be considered heinous crimes and
to penalize these not with the death penalty, but which reclusion perpetua only, with the qualification that "any
person sentenced to reclusion perpetua for . . . [such heinous] crimes under this Code shall be required to serve
thirty (30) years, without entitlement to good conduct time allowance and shall be considered for executive
clemency only after service of said thirty (30) years." HB No. 62 defines and enumerates the heinous crimes and
seeks to penalize them with the death penalty.

An amendment by substitution to SB No. 891 was introduced by the Senate Special Committee on Death
Penalty. The amendment was entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crime, Amending
for that Purpose some Articles of Act No. 3815, as Amended, and for other Purposes." The substitute
amendment sought to amend (a) Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code by providing in the scale of penalties the
following:

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: DEATH

Afflictive Penalties: LIFE IMPRISONMENT

Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal

and (b) Article 27 of the same Code by inserting therein the penalty of life imprisonment and providing a specific
duration therefor as well as for reclusion perpetua. The proposed amended Article 27 pertinently reads as
follows:

Art. 27. LIFE IMPRISONMENT. — THE PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT SHALL BE FROM THIRTY
YEARS AND ONE DAY TO FORTY YEARS.

RECLUSION PERPETUA — THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA SHALL BE FROM TWENTY

YEARS AND ONE DAY TO THIRTY YEARS.

Thus, life imprisonment, therefore a penalty imposed by special penal statutes, was sought to be incorporated
as penalty in the revised Penal Code with a specific duration.

In his sponsorship of this substitute bill, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino explained the incorporation of life
imprisonment as follows:

But a very basic amendment was made, and that is, an amendment that will create a new
penalty, known in this bill as life imprisonment. The new penalty was created in order to enable
the committee to provide, in some crimes, a three-grade penalty that would be composed of
reclusion perpetua, as now provided by the Revised Penal Code, as the lowest grade; on top of
that, would be life imprisonment; and the third highest grade would be death penalty. With this
new grade of penalty, it became possible for this bill now under consideration to impose a
penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death, composed of actually three periods or
grades.5

However the Bicameral Conference Committee eliminated from the proposed amendment of Article 27 the
penalty of life imprisonment but extended the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (2) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years. Thus, in his sponsorship of the Conference Committee report on both the substitute SB
No. 891 and HB No. 62, Senator Tolentino stated:

By this, Mr. President, we have this new consolidated session that is before the Members of this
Chamber. There is one part or one portion of the Senate version that we have agreed to be
eliminated and that is the creation of the new penalty known as "life imprisonment." Even in
this Chamber, there were some doubts as to the creation of this new penalty of life
imprisonment because reclusion perpetua, which is in the Revised Penal Code and retained in
this bill, also means the same thing. It is a perpetual imprisonment.

So in order to still accommodate the increase of imprisonment by means of life imprisonment

— while we eliminated the new penalty of life imprisonment which would last from 30 years
and one day to forty years — what we did was simply to extend the period of reclusion
perpetua by adding 30 to 40 years imprisonment to the original 20 to 30 years, making the
 reclusion perpetua in this new bill range from 20 years to one day to 40 years. This would be
what we had called one day before a "flexible or divisible penalty." 6

Although Senator Tolentino described reclusion perpetua as a "flexible or divisible" penalty, yet in the portion of
his sponsorship speech immediately succeeding the foregoing description, he explicitly stated that the said
penalty is one of the two indivisible penalties in the Revised Penal Code. Thus:

Instead of having three penalties in the divisible [sic] penalty, we would have only two
indivisible penalties — reclusion perpetua to death; and the principles on aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code will be applicable to this penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.7

At first glance, by stating that reclusion perpetua was "flexible and divisible" and then later referring to it as one
of two indivisible penalties, Senator Tolentino might have fallen into an inconsistency. If we recall, however,
what he stated in his sponsorship speech to substitute bill where, as above adverted to, he mentioned the
proposed three-grade penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death, then indeed he could also be correct in
the sense that such three-grade concept would in fact be a complex penalty which would be divisible, with each
grade composing a period and which could then be governed by Article 77 8 of the Revised Penal Code. That
Senator Tolentino had this three-grade penalty in mind when he spoke of flexibility and divisibility and that he
stood by his subsequent statement that reclusion perpetua is one of two indivisible penalties is further borne
out by his explanations in relation to the rule in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code on the application of
mitigating circumstance. Thus:

Senator Tolentino.

In general, Mr. President, in all of these heinous crimes, the penalty reclusion perpetua to
death. Unless otherwise provided in the bill itself, this means that the provisions on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances will apply to them. Therefore that means, if there is
no mitigating and no aggravating circumstances, the penalty of death will not be applied
because under the provisions of the revised Penal Code, when there are two indivisible
penalt[ies] such as reclusion perpetua to death, if there is no aggravating circumstance, then
the penalty will be of lesser degree, which means: life imprisonment. But even if there is an
aggravating circumstance, still death penalty will not be applied because it will still be the
lesser penalty. This is how it is going to operate.

But if there is an aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating circumstance, the Revised
Penal Code provisions for the application of the higher penalty or the death penalty. That is
how it is going to operate. . . .

...

Senator Tañada.

Mr. President, permit me to clarify the matter further. The Gentleman is saying that the
principle of mitigating and aggravating circumstances is applicable in general to all these crimes
listed in this consolidated version. That means that, first, if there is no aggravating circumstance
and there is no there is no mitigating circumstance, then the crime, although listed here in the
measure, will not be punished by death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Senator Tolentino.

Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Tañada.

Second, if there is an aggravating circumstance, but there is also a mitigating circumstance, then
generally speaking, that aggravating circumstance is offset by the mitigating circumstance in
which case the lesser penalty which is reclusion perpetua will be the one imposed.

Senator Tolentino.

That is right, Mr. President.9

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the deed, and if the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, then the
greater penalty shall be applied if there is present only one aggravating circumstance, and the lesser penalty
shall be applied when the commission of the act was attended by some mitigating circumstance but without an
aggravating circumstance or when there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, and if both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances were present, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another taking into account their number and importance and then to apply preceding rules according to the
result of such compensation.

Verily, if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A.
No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of
any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion
perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when
either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for
imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.

This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63 assumes serious proportions since
it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (section 2), qualified piracy (Section 3),
parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8), robbery with
homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11),
and plunder (Section 12).

Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it should have
amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter if the law on what are considered
divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the period thereof. There are, as well,
other provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion perpetua , such as Article 41 on the accessory
penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched by a corresponding
amendment.

What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua? The deliberations in
the Bicameral Conference Committee and in both Chambers of Congress do not enlighten us on this, except the
cryptic statement of Senior Tolentino adverted to above on the elimination of the "new penalty" of life
imprisonment by the Bicameral Conference Committee. It may, however, be pointed out that although the
Revised Penal Code did not specify the maximum of reclusion perpetua , it is apparent that the maximum period
for the service of this penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years. In People vs.
Reyes, 10 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, stated:

We hold that there is legal basis, both in law and logic, for Presidential Decree No. 818 to
declare that any penalty exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum duration of reclusion
temporal, is within the range of reclusion perpetua.

It will be observed that Article 27 of the Code provides for the minimum and maximum ranges
of all the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep the peace which shall be for such period of
time as the court may determine) from arresto menor to reclusion temporal, the latter being
specifically from twelve years and one day to twenty years. For reclusion perpetua, however,
there is no specification as to its minimum and maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely
provides that "(a)ny person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some
other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon."

The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the Code which, in
laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more
than three penalties, provides that "the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not
be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him," and "(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual
penalties ( pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."

The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as
the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-
fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales of
penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and 71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty
 immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the
minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with duration thereafter to
last for the rest of the convict's natural life although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the
maximum period for the service of penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. It would be
legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of
reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a resultant lacuna
whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but is less
than thirty (30) years. 11

At most then in fixing a specific duration for reclusion perpetua , Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 merely restated the
existing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to MODIFY the decision of 25 May 1994 in this case by DELETING therefrom
the disquisitions on whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and SETTING ASIDE its division into three
periods and, finally, AMENDING the dispositive portion thereof to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-9118466 is
hereby AFFIRMED, subject ot the modifications above indicated. As modified:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, in addition to the penalty of

reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS
Y BRIONES is further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Chanda Lucas
y Austria, in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and

(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS Y

BRIONES is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser
offense of attempted rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and One
(1) Day of prision correccional as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
of prision mayor maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Chanda
Lucas y Austria, in the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
4. People v. Latupan, G.R. No. 112453, 28 June 2001

[G.R. Nos. 112453-56. June 28, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERARDO LATUPAN y SIBAL alias JERRY, AccusedAppellant.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 convicting
Gerardo Latupan y Sibal, alias Jerry of the complex crime of double murder and sentencing him to "life
imprisonment" and to indemnify the heirs of the two victims in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos
each. The court also convicted, Accused Gerardo Latupan of inflicting physical injuries to Jaime Asuncion, and
sentenced him to "ten days imprisonment" and to pay two hundred (P200.00) pesos as indemnity.

On April 13, 1992, Provincial Prosecutor Alejandro A. Pulido of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Tuao,
Cagayan four separate informations charging Gerardo Latupan y Sibal alias Jerry with two counts of frustrated
murder and two counts of murder, committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 379-T

"That on or about April 29, 1991, in the Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Gerardo Latupan alias Jerry, armed with a pointed knife, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, box, maul, kick and hit with his aforesaid arm one Leo Asuncion, inflicting upon him injuries on
the different parts of his body.

"That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.

