'The story, vividly

told, is enthralling ! '

IIRUCE LOCKHT\R]'
-SlR in Sunday Times
HITLERS SECRET
H ITLER'S ENEIIIY
SECRET ENEMY ADMIRAL CANARIS : PATRIOT OR TRAITOR

IAN COLVIN
by
Ian Colvin
ADMI llr¡cl ,'l lnrcllrgt.n, c,
(
^^ was ving :t¡r¡r:rlt.rrt lv lrccrr
a loyal s uring rlrc ( lz<.t.lr t.risis
of 1938 hc Nazis, scntling irn
emissary to urge Chamberlain ro catl the [,-ülrrcr's blull.
* Canaris gave warning to the British of an air-raid
on London planned for f f a.m. on September 3rd,
1939 (when Chamberlain broadcast the declara-
tion of war).
* He revealed the forthcoming German invasion
of Norway and the Low Countries.
't He kept General Franco's Spain out of the war.
* He took no act¡on when Hitler ordered the
assassination of Churchill.
Canaris was at lasr dismissed, was arrested afrer the .July
Conspiracy' and was execured in April 1945. Ian Colvin
(whose photograph is shown above), a renowned foreign
correspondent, was probably the first man outside rhe
British Secret Service to discover Canaris' activiries. His
book,
piece
lights
the ai
was shot down in the belief rhat Churchill was on board.

i1

Jt¡
tat

üi
 /;

SIICRI1 ' I]NEMY

((,i hi(l rl' I n/l lligenn)

lAN COLVIN

HITLER'S SECRET ENEMY

has '¡vtit-
L-¡-ustnlrro LosooN Nr'ws: 'Mr Colvin and inttigu-
ten one of the most
"*.itit'g,.ttigmatic'
ing stories for a verY long ume"
BEVISED EDITION
Sr¡sp,tt Truns¡ 'The story, vividly
told' is en-
thtalling.'
of fiction"
Nnws C¡rnoNrcr.r: 'It teads like a thtillet

//^^

ft

PAN BOOKS LTD : LONDON

 ILLUSTRATIONS IN PHOTOGRAVURE
(betueen pages rr2 and rtj)

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris

Dr fosef Müller

Ewald von Kleist

Dr Paul Leverkühn acts as one of tlre Defence Counsel at the

trial of Iiield-Marshal von Manstein before a British military
court at Hamburg

The twenty-one prisoners at Nuremberg photographed togeth€r

*rh.
for the last dme as they appeared i.t".. international
tribunal to hear sentence passerJ upon üem

Rastenburg after the bomb. Mussolini and Góring view the

wreckage
ffi'

PREFACE TO THIS PAN EDITION

guilt for the which nobody

will disputc, ns of the 'tota[
guilt' thesis. that not only
was Hitler r also the entire
German nation and'his entire sraff of military advisers, includ-
ing those who advisetl him against war.
Such evidence as defence of persons charged
as war criminals, an the German Foreign Office
and the Great Gene o show that there had been

adherents of the Morgenthau policy of pastoralisation of Ger-

many clung to rigid control of Germany even when it had ceased
to be practicable.
So this book made a splash in üe pond. It incensed some of
the critics. Others who had not seen rhe Foreign Ofñce docu-

of sympathy was known to the British Foreign OfEce, but either

not suficiently fostered to be useful, or neglected because the
British ofrcial estimate was tlat we should win the War any-
7
 largely a licensed gathering of intelligence,'hardly
Fferlrlerrt llrr¡r¡cvclt nr C¿rs:rbl
their autobiographies. We do nor yer know what
^l- -t
d€rlnrr¡rL¡rr wn¡ r¡s c¡rsual as sir winston churchill makes wrrnitrgs and what ruses won tle First World War. Pressurisa-
it out tlo and a disregard for the Official Secrets Act (because there
t¡l hc l¡r lrll nrcr,<.,irs, then this book shows, I think, ürt
it w"""i h¡ bcen a tendency to apply it too widely) have drawn the veil
thc let¡t i¡ fatcful casualness, fraught with áoom.
Intclligence documents ,.. ,.I-do*, if ever, released I little from the secrers of the Second World War. At the centre
to the s secret world stands the still shadowy and enigmltic
p . When spies are caught
li for political reasons. But of Admiral Canaris.
which the Second W'orld War

. was a British agent. But an unsteered agent, an unpaid agent,

wrath for the future. Indeed, a
an unbribable agent, an agent whose name was never on our
will become fewer. books, who risked his life with every move he made against
Chri:topher Warner, late Hitler and eventually paid for his intrigues by a slow and
^.Sir whose chance remark Under_secretary in the Foreign
Office, agonizing death. At 'second proof' stage of a book like this,
at table ,,".,"Jrn. on the theme of
which has been before the public for six years, it is unusual to
discover startling new evidence that can be quoted and ascribed,
to satisfy the demand for authenticity. But in conversation re-
ccntly with a former dip the British Embassy in Stock-
holm, I have heard once assertion that Canaris and his
officers were helping the British in World War II. This diplo-
mat, placed where he could see intelligence reports, knew that
I am much indebted for materia from ofrcers
to regret cxact informat
ssy Minis disposition of
months cxact was this
transmitted to the Admiralty in Lo n the great
German convoys started up the Katt of Noiway
a small group of British Intellige StockholÁ
gathered to drink a glass of wine in celebrarion of üeir own
success. For they felt that everything must be known in London,
and tbat the Nazi venture was doomed. No doubt Admiral Can-
Secretaries of State, diplomats and Intelligence
officers retire aris thought the same thing. With dismay, as the first days of the
and write their memoirs. But the i"rir";,;"rid. of diplomacy, German invasion passed, they realised that Britain, despite all
8
9
 qtF'
Xtr,

It r.q tFl lrrowle,l¡c, wil$ utterly unprepared, for what

rl ,r,l rr,, l,
I

anrl ¡rcliviti«:s I prcsent to the F OREW O RD

IaN Corvrx THE INTELLIGENCE GAME

Cupc Toun, r957

I low good was the British Intelligence Service during the

§ct-ond World Warl Did it compare with the legendary repu-
lution of the Secret Service in the pastl Did we out-man(Euvre
the German Abwehr? Did we know what country Hitler in-
tcnrlcd to attack, and whenl It seemed that at the beginning of
thc War, the British Government was surprised by a series of
uncxpected aggressions.
I was casting these questions over one of the Under-Secretaries
of State at lunch when the Germa¡ wars were over and he rose
to the subject, remarking with a certain emphasis:
"Well, our Intelligence was not badly equipped. As you know,
wc had Admiral Canaris, and that was a considerable thing."
Hitler's Intelligence Chief a British agent? Although I had
occasion over a flumber of years, as a correspondent of British
newspapers in Berlin, to catch glimpses of the workings of the
Chief of Intelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, it
would have no more occurred to me to describe him as a British
agent than I would have described Tallyrand as an agent of
Castlereagh. Yet the Under-Secretary said "We had Canaris"
emphatically, and his point of view was so fascinating that I
have begun this study of Canaris by quoting it.
As I walked away from lunch that day it seemed that this
must be the best-kept secret of the War, I wondered to what
extent the Services Information and News Departments, usually
so helpful in historical research, would respond to enquiries
about Admiral Canaris.
"You have chosen a difñcult subject for us," said Brigadier
Lionel Cross at the War Office. "Why not ask the Admiralty?
After all, he was a sailor." At length I found an officer in the
Admiralty who had made a study of Canaris. "I am afraid I
carlnot help you much on the aspect which ioterests you," he
IO
1f

L ria;
 "and I don't think anyone can.,,J tried the Foreign wl¡etr thc lclephoue in my office rang, and I realised with some
iilillfl:..',
¡rlunlrl¡trretrt lhlt someone on our own side had a word or two
material on Admiral Canaris_ lrr ráy ultrrrrt Canaris. The British Secret Service looked further
Office. ..We could not contem- ll¡tr¡ llrc urind of Admiral Canaris than his close German asso-
t yourself, and we cannot spare tllHter wcrc uware. Some of his old British opponents in the duel
through t1-rese papers for yáu.', of wltr h:rvc helped to correct imperfections in my portrait with
ns are given access to a great á lrlicitous and friendly touch.
.,we date'" 'l'lrc trtrin records of the Admiral's secret activities, his diary,
don,t see our way to help you.,, Ittrty ltitvc bcen destroyed by the Gestapo, but there is no con-
Was sked Lord Vansiitarr if he áould t'lrr¡ivc cvldcnce that it may not come to light when the prisons
say any riend of üe British. .,I o.rly kn.w
-_ u'c orl)ticd of the remnants of the Nazis and the world has
of him as an efHcient intelligence offiA,;i;'answered.
By chance I met a rnrr, át lunch who
(lulctcncd down. Therefore I have not attempred a full bi.
_ had worked in rr¡rn¡rhy of Canaris or even a verdict on his strange character.
YJlil'IY s
the
We fell to
d*i.,g tt. wr.. 'l'l¡c intricate collecting of technical information and the net-
rrientioned and I once again wr¡r'kr¡ ¡¡f agents and large departments that fourish in the in-
klli¡crrce game are the backcloth, but not the main interest of
"Ah man from the War Office, ..he helpdd tlrir b«xrk. FIow we deceived the enemy and rooted out his agents
ali he us
I said I thougit ,irt tf,i, was so.
he.l', llr llritain is a chapter that may be told in the fullness of time.
"What f him?", y..*p.';i;;asked. ll is the mentality of the man himself, and the web that he wove
So the search for Admiral Crrrarl, *..r, o.r; Germa¡s in re- rounrl Hitler, that seize the imagination. The readers will have
tu jurlge'for themselves whether Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was
n Ocrman patriot or a British spy, a Europ€an statesman or a
conmopolitan intriguer, a double agent, an opportunist or a seer.
It will not be easy for them to make up rheir minds.
I started the story with my ideas still disordered; then I under-
took a journey to Spain and scoured sourh Germany for the
remnants of his Intelligence Service. This was not sumcient-
of Canaris by Dr Karl Berlin and the northern provinces had to be reconnoit¡ed, Still
ad trend of his career and
I the picture blurred and altered. Every German off,cer I met put
¡ little more into the portrait, but each was sceptical about the
Members
their lines that his colleague had draw_n. "That can't be true----or the
own aspect g his Admiral would certainly have told me about it." FIow often was
assistant an
I to hear that answer I How often I saw their faces cloud with
in Turkey, *1Í suspicion that their own idea of him was incomplete t
can. Close Canaris have helped too, liL.
Otto John, who worked for him ir, fortrgri,
Eventually when I had visited Madrid, Berlin, Frankfurt,
lnd Fabian von
Schlabrendorfl, who was enrrusred by hi*'*ith
Hamburg, Wiesbaden, Munich,
high p"llti; who appeared to know more
secrets.
ruggested thatI should visit a
I expected to be
writiqg this book without any ofñcial assist- rd Richard Protze," he said; "you cannot finish your book
see
ance from the British ,.rá hrd already
n.riri.¿'_rry chapters ; ithout him." Who was hei The Admiral's mate when he was
T2 r3
i

t,
 CHAPTER I

ri i AT THE HEIGH T oF HIS AMBITI oN

namer', I said. .,yet some
destiny.,'
name until the end of the
Military Intelligence.
d it openly would be
sentenced to imprisonmen,.
"Ife was an officer of the German Navy
who served in the
General Stafi and Iater in the High
C.__á"J_¡ut he was nor
really an ofEcer by ¡ ,'
"A politician with
"Yes, if you like,',

gence. Had he been anorher kind of officer he might have risen

command the North Sea Fleet, or the new German Navy that
had done so much to build up secretly.
" Alüough he had sailed in ú-bort.'with credit in the First
and had risen ro command the battleship Schlesien,
o knew him with whom I have spoken agre.s thai
¡ was tne r hat interested him most of all. He
ii "r th. ron industrialist with an Italian name,
ijlns ".ttt.a 1". $.Tr"y, who traced his ancestry to Lombardy.
I'He distinguished himself early in his naval career when the
irgruiser Dresdet was dodging British warships in South Ameri_
can waters after the brttle oJ the Falkland irl"rrdr. His fellow
, ofricers. were struck by his skill at procuring
her coal and victuals
f5
wru, ( )ne of its members, Deputy Moses, hody accused him of
Hltellltt¡f llte nturderers of the two Socialist leaders, but Canaris
trylr trlrolt cnough to point out that üe incident in question did
Itt[ üonre wit[rin the scope of the Reichstag enquiry.
l{Erl hc rrot negotiated for U-boats of German design to be
httllt ln S¡r:rin, Holland and |apan during the years after the
V¡rruillcr 'l'reaty had deprived Germany of these weapons? Had
lt+'¡rrf l¡¡kcn part in the Kapp Putsch of rgzo and forsaken the
llelnrrre Minister Noske, to whom he was ADC, when Noske
flr,l ll',,rn l}crlin to South Germany? Canaris smiled and allowed
llt¡re rlr»'it:s to run their course. Not,one did he ever trouble to
rletry, rrrr,l laughed heartily when they were seriously mentioned,
trl¡rtc¡ lris friend, Dr von Schlabrendorff,
lt wus r f<¡ible of his that his family had connections with that
Arlrrririrl Kanaris who was a hero of the Greek wars of libera-
lkrn in thc nineteenth century. Perhaps it was also not entirely
rlirl¡reclble to him to have a number of these tales circulating.
Nolxxly knew which to believe. They earned him a mysterious
fr¡rut:rtion. They made it less easy for enemies and rivals to take
Itlr lltr«r nreasure.
Wlrlt circumstances had combined to bring the rear,admiral
fror¡r Swinemünde to this high and secret post in the capital?
Arlr¡rirrl Raeder had been obliged to recall Captain Patzigfrom
llrc appointment of Chief of Intelligence. Field-Marshal von
Hhrrrrbcrg, the War Minister, a faithful prop of the National-
§rrcirlist regime, had criticised the uncompromising attitude of
lrutz.ig towards the security service of the Secret State Police.
llcinhard 'Butcher' Heydrich, chief of this organisation (known
úr the SD), had complained to his own chief, Reichsführer of
the SS Heinrich Himmler, thatPatzig was obstructing co-opera-
tl¡¡n between the Intelligence Service and the State Police in vital
mutters of security. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy did
n(,t want to support Patzíg, but he hoped to second anot}rer
noval officer to this important post. To lose it to the Army or the
Luftwaffe would be regrettable. Raeder did not consider that the
mcn in field grey possessed the mental horizon to direct a secret
rcrvice wiü commitments all over the world.
"That is correct, but not the whole story."
Richard Protze here took up the narrative.
"Our Führer had concluded his treaty of friendship wiü
r.7
 I

fhting counter-espionage actions with the FrenJ

or rerrnquishing
;,;;;;;^-r:::'l:-: "§ Pnce 1,,.*-" "ii.. rhe chance of an u in the Rhineland. To Heydrich, Himmler
H*T:i:."Tq^y, f ^ 1I,11 ",r,..", of parti tio n oice may have seemed excellent. Canaris was
time ñ;,"d j;
"E-
#oi::"fi,1..,ril,:,::i
¡;,: I*:1i::the bt m instinctive enemy of Bolshevism. It was he who
I"X-n::f
in the : l'-,h:,:"..."!Ty: or B"l,h*;;;. .iJ:::J:fi
r9j4 treaty forbad. ;;:.-:;^:'::::l'. secret crausc
^ :: all the instruments and
üeother's re it was sunk off Sca
the territoi and
other's rerrir^^, ^^l s-
Captain patzig funds to subsidise the
ig called
- with the Generat _
__r_-r¡¡.!¡rro duu lOlthcvlk armies. This man might be an ally for Hitler:in
Í::1,ij:1
-_-:-L -t
strfi ,gr.._oíf-;il; ..*
cluded with *.'.'
the words: Émo¡ of stifi-backed Prussian militarists wíth their secret
for Russia. Admiral Canaris officially entered 74-76
we continue our work.,, on fanuary 5th, 1935, after some weeks of working
ln,
l$own ¡u the Abwehr, or Security Service, because the Treaty
V¡rmlllcc attempted to restrict ih. G.r-"r, armed forces tá
as their only legitimate intelligence activity,
s new command was then probably the best co-
h, opparatus of its kind in the world and it had t}re ad-
of being small. It was divided into three departments:
in Pazig,s. 'We use it for taking I, to collect information through German and foreign
Abwehr II, to manage sabotage; and Abwehr III, to do
orders had been natry dis.
3j:ffgX,j:,::T:'y#fl?.
obeyed. Paizi go. perhopsTi,
he had ir at the ¡r.[ Jf ii,
ionage work at home. One of the concessions made
:g,il, to
tlltlcr the Commanders-in-Chief when he came to power
T::.,j1Í:iliigwas üeing ob:;;;-;;ü. §r, i'"j"i". ljull, Ithc nbsolute independence of the Abwehr. It was answerable
f#:,:lJ::H,_*-""?.,_iló;;J;;.ff
had another officer available.
ñ:ü:";ilt?T rcrvice chiefs alone, a secret state within the State.
I tt was, besides, a Foreign Section of the Abwehr (Amts-
Ausland) which looked after foreign military attachés in
rcceived reports of German military attachés abroad, and
fdinated the military with the political intelligence which
German Foreign Office gathered through its own services.
work of digesting and exploiting military intelligence was
by the Great General Staff itself, and later by üe High
of the Armed Forces when Hider created that organ
w¡r. The three Services were thus under one hand in intelli-
matters, and there could be no inter-Sérvice rivalries, no
of vital intelligence by the Army which the Navy
to see, no exclusive air intelligence. Soldiers, sailors, air-
snd civilians had to work together, owing to the design of
¡chine. Hitler gave Canaris a directive to build it up and
It an instrument that could measure itself with the secret
of the Western Powers.
r.9
 § grte nrl rtrlkcs, no labour unrest; and foreign Powers were
' W*1, lrlrr¡ hcr irr lpprehension. FIer neighbours lere being polite
altú wllllrr¡¡ to hc friendly, though still on their guard. To the
, tüttwnttl l¡ry d, Russia, mistrustful
lhtl llr¡rrrrt¡rl th petty squabbles at
hrme, rtill rr army witha mass of
f€tet vr¡, lrr.l bchind her lay Britain wielding naval supremacy
tllrl tlrr tlrrclt of the blockade. The British exerted economic and
ñlttrrr lrl irrllucnce all over Europe and the world.
lirrr tlrcr yct lay America,lazy and delightful, a potential world
lnrwet llut still far keener on producing prosperous families üan
ilhatlr¡ worltl politics. It was England, no doubt at all, the
Arlrrrir,rl tlrtrught, üat by reason of her traditions, her toughness
lltrl lrer fnr-sighted statesmanship, would ofier Germany the
¡lt c,itlrrl rcsistance or the most solid friendship.
Htrrrly of en operation in the early lifeof an officer often gives
llt tlrr ('lucs to his future promise, and his service with the
tf ttlrcl l)r'¿rlcn in the South Atlantic and Pacific in r9r4 and
By the late 'twenties the Reichswehr had forgiven the doctrinal
¡qt1 lrrtlicatcs the strong points of Canaris. I enlarge upon this
lrell('rl
()l his early life as one of the few which is fully docu-
ururs ut Marxism:"T.i._illl*.
of lvrarxtsm sumclenUy to negotlate , secret
negotiare a ,.7r", mili
military train-
¡11ors
ing agreement with the USSR, lltrttlerl, ncr:ing that so much else is hearsay, He was Flag
e urr\, su
so that
urar they tr out ne w
could t¡y
Lllcv couro
and forbidden ylrporrr- in Russia unobse.íed by the Versailles I,lsulenrult and Intelligence OfEcer to Captain Lüdecke at the
Treaty powers, Many of the officers of the General Srafi believed Jlrtllle ol'Coronel and wrote home to his mother in November
even in the 'thirties that it was quite possible to achieve a work_ , lU14 it¡ r cautious vein of optimism:
t'A li¡rc success certainly, which gives us breathing space and
ing alliance with Russia, despire the iact thar Hitler
üe -o.r.,a ,p
German-Russian military ,g.e.merrt soon af-ter h. ca-.
lnly hxvc an effect on the general situation. Let's hope we con-
á tlttttc in this way."
Power. ()rr l)ccember 8th Admiral Sturdee caught the German
Admiral Canaris, turning over tl-re reports
at his desk above the
-
Tirpirzufer, I ttllrurlron oif the Falkland Islands after false wireless signals had
looking at the old -"p oi the world and rhe faded rleicivcrl von Spee as to his enemy's position, Tlte Dresden was
photographs of service chiefs, staiing outacross the chestnut tho rrnly warship that escaped from Sturdee. She ran into Punta
trees over anal, was confronted with the proL

h::,i: li,1o*'roT',1.1#***li
erful again and great. The
Arett¡rs and refuelled before slipping through the Straits of
Mu¡cllan to hide in the steep bays and inlets of the Chilean
GR¡IIt.
According to the official British Naval history of the First
e U-boats that Canaris had World War, the B¡itish Consul in Punta Arenas, who happened
tly in Spain and Holland would to hnvc had a German partner in busine§s, soon Picked up her
:men a¡d after Whcreabouts, but he was disbelieved in the Admiralty, which
rctories. T
in Germany ancl employment, cleanliness hld received other reports. The Germans were spreading
if,::: tumours that she was in deep, uncharted culs-de-sac, which in
20 2t
 fact slrc was, but the reports were so various as to bewilder thc rke thereupon decided to blow up his forward magazine
sca t in the false. (One ol tcuttlc thc ship. She would not have escaped for as láng as
the Hope Inlet.) I fancy I dl«|, l'tis fcllr¡w officers agreed, had it not been for the skilful
see ped later to perfection. tlf Cl¡rrris in securing supplies, gathering intelligence, and
Th rhe coast foihundreds out decePtiorl rePorts.
.{il -'- from some of his later rea¡tinn< th.r }'i".'isit on
rn,roirtc
'\.t /:l-"-^.,,
Glasgou l^f+ l^^+:-^ impr
left a^ lasting :-^-
power
nination of the British. Her frigld
l9§t ry as he stepped aboard her quarter-deck, but they spoke a
llng t¡¡c which he understood well, and when the action was
€Yer Clptain Luce sent his surgeon officers ashore to tend the
Q¡rrnnn wounded. He then demanded inrernment of the crew.
' Captain fohn Luce of the Glas gou resden with
his first salvo at 84oo yards and the re with her
six-inch guns. The Dresden's frre co a¡d two of t
her glns were quickly knocked out. Caprain Lüdecke signalled o
that he was prepared to parley, bur in the confusion oi brttle ,lncitcd Arab tribes with subsidies against France and Britain in
he had to hoist a white flag before the British cruisers ceased Mt,roc"o and West Africa.
6re. The Dresdm's steam pinnace then brought a German l,'ra¡rce no doubt blamed Spanish connivance for these activi-
lieutenant alongside. FIis name is not mentioned in the British tler, for France and Spain had always been rivals in Morocco.
official report. It was Canaris, who spoke excellent English and "He blew up nine British ships from his base in Spain," said
had already shown his skill in various negoriations. He was to Prr¡tze, "Don't forget to mention that."
ask for terms, but when taken to Captain Luce he first tried a When Madrid became too hot for him and after he had nearly
stroke of guile, declaring that the Dresden was already interned f¡llcn into the hands of the French on his way back to Germany,
by the Chilean authorities and could therefore nor be artacked Cunaris served in U-boats and his patrol reports attracted the
wiüout breach of international law. It was certainly a plausible tttention of the Kaiser. 'Is this a desceodant of the national hero
lie, but Luce appeared to have other information aná would of the Greek War of Independence?'the Kaiser wrore in the
not believe it. He could see that the Dresden had been getring . ¡nnrgin. Perhaps it was in a subsequent moment of vanity that
uP steam. Conaris let it be thought that he was descended from Korsrantin
Kanaris,
,' Su.h is the outline of his early career. An original mind,
" lnitiative, resourcefulness and a high degree of cunning-his

.l, Personal integrity still difficult to assess.

