ARTICLES OF THE DAY

November 12, 2021

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 2

ROBERT INLAKESH, RUSSIA TODAY .................................................................................................................. 4

ALEX DE WAAL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................................................... 6

JAMEEL JAFFER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................................................ 10

MICHAEL KUGELMAN, SOUTH ASIAN VOICES ................................................................................................ 14

RAY MWAREYA, AL-JAZEERA ......................................................................................................................... 17

MITZI JONELLE TAN, AL-JAZEERA ................................................................................................................... 19

RIAZ RIAZUDDIN, DAWN NEWS ..................................................................................................................... 21

 The US’ coercive sanctions on Cambodia are actually aimed at
another obvious target
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
W ashington has
highlighted
‘corruption’ as
justification for a new array of
sanctions against Phnom
Penh, but in reality this
bullying manoeuvre is another
step in its ongoing efforts to
contain China.
Earlier this week, the United
States slapped a series of
sanctions on Cambodia,
blacklisting officials and
military leaders whom they
accuse of corruption and
issuing an advisory, warning
businesses “to be mindful of
interactions with entities in
corrupt business practices,
criminal activities and human
rights abuses.”
Washington has more threats
lined up, too, warning it would
review Cambodia’s trade
benefits under its
‘Generalized System of
Preferences’ for developing
countries.
But, let’s be clear, corruption
isn’t America’s real issue here
– it is the fact that the US is
being denied access to a
Cambodian naval base which
it believes is being used by
China. This has resulted in a
series of ultimatums from the
US over the past few months
that Cambodia must show
transparency by allowing it to
inspect the base, or effectively
face the consequences. Now it
would appear those
consequences have arrived.
To nobody’s surprise, the US
– whose cheerleaders
tediously pen op-eds accusing
China of being a “bully” – is
effectively coercing a small
country of 16 million people sized), or, if they are weak
to give the US unrestricted enough, to attempt to change
access to its own facilities. them by some forceful means,
including the use of sanctions,
Does anyone seriously believe
regime change or even war. In
that Washington would allow
the Middle East, it seeks to
China or Russia into its own
contain Iran in partnership
naval facilities? How do you
with Israel and Saudi Arabia,
think the media would
while also trying to topple
respond if either Moscow or
regimes Tehran supports, such
Beijing made those demands
as in Syria and Lebanon.
against a third country?
Placing this model of US
Hypocrisy aside, it is
foreign policy into the
absolutely clear that the US is
geopolitical layout of
intent on turning the heat up
Southeast Asia, there are
on Phnom Penh, because it
several countries which,
sees it as an important chess
irrespective of their
piece in the game against
governments, have
China. Cambodia is a
overlapping strategic interests
Southeast Asian country
that complement the US to
which is more loyal to China
some degree, providing some
than others in the region, but
space for Washington to work
one that has less strategic
with them – for example,
clout than some of the others.
Vietnam, the Philippines and
It’s obvious that until it
Indonesia.
reorients itself more towards
Washington, America will Cambodia is a different case.
ratchet up the pressure to try to As a small state whose foreign
force it to change. policy has consistently been
geared towards avoiding the
When the US calibrates its
local dominance of Vietnam,
foreign policy towards regions
it is currently the most
of strategic interest – which it
exclusively pro-Beijing state
is currently doing with the so-
in the region and heavily
called Indo-Pacific – it
reliant upon it across multiple
carefully selects which
areas. Despite having only a
countries it can work with and
small coastline, it could
which ones represent an
potentially influence the
obstruction to its goals. Out of
balance of power in the South
the associated countries, it
China Sea in Beijing’s favour,
then selects a number of
and so is seen as a strategic
partners to work with and
liability by the US. As a result,
build up from the former
the knives are out for
category, while it develops
Cambodia in Washington.
punitive strategies against the
The strategic interest of the
latter.
US dictates that it is now time
History shows these can to exert pressure in an attempt
consist of seeking to contain to prevent Beijing from
them (if they are significantly gaining a military monopoly
over it. The suggestion that
corruption is a problem is
simply a front for America’s
obvious discontent over the
naval base. The evidence? The
global Corruption Perceptions
Index shows Cambodia has
similar levels of corruption to
most countries in Southeast
Asia. Why would corruption
in a smaller country be of
concern to the US, but not the
larger states around it? The
opportunism is obvious. The
real problem from
Cambodia’s point of view is
that it has few options in
dealing with this new problem
other than to cave in. It has a
poor economy, and does not
have much leverage to
negotiate on an equal footing
with the US in the same way
as countries like Vietnam and
Indonesia, who use this
geostrategic advantage to also
court Beijing and essentially
try to keep both America and
China happy. Phnom Penh is
an easy target, and in the long
run, the US may be looking to
seek to dislodge the
longstanding rule of Hun Sen
and restore the country to
democracy, giving it an
ideological foothold as well –
backing up the Indo-Pacific
strategy, which has been as
much about “spreading
democracy” as a means to
contain Beijing as military
considerations. Yet this
should not distract us from the
reality that the US is exerting
coercion over a small country.
In conclusion, the US has
always had a very selective
response when it comes to
dealing with corruption.
While it never openly
encourages it, in practice all
over the world America has
backed up astonishingly
corrupt regimes, with the one
which recently collapsed in
Afghanistan a prime example.
Yet now it is using corruption
as a reason to target a nation
that is not complying with its
‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific
strategy. This makes the
situation painfully obvious:
the US sees Cambodia as a
troublesome player in the
game, and in line with its well-
established pattern of seeking
to crush countries who stand
in its way, it’s now ramping
up the pressure on Phnom
Penh. But rest assured, if
Cambodia does decide to give
concessions, this sudden
problem of corruption will
magically be forgotten about.
Bashar Assad is gaining acceptance among Arab leaders. The US
and Israel are losing an opportunity to engage him
Robert Inlakesh, Russia Today
I
n a significant move
towards normalising
Syria’s government, UAE
Foreign Minister Sheikh
Abdullah bin Zayed visited
Damascus to discuss
strengthening the ties between
the two nations, sparking
outrage from the US and
Israel. A surprise visit to the
Syrian capital on Tuesday by
Abu Dhabi's foreign minister
sparked condemnation from
the United States, which seeks
to encourage its Arab State
allies to steer clear of
President Assad. According to
State Department
spokesperson Ned Price, the
US urges “states in the region
to carefully consider the
atrocities that this regime, that
Bashar al-Assad himself has
perpetrated on the Syrian
people over the last decade, as
well as the regime’s ongoing
efforts to deny much of the
country access to
humanitarian aid and
security.” That seems to have
fallen on deaf ears over in Abu
Dhabi.
However, despite the Biden
administration having voiced
its opposition to Assad’s
government, behind the
scenes, it may actually be
working to create a temporary
amendment to its 2019
“Caesar Act” sanctions, the
mechanism it is speculated the
US may implement to protect
the likes of neighbouring
Jordan. This would involve
Amman liaising with the
Syrian government to allow
Egypt to send oil through to
struggling Lebanon. Back in
September, Jordanian,
Egyptian and Lebanese
representatives even met to
discuss the logistics of
managing such a transfer of
oil, so as to provide Lebanon
with the means to generate
electricity.
Publicly, it seems the UAE –
which reopened its embassy in
Damascus three years ago – is
leading the push to have Syria
reinstated into the Arab
League and enhance
cooperation between the two.