"Contrary to law." 2

Criminal Case No. 380-T

"That on or about April 29, 1991, in the Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Gerardo Latupan alias Jerry, armed with a pointed knife, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, box, maul and kick one, Jaime Asuncion inflicting upon him injuries on the different parts of his
body.

"That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will.

"Contrary to law." 3

Criminal Case No. 381-T

"That on or about April 29, 1991, in the Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Gerardo Latupan alias Jerry, armed with a pointed knife, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one, Jose Asuncion inflicting upon him stab wound on his body which caused his death.

"Contrary to law." 4

Criminal Case No. 382-T

"That on or about April 29, 1991, in the Municipality of Tuao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Gerardo Latupan alias Jerry, armed with a pointed knife, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one, Lilia Asuncion inflicting upon her stab wounds on her body which caused her death.

"Contrary to law." 5

At the arraignment on May 25, 1993, Accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. 6 During
the pre-trial conference of the four cases, Accused offered to change his plea of not guilty to guilty of the
complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. The prosecution did not interpose any objection. Thus,
on July 20, 1993, the trial court re-arraigned the accused. He withdrew his plea of not guilty and instead
pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. 7

Thereafter, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to establish the culpability of the
accused.

The facts are as follows:

On April 29, 1991, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Ceferino Dagulo (hereafter Ceferino) was chopping firewood
outside his house in Angang, Tuao, Cagayan. Suddenly, he heard the shouts of a woman and a child coming
from the north.

Moments later, Ceferino saw accused Gerardo Latupan y Sibal walking in his direction, carrying a thin, bloodied
knife. Accused Latupan entered the house of Ceferino and started chasing Ceferino’s wife, who was able to run
to another house nearby. Unable to catch Ceferino’s wife, Accused Latupan turned to Ceferino and said, "I will
kill you all." At that time, Accused Latupan’s clothes, chest, hands and legs were full of blood. Accused Latupan
attempted to thrust the knife into Ceferino, who was able to parry it. Later on, Accused Latupan told Ceferino to
bring him to the authorities and tried to give the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch the knife and told
accused to go to the authorities by himself. Hearing this advice, Accused ran away.

The house of Emilio Asuncion (hereafter Emy) was 100 meters from Ceferino’s house. At around 4:00 in the
afternoon of the same day, Emy Asuncion was returning to his house from a store. He reached his house and
found his wife, Lilia dead on the ground with several stab wounds on her body. His one-year old son, Leo, was
lying on top of Lilia Asuncion. Emy picked up Leo and saw that the left side of Leo’s face was lacerated. He saw
Jaime, his three-year old son and asked where Jose, his eldest son, was. At that moment, Emy heard the voice of
Jose from upstairs of the house, asking for medicine. He ran upstairs and saw that Jose was wounded. He asked
Jose who stabbed him. Jose replied, "Uncle Jerry, Tatang." Seeing that Jose needed immediate medical
treatment, Emy brought him to the house of Ceferino and then returned to his house to get his two other
children, Leo and Jaime. They left the corpse of Lilia Asuncion inside Emy’s house.

Lilia Asuncion was the sister of Ceferino’s wife.

Meanwhile, Ceferino tried to ask a barangay councilman for assistance. Failing to obtain assistance, Ceferino
went back to his house and found Emy Asuncion and his children there. Then, Ceferino went to a military camp
to borrow a vehicle to bring the children to the hospital. The military men provided them with a jeep. Thus, the
three children were taken to the Nuestra Señora de Piat Hospital in Cabalansan. Riding in the jeep were five
soldiers, the accused Latupan, Emy Asuncion, Ceferino Dagulo, Ceferino’s wife, and the three children, Leo,
Jaime and Jose Asuncion.

During the trip to the hospital, Emy’s son, Jose, saw accused Latupan inside the jeep. Jose pointed to accused
Latupan as the one who stabbed him.

At the hospital, the doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime. However, the doctors advised Emy and
Ceferino to bring Jose to another hospital due to the seriousness of his wounds. So, they proceeded to Cagayan
Valley Regional Hospital. Sadly, Jose was dead on arrival. 8 He was only nine years old.

Jaime, 5 year-old son of Emy Asuncion, testified that he was three years old when the incident occurred. He
stated that accused Latupan stabbed his mother, stepped on him, threw his brother, Leo, outside the window
and stabbed his other brother, Jose. 9

After presenting testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case. The defense did not
present any testimonial or documentary evidence, merely relying on accused’s plea of guilty. Thus, the case was
considered submitted for decision.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GERARDO LATUPAN alias JERRY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex offense of Double Murder, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the two victims in the amount of P50,000.00 each or a total of P100,000.00.

"For the physical injuries suffered by Jaime Asuncion, the accused is sentenced to suffer ten (10) days
imprisonment. Likewise, for the physical injuries suffered by Leon Asuncion, the accused is also sentenced to
suffer ten (10) days imprisonment, both to be suffered simultaneously with the more grievous sentence of life
imprisonment, plus P200.00 indemnity to each of the two victims.

"SO ORDERED.

"Given in chambers this 25th day of August, 1993, at Tuao, Cagayan, Philippines."

"(sgd.) ORLANDO D. BELTRAN

Judge 10

Hence, this appeal. 11

Accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder.

Although this Court has set aside convictions based on plea of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment, the circumstances of this case
merit a different result. "Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the
accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses
legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by
the accused of the offense charged." 12

Crucial to the prosecution is the testimony of the eyewitness, Jaime Asuncion, who witnessed the incident and
even suffered injuries from the unprovoked attack of Accused-Appellant. He was familiar with accused-appellant
and categorically related to the court the events that occurred on the afternoon of April 29, 1991. Jaime
narrated how accused-appellant stabbed his mother, threw his brother out. of the window, stepped on him,
and stabbed his other brother.

Moreover, Accused-appellant was seen not far from the scene of the crime with a bloodied knife and clothes,
and mumbling threats at onlookers, including Ceferino Dagulo and his wife.

Thus, Accused-appellant is liable for the deaths of Lilia and Jose Asuncion, and the physical injuries of Jaime and
Leo Asuncion. From the manner accused attacked the family, he left them with no means of defense or escape.
Considering the treacherous manner by which the victims were killed, the accusedappellant is liable for murder
and physical injuries.
The trial court, however, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex crime of double murder" and
separate offenses of serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period." The instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex crime is
committed. 13 The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion
resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death of two persons
does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime,
are committed." 14

Thus, Accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double murder, but for two separate counts of
murder, and separate counts of physical injuries.

Further, the trial court incorrectly assumed that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was
included in the plea of guilty. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances, which are taken into consideration for
the purpose of increasing the degree of penalty to be imposed, must be proven with equal certainty as the
commission of the act charged as criminal offense. 15

Thus, evident premeditation cannot be presumed against Accused-Appellant. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.
16 In this case, there was no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the prosecution to show when accused-
appellant meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that elapsed
before this plan was carried out. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the commission of the crime
in April 1991 was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The trial court convicted accusedappellant of murder
and sentenced him to "life imprisonment." The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life
imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court intended to impose reclusion perpetua.

However, the penalty of life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in
duration and in accessory penalties. 18 First, "life imprisonment" is imposed for serious offenses penalized by
special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment"
does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, "life
imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the
maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. 19

We likewise note that the trial court sentenced accused to "ten days of imprisonment" for each count of slight
physical injuries. We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal terminology
in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and
accessory penalties. 20 The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as, under the scheme
of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and
corresponding accessory penalties. 21 Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the
Revised Penal Code, such as "reclusion perpetua," not "life imprisonment" or "ten days of arresto menor," not
"ten days of imprisonment."

Hence, the proper penalty for each murder committed in April 1991, considering the absence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, is reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties. Further, Accused-appellant
is liable for two counts of slight physical injuries and must be sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto
menor, each, likewise with its accessory penalties under the Revised Penal Code. 22

We sustain the triad court’s award of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as death indemnity for each of the
victims. No further proof is necessary other than the fact of death of the victim and the accused’s responsibility
therefor. 23 In addition, we award moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 pesos for each victim, without
need of proof of consequent physical suffering and mental anguish of the heirs of the victims, in line with recent
rulings. 24

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 in Criminal
Case Nos. 112453-56 with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant Gerardo Latupan y Sibal is convicted of two
counts of murder, for the death of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua in
each case, and to indemnify the heirs of Lilia and Jose Asuncion in the amount of P50,000.00 pesos, each case,
and in addition thereto, the amount of P50,000.00 pesos, each case, as moral damages.

Accused-appellant is further convicted of two counts of slight physical injuries and is sentenced to twenty (20)
days of arresto menor, in each case, plus P2,000.00 pesos as indemnity to each of the two victims, Jaime and
Leo Asuncion.

Costs against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

5. People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, 17 August 2011

G.R. No. 188562 August 17, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

RODEL LANUZA y BAGAOISAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision 1 dated April 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31406, which affirmed
the Judgment2 dated January 30, 2008 of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City in Criminal
Case No. 13388-14, finding accused-appellant Rodel Bagaoisan Lanuza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and applying the indeterminate sentence law, sentenced accusedappellant to imprisonment from
four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

The criminal information, charging accused-appellant with the crime of frustrated homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, reads:

That on or about the 1st day of April 2007 in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot by the use of a 12 gauge shotgun, Joel G. Butay, performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is the timely medical attention extended to
said Joel G. Butay.3

On July 11, 2007, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the criminal charge. 4

During the preliminary conference, the parties admitted, among other facts, that accused-appellant shot private
complainant Joel G. Butay; that as a result of the shooting, private complainant sustained a gunshot wound
which caused his confinement at the provincial hospital for 12 days; that accusedappellant voluntarily
surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP), Laoag City, surrendering a shotgun, five live bullets, and
one empty shell; and that private complainant suffered actual damages amounting to ₱70,000.00. Accused-
appellant, however, asserted that the shooting was accidental, as contemplated under Article 12(4) of the
Revised Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability "any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it." Private complainant, however,
insisted that accused-appellant pulled the trigger of the gun with the intention of killing him.

