Plato's Critique of Hedonism in the "Philebus"

Author(s): Robert C. Bartlett

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 141-151
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055408080052

Plato's Critiqueof Hedonism inthePhilebus

ROBERT C. BARTLETT Emory University
o one can claim to have thought seriously about the question "How ought I to live?", theguiding
question of political philosophy, without having confronted thepowerful answer to it supplied
N by hedonism. In thinking about hedonism today, we may begin from that thinker who was both
very important to and early in its history: Plato. Of the dialogs that have come down to us as Plato's,
only thePhilebus takes as itsdirect aim the examination of pleasure's claim to be the human good. The
Philebus culminates in the suggestions that the need for self awareness or self-knowledge may finally be
more fundamental to all human beings (and hence to hedonists) than is even the desire for pleasure, and
some a great
that the experience of at least pleasures constitutes obstacle to precisely the self-knowledge
we seek. The Philebus is important today not only because it contains a searching analysis of hedonism
but also because itcompels us to raise the crucial question of theprecise nature of "the good" with which
we are own or
justly most concerned?our that of others?a question whose centrality to
self-knowledge
we are in danger of forgetting.

No one can claim to have thought seriously about in order to trap the wily Protagoras in a contradic
the question "How ought I to live?", the guiding tion concerning his attachment to courage (consider
question of political philosophy, without having Protagoras 353a7-b3).1 For among the "precaution
confronted the powerful answer to it supplied by hedo ary measures" used by the avowed sophist to protect
nism. Although there are many versions of hedonism, himself is his disavowal of being a hedonist (317b5,
philosophic and popular, serious and silly, they are 316dl-2, 351cl-d7), the result of a calculation of what
united by the thought (or sense) that pleasure is the the "safer" answer is with a view to the present cir
chief good that human beings of necessity seek (e.g., cumstances and indeed with a view to his life as a
Feldman 2001 and 2004). In attempting to recover for whole (351d2-4). Socrates' elaborate explanation of
ourselves full awareness of a doctrine of more than the alleged hedonism of "the many," which culminates
merely scholarly interest?for itholds out the promise in an advertisement for the sophists far better than
of guiding us to the good we desire, namely, a happy Protagoras' own (357b5-e8; compare 328a8-c2), is an
life?we may reasonably look for instruction to the extended exercise inmaking the great sophist squirm:
long and complex tradition of hedonism, to both its Protagoras chose not to confess to the hedonism that
proponents and its critics. could have been the basis of a most attractive come-on

Precisely the richness of that tradition, however, de
mands that, at the outset at least, we limit our inquiry
in some way, and a survey of the surviving records
quickly suggests the name of one great thinker who
was both very important to and early in the history of
hedonism: Plato. Three dialogs of Plato offer analyses
of the argument that pleasure is the good?the Gor
gias, Protagoras, and Philebus. In theGorgias, Socrates
attacks Callicles' hedonism in such a way as to demon
strate the incompatibility of Callicles' mostly subter
ranean moralism with his extreme hedonism: Callicles'
disgusted censure of certain intense bodily pleasures
(and of Socrates' shamelessness in even mentioning
them) means thatCallicles actually looks tomorality or
decency as a standard higher than pleasure in deciding
how to live, and it iswith a view to that standard that
Socrates proceeds to refute him (Gorgias 494el-8). In
thisway Socrates reveals the limitations of Callicles, to
be sure, but not necessarily those of hedonism, since it
is possible to imagine a hedonist capable of following
out the logic of hedonism with unblushing consistency,
free of such scruples (compare Hackforth 1958, 5).
In the Protagoras, Socrates to "the many"
imputes
consistent hedonistic calculus, but he does so ultimately
Robert C. Bartlett is Professor, Department of Political Science,
Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 (rcbartl@emory.edu).
The author thanks the Earhart Foundation for a summer research
grant that made possible the completion of this study.
to the students most promising in his eyes?those of
the ilk of Alcibiades and Critias, for example (316a3
5)?students who combine great wealth with the driv
ing ambition to possess for themselves the greatest
goods, apparently unfettered bymoral concerns. In the
sequel, however, Socrates also brings out the fact that
Protagoras' admiration of courage is incompatible with
his (implicit) acceptance of hedonism and his (all but
explicit) denigration of justice: Protagoras sincerely
admires those who sacrifice themselves in the name
of courage, even if they feel no pleasure in doing so
(Bartlett 2003).
In both the Gorgias and Protagoras, then, Socrates
makes use of arguments pertaining to hedonism for
reasons other than an analysis of hedonism strictly
speaking. Only the Philebus takes as its direct aim the
examination of pleasure's claim to be the human good.
Itwould seem that Plato's most penetrating critique of
hedonism, then, is to be found in the Philebus and only
there.
a 1
Russell (2005) also contends, if for different reasons, that the he
donistic argument adduced by Socrates in the Protagoras should not
be taken as a statement of his own view (239-48). Failure to see that
Socrates makes use of certain hedonistic arguments for purposes
specific to the dramatic setting of the Protagoras results in such in
genious but strained attempts to square them with, for example, the
rejection of hedonism in the Gorgias as can be found inRudebusch
1999.

141
Plato's Critique ofHedonism in thePhilebus February 2008

The present study will begin with an overview of the phron?sis and the like is "the most advantageous thing
Philebus, a notoriously difficult and labyrinthine dia of all" for all who are or will be so capable, need mean
log,2
as a necessary
preparation for a commentary on
only that these intellectual abilities are particularly use
those of itsparts most directly linked to Plato's critique ful to us in satisfying our most important needs, not
of hedonism. This critique depends on the recognition, that they satisfy them all completely or permanently,
first, that the need for self-knowledge is fundamental for example, let alone for everyone. He surely does not
to, and perhaps prior to, the desire for pleasure and, mean by "good" here some transcendent "good in it
second, that there are certain intense pleasures the ex self" that isother and higher thanwhat is advantageous
perience of which makes self-knowledge very difficult to the one possessing the good thing, as a refreshing
to attain and which can on that ground be reasonably drink, for example, is good for a thirstyhuman being.
criticized. Reflection on Plato's critique of hedonism is However much Socrates' presentation of what is good
important in itself, of course, but, as the essay's final will change, in an attempt both to satisfy and to im
section will argue, it deserves attention also because it prove Protarchus, he does not explicitly mention "the
brings into sharper focus the specific moral obtuseness idea of the good" anywhere in the dialog. There is also
of the contemporary approach to hedonism, one that is, no reason, in the opening sections, to attribute such a
from the Platonic point of view, also a massive obstacle transcendent view of "the good" to Philebus.
to self-knowledge more
generally. Protarchus is a different story.Protarchus proves to
hope for precisely "the good" so understood, and he
is the first in the dialog to speak explicitly of it (13b7).
OVERVIEW OF THE PHILEBUS
He is encouraged to do so, it is true, by Socrates' in
The question that unites Plato's Philebus is that of the troduction of a crucial question that is a supplement to
best way of life for a human being or, more precisely, and hence separate from the summary of the Socrates
whether the best human life consists in the enjoyment Philebus conversation he had just given: "in addition
of pleasure or the possession of knowledge. As the dia to these points, let us agree also to the following: [... ]
log opens, we learn that Socrates and Philebus have just each of us now will undertake to present a character