But, for Abu Dhabi, the so-
called ‘brotherly’ nature of
their relationship comes with
strings attached. From an
Emirati perspective, the
relationship between the
Syrian government and the
UAE is threefold: first, Abu
Dhabi sees Syria as a potential
partner in the fight against the
Muslim Brotherhood; second,
it sees an opportunity to work
towards facilitating the
cooperation between Egypt
and Jordan on the potential oil
transfer to Lebanon; and last,
it seeks to bring Syria closer to
the Arab reactionary regimes
and distance it from Iran. Both
Egypt and Jordan have also
taken strides to normalise
relations with Damascus: in
October, Jordan’s King
Abdullah II participated in a
phone call with President
Assad and, on Tuesday,
Egypt’s foreign minister made
it clear he was open to the idea
of Syria re-entering the Arab
League.
Prior to the war in 2011, the
Syrian government had
embraced neo-liberal
economics, but in terms of its
foreign policy, it has always
maintained a nationalist
agenda. When the war in Syria
began, the UAE jumped on the
bandwagon of conspiring
against Assad and financed
armed groups to overthrow
him. In and of itself, this
makes it clear that Abu Dhabi
is not acting in the interests of
regular Syrians. It is easy to
foresee the Syrian government
developing its relationship
with the UAE in order to
strengthen its position in the
region and secure investments
to rebuild its war-torn nation
in the future. From a realist
point of view, however, the
decision-makers in the
Emirates see that Assad is not
going anywhere. They are
seeking to combat Islamist
forces regionally, so why not
try to influence a nationalist
nation while working
alongside it to weaken the
Muslim Brotherhood and
erase Iran’s footprint in the
country?
Given Turkey may
imminently open up another
offensive into northeastern
Syria to combat the Kurds in
areas controlled by the US and
Kurdish SDF (Syrian
Democratic Forces), the
Emirati foreign minister may
well have wished to discuss
this issue during his visit to
Damascus. Turkey, which
currently controls two pockets
in Syria’s north through its
Syrian National Army
mercenary militia, is aligned
with the Muslim Brotherhood.
To the UAE, Turkey and
Qatar are its biggest regional
rivals.
But Washington, which is
surely well aware of the policy
positions its Middle Eastern
allies are taking on Syria,
continues to not only
economically restrain
Damascus, but also occupies
roughly a third of Syrian
territory with its proxy forces.
The US currently presides
over 90% of that nation’s oil
resources and is even looting
its most fertile agricultural
lands, which those Syrians
who are suffering under an
economic crisis are unable to
access. The US not only
blocks progress and has
extirpated attempts to rebuild
the country, but adopts a
militaristic approach and
views itself as maintaining the
right to remain there, despite
not having acquired any
congressional approval to be
operating in Syria.
The main role of the US
occupation of Syrian lands,
through its Kurdish proxy
forces in northeastern Syria
and its mercenary forces in the
al-Tanf region of south Syria,
is to combat Tehran. Until
significant Iranian influence is
cleared out of the land, they
will not leave of their own free
will.
Then we have Israel, which
will also not leave the Syrian
lands it illegally occupies
unless it is forced out in a war
between the two nations. In
tandem with Islamic State (IS,
formerly ISIS) terrorists who
have crawled out from their
caves and suddenly received
anti-tank munitions and a
spike in their numbers, Israel
has picked up its attacks
against Syria. In fact, it has
carried out at least five in
Syria over the past month,
killing soldiers and
assassinating an ex-member
of parliament. Israel is also
seeking to quadruple its settler
population in the Golan
Heights, with Israeli PM
Naftali Bennett having
announced new construction
plans just last month. It’s clear
that Israel is seeking to
provoke a reaction from
Damascus and test how far it
can cross the line before
drawing defensive fire.
Instead of the Syrian Arab
Army responding to US and
Israeli aggression,
independent groups that align
with Iran have been at the
forefront of combating Tel
Aviv and Washington. The
reality is that Syria is so
embroiled in this hostile
situation between different
foreign powers attempting to
extract different things from it
that it is difficult to tell where
the government is currently
headed, and whether it will
continue to follow a
nationalist path or eventually
adopt a more business-minded
rather than ideologically
driven approach. Ultimately,
it seems the UAE will play a
limited role in Syria for now,
but only time will tell who
gets the better of the other in
this ever-expanding
relationship.
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 Countering Sudan’s Coup
Alex de Waal, Foreign Affairs
C
oming just two years
after Sudan’s historic
democratic transition,
the October 25 coup by the
Sudanese army has halted the
country’s faltering steps
toward stability. In the weeks
since seizing control of the
government, General Abdel
Fattah al-Burhan, the head of
the Sudanese Armed Forces,
has dissolved civilian
institutions and kept deposed
Prime Minister Abdalla
Hamdok and other leading
politicians under detention.
Meanwhile, tens of thousands
of Sudanese have
courageously taken to the
streets in protest and staged a
general strike amid food
shortages and rampant
inflation.
As significant, however, may
be what Burhan’s actions
mean for U.S. diplomacy in
the region. In contrast to his
predecessor, President Joe
Biden has made the Horn of
Africa a priority, appointing a
special envoy, Jeffrey
Feltman, to develop and
implement a strategy to bring
peace to the troubled region.
The United States had also
supported Sudan’s nascent
democracy with financial aid,
loan guarantees, and
assistance to institution
building and security-sector
reform. Yet the coup caught
Washington seemingly by
surprise, occurring just hours
after Feltman met with
Burhan in Khartoum and
stressed Washington’s strong
commitment to the existing
agreements between the
civilian and military
leaderships.
As a direct snub to the United
States, Burhan’s power grab
has further called into
question U.S. influence in an
already unstable
neighborhood. Burhan was
likely emboldened by the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan
and by Ethiopian Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed’s
repudiation of U.S. efforts to
end the war and humanitarian
crisis in that country. Now, the
general threatens to undo yet
another fledgling democratic
government that had been
supported by the United
States, to the not-so-secret
satisfaction of Russia, China,
and would-be autocrats
around the world. Such an
outcome, however, is hardly
predetermined. In contrast to
other fragile aspiring
democracies across the greater
Middle East in recent years,
Sudan maintains a strong
diplomatic relationship with
the United States. Crucial to
Washington’s leverage is
whether key allies in the
region—Egypt, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates—are onboard.
Whether the Biden
administration is prepared to
take rapid action to restore
Sudan’s democratic transition
will be a crucial test of its
ability to shape political
outcomes in the Horn of
Africa and the Red Sea arena
and of Biden’s increasingly
vulnerable democracy agenda
worldwide.
“THIS IS NOT A COUP”
Adopting the familiar stance
of Sudan’s previous military
dictators, Burhan has sought
to project an image of strength
and stability. Among the
confusing things the general
said on the morning he took
power was, “This is not a
coup.” His claim has been that
as both head of the Sudanese
Armed Forces and chairman
of the Sovereign Council—a
kind of collective
presidency—he is already de
facto head of state. In the
tradition of nationalistic army
officers stepping in to save the
nation from crisis—which has
happened three times in
Sudan’s 65-year history as an
independent state—Burhan
asserts that he is the legitimate
guardian of Sudan’s transition
and that the civilians have
failed.
Few inside or outside Sudan
have been fooled by this
posture. As the Sudanese
public have vigorously
protested, the African Union
has suspended Sudan’s
membership on the grounds of
an “unconstitutional change of
government.” Nor has Burhan
offered a credible solution to
any of Sudan’s many pressing
challenges, including
stabilizing the economy,
completing efforts to bring the
two largest rebel groups into
last year’s Juba Peace
Agreement, and meeting
popular demands for a swifter
transition to democracy.