'Captain Luce's answer was-as the tradition of the service

required,' relates the official British Naval history of the First
World War, 'that he could treat on no basis but that of uncon-
ditional surrender.'
With this answer Canaris returned to the Dresden a¡d It seemed to me extraordinary after following some of
23
 iln¡lris's a(lvcntures in the Second World War to turn back thc
plr¡¡cs of' history and read how his first personal encounter with
thc tsritish in r9r5 ended with 'unconditional surrender,. Thesc
words re-echo in our story.
CHAPTER II
OPERATION KAMA
Nnrrnrt did the Pole.s take too seriously the agreement with
Germany not to spy on each other. We shall see that the Polish
Intelligence Se¡vice continued to search by the most daring
methods for the true intenrions of üe German General Staff. Ii
did not relinquish its suspicion that, despite Hirler's assurances,
Germany intended to parririon Poland with Russia. But whereas
the Ge¡man Intelligence Service specialised on aerial reconnais-
sance of terrain, in the offensive sense, the Poles concent¡ated on
discovering what plans were being made in Berlin against
Poland and what arms were being developed. The activities of
Captain Jurek von Sosnowski weie directed to that end. This
was the first big espionage case rhat fell into the hands of
Canaris, half finished by the service under Patzig.
Canaris himself sat high above the police work that unravelled
this extraordinary scandal, and his nam€ was never mentioned
in connection wiü it.
His app a special secret, the post was secret, and
the Third
for secrets
ts treachery laws was a safe repository
Admiralty, which had come acioss tirl
activities of young Canaris in neutral countries during the First
World War and followed his career, lost sight of him between
ry35 and ry39. lt did not note a change of appointmenr from
Suinemünde. The embassies and legations of Berlin' simply
knew him as a naval staff officer working in the Ge.man
Admiralty, in contact with the attaché secrion pf the War
Ministry, an'tl his personal liking for small intelligence missions
made it difficult for those foreigners who came into contact
with him in the course of their duties to guess that this was the
Chief o[ the Intelligence Service himself.
24
tris moved his family from Swinemünde to a little house
ln l)ollestrasse, in Sudende, and lived there the simple,
lۖcwhut austere life that was traditional to the German Ser-
I'hcse Berlin suburbs with their rdens and
r¡t ilrchitecture were an example to of how to
0 suburban life delightful. He soo d that the
Qlrlef «,f Prussian Secret Police and later Chief of the Reich
lectrrity Service, SS Group Leader Reinhard Heydrich, occu-
plerl nrrother house in the same street as himself. It was plain
lltut thc Chief of the Military Intelligence and the Chief of the
(lortu¡x, Security Services must be on calling térms. With Frau
Ct¡tnris and his two daughters the Admiral used to stroll up the
fo¡rrl on a Sunday afternoon for a game of croquet with the
tleyrlrichs. We shall see later that there were lunches witl
Ileyrlrich to which the senior men of the Gestapo and the In-
ttll gcrrce were invited.
I
l(cinhard Heydrich had been one of his first visitors at the
Tlr¡ritzufer, to discuss a serious espionage affair that raised the
whr»lc question of responsibility for security in üe Reich. He
wlr not a pleasant man to encounter: of hawklike features,
lli¡¡htly unsymmetrical, a straight and thinJipped mouth and
hrrrl, cruel eyes. Heydrich was tall and bony, with angular
rltoulclers; wi¡h him silence prevailed mostly and this cold silence
mrttlc it difficult for his colleague to settle problems on a basis
of friendly compromise. The Admiral was small by contrast,
voluble, spoke softly and gesticulated a little. They were as litde
nlike as mallet and hoop, and, though outwardly polite, each
tlode reservations about the other.
. A
w
*n:i'l*.1;lH;:.
This had been the subj
tcrrtion with Captain Patzig, and he gave the new man no
rtspite. He wanted to know who were the foreign agents in
Gcrmany, and a scandalous espionage affair that had been tried
In camera during 1934 lent weight to his request, It concerned
thc Poles.
It was noticeable that Canaris treated Heydrich on the foot-
lng of an officer who had been at sea with him. He remembered
Heydrich from the yeer 1922, when he had been First Lieutenant
' of thc training cruiser Beilia, and Heydrich a naval cadet, and
25
 fr púl h¡d n<¡ such opportunities. Their intelligence work
thring ancl original. Among others, ]urek von Sos'
I l¡tttn of handsome appearance and dashing temperai
Wlt rcltt into Germany posing as a cashiered officer who
I dh¡trrecrl himself by an afiair with the wife of his regimen-
§lttlttltlrttlcr, He crossed the frontier leading two horses, as e
ftñ tlnttlrrg a new life, and he calculated that he would do best
Etltrl wunil,r who would work for him. '

"lrtt tu. tcll this"Itstory,"

was I
said
who
Richard
laid
Protze,
Sosnowski by
ex-Chief
the
of
heels."
Btlrtter,tirpionage.
th ¡,ut lris nose down to the table of the inn in Holstein where
I dlrei,verc,l him, like a hound taking up the icent, fixed his
lgf[rl,lohl" blue eyes on the listeners and traced out each foot-
ordinary story of Captain von Sosnowski.
Its¡l tlmt thc P<¡le took.

ni
m
JJ,'.',1;i,1T::,,.l:
ies of the First
ff
World War
:
'r'l'ltrre wcre two Polish intelligence officers in Berlin in those
dtyr, Licutcnant Griff-Tschaikovsky had no idea how to begin
hh work, so he came to us fairly soon aod confessed that he
and the hopeless interlocked bloodshed that even tanks and air-
loulrl ltot do the job. He asked us to give him information.
craft had not broken up into a war of movement. France drew r"You shall have plenty of material, my ladr' we told him.
the conclusion that she must build a defence line in concrete, ;rb,rut turn. Now you work for us.'
a national trench, the Maginot Line.
'Hl¡ht
t'ltrrrlrably
the most interesting section of the General Stafi
I{r lN6, at this time under Colonel Heinz Guderian. It was an
frpcriurcntal section developing armoured fighting vehicles. It
h¡d ¡lso to be acquainted with the areas in which these vehicles
lVould operate and the type of warfare that was envisaged. IN6,
thcrcfore, was kept informed of operational planning and of
, O¡xration Kama, the secret development of forbidden German
Wcupons in Russia. My branch, Counter-Espionage IIIF, went to
Ouderian for false information to pass on to Griff-Tschaikovsky.
d took them to the garden of the
as a dark room.
d ours when one day he found
when Dollfuss was murdcred, as long as the Stresa front was somebody else's films, of which
of Rome ánd Vienna had common
possible, the General Staffs
d broughtit to us-it contained
;,iffi:
t4i r
tact on other matt€rs possible. Lahousen undersrood ,h?t"r"el- ,ift'
;¡.1¡

..,.
national
.free-masonry
of intelligence services and promised i
Il¡cnts,
Roatta what help he could. ttfurek von Sosnowski was handsome
a devil, brave and cool,
z6 27

"Frau von Falkenheyn set about this work without any mis-
giving.
"'I have a friend in the War Ministry,, she said. ,I will see
where she works,'
"She invited Frau von Natzmer out to bathe in the Wannsee
28
lltrl llrten tf hers whom she knew to be in need of money, furek
lVdt lrlt¡y, lrrr¡. IIc found a Colonel in debt, Colonel Bieáenfuhr,
Itállerl a ll¡tirot¡ with his wife, bribed a Lieurenant Rotloff, who
tl¡l wor hr,l i¡r the War Ministry, and within the space of one
frul lrr lr¡rrl tilrtlined r5o secret documents, the keys of Colonel
llltrl+.rl,r¡r'n srr[c, and the German outline plan of attack on
lrrrlnrr,l,
"ll wur th<:n that jealous Rita Pasci went to a theatrical agent
Wltlr tl¡c t r,nr¡rlaint that she was being asked to spy on Germany.
'l'lr ,t¡.rt cíurlc to us and asked for the assurance of pardon, if
¡he rll,l wlr¡rt shc was trild.
t"Yllr rlr:rll have that,'we said to Rita.'But now you turn
tlrurt ¡rrrl wrrrk for us. Find out the names of those wiih whom
lltlr li,r¡rrrwski is working.'
"l lrrr,rl¡ry [tita Pasci rang us up and asked: 'Do the names
lll,ttt v,,rr N:rtzmer and Fráulein von fena mean anything to
yrul' I lclt wcak at the knees as I heard rhese names-I knew
llt¡l tlr,'¡. w<:rc 'War Ministry secret¿ries in charge of confiden-
ll*l w,,r k.
'rlir¡rrowski arranged a ball in the Bach Hall for the film
átlrl llrlu¡rn world oI Berlin. I sent my wife to ir to see who
WrruLl l,,.tlrcrc. I arranged with the SD to raid Sosnowski'sfat
lltnl ¡¡u¡r.'rright as he was holding a supper party after the ball
llt ll,tr,,rir.oI ltita Pasci."
lürrrrowski paid great compliments at the ball to Flelena,
lllrl¡ur,l l'rotze's wife, a shrewdlooking woman with a steely
€|r, wlrorrr hc had never met before. She said quite truthfully
lftnt .lr" w:rs working for the War Ministry.
"l
ttlt
lr,,¡,.: wc meet agaln," he said.
olr¡rl¡ly this evening," she answered with a smile.
Rlr'l¡rrltl Protze sat shaking in the Abwehr offices. ..We,ll
lllc lr tlrc band tonight or never," he muttered.
llltu l'rrsci rang up from the flat: "/urek is uneasy. . . he,s
Protze, knocked at the door of
::::
whit
ifj-¿:lT,,;
while they
I¡rr,hed thc'fl¿t.
29
 iThird Reich, and also because we catch our first glimpse of
in office through a Polish diplomat.
Polish Ambassador in Berlin, )osef Lipski, remembers
how this awkward case brought him into contact wit}r

,
ttlt was about this time I was visited by an elderly, white-
When this accusation was repeated in court some months German Admiral," Lipski related to me. "Sosnowski was
later, Sosnowski clicked his heels and sprang to attention. There in prison. I was struck by the soft, benevolent manner "of
was dead silence. Canaris. He talked as if he was enlisting my sympaüy by
"Yes, that's what I am," cspecial degree of confidence. He seemed to be searching for
most sensible course of action for us both. I never dreamed
e moment that this was the Chief of German Intelligence.
t'Hc suggested that Poland should exchange a German
spy who was held in Warsaw for Captain furek von
for life. ro The Polish Governrnent agreed with this suggestion
nowski in td the exchange took place.
hich she ttSubsequently I invited Admiral Canaris to the Embassy and
in-
came once or twice to dinner with his wife. I still had no
As she was led out of court for the last time she cried: ,.I die of his identity."
gladly for my new Fatherland," and Jurek, deeply moved for the
first time in the proceedings, stooped to kiss her hand. Both What of the r5o documents and the plan of attack on Poland?
women died by the axe in February 1935. The furious Colonel in so many cases of first-class espionage, the General Staff
Guderian broke off all social relations with the poles, and there ving the information refused to believe it. Sosnowski on his
was anger and consternation in Reich governmen! circles that to Poland was kept in a fortress while the Polish Intelli-
such a fantastic scandal should have marred the new German- Service tried to determine whether his documents were
Polish treaty of friendship. ne, whether those of Griff-Tschaikosky were genuine, or
both were false.
e suspected that Sosnowski had beeri transmitting mislead-
It took Richard Protze the best part of a day to relate the
Sosnowski story from beginning to end, and his narrative dif- intelligence prepared by the Germans," Lipski told me.
Lahousen, head of Abwehr II, was given Sosnowski
fered notably from the sparse accounts that have hitherto come
one of his principal intelligence targets when the Wehrmacht
retold thisstory giving ¡cked Poland in September 1939. "But when we reached
false name as today.
book the Ger
," he said, "we found that he had been moved east-
s have and had fallen into the hands of the Russians."
gathered together a good deal of detail about the extraordinary
unimaginative Griff-Tschaikovsky was hanged for
case of Sosnowski, have made a film of the subject and have
; no particular benefit to Poland was gained from Sos-
published a very full accounr of what was as extensive a case in 's daring work. As for Rita Pasci, the Hungarian dancer,
Germany as that of Dreyfus in France in the prwious century, I last heard of her she was back in. ruined Germany
but I see no reason here to add much to my original a.couni. g with a gypsy band.
This espionage case was all part of the struggle for mastery in
30
3t
 r, who ass€rts that Canaris obtained Góring's support for
and helped to get Italian aid for Spain.
umenrs dso show that Hitler and Góring
rprise, acted quickly and failed to exact hará
from Spain as the price of their aid. At that
CHAPTER III the German General Staff was a]l for caution after the

THE SPANISH ADVENTURE

1936 few people
it was very soon
ad been the insti-
late 1938, her Army was less than half the size of the
hives of the Ger-
man Foreign Ministry have been published (Germany iznd the tch A_rmy. Admi¡al Raeder was against intervention.
Spanish Ciail War)r it is plain that every foreign government can find no statements that any highly placed German
wast ler was quickly
for quick and active aid to Spain except Wilhelm
advis It
appears alsg
from and Góring to utcn¿nt-General Bamler, then a major and departmental
support General Franco and acted as personal emissary to tlre of the German military security in Abwehr III, has given
Caudillo during the whole of the Civil War. lvict interrogation an account of what Canaris did in |uly
The spark that set the land afame on |uly r6th, 1936, was thc August 1936. Bamler left his command and went over to
murder of the Conservative politician, Calvo Sotelo. FIe was ssians during the last stages of lhe Eastern campaign.
called for in Madrid by the Spanish republican police and fountl has printed his srory, of which I give the main pointi,
dead next morning. That was the signal for civil war. lin interested me,' related Bamler, .because I had previously
raPporteur on Spanish affairs in t]re third section of the
Staff. Canaris told me that he knew Spain particularly
e said that he had good and wide contacts which hL
in Spain, Spanish Morocco, and Rio de Oro.' He main-
these contacts personally, and indeed his closest collabora-
not informed of all his contacts.
technicians, volunteers and foreign contingents of all sorts. Thc ,eris was sent by the German Naval Intelligence Service to
war correspondents of the world followed the battles and sieges ln 1916 on- a particularly important seciet assignment.
in the peninslla and the diplomatic correspondents of all nations with the help of Germans residing in Spain, and-Spanish
rep During
all , he.successfully prepared the setting ,rp of a ,rrpply brr.
s undei nan submarines; he prepared a ramified ,yrt.Á- for ob_
the ther by
the movements of British and French ships in the
the
rnean, especially off Gibraltar. From Spanisli Morocco
_ The part of Canaris in deciding Hitler to act is described by
d.e Or9, he directed uprisings of Moroccan aqd Arab
Lieutenant-General Bamler one of Canaris's departmental chiefi,
and Colonel H. Remer, former German military attaché in inst the French and the British. From then on, as
I Documenrs on Gsman Foreign policy r9r8-r945, vol. iii. imself told me, began his secret collaboration with

32 33
Franco, who at that time was serving in the Spanish Army in
Morocco in the rank of Major.
'After the Primo de Rivera Government was overthrown and
the Republican parties came to power, Franco (who had since
risen to become Chief of the Spanish General Staff) was sent
to the remote Canary Islands. Another friend of Canaris, General
Martinex Anido, who was Minister of the Interior under Primo
de Rivera, quit Spain and lived in Portugal. Canaris had mean-
while restored his own intelligence system in Spain, making fre-
quent trips for üe purpose, and he kept up his contact with
Franco.'
The narrative of Bamler, which appears correct in its main
facts, though possibly coloured by internment in Soviet Russia,
continues that two agents of the insurgents arrived in Berlin to
see Canaris as soon as üe Civil War started.r Then Franco sent
to inform him that he had fown from the Canary Islands to
Morocco and wanted military assistance and air t¡ansport for
his troops to subdue the Republicans in Spain.
'I myself was a witness of how Canaris brushed aside all other
questions and spared neither time nor effort to have the leading
men of Germany and Italy interested in his plans. Canaris ex-
plained everywhere that although Franco was unknown as a
politician he deserved full trust and support as he was a tested
man with whom Canaris had worked for many years.'
Canaris impressed Góring with his ideas, There were confer-
ences in Góring's home, Karinhall, on the Spanish war and in
the offices of the Prussian Prime Minisrer, one of Góring's many
Posts.
Canaris asked for funkers transport aircraft to fly the Moroc-
can troops and the Spanish Foreign Legion across the Straits of
Gibraltar to Spain. Góring was at first dubious of such a venture .
Then, says Bamler, Canaris went straight to Hitler.
It is appropriate here to say something of the relationship be-
tween Canaris and Hitler. General |odl, when he was asked by
the Nuremberg tribunal whether he passed on the reports of
Canaris to Hitler when they told unpleasant truths, replied that
Canaris had direct access to the Fuehrer whenever he. wished.
This was so, and if in later years Canaris failed to report directly
r Probably Langenheim and Bernhardt, whose ¡ames are ¡eveled in
Gcrmany and the Spanish Ciuil War.
34
him it was because they had instinctively fallen out of sym-
y. At this moment, in 1936, Hitler was still honouring his
s with the General Stafi; he was not interfering in
tary matters; he had not begun to arm the SS, he had not yet
perjured evidence against his Commander-in-Chief,
von Fritsch.
Canaris and his master had in common an intuitive hatred for
ism and a leaning towards the British in their political
. They were both possessed of strong suggestive powers,
whereas Hitler streamed out his hypnotics to the masses and
small audiences alike and all the time, without breath or
Canaris worked upon the individual with softness and
in an infinity of degrees. During military conferences it
noticed that he had a curious soft eloquence that attracted
quietened Hitler.
t'You can talk to the man," he said, "He can see your point of
, if you are careful not to irritate him. He can be reason-
The story of the agents from Spain is borne out in a document
the Reich Chancellery dated |uly 5th, ry39, which reveals
the decision to intervene in Spain was takeh. It recom-
s two Germans living abroad to be decorated for services
üe Spanish Civil War and states in a preamble:
'At that time (late ]uly r93Qr Herr Langenheim and Herr
members of the Foreign [ranch of the Party, arrived
Berlin from Spain with a letter from General Franco to the
. . . . The first interview with the Führer, on which
ion the letter was delivered, took place in Bayreuth . . .
the Führer's return from the theatre. Immediately after-
the Führer summoned Field-Marshal Góring, the War
, General von Blomberg and an admiral who was
flcnt at Bayreuth. That night support for the Generalissimo
I agreed to in principle, while additional details were worked
during the course of the following day.'
, is probable üat the admiral at Bayreuth was Canaris.
Remer's statement is also emphatic that Canaris was a
ve infuence with the Reich Government and with Italy
Spanish afrair. lf the documents hitherto published in
German Consul in Tetuan reported on |uly z4th that üey were
way by air.
35
 Germany and the Spatish Ciail War do not bear this out, that
is perhaps because the Chancellery and War Ministry corre-
' spondences arenot included.
According to Bamler, the Führer asked Canaris for a de-
tailed report on Franco. The Admiral obtained permission for
military assistance for the insurgents, and for himself
authority to act in these secret operations with Spain. Then he
was ofi to Italy to meet his Italian colleague, General Roatta,
and convince him that Mussolini must support Franco as well.
Gone were the days when Roatta peered anxiously northwards
over the Brenner Pass and asked Lahousen in Austria to find
out more about the German armoured divisions. The dispute
over Abyssinia had made Germany and Italy allies.
Canaris was received by Mussolini to expound his case on
Spain and flew back to Berlin to supervise further operations.
He helped to organise Hisma and Rowak, Spanish ,rrd G..-"r,
purchasing commissions for the Spanish insurgents; Rowak had
Bernhardt at its head. It was disguised as a commercial E¡m
and bought arms for them in Germany, Czechoslovakia and
elsewhere.
"Canaris did not only organise arms supplies to Franco. He
supplied them to the Spanish Republican Covernment, too.',
This interjection came from Richard Prctze ofAberwehr IIIF,
with whom I reviewed German participation in the Civil War.
"You won't find that in the documents, either,', he said.
"This is howit happened. Góring asAdministrator of the Four
Year Plan had charge of German arms deliveries and the release
of foreign currency for the Civil War. Someone suggested at one
of his conferences that Germany should attempt to provide
weapons to the Spanish republicans as a means of sabotaging
their war potential. Góring liked the idea and asked who cóulá
carry it out.
" 'I can,' said Canaris, 'I've got the man for you.'
"There was a G€rman arms dealer, |osef Veltjens, whom
Canaris directed to buy up all the superannuated weapons from
the First World War which Canaris had helped to sell abroad
after the Treaty of Versailles. Rifes, carbines, ammunition and
grenades were bought up in Czechoslovakia, Balkan countries
and elsewhere. They were brought to Germany, where SS
armourers filed.down the striking pins, doctored üe ammuni-
36
reduced the grenade charges or inserted instanta
The consignments were then distributed to international
dcalers in Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia and Holland
¡csold to the Spanish Governmenr for cash payment in gold.
lens himself owned three cargo vessels which were ,rrJd to
special the arms to Spain."
tnaris few many times to and from the peninsula high over
rce by night in stripped-down funkers transport airciaft siÉ
smong the stores and the reserve petrol cans. Together with
Deral Faupel, the military envoy to the Burgos Government,
ret up liaison headquarters with the Spanish Army that was
Command and administer the German Condor Legion, an air
lpr with anti-aircraft batteries and observer units. fhe Condor
was highly specialised in air artack and air defence with
and bomber aircraft.
remember meeting a Bavarian baron in the Luftwaffe,
tmund von Gravenreuth, who had volunteered for Spain
earned Hitler's Spanish Cross for aerial combats. FIe was
about the decoration because he was still under oath
ecy about operations in Spain. The Luftwaffe got valuable
t experience in Spain, he said. He was shot down in the
World War by the RAF.
in and France were disturbed by the developments in
and the Popular Front saw itself, far from becoming a
party, being undermined by the Germans frám
north and south. Communist and Republican arms and
teers pass-ed into Spain through the Pyrenean frontier and
Mediterranean ports.
to G_erman war supplies, a few telegrams went through
i
¡n Ministry channels to Canaris in the first months of the
War, asking for weapons; but the whole apparatus of
rn armed intervention was quickly transferréd to the
Command the Abwehr as a
is had his nce on military
cntion sent codes to his offic
r years he played a leading parr in the Spanish affair as
as his general wo,rk of expanding the Abwehr and defend-
t against the increasing demands of the SS. He succeeded
ing the Condor Legion a top-secrer unit, difÉcult to
or penetrate even by üe Spanish Army that worked with
,37
 Colonel Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg, military
.há
Sp.irr. His own name did not even emerge, though he
don, had been appointed German memLe, of the 'thc principal director infiltrating the Germáns in by air
Non-Intervention Committee and reported to
A strict silence fell on all German personnel selected for
who. held the key to the wholÉ siruation
ion: it was related at the time that a few officers who
a waltlng game.
t¡lkcd to their families about their destination were found
of treason and sentenced to death. The German aircraft
yrf d:i
.,nr r-*,"3'"1,:H,I#:{ :'#,1 ;*::ff iJ"if; over Spanish battlefields, the detectors and predictors.were
British, "the Civil War will be over in a-fe* months.,,
But the out, the AA guns of üe Luftwaffe fought the Republican""
Hitler's ordnance a¡tificers toiled and sweated in
's service.
an efiort of memoiy today to recall how long üe
vil War dragged on-until May 1939, within a month
lrrrrrg.rr,r.llt
I develop into
:r'r"*ru
of the Second World War breaking out. I have met
who are equally vague about the latter date, and when
retard the tglk to them of the war assume that you mean their Civil
of Britain her
, When Madrid fell on March z8th, 1939, Canaris looked
on thirty-two months of intense work on the Spanish opera-
Gcrmany and the Spanish Ciail Iilar shows that he re-
some of the first reporrs on the confused fighting that
ted to Berlin conversations with out in fuly 1936, that General Mola on the Northern
he said, casually asserted that sent him urgent appeals for arms and that Hitler sent
a weak Spain. to Franco in October ry36 to urge him to a more energetic
937 and, many lcution of the war. He toured the front with Franco, héard
6rst tentative suggestions in April 1938 that the Condor
bn should be withdrawn from Spain, and in April 1939 was
to,persuade Franco ro announce publicly that Spain had
d the Anti-Comintern Pact.
gen relates from conversations with his staff that it was
to defer to Socialist internati nt exhilaration to Canaris to be quit of Germany and
Spain, tearing about the ruinous Spanish roads in a
people he had ha¡d work to rec
the_German Army to the Spanish advenrure.
dining at little wayside inns, whiling away an hour or
von Fritsch, thé Commander_in_Chief, and General
r Cadiz, savouring Southern dishes and rough
_ $*{ , th his cronies of the Spanish Armada, looking
Ludwig Beck, the Chief of the German General Stafi,
disliked trom Algeciras at the British warships at Gibraltar. Thé
I hills of Spain, its worn Sierras aná mud-built villages
their windowless churches, its beauties of Goya, Zurbalan
tfurillo, how he was sad ro leave them, and how his spirits
when he was back in this land, joking with his heád of
I, Colonel Piekenbrock, or his adjutant, and giving an
li.tary planning marred the cam_ ted Nazi salute to a herd of sheep at a street *.ner.
38'
39
 ' he said with a wink to rhe car Hc l¡rid it down again and went off into deep dis-
s may be one of our high them." lor minutes together until their attentiveness tailed off,
se for a moment that th Servicc hc was lighting his cigar in a twinkling before one of
was not aware that a strange and important German was activc tould cpring forward. That was a trait of his character,
in the Peninsula. It could not know fár certain at that time that [!¡ mistrustful, independent, and yet he inspired them.
aid to Spain, compu ooo Reichs_
made uncoirditiona y Hitler «r
'an absolute gift' to there was Workcd under Admiral Canaris I had the strong feeliñg
no secret military alliance between Hitler and Franco. When the wcre still living in the past with their chief, obeying,
me a sig- doubting, and loyal despite everything. He dis-
stfength- fltttery, worked without ceasing, was abstemious and
roud anrl / drank no more than a glass of red wine and water in
When a avcninS.
)ac of his many peculiarities was his demonstrative fondness
hh rough-haired dachshunds. When he travelled they often
with him and slept on a second bed beside his own. He was
of horses, who rode regularly and well. In contrast to
Hitler was never known to mount a horse or even travel
outriders. A few wolf-like Alsatian dogs prowled in his
domain. He, too, was mistrustful, but he was
the event of a general confict over Czechoslovakia. Such were rnd disdained suflering, whereas Canaris was continually
the beginnings of olicy of i ion ln some act of compassion. One of his many nicknames
which Canar part. Bu his hhind his back, was Vater der Vertiebene, or father of
-in
hand was seen in was for the
hand of a man who was encouraging Adolf despite their dissimilarities there was some symp.athy be-
Hitler int Führer and Intelligence Chief in the early days of office.
is reasonable and sees your point of view, if you point it
to him properly," Canaris repeated to his adjutant. "Mann-
mit ihm reden."
was one of the silent obsessions of Hitler that his Army had
r abandoned the policy of secret understanding with the
THE RUSSIAN KNOT Army that had prevailed in the Weimar Republic.
he had denouoced the secret training tre ty of ry26
his views with the retired Chief of General Staff,
von Seeckt, he was still not satisfied that illicit contacts
tiot exist. The two biggest armies in the world had been
ly separated and arranged in opposite camps by Adolf
. He and his internal system of tyranny thrived on the
talk on unseeing and tlen rapidly pierced it with his own. He tension between these two nations. Stalin, to judge by
half raised the cigar to his lips and the lucifers spluttered all behaviour, would have been willing enough to
40, 4r.
 continue a policy of understanding and prolong the 19z6 mill. I rcquired.It was intended to plant false informa-
tary agreement. Rurrians. According to Abshagen, Canaris was on
¡nd tried to find out more about the operation.
was touching delicate subjects that were outside its