brought their argument about this question to a halt. istic [hexis] and disposition [diathesis] of soul that is
Plato thus declines to present that argument to us di capable of supplying to all human beings the life that's
rectly,but he makes perfectly clear its result: ithas done happy" (lld2, 4-6). The good thing now on the table,
nothing whatever to prompt Philebus to abandon his then, ishappiness or thegood (consider Aristotle, Nico
opinion of the superior goodness of pleasure (12a6-8). machean Ethics 1097a30-1097b6), and whatever itmay
In that prior conversation, we now learn, Socrates be itmust be available to all human beings. To be sure,
had contended that prudence, understanding, memory, Philebus himself had asserted that pleasure is good "for
and their kin are, for all those capable of possessing all animals" (llb5), as we noted, whereas Socrates had
them, better than and superior to enjoyment, plea carefully limited his own case in favor of phron?sis by
sure, delight, and the like?things that Philebus had speaking only of those capable of it (llb9-10; consider
maintained were good "for all animals" (llb4-6).3 We also 52b6-8). But Philebus probably intended by this
learn too that Socrates does not object toPhilebus' con phrase nothing other than an emphatic statement of
tention that pleasure is good or a good (llb4-7; see also the universality of the goodness of pleasure: that all an
13bl). Socrates, then, is no ascetic or (as he insists later imals necessarily seek out pleasure is a clear sign of its
on) he is not one of the "enemies" of Philebus, who natural goodness (consider the comparable argument
have conceived an excessive hatred of pleasure (44b6 of Eudoxus as reported by Aristotle, Nicomachean
d5) ultimately on what appear to be moral grounds Ethics 1172b9-15); Philebus surely did not mean to
(consider 46a5-ll). Rather, he contends and Philebus equate the experience of pleasure with "happiness," for
denies that understanding (to phronein), thinking (to we do not properly speak of the happiness of animals
noein), and the like are superior to pleasure, superior in (NE 1099b32-1100al). But, to repeat, the good proves
goodness, which here means in the profit or advantage to have a very differentmeaning for Protarchus.
(?phelim?taton: llcl-2) they bestow on those possess After Protarchus takes over the argument in favor
ing them (Gadamer 1991,103). of pleasure, now in the form of the proposition that
It is striking that Socrates' opening recapitulation pleasure is "the" good "for all," for all human beings
(Ilb4-c3), which meets with the complete approval and animals and even plants (22b3-8), itgradually be
of Philebus (Ilc4), avoids mentioning "the" good in comes clear that this qualification amounts in him to
summarizing the two competing positions (see 13e5-6; the hope that there is a way of life capable of making
19d3-6; also 66e3-5); Socrates and Philebus, itappears, all human beings happy (lld4-7; also 61al); Protarchus
have been debating simply the relative merits of plea has some concern for the welfare of all human beings.
sure and phronesis or the question of which is the Yet this concern would seem to have a root other than
better thing to possess. Socrates' most
emphatic state hedonism, themost obvious focus of which is the plea
ment here, according to which the capacity to share in sure experienced by the hedonist himself or herself.
Protarchus, then, has not faced the most im
important
2
Consider, for example, Schleiermacher 1973, 309; Bury 1973, ix;
plication of the most basic premise of hedonism, for
Bolotin 1985, 8.
he proves to have jumped too quickly to the view that
3 one point he claims merely
I have used the Oxford Classical Text prepared by Burnet
(1986); pleasure is "the good"?at
translations throughout are my own. to be repeating what he has heard from others (38a5;

142
American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1

compare 29al-4)?without having faced squarely the the good life,namely, the decent opinion thatwhat we
prior and more fundamental question of whose good care about most is not our own good (be itpleasure or
most concerns him or deserves to concern him, his own something else) but virtue in general (55bl-c3) and jus
good or the good of others.4 tice in particular (39el0 and context)?to say nothing
Accordingly, in order to rid Protarchus of his he of "purity."
donistic inclination, Socrates simply makes use of As laudable as Socrates' accomplishment here is
Protarchus' own, half-hidden moral opinions; he both in demolishing Protarchus' confused understanding of
elicits Protarchus' latentmoralism and encourages it to hedonism, this very confusion means that Socrates
have itsnecessary effect on his hedonism. That effect in fails to encounter, let alone conquer, hedonism in its
the course of the Philebus is easy enough to track: hav full vigor. His manifest success with Protarchus, then,
ing begun from the assertion that the distinction "bad must be judged unsatisfying by anyone who seeks
pleasures/good pleasures" makes no sense because all the truth about the matter in order to know how to
pleasures are good (13b3-c2), Protarchus subsequently live (consider llc9-dl, d4-6). But Protarchus is of
admits or contends not merely that there are indeed course not Socrates' only interlocutor here, and the
bad pleasures?which a philosophic hedonist would dialog's strange title serves to remind us of the presence
readily admit on the ground that some immediate plea throughout of Philebus. In fact Socrates himself repeat
sures lead to greater pains later on (consider Protago edly indicates that he remains interested in Philebus
ras 353a7-b3)?but that there are unseemly (33b2-c4), and his opinion: he tries early on, with only limited
depraved or wicked (37d2-5; 40e9-41a4; consider also success, to draw Philebus into the conversation with
45e5-8), unjust (49dl-8), and shameful (65e4-66a3) Protarchus (12a4 and a6, 16b5, 22cl, d5, 26b8, 27el),
pleasures, all of which are of course to be shunned. One and he continues to speak of and to both young men
might note in this context too Protarchus' remarkable (e.g., 28a5)?even long after Philebus has sunk into
inability to take a stand or at least to keep to one: a determined silence (44b6, 50e2, 59bl0, 60a7, 64b6,
by means of a very dubious argument Socrates leads 66e2).
Protarchus to abandon early on the view that pleasure What is one to make of Philebus? As has been in
is the good, as distinguished from being merely one of dicated, Philebus clearly remains devoted to the good
at least two goods (21d4-5 and context; 22b3-9), and ness of pleasure at the conclusion of his conversation
he will for a time agree that pleasure is not good at all with Socrates (12a6-8). Plato's title, then, by remind
(54d4-8, 55al0-ll)?only to accept Socrates' final ar ing one of the (mostly) silent presence of an obstinate
gument (or rather "divination": 66b5) that includes the objector, points also to a Socratic failure. It is true that
revelation that the best lifewill indeed contain certain Philebus might appear to be merely a dogmatic hedo
"pure" pleasures, not in the first or second rank but in nist not open to a true conversation with Socrates, let