In fact, there is a much simpler
explanation for Burhan’s
seizure of power. According
to the 2019 Constitutional
Declaration, which is the road
map for Sudan’s transition to
democracy, Burhan was due
to step down from his
chairmanship of the Sovereign
Council on November 19,
handing it over to a civilian
leader. Clearly, he was
unprepared to take this step.
But he also seems to have
been unprepared for the extent
of popular hostility to his
takeover.
Burhan’s power grab has
further called into question
U.S. influence in an already
unstable neighborhood.
Faced with the prospect of
renewed military rule, large
numbers of Sudanese have
been determined to preserve
the country’s remarkable first
steps toward public freedom
and accountable government.
Driving the protests has been
the Forces for Freedom and
Change—the broad coalition
of professional groups,
political parties, and civil
society organizations, as well
as neighborhood committees,
that organized the nonviolent
protests that brought down the
former regime of President
Omar al-Bashir in April 2019.
This capable and resilient
democracy movement has
repeatedly shown itself to be
unbowed by the military.
Following a massacre by the
armed forces of more than 100
protesters, two months after
the fall of Bashir, the FFC
mobilized a “march of the
millions” that forced the
generals to negotiate. And on
October 30, just five days after
the coup, the FFC defiantly
staged another “march of the
millions” that brought out
hundreds of thousands of
protests in cities across Sudan,
despite an Internet shutdown
imposed by the military. The
FFC is also behind the general provide. Already, the Biden
strike. administration has decided to
“pause” $700 million in aid in
The protesters’ central
response to the coup. But it
demands are an immediate
also can use a much bigger
return to civilian rule and the
financial rescue package as
removal of the army from the
leverage. Rescheduling
political leadership. Hamdok,
Sudan’s $70 billion debt, for
who had earlier been
example, will require the
criticized for his harsh
cooperation of the United
austerity measures and his
States, which with its
preference for consensus
European allies has a
building that has veered into
controlling stake in the World
indecision, has also gained
Bank and the International
new support since the coup.
Monetary Fund.
Though he remains under
house arrest, he has refused to Cut off from Western donors,
back down on his call for a Burhan could sustain his
restoration of the pre–October regime on sales of gold, the
25 governing formula, and he profits of military-owned
has emerged as a unifying companies, and deals with
figure among the protesters Russia to provide
and the central player in mercenaries. But the United
efforts to negotiate a reversal States could respond with
of the coup. financial sanctions: should the
Biden administration invoke
If the FFC and its supporters
the Global Magnitsky Act,
succeed in restoring Hamdok
these activities could quickly
to office, they will be urging
be shut down. The United
him to take radical steps to
States can also speed up plans
dismantle the power of the
to uncover illicit flows of
military. Two years ago,
minerals that are ferried out of
Burhan buckled under the
the country through the
combined pressure of street
Khartoum International
demonstrations and U.S.-led
Airport. A bipartisan bill has
international pressure.
been tabled in Congress,
Sudanese democrats are
whose members have called
hoping that the same
on the U.S. secretary of state
combination will work today.
to “immediately identify coup
But this time the generals are
leaders, their accomplices,
proving to be a tougher nut to
and enablers for consideration
crack.
for targeted sanctions.”
BETWEEN A
Sudan’s history shows that a
STRONGMAN AND A
strong authoritarian leader
HARD PLACEIn theory, the
does not mean a strong, stable
United States has strong tools
country—in fact, quite the
at its disposal to push for a
reverse. More difficult may be
reversal of the coup. Burhan’s
persuading important U.S.
biggest weakness—and
allies in the region to oppose
Washington’s greatest
military rule. Despite the
strength—is that Sudan
African Union’s firm stand
desperately needs money. The
against the coup, several
general can turn to the Gulf
governments are more
states for temporary support,
comfortable with Burhan than
but the amounts needed to
with the civilian leadership.
salvage the economy are far
Hours after Burhan met with
larger than what the Saudis
Feltman, he flew to Cairo and
and Emiratis are ready to
received final approval for a
military takeover from
Egyptian President (and
former General) Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi, an old friend. And
Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates are also
habitual supporters of military
strongmen, even in a case like
Sudan’s, in which the military
has close ties to Islamist
groups, whereas the
democrats are strongly anti-
Islamist. Israel dealt directly
with Burhan over the
negotiations for Sudan to
establish diplomatic relations
in 2020.
Feltman’s diplomacy has
focused on getting these
Middle Eastern allies to align
with the United States in not
recognizing the new
government. So far this has
been moderately successful.
Under U.S. pressure, no Arab
country has come out in
support of Burhan, and the
Arab League—in an unusual
divergence with the Egyptian
government—has condemned
the coup.
Paradoxically, Sudan’s
perilous economy gives
Burhan a card to play: he can
dig in and invoke the
likelihood of a food security
crisis and the collapse of the
Juba Peace Agreement if aid is
not forthcoming. Burhan’s
“back me or things may get
worse” argument is
superficially plausible
because of the threat of an
economic meltdown bringing
civil disorder. But Sudan’s
history shows that a strong
authoritarian leader does not
mean a strong, stable
country—in fact, quite the
reverse.
THE SHADOW OF
BASHIRMany Sudanese see
the coup as a bazaar in which rival
counterrevolution—a return
to the days of Sudan’s
longtime strongman president,
Omar al-Bashir. Not only did
Burhan and the army
leadership hold prominent
posts under Bashir, they also
profited from the “deep state”
that he used to perpetuate his
rule. Under his regime,
networks of military officers
and Islamists ran shadowy
businesses that included arms
manufacturing, gold trading,
and money laundering, in
addition to controlling a slew
of legitimate companies that
won lucrative construction
and import-export contracts.
Hamdok’s moves to dismantle
these networks may indeed
have spurred the takeover.
Since seizing power, Burhan
has released some of the
leading figures of the former
regime from prison, where
they were awaiting trial on
corruption charges. He has
also appointed old cronies to
key posts controlling finance,
oil, and minerals.
To anyone who lived through
the earlier era, these are
ominous moves. Bashir lasted
three decades in power
through skillful management
of the country’s various
factions. His constituencies
included the Islamists, who
over the years traded their
radical principles for the
comforts of crony capitalism;
military and security officers,
who profited from corrupt
dealings; and provincial chiefs
and militia leaders, who were
paid off to make their
fiefdoms pliant to the will of
the government. Instead of
engaging with the legitimate
demands of southern
Sudanese, Darfurians, and
other groups suffering from
notorious inequalities in
wealth and power, Bashir
turned Sudanese politics into a
members of the elite jockeyed
for personal rewards.
As well as the future of Sudan,
the credibility of the U.S.
commitment to democracy is
at stake. Meanwhile, the
grievances of the general
population festered and grew.
In southern Sudan, local
warlords paid by the
government to suppress
discontent ended up siding
with the rebel Sudan People’s
Liberation Army and
supporting secession. In
Darfur, the most powerful
paramilitary commander—
General Mohamed “Hemedti”
Dagolo—brought his troops to
Khartoum, where he has
become a key power broker.
And with the army and
security gobbling up as much
as 60 percent of government
spending, economic crisis was
inevitable.
Even after 2019, with a new
civilian leadership installed in
Khartoum, rural Sudan
remained governed by the
army, paramilitaries, and
tribal chiefs. Under Burhan
and Hemedti, new violent
conflicts have unfolded
between Arab and non-Arab
groups in Darfur and other
outlying regions, with more
than 400,000 people displaced
this year.