In view of accused-appellant’s assertion of an exempting circumstance in his favor, the RTC, in its PreTrial Order 5
dated July 26, 2007, ordered a reverse trial of the case.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

Accused-appellant testified on November 21, 2007, 6 while private complainant testified on November 29, 2007. 7
The RTC summarized the evidence presented by the parties as follows:

From the defense evidence, it appears that the incident subject of this case took place at the basement of the
BIR office in Laoag City in the morning of April 1, 2007, while the private complainant as outgoing security guard
was handing his shotgun to the accused, the incoming security guard. Because the accused did not report for
duty on the scheduled time, the private complainant reprimanded him. After the accused had affixed his
signature on the pertinent portion of the logbook enumerating the items turned-over to him by the outgoing
security guard, the private complainant handed to him their service firearm, a shotgun. Allegedly, the private
complainant held it with both hands, with the muzzle pointed at him and the butt towards the accused. At that
moment, the accused gripped the firearm with one hand, with his pointer finger inside the trigger guard and on
top of the trigger itself. In his affidavit which was adopted as part of his direct testimony, the accused stated
that "I immediately held opposite the muzzle of the gun where the trigger is, I almost slip with it while in the act
of gripping and then immediately the gun went off; the incident happened so fast that I was stunned then
realized that I accidentally shot my fellow guard." The private complainant was hit on the left side of his waist.
With the private complainant bleeding and unconscious, the accused went to the telephone upstairs to call for
an ambulance. There, however, the accused heard the sound of a motorcycle leaving the BIR premises. He went
down and discovered that the private complainant was no longer at the place where he had left him. The
accused, thereafter, proceeded to the Laoag City police station and surrendered.

The prosecution presented a different scenario. According to the private complainant, he did not actually hand
the shotgun to the accused. Instead, he merely placed it, together with one bullet, on top of the security guard’s
table. Although he was turning over six bullets to the accused, the private complainant asserted that the five
others were inside a drawer on the security guard’s table at their office upstairs. While the private complainant
who was about to go home was asking why the accused did not report on his scheduled shift, the latter got the
shotgun, placed the ammunition inside it, and shot him. The private complainant fell down on his buttocks. The
accused went near the private complainant and pulled the trigger a second time, but the shotgun did not fire
and the private complainant heard only a click. The accused ran upstairs, and the private complainant crawled
to his motorcycle and drove it himself to the provincial hospital. The medical certificate issued by his attending
physician, Dr. Frankie Pete Albano, shows that the private complainant sustained the following:

"- Gunshot wound 3cm. in diameter left lumbar area thru and thru left paravertebral area

- Fractured spleen / Hemoperitoneum 100 cc thru and thru left kidney (2 points)."

The medical certificate also indicated that exploratory laparotomy was conducted on the private complainant,
his spleen was repaired, and a drain was placed on his left perirenal area. 8

At the end of the trial, the RTC promulgated its Judgment dated January 30, 2008, finding accusedappellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused RODEL LANUZA y BAGAOISAN is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code and, with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years
of prision correccional as minimum to seven years of prision mayor as maximum. He is further ordered to pay
the private complainant ₱70,000.00 as actual damages and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against the
accused.9

Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief 10 before the Court of Appeals on July 23, 2008 to assail the
foregoing judgment of conviction rendered against him by the RTC.

In his Brief, accused-appellant maintained that he shot private complainant by mere accident. In the event the
Court of Appeals is not convinced that accused-appellant acted with due care, one of the elements for the
exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant urged the
appellate court to impose upon him a sentence in accord with Article 67 of the same Code, which specifically
provided for the "[p]enalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance
of Article 12 are present."

In the alternative, accused-appellant contended in his Brief that, at the most, he could only be held accountable
for the crime of physical injuries in the absence of proof of his intent to kill private complainant.

Accused-appellant argued that if he really had the intent to kill, he could have shot private complainant with
precision. Accused-appellant claimed that private complainant’s version of events immediately after the latter
was shot was incredible. By private complainant’s own admission, accused-appellant did not say anything to
him, did not hit him with the gun, and did not kick him while he sat on the floor after being shot. Private
complainant even pleaded for help from accused-appellant after sustaining the gunshot wound.

Accused-appellant further raised doubts as to the credibility of private complainant given the inconsistencies in
the latter’s testimony. The private complainant allegedly testified that he placed the shotgun and one bullet on
top of the security guard’s table for turn-over to accused-appellant. The five other bullets for the shotgun were
in a drawer in another security guard’s table on the upper floor. Private complaint claimed to have seen
accused-appellant load one bullet in the shotgun. However, during cross-examination, private complainant said
that all six bullets for the shotgun could not be seen during the turn-over. Thus, private complainant could not
have seen accused-appellant load any bullet into the shotgun. Private complainant also initially narrated that he
was about to board his motorcycle when he was shot by accused-appellant; yet, when cross-examined, private
complainant stated that he had already boarded his motorcycle at the time he was shot.

In its Brief11 filed on November 27, 2008, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines countered with the
following arguments:

I.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

ACCIDENT.

II.

THE PROSECUTION PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS A
RESULT OF A DELIBERATE AND INEXCUSABLE ACT.

III.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CORRECTLY FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.12

Upon review of the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on April 27, 2009,
dismissing accused-appellant’s appeal and affirming his conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide, as well
as the prison sentence handed down against him by the RTC. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the January 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 13388-14 finding Rodel Lanuza y Bagaoisan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide is AFFIRMED. 13

Instead of seeking reconsideration of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, accused-appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal.14 The Court then issued a Resolution15 dated August 19, 2009 requiring the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In response to said Resolution, plaintiff-appellee filed a
Manifestation16 stating that it was adopting its Brief before the Court of Appeals since there was no new issue
raised in accused-appellant’s appeal before this Court; while accusedappellant did not file any pleading at all.

The Court sustains the verdict of guilt against accused-appellant.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present. 17 Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist,
inter alia, of the means used by the malefactors; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the
circumstances under which the crime was committed; and the motive of the accused. 18 These elements are
extant in the case at bar.
The prosecution has satisfactorily proven that accused-appellant intended to kill private complainant based on
the method of attack, the weapon used, and the location of the gunshot wound. Accusedappellant shot private
complainant with a shotgun at close range hitting the latter’s abdomen. Resultantly, private complainant
sustained a wound that could have caused his death if not for the timely medical attention given to him. As
aptly elaborated by the RTC:

[T]he medical certificate shows that the gunshot hit the body of the private complainant, causing injuries to his
spleen and left kidney. In fact, the ‘hemopentoneum’ referred to therein means that there was bleeding inside
his abdomen and that 100 cc of blood was taken from it. As a result, the attending physician had to operate on
him, repair his spleen and place a drain in the vicinity of the kidney. Moreover, the private complainant had to
be confined at the provincial hospital for twelve days, a fact underscoring the gravity of his condition. Clearly,
one does not have to be a physician to realize that a person would die if the said injuries would remain
untreated. Accordingly, the accused must be deemed to have performed the last act necessary to kill the
private complainant.19

As both the RTC and the Court of Appeals observed, the version of events as recounted by the private
complainant was highly credible, while that narrated by accused-appellant strains human credulity.

The RTC did not give probative weight to accused-appellant’s testimony that his shooting of private complainant
was completely accidental, for the following reasons:

It is axiomatic that a person who invokes accident must prove that he acted with due care. This was belied by
the conduct of the accused when he allegedly received the shotgun from the private complainant. As he himself
admitted, he received the shotgun by placing his pointer finger, also known as the trigger finger because it is
used to squeeze the trigger, inside the trigger guard and over the trigger itself. Worse, he did so while the barrel
of the gun was pointed at the private complainant. Worst, he had been a security guard for three years prior to
the incident and had undergone lessons on gun safety. According to him, he knew that it was not proper for a
person to receive a firearm from another by immediately inserting a finger inside the trigger guard. Likewise, he
knew that the hand-over of a firearm with its barrel pointed towards the giver or any other person was not
proper. That he did these improper acts despite his training and experience as a security guard undermines any
notion that he had acted with due care during the subject incident.

In any case, the version of events narrated by the accused is unworthy of credence. To repeat, that the accused
did the abovementioned acts despite his experience and training as a security guard is difficult to believe. No
one can be a security guard and receive a firearm by immediately inserting the trigger finger inside the trigger
guard. In the same vein, no person can be a security guard and still point a firearm at himself or herself or any
other person while handing it to another. Clearly, no one who has undergone lessons in gun safety, much less
one who earns a living by providing security, can be capable of the acts admitted by the accused. Simply put, his
claim that he performed those acts is unbelievable.