(exactly!) the fifth (66a4-c7). alone a conversion (consider Hackforth 1958, 6), and
It is true that the moral character of the critique some commentators argue, for this or other reasons,
of hedonism in the Philebus is not immediately ap that the transition from Philebus to Protarchus as inter
parent, least of all where it is very much in play, in locutor constitutes a clear ascent (e.g., Benardete 1993,
the dialog's opening, and notoriously abstract, dis 1 n.4; consider also Frede 1993, xviii). That Philebus
cussions. The character of those discussions is deter is not an ideal interlocutor seems beyond dispute. If,
mined in part by the fact that Protarchus is a "so however, we compare Socrates' summary of his conver

phisticate." For Protarchus has been exposed to just sation with Philebus to the argument that he insists on
the kind of rhetorical-sophistic education that Socrates in the remainder of the dialog, we must conclude that
had warned Hippocrates away from in the Protagoras, he had not put all his cards on the table when speaking
for example: Protarchus notes in passing that he has with Philebus: the good life is the life of thought and
heard Gorgias "many times," and he does not bat an pleasure correctly combined and not, as he had argued
eye at the rather nasty thing he has heard him say before, that of thought as distinguished from pleasure.
(58a7-b3; consider Gorgias 452el-8 and 454b5-7; con (Although his summarized argument with Philebus is
sider also Philebus 14cll-d3 and 42d9-43a3 for other compatible with pleasure's being a secondary good,
indications of his prior education). At the beginning of Socrates presents as a
wholly
new turn in the argument,
the dialog, to repeat, Protarchus wrongly believes that new to Protarchus and hence to Philebus, the propo
he believes "the good" with which he is concerned to sition that the good life is thought and pleasure com
be his own pleasure, and after considerable exertions bined, a certain "third" thing: 20b6 and following; also
Socrates succeeds merely in bringing him back to the 14b4). If Philebus remains unpersuaded by a position
necessary beginning point of any serious reflection on that Socrates himself abandons, because it turns out not
to be his true one, is this not a point inPhilebus' favor?
4
As Bruell (1993) puts it, in his review of Gadamer's
Further, it is Philebus who originally took the lead in
(1991) study of
the Philebus, if one "characterizes hedonism as the equation of the disputing with Socrates, it is Philebus who interrupts
" on One a sober
... one's 'own then it is necessary, in order Socrates' remarks and Many with and
good with well-being,'
to see the full force of this characterization, to portray "the opposite
sobering doubt about their relevance (18al-2, d3-8),
position" with at least equal clarity, something Gadamer fails to do, and it is Philebus who evidently enjoys supremacy
according to Bruell: "The simple yet necessary question (for myself the assembled whom as their
or for someone or something else?) is thus lost sight of?and not among youths, he,
for the reason that the opposite position has been squarely con leader, iswont to address as "boys" (16b4-5; 44cl-2).
fronted ..." (Bruell, 169). What ismore, in his "worship" of Aphrodite, Philebus

143
Plato's Critique of Hedonism in thePhilebus
(roughly, "Youth-lover" [Bury 1973,101; Gosling 1975,
73; Frede 1993, 1; Benardete 1993, ln.l]) is surely
a more erotic fellow than Protarchus, whose journey
from defender of hedonism to rather priggish marm is
amazingly quick; and Socrates himself points out, in a
crucial passage, the connection between
and (Socratic) dialectic (58d4-5 and context).
All of this suggests thatwe be open to the possibility
that the serious defense of pleasure is offered less by
Protarchus than by Philebus, the brevity of whose ap
pearance in the dialog is, to say the least, compatible
with this possibility.5 If the very position we most need
to observe is presented only fleetingly and piecemeal,
it is still possible not only to put those pieces together
(consider Bolotin 1985, especially 2-6), but also to sup
plement them by reflecting on the manifest defect or
defects of Protarchus. For a hedonist with the right to
reject Socrates' arguments?whether or not Philebus
himself ultimately fills that bill?would at a minimum
have to do precisely what Protarchus has not done,
namely, think through and accept the consequences of
the selfish character of "the good" according to hedo
nism. Could itbe, then, that the complex conversation
with Protarchus is simultaneously aimed also at "Phile
bus," that is, at themore impressive sort of hedonist?
As it seems to me, the most important arguments in
the dialog have just this character: Socrates presents
his true views to both Philebus and Protarchus, but he
does so sometimes with sound
arguments
times with defective ones, the very defects of which
make them more, not less, attractive
For example, the argument according to which the
good life is the proper combination of thought and
pleasure?what is indeed Socrates' view?carries
viction with Protarchus because it relies on two un
proven beliefs or hopes that are deeply held by him
but not by Socrates: "the good" must be complete or
perfect,
on the one hand, and sufficient,
which amounts to saying that someone in possession
of "the good" needs nothing else whatever or is simply
happy (see pp. 145-146 below).
What then of Socrates' sound arguments? To re
spond adequately to themore impressive sort of hedo
nist, to a "Philebus," Socrates would be compelled to
go beyond a moral critique of hedonism by confronting
the question of the good head-on, so to speak: suppos
ing there to be a human being who could consistently
argue that the good with which he ismost concerned
is necessarily his own good, inwhat does it truly con
sist? In pleasure or knowledge or something else? The
Philebus attempts to answer just this question. That
is, it offers both an apparently effective but ultimately
unsatisfying moral critique of hedonism, directed at a
compliant Protarchus, and an apparently ineffective,
extra-moral critique directed at a recalcitrant Phile
bus. But it would be more precise to say that Plato
declines to indicate what effect the
5 "succeeds" only in leading Protarchus to abandon the
"Protarchus at least is converted [from hedonism]. But is he the
representative of hedonism here? We might consider him to be too
compliant, which would considerably weaken Plato's critique..."
(Van Riel 2000, 31).
144
February 2008
ported in the Philebus had on its titular character. Was
it ineffective in fact? The crucial question is this: does
Socrates' serious critique of hedonism deserve to win
over Philebus?to say nothing of the unnamed others
who listen silently to the entire conversation (15c7-8,
the soul's eros 19c4-5, 52e3, 67b9) and, by extension, the reader?
PLATO'S APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGE
OF HEDONISM
Protarchus and The Good
Socrates begins his treatment of the question whether
pleasure, knowledge, or some third possibility is the
good they seek by asserting that pleasure is complex
and that it is as result necessary to inquire into its
"nature" (12c4-6). Ifwe take a bird's-eye view of the
conversation that follows, however, we see that they do
not turn to address directly the nature of pleasure?its
kinds or forms (eide) and their genesis?until 31b4.
The Philebus, in other words, will offer (what proves
to be) a powerful analysis of the nature of pleasure
only after a remarkably long delay. What then is the
purpose of the intervening sections that constitute this
delay? To answer this question, itwill be helpful to
begin by noting the "action" that occurs there?that is,
the principal effects of Socrates' arguments on his two
interlocutors?before turning to examine some of the
and some
arguments themselves.
to Protarchus. Protarchus is at first surprisingly resistant to the view
that there are important qualitative differences among
the various pleasures (Bolotin 1985, 8). Yet Socrates
con manages towrest from Protarchus his agreement with
or at any rate
acquiescence in that proposition?"Let
pleasures be many and dissimilar" (14a8)?and this
in turn prompts us to expect an analysis of the kinds
on the other, of pleasure there are and of the defining class char
acteristic that unites them. What we receive instead
is the discussion of One and Many. This discussion
prompts Protarchus first to issue a playful threat against
Socrates and then to call for him to be eager to find a
"way and contrivance" to rid their argument of "such
confusion" and so to uncover "some nobler path" than
the one they are on (16a7-b3). The nobler path in
question (16b5) meets with the approval of Protarchus
(17e7-8), until Philebus twice raises the simple ques
tion, which Socrates deems to be a good one (18a3-4,
d6), of what in the world the present argument has
to do with them and what its significance is (18al-4,
18d3-8). Socrates' further elaboration of it,however,
leads Protarchus to insist, in his longest remark of the
dialog, that Socrates cease obstructing them as he is:
Socrates should either go through the forms of plea
sure and knowledge himself or even abandon the at
tempt altogether (19cl-e5; 20al-8). Thus we see that,
conversation re from having secured Protarchus' agreement that there
are indeed qualitatively different pleasures, Socrates
attempt to discover them and therewith the nature of
pleasure. Socrates then agrees to forego the analysis of
the forms of pleasure (20c4-5) and argues instead that
American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1