tzth, 1937,it was announced in Moscow that Mar-

i and seven other Russian generals had beeh
¡ct¡ of high treason and espionage for a foreign srare.
purgc of the Russian officer corps followed and con-
the German Army.
ttrc rcst of 1937, thousands of suspect Russian officers
many of them innocent. Gene¡al Beck, writing an
of the general military situation in the summer of
Jfvc it as his opinion that the Russian Army was not a
lg bc reckoned with at that moment and that the blood
lcft it temporarily without morale, an inert machine.
came back to üe Tirpitzufer and related with gloat-
ion that he found other means of forging secret cor-
, between the German Army leaders and Marshal
that indicated intentions to overthrow the Soviet
He claimed that this was the idea of Hitler, that it had
6rst on the Czechoslovak General StaE and sent
to Moscow. It was this ruse that had set the corpses
Moscow he walked into icion.r he said, and the Russian Army would be exhausted by

.,?:#u""I1',;ilTr Liil'ü::illii::i
a chill and would not go to London. FIe was transferred fronr
ll
g for years ahead.
probably never be known what these forgeries did to
Erles against Tuchachewski. The details have been re-
the Commissariat of Defence to the Volga command, kc¡rt ¡rticles by Abwehr officers in the German Press and
under secret observation for some months, ,ád th..,.r...ríed. ' I Chose the Galloats. In several versions it is agreed
In the latter half of 1936 Heydrich wenr to the Tirpitzufer to papers were first passed to the Czechoslovak General
. ask Canaiis for facsimiÍei of üe expired German-Russian mili- Prcsident Benes is said to have be<n deceived by them
tary training agreemenr.with the signatures of the generals who tve approved forwarding them to Stalin.
had signed it, Tuchachewshi, Sákt and'Flammerstein. IIc rnd-Heydrich convinced themselves rhat some truth lay
asked, besides, for the loan of handwriting experts who woultl e forgery they had planted. On March zznd, t937,
be able to forge these signatures, and he dec-Ía..á that the Führcr errested one of General von Seeckt's friends, Ernst
had given him charge of a most secret operation for which this who had helped to negotiate the 19z6 training agree-
I have the story of Blumiel from a German professor who sharetl hi¡ was also a friend of the Russian journalist, Karl
-1
prison cell, My own artempts to trace Blumiel in Éerlin have been without ho had fallen from favour with Stalin, confessed devia-
result. lreen sentenced tá death. Heydrich arrested nineteeo
+ 43
 other persons with Niekisch, some of whom had worked for thc his prison treatment, still also on friendly terms with
Army in liaison work with Russia. s who had liberated him in ry45 after seven years
Heydrich was bent on discovering whether the General Stalf llndenburg gaol, where he happened to sit next to Blumiel,
and the Abwehr still had forbidden contacts with the Russian Communist agent who had shadowed Tuchachewski.
General Statr. The investigatio! and the trial lasted till Novem- hed been arrested during the war for taking home a fuse
ber 1938. One of Canaris's own agents was involved, and thc was on the secret list from a Berlin munitions factory.
Admiral sat in the court to hear him give evidence. When that omuggled it out through the X-ray detection chamber in
particular hearing wa lea¡ned nothing box lined with lead. Two other of these samples he had
against him, Canatis demonstratively to thc Soviet Embassy in Berlin and forwarded to Russia.
shook his witness by to let the officc defcnce had been that he wanted "!o use it as a paper
have a note of his expenses. This unusual example of civil " which, since it was found lying openly on his desk,
courage was related to me years afterwards by Abwehr ofñcers :d wonderfully well. He escaped with a life sentence.
on whom it made a deep impression at the time. Canaris knew
Nickisch too slow for Heydrich and
cases were altogether
Icre producing no revelations that would shake the Army.
and he could not wait to break the power of the
Staff. They feared that it would otherwise break them
¡ct in a crisis against the Nazi regime. They therefore pre-
together with a living witness-he did not live for long-a
President of the üird senate of the Péoples' Court thundered at of moral delinquency supported by perjured evidence
the accused: "The foreign Press has forecast death sentences, rt the Commander-in-Chief, General von Fritsch, and
lying again as usual. The court will pass sentences of imprison- that upright and bewildered man from the key position in
ment only." Blomberg, the War Minister, who had made an un-
marriage with a woman of bad reputation, was retired
that time, and on February 4th, 1938, the General Staff
deprived of some of its most important functions that
to a new High Command under the direct control of

was the time," nodded Richard Protze, "when Canaris

to turn from Hitler. He must have known more than us
rut the extraordináry accusations of homosexuality that
concocted against the Commander-in-Chief. It is well
that Heydrich schoolcd a delinquen¡ named Schmidt -
that he had had perverse relations with General von
gh, whereas the other party ro Schmidt was in fact a Cap-
to me led the Gestapo astray from my real informants in subse- von Frisch. The Admiral set me the difficult task at án
quent investigations. notice of taking a photograph of this Captain von Frisch
I met Ernst Niekisch nine years afterwards h 1946, a porrly, spirited away from his home by SS men who were afraid
mild-man¡ered professor lecturing in Berlin University, srill pui- true version of the affair becoming known. I managed to
l Neus Chronicle photograph wiüout knowledge of the SS and it was
44 45
lry-
' produced in cou¡t by the defence. The case collapsed, but Hitler Bamler, the same man who studied Spain and de-
never reinstated Fritsch. The SS murdered Schmidt and most to the Russians in 1945, was Chief of Department III
probably Frisch, too. If you have to mark any one event as rhc lltary security) in the vital years Í%4-8. He sold the pass to
crisis of loyalty between Canaris and Hitler, that is it.', Nazis. Bamler was tn uodistinguished character.
, his enthusiasm for counter-espionage work, he organised
m of some fifteen cabaret giris wiiÍr hnguistic aná other
itan attainments in a Berlin bar called 'Rio Rita,,
üey spied on the attachés and foreign visitors, while ,¡

teners ce to the Russian purges, ..if they ripposerl , like a ringmaster, or worse, sat nearby drinking cham,
thems will. What is that in a nation of éighiy m;t into the early hours at the expense of the Abwehr. I doubt
lions? want mén of intelligence. I want-men of 'Colohel Bamler's Follies' learned anything from the
brutal in that hectic red plush atmosphere; but while he
This was all a litde too much for the Admiral, who stood in in the 'Rio Rita', Heydrich and his henchmen were
icion, Hc g deeper into the mysteries of military counter-
the grcrt
nation:rl
and thc
Berlin intrigues that generals in t-he twentieth century were n{r
CHAPTER V
more than puppets in uniform, helpless in face of the modenr
OPERATION OTTO
n had casually remarked in the course of a small con-
held secretly on November 5th, Íg37, that he intended to
tvar sooner or later. The papers of General Beck, present
The General Staff selected several ofEcers to work out rhc lef_ of General Stafi, give some account of this meeting.
of these then said that after 1943 he would no longer have
quarrels y in weapons. Lord Halifax, the Lord President, was
nd; for to Berlin and Berchtesgaden at this time. The open
iven for his visit was the hunting exhibition organised
thought that the w"r..ristfTrt§, or-r¡ would then takc irr Huntsmaster Góring ín Berlin, but Halifax was really
place in the batrlefield and be bled with rhe resr. Unless tbc SS up the enquiries made previously of Hitler by Sir fohn
demands were resisted on principle, it was easy enough to firrrl ¡nd Mr Eden in 1936. Was an understanding between
some re4.son good enough for not making an absofute stantl end Germany possiblel Hitler assured Lord Halifax
against them. many intended to obtain a revision of her frontiers by
Wtrile the-SS helped rhemselves in the armoury, rhe Securiry means. He and Góring both declared that Austria and
Service, or SD, bored its way into the counter-espionage trrrrlc could be united without a war, and the diffident and
The SD men met the military intelligence ofrcl.s at regrrl;rr Halifax admitted the force of their argument that
'comradely' beer parties between Army and party and kept'ih"it difficult in that case for the Western Allies to inter-
ears oPen. American roving Ambassador, William Bullitt, was
I Contemporary report made to Gene¡¿l Ostq. in November t937, saw Góring, and wrote in a
46 47
memorandum to the State Department: 'I asked Gdring if lrc
meant that Germany was absolutely determined to anncx
Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an, absolute detcr.
mination of the German Government. FIe was not pressing tl)c
matter because of certain momentary political consideratiolrs,
notably relations with Italy. A union of Austria, Hungary arr,l
Czechoslovakia would be absolutely unacceptable to Germany
such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.' Itw¡t
plain that what the Nazis most feared was a restoration of tlrc
Habsburg monarchy.
Abshagen notes that in the winter of ry37-8 a secret mclít'
morphosis was taking place in Admiral Canaris. FIe was irr rt
better position than any to know what terrible conficts lay ahcl,l
for Europe if Hitler persisted in his policy of war. His deplrt
mental chief of Abwehr I, Colonel Piekenbrock, brought hirtl
reports on Allied rearmament: it was proceeding slowly but cvi
dently out of far greater resources than Germany commandetl.
- While Ribbentrop comforted himself with the thoughts thrrt
the British Fascists under Sir Oswald Mosley would achievc rt
national revolution in Britain, Canaris quietly asked an English
visitor to Berlin what was expected of the British Fascists.
"We treat them as a joke," the visitor replied.
The Admiral demurred and then accepted the opinion.
General Ludwig Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, was tlis'
turbed at the thought of occupying Austria. It would not stol)
there, because it meant in fact a Balkan line, a south<astwaltl
thrust in German policy, assimilation of alien races, dominatio¡t
of Czechs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and a cl:rslt
with Turkey.
Canaris found himself in agreement with his Service chiefs '.
a policy of annexation and expansion south-east was against lll
their ideas of security. He did not think that the attack t¡n
Austria could be prevented, but he began to collect around hinr'
in the utmost stealth, such men as might be able to Preverrt
Hitler from carrying out other plans. It was at this time that I
had my first glimpses of his separate diplomacy, and first heard
his name whispere4
Colonel Hans Oiter, his deputy and Chief of the Centrel
Section, was a more daring spirit in many resP€cts than his ch
An elegant cavalry ofñcer of the old school, handsome, galla
48
thc ladies and contemptuous of the National-socialist
he was all for striking when the iron was hot; but the
had a more hesitant nature. Gradually his departmental
Piekenbrock, Groscurth and perhaps even Bamler-
, too, von Bentivegni and Láhousen---{ame to discern that
chicf's heart was no longer in the business and that a depth
:aning lay behind his careless criticisms of the leaders of the
Hitler, on February 4th, 1938, took over the post of War
himself and detached and formed the High Command
the Armed Forces under his direct conrrol (knlown since as
I OKW), he appointed as Chief of the High Command
Wilhelm Keitel, who üus became the direct chief of
iral Canaris. Canaris must report to this big, stolid soldier
was terribly ignorant of the world. The OKW took over
responsibility for interpreting intelligence, planning and
i operations, for strategy and for higher command. The
Stafi was_left to organise, train and expand the Army.
is now sent his reporrs to the OKW.
next task that fell to him was to prepare plans for the in-
:ion of Austria. Both Bullitt and Halifax had been so
in their reactiors to German aims that Hitler saw the
uss as a perfectly safe and reasonable operation.
diary of Ge¡eral fodl, the deputy chief of the High
and, relates this phrase of the intelligence game. |odl Je-
in Nuremberg that he supplied the Admiral with full
¡tion on German military dispositions in February 1938,
he could prepare a decepiion plan for ,Case Otto'.
Reich Government had realised üe adverse effecr on
le in.the Army and on world opinion if German troops
mobilised or moved to the Austrian frontier. Hitler decided
wrote in his diary on February rzth:
On the evening of ¡rth and on r3th February, General Keitel
¡h General von Reichenau and Air Generaj Sperrle at the
rsalzberg. Schuschnigg together with Guido Schmidr are being
under heaviest political and military pressure. At z3.oo houri
nigg signs protocol.
February: In the afternoon General K. [Keitel] asks
C. [Canaris] and myself to come to his apartment. He
49
 tells us that üe Führer's order is to the efrect that military pressure,
by shamming military action, should be kept uP until the r5th.
Pioposals foithese deceptive maneuvres are drafted and submitted
to the Führer by telephone for approval.
r4th Februaiy t At z.4o o'clock the agreement of the Führer
arrives. Canaris went to Munich to Abwehr Ofñce VII and
initiated the different measures.
The efiect is rapid and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military PrePara-
tions.
A document'submitted by General Keitel, who himself took
part in the deception scheme at Berchtesgaden, rattling off fic-
titious troop movements to the Austrian statesmen, shows these
proposals of Canaris as aPProved by the Führer.
(r) To take no real measures of preparation in the Army or Luft-
waffe. No trooP movements or redeployments.
(z) To spread false but quite credible news which may give üe
imp,ression of military PreParations against Austria:
(a) through V-men (Vertrauensmiinner or agents);
(á) through German customs personnel at the frontier;
(r) through travelling agents.
Such rumours could be
- $) (o) stoppage of leave in the area of VII Army Corps;
(á) rotling-stock is concentrated in Munich, Augsburg and
Regensburg;
(e) Major-General Muf[, the German military attaché in
Vienna, is recalled to Berlin for consultation [this hap-
pened to be true];
(/) police reinforcements on the Austrian frontier;
(e) customs ofEcials report AIPine trooP movements in the
Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden area.
Both General Lahousen and Abshagen, first biographer of
Canaris, assure me üat the Austrian Governmen! was not de-
ceived and therefore presumably not intimidated by these
rumours put about by the Munich ofñce of the Abwehr. Never-
theless, President Miklas of Austria ratified the Berchtesgaden
protocol with his signature and thus made the National-Socialist
Party legal again in Austria. They might wear uniforms now
and march the streets again.
Canaris-it was typical of his restless nature-would not leave
5o
plan to his departmental chief, Colonel Groscurth,
himself flew to Munich to explain it to his rePresentative in
Count Marogna-Redwitz.
at arry rate, it must have become apparent to the
s that their concessions had been wrung from them !y
But as they tried to reassert law and order against the
t Nazis, it became obvious that clashes and bloodshed
be expected. Schuschnigg, who had been warned by Hitlet'
a Customs Union wiü Czechoslovakia or a restoration
monarchy, suddenly announced on March 9th a plebiscite
ghout Austria on the question of independence.
plebiscite should bring a strong majority for the
ists,' noted |odl in his diary. 'The Führer is determined
to tolerate it.'
called together his military advisers and ordered the
into Austria for the day of the plebiscite. He wrote to
the news to Mussolini and told Ribbentrop ro stay in Lon-
where he sat firmly on the sofa in No ro Downing Street
e afternoon of the invasion telling his hosts that everything
be all right, and Neville Chamberlain accepted what hé
March ¡oth General Keitel told Admiral Canaris of the
r taken. There was now no need for a deception plan to
te the Austrians.'The troops were concentrited, tle roll-
really rolled, the police were reinforced. But now the
Government was inclined not to believe their own in-
reports. Schuschnigg thought rhat the game of blufi
still being played, until it was too late to mobilise the
n Army.
was in Vienna soon after the first German tanks to
intelligence targets his men had captured, There were
of the Austrian Intelligence Service to be perused. He
r special detachment out known as Force ZL, to lay hands
try documents relating to himself before the Austrian Nazis
Reich SS should get rhem. One captured target he sur-
with satisfaction, Colonel Erwin Lahousen, the Austrian
of Intellig_ence, now became his personal property. The
promptly swallowed the Austrian Intelligence §ervice.
i Admiral, short of stature, looked up at the tall Lahousen
reported to him, and asked with a mysterious frown:
5r
 "Why did you not shootl You Austrians are to blame for
everything."
Lahousen was a product of the Austrian Imperial Army.
Obedience had become his second nature. Two men from the
Reich were busy drawing others into their service, and while
Himmler gathered the many Austrian brownshirts, Canaris
carefully took his pick of the oüers. Lahousen served him with
devotipn to the end, and when they first discussed selection of
Austrian intelligence officers for service in the Reich the Admiral
fixed Lahousen with his keen eye and said softly:
"Bring me real Austrians. I donrt want any Austrian Nazis."
Having given this second indication of his own opinions,
Canaris set Lahousen to work spying out the' Czechoslovak
frontier fortifications and troop dispositions, and Lahousen set
about it with zeal.
"I quite understand that you question my behaviour," he told
me years later, as we sat and drank a glass of beer together in
Munich. "I undertook this work because I was an ofrcer of the
Austiian Imperial Army. I had always regarded the Czechs as
trouble-makers."
This was the time in which the Admiral's mind was filling
with misgivings and Lahousen's analysis of his thoughts is in-
teresting. He told me that Canaris was in favour of a union of
Germany with Austria, but not on the basis of an invasion and
National-Socialist supremacy. He hoped that the Austrians
would take his deception plan seriously and mobilise, and he
was obliged to admit afterwards that the Austrians, having
failed to be taken in by the plan in February, deceived them-
selves into thinking tlat the real mobilisation in March
also a blufi.
Canaris made arrangements to absorb or dissolve the rem-
nantsof the Austrian Intelligence Service and returned to
Berlin.
52
CHAPTER 1rI
THE CONSPIRACIES BEGIN
vERyrHrNG had gone down before Hider and his party: they
nearly as powerful in Germany as the Communist Party in
ia. There was nothing that Canaris could do but watch for
new means of curbing his master without revealing his
hand too far. So his regular Service life went on undis-
bed with a seven-day week in the office, a ride every morning
:he 'Ilergarten
the Tiergarten Park,
Park, a dinner party now and then in
e small dinner
new villa in the Dianastrasse that rarely exceeded two guests.
iring his working hours he and his depury, Hans Oster, kept
touch with a small number of remarkable people, some of
were taken into his organisation as soon as war bróke out.
while he was careful to keep a. meticulous diary of the
¡ of his official life, first in his own hand and then dictated
his secretary and typed in two copies, one of which he kept
while the other was put in rhe safe within the depart-
f,he National-Socialist system discouraged and fotbade the
exchange of information between Government oficials.
was certain strictly organised liaison such as Heydrich
was
wirh Canaris in Gestapo policy matters and the
ign Intelligence branch r maintained with the Foreign
. Apart from that, Baron von Weizsácker, the per-
Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, kept
is stealthily informed of events and political undercurrents
Wilhelmstrasse. The Admiral could find our what was
on in the Reich Chancellery. Colonel Schmundt, Hitler,s
Adjutant after the resignation of Colonel Flossbach, was
with Canaris. A suave, discreet, obedient soldier, he
tell of visitors, conferences and intrigues, though not
able to report these events quickly. I remember in 1938
r Of the Abweh¡.
53
hearing of some intimate details,of happeniirgs in the Chancel-
lery that reached the Abwehr through Schmuntlu
In the same way there was a means of penetrating the Gestap<r
activities through Senior Group Leader Arthur Nebe, an old
Berlin police type who had been transferred from the crimin¿l
police to the secret police and hated it.
Then there were the men who had no official position, but by
reason of their standing and connections could gather and dis-
seminate information and opinions, politicians working in thc
shadows because open opposition was impossible. The most not-
able of these was Dr Karl Górdeler, former Lord Mayor of
Leipzig, who had been prpposed to President von Hindenburg
by Chancellor Brüning as his successor. He was an infuential
man, highly thought of in America, but his name, like that of a
host of eminent men in the 'thirries, fell out of public memory
and was forgotten.
Another associate of Canaris was the lawyer, Count Helmut
von Moltke of Kreisau, a man of high intellect and imposing
physique, intense and uncompromising in his principles.
There was Dr Josef Müller, an able Bavarian lawyer-known
popularly as Ochsensepp-Sepp being short for fosef and his
birthplace being Ochsenfurt, Müller was in the confidence of
the Pope, who had entrusred him with missions in Germany.
Nicholas von Halem, a lawyer, had contacts with the British
Press. Háns von Dohnanyí, a Reichsgerichtsrat, or KC, Canaris
had met in sorting out the legal complications of the Fritsch
case.
Dohnanyi's brothers-in-law, the Bonhófiers, had wide connec-
tions with the Protestant Church and'some contact with the
Church of England. There was also Ewald von Kleist-schmen-
zin, faction,l which, although it
had in being and representeá the
idea of Prussia. Kleist and the
Admiral much with t the
Admiral I highly of his but
the Prussi imself feared ven
by old friends through his frank and caustic criticisms of the
Reich Government. He was not often in Berlin, but when he
came the Nazi District Officer at Belgard near his counrry home
r A strongly monarchist group,
54
t him absent and the Gestapo Security Service in
tried to pick up his trail and watch his activities. This
man with whom Canaris could achieve somerhing, but not
, have in the ofEce too often.
German Conservative, a younger man, Fabian von
, was in the confidence -of Canaris and kept up
for him with the Prussian Conservatives. He also saw
Gisevius, political contact man to Dr Schacht, whom occa-
y he met personally. There came and went a host of others
minds üe Admiral fathomed and to whom he revealed
own in an inñnity of degrees, according to his idea of
politics and their discretion. Even among themselves his
orators had no idea of the several uses to which he was
them; but üe broad lines of their action were discussed
conferences at the Tirpitzufer, when ordinary service
permitted.
't forget l" His peculiar soft manner of speech was
to me by Schlabrendorff, who described how the
would drop his voice to a whisper when the conversa-
with his close intimates w€re over. "We have not talked
discussed the safety of the Reich."
lly Canaris and his confedera.tes cast about for some
against Hitler. The Civil Service had succumbed, the
had made its peace in ry34, when a promise was extracted
Hitler not to arm the Brownshirts; the Protestant and
Catholic Churches had been squeezed out of public life;
n industry had capitulated and German finance had been
ted by Nazi economists.
oreign allies-world opinion-the Governments of such
as Great Britain and America, must come to the aid of
ny if war was to be avoided,"
were the views that I heard with some amazement dur-
lengthy discussions in Berlin with two of the German Old-
ative Party in the spring of ry38, Ewald von Kleist and
von Bismarck: they represented Prussian ]unker
ion, which has sometimes been wrongly associated with the
iof 'Hitler. We met one April day in-the Casino Club in
in and there for the first time I heard spoken in a whisper
of the man who was protecting them and furthering
efforts.
55
 "Canaris !"
Kleist described to me the difficulty of dealing through the
British Embassy, which, besides being accredited to the Reich
Government, was not as critical of its methods as they could
have wished. Also there was the danger of discovery. The diplo-
mats sent messages in cipher, which could be intercepted ancl
sometimes broken. These men wanted contacts of a political
nature outside the world of diplomacy and outside the Intelli-
gence Services. Schlabrendorfi described to me a conversation
lith Canaris in which they had discussed the possibility ot
working with the British Secret Service against Hitler.
One of them had suggested that the British Secret Servicc
exactly as I could and quote in direct speech.
"I must warn you against the British Secret Service," he said,
"for several reasons. Should you work for them it will most
penetrated it
about you in
cipher. Your
s bad, too. It
would be difficult to overlook such activities in the long run.
It has
quite y
do not
they will not hesitate to betray you to me or to my colleagues of
the Reich Security Service,"
It became a business of searching out reliable men with good
political connections who were not known to or suspected by thc
Nazis. Josef Müller possessed special contact with the Vaticau
that might be considered of a diplomatic nature. Ewald von
Kleist let it be known üat he had an English friend who could
arrang€ direct contact with London politicians. Karl Górdeler
thought immediately of Brüning and thought that he would bc
able to explain to the British with his aid what the predicamenl
of Germany was.
"Now we have come to the case of Czechoslovakiar"
56
told Kleist in May. "I am not at all sure that Great
will not choose to fight, if the Führer marches inro
kia."
confessed that none of them had positive knowledge.
British were aloof, not easy to sqund on such a hypothetical
It was a difficult question to ask in its real form.
entrop through his diplomatic and foreign party intellig-
channels was repeatedly asking for the private opinions of
thmen. ''Would Britain fight to stop Sudeten Germans
joining the Reich?' he inquired. But that was not the
qu$tion that the General Staff wanted to pur.
naris and Oster drew Kleist aside early in May 1938 and
him of the actual state of secret policy, which he repeated
tne a few hours later, without committing the kind of indis-
tlon of which Canaris would have disapproved.
was to be no deception plan against Czechoslovakia,
tlid, no false rumour of troop movements and, above all, no
on the frontiers by the Nazi Party. The High Com-
had explained to Hitler that with his western frontiers
, in face of a French Army numerically nearly twice
trorig as the German Army in üe spring of ry38, no challenge
the Western Allies could be accepted in the near future.
itler is vulnerable in the issue of Czechoslovakia," said
. "If the Allies were to warn him against aggressive or
sive action, he would be obliged to accept the warning and
even if it were given only through diplomatic channels."
pondered this interim situation. The Reich was not
ng enough for war, yet-could not recoil towards peace, un-
tome impulse were given. What could bring a swing of the
? He fancied that he saw a way.
is brought him to General Beck, and the Chief of the
General Staff confessed to him that he, too, needeá
allies to overcome Hitler. He spoke with the quiet em-
of the scholar and philosopher. It was evident that he
not growling for immediate action against the Nazis, and
he looked first to the Commander-in-Chief for a decision.
Would, however, act independently, he said, in a certain
of crisis.
nd must lend us a sea anchor," said the Admiral,
are to ride out üis storm."
57
 It 'c;r( :rcceipt of circumstantial reports from Pragüe and else-
adye ll¡rt on May 2oth', wrote Sir Nevile Flenderson, the British
hold rrr,l ¡ador in Berlin, 'I immediately called on the Under-
activ rlc , Baron von Weizsácker, and asked him to tell me
lays in Whitehall, ,l there was any truth in these stories,' 1
that the Foreign O r. I was now aware of the temporary weakness of
prehend Germany's r. position. It seemed as if for a short time the British and
known to him, then it all seemed part of a clever and intricrrrc Intelligence Services were working together with ont
pattern of policy. He saw the might and tradition of the nati,,¡r squeeze Hitler out. Weizsácker formally denied the
to the British Ambassador, but Lord Halifax in London,
Vensittart at his elbow, felt sure that now was the time
Hitler hard. Warnings were spoken freely upon the
wire between London and Berlin.
tpent most of May 2rst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
protests,' wrote Sir Nevile. It seems that Hitler had
ruled by Neville Chamberlain and outmaneuvred by Sir Horacc ion even to cause civil disturbances in Czechoslovakia
Wilson. second half of May 1938. He knew the momenrary weak-
I said nothing of my conversations with Kleist for some days of his own position too well. There may have been plans in
for the simple reason that I did not fully understand whar I ttion for some dangerous action at a later date. Certainly
the events of the day ma<lc wanted Czechoslovakia quickly-in r938-and he did not
I went to see Sir Geor¡¡c to have to mobilise to get it. He may still have played with
the British Embassy, who of an internal revolution in the Sudeten area as a means
than most of his colleagucs ining his ends. The warnings of May 2rsr put an end to
and seemed not to be wholly in sympathy with the line of ap- fancies.
peasement that his Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, was still iately after Sir Nevile Henderson's démarche and the
actively pursuing. I repeated to s denials of Hitler and Keitel, the European Press published
with Kleist and how he said the r I that suggested that Hitler had been obliged to 'climb
fact vetoed any hasty action by . The effect on him was instantaneous. The stories of
Germans, 'because Germany was still vulnerable. Hitler had rolling on the foor and biting the carpet date from May
undertaken not to commit himself y€t under any circumstanccs 1938. "England, I will never forget this," he cried in
--{onsequently he was actually afraid of incidents ar rhis ysms of rage. But he was not long inactive. He summoned
moment which might harm his prestige if he had to stand by Commander-in-Chief, General von Brauchitsch, on May
and watch them happen before he was strong enough to inter- ¡nd gave orders for the West Wall of Germany to be built
vene. Sir George asked me a number of searching questions, and for increases in the peacetime strength of the
then he composed a dispatch for London on what I had said. forces to be put into effect.
Within about a week an exrraordinary thing happened. damned disgraceful, awful show," exclaimed Sir Nevile
Rumours from German and Czechoslovak sources in the thi¡d to me privately of the diplomaric démarches of May
week of May attached importance to military exercises near rhe the Press reports that ensued. Upon refection, he dei-
Czechoslovak frontier by the National-socialist Motor Car Corps the effect in his memoirs as 'unfortunate'.
and local movements of troops. was, in fact, instructed f¡om London to make üese enquiries.