There are other reasons for withholding credence from the claim of the accused. According to him, after the
private complainant was shot and rendered unconscious, he did not go near him. For ten seconds before he
finally decided to go upstairs, he did nothing. Moreover, he made no attempt to check if he was still alive or if
he could help him in any way. That he offered no help to the wounded private complainant undermines his
claim of accident. As observed in People v. Reyes, "had [the shooting] really been accidental, then the natural
tendency of the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate victim and even to plead
and express his regret to the mother of the deceased." 20 In contrast, private complainant’s testimony passed
muster with the RTC, to wit:

Indeed, the version of the private complainant deserves more credence. Contrary to the strained and
unbelievable scenario posited by the defense, the private complainant’s account was straightforward and
credible; allegedly, he reprimanded the accused that morning for not reporting on his scheduled shift, but the
latter got mad and shot him. It must be stressed that the accused himself admitted that the private complainant
had reprimanded him that morning. Clearly, there was reason – no matter how flimsy – for the accused to get
angry and to shoot the private complainant deliberately.

In any event, the Court has carefully examined the testimony of the private complainant as well as his
demeanor at the witness stand, and has found no reason to withhold credence from him. At the outset, the
accused failed to show any motive – and the records show none – for the private complainant to concoct a story
and to testify falsely against him. Moreover, the records show the private complainant’s positive and forthright
testimony to be consistent even under able cross-examination. It has been held that "the best test of credibility
is its compatibility with the common experience of man. A testimony deserves credence if it does not run
counter to human knowledge, observation and experience; whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes
incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance. Applying that standard, the Court finds no sufficient reason to
withhold credence from the private complainant’s testimony. 21

Hence, the RTC ultimately concluded:

In that light, credibility leans heavily in favor of the private complainant. The contrary testimony of the accused
does not deserve credence, and his claim of accident must consequently be rejected. For this reason, his
alternative – albeit implicit – claim that he should be held liable only for criminal negligence resulting in physical
injuries must also be rejected. Thus, the Court holds that the shooting of the victim took place not because of
accident or criminal negligence; rather, it was the result of a deliberate and inexcusable act, for which the
accused must be held criminally liable. 22

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of the RTC. The appellate court reasoned that private
complainant simply lacked the motive to concoct a story or falsely testify against accused-appellant.

There is no cogent reason for the Court to disturb the foregoing findings and conclusions of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. Accused-appellant’s implausible alibi of accident cannot overcome private complainant’s
positive and forthright testimony that accused-appellant shot private complainant with intent to kill.

It must be emphasized that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 23

The inconsistencies in private complainant’s testimony are not as serious or damaging as accusedappellant
wants this Court to believe. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the purported inconsistencies in
private complainant’s testimony pertain to details which are inconsequential to the credibility of his overall
testimony, thus:

While there may be some inconsistencies in private complainant’s testimony, these incompatible declarations
do not pertain to the essential elements of the crime of which the accused-appellant was convicted. They refer
only to minor matters and are inconsequential as they do not impair the credibility of the prosecution witness.
In fact, inaccuracies may suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed. This is
because a witness is not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. 24

Questions on whether or not private complainant had actually seen accused-appellant load the shotgun with a
bullet, or whether or not private complainant was already on board his motorcycle when he was shot by
accused-appellant, would have no bearing on the fact that private complainant was shot by accused-appellant
with the service shotgun turned-over by the former to the latter. The Court stresses that accused-appellant
himself admitted the fact of shooting, and only disputed any intent to kill private complainant. The conclusion of
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, that accused-appellant intended to kill private
complainant was not based entirely on accused-appellant deliberately loading the shotgun, but also on the
existence of motive on accused-appellant’s part, the location and severity of private complainant’s injury, and
accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the shooting.

Finally, the Court likewise sustains the penalty and damages imposed against accused-appellant.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than that prescribed by
law for the crime of homicide. 25 Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of the sentence shall be
that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal, the penalty for
the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, there being
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the
sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its minimum term which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the range of
prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition
of imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, is in order.

There is similarly no reason for the Court to disturb the award of damages made by the court a quo.
Accused-appellant shall compensate private complainant for actual damages in the amount of
₱70,000.00 as the parties voluntarily stipulated during the pre-trial conference that private complainant
incurred actual expenses in said amount because of his injuries. Accused-appellant shall also be liable for moral
damages suffered by private complainant in the amount of ₱25,000.00, in accordance with jurisprudence. 26

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated April
27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31406 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6. Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, 23 November 2011

G.R. No. 180219 November 23, 2011

VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of the affirmance of
his conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the Court of Appeals (CA)
through its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007. 1

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Biñan, Laguna (RTC) had rejected his pleas of self-defense and accident
and had declared him guilty of the felony under the judgment rendered on June 22, 2004. 2

Antecedents

The information filed on November 17, 1995, to which Talampas pleaded not guilty, averred as follows: 3

That on or about July 5, 1995, in the Municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused VIRGILIO TALAMPAS, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed
with a short firearm and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Ernesto Matic y Masinloc with the said firearm, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound at the back of his body which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The State presented as witnesses Jose Sevillo, Francisco Matic, Jerico Matic, Dr. Valentin Bernales, and
Josephine Matic. The CA summarized their testimonies thuswise: 4
Prosecution witness Jose Sevillo (Jose) who allegedly witnessed the incident in question, testified that on July 5,
1995 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic
(Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road in Zona Siete (7), Wawa, Malaban, Biñan, Laguna, repairing
his tricycle when he noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter
alighted at about three (3) meters away from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver,
and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant
again fired his gun three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto)
to fall on the ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back
(patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to the
hospital. On June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Biñan Police Station.

Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of his brother Ernesto who was then 44 years
old, he (Ernesto) was driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned ₱100.00 daily, although not on a
regular basis because sometimes Ernesto played in a band for ₱100.00 per night.

Jerico Matic, eldest son of Ernesto, alleged that he loves his father and his death was so painful to him that he
could not quantify his feelings in terms of money. The death of his father was a great loss to them as they would
not be able to pursue their studies and that nobody would support them financially considering that the money
being sent by their mother in the amount of ₱2,000.00 to ₱2,500.00 every three (3) months, would not be
enough.

Dr. Valentin Bernales likewise, testified that he was the one who conducted the autopsy on the body of Ernesto
and found one gunshot in the body located at the back of the costal area, right side, sixteen (16) centimeters
from the spinal column. This shot was fatal as it involved the major organs such as the lungs, liver and the spinal
column which caused Ernesto’s death.

The last witness, Josephine Matic, wife of Ernesto, testified that her husband was laid to rest on July 18, 1995
and that his untimely death was so painful and that she could not provide her children with sustenance. She
asked for the amount of ₱200,000.00 for her to be able to send her children to school.

On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo Matic
(Eduardo), not victim Ernesto Matic (Ernesto); that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the
incident, had had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he had parried the blow; that he and Eduardo had then
grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled, he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver;
that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto
during their struggling with each other; that the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he
had then seized the revolver and shot Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people
had started swarming around.

Ruling of the RTC

On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, 5 and disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT ranging from TEN (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) years and EIGHT (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Matic y Masinloc the following sums, to wit:

1. ₱50,000.00 – as and for death indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 – as and for moral damages;

3. ₱25,000.00 – as and for actual damages; and

4. ₱30,000.00 – as and for temperate damages.

Furnish Public Prosecutor Nofuente, Atty. Navarroza, the private complainant and accused with a copy of this
decision.

SO ORDERED.6

Ruling of the CA
 Talampas appealed to the CA, contending that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ERNESTO MATIC WAS
MERELY ACCIDENTAL.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN
DEFENSE OF HIMSELF WHEN HE GRAPPLED WITH EDUARDO MATIC.

Still, the CA affirmed the conviction based on the RTC’s factual and legal conclusions, and ruled that Talampas,
having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had thereby assumed the burden of
proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence, but had miserably failed to
discharge his burden.7

The CA deleted the award of temperate damages in view of the awarding of actual damages, pointing out that
the two kinds of damages were mutually exclusive. 8

Issue

Hence, Talampas is now before the Court, continuing to insist that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accidental death.

Ruling

The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself. 9

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The established
circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only
against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of Talampas’ attack, he having only
happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any
unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the
victim (Ernesto), thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4)
of the Revised Penal Code, 10 the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a situation where a person
is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process
produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental
result flowing out of a legal act. 11 Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.12 In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.

The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at
Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that point,
Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall
face down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly,
Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and
Ernesto.

And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting
and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the
blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.
Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused).13 Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, 14 criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.

The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,15 the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and
one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. 16 It is such period
that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years and eight months contravened the express provision of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion temporal.
Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.

The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum term thus fixed
was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10
years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience
when it will be time for the penal administrators concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is
already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the
computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment
from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y
MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, and IMPOSES the indeterminate sentence of
10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
7. People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008. See CJ Puno Dissent and J.Corona Separate
Opinion

G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

BETH TEMPORADA, appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification
the May 14, 2004 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant
Beth Temporada of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The antecedents, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:

From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita
Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the
Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a
fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay,
Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused and appellant were
then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred business to Discovery
Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all the requirements consisting of their
respective application forms, passports, NBI clearances and medical certificates, the accused and
appellant, on different dates, collected and received from them placement fees in various amounts, viz:
a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00; b) from Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio –
P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle – P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay – P69,520.00. As none of them
was able to leave nor recover the amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal
complaints against accused and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002,
Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and
appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended,
and the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:

 Criminal Case No. 02-208371:

"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH

TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.

That in or about and during the period comprised between the months of September 2001 and
January 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing
themselves to have the power and capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment to REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T. DIMAANO, EVELEYN V. ESTACIO, SOLEDAD
B. ATTE and LUZ MINKAY without first having secured the required license from the
Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly or
indirectly from said complainant[s] the amount of PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00,
PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00, respectively, as placement fees in consideration for their overseas
employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than that specified in the scheduled of
allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expenses they
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for purposes of
their deployment.

Contrary to law."

Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five (5) Informations for
estafa contain substantially identical averments as follows:

Criminal Case No. 02-208372:

"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH

TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.

That in or about and during the period comprised between November 23, 2001 and January 12,
2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said
ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to
the effect that they have the power and capacity to recruit and employ ROGELIO A. LEGASPI,
JR., as technician in Singapore and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in
inducing said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P57,600.00,
which amount, once in their possession, with intend to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR. in the aforesaid amount
of P57,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law."

The other four (4) Informations for estafa involve the following complainants and amounts:
1. DENNIS T. DIMAANO P66,520.0
0
P88,520.0
2. EVELYN V. ESTACIO
0
P69,520.0
3. SOLEDAD B. ATLE
0
P69,520.0
4. LUZ T. MINKAY 03
Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at large. Upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. After joint trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered
judgment convicting appellant of all the charges:
 WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth Temporada BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the
offenses charged and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum for the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum to ten
(10) years and one day of prision mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against
complainants, Dennis Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum for the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.

The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants actual damages as follows:
1. Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr. P57,600.
00
66,520.0
2. Dennis T. Dimaano
0
88,520.0
3. Evelyn V. Estacio
0
66,520.0
4. Soledad B. Atte
0
69,520.0
5. Luz T. Minkay
0

SO ORDERED.4
In accordance with the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,5 this case was referred to the CA for intermediate
review. On February 24, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC:

WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-208373, 02208375, & 02-
208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.6

Before this Court, appellant ascribes the lone error that the trial court gravely erred in finding her guilty of
illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa despite the insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.

We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed for the five (5) counts of
estafa.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:

ART. 13. Definitions. – x x x

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code
(now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.7

In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her co-accused,
misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business to obtain overseas employment upon
payment of a placement fee which was duly collected from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano,
Evelyn Estacio, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay. Further, the certification 8 issued by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and the testimony of Ann Abastra Abas, a representative of said
government agency, established that appellant and her co-accused did not possess any authority or license to
recruit workers for overseas employment. And, since there were five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found
appellant liable for illegal recruitment in large scale.

Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the requirement of her
employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she was aware of the latter’s illegal
activities and that she actively participated therein. In essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower
courts.

The contention is untenable.

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. 9
Appellant actively took part in the illegal recruitment of private complainants. Rogelio Legaspi testified that
after introducing herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a technician in
Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor. In addition to the placement fee of P35,000.00
which he paid to accused Bernadette Miranda, he also handed the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant who, in
turn, issued him a receipt for the total amount of P45,000.00. Upon the other hand, Soledad Atle and Luz
Minkay, who applied as factory workers in Hongkong through co-accused, Emily Salagonos, declared that it was
appellant who briefed them on the requirements for the processing of their application, and assured them and
Dennis Dimaano of immediate deployment for jobs abroad. For her part, Evelyn Estacio testified that aside from
the placement fee of P40,000.00 that she paid to co-accused "Baby" Robles in connection with her purported
overseas employment, she also gave appellant P10,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt for the amount of
P5,000.00.

The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable participant and effective
collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of complainants. As aptly found by the CA:

Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to complainants as general
manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining them, briefing them on the requirements for
deployment and assuring them that they could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts,
unerringly show unity of purpose with those of her co-accused in their scheme to defraud private
complainants through false promises of jobs abroad. There being conspiracy, appellant shall be equally
liable for the acts of her co-accused even if she herself did not personally reap the fruits of their
execution. We quote with approval the trial court’s findings on the matter:

"xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her co-accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles,
Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco in convincing complainants xxx to
apply for overseas jobs and giving complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis Dimaano
guarantee that they would be hired as factory workers in Hongkong, complainant Rogelio
Legaspi, as Technician in Singapore and Evelyn Estacio as quality controller in a factory in
Hongkong, despite the fact that the accused was not licensed to do so.

It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the Alternative Travel and
Tours Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth Temporada introduced herself as ATTC’s General
Manager. Saod accused was also the one who received the P10,000.00 given by complainant
Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. and the P10,000.00 given by complainant Evelyn Estacio as payment for
their visa and plane ticket, respectively."10

Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of the activities of her co-
accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed unaware of the
illegal nature of said activities, the same is hardly a defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. Under The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.11 Thus, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the
fact alone that the accused violated the law warrants her conviction. 12

In the instant case, we find no reason to depart from the rule that findings of fact of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded great respect by an appellate court. The
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because it is in the position to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. 13 Further, there is no showing of any ill-motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against appellant. Absent such improper motive, the presumption is
that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full weight and credit.

Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00
nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court,
therefore, properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on the appellant.

Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the same. Wellsettled is the
rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately
convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. 14 The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. 15 The same evidence proving appellant’s criminal
liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for estafa. As previously discussed, appellant
together with her co-accused defrauded complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability
to send complainants for overseas employment. Because of these assurances, complainants parted with their
hard-earned money in exchange for the promise of future work abroad. However, the promised overseas
employment never materialized and neither were the complainants able to recover their money.

While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the CA erroneously
computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down in People v.
Gabres;16 hence its decision should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The
reversal of the appellate court’s Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the latter, were
erroneously computed and must necessarily be rectified.

The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the
penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa cases
at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is within the range of prisión correccional minimum
and medium.

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However,
the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is
not prisión mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal
portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 17 of
the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor
minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. 18 The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus
be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court. 19

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with the
case of People v. Pabalan20 in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in
favor of the accused. The doctrine enunciated in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was
utilized in computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In accordance with the above
procedure, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC sentenced the accused
to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of
prisión mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly
imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the amounts defrauded were P66,520.00,
P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum for each
of the aforesaid three estafa cases. Since the amounts defrauded exceed P22,000.00 by P44,520.00,
P47,520.00, and P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court).
The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
mayor, and not 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.

Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00, the accused was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 11 years
and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6
years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can
be validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of
prisión mayor.

Response to the dissent.

In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the Court has consistently followed the doctrine espoused in Pabalan and more fully explained in
Gabres. The dissent argues that Gabres should be reexamined and abandoned.

We sustain Gabres.

I.

The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the maximum term shall first
be computed by applying the incremental penalty rule, and thereafter the minimum term shall be determined
by descending one degree down the scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel but erroneous
interpretation of the ISL in relation to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is not clear
how the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the legal justification therefor is not clear
because the meaning of the terms "penalty," "prescribed penalty,"
"penalty actually imposed," "minimum term," "maximum term," "penalty next lower in degree," and
"one degree down the scale of penalties" are not properly set out and are, at times, used interchangeably,
loosely and erroneously.

For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of certain terms in the sense that they
will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be aligned to what the dissent appears to be proposing in
order to clearly address the points raised by the dissent.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists
of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article
24922 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1
day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances which
when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict.
This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is
committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty
under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court
chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the " penalty actually imposed" on a
convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.

Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of homicide with a prescribed
penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances in this case, the imposable penalty is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided it
is within said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusión temporal,24 which is a single fixed penalty, with no minimum or maximum term.

With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum and maximum term
called the indeterminate sentence. 25 Section 1 of the ISL provides –

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.

Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL regime became the maximum
term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime,
then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the minimum term
could be anywhere within the range of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next
lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have possibly been
imposed.

If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term based on the maximum
term after the attending or modifying circumstances are considered, the basis for computing the minimum
term, under this interpretation, is the imposable penalty 26 as hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at
odds with Section 1 of the ISL which clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
"within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Consequently, the
basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, 27 and not the imposable penalty.

In People v. Gonzales,28 the Court held that the minimum term must be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability." 29 The Gonzales’ ruling that
the minimum term must be based on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying
criminal liability" is only a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from within
the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and from nowhere else). 30

Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise that its so-called "regular formula" has generally
been followed in applying the ISL. To reiterate, according to the dissent, the "regular formula" is accomplished
by first determining the maximum term after considering all the attending circumstances; thereafter, the
minimum term is arrived at by going one degree down the scale from the maximum term. As previously
discussed, this essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the minimum term shall be taken from
the penalty next lower to the imposable penalty (and not the prescribed penalty.) In more concrete terms and
using the previous example of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would mean that the
minimum term for homicide will no longer be based on reclusión temporal (i.e., the prescribed penalty for
homicide) but reclusión temporal in its maximum period (i.e., the imposable penalty for homicide with one
ordinary aggravating circumstance) so much so that the minimum term shall be taken from reclusión temporal
in its medium period (and no longer from prisión mayor) because this is the penalty next lower to reclusión
temporal in its maximum period. The penalty from which the minimum term is taken is, thus, significantly
increased. From this example, it is not difficult to discern why this interpretation radically departs from how
the ISL has generally been applied by this Court. The dissent’s "regular formula" is, therefore, anything but
regular.

In fine, the "regular formula" espoused by the dissent deviates from the ISL and established jurisprudence and
is, thus, tantamount to judicial legislation.

II.

There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or "stagnating" the minimum term within the range of prisión
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Preliminarily, it
must be emphasized that the minimum term taken from the aforementioned range of penalty need not be the
same for every case of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,31 the Court
provided some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty:

We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section
1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment
period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense." 32 We are here upon
new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in
the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the
"minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the
extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors
and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within
the ascertained limits. x x x x

We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the
considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of
imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI,
 August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member
of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the
court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not
be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social order.

Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered are: (1) His age,
especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3)
his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and
aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to
the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the
gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes – this should be
kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his dependents, family
and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and
the State are important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in
redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to
the beneficent intention of the Legislature. 33

Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines in Ducosin, will impose the same
minimum term to one who commits an estafa involving P13,000.00 and another involving P130 million. In fact,
to a lesser degree, this is what happened in the instant case where the trial court sentenced the accused to the
same minimum term of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208372, 02-
208373, 02-208375, 02-208376, and 02-208374 where the amounts defrauded were P57,600.00, P66,520.00,
P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However, there is no absurdity and injustice for two
reasons.

One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by a court would be the same, the maximum term
would be greater for the convict who committed estafa involving P130 million (which would be 20 years of
reclusion temporal) than the convict who swindled P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). 34 Assuming
that both convicts qualify for parole after serving the same minimum term, the convict sentenced to a higher
maximum term would carry a greater "burden" with respect to the length of parole surveillance which he may
be placed under, and the prison term to be served in case he violates his parole as provided for in Sections 6 35
and 836 of the ISL. Under Section 6, the convict shall be placed under a period of surveillance equivalent to the
remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the
Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the convict with the higher maximum term would have to serve a longer
period upon his re-commitment in prison in case he violates his parole because he would have to serve the
remaining portion of the maximum term, unless the Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a
new parole to the said convict as provided for in Section 8.

Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities, to this limited extent, the ISL still
preserves the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for a convict who
commits estafa involving a greater amount as compared to one who commits estafa involving a lesser amount.
Whether these differences in treatment are sufficient in substance and gravity involves a question of wisdom
and expediency of the ISL that this Court cannot delve into.

Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty is, likewise, applicable to other offenses punishable under the RPC. For instance, the
minimum term for an accused guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance vis-à-vis an accused
guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances would both be taken from prisión mayor – the
penalty next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict guilty of homicide with three ordinary
aggravating circumstances committed a more perverse form of the felony. Yet it is possible that the court, after
applying the guidelines in Ducosin, will impose upon the latter the same minimum term as the accused guilty of
homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance. This reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of
the other offenses punishable under the RPC. Should we then conclude that the ISL creates absurd results for
these offenses as well?
In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the legislature to be beneficial to the
convict in order to "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." 37 By the legislature’s deliberate design, the range of
penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains fixed and only the range of penalty from which the
maximum term is taken changes depending on the number and nature of the attending circumstances. Again,
the reason why the legislature elected this mode of beneficence to a convict revolves on questions of wisdom
and expediency which this Court has no power to review. The balancing of the State’s interests in deterrence
and retributive justice vis-à-vis reformation and reintegration of convicts to society through penal laws belongs
to the exclusive domain of the legislature.

III.

People v. Romero,38 De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,39 Salazar v. People,40 People v. Dinglasan41 and, by analogy,
People v. Dela Cruz42 do not support the formula being proposed by the dissent.

The instant case involves a violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. 43 The penalty for said violation is–

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar
involved violations of Article 315 of the RPC as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689 44
because: (1) the funds defrauded were contributed by stockholders or solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, (2) the amount defrauded was greater than
P100,000.00, and (3) the estafa was not committed by a syndicate. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 provides–

Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article
315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if
the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be
reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)

Since the prescribed penalty is reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua, the minimum terms were taken from
prisión mayor, which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. 45 As can be seen, these cases involved
a different penalty structure that does not make use of the incremental penalty rule due to the amendatory
law. Thus, the comparison of these cases with Gabres is improper.

Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing checks which is punishable under
Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 488546–

Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred
and fifteen is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
and P.D. No. 81847–

Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusión temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusión perpetua; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum was increased to
reclusión temporal by the amendatory law. Consequently, the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal is
prisión mayor from which the minimum term was taken. This is the reason for the higher minimum term in this
case as compared to Gabres. In fact, Dinglasan is consistent with Gabres–

Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is criminally liable for estafa, exceeds
P22,000, the penalty abovecited must be "imposed in its maximum period, adding 1 year for each
additional P10,000." Pursuant to People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, Oct. 28, 1999, an
indeterminate sentence shall be imposed on the accused, computed favorably to him. In this case, the
indeterminate sentence should be computed based on the maximum period of reclusión temporal as
maximum, which is from 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years. The minimum period of the
sentence should be within the penalty next lower in degree as provided in the Revised Penal Code,
i.e., prisión mayor, which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment. Considering that the
excess of the fraud committed, counting from the base of P22,000, is only P4,400, which is less than the
P10,000 stated in P.D. 818, there is no need to add one year to the maximum penalty abovecited. 48
(Emphasis supplied)

As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisión mayor) was determined without considering in the
meantime the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 on the prescribed penalty (i.e.,
reclusión temporal).

Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty for qualified theft is two degrees
higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty structure for simple theft 49 and estafa is similar in that both
felonies (1) requires that the prescribed penalty be imposed in its maximum period when the value of the thing
stolen or the amount defrauded, as the case may be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2) provides for an incremental
penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. It should be pointed out,
however, that the prescribed penalty for simple theft is prisión mayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is
lower at prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum.

Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is, thus, reclusión temporal medium and
maximum, while the minimum term is taken from the range of prisión mayor maximum to reclusión temporal
minimum, which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal medium and maximum. The penalty next lower
to the prescribed penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess of P22,000.00
consistent with Gabres. In fact, Dela Cruz expressly cites Gabres–

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since
the penalty prescribed by law is reclusión temporal medium and maximum, the penalty next lower
would be prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusión temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be anywhere within ten (10) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into consideration the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved in
the present case exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying circumstances
in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence, not in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty. (citing Gabres) Thus, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty in this case is the maximum period of reclusión temporal medium and maximum,
which ranges from eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty one (21) days to twenty (20) years,
 as computed pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. 50 (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting Opinion’s thesis that the minimum term should be
computed based on the maximum term. Quite the contrary, Dinglasan and Dela Cruz are consistent with
Gabres.

IV.

The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as analogous to a modifying
circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation that the "attending circumstances" mentioned in Section
1 of the ISL are limited to those modifying circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the
RPC. Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below –

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit "attending circumstances" as referring
to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be
limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other
modifying circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as "attending circumstances" for
purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism under Article 160 51 of the RPC. Under this
provision, "any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as a special
aggravating circumstance where the penalty actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. 52 Since quasi-recidivism is considered
as merely a special aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is computed based on the
prescribed penalty without first considering said special aggravating circumstance as exemplified in People v.
Manalo53 and People v. Balictar.54

The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by the Court in Gabres when it ruled therein that
the incremental penalty rule is analogous to a modifying circumstance.

Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides –

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x

Under Gabres, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is the prescribed
penalty55 for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in excess of
P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special aggravating circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually
imposed shall be taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic
mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the prescribed
penalty without in the meantime considering the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00.

What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the amount defrauded is P32,000.00 or
more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its maximum period but there is imposed an incremental
penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule applicable to
estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) at the discretion of the
court, in order to arrive at the penalty actually imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).

This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as
analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending
circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted as referring to such circumstances that are applied in
conjunction with certain rules in the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on
the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this
standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule
is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical
formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it
serves the same function of determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under
Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which the former accomplishes this function differs
with the latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to
modifying circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental penalty rule falls within the
scope of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because
this interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 56 Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinion’s
interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissent’s interpretation, Gabres
should be sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused.

V.

The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the minimum term does not make
sense within the meaning of "degrees" under the RPC because the minimum and maximum terms consist of
single fixed penalties. At any rate, the point seems to be that the penalty from which the minimum term is
taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken.

As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic mitigating and ordinary
aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most,
the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is
taken from the prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in this
limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with one
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken from reclusión temporal in its maximum period
which is within the prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisión
mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by the
dissent.

In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the prescribed penalty.
Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years of reclusión temporal while the
prescribed penalty remains at prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum, hence, the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere within
prisión correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense,
the incremental penalty rule deviates from the aforestated general rule. 57

However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the minimum term is taken is only one
degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken, and completely another thing to claim
that the penalty from which the minimum term is taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from
which the maximum term is taken.

The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general observation from the application of generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances in the RPC in relation to the ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer
to the one-degree difference as an essential requisite of an "attending circumstance." If the application of the
incremental penalty rule deviates from the one-degree difference, this only means that the law itself has
provided for an exception thereto. Verily, the one-degree difference is a mere consequence of the generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances created by the legislature. The difficulty of the dissent with
the deviation from its so-called one-degree difference rule seems to lie with the inability to view these
"attending circumstances" as mere artifacts or creations of the legislature. It does not make sense to argue that
the legislature cannot formulate "attending circumstances" that operate differently than these generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, and that, expectedly, leads to a different result from the
one-degree difference–for it would be to say that the creator can only create one specie of creatures. Further, it
should be reasonably assumed that the legislature was aware of these special circumstances, like the
incremental penalty rule or privileged mitigating circumstances, at the time it enacted the ISL as well as the
consequent effects of such special circumstances on the application of said law. Thus, for as long as the
incremental penalty rule is consistent with the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, there
is no obstacle to its treatment as such.

VI.

Much has been said about the leniency, absurdity and unjustness of the result under Gabres; the need to adjust
the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty to make it commensurate to the gravity of the estafa
committed; the deterrence effect of a stiffer imposition of penalties; and a host of other similar reasons to
justify the reversal of Gabres. However, all these relate to policy considerations beyond the wording of the ISL in
relation to the RPC; considerations that if given effect essentially seek to rewrite the law in order to conform to
one notion (out of an infinite number of such notions) of wisdom and efficacy, and, ultimately, of justice and
mercy.