neither pleasure nor knowledge by itself can constitute It is in this general context that Socrates suggests that
the good or the good life but only some combination they come to agreement about "certain small matters"
of the two can do so. In this way he brings to a close (20c8). The brief exchanges that follow are the most
the firstmain section of the dialog (llal-23b4). important of the dialog to this point and in large part
Whatever else one might say about this procedure, determine its course. For Socrates now makes explicit
it ismarked by an obvious peculiarity: Socrates and Protarchus' own convictions or
hopes concerning "the
Protarchus dismiss pleasure as the good before turning good," convictions that have thus far been largely im
to examine what pleasure is!Yet this strange procedure plicit, although they have already begun to produce
has several advantages. First, itpermits Socrates openly their necessary effects. Socrates brings out Protarchus'
to dismiss the immoral answer to the question of how hopes first by asking two questions that as such can
to live that ishedonism (consider 20b9-c2), thereby not not be taken as declarations of his own view: when
only saving Protarchus from such a doctrine but also asked by Socrates whether it is necessary that the good
earning greater freedom for himself to explore it later be something both "complete" (or "perfect": teleon)
on as an
already discredited view; and, second, it en and "sufficient," Protarchus replies emphatically that
courages those who see the fraudulent character of this it is (20dl-6; see also 60b7-c5). To these two questions
quick dismissal of pleasure to retain a serious interest in Socrates adds an affirmative statement of his own, what
Socrates' subsequent and more
revealing exploration he calls "the most necessary thing to say about it, as I
of it. Itmay be too that Socrates' aim in these early sec think," namely, that everything that knows of or recog
tions is to accomplish what he does in fact accomplish, nizes the good hunts after it and seeks itout in itswish
that is, to put Protarchus off the inquiry into pleasure; to get hold of it and to possess it for itself (peri hauto:
it is surely the case that, by beginning the dialog on 20d7-10). Protarchus agrees to this as well.
pleasure as he does, Plato erected a forbidding gate or Justwhat Protarchus means by contending that the
fence separating readers from the heart of thematter, good is "complete" and "sufficient" appears in the
and perhaps also diverting their attention from it.6 course of Socrates' argument that neither phron?sis nor
A detailed analysis of the discussion of One and pleasure can be the good, but only some combination of
Many is beyond the purpose of the present essay. Two these two can be. The crucial premise is this: "if in fact
observations must suffice.First, that discussion ismost either of these is the good, then itought to require noth
clearly meant to suggest, to Protarchus but also and ing further in addition" (20e4-21a2, emphasis added).
perhaps above all to Philebus, that theworld at its core The good they are now seeking, in other words, must by
can be grasped by the human mind. Philosophizing itself supply us with all that we might need or want in
need not be an exercise in futility,Philebus' manifest life. Socrates easily and quickly shows that a life spent
frustrations notwithstanding. Second, the arguments enjoying all of the greatest pleasures, but wholly devoid
specific to these opening sections afford us a clear of intellectual awareness, would be as deficient as a
view of Protarchus' hopes concerning the good or the life of thought, understanding, and calculation wholly
good life, hopes that run deeper in him than does devoid of pleasure. It is on the basis of this comparison
the hedonism he initially thinks will realize them. As that hedonism is officially rejected in the Philebus and
we have seen, Protarchus at first denies what expe that Protarchus ceases to consider himself a hedonist
rience would suggest, that there are important quali (21e3-4, 22b3-9, e4-6). Yet the question on the table
tative differences among the pleasures. His resistance is "the good" understood as the human good, that is,
stems from his view that, however contrary the things as the best way of life for a human being or the best
that give rise to pleasure may be?moderation or li human possession (19c6), and the comparison here is
centiousness, prudence
or foolishness?the pleasures entirely inadequate because it speaks of two livesman
in question are one (12d7-e2); and this view is in turn ifestly impossible for human beings. For, as Socrates
the product of his contention that all pleasures are good himself notes, the life of pleasure devoid of intellectual
(13b6-c5): the premise "pleasure is the good" means awareness is the lifeof a shellfish or mollusk, not that of
to Protarchus that all pleasures without exception are a human being (21cl-dl), just as the life of intellectual
good (and good for all human beings), an extreme view awareness devoid of all pleasure would be impossible
that no philosophic or even sensible hedonist would for us (consider in this regard Socrates' earlier men
maintain. In Protarchus' opinion, then, there is some tion of certain pleasures attending thinking or under
one class of good things wholly without admixture of standing
or the awareness of these: 12dl-4, 15d9-el
the bad, and he thinks he has found in pleasure the and context). In other words, Socrates has succeeded

unalloyed or pure good he seeks. in dismissing only a version of hedonism that could
not be lived by any human being, and such hedonism
as might actually be lived?with reason, calculation,
6 memory, and the rest in service of the maximization
Thissection of the dialog, concerning the problem of One and
of pleasure?remains a genuine possibility. (The life
Many, is the only one to have "excited continuous concern" from the
nineteenth century on (Benardete 1993, 243). Frede (1993) remarks of themind as itmight actually be lived too remains.)
that "Gosling (1975) devotes 70 pages of his General Commentary Protarchus' remarkable agreements here speak to the
to the dialogue's first 20 pages"?which section Frede herself dubs "a
kind of purgatory" 18 pages suffice for the remaining
power in him of his conviction that, to repeat, whatever
(xiii)?"while "the good" is itmust be complete and sufficient and
36 Stephanus pages" (xli n.2; compare Gosling 1975, 143-208). For
extended discussions, see Striker 1970; Shiner 1974; Hampton 1990,
so by itself secure for us?that is, for all human beings
13-40. (lld4-7)?an altogether happy life: ifpleasure stripped