58 59
 Such are the facts that I was able to gather about the memor-
Berchtesgaden. I cannot say for certain how close the hand ol'
Canaris lay behind this blow against Hitler in the vulnerablc
interim. Kleist was very close to Canaris at this time and warnetl
his own wife, so she tells me: "Remember that you have never
heard me mention the names Canaris and Oster." Kleist could
be secretive, but it was not in his nature to dissemble his con-
tempt for the Nazis in any company and therefore he could nc,t
be taken into the Abwehr like some of his less implacable asso-
ciates when war broke out. I had to guess sometimes, as we sat
in a quiet corner of the Casino Club in Berlin, from the accent
and emphasis of Kleist's narrative whence his counsels came and
I can do no more than tell the reader what my ilnpressions were
then, since no amount of research now will uncover what went
on between those two. It seemed to me that Admiral Canaris
was using every oblique means in his power to beset and con-
found the cocksure demagogue and that one of the highest
ofHcers in the State was Adolf Hitler's secr€t enemy.
A GL'*"J;:';;NARIS
CeNenrs was soon informed of the brainstorms in the Wilhelm-
strass€ and the determination of Hitler to have his way over
Czechoslovakia. He probed, listened and chatted with his chief,
General Keitel, and went deeper into the risks ahead with
General von Brauchitsch, General Beck and the Under-Secretary,
von Weizsácker. Adjutant Schmundt helped to complete the
picture. It is customary for Intelligence Services to try and place
a man near the ruler, but the difficulties of ascertaining what
Hider thought and did should not be underrated. Kleist came
6o
from his Pomeranian home soon after the turmoil had
and visited Canaris again.
situation has altered now," Kleist told me. "There will
ln attack of some sort on Czechoslovakia this year unless
pledges herself openly to go to theaid of that state uhat-
the form of aggression against her. M. Blum's Foreign
llrter, Yvon Delbos, spoke üis word once-4uelconquc-brt
Blum has been out of power since April. We cannot expect
French to master this situation."
Wc waited a few weeks, but there was no further reaction
the British and no fr6h statement of policy in Westminster.
attitude remained that spoken by Mr Neville Chamberlain
the House of Commons on March 24th-that a confict would
unlikely to be limited to üose powers who had treaty obli-
to Czechoslovakia.
There was a German journalist in London, one Dr Karl
Abshagen,r who was sending private reports to Oster
the political situation. Oster showed them to the Admiral.
asserted that the British would fight if a general con-
arose over Czechoslovakia, but Ribbentrop was reporting
the Chamberlain Government would on no account fight
would even restrain France from making a firm stand.
fosef Goebbels was nervous. He read Abshagen's reports and
his editor: "Abshagen must continue to report quite frankly,
ther or not his reports agree with those of the Embassy in
But tell him to [ake care that his phrasing gives no
for they will be read by our Führer in the original."
was learning to appreciate the good things of this life;
mansion at Schwanenwerder, his banquets arrd Bierabends,
dancing-girls and motor-cars would vanish like smoke if üe
Reich made a blunder over Czechoslovakia.
The reports were studied in Canaris's Foreign Branch. This
the insoluble question that was fraying the nerves of General
and the Commander-in-Chief in fuly 1938.
you believe that England will fight if we attack Czecho-
kia?" Kleist asked of me.
i"I believe sor" I answered. "Perhaps only by blockade at the
daresay it is true," said Kleist. "I believe the British will
r Auüor of the German biography of Canaris.
6t
fight." Then he dropped his vr¡ice and whispered: "The the military profession. was at this time Iearning
Aámiral wants someone to go to London and ñnd out. We have sh and:*1fo.g. the Fnglish_He
hisrorian" a" "-,^- ^-^- r
an offer to make to the British and a warning to give them." General Stafi, ñis milih;y
There seemed to be no secret between Canaris and his political rons, and moral and ooliti
friends that Hider had ordered the High Command to PrePare
for a general mobilisation in the autumn. Beck
As we sat and discussed the riddle of the British attitude, in ne of
the Bendlerstrasse opposite the General Staff were already work- Cofit- r,
osu¡ r¡¡ urc .'rrsr
wofld war. Hitler had senr Wiedema;'i; ".-
ing intensively on the planning of Case Grün, the invasion of nd_Lord Halifax about Czechorlouakia-lrra'
Czechoslovakia. General von Brauchitsch had been notified by was satisfied
i$r impressions that Wiedemr"" U.."giii*t.
.t}r.
Hitler in the last days of |uly that a general mobilisation was to Beck noted in his diary:
be prepared, with September z8th as zero day. It was now early
August,
The Abwehr had its deception plan to cover these PrePara-
tions, which would not fail to be noticed, as Reichsbahn staff
received orders to assemble rolling-stock, and civil contractors
sent forward stores and rations. The intelligence game went on
according to the rules by which it was played. One of Canaris's
V-men was sent to the British military attaché with the news that
zero day would be August r5th, perhaPs to test British reactions
and perhaps put them off the scent.
The Chamberlain Cabinet did not like unpleasant news, and
it found this hard to digest. Colonel F. N. Mason-Macfarlane Of Russia he wrote in cautious, weighin-g
phrases in an
was taken to task by the Cabinet. Sir John Simon cross-examined appre_
rtion of the situation in the s;*Á
him from a cold height. August r5th came and went and there "ir;¡,"-"
were no disturbances and not a sign of German trooP move-
ments.
"It is difficult to explain to people like that," Colonel Mac'
farlane complained afterwards, "thatwhat did not happen yester-
day may still occur a fortnight later."
The Cabinet was all the more inclined to disbelieve thesc ck had then in mind that the Commander_in-Chief,
many rumours and to agree with Sir Nevile Henderson that it Brauchitsch, should at lcritical General
was a inatter of keeping calm and working for a peaceful solu-
_;;;;LJa.i to Hitter
n* cro,rp, Army
not preparedf.-I.
tion that might indeed precede a general settlement with Ger- l.^-r:o ¿;rpr-¿;;manders
""d for
to take the responsibility
many. The ruse of the false date had some effect. But when t i, iropor"tri.á "'*,- ^^, .-.^._¡¿
General Ludwig Beck had another order of mind than i" " bd¡.
ing of the generals,early i"'a"g"ri- h ;:
Canaris. A man with the forehead of a philosopher, thoughtful in Brauchitsci, *ho u7r" a
eyes and wide, sagacious mouth that drew down a[ the cornc¡¡ ,., hil
s. It was said of the des
as his pessimism deepened, he knew by heart and quoted Clausc. hitsch
nac oought his narlllegiance.with
rLrcr
wirz and Schliefien, but his desire for knowledge reached bc. a
abled him to meet á .o.rtrr.t of divorce. ogift af *or.y
6z
63
 Bcck' ringing.in me, the German customs and currency control and the
Hitler knew well what
S*[ir-.rr. were the words of tly to him po would'discover thai I had left Germany without a
that: "I will have to make war
iü my old it, and the Admiral would be compromised. I am known
be an enemy of the regime. I would never get a peráit."
Ú1.r, t fight Britain and France I will have a new set
".".t"fr.
:il;;";i;r.'l ii's","tti'sch would not take the lead' then he' The Junkers 5z alrcraft of the Hansa Airlines was standing at
,o the critical moment'
' empelhof Aerodrome on August rTth with the civilian pas-
;.;il;;ilo
-i;;;; ,h. Admiral's
". intention to undeceive the British in his gers checking through customs and currency control. Each
him and these tient German traveller was sponsored by some Ministry or
own wav. General Beck knew Kleist and t¡usted
conversation in the chief of 1al body, their allowances of foreign money approved by the
;#'tii ;;;;;"J1ig"in''nt ichsbank and stamped in their passports. There were no bona
---;iit""gtt Staff's ofEce'
the General
tourists any more. It was a little like travel from England
yietding
,will to Hitler," concluded Beck' "üe British
lo"r. its two main allies here, the German the war had been won. Each had to show an invitation
cou..o*Jrt kind foreign friends who would bear his or her expense
General German people' If you can bring me from
L.;á;; f that the British will make war if we in- rad and each was noted in the Gestapo registers as having
I will make an end of this regime"' ign friends and being either harmless or suspect, or vouched
;;¡; ¿, by a government department wiü interests abroad.
Kleis he would regard as Proof'
..An t Czechoslovákia in the event of war"' As the aircraft was filling up, a military car drove onto the
from a member of the British Govern- hway without making any detour towards Customs and Pass-
Beck Control. A German general in uniform alighted and es-
ment defi de would strengthen his hand with the
generals. basis, K1eist tolá. me on his return from a civilian to the air liner. There was no question of inter-
mi'sion which he undertook for Beck :e by customs and police. The civilian, a small man, in a
London, suit, was evidently in considerable nervousness until the
and Canaris.
dangerous man ft took of[, then sank back in his seat with a sigh of relief.
Canariswas nowperplexed as to howto get this
to London without being aP funkers rose from the ground and droned over the roads of
and the forests and lakes of Brandenburg. An English
who knew him to be an ene
- Intel e, who who had watched the movements of Herr von Kleist
was all a certain interest from a seat behind him settled back com-
spy.
tect GestaP /, too. This was my friend and colleague, H. D. Harrison,
had promised to keep a watchful eye on him. The military
the mercv of the British
a kinsman, General von Kleist, got into his car and drove
Kleist isked for a false PassPort' This was e stratagem
l.n
from Tempelhof to the War Ministry.
,"ñh;. Admiral still deligh tá' Ht h'd an irreverent attitu(lc
he was the same nervous tension as' the funkers aircraft
towards the
travelled nc down at Croydon; but something of the informality
still
since him. The Customs did not seem interested in his
so ever t
PassPort was
nd an rssue oI , the passport ofñcer hardly glanced at his passport.
po,,',d,o*.
cussed with
3:*i'lll;
the London coach had left a telephone call informed üe
Intelligence Service that a German visitor who might
them had arrived on the afternoon plane,
iourney.
' i'I dt.r', want to be mistaken for a Nazi agent or for a spy' is here."
you, we know about him."
t" opt"irr.a with a twinkle in his keen grey eyes' "If the Briti¡
64 ,65
 London in August 1938 was still unaware that the Czecho-
slovak crisis was imminent. Parliament had gone into recess as
it was to go into recess a year later before Poland fell. Lord
Runciman had gone o¡ his mission to Prague, London was not
as empty as it would have been in ry37. There wbre interesting
men in town who-had not gone to shoot grouse. Kleist looked
at this immense and bustling city, which with its mercantile and
pólitical traditions had stood athwart German expansion for
§€venty years.
He had not been long at the Park Lane Hotel when Lord
Lloyd of Dolobran arrived to whisk him away to dinner in a
private room at Claridges. There was some similarity between
these two men: Kleist the extremist of the German Conser-
vatives shunned for his uncompromising views; George Lloyd,
similarly shunned by Chamberlain and listened to reluctantly
by his friend, Edward Halifax, who used his advice as an anti-
dote to the more disastrous counsels of Sir Horace Wilson and
Sir Nevile Henderson. Lloyd spoke no German and Kleist no
English, and they managed rhe conversation in French.
"Everything is decided, Lord Lloyd," exclaimed Kleist. ¿'The
mobilisation plans are complete, zero day is fixed, the Army
group commanders have theirorders. All will run according to
plan at the end of September, and no ofle can stop it unless
Britain speaks an open warning to Herr Hitler," He added that
it would be all the more effective if made jointly with France
and Russia.
Then he related the state <if power in Germany, the reluctance
of the general f th the waverings
of Brauchitsc ent ar among the
people, the u the which would
not be at the height of their programme of rearmamenr unril
ry$.IÍ Great Britain took a firm and positive stand with France
for sole responsibility in an
hope that the commanding
rsisted in his war policy and
Lloyd, when their interview was ended, went to see Lord
Halifax, and Kleist was given an appointment to meet Sir Robert
Vansittart, former Permanent Under-Secretary and then Foreign
Adviser in the Foreign Officc. They w.ot oué, rhe same grooid
6 67
in. From what I can garher Vansittart and Kleist found
common ground for discussion, but Vansittart was mis_
:ful..He suspected that this German was out for scimething
might want to do a deal.
"Of all the Germans f saw,,, Lord Vansittart told me years
ierwards, "Kleist had the stuff in him for a revolution against
der. But he wanred the Polish corridor, wanted to do a deal.',
:ist had *T.:T.: emphasised to_me that although Germany
no historical claims on Czechoslovakia, revision"of frontiers
Poland was parr of his policy. The brief reference to Kleist
_
his mission in the British official documents published since
not sugg€sr that any discussion of poland was part
: yr..dg
his mission in 1938, nor did he ever mention that to me. Lord
ansittart's remarks did not seem to me to relate to the main
Vansittart gave Kleist some hopes that Britain would stand
m.Jhat.was his own policy. He promised a display of British
I French naval strerqgth i" th. Mediterranea-n ihat would
ke Mussolini anxious to play the mediator's role.r FIe en-
ired into the aims and ideas of the secret opposition thar Kleist
iresented. The |unkers pressed ftr a decláration or a letter to
Great General Staff fiom the british Government.
Kleist went from London down to Chartwell Manor, where he
received by Mr Churchill with solemn precaurions, and the
: aflairs of state were aga.in discussed. He could see that
Churchill was ¡ot in the Government, he was in con-
nt touch with Lord Halifax, and their views differed mainly
d:fl.:, emphasis and method. Here was the bulldog whá
ld show his teerh úhen soft language failed. The Fáreign
:e and especially the Inn_er Cabinet dimu¡red ue.y
idea of -.r.h"at
sending an ofEcial lefter to any one not in the
,owledged government of Germany; but Ltrd Halifax asked
inston Churchill to do so.
á August z4th Kleist slipped out of London as quialy as he
come. Two days later the British Government annouÁced in
hat alarming communiqué that it had called Sir Nevile
erson to London owing to 'the serious na¡ure of reports
Central Europe'.
Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir fohn ,Simon, Si¡ Robert
r This suggestion came to noüing.
 a¡rd Sir Ncvile Henderson
de- half of its minority
i Ca d of these
Vansittart, Sir Horace Wilson was
complications and est
a month,'*iI- Sir Nevile wa's
bated the crisis üat *" t"ff
Abshagen.
use ltr hoPlng
Admiral Horthy, the an his.
ouite emphatic that there was no "Cana¡is used to visit me every time he came to Budapestr,'
l"'it'¿, he suggested a careful a
."'li,.-,;'ríil... Admiral Horthy told me in r95o, in retirement in Estoril. ,,úe
It that would not
were both naval officers and apart from üat our outlook was
similar. He did not himself give me advice; but we were both
agreed in 1939 that if America entered the war against Germany
then Germany was finished,"
Canaris and his von Tippelskirch,
warned the Hungari in SepteÁber r93á
zruh..
=*ili.,,,tookhislunchat"'"l:'J;*"I'o,Jfl that Germany might war with Brltain lf
T',i[::ill1.t11
maced as
headlines
irPitzufer
awaiting
nd got it.
alone," he said'
ew a deeP breath' The Admiral was still pondering as to how he would give
,best.efiects to. the reportJof Kleist when the Gertapo gof in
"I have found nobodr t" ti;:';":,}1'Jj'TLl1.':,1';|,: uch with Abwehr III, the Military Security Service.
avoid a war at almost any cost "There has been someone in London conáucting treasonable
it without wishing to' TheY saY trversations. Find out who it is t We are already at work."
British constitution to commll Kleist sat about the Casino Club thinking up an alibi. FIe was
extremely worried. Canaris called for the officer who
td prepared the visit of Kleist to London.
He made his rePort and a
"You are to take up this enquiry," he instructed him. ..Ex-
Admiral's desk a letter to hims re every possibility. I have satisfied myself that there can be
after the visit to Chartwell' It question of our own man being involved. He is not to be
well become involved in a ned. You must seek elsewhere."
;;ñ;;;,.ert'in-that I Soviet Foreign Minister, Litvinov, hurried to Geneva in
a war would become inevtt
c.'
i;;;J;;J,ti,ggr.might v
l'
second week of September to see what could be done to save
ve security. Ffe saw Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign
defeated. He, Kleist, r, on the rrth, but Bonnet stayed only one day in Genña
odc Germans as he had come to
rePr€sent'
in a language not encouraging, and Lord Halifax did not come at all.
óne Englishman, at any r rte' could speak
British and French Governments wanted to hold Russia
*¡a.*-,r.;r.
the Germans understood' üis delicate situation. At Nuremberg the Party Congress
R ihhentroo was working :i.tht l]"it":l'^":
L full swing: üe brown-shirts marched, the' gauláters
Poles. the Brit-ish if suddenly the I I
similar claims in Prague on the amplifiers blared out the speeches of Flermann
garian 69
68
Górine over the roofs of
the Ministry. Mr Chamberlain intended to fy to Berchtesgaden to
Army"pas.ed on Parade. PsY- discuss a solution to the Czechoslovak situation. /
i'"- an Énglish flY Lahousen remembers how the Admiral laid down his knife
"'rrü,li'i'
the British Government, sat an
The and fork. He had quite lost his appetite.
"What I He-visit that man l" He muttered the words blankly
at first as if he scarcely understood. Then he repeated them to
himself and got up from the table, walking about rhe room.
He was utterly distracted and ate no more dinner. The tension
move, but was broken, half the world was in loud relief by midnight, and
him coura thalf was in deep gloom, and among those who sat in gloom was
st .Hitler's Intelligence Chief. The Admiral excused himself to his
*^Tl. solu
tonal Bene§'
át after Kleist had returned from London General Beck heads of departments and went early to bed. Had he been mis-
hrd tu..rád over his own duties to his deputy' General Franz taken in opening his hand to the British? Perhaps he had scared
them in London into the Berchtesgaden policy. Maybe they had
Halder.TheChiefoftheGeneralstafihadofferedhisresigna-
sPeech believed that his advice was anything more than mischief or
he inte elt.