This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of debate. The Constitution forbids it, and the principle of
separation of powers abhors it. The Court applies the law as it finds it and not as how it thinks the law should
be. Not too long ago in the case of People v. Veneracion,58 this Court spoke about the dangers of allowing one’s
personal beliefs to interfere with the duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later, once again
assumes much relevance in this case:

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they
are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, the law becomes meaningless. A government
of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference
of their own personal beliefs.59

VII.

Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental penalty rule based on the phrases
"shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be" and "for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code" found in the last sentence of said rule, viz:

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed
in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may
be. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in construing penal statutes, as
between two reasonable60 but contradictory constructions, the one more favorable to the accused should be
upheld, which in this case is Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory
construction in this wise:

It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the
government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom
penalties are sought to be imposed. This simply means that words are given their ordinary meaning
and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a
criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the status of a constitutional rule
under principles of due process, not subject to abrogation by statute.

The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several justifications based on a concern
for the rights and freedoms of accused individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts
understand it to mean that penal statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in language
people generally understand, about actions that would result in liability and the nature of potential
penalties. A number of courts have said:
 … the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed … is a fundamental principle which in
our judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to
citizens and subjects of making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission of which the
citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons of interpretation which apply to civil
statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction]
…. The burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power, it is their duty to
relieve the situation of all doubts. x x x x

Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and
judges. As one judge noted: "the courts should be particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are
not overthrown, in order to reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to be, sheltered behind
them."

But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not clearly and unequivocally
prescribed it could result in judicial usurpation of the legislative function. One court has noted that
the reason for the rule is "to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses
not within the contemplation of the legislature." Thus the rule requires that before a person can be
punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. And, so,
where a statute is open to more than one interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts
further rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground that it was not the
defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the statute. Along these same lines, courts
also assert that since the state makes the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it. 61
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable interpretations, the
construction which would impose a less severe penalty was adopted. 62

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties
imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8
months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4

years and 2 months of prisión correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of
reclusión temporal as maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION

CORONA, J.:

A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. - William Blackstone1

For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner. - William
Shakespeare2

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is one of the more complicated and confusing topics in
criminal law. It befuddles not a few students of law, legal scholars and members of the bench and of the bar. 3
Fortunately, this case presents a great opportunity for the Court to resolve with finality a controversial aspect of
the application and interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is an occasion for the Court to perform
its duty to formulate guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines or rules. 4 In the process, the matter
can be clarified, the public may be educated and the Court can exercise its symbolic function of instructing
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by statutory and constitutional guarantees. 5
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed
innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. 6

Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that "a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment." 7

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." 8 Since the goal of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused.

It is on the basis of this basic principle of criminal law that I respectfully submit this opinion.

The Bone of Contention

The members of the Court are unanimous that accused-appellant Beth Temporada was correctly found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33 and the Court of Appeals. However, opinions differ sharply on the penalty that should be imposed on
accused-appellant for estafa. In particular, there is a debate on how the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
applied in a case like this where there is an incremental penalty when the amount embezzled exceeds P22,000
(by at least P10,000).

In this connection, the relevant portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed twenty years.
In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor to reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxxxxxxxx

On the other hand, the relevant portion of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; x x x

Jurisprudence shows that there are two schools of thought on the incremental penalty in estafa vis - Ã vis the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the first school of thought, the minimum term is fixed at prision
correccional while the maximum term can reach up to reclusion temporal. This is the general interpretation. It
was resorted to in People v. Pabalan,9 People v. Benemerito,10 People v. Gabres11 and in a string of cases.12

On the other hand, under the second school of thought, the minimum term is one degree away from the
maximum term and therefore varies as the amount of the thing stolen or embezzled rises or falls. It is the line
of jurisprudence that follows People v. De la Cruz.13 Among the cases of this genre are People v. Romero,14
People v. Dinglasan15 and Salazar v. People.16

The Court is urged in this case to adopt a consistent position by categorically discarding one school of thought.
Hence, our dilemma: which of the two schools of thought should we affirm?

The First School of Thought Is

More Favorable To The Accused
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a sentence, the court must determine two penalties
composed of the "maximum" and "minimum" terms, instead of imposing a single fixed penalty. 17 Hence, the
indeterminate sentence is composed of a maximum term taken from the penalty imposable under the Revised
Penal Code and a minimum term taken from the penalty next lower to that fixed in the said Code.

The maximum term corresponds to "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the [Revised Penal] Code." Thus, "attending circumstances" (such as mitigating,
aggravating and other relevant circumstances) that may modify the imposable penalty applying the rules of the
Revised Penal Code is considered in determining the maximum term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is
arrived at after taking into consideration the effects of attendant modifying circumstances.

On the other hand, the minimum term "shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense." It is based on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
the offense without considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances. 18

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa (except estafa under
Article 315(2)(d))19 is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the
amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period. Moreover, where the amount embezzled is more than
P22,000, an incremental penalty of one year shall be added for every additional P10,000.

Thus, the Revised Penal Code imposes prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period (or a period of four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is
more than P12,000 but not more than P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty is imposed in its maximum
period (or a period of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight years) with an incremental penalty of one year
for each additional P10,000 subject to the limitation that the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no
case exceed 20 years.

Strictly speaking, the circumstance that the amount misappropriated by the offender is more than P22,000 is
a qualifying circumstance. In People v. Bayot,20 this Court defined a qualifying circumstance as a circumstance
the effect of which is "not only to give the crime committed its proper and exclusive name but also to place
the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed for said
crime." Applying the definition to estafa where the amount embezzled is more than P22,000, the amount
involved ipso jure places the offender in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than the imposition
of the penalty in its maximum period plus incremental penalty, if warranted. 21 In other words, if the amount
involved is more than P22,000, then the offender shall be sentenced to suffer the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty with an incremental penalty of one year per additional P10,000.

However, People v. Gabres considered the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved as a generic
modifying circumstance which is material only in the determination of the maximum term, not of the minimum
term:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be
"within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense." The penalty next lower should
be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by
law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to
modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This
interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charged against accused-appellant is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. (emphasis supplied)

If the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is considered as a qualifying circumstance, the penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for it will be the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period. This has a duration of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight
years. The penalty next lower (which will correspond to the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence) is
the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, which
has a duration of five years, five months and 11 days to six years, eight months and 20 days. 22

If the circumstance is considered simply as a modifying circumstance (as in Gabres), it will be disregarded in
determining the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. The starting point will be prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum and the penalty next lower will then

be prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods, which has a duration of six months and one day to
four years and two months.

From the foregoing, it is more favorable to the accused if the circumstance (that more than P22,000 was
involved) is to be considered as a modifying circumstance, not as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, I submit that
the Gabres rule is preferable.

On the contrary, the second school of thought is invariably prejudicial to the accused. By fixing the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence to one degree away from the maximum term, the minimum term will
always be longer than prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods.

Worse, the circumstance (that more than P22,000 was embezzled) is not a modifying circumstance but a part of
the penalty, if adopted, will mean that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence will never be lower
than the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
the penalty next lower to the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period.

The Second School Of Thought

And Its Shortcomings

The primary defect of the so-called second school of thought is that it contradicts the in dubio pro reo principle.
It also violates the lenity rule. Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation with harsher effects on the accused.
In particular, compared to the first school of thought, it lengthens rather than shortens the penalty that may be
imposed on the accused. Seen in its proper context, the second school of thought is contrary to the avowed
purpose of the law that it purportedly seeks to promote, the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The second school of thought limits the concept of "modifying circumstance" to either a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It contends that the
respective enumerations under the said provisions are exclusive and all other circumstances not included
therein were intentionally omitted by the legislature. It further asserts that, even assuming that the
circumstance that more than P22,000 was embezzled may be deemed as analogous to aggravating
circumstances under Article 14, the said circumstance cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance
because it is only in mitigating circumstances that analogous circumstances are allowed and recognized. 23 The
second school of thought then insists that, since the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is not
among those listed under Article 14, the said circumstance is not a modifying circumstance for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The second school of thought therefore strictly construes the term "attending circumstances" against the
accused. It refuses to recognize anything that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact meaning and
admits no equitable consideration.

To the point of being repetitive, however, where the accused is concerned, penal statutes should be interpreted
liberally, not strictly.

The fact that there are two schools of thought on the matter by itself shows that there is uncertainty as to the
concept of "attending" or "modifying" circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio pro reo principle, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of the accused and not against him.

Moreover, laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted. 24 The
meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose which induced the legislature to
enact the statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give a word or phrase a restricted or expansive
meaning.25 In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt the interpretation that best serves the
manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its object. 26 Where the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible to two or more constructions, that which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted should be adopted. 27 Taken in conjunction
with the lenity rule, a doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of incarceration ought to be
given an interpretation that affords lenient treatment to the accused.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to shorten his term of
imprisonment.28 The reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps "uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness." The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation that benefits the accused. 29 This
Court already ruled that "in cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be
unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate
sentence should not be applied." 30 In the same vein, if an interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
unfavorable to the accused and will work to increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should
not be adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the penalty of
lesser crimes carries with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave penalties is not only wrong
but also dangerous.

Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that the minimum term of the penalty be no farther
than one degree away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true that the minimum term of the
penalty in an indeterminate sentence is generally one degree away from the maximum term, the law does not
mandate that its application be rigorously and narrowly limited to that situation.

The Proper Indeterminate

Penalties In These Cases

From the above disquisition, I respectfully submit that the prevailing rule, the so-called first school of thought,
be followed. With respect to the indeterminate sentence that may be imposed on the accused, I agree with the
position taken by Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.