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Plato's Critique ofHedonism in thePhilebus February 2008

of all else will not make us happy, then it cannot be the mentioned classes, but as for pleasure and pain, just like
and all such things, there are times when we
good. The conclusion may follow from the premises,
hot and cold

ought to welcome them and others when we ought not, on

but the premises are entirely questionable. Above all,
the grounds that they aren't good, but sometimes some of
is there such a complete and sufficient good for human
them do admit of the nature of the good things. (32c6-d6)
beings, the possession of which by itselfwill render us
all happy?
The first dismissal of pleasure as the good in the In the immediate sequel (32d9-36c2), Socrates
Philebus is convincing to Protarchus on account of makes three principal arguments. In the first, Socrates
the moral hopes he entertains concerning the good holds out the possibility that we might live without
we
understood as happiness: he hopes there to be some pleasure or pain, which means in this context that
one good in the world, the possession of which will might live free of the natural processes of emptying
complete him in such a way as to render him in need and filling, that is,of "destruction" and "preservation"
of nothing further; when Socrates argues, by hook or we would have to
(32el-3). And if in living that life
by crook, that pleasure is not such a good, Protarchus sacrifice the pleasures of "filling" (together with those
ceases to consider himself a hedonist. The fraudulent of the pleasant hope preceding it),we would also gain
character of that dismissal means, however, that one the freedom from being "emptied" (and the painful
should expect an additional, and more serious, critique fear preceding it).Must this not mean, however, that
of pleasure. there is a way for us to live free of the natural decay
or destruction altogether?of which "filling" too forms
a part, it turns out (see 42c9-d3)?and thereby to pre
The Examination of Pleasure serve ourselves (33d9-34c4; consider 14a6)? Socrates
not only identifies this lifewith the lifeof thinking?and
In the dialog's central and longest section (31b4-55c3),
in so doing explicitly returns to the unreal or impossi
Socrates examines and, it turns out, in
pleasure pain: ble life of nous wholly devoid of pleasure (compare
what do they exist, and through what pathos do they
33a8-b3 with 21d6-4)?but also calls it "most divine,"
come into being? Socrates now contends that they
a suggestion Protarchus accepts on the supposition that
come into being in the third or "common" or mixed
itwould be unseemly for gods to experience pleasure or
class, although he had suggested, immediately before, its contrary (33b6-10). Thus Protarchus holds out the
that pleasure "itself is unlimited and belongs to the
class that in and of itself neither has nor ever will have hope that human beings might live free of the limits
and demands of nature itself, especially the natural
a beginning or middle or end" (31a8-10). The prospect
necessity of decay and the pains that the anticipation
of an unlimited?and unending or eternal??pleasure of itmust bring; Protarchus holds out the hope that
is now dropped in favor of what happens "according to
we might live in a manner akin to the immortal gods.
nature," as Socrates repeatedly indicates (31c3; 31el0 And in sketching such a possibility, Socrates encour
32a4; 32a6-8; 32bl); and according to nature, not only
do pleasure and pain necessarily belong together, but ages Protarchus to indulge in the very thing under
the generation of pleasure. That
discussion, for it is pleasant indeed to anticipate a life
pain precedes is, plea so understood.
sure is the result of the natural restoration or "filling"
Socrates to our both
of a certain (bodily) emptying or depletion, as the proceeds explore pleasures,
"true" and "false," in a series of three arguments
pleasures of eating and drinking follow on the pains In the second and therefore central of
of hunger and thirst.These examples suggest that, far (36c3-55c3).
these (41a7-42c4), Socrates indicates that, just as see
from being unlimited, the pleasures in question are
ing things far off or close up obscures the truth and
temporary, giving way in time to the pains of emptying, causes us to form false so now
which are primary. Together they constitute one form opinions, experienc
ing pleasures and pains "close up" will obscure the
(eidos) of pleasure. truth and cause us to form false opinions: whereas
More intriguing is "the other eidos" (32c3-4, 33c5) in the first argument (36c3-41a6) Socrates was con
of pleasure, namely, those pleasures that are bound
cerned with how opinions affect our pleasures, he is
up with the expectations or anticipations "of the soul now concerned with how pleasures (and pains) affect
itself": the expectation of or hope for future pleasures is
our the pleasures and we are
pains experi
itselfpleasant and heartening, just as the expectation of opinions (of
encing), the "contrary" of the prior point (41e9-42b7).
pains is frightening and painful (32b9-c2). These plea The "false" pleasures in question are those that seem
sures and bound up with our aware
pains, moreover,
ness of and concern for the are so greater and more intense than they really are because
future, important of the presence of pain, just as the "false" pains are
that Socrates makes the goodness of the entire class of
those that appear, in the presence of pleasures, smaller
pleasure rest on them. In short, our hopes and fears will and less intense than they really are (42b2-c2). Socrates
be the test case determining the adequacy of hedonism:
fails to give a single example of the pains and plea
sures he has inmind. He does allude, however, to a
for I think that, as regards my opinion, at any rate, it is
in these [expectations] of both pain and pleasure, when point agreed to earlier, according to which pain and
admit of degrees, "the more and less," and so
each in turn comes into being pure (as it seems) and un pleasure
mixed, that what pertains to pleasure will become mani are among the unlimited things (41d5-10). The earlier
fest, whether the whole class is to be welcomed or whether agreement concerned the classification of the pleasant
we ought to grant this to some other of the previously and unmixed life led by Philebus, who contends that

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American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1

pleasure is altogether good because it is unlimited in such desires are found, not in the healthy but in the
point of number and degree ("the more": 27el-9). This sick and go together with a certain "wickedness" of
allusion suggests that the pleasures in question may be soul and body, not "virtue" (44d8-45e8). To understand
or include those with which Philebus ismost identified, pleasure
as such, then, one must look to the pleasures

he whose particular goddess isAphrodite (12bl-10). that accompany "illnesses," that is, to "unseemly" plea
be heightened or sures: those that accompany the scratching or rubbing
Might the pleasures of Aphrodite
as
exaggerated by the presence of a certain pain, just of itches (consider Gorgias 494c4-e2) and, following
some "true" pains may be falsely diminished by the closely on these, the most intense of the bodily plea
presence of those pleasures? The clarification of this sures, the sexual pleasures, vividly described here by
possibility falls among the purposes of the third, last, Socrates (47a3-9). A person will be more inclined al
and longest discussion of pleasures "true" and "false" ways and in every way to pursue these pleasures, "the
more licentious as well as senseless he happens to be,
(42c5-55c3).
The question of whether pleasure is nothing other and he calls these ones greatest and counts as happiest
or more than the absence of pain prompts Socrates to him who lives his life to the greatest possible extent
introduce Philebus' "enemies," who, in their hostility to in theirmidst" (47b5-7). This description calls tomind
hedonism, hold this view. On the one hand, Socrates de Socrates' own, early in the dialog, of the pleasures of
nies that they are correct; on the other, he suggests that the licentious and the foolish (12c4-d6), where he had
he and Protarchus treat them as "prophets" or "allies" also noted, in a very important remark, that the foolish
or "witnesses" (44c5, d7,51a4-5), for something can be are "full of both foolish opinions and hopes" (12d3):
learned from them. The discussion that follows is long, the opinions and hopes guiding the licentious and fool
complex, and wide-ranging. Only once his discussion ish (or senseless) are the ones now under discussion.
of their opinion has concluded does Socrates indicate And by taking up each of the mixtures of pleasure
clearly its twofold purpose: and pain?those of the body, of the soul, and of body
and soul?in an order different from the one inwhich
I am somehow not quite persuaded by those who claim he had originally enumerated them, Socrates sees to
that all pleasures are a cessation of pains, but, as I said, I it that the topic of themost intense bodily pleasures is
use of them as witnesses to the fact that some things
make followed by that of hope (compare 46b8-c4 with 47d5-9
seem to be pleasures but aren't at all, and that certain other
and context; hope ismentioned at 47c7).
have appeared to be great as
Something of the importance of these intense bodily
[pleasures] [phantastheisas]
well as numerous, but they have been kneaded together
the greatest distresses pleasures is suggested eventually in the lengthy dis
with both pains and the relief from
cussion of the mixtures of pleasure and pain belong
[odunon] related to a difficulty[aporias] of both body and enumerates seven such
soul. to the soul itself. Socrates
(51a2-9, emphasis added) ing
fear, lamentation, eros, em
mixtures?anger, longing,
As to the first stated purpose, Socrates completes it ulation, and envy?with envy (or malice: phthonos)
early on: those who claim that they are enjoying plea receiving by far the lengthiest treatment (compare Be
sures, when in fact they are enjoying merely the ces nardete 1993, 57 with, e.g., Frede 1993, 56, n.2, and
sation of pain, are mistaken and to that extent enjoy Russell 2005,189, n.47). Still, Socrates makes clear that
"false" pleasures. More important is Socrates' second his chief purpose in taking up envy is to be able to
stated purpose, and the questions itprompts us to ask demonstrate more easily themix of pleasure and pain
will guide the analysis of the view of the "enemies" in fear and eros (50cl0-d2; 48b4-6). It would be very
that follows: what are the other great and numerous difficult to see how fear?that is, the anticipation of
pleasures that have appeared or been imagined, what pains (32b9-c2)?could also be pleasant, were itnot for
are the pains and "greatest distresses" in question, and the example of fearing that Socrates himself had given
what is the "difficulty" that involves both soul and early
on: he professes to feel a more-than-human fear
ofmisnaming the gods (12cl-4). This experience would
body?
inquiry here into the nature of the class
Socrates' confirm, for ourselves and others, the seriousness
surely
is conducted simultaneously with and so of our concern to be pious or "dear to the gods." And
"pleasure"
is shaped by his exposition of the view of Philebus' such seriousness, in turn, would heighten our hopes
enemies. Although he reminds us of this fact (44c5-d2, to know the goods that belong only to those who are
45c7-8, 46a5-6, 51a3-5), he also fails tomake it quite themselves good
or
pious.
clear when he is speaking in his own name and when The case of eros is more puzzling. Socrates had ear