all the
came to fighting. Kleist went from CHAPTER VIII
rging them to act. The Admiral
ili letter. Some were keen and excit- BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
by September r4th General von our of the senior German generals were furious with Canaris
Witzleben, Commander of the Berlin area, had made arrange- 'leading them so far astray with his reports on British deter-
ments'witir General Halder and others to arrest Hitler as
he
nation to ñght. The Intelligence Service should not be en-
returned from Berchtesgaden to the caPital' Count Helldorf'
to a naval officer, üey said. Lahousen tells me that he
President of li.e, *at use his forces to
a senior German officer describe Canaris and his friends
arrest thePa . General command of the
"the people who undermined the influence of the General
Third Panze south of ld march on the
would go back to his ?fr" by opposing Hitler on the wrong issue. That was one
..pá; a signal from Witzleben' Beck int of view. Colonel-General von Rundstedt had a brief en-
ofh.. i. the lendlerstrasse. "There can be no doubt of the with his old friend Kleist about September z5th and his
existence of the plot at this moment and of serious measures to kindled with anger and annoyance when Kleist pursued the
make it efiectiie," wrote Mr Churchill years later i¡ The of action against Hitler. It was as if the generals had been
the
Gathering Storm. An awful calm hung that afternoon over and Hirler right all along.
roofs of Áe Bendlerstrasse. Did Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich crisis is not yet over; we have still no solution," Canaris
smell danger? The afternoon passed-without incident and
by out. But they hardly doubted any more that a solucion
dinnertimá Admiral Canaris knew why' at hand. Brauchitsch would hear no more talk of a.revolt,
He was sitting at table with Colonel Lahousen, Piekenbrock ile Keitel had been allowed to hear none from the start;
-wh.n
and Groscurth, a message came to him from the War despondently told General von Witzleben, the most
1 fheir secret report has yet to be published of the rebels, that he could not be answerable for military
7o 7t
action aga.inst Hitler if Mr Chamberlain found a peaceablc
solution io the Czechoslovak dispute. Kleist wen't back to his
estates in Pomerania, utterly disillusioned. There seemed to bc
no ¿nd to the domination of Hitler.
His kinsman, General von Kleist, who had seen him to thc
:
le «r
hinr
draft setdement of
h Cabinet to approve antl
was quickly at work on
the Hungarians.
"Do you not see that you will be too late to Present yot¡r
claims if you do not make üem now?" was the tenor of his
BudaPest.
e that Chamberlain was in Bad Godesberg with
ent accePted by his Cabinet and France, Hitler wrs
in a surly mo eady to be polite to the elder man.
"I am awf that's no more use," he exclaimetl,
indicating th plan, so Neville Henderson relatcs.
The subtle restraint that Canaris had put upon the Flungariarrs
had broken down. They and the Poles had made Hitler thc
arbiter of their claims upon the narrow provinces of Czecht,
slovakia.
Down the Rhine V)lley past the Hotel Petersberg wherc
Chamberlain and his delegation sat out two September aftcr'
noons, the German troop trains ran at the toP state of alert with
light and anti-aircraft defences mounted on oPen platforms at
the front and rear of each train. The SS on the terrace, providctl
by Hitler as a bodyguard for Chamberlain, drank and sprawlctl
in the autumn sunshine, singing maudlin songs' When on duty
their exa ity conveyed no sense of poli«:
ness and n. Across the Rhine at the Hotcl
Dreesen, ulent answer to Chamberlain's
letter of the z3rd asking whether the Reich Chancellor war
willing to abide by his intention to seek an orderly settlement,
The translator, Schmidt, took the letter and, as the hours lapsetl,
Hitler made a remark to his Chief of Staff of Storm Troopers,
Viktor Lütze, which I heard about at the time and have
72
else on record. He glanced at his watch; it was 4 pm
the z3rd.
"I know id. "He will give way. If
he has not six o'clock, thiá the agai,
is won and
thc
reported to him. He made his ranting speech in the Berlin Sport
Palace on September z6th, and I noticád that his voice was un-
ccrtain, with long caused by the mental strain of
thc the crisis. That ev h Foreign Of[ce issued a com-
muniqué that suggested for the first time that:
'If. in- spite of all efforts a Germa¡ attack is made upon
^
Czechoslovakia, the immediate ¡esult must be that France iill
be bound to come to her assistance and Great Britain and Russia
will,certainly stand by France. . . .'
The following morning it was announced that the Home
Fleet was to be mobilised, and that had more effect than all the
words they had hitherto spoken, but Hitler still raved and swore
against the Czechs, until an urgent telephone call f¡orn his Ex-
cellency Signor Attolico, on behalf of Mussolini, smoothed the
wey to Munich.
What of General Franco this crisis? He has hardly
-during
en mentioned in early works on the Czech crisis, but the Ger-
n documents on the Spanish Civil War published in r95o
wed that the Spanish Foreign Minister, Count Jordana, aá-
itted to the German Ambassador on September z8th, r93g_
e crucial date-that Franco had given Great Britain and
ance his assurance of Spanish neutrality in the event of a con-
_Thcre
was also a rgport, highly unpalatable to Ribbentrop
Hitler, that Franco had oficred to intern the Condor Legion
Spain. I should think that this uncertainry went as fai as
üssolini's attitude to prevent war at that *o*.rrt.
These last turns of events were a stroke of gmd luik for
l5
 iaged that he was "surrounded by cowards and incom-
Had I received this report at the time this note was sent
ld never have iovited Chamberlain to Munich and by
we should be in the Balkans."
had Keitel draw up a secret minute on October zrst, elévén
after the Munich settlement came into force, enjoining the
forces to be prepared for surprise air attacks and to be.
to occupy Memel and üe remainder of Czechoslovakia at
notlce.
a ti¡ne Admiral Canaris eschewed high politics so that the
might setde. No particular course of action was possible
the Munich conference. He had, besides, Plenty to do
ising his Intelligence Service for war. FIe was a man who,
he sometimes left important work to his deputies for
at a time, would suddenly concern himself with details;
very methods of gathering rePorts and spreading informa-
were of interest to him.
reader should not imagine that his sole interest lay in
his position to conspire against Hitler. "He was a man
was in perpetual motion, absorbing and disseminating in-
tion," so Schlabrendorff characterised him to me.
tcll them what they want to hear and what they can repeat"'
' upon üem.
was
lr the secretary f:f,srti".l:it
:asionally he would discuss the mechanics of intelligence
sorry that ' at this moment"' he srtttl' his associates. "Tapping telephones is of little value," he
"t
Foreien Aflals, is told Schlabrendorfi, indicating a pile of monitorings of
il;il i""*rit, to inform him in the very t::rrly
conversations that reached him daily from the Research
days of A erman plan that worked <.¡trt tr¡
. "Since nobody talks openly on the telephone in the Third
the actual that counsel came from ancl tlritl
they can read such ¡ecords all day without learning any-
üere was rce that there should be atl i¡¡t' ,
*"tt"",,,.,..u.
ir.¿iri. á*f"ration of solidarity with France "O Admiral was not entirely right in that observation,"
Ll"Yrl Richard Protze. "As a matter of fact, the Research
of ct¡¡' had orders to watch his own telephone, but it abstracted
intclll, of his talks frorn the sets that were sent to the Abwehr.
is no doubt that the telephone told a great deal, if you
British Secret Service'
what you were looking for. The Gestapo doubtless thpught
n the ink of the Munich agrec
fresh mischicf' is's telephone conversations were worth listening to."
ment was barely dry, that Ribbentrop-produced rlrll' Gestapo had been fixing microphones in the walls of that
from Lo;d9r.I that Russia,had
He showed Hitler a report ,,of the Hotel Adlon adjoining the British Embassy, but I
France on September z6th that she did not winh
fred Britain and suppose that much of vital interest was overheard. The
i. ,."¿ armed forces to take patt in a European.w*:W:l]]'tFü
I were intrigued to discover that, one of the Brirish diplo-
il; il" I heard from one of Canaris's men that the
75
74
mats was in the habit of inviting an actress to supper-but this
kind of surveillance took up a lot of time and was not profitablc
in the end. Before long British engineers came out from London
and located the microphones.
Ciphers? Both the Abwehr and the Gestapo had their
diciphering branches. It was a high art. Sometimes the Foreigu
Ministry would deliver an important note to foreign embassies
during a slack period at t}re week-end. Then the deciphering
teams would wait for a cipher message to be handed in to the
Reichspost, There was a possibility that an over-zealous secretary
might transmit the note without paraphrasing, and that, with
the original -in their possession, gave the Abwehr a chance of
deciphering a code. They found the British ciphers the hardest
of all.
. Apart from his system of regular agents in diplomatic, con-
sular and commercial posts, the Admiral maintained a nétwork
of V-men or confidence men whose business was to transmit anrl
gether strategic and tactical information. FIe was willing to pay
highly for the services of deaf mutes, not, we might supposc,
because they were more trustworthy with secrets, but because of
their peculiar gift for lip reading. A deaf mute with a shorthand
book in his lap sitting at the other side of a restaurant coul(l
bring him a pretty fair account of what the British diplomat hatl
been telling his companion at dinner.
The German network in the United Kingdom was not largc.
It was directed from the German Legation in Dublin, fronr
Lisbon, Oslo and Hamburg, but there was a possibility of div
covering British secrets through certain of the embassies antl
Dominion ofÉces in London. Once in the period after Municlr
he showed a visitor a copy of a confidential report sent to Lon-
don by the British Embassy in Berlin only a week previously.
It dealt with the condition of the Reich railways and thcir
potential in time of. war, He often seemed careless in such colr.
versations and soon the British were apprised that someone wlt
photographing Government documents for the Germans.
"I am told üat Canaris believed he had penetratéd the Britirh
Secret Service," I told Richard Protze. The old man nodded hh
white head. "Not everywhere, perhapsr" he answered, "btrl
more than you would easily suppose. It was quite simple in
cases. We had military intelligence agreements with the Ba
76
before the War. We had merely to say: ,and we want to
agents of
tr agerlrs or ours rnsrde üe .Bfltish
inside the British iniellisence
intelligence offices in i,
no, Reval and Tallin'. Then in The Hague áuring the early
of the War, I had a daily report of .r.ñt, inside ihe British
igence office from an unáerpaid British ag."L fhar HnJ;i
is quite usual."
Canaris was somewhat hampered in improving his services
ir¡
:itain by a directive from Hiiler. The
-ilitaryittaché in Lon-
was under strict o¡ders not to take part in ctvert intelligence
i,. and General Geyr von S :hweppenburg tells us iÁ his
oirs that he quarrelled on this oiry ,,rbiét with Canaris,
wanted him to do more for the Abíeh¡. To the end of the
'ar
the number of German agents in Britain was small, their
in_
rmation unreliable and most of their communicatiorrs ,nd..
vation. The counter-espionage work of MI5 was of a high
, and at times the German iervice operatiíg f."m Dublin
s bewildered by false information planted on"it, and
misled
own Government.
Canaris insisted on seeing his agents personally when they
me to Berlin and listened to their ñportr, nodding with
visibl!
terest, even if what they related *ri lorrg since kiown to
him.
"E,verything you are telling me is of the highest
intercst,,, he
exclaim.
There were four main intelligence ntres in Germany that
nlt with the gathering of intell-igenc rom rhe world outside-
te Abwehr ofrce in Kónigsberg worked inro Russia, the
of[ce
Munich worked on rhe B;ka; and Mediterranean countries,
ne dealt with France, Hamburg with the British Isles,
the
icas and Scandinavia,
 tte real thing," a British diplomat from Ankara told me after-
wards. "Iam sur at least one agent in
each of our emba I daresay w. hád orre
in all theirs." He in term§-of Operation
Cicero.

CHAPTER IX

THE GREAT MOBILISATION

Pnecun had been occupied in March ry39 and that in itself
meant war sooner or later. Lahousen remembers the resigned
attitude of Canaris at this time. As the German columns rálled

be attacked next. Now that they had deserted their policy of

from feud friendship with Poland, the Germans set about .r^orr.l, agáinst
apart
So these ligenc ir rival chiefs Colonel Joszef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, alleging that
their ds set and counter- he had long been in their pay. Having raken action, ót ÁU..-
and
in and Halifax hesitated, and from March 3rst onwards untii
ugust z6th the British guarantee to Poland remained in un-
tified form.
Can¿ris thought by ]une that it was now high rime to send a
ecial agent to London again. He and Ostei saw Kleist and
been writtenin fiction. . whether he would turn orl a second mission, but the
-has*Noüing mind of Kleist foresa no result from it.
that you have read in novels can be compared with
78 79
 "I'm not going to London
"What have we to offer ? " he asked'
with emptv hands"'
";;;ó:¿Jét"? o6.., named Bohm-Tettelbach was selected
in his stead and went to meet the British under these very
Poland soon I have been able to speak with
one of the G ca¡ried these message^s and was
interested to at he had been a clo-se friend of
him that she would, but theY
feclings' Bohm-Tettelbach felt
pose Britain failed to conclude
ialks in Moscow dragged on'
ritish would commit the mad-
anY and Russia, the two
décided to Partition her?
GermanY wiüout having
to
achieved anything. When the Rhine Army burst
into Germany
Á-rngrit .Jpt*á among others-in the ruins round Düsseldorf
Boh'm-Tettelbach", who disconsolately related
to an in-
Ai#á that
o.doloo, British ,r,";o, of the Public Relations Branch
Halder hrd úe.n ready to arrest Hirler in August
1939
é."..A There
if he had been convinced üat íhe British were in earnest'
had to
;;t- t;-. such intention, but the British would have conquer alone; but Molotov was also interested in making per_
r"rl. ii.it attitude plainár than ever before in order to get the fectly sure that Germany did not intend to attack Russiá lm-
mediately afterwards. He therefore kept the British and French
negotiators in Moscow for the time being. Nobody could really
say in the third week of August for certain under what condi-
tions and in what alliance Germany would be fighting.
How ludicrous the Italians appeared in these days of con-
rnl_ They_ had signed a military alliance with Germany in
spring-the pact of steel---on the understanding that there
be no war for three years, and then CouniCiano con-
to m to Russia for Germany in |une tci
that pact rhat would, did he'but know it,
an immediate war possible for Hitler.
no did not hear that war was imminent until the second
in August, when he hurried to Berchtesgaden. In fact the
and como
it.-tVii. Stitish would rátify thelr Polish guarantee r Intelligencc Service knew it before him. Canaris hap
;;"-,l.'il.t*r,Jing *itit {u'sia, him that it wasbe savcrl'
then peace might
to be at üe Obersalzburg on August roth and decided io
The Czechoslovak irisis had taught
8¡
8o
visit Castle Fuschl and see Ribbentrop. The Foreign Minister rc'
galed the version of the naval war
ihat woul anean. Ttre Italians woultl
throw in he said, and close thc
Mediterranean to the British Navy.
This was one of those conversations to which üe Admirll
would simply listen and npd with aPParent interest; but he rc
marked dryly to his adjutant as they drove away from Castlc
Fuschl:
"When the big battle starts in the Mediterranean you and I
will sit on a raft and just see how the roast-beefs bash thc
Italianos."
A week latero in Berlin (the German-Russian pact was not yct
concluded and general mobilisation would be complete in nint:
days), he had a significant discussion with General Keitel arrtl
saw that the simplicity of the Chief of the High Command was
hardly less terrible than that of his master. Keitel, this solitl,
blond, pleasantJooking man with his light blue eyes and upright
bearing, seemed bereft of'all imagination.
Canaris noted this discussion in his diary-the famous lost
diary for which the Secret Services of four Powers have searchctl
in vain. By chance the entry for August t7th, t939, was copicrl
and the copy kept by General Lahousen. It reads:
Discussion with Colonel-General Keitel, t7. YlIl. 1939.
I report to Keitel my conversation with fost (an SS ofEccr).
Keitel says that he cannot concern himself with this operationr :ts
the Führer has not informed him of it and has only told hinr to
procure Polish uniforms for Heydrich. He agrees that I was riglrt
io inform the General Stafi. He says that he does not think mtrclr
of such operaúons, but that tlere's nothing else for it, if tlre
Führer oráers them. It is not uP to me, he says, to ask tl¡c
Führer how he imagines such an oPeration is to be carried out.
Such was indeed the attitude of Keitel towards Flimmlcr'¡
plan to dress German convicts in Polish uniforms (with filrn
units standing by) and drive them into attacks on Reich tclri'
tory so that it would appear that the hot-headed Poles had strue k
the first blow.
Canaris then reported to his chief that he had heard frt,rrt
r Secret operation 'Himmle¡'.
8z
eneral Roatta I of the unwillingness of Italy to be dragged into
war. The diary nores that Keitel replied ,that he it irrt , it
d be a g.ood thing if Mussolini told the Füh¡er quite clearly
he-would not fight. He, Keitel, believed that italy woulá
fight all the same. I replied that I considered that this would be
out of the question and related to him the full gisl of the Ciano-
Ribbentrop meering. Keitel replied that t}re Führer told him the
,opposite. I told him also that Count Marogna 2 has learned that
the King of Italy has said to King Alfonso-of Spain that he will
not sign if Mussolini lays a mobilisarion order before him. Keitel
remarks üat it was interesting to see that even a nation ruled by
a dictatorship could be quité temperamental when it came tá
war. How much more difficult it must be when it came to
democratic countries I He was convinced that the British would
that the British would have behaved in just the same way if
there had been bloodshed when we marched into Czechoslo-
kia. I try to explain to Keitel the effect of economic warfare on
Gcrmany and tell him that we have only limited forces with
which to fight back. I have just learned that we could put only
U-boats into the Atlantic. Keitel says that it will be easy to
Rumania to deliver oil to us when Poland is defeated. I
rrm him of the precautions already taken by the British in the
kans and tell him that they will have certainly prepared
i¡st that eventuality, too.'
Hider calculated on breaking the news to the commanding
nerals that he would make war on.August z6th or soon afterl
before the announcement that the German-Soviet non-
ssion pact had been concluded. The worst news first would
its sting drawn by the second, and the obedience of the
would thus be ensured. He summoned them to Berch-
His old colleague as Chief of the Italian Military Iatelligence, then
tary attach( in Berlin.
Óhicf of the Abwe5r Munich Offrce.
83
tes¡¡aden on August zznd and delivered his war speech after
the arljutants had forbidden them to take any notes.
Hitler announced that he was going to make war on August
z6th. He began by asserting that they would all have to realise
that Germany was determined from the beginning to fight the
'Western Powers. The first task would be the destruction of
Poland and the elimination of her manpower, not merely the
reaching of a certain line of territory.
"I shall give a propaganda reason for starting the war, never
mind whether it is plausible or not. Nobody will ask the victor
afterwards whether he was speaking the truth."
So he ranted on, and Admiral Canaris, standing unobtru-
sively in the background, made his own notes the whole way
through.
"We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us
with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. lt is a big aim that de-
mands great efforts. . . . I am only afraid that some Schuánhund
will ofler to mediate."
The following day the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
was concluded and the Führer spoke jubilantly to his Foreign
Minister on the Moscow line, hailing him as a second Bismarck;
but the effect on the British was not what he,had expected. In-
stead of allowing the still unratified guarantee to Poland to lapse,
they ratified it on August z5th. Hitler then told Góring that he
would postpone general mobilisation by a few days, whileGóring
tried through a Swedish mediator, Birger Dahlerus, to dissuade
Chamberlain from fulfilling British obligations; but it was
obvious that wHereas a day or two was welcome to the move-
ments snd transportation officers to bring delayed dispositions
into line, this terrible monster, a general mobilisation, could not
be held back for long. Even when Mussolini sent Hitler a mes-
sage that Italy definitely could ndt enter the war Hitler was
not discouraged.
He gave his final order on August 3rst, Himmler's convicrs
in Polish uniform carried out their futile propaganda attack orr
Gleiwitz radio station, wer€ shot down and subsequently photo-
graphed. German troops emerged from merchant ships in Dan-
zig where they had lain for a week under hatches and stormc(l
the Westerplatte fort; the Panzer spearheads that Guderian hatl
built penetrated the Polish corridor.
84
. On September znd Sir Nevile Henderson delivered the British
ultimatum through Ribbentrop. It declared rhat Britain and
Germany would be at war next day unless Germany suspended
hostilities against Poland. The face of Góring waddling in the
entechamber fell when he heard this news. "It was like a blow
with a club to us soldiers of the First World War," commented
General fodl, the Deputy Chief of the High Command. What
else did they expect?
Canaris had meanwhile sent out to Stockholm the man
through whom he hoped to keep alive his stealthy contacts with
the British; but Kleist sat about for a few days in the Park Hotel
and achieved nothing. I received a last letter from him. Before
the last threads snapped, the Abwehr attempted one final kind-
ness to its old rivals of the Intelligence Service. A junior officer
was sent on September 2nd to warn the British military attaché,
Colonel Denis Daly, that a blitz daylight attack was intended for
rr am next day. A report was accordingly sent in cipher to
London. "I am convinced that there was no intention to deceive
us in this matter," Colonel Daly told me after the War. "The
man who came to bring me that message was certainly taking
considerable risks."
General Halder was subsequently able to dissuade Hitler
from this isolated attack, which would have no lasting military
efiect, but by then it was no longer possible to advise the British
that it was cancelled. The state of alert in London was such
that the sirens were sounded at rr.15 am, just after M¡ Chamber-
lain had finished speaking in the House of Commons. It was ex-
plained afterwards that an unidentified French aircraft in the
Thames estuary had occasioned this alert. British Government
departments were meanwhile taking up ttreir prepared war
quarters. The British felt that a war without mercy lay ahead
and from now on they might expect no more help from Admiral
Canaris. Meanwhile at üe Tirpitzufer the Admiral, who had
read out to members of his own office extracts o( Hitler's speech
of August zznd, declared to them that the defeat of Germany
would be terrible, but that a victory of Hitler would be more
terrible still I He considered that rothing should be omitred
that would shorten the War.r
1 K. H. Abshaget, Canai!.
85
 Walking that morning in the Tiergarten he saw the Spanish
military attaché driving past and waved to him to stop.
"Naiurally," said üe Spaniard, "Germany has calculated out
this war to the la§t detail of ultimate victory."
"Calculated nothing at all," answered Canaris.
THE ADMIRAL HELPS A LADY
Dpn Füsrrn was delighted with the progress that his armics
were making. All along the front from the Baltic through thc
Polish Corridor, Posnan, Silesia and Galicia, the fifty-six Germrt¡r
divisions, led b ough
üirty divisions Pxr-
tially mobilised . T¡'.
Luftwafie had Gcr
Ca
land, guided by ri
ich's Security Ser hc
of sabotage. The tlr
Hitler on September r2th when üe Führer's special train lay ll
Ilnau in Silesia with Generals Keitel and Jodl and Ioachim v,'r¡
Ribbentrop in attendance. The Polish divisions, such as hrr,l
¡ot been destroyed or surrounded near the frontiers, had fallcl¡
back into the valley of the Vistula round Warsaw, we¡e (rr
circled north of Lodz and at Radom, or were being chased rrvt't'
the River San, past unPronounceable Przemysl towa¡ds Ix'r¡¡
berg and the frontiers of Rumania.
It was,now a question of bombarding the capital or layirr¡
siege to it. The Führer was in a gloating, destructive mood rtrttl
ordered the former. M. Molotov would soon inform M, Cryz
bowski, the Ambassador of Poland in Warsaw, that "Russit
was moving forward to take into her protection the kir¡rlrcrl
peoples of Poland." It was evident that Hitler must act qui, kly
if he wished to achieve the glory of maximum destruction witlt.
out the aid of his treaty partner.
Canaris had come furnished with information reports on tltl
movements of the French Army which was probing the Gcr
86
,defences in the Saar basin. If it went ill with Germany in the
iEast and France could seize the Saar, German war potential
would suffer considerably.
There was a map room in the train, and Canaris, taking the
lanky Lahousen with him, found himself first listening to Rib-
bentrop.
'Immediately after we had entered,' he noted in his diary,
'Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop expounded his ideas to me
as to how the German-Polish war might be ended politically.
In subsequent discussions in Keitel's coach, these solutions were
summarised as follows:
Solution ¡: The fourth partition of Poland takes place, and
Germany declares herself disinterested in terrirory east of the
Narev-Vistula-San line in favou¡ of the Soviet Union.
Solution z: The remnants of Poland are made into an inde-
pendent state¡ a solution that would commend itself to the
Führer, as he could then negotiate with the Polish Government
on the manner of establishing peace in the east.
Solution 3 : The remains of Poland are dismembered.
(a) Lithuania is offered the Vilna region.
(á) Galicia and the Polish Ukraine become independent (pro-
vided that this is agreeable to the Soviet Union).
'I would have to arrange in Solution 3b for a revolution
grganised by Melynyk's Independent Ukraine Movement to an-
ilate fews and Poles in the Ukraine. This movement would
to be prevented from spreading to t}le Russian Ukraine
Great Ukraine Movement].'
i After discussing the role of the propaganda companies in 're
ing' the Polish proletariat while the SS were extermin-
the Polish intelligentsia, clergy and nobility, Canaris
Keitel on the question of atrocities. This was the first
a series of 'lectures to the generals on the facts of life', as he
ibed them to Lahousen.
told Keitel that I was aware of extensive executions planned
, a¡d that the nobility and the clergy particularly were
exterminated. The world would. in the final reckoning
the Wehrmacht responsible for tlese deeds that would be
itted under our noses.
I replied that the Führer had already decided this
. He had made it plain to the Commander-in-Chief that
87
 if the Army wa take cha
would take ove or would
district as well governor
given the task of racial extermination.'
Reading over his version of the day's conference, the Admiral
made a marginal note in pencil: 'Political spring-cleaning.'
Canaris then protested that the bombardment of W'arsaw
would have a damaging efiect on German prestige in the world.
'Keitel were definitely decided by
the Führ Führer had frequent tele-
phone co
"'Sometimes they keep me informed," Keitel explained, .'but
not always."'
Then Hider suddenly appeared in the coach and asked what
news Canaris brought from the Western Front.
'I answered that the information to hand indicated that the
French yere troops and artillery to prepare a system-
lssembling
atic and methodical ofiensive in the Saarbrücken area.'I had
taken measures to'inform him shortly of the locality and direc-
tion in which this offensive would be launched.
'"I can't imagine that the French will attack in the Saar-
brücken arear" remarked Hitler. "Our defences are the strongest
there with A-fortifications and the French will find a second ánd
third line of prepared positions, if anything still stronger than
the first. I consider the Bien forest and the Palatinate fo..rt ,*
our weakest spots. Although the other side object that it is useless
' to.attack in a wooded area, I think otherwise.
o to bring up something in the meantime that will baste him in
y such a manner that he will lose both sight and hearing.'
e '"Therefore the way through Holland and Belgium is all that
remains. I don't believe it, but it is not impossible, so we must
be vigilant." '
This was nothing if not lucid, and though we have laughed
since at the hideous blunders of Hitler's intuition, it was not a
faulty guide in the military calendar of ry39. Canaris was re-
garded as a cautious pessimist by Hitler and Keitel in these days.
They suspected no more than thaL The conference prepared
for an independent Polish Ukraine on üe basis of Solution 3
and Ribbent¡op approved broadcasts in the Ukrainian language
emphásising that the Wehrmacht had 'no quarrel with the
Ukrainian people'. These broadcasts were of course heard by
Moscow, and small wonder if when Ribbertrop returned to
Moscow on September z6th to sign the Soviet-German treaty of
friendship that consolidated the month-old non-aggression Pact,
he found Molotov insistent on Solution r-a complete Partition.
Russia wanted no little Ukraines.
Canaris left this ghoulish company at Ilnau, after Hitler had
solemnly enjoined him to exert the utmost vigilance in neutral
countÍies. Then he returned to Berlin. Herr von Hassel t noted
in his diary that Canaris was overcorne and exhausted by the
horrors that he had seen in Pola¡d. Then the Admiral was
off again, this time to Posnan in a train of his own to hear more
reports from Poland and to examine some of the more interesting
intelligence targets captured.