With his unconvincing talk of
stability, Burhan seeks to
resurrect the politics of the
Bashir era. If the soldiers are
allowed to set the terms of a
compromise deal with the
civilians, we can be sure that
Sudan’s bloated military
budget will not be touched and
the deep meddling of the
military in the economy will
remain, strangling the free
market and nourishing
corruption. Provincial
strongmen will prosper. Left
untouched, the Burhan regime
could take Sudan back to its
darkest days of kleptocratic
militarism and endless
conflict.
FINDING A WAY OUTA
better outcome is still
achievable. In the second
week of November, a
promising compromise
formula for reinstating
Hamdok at the head of a new
civilian cabinet fell apart
owing to Burhan’s
intransigence. The general
refused to relinquish control
over the strategic assets of the
economy and reinstate the
civilian committee that had
been dismantling the corrupt
capitalism of the previous
regime. By showing Burhan’s
true colors, however, these
actions also provide a strong
rationale for the United States
and its allies to take decisive
action against the military’s
finances, including targeted
sanctions.
At the same time, Burhan
cannot afford to lose popular
support completely and knows
that the use of force against
protesters—who now include
broad cross sections of the
population—would spell ruin.
Hamdok and the FFC can
offer some modest
compromises for Burhan to
save face and also strengthen
Sudan’s transition—for
instance, by establishing the
long delayed legislative
assembly with a balanced
representation of political
parties and perhaps even some
military representatives.
Sending Bashir to the
International Criminal Court
in The Hague is a divisive
step; as part of a political
settlement, he could face
justice in Sudan instead.
In the weeks since the coup,
the United States has also
suggested it is open to some
degree of compromise. In a
discussion at the U.S. Institute
of Peace on November 2,
Feltman emphasized that
Washington’s driving priority
is stability. In a statement the
following day, the “quad” of
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, the United States,
and the United Kingdom also
stressed that any government
in Sudan must be committed
to the 2019 Constitutional
Declaration and the Juba
Peace Agreement “as the
foundation for further
dialogue about how to restore
and uphold a genuine civil-
military partnership. . . .” This
falls short of an unequivocal
demand to restore civilian rule
and ducks the question of
Burhan handing over power
this month.
If the United States hopes to
put a halt to Burhan and give
support to Sudan’s
beleaguered democracy
movement, however, it must
act quickly. Using its main
instrument for pressing
Burhan—finance—
Washington can, with support
from its Middle Eastern and
European allies, put the
generals in a hard place. At the
same time, by building a
unified international
diplomatic front to back the
African Union’s principled
opposition to an
unconstitutional change of
government and support the
demands of the Sudanese
people for civilian rule, the
United States can bring
Burhan back to the table.
Without such engagement,
however, Sudan risks losing
all of the progress it has made.
As well as the future of Sudan,
the credibility of the U.S.
commitment to democracy is
at stake.

Jameel Jaffer, Foreign Affairs
A
mericans lie on their
résumés, in their
dating profiles, in
campaign ads, in their
memoirs, and, perhaps most
of all, on social media. Thanks
to the First Amendment, they
can mostly do so with
impunity—or, at any rate,
without fearing that the
government will punish them
for it. In most contexts, the
First Amendment prohibits
the government from
restricting speech because of
its message. It makes it
difficult for public figures to
win defamation suits. It
precludes the government
from criminalizing falsehoods
that don’t cause serious harm.
As a result, Americans enjoy
broad freedom to say things
that aren’t true.
From one perspective, this
freedom is a wonderful thing,
or at least a necessary
byproduct of the United
States’ foundational
commitment to popular
government, individual
autonomy, and free trade in
ideas. But in an era in which
misinformation is often
described as a scourge, this
freedom takes on a darker hue.
What previously seemed like
a feature of the country’s
constitutional system can
begin to seem like a bug.
Is the First Amendment
preventing the U.S.
government from curtailing
harmful lies online? More
broadly, is a blind
commitment to free speech
impeding public and private
institutions from responding
as they should to the problem
of misinformation? These are
Liars in High Places
the questions that Cass
Sunstein—a Harvard
professor, a former regulatory
czar in the Obama
administration, and the most
cited legal scholar in the
country—takes up in Liars.
The book is both succinct and
far-ranging. In a brisk nearly
200 pages, Sunstein looks at
lies through the lenses of
ethics, political theory, and
constitutional doctrine. In
attributing the current
informational crisis to a
proliferation of lies, however,
the book largely overlooks the
role that governments, the
media, and technology
companies are playing as
agents and amplifiers of
misinformation. Sunstein’s
account lets the most powerful
actors off the hook.
REGULATING
SPEECHSunstein argues that
the United States should
regulate lies more
aggressively than it does,
even as he acknowledges that
in most contexts, it is better
to allow false speech to be
corrected in the marketplace
of ideas. It is usually better to
trust the marketplace, he
says, because even a
government operating in
good faith will not always be
able to separate truth from
fiction and because some
governments will use the
authority to police speech to
suppress dissent instead. (The
“fake news” laws being
adopted around the world,
including in Brazil, Hungary,
and Russia, are a reminder
that this threat is real.) There
is also a risk that falsehoods
that are suppressed—rather
than confronted head-on—
will fester and become more
dangerous.
But these arguments are not
always convincing, Sunstein
says. Some falsehoods
threaten serious harms that
are not likely to be corrected
organically in public
discourse. With respect to
these falsehoods,
policymakers must consider
regulatory responses. The
U.S. Constitution is not always
an obstacle to regulatory
intervention, Sunstein
observes. The First
Amendment permits
defamation suits, although it
does place some limits on
them. It allows the
government to ban false
advertising. It doesn’t
preclude the government
from prosecuting someone
for committing perjury or
impersonating a government
officer. In all these spheres,
the First Amendment allows
the government to punish
people who lie. The First
Amendment should be
understood to permit the
regulation of lies in other
spheres, too, Sunstein says.
For example, the government
should be able to regulate
misinformation that
threatens public health. It
should be able to regulate
doctored videos, even if they
aren’t defamatory. These
kinds of lies, Sunstein writes,
cause serious harms that
cannot always be prevented
or remedied by responsive
speech. People may rely on
false claims about public
health before the claims can
be exposed as false. A video
may change the public’s
perception of a public figure
even if it is later shown to
have been doctored. The
government should be able to
respond to this kind of
falsity—if not by prohibiting
certain kinds of speech, then
at least by labeling the lies as
such or by requiring social
media platforms to do so.
First Amendment doctrine,
Sunstein argues, too narrowly
limits the government’s
ability to tackle harmful
falsehoods. One of the cases
he takes aim at is New York
Times v. Sullivan, from 1964,
in which the Supreme Court
held that a public official who
sues a critic for defamation
must demonstrate that the
critic knew his or her
statement was false or acted
with “reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”
Many reporters, editors, and
media lawyers regard the
decision in this case as
synonymous with press
freedom, but Sunstein is not
so enthusiastic. In an age in
which anyone can
disseminate misinformation
across the world with the click
of a button, he says, the case
“looks increasingly
anachronistic.” It makes it too
difficult to hold people
accountable for lies that do
real damage, he argues.
He also takes issue with the
Supreme Court’s more recent
decision in United States v.