in that of the "enemies," which amounts to saying that lier spoken of eros in the strange example of one who,
he is willing to allow Protarchus (and the reader) to being emptied "for the first time," "desires" (erai) to be
make themistake of thinking that he too shares their filled (compare Frede 1993, 37 n.l): eros presupposes
highly moralistic condemnation of pleasure (consider
some awareness of that is, of "destruc
"emptying,"
also 44e3-4). It is in the context of this condemnation tion." Could it be that the pain that accompanies eros
on the part of others that Socrates conveys crucial ele is the pain of the anticipation of death, the "difficulty"
ments of his own critique of pleasure. (aporia) affecting both body and soul and giving rise
He begins as follows: in order to discern the nature to the "greatest distresses"? If this is so, then the "fill
of pleasure, the enemies say that one ought to look to ing" in question must be the assurance that death is
the highest and most intense pleasures, which are the in fact not an end, together with the pleasant hope to
bodily ones and are preceded by the greatest desires; which such assurance would give rise. And the more

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Plato's Critique ofHedonism in thePhilebus February 2008

immediate pleasures that typically accompany eros? end of their inquiry into One and Many, for exam
the pleasures that have been given so remarkable a ple, he notes that, though itwould be noble to know
"
description in this section and that have been alluded all things, nonetheless it seems to be a 'second sail
to from the beginning of thePhilebus (12bl-c4)?have ing' not to escape one's own notice" (19cl-3): in the
to an extraordinary degree the capacity to foster that absence of a complete knowledge of everything, the
hope. As Socrates points out, to experience the peak of next best thing is to know oneself. And, in the context
them is as itwere to die; it is somehow to experience, of the analysis of the third kind of "false" pleasures
though of course to survive, death (47b2-4); the singu that includes a critique of those who are ignorant of
lar union of lover and beloved holds out the promise themselves, Protarchus volunteers and approves of the
of the overcoming of themortality of each. Eros, then, Delphic dictum, "Know Thyself" (48cl0)7
is properly a mixture of pleasure and pain because it If the hedonists must grant the importance of self
requires the pain of the awareness of death, of one's in knowledge, the crucial question, which the Philebus
dividual mortality, in order fully to experience themost prompts one to raise, would seem to be this: what if
intense of the bodily pleasures with which it is associ there are pleasures the experience of which makes it
ated, pleasures which cannot, however, be considered difficult, if not impossible, to gain the requisite self
merely bodily because they point beyond themselves knowledge? When Socrates determines, at the end of
to, and encourage, through both their natural intensity the Philebus, the proper mixture of goods in the good
and their natural consequence, the most intense plea life,he first includes certain "true" pleasures and then
sure of soul that is the expectation of or hope for an examines the opinions he has these pleasures them
eternal existence. selves express, what might be called a dialectical exam
Thelover's erotic dedication to the beloved, which ination. The (true) pleasures, who take their bearings
presents itself as being for the sake of the beloved alone by what is possible and what is advantageous (63b7-9),
(consider 53d9-10 and context), is but one, albeit very condemn "the greatest and most intense" pleasures
important, example of selfless dedication: the posses on the ground that they pose "myriad impediments"
sion of such as consists, not in one's own to them. For these intense set the
goodness example, pleasures
pleasure or even in thinking but in justice and piety souls inwhich the (true) pleasures dwell into utter con
(39el0-ll), too may bring with it the hope of over fusion on account of the "mad pleasures" they create:

coming death. The great and numerous pleasures that the greatest and most intense pleasures are themselves
have been imagined?those that accompany fear and responsible for fostering certain "mad pleasures"
eros as well as anger and lamentation?have indeed (63d2-6, with the MSS). As the earlier account of
been "kneaded together" with great pains and can in a just these most intense pleasures had suggested, they
sense be said to be but respites from them. prompt us to "forget" our mortality and thereby
prompt us also to forget ourselves in a crucial respect;
the present context too makes mention of the "forget
PLATO'S CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM ting" these extreme pleasures cause (63e2). The state of
soul associated with those most intense pleasures even
In attempting to discover the core of Plato's critique requires us to forget what Socrates himself had called
of hedonism in the Philebus, one may begin from the "the most necessary thing" about the good, namely,
fact that Protarchus, while still understanding himself that we wish to possess it for ourselves (20d7-10; con
to be a hedonist, readily agrees that he would accept sider 35a3-4,47b2-7,53d9-e7). That state of forgetting
the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures for the whole too, then, must number among the "mad pleasures."
of his life only ifhe could have mind, knowledge, cor At the same time, and in keeping with their stated op
rect opinion, and memory too (20el-21d4-5 and e3-4). position to the "mad" pleasures, the "true" pleasures
This agreement suggests that, precisely for hedonists, themselves do not wish to exist apart from knowledge,
it is not enough simply to experience even great plea including self-awareness (consider 63b7-c3).
sure constantly, in themanner of an oyster; they wish As the present analysis has argued, the most seri
also to be aware that they themselves are doing so, ous part of the examination of pleasure is devoted to
which requires, at a minimum, the persistence of the exploring those "greatest and most intense pleasures"
"I" experiencing the pleasure and therefore such things that are magnified by the presence of the pain of "de
as mind and knowledge. In addition, hedonists derive cay," even as theywork to distort, by diminishing, that
much pleasure from the capacity to recollect past plea very pain. By encouraging us to forget the "limit"9
sures and future ones. Yet and
anticipate anticipation
recollection of this kind, which necessarily fall to the lot 7
Van Riel (2000) makes the important observation that Plato's
of all human beings (39e4-7,40a3-4), are choice worthy
"analyses [in the Philebus] allow us to infer that no hedonist accepts
not only because they are pleasant but also because that the criteria used to pursue certain pleasures lies within pleasure
they are essential to what the hedonists most want, itself. Hedonists, too, will implicitly subordinate their pleasure to
to experience themselves. Socrates external factors" (31)?though he does not proceed tomention self
namely, pleasure for
as being among those factors.
repeats the argument just summarized much later in knowledge
8
the dialog (60d3-e5)?needlessly, so far as Protarchus Bury (1973) prints the reading of theMSS, but he understandably
notes that the phrase "is, to say the least, a strange expression" (on
can see (60e6-7)?in order to confirm this importance
63d6).
of self-awareness to the pleasure-seekers. In 9
precisely After Socrates sketches the four classifications into which all things
deed, Protarchus himself confirms it repeatedly. At the fall (the unlimited, the limited, themixture of these, the cause of the