we
Ho
::T:if.:111i::r1tlilil
It would be a breach of
I supposed that by now all the threads between Britain and
Germany had been broken, that there was no personal link left
between him and his old enemy. I met a Polish diplomat, an
¡eutrality. In any case, time is required before they can launch old friend from the days in Berlin, and consulted him. "I think
a big offensive against the West Wall." ' I can find an answer tá that for you," he said. "Would you like
'Keitel and |odl agree with the Führer. fodl adds that France to meet Madame f ? She knew Canaris in those days." We drove
weeks for artillery preparations out to a small house in Surrey, where a Polish family had settled
de on a large scale, so that an after the War and my friend introduced me to üe lady of the
fore October. house, a grave woman with black hair and dark steady eyes, who
'"Yes, and October is pretty cold," continued Hitler. ..Our for a short while laid aside the busy duty of looking after a home
men will be in protected concrete works, while the French must to tell us her story. First she gave us tea and when I had asked
lie in the ópen and attack. But even if the F¡enchmen could r The German ambassador i¡ Rome until 1938, when he quarrelled with
rcach one of thc weakest spots in the West W'all, we will be ablc Ribbentrop over Axis policy.
88 89
her .whether she had known Canaris she ran on from memory.
"If I ask you not to mention my name or to tell anything that
would identify me, it is because I do not often tell this story and
would prefer to tell it once and then have done with it. My
husband and I lived in Berlin before üe War. We knew the
Polish colony there and we had some contact with the Germans.
I remember meeting some of the German generals in the house
of our military attaché. There were Luftwaffe generals, too, and
I remembered this Admiral Canaris, because he was a singular
man, not stifi and hard-voiced like some of the ofhers-the oppo-
site in fact, soft-voiced and friendly. Of course, I had no idea
then who he was, nor do I think did anyone else.
"When the War broke out I was in South Poland with my
children near Lublin at the home of my family. The Ukrainians
plundered us and stole my handbag which contained my identity
card and money, Soon afterwards we heard that the Russians
were advancing, so I said to my family that we had best go
westwards towards the Germans rather than stay where we were
and be killed. The first German officers we met wanted to know
who we were, and when I claimed diplomatic immunity they
wanted me to give them the names of Germans as references. I
mentioned üe names of an army general and a general of the
Luftwaffe whom I had met in Berlin. Then I remembered the
friendly little naval ofÉcer and added. 'And Admiral Canaris.'
"I noticed that the German officer found it hard to conceal
his astonishment when I uttered this name. His whole tone and
bearing altered. He told me that he could not give me a Pass to
go westwards, but he ordered a military vehicle to take me on
its way to Posnan."
There Madame ] found herself among a great many other
fugitives awaiting identification, but she did not have to wait
long. One of the Admiral's staff olficers singled her out and
asked her to go with him to the railway coach,
"Can he not identify me here?" she asked proudly, not will-
ing to enter a German train.
"It will be difÉcult for him to talk to you among these people."
When she had mounted the Admiral's coach it became gradu-
ally clear to her that he was in some high command with special
powers. She had managed to keep her composure until that
mornent, but as she encountered him again in these altered
I 9t
circumstances and contrasted them with remembrance of old
days she wept.,The fate of the Polish armies was uppermost in
her thoughts.
"Our armies have been routed," she explained; "I fear they
have not stood and fotight."
"Do not distress yourself," the Admiral answered gently. "The
Polish armies havt fought well and'bravely. They were simply
out-mechanised by our armies and could do nothing against
such a weight of material. You have perhaps seen the survivors
retreating in the south-east, but you need not be ashamed of the
stand that they made here in the north and west."
He asked her what he might do to help her, and she asked
him to send her and her children to her parents in 'Warsaw.
Canaris frowned and shook his head. "I would not go to
W'arsawr" he suggested.
FIe seemed to be sorting out the future for her, and wherever
he looked at the map he f¡owned.
"Switzerlaod," he said, "that is the best place."
Ittook a week or so before clearance could be obtained for
Madame I and her children. Then she was sent out by train and
managed to find an apartment not far from Berne. FIer parents,
whom she had wished to join, remained in Warsaw, but the
Admiral promised that all letters she might send would be im-
mediately forwarded and that if they forwarded their letters to
him he would in turn pass them on. In this manner Canaris
saved an old acquaintance from the dangers of Hitler's 'Eastern
policy' and protected her parents, too, for he could well say that
while he held his hand over them, he retained his influence with
her, even if she had been able to rejoin the Polish Government
in Western exile, and similarly while she was abroad they could
not be molested.
Madame I reported to the Polish lrgation in Berne when she
arrived in Switzerland and was registered as one of the Free
Polish Movement. She told the strange story of her release
'through the good ofñces of Admiral Canaris whom she had once
in Berlin. When she mentioned this name again, the
showed immediate interest ahd the British reacted, too.
wanted to hear more about him, Madame f stayed in
itzerland.
"That's a well-known trick for securing an agent," com-
mented a British diplomat towhom I related thisruse of Canaris.
It seemed to justify the boast of Canaris to Bamler that he kept
a special Intelligence Service of his own. I recalled the unsub-
stantiated stories that Canaris in Spain had made use of Mata
Hari in Paris during the First World War.
But when I asked Madame ] whether Canaris had attempted
to draw her into espionage work, she shook her head and con-
tinued the story.
"The Admiral never asked me to find out anything for him
about the Allies, alüough he must have known that I was in
touch with my ourn countrymen in Berne and, through them,
with üe British.
"Not long after I had arrived in Switzerland he made a visit
to Berne. That was in the winter of ry39. He took the oppor-
tunity of calling to whether we were setded and whether he
see
could do anything for my parents. Once he spoke of sending out
his second daughter [o Switzerland as she had become depressed
by the atmosphere of war in Germany. During his first visit I
could not be sure that Switzerland was not going to be invaded
next, so I asked him whether I should go on to France.
"No, not France, üat is an uncertain place."
I asked him whether he thought Italy was safe.
" 'Italy, madame, yes, I thin-k so, until the spring of next year,
then Switzerland is better.'
"I don't suppose you could call Admiral Canaris an indis-
creet man or he would not have held that high position in Ger-
many for so long. But he could be very outspoken. He told me
that winter of ry4o that Germany would certainly make war on
her treaty partner Russia sooner or later. Next spring he was in
Berne again, and when I asked him whether the troop move-
ments in the Balkans were aimed against Turkey, he simply
replied, 'No, Russia perhaps.' During the first stages of the
Russian campaign he visited me again-that would have been
in October r94r-and said that the German front had run fast
and bogged down in Russia and that it would never reach its
objectives, But he was most interesting when he was talking
about the tension within Germany and the conspiracy that was
gathering against Hider. By then I was asked to relate our con-
versations to the British only-I don't suppose that it could
otherwise have remained secret as long as it did."
92
"Do you suppose that he knew of your connection with the
British?"
"There was not much that Admiral Canaris did not know,
but then he could talk very impulsively. All his conversarions
were in the sphere of high politics; but you could sense from
them what was imminent. He would not have told me of purely
military matters-small treason such as agents deal in. When he
spoke it was of the Reich and Russia and Great Britain and
America. At times the tension in him affected me deeply when
he spoke of thei¡ aims against Hitler. I asked the British some-
times-'Shall I tell him to go ahead'; the British were very
correct in such matters and said nothing. But the British Secret
Service could keep secrets, and throughout the War this link
was undiscovered."
Months later, after seeing many friends and ofEcers of
Canaris, some of whom remembered Madame f, I went over
her story again with her. It seemed to fit the pattern of Canaris's
calculated indiscretions in conversation.
"FIe never once tried to find out anything about the Allies
through me," she repeated. She was silent for a while ald then
added:
"And you should make it plain too that he did not give away
ordinary military se{rets----otherwise the Germans will say that
he was a British spy."
CHAPTER Xt
THE DOUBLE DUTCHMAN
Wu.r¡ was there about the fat Dutch landscape that so per-
turbed Admiral Canarisl He had warned his chosen friends
who where conspiring against Hitler that they should no¿ ven-
ture into Holland. "I think I have peneuated the British Secret
Service," he had said. "I might receive embarrassing reports
from that quarter."
"Not Holland!" said the friends of Canaris to me in 1938
when we spoke of possible meeting-places abroad; but they could
ilrot grve more precrse reasons for their anxiety. As years have
93
passed, the true grounds have become apparent. Agents of all
sorts came and went in the Lowlands, and one of them in the
late 'thirties slipped into a position from which he could watch
the activities of many others. This was the Dutchman, Walbach.
A man was skulking in a quiet avenue of one of the suburbs
of The Hague one summer evening, glancing at a pleasant
Dutch villa set back f¡om t}le road. He was there the next day
and stumped out of the shadows, hardly taking the precaution
to conceal himself. Two men inside the villa watched him and
returned from time to time to the windows. FIe was always
there I astrological reports and pushing ahead with preparations for a
On the third day a man walked out of the villa and straight
up to the straDger.
"If you don't clear ofi I will fetch the police and charge you
with loitering l"
"I have no particular wish to loiter here." The Dutchman,
Walbach, sullenly returned the searching gaze of the German
agent. "It's hardly worth the money that Svert gives me. I have a
family to keep."
"Come inside l"
Walbach the loafer soon found himself in the presence of a
short, thickset m¿n with a massive white head and a penetrating
stare. The chief of German counter-espionage in Holland,
Richard Protze, shook his finger at the Dutchman.
"Don't you meddle with us, my lad. It will do you no good.
What do the others pay youl"
"Seven hundred guilders a month."
"If you getresults, you shall have eight hundred a month from
mb-and more I Your job will be to work your way into the
British Secret Service."
The loafer Walbach stumped off through The Hague, armed
with information as bait to catch bigger fish than himself. His
activities in the last years of peace and the fust months of the
'War were a nightmare to the Allies up and down the Lowlands,
as AIIied agents ceased to return from Germany, as operatiofls
went awry and secret information leaked out to the enemy. The
agent Walbach is always i¡ the shadows of the Dutch landscape,
diligent, dissembling, undetected, while his victims walk away
to prison and death.
During theWar months of ry39 everything in theWest seemed
94
pcaceful and fat as the landscape. Except for reconnaissances
the French and British remained quietlybehindthe Maginotline.
There was no shelling of cities, except Lorrach, and not much
aerial combat. Only at sea the U-boats and cruisers ranged and
struck at British shipping. The American newspaper correspon-
dents who could see both sides, began to say that this was a
'phoney war'. Some aspects of the War were difñcult to explain
to onlookers. The British were cautious of using their unmus-
tered strength. There was intense winter activity in the German
High Command, with Hitler ordering weather forecasts and
general ofiensive in the West while his generals entreated him to
postpone it, at least until the the spnng.
Reinhard Heydrich was meanwhile unsatisfied with the
balance of power in the Reich. He had lost some face over the
Fritsch affair when Góring, resplendent in the uniform of a
Reich Marshal, had risen in court, overawed Heydrich's witness
and torn the prosecution case to threads. At the outbreak of war
Hitler had proclaimed himself 'first soldier of the Reich' and
confided his person to an Army bodyguard battalion led by
Major-General Erwin Rommel, instead of relying on the SS
who had protected him throughout the years of struggle berween
Party and State. It was only after the mys(erious death of
.Warsaw
General von Fritsch in the field not far from that Hitler
began to think of an SS bodyguard again.
Heydrich had never got to the bottom of the intrigues of the
Army in London during 1938. He knew that some military op-
ponents of the regime had warned the British against Hitler.
The Heydrich Security Service had since been extending its
activities abroad in the field of surveillance; but Heydrich had
found no positive t¡ace of conspiracies against the Reich Govern-
ment. Then his lieutenant, Schellenberg, suggested to him that if
such plots existed and could nor be detected,Hitlermightequally
well be convinced by an invented plot. It would also have a áetei-
rent effect on the generals if what they were contemplating was
actually disclosed in anoüer form. So two operations were
planned in outline at the Prinz Albrechtstrasse-more or less
simultaneously, though not at first directly related to each other.
One was for a mock attempt on rhe life of the Führer on
November 8th, 1939, in the Burgerbáu beer cellar in Munich
95
, ring e reunion of founder members of the Party. The other The Hague, used him to car tevens and his
s to kidnap two of the principal British agenti in Wert rn associate, Captain S. Payne Army officers
roPe. plotting against Hitler were ntact with the
The y ct, iust British Secret Service. There was excitement in high Foreign
as the o o.r[ by Office circles in London.
Germa u on the
spot or slaughtered afterwards. A Communist named Georg
- Elser, under long sentence of internment in Dachau, wai
promised his liberty by SS agents if he would construcr a hiding-
place for a time bomb in one of the pillars of the beer cellái,

camp, relates his story fully in The Vcnloo Incident. Elser was
afterwards given a large sum of foreign currency and offered the wefe going to The Hague and Amsterdam every day. The
Ten_
chance to escape. The bomb, connected by a wire to a detonating ninth of November was üe day of evil omen. Thé Gérmans
point outside the hall, was exploded about ten minutes after o talk, said that their general was on the way
Hitler had left the reunion and killed several of the founder the Caft Backus near Venloo, but contrived ó
members of the Party who were sitting on and drinking beer so late that Stevens and Best drove to the
together. This lent colour to the incident and made it seem
more realistic, Elser was 'recaptured' the following day at the
Swiss frontier where he was naívely trying to cross without a
passport at a Customs starion.
The business of capturing these particular British agents ap-
pears to have been a little more difficult. Heydrich believed that
the principal agency of the British Intelligence Service for watch-
ing Germany was situated in The Hague. Walbach had by now
burrowed deep into the British Intelligence system and asserted riding under heavily armed escort into the Reich.
that its chief was Major R. H. Stevens, an official attached to the "Have you a hand in this? Where is Maior Stevensl,' Canaris
British Consulate in The Hague. Heydrich rook Stevens ro be 6¡ed this question at Richard Protze, whom he had ordered to
the Chief of British Intelligence for Northern Germany. report to him personally in Düsseldorf.
So it came about that after üe Polish campaign was over the "Stevens is in Holland," answered protze.
SS Security OfHcer Schellenberg, who had been watching an "He You
agent called Franz who went to and fro between Germany and havea "'If
r Executed by the Nazis io 1933 for allegedly having set ñrc to the "Ik Protze'
Reichstag building in Be¡lio. quiveri
II.s.E.-4
ñ y7
 "Ark Abwchr II," hissed the Admiral, but none of his
brnt¡che¡ cr¡uld tcll him anything about it.
l)rolzc «¡uickly put his beagle Walbach on to the trail in The
Hugue and received the dry answer from.the British: "The
Gcrmans know better than we do where Stevens is."
"Canaris was riot informed in adva¡ce of the SD action at
Venloo," General Lahousen assured me. "Nor were the Com-
manders-in-Chief, and they were more than a little perturbed.
The Admiral had a horror that the Gestapo might extort from
Stevens and Best someüing about the opposition in Germany."
to whether any Ger-
d by the affair. Hey-
ofrcers involved, but
it seemed that the loyalty of some senior generals was question-
able.
The German newspapers were full of the details of the'bomb
plot' in Munich and on üe following day the Vetloo kidnap-
ping. Schámmel, alias Schellenberg, sent one last sarcastic mes-
sage over the British wireless set and then let it be photographed
by the Propaganda Ministry as a piece of evidence. One Professor
de Crinis, an SS doctor, who later became head of the Psychiatric
Clinic of üe Berlin Charité Hospital, had the brilliant idea of
linking üe Venloo incident with the Munich beer-cellar 'plot'
and suggested this to Heydrich. Stevens and Best were paraded
where Elser could see them and learn to identify them without
hesitation; he was briefed in the second phase of the deception;
but although German newspapers asserted that the British agents
were behind the plot on the life of Hitler, details of the two ir.
cidents were not entirely easy to reconcile and eventually thc
idea of a grand State trial was dropped. Heydrich had nevcr,
theless achieved two stage efiects. He had invested his Führcr
with the aura of a charmed life and recalled the ebbing synr.
pathies of the common people. He had also made it appear thrr
there were traitors in Germany with whom the British wanrt:tl
to get in touch. He established his case for an SS bodyguarrl
beyond all doubt, and Hitler never again confided his person to
the Army.
Canaris had meanwhile transferred his political intelligerrcc
work, which was a forbidden field for him, to the safer prc-
cincts of the Vatican.
98
Dr fosef Müller, his Roman Catholic friend, was a deep and
crafty mind and a man who could dissemble with almoit the
artistry of his chief. Short, paunchy, with the bland face of a
bon uiaeur, nobody would have believed that this lieutenant
of the reserve would quietly carry on negotiations of high
treason at this time when the shadow of Heydrich had falén
across their secret contacts with England.
Müller was attached to the Munich office of the Abwehr
which worked into Italy. He had an old friend in the Vatican, a
German |esuit from Freiburg in Breisgau, Father Laiber, who was
secretary to the Pope. Pope Pius XII himself, as Cardinal Pacelli,
Germany before his election to
1939. He had spent many years
seen the struggle between the
pagan Nazis and Moüer Church and met the leaders of the
German op_position. Müller was given his passports by
Canaris's office and set ofi to Rome in the middle of November.
He soon made progress at the Vatican. Francis D'Arcy Osborne,
the British Minister, sent home to London for instructions and
permission was given for discussions to be held with Müller on
a basis for peace which would be acceptable to both Britain and
i regime.
Irltff'ffi:
Müller was ons were
sufficiendy ad and visit
his Holiness i me that
there was no question of a visit to Rome by the Foreign Secre-
tary at this time. It is probable that the most rhe British did was
to send out a specialist to Rome to prepare a personal report. We
shall see, however, from his speeches at the time tha¡ Lord Hali-
fax was kept informed of these peace discussions,
The risks that Müller ran were great indeed, After a pro-
nged visit to Rome, it was decided to set forth the basis of
rations, and the Vatican undertook üe draft.
"I had considerable difficulties in my discussions," Müller
d me. "The British keep üeir word, and they were not ready
promise anything that might be unacceptable later."
The draft was written out on Vatican notepalter. One copy
99
was sent to the Foreign OfHce in London, and the copy that
Müller took back to Berlin with him had attached to it the visit-
ing card of the Pope's secretary. Father Laiber wrote on the
visiting card:
Dr ]osef Müller, the bearer of these proposals, enjoys the
full confidence of His Holiness.
When Müller reached Berlin he put his letter in the hands of
Dohnanyi in the ofHce of Canaris. The Admiral, who did not
want to appear to know about this business, glanced at a report
known as the'X-report' which was based on the Müller negotia-
tions before it was passed on to General Halder, the Chief of the
General Stafi. The X-report was prepared by General Thomas,
Chief of üe Economic Department of the War Ministry.
The conditions which it outlined as a basis for a peace settle-
ment, as Müller remembers them, were that
(r) Germany must rid herself of all Nazis in the Government
make an end of their political system.
(z) A German Government must take over that is able and will-
ing to adhere to its obligations.
(3) A settlement could then be reached which would leave Ger-
many in possession of Austria and the Sudeten area.
Lord Halifax gave some weight to these views during a public
speech on fanuary 2oth, Í94o.
"The only reason why peace cannot be made tomorrow," he
said, "is that the German Government has as y« given no evi-
dence of their readiness to repair the damage that they have
wrought upon their neighbours or of their capacity to convince
the world that any pledge they may subscribe to is worth more
than the paper on which it is written."
This was a clue which the German General Staff could com-
pare with its secret report.
General Halder examined the basic terms of peace with
General Beck, who, though retired, still maintained close con-
tact with his former depury. The Vaticandocumentswere locked
away in the safe of a Colonel Schrader, a trustworthy stafi officer
at Army High Command HQ in Zossen. General Thomas, thc
Wehrmacht Economic Chief, had combined his knowledge that
Germany could not wage a long war wiü the political apprecia-
tion that Müller had brought home and drawn the conclusion
that they must make peace. When the X-report was shown to
the Commander-in-Chief, General von Brauchitsch said that the
Führer was invested with the glory of his Polish victories; the
younger ofHcers and the troops could not be relied upon for
action against the Füh¡er. Germany was involvcd in a struggle
of ideologies which would have to be fought our ro rlle end.
During his visits to Rome Müller discussed fully with Laiber
such matters as the Vatican methods of conducting its diplomacy
and the security that must be taken in their negotiations. Again
the anxiety of Canaris about ciphers was discussed. He lived day
and night in peril of being mentioned by name in the codes of
the Allies and neutral Powers.
"The Vatican ciphers are perfectly safe," declared Father
Laiber.
Müller demurred and advised him to be cautious.
"So he says that the Vatican ciphers are safe," Admiral Canaris
and
nodded, as Müller related his conversations in Rome. "Show
him this."
He held out a deciphered copy of a Vatican secret disparch to
the Nuncio in Portugal. Laiber blenched when Müller showed
it to him.
Müller returned many times between ;939 and 1943, when a
peculiar mishap interrupted this contact with the British. By
then, of the two copies of the protocol that had been worked out
between him and Osborne, the British had destroyed their copy.
"We asked them to take that precaution in r94o," said Müller,
"when it seemed that England might be invaded before the
Foreign Office had time to destroy its records."
Although the German Commander-in-Chief was a despondent
and thought that perhaps Hitler rnust first get a bloody nose
on the Maginot Line before he could be overthrown, the Chief
of the General Staff, General Halder, played with the idea that
Canaris might plan the murder of Hitler and so provide a solu-
tion to the dilemma.
There was a force at his disposal, the Brandenburg Regiment,
a mixed commando unit for attacking or capturing spe<ial
intelligence targets. It was under his command in the same way
the little commando force of Admiral Lord Keyes was held
IOI
for special duties. But the Brandenburg Regiment was not
politically reliable for an attack against Hitler.
Besides, there were disturbing voices on the ether. Quite early
in the War the BBC German service, broadcasting an impulsive
attack on the Nazi leaders, added:
. "The only decent fellow among them is Admiral Canaris."
His friends remembered distinctly the shock of hearing this
broadcast, and worse was to follow when an American magaztne
carried a gossip paragraph about Admiral Canaris as the 'man
who would lead a revolution against Hitler'.
. By chance I received a letter from a remote country re{tory
which confirms the mischief that some of these unguarded
reports must have done.
The Rector of Wraxhall, the Reverend H. S. Briggs, told me
tlat he clearly remembered that similar reports in a small gossip
periodical alarmed him at the time.
"During the War . . . even I in a Somerset village had divined
f¡om what I had read in a British newspaper that Canaris was
working in Berlin against Hitler."
At least twice in üe five years of his war service such
rumours attached themselves to his name, and though he en-
countered his two colleagues, the Reichführer SS and Heydrich,
shortly afterwards with the pleasant observation: "It seems from
the Foreign Press that I am to start a revolution in Germany"-
who could tell from the cold stare of Himmler and their ex-
change of glances wheüer he had outfaced theii suspicions?
Events pelted so fast in these six months of false calm on the
edge of r94o üat some awkward moments were submerged
though not forgotten. The men in black uniform and the men
in field grey had to work together for all their mutual suspicions
of each other. The military situation in the West held their at-
tention. That winter and spring Holland grew more and more
important to both sides. Abwehr I and III collected information
on Allied activities in the Low Countries-Hitler had asked for
the sharpest surveillance, and many of their reports were selected
by the Foreign Ministry to embody in a white book accusing the
Allies of violating the neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Both
Keitel and Canaris agreed that they would not sign the White
Book when they saw the proofs ready for publication, especially
when the German Foreign Ministry commented üat Canaris's
reports were not conclusive in proving Allied violations of IJcl-
gian and Dutch neutrality and might have to be 'touched up a
little'.
There was a disturbing incident when Abwehr II, the sabo-
e Belgian and Dutch
ause theY were wanted
Army. It would have
seemed more logical to get a German master tailo,r to pay a visit
newspaper published a caricature of Góring in a Dutch tram'
drivei'r uniform. The Swiss, meanwhile, seized a car full of
Swiss Army uniforms at Geneva. They were aPParently samPles
being taken to Germany to be copied for similar PurPoses.
Abwehr II was also laying a network of inactive agents for
special use when D-day came in the West. This explains why
there was such a sudden burst of undetected activities when the
lull of the 'phoney war' was over and the Germans marched in.
Bridges and road blocks were seized and held by civilians or
men in Allied uniform and curious acts of sabotage disrupted
the defence, its supplies, transport and telephone communica-
tions.
It was the task of the British Secret Service in the luIl to de-
tect and report these agents wherever they were planted. It
watched the activities of the Abwehr and the Dutch Nazis, and
a hectic race began, each side working day and night to de-
molish the net that the other side was building up. Walbach, the
stolid Walbach, slipped in and out of the German intelligence
offices in The Hague and Amersterdam bringing vital news
from the inward parts of the British Secret Service. 'Klemmer is
a British agent I The British know that Schramm is a German
agent.' The Abwehr struck here and there at a harmless-looking
business man or a peasant at the frontier. Walbach turned in one
name after another. He reported also to Commander Protze the
names of those men whom the British had discovered to be
working for Germany. One after another, the names of the
r03
§erma1 agents rolled out. As fasr as the Abwehr built up, the
British knew it. Protze's nerves grew taut.
'The British know that Admiral Canaris has beeh to Hol-
land,' reported Walbach. Here and there Walbach brought in
the names of German intelligence officers as men who were
incredible as it may sound, the British had no counter-espionage
organisation to watch them. In Holland, however, the British
seemed to know the names of German spies passing through,
Walbach reported. Protze sat down and tried to cool off and
form his own conclusions. There must be a highly placed Allied
agent within the German Intelligence Service.
'The British are watching for a man with a limp coming
from France to The Hague taking the evening eip.ess for
Cologne tomorrow evening l'
So one catastrophe after a¡other was reported by Walbach,
Then the bomb fell.
'There is an agent of the Allies highly placed in the German
Legation in The Haguel'
Protze sprang to his feet. He was within an hour in the study
of Count Czech, the German Minister, and whispered his news.
"Whom do you suspect?" asked the Count guardedly.
Protze uttered a name. It was that of the First Secretary.
"Quite impossible, my dear Commander. I know him very
well. It is Herr von Pulitz, he comes of a very good family."
The Minister drew out of his desk a list of security suspects.
"I üink there are some British agents listed here," he said.
"Let's see if one of them could have penetrated your service."
But Protze thought he knew his man. He would wait to get
him. At the end of the discussion he pledged the Minister to
secrecy and withdrew to set his snares about the victim.
Count Czech was asked to a security conference wiü German
intelligence ofEcers in Amsterdam. He mentioned it thought-
fully to one of his secretaries on his return to The Hague.
"They tell mer" he mused, "that there is an Allied agent in
my Legation."
ro4
The man addressed gave an imperceptible start, smiled and
nodded vacuousiy. But within twenty-four hours the Ministcr
noticed that the secretary had vanished. He made enquiries of
the Dutch police and the German intelligence ofñces in Cologne.
They could tell him nothing. "Perhaps he has gone to join his
regiment," suggested the Minister; "he was always asking to,"
The old sleuth, RichardProtze, was soon back in his study,
with a sorrowful expression,
"Excellency, our man has flown. He is in London. Did you
talk, Excellency? "
Admiral Canaris heard the whole story with the utmost calm
in his offices in Berlin. Richard Protze sat at his elbow. Count
Czech was not present, but over his head there hung a charge of
breach of official secrets regulations. Yet oddly enough in this
case, ás in so many others, Canaris was not moved by rancour
either against the Count, who had lost him his prey, or the
enormous treason of the vanished man himself. Protze was
astonished to find that Canaris was only anxious to hush up the
whole affair. I met the elusive secretary, Herr von Pulitz, in
London years later, before he crossed over the EIbe to work for
the East German Communists.
"Canaris would have hanged me had he caught me," he said
with an uneasy laugh.
I think that he spoke the truth there, except that it would have
been Heydrich who did the job.
When the full force of the German offensive broke in the West
on May roth, r94o, the affair of the renegade secretary had
already been buried. Walbach had somehow escaped the sus-
picion of the British and even risked leaving Holland with the
other Allied fugitives who took boat for the white clifis. Wal-
bach swam unnoticed with the shoal.
ro5
 Polish guarantee in
some discussion in
was invited to join
with them until th