Alvarez. That case, from 2012,
invalidated the 2005 Stolen
Valor Act, a federal statute
that criminalized lies about
receiving military decorations
or medals. (The defendant in
the case was an inveterate liar
who had falsely claimed to
have been awarded the
Congressional Medal of
Honor.) The Court’s decision
was based in large part on the
concern that imposing
penalties for false speech
might chill true speech, a
concern Sunstein shares to an
extent. But he thinks that the
Court’s decision in United
States v. Alvarez was wrong,
“even preposterous.” He
questions whether any
socially useful speech was
really chilled by the Stolen
Valor Act. In the name of
defending the truth, he
suggests, the Court merely
ceded more ground to
falsehoods. AN AGE OF
DECEPTIONSunstein says
Americans are living in “an
age of deception,” an era in
which lies have become
ubiquitous. He is especially
concerned about what he
sees as the proliferation of
defamatory lies about public
officials, public institutions,
and public figures. He
mentions the “sustained
attacks” on Hillary Clinton in
the lead-up to the 2016
presidential election,
unjustified attacks on the
integrity of the media, and
news stories that carried
“false statements about
Taylor Swift, Christian Bale,
and Julia Roberts.” Lies about
public officials and
institutions undermine faith
in government. Lies about
other public figures—
musicians, actors, and
athletes, for example—can
ruin people’s lives. “Many
people are now being
subjected to ‘cancellation’ on
the basis of lies,” Sunstein
says, although he does not
offer specific examples. His
concern extends beyond
defamatory statements. He
argues that false statements
falling short of libel are
harming individuals and
society. He does not supply
evidence that lying is more
common today than it used to
be. Still, he writes, “the
problem is serious and
pervasive, and it seems to be
mounting.”
Sunstein is especially
concerned about all of this
because social media allows
liars to disseminate their lies
more quickly and broadly. But
he is principally worried
about the liars, not the social
media companies, and in fact
he casts the companies more
as heroes than as villains. “To
their credit, some of them are
doing a great deal already” to
combat misinformation, he
says, and “their creativity
offers a host of lessons for
public officials.” (Sunstein
discloses upfront that he has
been a consultant to
Facebook, including on some
of the issues discussed in the
book.) The companies, in his
view, are doing “excellent
work”—even if they should
do more, such as fact-check
political ads, strengthen their
prohibitions against
misinformation relating to
public health, and suppress a
broader range of doctored
videos.
Americans are living in an era
in which lies have become
ubiquitous. Sunstein has a
similarly rosy view of the
government’s relationship to
lies. He does briefly mention
that U.S. President Donald
Trump pushed
misinformation about the
2020 presidential election.
But the lies of government
officials are mostly beyond
the scope of his inquiry.
There’s no mention here, for
example, of the false claims—
all made by senior
government officials at one
point or another—that Iraq
was hiding weapons of mass
destruction, that Muslims in
New Jersey cheered the 9/11
attacks, that the CIA did not
use torture, that drone strikes
have not resulted in civilian
casualties, or that wearing
masks won’t help against
COVID-19. Sunstein says he’s
especially focused on
falsehoods that undermine
the democratic process, but it
is difficult to understand why
a tabloid’s lies about a
celebrity imperil democracy,
whereas the official lies that
misled the country into war
do not.
Social media companies, too,
bear a great deal more
responsibility for the age of
deception than Sunstein
acknowledges. Their ranking
algorithms can privilege
sensational or extreme
speech and channel users into
echo chambers where
conspiracy theories flourish.
Their decisions about which
kinds of interactions to allow
on their platforms can have
similar effects. And their
policies relating to ad
targeting can determine how
broadly misinformation
spreads and whether the
misinformation can be
corrected by others. Social
media companies—like
governments—undoubtedly
have important roles to play
in addressing the problem of
misinformation. But Sunstein
is wrong to conceive of them
only as firefighters and not
also as arsonists. LIAR, LIAR,
DEMOCRACY ON FIREStill,
Sunstein’s policy proposals
are worth considering. His
prescriptions concerning
content moderation are
modest but reasonable. His
analysis of the Supreme
Court’s case law relating to
false speech usefully pulls
apart the various factors that
courts should weigh in
deciding whether regulating
misinformation in any given
context would be consistent
with the First Amendment.
(The factors include the
speaker’s intent, the
magnitude of the harm that
could result from the false
speech, and how soon that
harm would occur.) He is
plainly right that loosening
current doctrinal standards
would create space for
regulation—including of false
speech that does not rise to
the level of defamation.
But he largely glosses over the
ways in which new
regulations could be abused.
Even today, under a speech-
protective doctrinal
framework, state legislatures
are fighting supposed
misinformation by, for
example, restricting public
schools’ ability to teach
students about systemic
racism. And despite the
Supreme Court cases that
Sunstein criticizes, it is
disturbingly easy for powerful
people to use defamation
lawsuits, or the threat of
them, to suppress important
stories. Devin Nunes, a
Republican member of
Congress from California, has
filed a slew of lawsuits against
journalists and ordinary
citizens who have criticized,
mocked, or reported on him,
even suing the anonymous
users behind two obviously
satirical Twitter accounts,
@DevinNunesMom and
@DevinCow. And the
Hollywood mogul Harvey
Weinstein was able to use the
threat of defamation
litigation to stave off, for
years, the news reports that
justifiably ended his career.
The United States should
regulate lies more
aggressively than it does.
Sunstein isn’t oblivious to
these concerns. At one point,
he suggests capping damage
awards to mitigate the chilling
effect of defamation suits.
But his analysis focuses on the
costs of the current doctrinal
framework and mostly skips
over the benefits. It leaves
the impression that Sunstein
has not fully accounted for
the possibility—the certainty,
some would say—that
making it easier for public
figures to sue critics for false
speech would make it easier
for them to suppress true
speech, as well.
At its best, Sunstein’s book
offers a host of useful ideas
about how First Amendment
doctrine and content
moderation policies might be
adjusted to encourage
governments and technology
companies to address lies.
But Sunstein gives the most
powerful actors a free pass. A
more convincing account of
the age of deception, and a
more compelling policy
agenda, would place less
emphasis on the
mendaciousness of ordinary
citizens and more on the
governments that spread
falsehoods—and on the
media organizations and
technology companies that
amplify them.
 The Politics of Taliban Recognition
Michael Kugelman, South Asian Voices
N early three months
after seizing power,
and more than two
months after announcing an
interim government, the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan
has not been formally
recognized by a single
country. It risks becoming a
pariah, just as it was in the late
1990s when it controlled
Kabul but had formal relations
with only three countries—
Pakistan, the United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. If
recognition does come from
the international community
this time around, it is more
likely to be conferred by
countries in Afghanistan’s
neighborhood than by the
United States or other
Western countries.
To Recognize or Not to
Recognize
In international law,
recognition generally means
viewing a government as
lawful, legitimate, in full
control of its territory, and
deserving of formal
membership within the
international community.
However, in reality, many
different factors inform
decisions about recognition.
The United States (and much
of the West) will base future
decision about Taliban
recognition on human rights
and inclusivity considerations.
The Taliban government,
which isn’t about to
compromise on its
fundamental ideology, is
unlikely to meet these
conditions. Consequently,
U.S. recognition of the
Taliban government is a long
shot. Regional players are
more likely to eventually opt
for recognition, due to
geographic factors. However,
for now, they’re taking a wait-
and-watch approach, in
particular to see if there are
sustained improvements in
security, before making any
decisions.
The U.S. and Recognition
Prior to the Taliban takeover,
U.S. officials said the group
would not earn legitimacy if it
took power by force—
implying that recognition
would come if the Taliban
gained power through
peaceful means, presumably
through a power-sharing
arrangement emerging from
negotiations with the Ashraf
Ghani government.