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American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1

that characterizes our life, then, such intense pleasures no one would willingly be deceived about this?as we
have the effect of taking us away from ourselves as we truly
are. We
require self-knowledge
or self-awareness,
truly are or of making self-knowledge more difficult. then, in order both to know our genuine needs that
The suggestion of the Philebus is that, in the face of determine the true good or goods and to be aware that
that limit,we naturally attempt to escape it, to begin we are in possession of them. And if that possession
with by forming the eros to be fulfilled or completed and that awareness are
accompanied by pleasure,
as

(see again 35a3-4); and such eros in turn prompts us they may well be, it cannot be said that we choose
wholeheartedly to dedicate ourselves, not apparently them primarily for such pleasure: they demand also
to "the most profitable of all things" for us (llcl-2; the painful knowledge of the necessary limit attending
also 19c4-6), but to such things as "virtue" and "pu us as mortals.

rity."We see this desire at work in Protarchus himself,

who easily accepts the collapse of "the good" into "the
noble," which is the class to which purity and virtue
presumably belong (64e5-6; compare 15a4-7); and in
so doing he "forgets" what Socrates had suggested was
our altogether necessary wish to possess the good for
ourselves. The peak of such dedication is surely the
virtuous lover's dedication to the beloved (consider
53d9-10 and context), itself accompanied and encour
aged by the intense pleasures at issue.
It is true that the demonstrable importance to hedo
nists of self-awareness does not by itself establish the
priority of it to pleasure. Might not themost impressive
sort of hedonist be eager to possess self-knowledge, and
to forego many intense pleasures, precisely to secure
the experience of themost solid pleasures? One would
be closer to settling the case, perhaps, if one could
demonstrate the necessity of our preferring to possess
a painful truth to a pleasant falsehood, especially if the
truth and falsehood in question were of great impor
tance to us. Is there something inherent in our desire to
know that cannot be reduced to pleasure? In thePhile
bus, to repeat, Socrates and Protarchus agree
most necessary thing to say about the good is that ev
erything that recognizes ithunts after itand seeks itout,
in itswish to seize it and possess it for itself (20d7-10).
This may remind one of Diotima's lesson to Socrates,
conveyed in the Symposium, according to which hu
man beings desire to possess the good, to possess it
for themselves, and to possess it always or
eternally
(206a3-10). But is not the desire to possess the good
CONCLUSION: HEDONISM AND THE
PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE TODAY
The preceding analysis of the Philebus has stressed
the importance of self-knowledge in Plato's critique
of hedonism. It is just here, however, in the matter
of self-knowledge, that a massive obstacle to the re
covery of Plato's argument appears. For that argu
ment relies on a basic premise that can no longer be
assumed to be accepted by those who approach the
question of hedonism today, and perhaps not even to
be familiar to them10?the premise that hedonism is
an inherently disreputable doctrine because it is nec
essarily selfish. It is no accident that Callicles' attack
on conventional justice, for example, is followed by
his profession of hedonism, and insofar as that at
tack does not extend quite so deeply in him as he
thinks, he is forced to abandon his hedonism. In Plato's
presentation of them, the topics "hedonism" and "in
justice" are linked. This is true even in the Philebus,
which at first blush abstracts frommoral questions en
that the
tirely: once freed from his hedonism, Protarchus takes
his bearings by what morality?justice, piety, shame,
decency?demands (see p. 143 above).
The reasoning behind this linkage may be summa
rized as follows. For the hedonist who knows what he is
about or who is no fool, his concern with "the good" is
altogether selfish: "the good" is indeed pleasure?my
pleasure! Hedonists seek in all things tomaximize their
own
good, understood as pleasure, and they will
en

eternally, in themanner of a god, in tension with the de gage inwhat may appear from the outside to be moral
sire to possess it for ourselves? For to desire to become actions only insofar as these happen to increase their
immortal would be to desire to cease to be ourselves pleasure (or to decrease their pain); if the demands of
justice or the law are displeasing, the hedonist consis
as we are, as we can be known to ourselves to be. In
what amounts to a gloss on the problem with which the tently seeks to avoid them. The hedonist, then, is con
Philebus leaves us, Aristotle notes that "each wishes temptuous of the claims of justice or morality as such,
the good things for himself, and nobody chooses to
possess all things by becoming someone else?for even 10 In
now the god possesses the good?but rather while be the lengthy entry under "hedonism" in the Encyclopedia of
Ethics, for example, written by a leading proponent of hedonism
ingwhatever he is" (Nicomachean Ethics 1166al9-26). today, no mention ismade of the selfish (or unselfish) character of the
And this insight, the acceptance of which requires the doctrine, evidently because that question is of no interest whatever
surrender of a very great hope, is for that reason painful (Feldman 2001, 662-69). Consider also the same author's dismissal
but nonetheless necessary to fulfillour deepest attain elsewhere of "hedonistic egoism" on the ground that he is interested

able to possess the true for ourselves?for only in "axiology"?that is, "about what's intrinsically good"?and
wish, good not at all in "the normative ethics of behavior." But would not
knowledge of what is "intrinsically good" (for whom?) have clear
mixture), he proceeds to link each with a life (27c3 and following): the "normative" implications (Feldman 2004, 31)? The substitution of
mixed life of prudence and pleasure belongs to themixed (27dl-ll); logical puzzles for the question of how to live may account for the
Philebus' life of limitless pleasure belongs to the unlimited (27el striking conclusion of the study in question: "What authorizes me to
28a4); and the life of phron?sis, knowledge, and nous belongs to, or pontificate as I have? At present, I prefer not to answer this question.
is at least linked with, the fourth class of cause (28a4 and following). Perhaps I am just emoting_Perhaps I just take pleasure inwriting
Only the limited remains unaffiliated with a life. But is not human them [i.e., these thoughts] down and offering them to you" (Feldman
life as such marked by its limited character or by its finitude? 2004, 206).