Accordingly, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

(1) in Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum;

(2) in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and
21 days of prision mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases and

(3) in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum.

DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:

The Court today basks magnanimous in its application of the rule that penal laws should be construed in
favor of the accused. Although I acknowledge that the application of this rule in the interpretation of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is properly aligned with the fundamental principle and purpose of the ISL to
uplift and redeem human material and to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness,[1] I am constrained to disagree with the reasoning of the majority.

In lieu of a straight penalty, the ISL provides for guidelines for the determination of an indeterminate
sentence, which shall be composed of a maximum and a minimum; thus, for crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), Section 1 of the ISL provides that “the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”[2] (emphasis
supplied)

While there is no dispute as to the determination of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the
crime of estafa, the ponente puts into issue the computation of the minimum when the crime committed calls
for the computation of additional or incremental penalties.
 The penalty prescribed by the Code for the crime of estafa is worded as follows:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be. (emphasis suppied)

The problematic portion of Section 1 of the ISL in relation to the above-quoted provision is the phrase
“prescribed by the Code,” which is essential in determining the range within which the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence can be pegged. As can be observed from Article 315, the penalty prescribed for estafa
in cases involving amounts exceeding P22,000 may be interpreted in two ways: first, that the term “penalty
prescribed” in Section 1 of the ISL merely refers to the phrase “the penalty provided in this paragraph,” which
refers to “prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,” without as yet
considering the addition of one year for each additional P10,000 involved; or second, that the “penalty
prescribed” denotes the whole phrase “the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos.”

In essence, the existing jurisprudence [3] which the ponencia staunchly defended and upheld, adheres to
the first interpretation. Under this view, since the “penalty prescribed” by the RPC for estafa is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the range of the penalty within which the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence would be determined would be that degree next lower thereto, or prision correccional
in its minimum to medium periods. Accordingly, the incremental penalty or the additional number of years for
the corresponding increase in the amounts involved in the fraud is merely considered as a “modifying
circumstance” which is considered in the determination of the maximum-but not the minimum-of the
indeterminate sentence. Hence, the range within which the minimum of the indeterminate sentence under the
current computation can be pegged is permanently set at prision correccional in its minimum to medium
periods.

On the other hand, the second interpretation provides that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be arrived at by descending one degree down the scale from the principal penalty, after factoring in the
incremental penalty into the same. In other words, for purposes of determining the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence, the so-called “prescribed penalty” for frauds involving amounts exceeding P22,000
denotes a penalty which has already been computed according to the number of years in excess of P22,000.
Necessarily, the distance between the maximum and the minimum shall always be only one degree away.

I find that this second interpretation is more in keeping with the intent and letter of the ISL and the RPC.

It is a basic rule in statutory construction that care should be taken that every part of a statute be given
effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole; for taken in solitude, a word
or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when a
word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. [4]

In our jurisdiction, “incremental penalty” as used in relation to crimes against property now refers to the
phrase “and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos.” I submit that for purposes of
determining the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, the “penalty prescribed” for estafa should include
the incremental penalty, since the penalty for estafa, as that in theft, hinges on the value or amount involved. [5]

People v. Gabres[6] was the first case which expounded on the treatment of the incremental penalty as a
modifying circumstance in the computation of the penalty for estafa involving amounts exceeding P22,000.00.
It explained thus:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be “that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed”
for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code
for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords
with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months
while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one
(1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00. (emphasis supplied)

To my mind, the rationale in Gabres is flawed. A plain reading of the provision on estafa yields the
conclusion that the law, as in the crime of theft, [7] intended a graduated penalty, viz: for estafa involving the
amount of P200 and below, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; for
amounts over P200 but not exceeding P6,000, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period; for amounts over P6,000 but not exceeding P12,000, prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods; and finally, the penalty subject of the controversy herein, “prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.” Verily, the manner in which Article 315 was crafted lends an
insight into the intention of the RPC, which is to ensure that the penalty for the crime committed be
commensurate to the amount of the fraud. Hence, I submit that the so-called incremental penalty is exactly
that–an incremental penalty–and not a modifying circumstance. Short of the RPC enumerating all the
gradations of the penalty for each amount that might be involved, the Code merely provided a formula in order
to arrive at the prescribed penalty. Nonetheless, a prescribed penalty had been intended, and that prescribed
penalty can still be easily derived after a mechanical application of the given formula. In fact, this is not the first
time we treated a modifying circumstance as separate and distinct from the incremental penalty, thus, in the
case of People v. Hernando[8]:

On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance nor the incremental
penalty for the amount in excess of twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos. Such
penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. (emphasis supplied)
 This position is boosted by the qualifier at the end of the provision on the penalty for frauds involving
amounts exceeding P22,000. To revisit Article 315:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be. (emphasis suppied)

As can be seen, the RPC attempts to limit the penalty prescribed, i.e., the computed penalty, to a maximum of
twenty years. Furthermore, the computed penalty is mandated to be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be, in keeping with the statement of the prescribed penalties for frauds of lower
amounts. Had the law intended the incremental penalty to be a modifying circumstance, there would have been
no sense in doing so. The more plausible explanation, therefore, is that the RPC is prescribing a penalty for
frauds exceeding P22,000. On this note, therefore, I am in agreement with the view that the penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum provided in the Code is merely the initial prescription or the
starting point–but not the complete penalty– which should be the basis for determining the range of “the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code” in order to determine the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence.

The rational backbone and main justification of the first interpretation is founded upon the rule in
statutory construction that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Mindful as I am of the woes
and wails of our prisoners, I cannot bring myself to ignore the error in this reasoning.

It must be recalled that the construction in favor of the accused is rooted in the presumption of
innocence which stems from the constitutional right to due process. Hence, the strict construction against the
government as regards penal laws pertains to cases in which the accused stands to be deprived of either life,
liberty or property.

In the instant case, I find that the application of this rule is somewhat strained. For one, the threat of
losing life, liberty or property without due process of law is more apparent than real, because the subjects of
the ISL are no longer merely accused individuals. On the contrary, they are already convicted felons whose
guilt had already been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, I do not see how they can still be accorded the
presumption of innocence.

Further, I am in doubt as to the characterization of the ISL as a penal law that could warrant a presumption
of innocence for the accused. A penal law is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes
penalties for its violations.[9] A closer look at the ISL, however, reveals that it does not make any act punishable.
Its complete title is telling: “An Act To Provide For An Indeterminate Sentence And Parole For All Persons
Convicted Of Certain Crimes By The Courts Of The Philippine Islands; To Create A Board Of Indeterminate
Sentence And To Provide Funds Therefor; And For Other Purposes.” Moreover, the classification of the ISL as
penal was made arbitrarily and without clear legal basis. People v. Nang Kay,[10] which cited the Corpus Juris
Secundum, points to the U.S. case of State v. Groos[11] as its authority for saying that the ISL is a penal statute. A
perusal of the said U.S. case reveals, however, that the penal character of the ISL was not put into issue in that
case, and that it was merely assumed that the ISL is a penal law. Accordingly, I submit that the presumption of
innocence could not be used in granting leniency in the computation of the minimum in the ISL.

Finally, even if we concede that the ISL is a legislation akin to an act of grace geared towards the
rehabilitation of criminals, and it being so, the intention of the lawmakers must be given effect, I still stand firm
that the existing interpretation is erroneous and reeks of disrespect to the sacrosanct principles of justice and
fairness.

It must be remembered that a statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in
relation to the statute’s totality. Further, each statute must be construed as to harmonize it with the
preexisting body of laws. Provisions of statutes must be reconciled, unless clearly repugnant. [12]

In the present case, it is clear that it could not have been the intention of the RPC to do away with the
gradations of penalty for the crime of estafa. Yet that is precisely what the majority has decided to do today. To
be sure, the existing interpretation disturbs the ladderized penalty scheme provided in the RPC and grants an
undeserved protection to felons convicted of frauds involving higher amounts. In effect, this puts in the same
category those who merely committed frauds involving lower amounts, thus, defeating the letter and intent of
the RPC and the ISL. For these reasons, I am duty bound to register my dissent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals.

8. In re Petition for Habeas Corpus, Pete Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 275

G.R. No. 147270. August 15, 2001

 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN,

PETE C. LAGRAN, petitioner.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On April 18, 1994, petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of three (3)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for
each count and to pay a fine of P125,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1 He appealed
the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on July 11, 1997 for failure
to file appellant's brief. The decision became final and executory on August 6, 1997 and entry of judgment was
made on March 5, 1998. 2li

By virtue of a Commitment Order issued by Hon. Elsa I. De Guzman, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 93, petitioner was committed to the Quezon City Jail on February 24, 1999. 3 On April 3,
1999, he was transferred to the New Bilibid Prison 4 where he has been serving his sentence until the present.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus on March 19, 2001. He prayed for his immediate release
as he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. Citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued
that if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences
emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated that he
has been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his detention
in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis.

Petitioner's argument deserves scant consideration.

Section 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 70. Successive service of sentences.--When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve
them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be
observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be
executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the
penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10. Temporary absolute disqualification,
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow profession or
calling, and
12. Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceeding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence
shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed
equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( penal perpetua) shall be computed at
thirty years.

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of
the penalties so permit. 5 The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual absolute
disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification,

(4) temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to keep
the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties, except destierro,
can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be
served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. 6 Where the accused is sentenced to two or
more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively. 7

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously.
Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, we find that petitioner has not yet completed the service of
his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999.
His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.