Few in Washington could
have anticipated that the
Taliban would take power
peacefully because of the
complete and rapid collapse of
the Afghan republic, not
through a negotiated
settlement or formal transfer
of power. The Biden
administration has indicated
it’s not currently prepared to
recognize the Taliban
government. Officials suggest
recognition will come only if
the Taliban take actions that
promote inclusivity (meaning
non-Taliban leaders,
including women, are brought
into the government) and
human rights, especially
women’s rights.
If recognition does come from
the international community
this time around, it is more
likely to be conferred by
countries in Afghanistan’s
neighborhood than by the
United States or other
Western countries.
One may argue that
conditioning recognition on
rights is misguided, given that
Washington often recognizes
and works closely with brutal
and repressive regimes. But
from the U.S. perspective, the
Taliban case is different.
First, most of Washington’s
relationships with repressive
regimes have served U.S.
interests—from Cold War
partnerships with
anticommunist dictatorships
in Latin America to more
recent alliances with
authoritarian states in the
Middle East that help tackle
Islamist terrorism. However,
Washington has less of a
compelling interest to pursue
partnership with the Taliban.
President Biden has bluntly
stated that bigger U.S.
priorities lie elsewhere,
beyond Afghanistan—from
fighting climate change to
managing competition with
China.
Additionally, the Taliban take
brutal to another level. They
harbor close ties to—and
command the deep respect
of—transnational and
regional terrorist groups like
al-Qaeda and the Pakistani
Taliban. Their Haqqani
Network faction, which
currently controls the interior
and refugee ministries, is a
U.S.-designated terrorist
organization implicated in
multiple mass casualty attacks
on Americans. Some Taliban
policies—like banning older
girls from attending school—
are unheard of in any other
country, including Saudi
Arabia.
And yet, Washington’s main
interests in post-withdrawal
Afghanistan require
engagement with the Taliban.
It needs the Taliban to ensure
safe passage for remaining
U.S. citizens wishing to
evacuate. It needs assurances
from the Taliban that they
won’t obstruct the delivery
and distribution of
humanitarian supplies. The
Biden administration hasn’t
indicated a desire for Taliban
assistance for
counterterrorism efforts
against Islamic State-
Khorasan (IS-K)—a shared
rival—but the pursuit of
intelligence cooperation can’t
be ruled out if Washington
doesn’t secure basing
arrangements or intelligence-
sharing deals with
Afghanistan’s neighbors. To
circumvent the engagement-
without-recognition dilemma,
Washington is depending on
the CIA. State Department
officials can’t negotiate with a
government with which
Washington has no diplomatic
relations. The CIA, however,
can engage covertly. Officials
can invoke plausible
deniability if reports surface
about U.S. talks with the
Taliban. However, the
administration has not denied
two CIA-led exchanges with
the Taliban—a meeting with
CIA director Bill Burns and
talks with Taliban leaders in
Doha led by a delegation
headed by the CIA’s deputy
director.
The Region and Recognition
Because of their location,
Afghanistan’s neighbors and
other regional players have
stronger incentives than the
United States or other
Western countries to formally
engage with the Taliban
government. Recognition
would facilitate cross-border
trade and new infrastructure
investments; enhance border
security cooperation; and
provide more opportunities to
work with the Taliban to
minimize the risks of
undesirable spillover effects.
These include refugee flows,
cross-border terrorism, and
narcotics trafficking. These
risks are less urgent for
America, which enjoys the
luxury of distance.
However, to this point,
regional players have
eschewed recognition, instead
engaging in ways that fall
short of normalization.
Officials from Russia, China,
Iran, Pakistan, and the Central
Asian states have met with
Taliban leaders. Islamabad
has even invited Taliban
officials to take up diplomatic
posts in Pakistan.
Ironically, while regional
players may think recognizing
the Taliban government can
better position them to work
with the Taliban to reduce
security risks, they’ll likely
hold back from recognition
until they have assurances
about the broader security
situation. For regional actors,
the litmus test for recognition
will be security, just as it will
be rights for the U.S.
They’ll want to see if the
Taliban can ease severe
humanitarian and economic
crises, resolve internal
divisions, curb terrorist
threats, and more broadly
succeed in consolidating
power. If it doesn’t achieve
any one of these goals,
security could deteriorate,
spawning destabilizing
outcomes from heightened
refugee flows to new armed
resistance movements.
Destabilization would reduce
regional players’ abilities to
operate in Afghanistan,
negating a benefit of
recognition.
Afghanistan-based terrorism
is a major concern for regional
actors. All worry about IS-K.
Beijing worries about Uighur
militants, and Islamabad
about the Pakistani Taliban
(TTP). New Delhi worries
about anti-India groups.
Ironically, while regional
players may think recognizing
the Taliban government can
better position them to work
with the Taliban to reduce
security risks, they’ll likely
hold back from recognition
until they have assurances
about the broader security
situation.
If and when they conclude
they’re satisfied with security
conditions, expect some
regional players to start
considering recognition. The
top candidates are Pakistan,
the Taliban’s longstanding
sponsor, along with China,
which has engaged closely
with the Taliban in recent
years. The Taliban’s
mediation of a new month-
long truce between Islamabad
and the TTP, and reports that
the Taliban have started
addressing Beijing’s concerns
about Uighur militants,
increase the likelihood that
Pakistan and China will be
two of the first countries
prepared to recognize the
Taliban. Russia and Iran may
not be far behind, but Tehran
will be more cautious given its
concerns about the safety of
Afghanistan’s Shia
community, and the lack of
Shia representation in the
government.
There are several outliers.
Tajikistan, which has taken a
strongly anti-Taliban position,
largely for domestic political
reasons, and is hosting Afghan
resistance leaders, is unlikely
to recognize the government
regardless of the security
situation. Same with India,
given the Taliban’s close
relationship with Pakistan; the
Taliban’s past attacks on
Indians in Afghanistan; and
New Delhi’s limited channels
of communication with the
Taliban.
An Urgent Test for
Recognition
Debating the issue of Taliban
recognition is not a purely
academic exercise.
Afghanistan’s devastating
humanitarian crisis—which
the World Food Program
director recently described as
the world’s worst—
underscores the real-world
stakes at play. The
international community has
concluded that it can deliver
humanitarian assistance to
Afghanistan without
recognizing the government,
because it can work with UN
agencies and private charities
on the ground and avoid
sending aid directly to the
government.
However, Afghanistan was
dependent on international
assistance for 75 percent of
public funding before the
Taliban takeover. It badly
needs broader development
and financial assistance, not
just food supplies and other
humanitarian aid, to stabilize
its economy and bring relief to
its masses. For the United
States, giving Kabul access to
aid—including nearly USD
$10 billion in foreign reserves
frozen by Washington—is
hard to justify without
recognizing the regime. In
effect, decisions about
recognition will have a direct
impact on the well-being—
and the very lives—of
millions.
 The COP26 deal will not be enough to end SA’s coal addiction
Ray Mwareya, Al-Jazeera
S
outh Africa runs on
coal. It is the world’s
seventh-largest coal
producer, and about 80
percent of the country’s
energy is generated by it. In
addition to the extensive use
of coal in the domestic
economy, about 30 percent of
South Africa’s production is
exported, making the country
the fourth-largest coal
exporter in the world.
The vast scale of South
Africa’s coal operation, run by
the state power company
Eskom, is an obstacle in the
way of global efforts to
combat climate change.
Indeed, today South Africa is
the 12th-biggest carbon
dioxide emitter in the world.
The international community
has long been trying to find
ways to help South Africa
recover from its coal
addiction. In late September,
in the run-up to the COP26
summit in Glasgow, for
example, high-level climate
envoys from the United
Kingdom, the United States
and the European Union
visited South Africa to
“discuss helping it end an
over-reliance on coal that
makes it one of the world’s
leading carbon emitters”.