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Plato's Critique of Hedonism in thePhilebus February 2008

even ifhedonistic calculation?so as to avoid penalties,
for example?will sometimes or even often prompt him
or her to comply with them.Moreover, no one should
take comfort in the hope that there may be hedonists
who happen to delight in promoting the good of others
or in nobly sacrificing their own. For clear-sighted he
donists will realize that they have no selfless concern
for others but view them strictly as means to increase
their own pleasure; and this realization destroys the
supposed pleasure involved in noble service
or self
sacrifice because it reveals the groundlessness not only
of the opinion that one is a noble fellow but also of
the very pleasure one may have once taken in holding
that false and foolish opinion. The hedonist shorn of
illusion will ask: why not take the route tomy pleasures
Mill commits the so-called fallacy of composition, that
is, of "moving from the claim that each desires his
happiness to the claim that all (i.e., each) desire the
happiness of all (i.e., not the happiness of each but
the total happiness of all collectively)"11 (Crisp 1997,
77-78; Ryan 1974,118). The difficulty is rather thatMill
himself jumps without argument from the point of view
of the selfish individual hedonist to that of someone
concerned, for an unstated reason, with the good of the
whole; "the sum of all these [individual] goods must be
a good," Mill avers?but good forwhom and forwhat
reason precisely (1972,1414)? Why should any in their
rightminds be concerned with that collective (alleged)
good, as distinguished from their own? The most fun
damental argument concerning the reasonableness of

that is direct and sensible? Thus hedonism appears in the individual's interest in the pleasures of all human
the pages of Plato as a disreputable doctrine?if not beings is lacking. This lack is clearest inMill himself:
necessarily, for that reason, a false one. Mill's deeply moral concern for all sentient creatures
The contemporary treatment of hedonism certainly is not traceable to his hedonism, and only ad hoc argu
recognizes the logical possibility of such inherent self ments could render his guiding concern defensible on
ishness, in the form of "egoistic hedonism." That ver hedonistic grounds?arguments that in any case Mill
sion is supplemented, however, by another and far himself never made. One is thus led to conclude that
more influential one, "universalistic hedonism," which there beats at the heart of themost influential version
looks not to the pleasure of the individual but to that of modern hedonism an undefended moral concern
of the community or aggregate (for the terms, see not reducible to the "General Happiness" principle but
Sidgwick 1962). The most important source for such rather productive of it. "The controversy Mill sees him
public-spirited hedonism is the utilitarianism of John self as engaged in is not whether there is such a thing
Stuart Mill. Mill advocated a frank hedonism because as morality, but, given that there is,what is required by
he thought the term "happiness" to be best explained it" (Crisp 1997, 79).
by recourse to the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoid The decisively limited character ofMill's inquiry into
ance of pain: "By happiness is intended pleasure, and hedonism amounts to his having assumed that the best
the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the pri lifewill of necessity be a just or moral one. By contrast,
vation of pleasure" (1969,210). Yet he promoted hedo Protagoras, Callicles, and Thrasymachus, among other
nism as one
passionately concerned with "the greatest characters in the Platonic dialogs, all challenge us to
good of the greatest number," that is,with the well scrutinize this assumption shared at the outset, to be
being of "all mankind" and even of "the whole sen sure, by every decent human being?a challenge that
tient creation" (214). Indeed, Mill identified as "the Plato as dramaturg too manifestly thought had to be
principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory," "self confronted by anyone wishing to lead what he held to
ishness" (215). be the trulygood life, the lifeof Socrates. The centrality
At this point, however, a Callicles or Thrasymachus of the problem of the goodness of justice is hinted at
might well ask: why in the world are you concerned even in the Philebus, for at a crucial point Socrates
with themaximization of the pleasure of anybody other defers, in the ranking of the various goods available
than yourself? Mill's sole reply is as follows: to us, to the knowledge of "a certain human being
who understands what justice itself is and possesses
If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself a logos that follows his thinking and who, in addition,
were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an thinks about all the beings in a similar way" (62a2-5).
end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was And to know what "justice itself is," one would have
so. No reason can be given why the general is
happiness to follow out the inquiry into justice as Plato sets it
desirable, that each person so far as he believes it
except
to be attainable, desires his own happiness.
forth,with the arguments of Callicles and Protagoras,
This, however,
a fact, we have not only all the proof which the among others, squarely inmind. In brief, the implicit
being
case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that
and unchallenged moral concern at work in themost in
is a good: that each person's is a good fluential discussions of hedonism today is,by contrast,
happiness happiness
to that person, and the general therefore, a good
the focus of scrutiny in the Platonic counterparts?in
happiness,
to the aggregate of all persons. (1969, 234)

From the observation that each individual strives to se 11

In a letter toHenry Jones clarifying the argument of Utilitarianism,
cure his or her own happiness understood as pleasure, Mill wrote: "[W]hen I said the general happiness is a good to the

then,Mill wishes to infer the goodness of securing, and aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being's
is a good to every other human being, though I think in a
indeed the duty to strive to secure, the general happi happiness
good state of society and education itwould be so. Imerely meant in
ness. The concern for the general however,
happiness, this particular sentence to argue that since A's happiness is a good,
does not follow from and is in fact radically different B's a good, C's a good, etc., the sum of all these goods must be a
from the self-seeking of each. The difficulty is not that good" (1972,1414).

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and tation." Review of Politics 55: 1 (Winter 1993), 167-70.
Protagoras.
This unexamined moral concern isunlikely to be sub Burnet, John. 1986 [originally published 1901]. Platonis Opera Vol
ume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
jected to scrutiny today partly on account of the success Bury, R. G. 1973 [originally published 1897]. The Philebus of Plato.
of the project of modern political philosophy broadly New York: Arno Press.

speaking. That project sought to solve the problem of Crisp, Roger. 1997. Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.
Feldman, Fred. 2001. "Hedonism."
justice once and for all by openly advocating a frankly
In The Encyclopedia of Ethics.
2nd Edition. Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker. New York:
selfish hedonism (Vaughn 1982)?for the sake of and
Routledge.
ultimately in service to the common good: justice itself Feldman, Fred. 2004. Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the
now demands that we be truly selfish. The citizens of Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford
the new political order, the "rational and industrious," University Press.
could finally have their cake and eat it by being thor Frede, Dorothea. 1993. Philebus. ed. and Trans. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett.
oughly selfish and by congratulating themselves on the Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1991. Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomeno
benefits they thereby confer on the common good. The logical Interpretations Relating to the Philebus. Trans. Robert M.
agency of the "invisible hand" would effect miracles. Wallace. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
From the older point of view, however, the very great Gosling, J. C. B. 1975. Philebus. ed and trans. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
political gains achieved by this doctrine of "self-interest Hackforth, R. 1958. Plato's Examination of Pleasure. Cambridge:
well understood" would likely come at the price of self
Cambridge University Press.
knowledge. For the triumph of this selfish-yet-moral Hampton, Cynthia. 1990. Pleasure, Knowledge, Being: An Analysis
doctrine makes itexceedingly difficult even to raise the of Plato's Philebus. Albany: SUN Y Press.
Klein, Jacob. 1972. "About Plato's Philebus." Interpretation 2: 157
questions that Plato insists are key to self-knowledge, 82.
the question of what morality demands of us, and,
Liddell, Henry, Robert Scott, Henry Jones. 1968. A Greek-English
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study
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whose as a to self-knowledge we are
importance path Ryan, Alan. 1974. J.S. Mill. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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Shiner, Roger A. 1974. Knowledge and Reality in Plato's Philebus.
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