The envoys held meetings
with officials from the South
African government, as well
as business and labour leaders.
However, their offer of help
was clearly not appreciated by
the person whose opinion
matters the most: Mineral and
Energy Resources Minister
Gwede Mantashe.
Mantashe, who previously
described giving up coal as
“economic suicide” and a
threat to South Africa’s
energy security, did not meet
the climate envoys during
their visit to the country.
Instead, perhaps as a
diplomatic taunt, he delivered
the keynote speech at a local
mining investment conference
while the envoys were still in
the country, and called for
“investment in technology
that could potentially prolong
the use of coal”.
Mantashe is not the only
prominent force in South
Africa resisting pressure from
the international community
to end the country’s coal
dependency. South Africa’s
four biggest banks are
refusing to turn off coal
financing, at least in the short
term. And the country’s
influential socialist trade
unions are also publicly
campaigning to stop any move
away from coal and towards
sustainable energy resources.
It is not difficult to understand
the motivations behind
widespread support for coal in
South Africa.
The South African economy
has long been suffering due to
inconsistent and short-sighted
policies and widespread
corruption. And the COVID-
19 pandemic hit the country’s
already struggling economy
hard. About one million jobs
are thought to have been
destroyed by the monthlong
hard lockdown last year, and
there has been a significant
rise in reporting of hunger
among citizens since. In July
2021, poverty, growing
inequality and rising
unemployment led to
widespread riots that resulted
in the deaths of at least 200
people.
In the second half of 2021, due
to the global energy crunch,
coal prices started to go up,
and in September, the global
benchmark coal price reached
$177.50 per tonne.
South Africa’s government
understandably saw the surge
in coal prices as a lifeline – an
opportunity to inject cash into
the economy to calm down an
increasingly restless
population and aggressive
trade unions.
The likes of Mantashe have
always argued that South
Africa does not have the
necessary economic might
and vast sovereign funds to
abandon coal investment to
meet the “green economy”
demands of rich nations. But
with South Africa descending
into a major economic crisis
with the pandemic, and coal
emerging as the nation’s
saviour, resistance to green
energy demands became
stronger and more widespread
in the country.
While South Africa’s
insistence on not giving up on
coal at this time is
understandable, this does not
mean the country’s coal
addiction is harmless. Beyond
contributing to the ongoing
climate catastrophe, South
Africa’s extensive coal
operation is also harming its
people. According to a 2017
study, commissioned by
environmental justice NGO
groundWork, “2,239 human
deaths per year could be
attributable to coal-related air
pollution in South Africa, as
well as more than 9,500 cases
of bronchitis among children
6 to 12.”
Moreover, regardless of South
Africa’s energy policies, the
country’s 80,000 coal jobs
will gradually vanish, and if
the country does not start
moving towards renewables
and creating new jobs for
miners soon, its already grave
unemployment crisis will
grow even bigger in the
coming decades.
Undoubtedly aware of the
dangers of remaining
dependent on coal for too
long, but also unwilling to
give up on the immediate
benefits it receives from the
industry, last week the South
African delegation arrived at
the COP26 summit in
Glasgow looking for an
arrangement that would allow
the country to have its cake
and eat it too. What South
Africa wanted was clear: a
promise from the rich nations,
who are primarily responsible
for the climate emergency, to
fund – in full – the country’s
recovery from its coal
dependency.
And with its calculated pro-
coal stance at the climate
conference, South Africa was
not only defending its own
interests. It was also putting
forward the points of view of
many nations in Africa and the
wider Global South that
believe they should have their
turn in benefitting from their
coal reserves despite the
climate crisis. For example, in
defiance of global calls for
greener economies,
Zimbabwe is planning to open
new coal mines in the near
future to meet its energy needs
and, eventually, become a
coal exporter.
Indeed, in the run-up to
COP26, South Africa’s
Environment Minister
Barbara Creecy had made it
clear to rich nations what they
need to do to entice the Global
South to abandon coal: pay
more than $750bn a year to
help them switch to
sustainable energy resources
without collapsing their
economies.
South Africa’s stubbornness
on coal paid off at COP26 – at
least partially. The US, UK,
France, Germany and the EU
agreed to pay $8.5bn to help
end the country’s reliance on
coal. South Africa’s President
Cyril Ramaphosa has called it
a “watershed moment”, and
pundits opined that the deal
could be used as a blueprint to
help end coal dependence in
other countries.
While the deal is undoubtedly
a step in the right direction,
the amount offered is nowhere
near sufficient to ease South
Africa’s concerns about
decarbonisation. In the future,
South Africa will try to
squeeze more money out of
the West and if it does not get
its way, it will continue to do
what delivers the highest
benefit in the short term. The
same is true for other African
and Global South nations.
If the rich nations do not come
up with a plan to permanently
coax the Global South away
from coal, coal dependence
will remain a big obstacle in
global efforts to combat
climate change and save our
collective future.
 The Global South does not need debt. We need climate justice
Mitzi Jonelle Tan, Al-Jazeera
I
n 2009, when I was 12
years old, world leaders
gathered in Copenhagen
for COP15. They made a
pledge to allocate $100bn per
year in climate finance for
Global South countries by
2020 so that they could
address the effects of the
climate crisis.
It was also in 2009, when I
was 12 years old, that I
developed a deep fear of
drowning in my own bedroom
and of my home being washed
away by floods as my country,
the Philippines, was ravaged
by Typhoon Ketsana. The
typhoon caused hundreds of
billions of dollars worth of
damage and killed nearly
1,000 Filipinos. But the rich
countries that pledged to
allocate $100bn a year by
2020 haven’t yet done so; in
fact, they recently pushed
their deadline back to 2023.
Now as presidents and prime
ministers are gathered in
Glasgow for COP26, Global
South youth activists like me
are demanding justice from
our so-called world leaders.
We are facing the devastating
impacts of the climate crisis.
The fact that current policies
still have us approaching an
estimated temperature rise of
2.7 degrees Celsius by the end
of the century is a slap in the
face of those of us who are
already living through the hell
of floods, wildfires, storms
and droughts at the current
warming of 1.2 degrees.
Even with the carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions reductions
pledges made during this
summit, heating will still rise
beyond the 1.5 degrees limit
that so many of us are fighting
for.
The recent pledges and
promises of climate finance
for impacted countries to
reduce emissions and adapt to
climate impacts are nowhere
near enough and will be
useless to us all if they are not
scaled up to match the action
that we need at the speed that
we need it – that is if they are
implemented at all, of course.
The broken promises and slow
progress on climate action
have led young people like me
to feel a deep sense of
betrayal.
Millions around the world
face the prospect of sinking,
burning, drowning or dying of
thirst. But the climate crisis
isn’t just about extreme
weather events and reducing
emissions. The crisis is also
that Global South countries,
which are most vulnerable,
aren’t able to bounce back,
deal with and minimise the
loss and damages we
experience because of the
historical and ongoing
exploitation of our lands and
our people.
The Global North is, through
its industrial activities,
historically responsible for 92
percent of excess global CO2
emissions and has endangered
our past and present. The
$100bn a year is just a drop in
the bucket of their debt to
humanity as we expect
climate impacts to cost $7.9
trillion by 2050. Not only is
the current flow of money into
climate finance not enough; it
also creates debt. According
to a 2020 Oxfam report, 80
percent of climate finance
came in the form of loans to be
paid back and not grants. This
means impacted countries are
sinking into debt to the
countries that historically
caused the climate crisis.
The bare minimum that rich
countries of the north must do
is meet the climate finance
pledge of $100bn and then
have that continuously grow.
And to make sure climate
action is going in the right
direction, we need more
concrete short-term targets
and milestones, such as annual
carbon budgets, to measure all
the ambitious net-zero targets
set by country leaders. We
don’t need more words from
politicians or to go deeper into
debt to Global North
countries. We need action. We
need climate justice.
Reparations that address loss
and damage and help
countries adapt are crucial for
climate justice. Scotland, for
example, recently pledged a
climate justice fund. But
reparations must go beyond a
transfer of money to include
the redistribution of both
finance and the technology
and science needed for
human-centred adaptation, for
a transition to renewable
energy, and policy changes to
ensure the people who are
most marginalised are listened
to and prioritised.
In the Philippines, foreign-
backed extractive mining
industries flatten mountains
and displace Indigenous
peoples from their ancestral
lands. In 2017, I got a glimpse
of the true meaning of fighting
for climate justice through an
Indigenous Lumad leader in
the Philippines. He told me
and the other students I was
with about how they were
being harassed, displaced, and
killed – all for protecting the
forests from mining
companies. That, he said, is
why we have no choice but to
fight back. It was such a
simple idea, but I realised that
he was right. It is that simple.
We need a system that
prioritises people and the
planet, not profit, and this can
only happen through a
collective fight.
It is in this spirit that other
youth activists and I call for
climate reparations from the
Global North to the Global
South for the historical
injustices rooted in
colonialism, profit-oriented
plunder and planetary
degradation that has led to the
climate crisis.
So many of us in the climate
movement are angry and tired
of these injustices. Unlike so-
called world leaders, we know
how important it is to connect,
collaborate, and show
solidarity with one another.
And as the movement
continues to grow, as we learn
from each other, and as we
increasingly centre
marginalised voices, it will
only get stronger. We will
continue fighting for a world
where no one is left behind.
Together, we are unstoppable
because we know another
world is possible.
 How happy or miserable are we?
Riaz Riazuddin, Dawn News
I
NFLATION makes us
miserable and so does
unemployment. But which
one is worse? Some of us
think inflation is more
harmful than unemployment.
Others think vice versa. There
is an ‘economic discomfort
index’, more commonly
known as the ‘misery index’,
which simply adds the rates of
inflation and unemployment
to indicate a level of ‘ill-
being’ or the reverse of an
economy’s ‘well-being’. An
assumption implicit in this
index is that a one percentage
point rise in inflation causes as
much discomfort as a one
percentage point rise in
unemployment. This seems
like an innocuous assumption
leading to a simple measure of
misery.
What is our current level of
misery? Before providing a
numerical value, I’ll ask
another question: do we know
the current rate of
unemployment in our
economy? Unfortunately, we
do not know. Unemployment,
apparently, is relatively more
difficult to measure than
inflation. We are inundated
with a new numerical value
for inflation every weak (in
terms of the Sensitive Price
Indicator), and monthly
values of consumer and
wholesale price indices, but
seldom with unemployment
data. Do we ever demand to
know the unemployment rate?
When I write ‘we’ it refers to
our nation. Our nation’s
preference in demanding
economic data is largely a
result of the priorities attached
to different data sets by our
policymakers who have experience inflation through
preferred to ‘not know’ about regular shopping. We cannot
the yearly unemployment say this for unemployment,
situation. Hence the sporadic because not all of us
nature of the Labour Force experience unemployment.
Survey (LFS). The latest Thank God again for this
unemployment rate for FY19 blessing. Therefore, it is very
at 6.9 per cent is two years old. important to conduct
The FY18 rate was 5.8pc, but employment surveys.
the rate available prior to this
An employed person can still
is three years old (also 5.8pc
buy a lot even when inflation
for FY15). We’ll never know
is high. A jobless person
what the official
cannot buy anything unless
unemployment rates were for
the family silver is depleted or
FY16 and FY17. These must
money borrowed. Does high
be extrapolated with statistical
inflation cause as much stress
artistry. Do we lack the
as unemployment? I think
expertise or resources to
there is no comparison.
conduct the LFS on a
Unemployment is far more
quarterly basis? No. We have
dreadful than inflation. While
full expertise. Hats off to the
this may be labelled as a
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
subjective view, scores of
that started conducting the
surveys in advanced countries
LFS on a quarterly basis and
based on ‘happiness research’
produced eight surveys for
support this observation.
FY11 and FY13. The sad fact
People in those countries
that it did not continue with
think that unemployment is
this exercise speaks volumes
about five times more
not about PBS, but the
dreadful than inflation. This
government of that time
means that a one percentage
which opted not to know
point increase in the
about unemployment rates on
unemployment rate causes as
a quarterly basis. This disdain
much misery as a five
by the government for
percentage point increase in
unemployment figures is not
inflation. This inflation-
unique. Every regime has
unemployment trade-off
yearly or quarterly holes in the
varies between two to 10
time series of the LFS. Note
times in different countries.
there are no such holes in
inflation reports, thank God. Coming back to the simple
misery index and ignoring
Does high inflation cause as
what the happiness research
much stress as
says, let us look at our misery
unemployment? In fact, the
indices. During the 21st
latter is far more dreadful.
century (FY01 to FY21) we
What I am writing now should were lucky to have
not be misconstrued as unemployment rates for 13
advocating the non- out of 21 years. The misery
production of weekly inflation index averaged at 14.6pc
data. Even if we do not look at during these years,
inflation data, we all unemployment at 6pc and
inflation at 8.6pc (for those
years in which unemployment
rates also existed). We were
most miserable in FY09 with
an index of 26, mainly due to
the double-digit inflation of
20.8pc, largely because of the
historic rise in international
oil and commodity prices. The
misery index stood at 13.7 in
FY19, the latest year for
which the unemployment rate
is available. It was at 10.3, its
lowest level, in FY15 mainly
due to low inflation induced
largely by low international
oil and commodity prices.
American economist Arthur
Okun devised the simple
index in the early 1970s. Its
level became close to 22 in the
US in 1980 during Carter’s
presidency. Reagan used it in
his campaign to discredit
Carter and win the election.
Such is the political use of
economic indices. We do not
have this index and, therefore,
the inflation index is used in
our economy for this purpose.
The current political
economic discourse in the
media is dominated by
inflation and the rupee price of
the dollar.
The simple misery index has
been modified by other
economists like Robert Barro
of Harvard and recently by
Steve Hanke of Johns
Hopkins Univer-sity. In
Hanke’s formulation lending
rates are added because higher
lending rates cause misery.
Growth in real per capita GDP
is subtracted as it causes
happiness. This formulation
helps make a country by
country comparison easier.
Hanke has calculated this
index for 156 countries for
2020 and ranked these
countries from the most to the
least miserable.
Venezuela ranks first (most
miserable) and its neighbour,
Guyana ranks 156 (least
miserable or most happy).
Why was Guyana most happy
in 2020? It struck oil in 2019
and as a result, real GDP per
ca--pita increased by 25.8pc in
2020. Next to Vene-zue--la in
misery are Zimbabwe and
Sudan. And next to Gu--yana
in happiness are Taiwan and
Qatar. As we are always
obsessed with comparisons
with India, it may not hurt us
to know that India is higher in
misery (in--dex 35.8, rank 39)
than Pakistan (index 32.5,
rank 49.) Bangladesh is better
than both India and Pakis-tan
with a misery index of 14 and
rank of 129.