NORWAY
H¡rnr,nro everything aggressive that Hitler had planned after
the seizure of Austria had been reported to Great Britain by the
Gerrrian opposition within the Abwehr, with what degree of
complicity on the part of the Admi¡al the reader will doubtless At times advance intelligence had seemed of little use-wirile
decide in the course of this narrative. I had myself seen how the we were still weak and while ou¡ vital interests did ¡ot seem
mobilisations against Czechoslovakia and Poland were imparted
in outline with dates and subsequent changes of dates some-
times as much as two months ahead of D-day. The shortest
warning of all had preceded the march into Prague, because on
this occasion Hitler had needed relatively few divisions and had
given Keitel orders that they were to be kept at twenty-four
hou¡s' notice at the frontier to advance before any follow-up the belligerent nations and of Europe itself.
troops had been moved. It remained to be seen whether the Hitleistarted to talk of invading Norway during a conference
Abwehr chiefs would continue to seek to identify their interests with Grand Admiral Raeder on October roth-fifty days before
with those of the British in wartime. Would they communicate Russia invaded Finland. The threat of British and French mili'
to the enemy information that might lead to the loss of thou- tary aid to Finland by occupying Narvik_ did.not exist at the
sands of German lives, even if it meant spoiling üe pattern of time. |odl was initiated into the secret in the middle of Novem'
aggression, too? ber; by December r4th Hitler decided to mourit the operation-
"Your friends will now have to serve their country," an intelli- it was called 'Weser-Exercise'-and on February 2oth he aP-
gence officer suggested to me shortly before the War. There
seemed to be a certain staid readiness in the minds of the Foreign
OfÉce to abandon contact with the enemies of Hitler. Of
Canaris, I am inclined to think that such on our side as could
observe something of his activities had not yet fully grasped his
mbtives and identified him still with the aims of his department Gral Spee.
Intelligence Service of the Wehrmacht. I had been induced Accordingly Canaris must have been apprised of Operation
-the
before the war to abandon journalism and join the Foreign Weser-Exercise in December, at the planning stage. His rePorts
Office-not, as I supposed at the time, to utilise tle contacts that on the dispositions of the Royal Navy will have been necessary,
I had already made, but in order to eliminate an unorthodox as well ar Abwehr reconnaissance of the harbours, .fiords and
channel of communication. The reports that had come out of batteries of the Norwegian coast. According to the pattern, his
in the two previous years dis- KO or war organisation would have to tackle special targets on
sh conception of German and D-day. The secret now lay in his hands.
to the sudden and energe the "It was a terribly weighty decision to occuPy Norway," said
to6 ro7
 fodl. "To put it shortly, it meant gambling with the enrire Ger- after and the German Navy destroyed like the French and
Spanish Fleet at Trafalgar, but with additional carnage-the
corpses of tens of thousands ans.
ports would be weltering in dis.
iomfiture would bc such for
Herr Quisling.' And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Ser- make an .rr¿ or ni- l1T
vice, in particular, very busy at this time in order to get even e. not lodged in the safe in
more precise information." h ed out in Rome through
Canaris reported in the middle of March that the Home Fleet the mcrliltion of the Pope? An end to the massacre of the
had moved from Western Approaches to Scapa Flow-the Polcs, thc nightly murders in üe conc sickly
nearest base to tfre Norwegian coast, Here the British could antl hystcricrtl perversion of a great ma&
move either to the Skagerrak or athwart t}le iron routes from ¡n¡ur. As hc discussed these doubts an Oster
Narvik to Germany, orr A¡rril znd, it seemed that this might well be the turning
"The Führer's decision was |odl, ¡roint of thc War.
"on reports from t}re Navy of mer- ()stcr found his way next day to the Dutch military attaché,
chant ships in Norwegian aters. (irloncl I. Sas, and told him that the invasion of Norway was
Secondly, a report came from Canaris that British troops and on to the Norwegian
tfansports were lying in a state of readiness on the no.th-eart received it thought the
coast of England." The British Cabinet had decided on March It is my belief that
ity to bring about the
crisis that he desired.
"The shortest way to defeat will be the most merciful," one of
his friends, Ewald von Kleist, had told me a year previously.
Abshagen hastens to say that "tle many assertions that Canaris
warned the Scandinavian Governments a few days before Weser-
Exercise began . . . are absolutely untrue". He bases his opinion
South Schleswig were made ready to march inlo Denmark, and on that of an Abwehr ofrcer-probably Lahousen or Liedig-
the entire German Navy assembled in the several task forces re- "who never heard even e hint of the idea of warning the Allies
quired for convoy duties or bombardment. German merchant- or the threatened countries during the early April conferences of
the Abwehr directorate". But the Admiral was not so rash as to
discuss in his ofEce what he intended to do-perhaPs not even
with Oster I It was interesting to me to find that Lahousen, for
yearshis assistant and Chief ofAbwehr II, never heard from Canaris
of the London negotiations of 1938. We have precedent, accord-
ing to Gisevius, in üe Abwehr planting information about atrocities
in Poland in foreign newsPaPers in order to create an impres-
sion on Hider. In this case, the Swedish Press was full of re-
ports for several days before Weser-Exercise of German trooPs
likely. enough, if the British were met in the Skagerrak again, embarking in Baltic ports. Abshagen finds it necessary to men'
that the Batde of |utland would be refought t*..rty-fo.r, tion-and discount-the possibility that Canaris had special con-
i.r.,
ro8 r09
tactwiü tle Swedish Legation in Berlin and thát it served his
purpose in warning the Allies. Captain Franz Liedig, his intelli-
gence officer attached to Army Command XXI that planned
Weser-Exercise in detail from the OKW outline plan, remem-
bers the Admiral saying to him that Hitler had always recoiled
when he sensed his opponent to be stronger and that if the
British Navy showed the flag in Norwegian waters Hitler would
abandon the operation. Liedig was convinced that the shipping
concentrations could not have escaped the notice of the British,
whose Intelligence Service in Sweden was active.
"We felt absolutely certain," Lahousen told me, "that the
Allies had at least fo,rty-eight hours' notice of Weser-Exercise.
Foreign Consuls had reported the movements of German ship-
ping and Abwehr had records of their telephone conversarion,"
"Of course, we had full reports days ahead," a British intelli-
gence ofrcer told me. "We had all the movemenrs of shipping
as they occurred. But they did not know what ro make of them
in London."
I am told that the British Intelligence officers inStockholm
f Norway solemnly gathered to. a
ccurate intelligence that they had
In fact one of them claimed to me
that, with the aid o{ Canaris's men, th€y had been able to send
to Whitehall the name and conrents of every ship in the Nor-
wegian expeditionary force as it was loaded and as it was moved.
port on April 7th that invasion was intended, and this was rhen
communicated first to London, though rhe British naval attaché
in Oslo was not immediately informed----one reason for the un-
preparedness of the Norwegian feet, An air reconnaissance on
the follOwing day-the same day as British mines were laid in
Norwegian waters south of Narvik- showed a force of German
w_ar-ships and transports steaming up the coast ofi Norway and
HM submarine Trident sank one of them, the Rio de laneiro. ft
was- only on the afternoon of April 8th when the three hundred
survivors of the R¡'o de laneiro, mostly soldiers in battle order,
IIO
Mr Chamberlain complained afterwards of the bewildering
diversity of reporrs. Mr Churchill, then still First Lord of thé
afg
lose
.If i
sI i
naval itrength in the days before Weser-Exercise, he must have
been nsight of the enemy into his own mind
and power of the machine of intelligence
and Abwehr, that was carrying him, in a
direc will.
There is little doubt from what Abwehr officers relate that
Canaris hoped for a sharp defeat in the Norwegian advenrure
that would bring a swing in public opinion against Hitler. In
point of fact, it was his own KO or war organisation in Oslo that
had to lead in the German warships, and the German naval
attachés who gathered the Quisling ministers and officers to-
gether and set the German Legation in a state of defence.
Although the bravery of the Norwegian Navy foiled the Ger-
man warships, and airborne landing was necessary to capture
Oslo, much of the credit went to Canaris for German success in
Norway-and he was promoted from Vice-Admiral to his final
rank of full Admiral.
Lest it be imagined that Canaris was squeamish or stood aside
from the attempts to thwart Hitler, let us turn the clock on one
month from April rst to May rst; Operation Gelb (Yellow) was
about to take place with breach of Dutch and Belgian neutrality
grand offensive against the Low Countries and France.
-the
The act itself was not more flagrant than the attack in Norway;
III
hut the IrnlrrlLrrrr lltot (lcrrcrrtl ()¡lcr initintr:rl wcre two-fold.
'['lrc c¡r¡r ol Norwny lr¡r(l sllowtr lrow frr astrly ]lritish intelli-
geuee errul(l bc in its lirrrrl upprcciations-a failing that the Ger-
nrau irrtclligencc dcveloped in measure as the situation of Ger-
many worsened.
The persistent Dr |osef Müller had been served with his pass-
port once more and ordered to Rome on pretext of an Abwehr
mission in the last days of April. By now most of the German
Navy had been sunk piecemeal in vivid and desperate actions
with units of the Home Fleet and submarines-without the
effect hoped for by the Admiral, a repulse of the German inva-
sion. The extent of German naval losses was being hushed up,
the extent of üeir gains on land given full publicity il Wehr-
macht communiqués. Now General Beck entreated Müller to
tell the Allies unmistakably what was impending on rhe Wesrern
Front. He named the date of May roth when the attack in the
West would be launched, irrespective of the fortunes of XXI
Army in Norway. This extraordinary stroke of backroom states-
manship was necessary, he argued, if the Allies were not to
she was defeated. She must prove
ll alive in her and working for the

Müller in nior Belgian

diplomat hi ld attack in
the West a on or about
May roth.

l12 Admirai Wilhelm Canaris

 Dr Josef Müler

'l'hc twenty-one prisoners at Nuremberg photographed together fbl'

the last time as they appeared before the international tribunal to hear
scntence passed upon ¡hem. Front rou, tight to left: fIermatn Goering
(dearh); Rudolf Hess (üfe imprisonment); Joachim von Ribbentrop
(dearh); Field Marshal rVilhelm Keitel (death); Ernst Kaltenbrunner
(death); Alfred Rosenburg (death); Hans Frank (death); Wilhelm
Frick (death); ]ulius Streicher (death); §Talter Funk (life imprison-
ment) and Dr Hjalmar Schacht (acquitted). Back rottt, right to left:
Graod Admiral KarI Docoitz (ro years' imprisonment); Admiral
Erich Raeder (üfe imprisonment); Baldur von Schirach (zo years'
imprisonment); Fritz Sauckel (death); Alfred Jodl (death); Franz von
Papen (acqütted); Arnr Seyss-Inquan (death); Albert Speer (zo
years' imprisonment); Constantin von Neurath (r5 years' imprison-
ment) and Hans Fritsche (acquitted)

Dr Paul Leverkuhn (extreme right) acts as one of the Defence Counsel

at the trial of Field Marshal von Manstein (in the dock) before a
British military court at Hambu¡g

Ewald von Kleist

 §.1
&-:'
ñ,:- -,
8i{&l
" l ,r x rk here l The Führer is foaming abour this.,,
I lt hcld out a report of rded by
.
llrc Sccurity Service to the investi-
H¡rt(. it ilnd discover the na Müller
rrrrrrrolised the telegram that might be his death warrant in
q,l'r('ximately these terms :
From HE The Belgian Minister The Holy See
To Foreign Ministryr Brussels
May rst r94o. Ar officer of the German General Staff
visiting Rome today, reports that invasion of Belgium and
Ifolland may be expected with certainty on or soon after
May roth.
As he held the deciphered intercept, his blood ran cold. The
(icstepo had the keys of the Belgian diplomatic code.

Rastcnburg after the bomb. Mussolini

(abovel ¡n,-t
Goering (below) view the *i..Lui."'-, "," rHE A"-;;;,"";-.LAND
Brrwr /th a mysterious message went out
also to a contact known as 'the Viking
line', a communication between Admiral
Canaris and the Swiss General Stafi. It warned the Swiss to
mobilise against an imminent threat of invasio¡. The Swiss did,
in fact, mobilise, but this storm passed westwards. Did Canaris
suspect that if Hitler could not penetrate through Belgium he
would thrust his left fank through Switzerland and the Belfort
gapl Or did Canaris simply make this feint to alarm the French
and lead them to tie down strong forces unused in the Belfort
area, that might be badly needed elsewhere. The Swiss have been
p:uzzling about it ever since, and their conclusion is that if üe
French had managed to hold the Maginot Line the Germans
would have marched through Switzerland. The real threat came
somewhat later than May 7th, after Holland and Belgium had
been knocked out, and while the Germans were still not quite
sure that they could break the Maginot Line.
I13
 Nine days of calm in May I R thickened fast since rprÁnfl I ty, Germans in Allied uniforms seized bridges
the Belgian Minister had sent from the Vatican. tlld tlrr, , Rommel's phantom division stormed over the
The British and French would taken Belgium into Meure r¡n the r3th and the Fourth Army streamed after it. If
full alliance and linked the Meuse defensive system with the flcrtrrnny had lost tactical surprise to the Allied Intelligence
Maginot Line : but King Leopold had been fum that Bglgiul ccs, it was not enough to make any difierence to the
muit remain neutral until she was attacked. Signs multiplied nes of the field. They had crossed the Maas in Holland on
that the Germans were concentrating for an attack in the West. D rluy and by May r5th the Dutch Army, cut off from its Allies,
The Falkenhorst army was by now adva¡cing north from wr¡¡ forced to capitulate. King Leopold offered capitulation bn
Trondheim and the Allies had re-embarked at Namsos though Mry zTth; by Iune 5th the Germans had entered Dunkirk and
they landed a Polish force at Narvik a day later; there had been crosscd the Somme; four days later all hostilities in Norway
a heated debate in the House of Commons on the 7th and Sth ccnscd, and on ]une roth, a month after D-day, Italy entered the
and the authority of Neville Chamberlain was totterinS. The W¿r.
Dutch increased their frontier Precautions, the Belgians sus- It is obvious that Hitler, strutting in exultation and soon to
pended traffic on the Albert Canal. Nothing wa§ certain yet, but trkc the surrender of France in his railway coach at Compiégne,
ihe Western Powers and the neutral States sensed something i.o will have forgotten his ill-humour at the Security Service re-
that unholy calm beyond the Rhine. Ports on the betrayal of his plans. Not so the Gestapo itself I
General bster lefi the Tirpitzufer on the evening of May 9th Canaris received a report on the telephone talks with The Hague
for a
on D-day: somebody remarked at a diplomatic reception in
Sas, Berlin that General Oster was a close friend of Sas. It seemed
abou that the Gestapo were on the verge of a discovery.
onB "You had better investigate this leakage in Rome," Canaris
whispered to fosef Müller, and Müller went with a feeling of
confidence that his chief would protect him. He did a wonder-
ful job of work. He called first on the German liasion officer
with the Italian Intelligence Service, Colonel Helferrich. In the
course of conversation he made it plain that he, Müller, was
what was nly a few hours distant. not a General Stafi ofEcer, simply a Lieutenant of the Reserve.
About e telephone rang again. It was a senior The incriminating intercept had referred to a 'General Staff
ofÉcer in wanting to know if Sas was positive that officer'. He himself was in Venice on May rst (as his passport
this meant an attack on May roth. showed) and he knew of no General Stafi officer who would
Colonel Sas was aware that the Gestapo was listening with have been in Rome on thac day. Of course, Colonel Helferrich
especial ephone calls at this moment. was a General Staff ofñcer, but suspicion of him was out of the
A cold e shaped his answers to give questionl Had they not better consider other possibilities? The
the clea mpting the German Security Crown Princess of Italy was a Belgian princess. Ciano had been
Service to break the connection. FIe succeeded in doing this; on friendly footing with the Crown Prince and Crown Princess.
but the secret was now out to the enemy that he had been in- The German Foreign Ministry had the closest contact with
formed. The Dutch Government tried to get in touch with Sas Count Ciano. Was it not likely that the leakage had occurred
again in the early hours of the morning. This time all telephone through those channels? Within a few days Müller ha<l so
cámmunications were cut, and invasion came soon afterwards. thoroughly tangled the investigations in Rome that on his rcruru
The Abwehr war organisations in France and the Lowlands to Berlin Oster remarked to him with a rueful smile :
rt4 I15
 h¡n ÉoHr m r+rll hr ñrlllc rhnr rhey lrlvc drop¡red thirt , ()plrutlorr Ser¡lior¡ to
ll{llll }, Érr,l rllr wl¡ [¡¡¡g on this crrrl-i' be sent
Ilill I lrlltrillr rilvr¡erl ( ),rlcr's truc llHlrtllor¡r wct.c to
nly at the crrtl rll¡r¡te,l tkrwrr to
,f rrrr. wrr., wrrcu sas, t l a
Hrltlrh. I lc also a
Atr,¡cld or tÁe Nerherlands
port to the
w" :lt#;il1?
u¡ Dutch Govcrn-
bY the
ment that
b.t ry.á-th Quite plainly Oster hatl
f the oPeratión as soon as
h. \;;ü
Mülle 939, even beforeHitler had asked
and go into ltaly, though
Colonel mental note to himself th"at a conference at Wolfschacht on
his own on the Atlantic coast must be
had given away the secret.
The B the German Navy for _r.f"r.
u,,( I l)arses availabre,*,h:
tlrc ¡¡¡¡¿ps. He asked roo
,,i;'iT:.:i,ti,.iffi|Jiy|,,xg
o¡rcration and "i. ,r!..Ár.i ,r'i"átp."sable to the
cr¡uipment for
,o* lirlcnt and exp
-y1, 1!at th¡
were considerable.
opportunities:fi:ü1ilt
The.whole issue -'*"ó
flil'r?#";i, scttling down
air power with neither side able --
úg;;; v¡¡ d 6ne balance of staff go on planning.
m The British , 'The German Návy plan, o I had
s that they ,une . . .' wrote Mr Churchill
9f
ln wanted to
Finest
e forw
not entirely enthusiastic about ,Our
might soon abandon the
with Canaris one summer
rtunes of the Third Reich attacked was altogether diflere
coast on which the Chiefs of
e British St
will not go on,,, he agreement, still laid t
The good humour of Canaris faded This intelligence
in an instanr. He pushed narssance or ground
his plate away.
ceived, the German forces were
their victory over France, It co
person in close contact with the German
naval stafi or the chief
victories to Canaris, found hi of the High Command-_outside a dor.r,
o.llCerman senior
"What a strange fellow we ha
in
remarked.
ecl
Hitler gave Keitel orders on
fuly znd for the outline plan of a
t¡6
r17

i
 of the Isle of wight'. The hand of Mr churchill
seems rr¡
becn guided at tliis time by somebody
to whom the inncr_
Kfltol hud issued a top-secret instruction to the three Com-
most counsels of Hitler *.r. ..uLl.d. ' Hrlttlor¡-hr-Chief on fuly znd:
-
And when the great speeches of Britain,s wartime THE WAR AGAINST ENGLAND
leerlcr
thundered ,.ro* ol Oor.J f.i'us therefore brircc
rh". Straiis 'l'lrc Piihrcr and Supreme Commander has decided:
ourselves so that if the British
Co_. orr_.ritt l,'f'lrut a landing in England is possible, provided that air
for a rhousand years men will .till ,ry, .fiis ".r¿ E;pil i;.; rtr¡r'rit,rity can be attained and certain other necessary cónditions
was rhejr firrcst
nour- . . ."__Canaris took home the forbidden frrllillcrl. f'he date of commencement is still undecided. All:pre-
monirorings of
text of his speeches and read ,lr.,nl"ln. ¡trtrrttiorrs arc to be begun immediately.
*;.|il ."..,irrg;,";hi,
¡. 'I'llc Commands of the tfuee Services are to supply the
The Admiral found something at last that followirrg information :
he had looked for (u) Army
in England for a Iong time; butie .."1d ;;;
rejoice in so late a (r) Estimates of the strength of the British forces, of losses,
11'."":iL. As he hiá down orre "rii;rJÁrri* reports of a
Churchill speech, he and of the extent to which the British Army will have
;pondently ;. E;i, Canaris:

*..;;;:;ry;?ru
"They are luckv o

"I cannot believe

jlX."*:,-, (z)
been re-equipped a month or so hence.
An appreciation of the operational strength of our
coastal batteries, and their capacity to provide additional
protection for our shipping against British naval forces.
itorings of
ch,r..hiil,, ,p-;;i. *i,¡, (b) Navy o
'tenant tant, Lieu-
/enke, when I tord h (r) Survey of possible landing points for strong Army
"WhYl" forces (25-4o divisions), and estim¿ted strength of
ral was always dinning it into us: .Don,t English coastal defences.
S s with your wives,.,,
discuss (r) Indication of sea routes over which our forces can be
transported with the maximum safety. In selecting land-
the letter from Frau Erika Canaris in
which she ing areas, it must be remembered that landing on a
told me of h
broad front will facilitate subsequent deep penetration.
astonished
Canaris and
/e ,"llJn? H'; (:) Data of shipping available, with probable date on which
discover that this could be ready.
existed. G) Air Force
An estimate of the chances of attaining air supremacy,
..--C1"r-.i: admired your Churchill,,, Richard protze told me. and figures showing the relative strengths of the Luft-
the same initials ,r,d *orld ..r.r-ili."
;ff.,n"d as ,the grear waffe and RAF.
To what extent can the landing be supported by a
Iirtte WC, he used ro say at his daily
the
,^-^-f:.:lly
rerence wher.r: sgme big stroke of British
con_ parachute attack? (Highest priority to be given to the
production of transport aircraft.)
staiesmanship íurned
üe screw a little harder on Germany. ,,Wlr"t 3. The Commands of the three Services should co-operate in
the great WCl, ,,
.* 1 do against evolving a plan for the transport of the maximum number of
Meanwhi erman Se¡vice chiefs were. plying troops with the shipping and aircraft space.
Abwehr for , the The invading highly mechanised and numerically
bout their targer_England.
superior to the o
The Nav s.
4. All prepararions must be undertaken on üe basis that the
strength of coastar d.f..;l, iil:
many divisions there were in the
ffirtl¿,ir,h#T3f
---- still only a plan and has not yet been
Britishi.il. of preparations must be restricted to tho
rr8 (Signed)
I19
 An odd report on the British defences was forwarded to the
German Navy by the Abwehr Foreign Intelligence:
Foreign Intelligence Department.
Berlin
slgltg+o
To: supreme command, Navy,
Naval War Staff, Section 3.
Re: England. Fortifications on the South Coast.
A secret agent reported on z September:
The area Tunbridge Wells to Beachy Head (especiatly the small
town of Rye, where there are large sandhills) and also St Leonards
is distinguished by a special labyrinth of defences. These defences,
however, are so well camouflaged, that a superficial observer on the
sandhills, bathing spots and fields, would not discover anything
extraordinary. This area is extremely well guarded, so that it is
almost impossible to reach it without a special pass.
In Hastiogs, on the other hand, most of the defences can be
recognised quite plainly. In the town there are troops of every kind.
The presence of numerous small and heavy tanksls most striking.
Numerous armoured cars were aiso seen in St Leonards and in
a small locality where there is a famous golf-course, probably St
)oseph.
War Organisation (Espionage) Appendix :
The agent was not able to give a clearer account of the number
of armoured cars in the difierent localities, or of the regiments he
saw there.
From the position of Beachy Head (west of Hastings) and Rye
(east of Hastings), it can be deduced that the place in question
near St Leonards was the western villa-suburb of Hastings. Tun-
bridge, which lies on the railway line from Hastings to London,
according to the sense of the report, ought to lie on the coast, as in
the case of St Joseph; this cannot be confirmed from the maps in
our possession.
The Admiral himself, had he given it a moment of his atten-
tion, would probably have admitted that there was a strrngc
smell about this report. It may have been a hoax; the peoplc of
Tunbridge Wells and St Leonards will find it hard to r<'t'og
nise their landscape in it. But what if it smelled? It w:rs irrst
ouch damping reports that suited the mood of the Führcr ¡¡t thi¡
moment. The Luftwaffe was failing in its spearhertl rrrissiott¡
Hitler was squinting over his shoulder at his fronticrs irr |ol¡rt¡rl
120 12f

could pick up and decipher or unscramble some of the wireless
cjfh_er me1,aS9s between London and Washington and some of
the 'scrambled' telephone conversations betweá prime Ministcr
and President; for all that, the Abwehr foothold in Britain itself
was precarious and unreal.
"There was no Abwehr KO or war organisation in England,,,
Lahousen tells me. "The Abwehr worked on the Britii Isles
from Norway, Holland and Portugal.', There was an Abwehr
foothold in Ireland, too, which wa.-s maintained by and helped
to maintain German U,boats.
I have discussed his British service with Commander Herbert
.
Éptlortr r¡rir¡tls irr l.-ngland were concerned with thoughts of
llttml lolrl,r.t with the German Chief of Intelligence.
,'HE H'-;;; ;;,"STRY
()¡ tlrc white cliffs of Dover, the sands of El Alamein, and the
lrnlrkr,rl tlrc Volga at Stalingra<i there are monuments to three
itrrrrirr¡1 ¡xrints of rhe Second World War, where the food of
llirlcr's lirc and steel was stemmed and turnedback. But if our
¡r'rrrrrlclrildren ask why it was that Hi
I.ttrl hr¡w Spain remained neutral agai
llrcre is no simple answer that we ;n
tltost cnigmatic turning point of rhe War is practically forgotten.
'l'hc L,nglish bathers at St |ean-de-Luz, rhe Americans Bi"r-
"i
travelled along this coast road to meet the Spanish Caudillo at
thc foot of the Pyrenees. No srone will be raised to mark what
is dimly remembered as the Flendaye Conference.
When painters and weave¡s were historians, they often con-
veniently put several incidents of the same story on to one canvas
or tapestry. The monarchs advanced on their steeds; the cloth
9f gold, the carcanets gleamed; the thickness of spears, heads,
legs and spurs lent a thronged importance to their meeting.
Another moment of time was caught in the background, the
vanquished lying slaughtered hurtling from
a cliff, the traitor hanging in gibbet.
Here, then, are the figures f my tapestry
of Hendaye: the German co with peaked
cap, bulging eyes set snakelike on the small plump Caudillo;
r23
 ll thcir
chivelry irr ¡ircy lrrrl scarlet;
ay coach, the Führcr,s ,,wrr,
the mectirrg tttrtotts published by the United States Department of
paris and Bordeaux ,rt Llrc r.ll<l ,rf ,h;l;;,;
b.t*.*r, tl," I,yrt.lr<.t.s Itcte ltr tr¡4fi lrr<:uk off their records of the parlour-car conversa-
¡trr<l the
llt¡t¡ illtl¡rrixlrcrl with the note that 'the record of this conversa-
lhrll I lrr.urn¡rlcte'. Yet we do know that Hitler travelled all
lh wry trr thc Pyrenees to try and get beyond them; what we
lHve 1,, li¡rrl r¡ut is why he failed. Even Schmidt, the interpreter,
,11¡6¡ ¡¡rrt tcll us that.
Wl¡,r ¡¡r¡:r¡rgcd this meeting?
.{¡lturr,r Suñer, brother-in-law of General Franco, and a man
Wllh rlint inct leanings towards the Nazis, was sent to visit
l[.tlln ¡r* Minister of the Interior a month previously. He relates
h lletn,rcn the Pyrenees and Gibraltar something of his pre-
lltrrirrlly c<¡nversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin. He
at Hendaye station_it r¡rr:uks ol' affable talks conducted in the vaguest terms, during
soon
venturing into San Sebastian_ wlrir'l¡ l¡c mentioned the need for artillery if Spain were to under-
tr-ails pulled in. The game lukc tlrt: siege of Gibraltar; but he is shown by the captured
1wo ( lelnr¡¡n documents t to have reaffirmed an oficial Spanish assur-
the official United States iocu_
lour Car,. Will you watk iná ¡trr('cgiven in strictest secrecy in Berlin in fune r94o that SPain
wor¡ltl in her own time cease to be neutral and enter the war
on tllc side of the Axis powers as arms and grain supplies from
( icrurany enabled her to defy the British blockade.
Suñcr continued that an attack on Gibraltar had been dis-
cr¡sscd with German military experts and that Spain would need
tctr fifteen-inch fu8-cm) guns to reduce üe Rock. It is curious
thlt a Minister of the Interior should h¿ve been authorised to
go into such details at that stage of discussing an 'eventual
cntry of Spain into the War'; but we shall see later a possible
explanation for this. It is interesting to divine from their talk,
when üey moved over to the map table, that Hitler was insistent
an attack on Gibraltar exis- that Stukas were far more devastating against fortifications.
remberg that these ourline Obviously he was anxious to establish his Luftwaffe staff on the
ncy,. though they would airfields of Spain. Once he had given artillery to Spain he could
not
til the political omens were no longer control its use; but even if Gibraltar could not be
taken with Stukas, the aircraft would be able to attack British
The communiqués of Oc convoys in the Straits and would remain a German weaPon.
the Chiefs of Staie met. Ac Suñer, who spoke for Franco, wanted the guns, but he was less
are sParse. enthusiastic about the aircraft. Finally Hitler was obliged to
allowed by state that 'it would not be possible to provide the fifteen-inch
his book á guns.' This was probably true. When we read German rePorts
I The Spanish Goaemment and the Axis, US Dept of State, 1946.
r24
t25
I
I
 dl¡covcred what was afoot and was afraid that Hitler would

anaris must have warned General

Military Intelligence, that Hitler
and that Franco must resist him.
But General Lahousen tells me that the wires to Spain at this
tlme were so loaded with inter-staff preparations for a military
olliance and the attack on Gibraltar that General Vigon would
No not have understood a divergent political message-if indeed
incoh Tfl:l Canaris had been so rash as to commit his views to cipher. No,
he
he aye to thcre was another means. Up popped the resourceful fosef Müller
meet Eben l¡r Rome while Suñer was still there and said to him:
Emael, no doubt he also remembered t}le destrucüon of the "The Admiral asks you to tell the Caudillo to hold Spain out
French Fleet at Oran, just three months earlier. of this game at all costs. It may seem to you now that our posi-
The grimness of the British war leader may have had a steady_ tion is the stronger-it is in reality desperate, and we have little
ing infuence: the thought that, harassed and stretched as it hopc of winning this war. The Caudillo may be assu¡ed that
Ilitler will not use the force of arms to enter Spain."
This was a disconce¡ting message for Suñer to carry, for he
read history with a difierent eye. Nevertheless I have no doubt
that he delivered MüIler's message. There were other mysterious
channels through which the Admiral could ascertain whether
hc had fulfilled his request.
When Hider exclaimed to Suñer in Berlin on September r¡h
that "it would be a matter primarily of taking Gibraltar with
extraordinary speed and protecting the Straits," the perplexed
mind of Suñer turned to the activities and opinions of Admiral
Canaris. 'With extraordinary speed?' The Admiral had not
been so sanguine of success as his Führer. Who had advised
Franco to ask for ten fifteen-inch guns for the Gibraltar under-
taking, which he was now told could not tre provided? The
.bf-¡!9f--Nazi Suñer in describing his Admiral and General von Richthofen had been the principal
h Hitler in September as spreading;con-
roblems'.
German officers of t}le military commission that examined the
Gibraltar undertaking. They should have known that the guns
were not available. 'I perceived in Berlin that anything to do
with Spanish a-ffairs was utterly confused,' wrote Suñer i¡ his
memoirs. 'One of üe reasons for this confusion was the some-
what singular role played by Admiral Canaris, who had re-
British consular or s to neutral lations in Spain with persons other than the Ministry of Foreign
that üeir cargowe o¡ material Affairs.'
These could then .r;"ii*gi;;
Aloud and to Hider at the time Suñer said üat the rePort on
r.26 t27
 The mesmeric powers of Hitler were abnormal, the bulging
cyes beneath his peaked cap as he seized the Caudillo's hand
gsve forth every symptom of hypnotic efiort. He sought to over-
military commission that ha ' beur the Caudillo, and during the next nine hours there was that
question on the spot, as well as on
reports formerly obtained or tuffocating flow of language with which he habitually stupefied
sent recently bv Admiral Canaris,
th+ had á. ,o the conclu- his victim, like a boa-constrictor covering his prey with saliva
sion that cíbraitar ."rrá u. l."q;#;;; bcfore devouring it. But the Caudillo showed extraordinary
relativelymodestmeans,,, ' r-"'-ir'oo..r, attack with toughness and resilience and took his wonted leisure after the
repast. The Führer complained that he was being kept waiting
.. l"ñg begged him to put these views in writing to Franco, as
if the Caudillo had been iold something q"i,. for above an hour, but the Caudillo excused himself with a
set about softenins Franco himself.
ále**t. So Hitler mcssage that he must invariably have his siesta.
ÉJJ..IJ.¿
-üing-;l"p*ry
that he would
have to go and see"him ," ¡..r, .-"i Ifitler described the bombing of London and the U-boat war
undersrood
in future. He complied wirh the suggestion
of Suñer, committed in the Atlantic, and he totted up his two hundred and thirty
to.writing his view on rhe vulneribiity of tlivisions. The Caudillo was affable, dignified, quite uncowed
CÁ.¿tr. and other
military problems connecred with the ,É;ü nnd at moments even detached; and when he mounted his
of war to Spain,
-.trng. own railway coach again to cross the Bidassoa and climb the
ear Führer,, replied Franco on Pyrenees, he was fending ofi an insistent Führer's:
those of your General "I must have your answer now."
mall details, match my "I will think about it. I will write to you."
There was indeed correspondence, and a to and fro of
ministers, ambassadors and generals. Flitler w¡ote on February
6th-after his target date had come and passed-and Franco left
his letter unanswered unril February 26th, when he replied:
rtunity for a secondary 'Your letter of the 6ü makes me wish to reply very
success.
endaye that Hitler made promptly. . . .'
his
*'*:',",fL:rffi At Hendaye the brusque methods of Hitleragainstsmallermen
il#:l.no,:l: than himself had failed for the first time, because Franco had
d him in Berchtesladen in gone to Hendaye armed with certain knowledge. Indeed, he had
Noyember. vital information that deciphered the views of Hitler and his
General Staff as set forth in the Führer's September letter. The
Admiral had given him the clue that while they would welcome
Spanish participation in the war, Hitler, his High Command
and his Army General Staff were agreed that, with Russia un-
conquered in their rear, there could be no question of entering
Spain by force if the Spaniard resisted. The prospect of guerilla
war along the roads and railways from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar
had sobered them; they were daunted-and no wonder-by the
thought of having to use and maintain the Spanish railways;
a separate line on üe Spanish pro they thought of the necessity, once in, for conquering Portugal,
tz8 too, if Britain were to be kept out of the Peninsula, and the im-
lI.S.E.-' Í29
 of the tapestry filled out with all the symbols
, it will no doubt surprise another in the re-
ground, Lord Templewood, the Ambassador in
who was frlled with anxiety by üe frequent visits of the
to Spain. Upon the face of General Sir F. N. Mason-
rc ('Mason-Mac'), who took over the Rock from Lord
l¡fnd had some knowledge of Canaris from his days as mili-
Itt¡ché in Berlin, I fancy I see a wry smile.
border of the Hendaye tapestry is peopled with small and
egents (like ants, bees and crickets among the grapes,
!r and olive branches of Spain); the British and Germans
each other; the Germans observing feet movements
i Algeciras and La Linea; the Germans watching Spanish
movements both near the Pyrenees and near Gibraftar, to
'üOop
dl¡cirn the measure of Franco's aspirations and fears. The high
$mo was played over their heads. The Abwehr found no signs
0f r Spanish assault force gathering against Gibraltar, but they
dld notic. a movement of troops towarás the Pyrenees.
. §o the immediate danger passed and the Führe¡ swerved in
, hh purpose from a southwará bending straregy that might have
jilPl up in the Middle East through Morocü and PeÑa, if he

War on the side of Germany. This came to the ears of the

of, the Peninsula on one occasion for reasons that I cannot

properly guess. By then Ribbent¡op and Himmler had organised
two foreign intelligence organisations that overshadowéd and
absorbed and intensified the struggle
the
with certain which organisatián
qf the"thr
r30
t3f
 IN THE BALKANS
I¡' Canaris helped to thwart Hitler in Spain, where Germany
could expect much advantage from commanding the Straits, it
secmed to me that he might pursue the same policy elsewhere.
I thought of the Balkans, where German interests were not
greatly furthe¡ed by Bulgaria and lukewarm Hungary in her
urrhappy position across the marches of Europe. Did Canaris
pursue a separate policy in these countries, tool I can recollect
thc pained astonishment on the faces of some of his subordinates,
who evidently revered him deeply, when I suggested that the
Admiral did in fact pursue his own grand policy with such
weapons as he could. Some found it a terrible suggesrion that he
could differ with his Government in wartime and perhaps under-
mine it. Yet other Germans were apparently doing just that. A
detailed report or^ the German ball-bearing factories at Schwein-
furt reached the British in Switzerland. A scientific paper all
about weapons development in Germany reached the British in
Oslo. What is treason when a country is ruled by a tyrant? We
read with enthusiasm in history books of the doings of Henry the
Lion against his emperor, of Wallenstein and Warwick; but in
our times the independent line is regarded simply as treason
against the State.
King Boris of Bulgaria, with whom Canaris was familiar,
seemed to be in a similar position to Franco at the other end o[
Europe.
Hitler's brain was teeming with ideas of wresting away from
the Balkans üeir precarious neutral status and striking a terriblc
blow at Russia. He had directed Keitel to give the Central Arrrry
Group at Borisov the task of outlining a plan of attack r¡rr
., as a staff exercise, Oddly enough, by a stealthy sr.ltr'tiorr
officers, a military group hostile to him was bcin¡¡ r:ol-
!l n Central Army Group Headquarters, and thcy srrw with
., Smusement and wonder that Molotov was seDt to llcrlill i¡r
November r94o to prolong Russo-German collabt¡rltir,¡¡. I litlcr
f32 r33
 Hitler required Bulgaria, not for any resources, but for its
r,tr¡r.v i nsisted on talking X:T;*,lt:',ffi::J",1';?,,:."j
rro¡rc nnd Finland, and in ihe Balkans.
The RAF i.rt ..,rpt.J
thcir conferences at one of the most fr.r,.a
-áro.nts and forced
rhem ro descend to the air_raid shelter. fflii.,
after Molotov_ had gone home, and
*rlt.¿
a month
th.; .; December rgth
ordered that Uperation Barbarossa against
Soviet Russia should ll emall ally on the south-eastern br¡rder of Europe who would con-
g and organisation. In the mean_ veniently help him if Turkey should march through the
to come and see him and dis_ Balkans; his first use of Bo¡is was to attack Greece and Yugo-
mania. slavia in the flank after the revoh against Prince Paul's regency
face, brought in a pro-British Government in Bclgrade. Hitler angrily
who postponed his zero-day of May r5th against Russia and turned
the fury of the Luftwaffe on Belgrade within ten days of the
aris, an and George
"r¿'llil?a, national revolution. ]oszef Lipski tells me that as Hitler was
in SoEa, President Roosevelt,s
ordering the annihilating attack on the Yugoslav capital,
a former
Governor of pennsylvani, ,rrd "'AmbassadorrEarle, Canaris, who had learned of his intentions, passed a warning to
the Democratic nomination for the Yugoslav Government, which on April 3rd declared Bel-
had
for his old friend Roosevelt, an grade an open city.' They were of little avail, eirher the warning
mbe
ing him firsr as US Minister to Austria ancl then to
Sofia, where
or the declaration. The German bómbers appeared over Bel-
grade at 5.15 am on the 6th and flew in relays from airfields in
Rumania. 'F¡om roof-top height without fear of resistance,' Mr
Churchill paints the lurid picture in his memoirs, 'rhey blasted
thq city without mercy. This was called Operation Punishment.
When silence came at last on April 8th, over seventeen thousand
and the nadonal fear of citizens of Belgradq lay dead in the sreets or under the debris,
Rumania, the smilins Out of the nightmare of smoke and 6re came the maddened
of oil in Ploesti. *a, fril animals released from their shattered cages in the Zoological
early in Septemb Gardens, A stricken storkhobbled past themain hotel which was
I::i:.
a mass of fames. A bear, dazed and uncomprehending, shuffied
through the inferno with slow and awkward gait down towards
the Danube.'
Canaris, as if in expiation of his powerlessness to alter the
destructive will of his master, few to Belgrade. He spent a d:ry
apparently investigating intelligence targets and wanderirrg
round the agonised city. Towards evening he retur¡lccl to thc
l This was hardly likely to have been invented by a Irolc ahr¡ut a (icr-
man; the Ambassador assured me that the Yugoslav Gcncral Strfl wls lrrlly
aware of Canaris's warning.
f34
r35
 F*ET"

billet found for him in a suburb and collapsed in prostration at "You, Rommel, of the Army, will one day be held responsible
the horrors he had seen. for what is happening behind the lines."
"I can't see any more of this," he cried. .,We will leave to- He found Rommel hardly sympathetic and so keen on his
morrow," dcsert war that he had no time to be shocked.
"Tomorrowl Where forl" asked his adjutant. "That's not behind my fron¡-not my concern at all," was
"Spain." hlr nttitude. "I'm a ñghting man."
FIe could, so it appears, fly whither he would. The extra- Oanaris visited Turkey twice during the war, though Asia.
ordinary extent to which he did travel abroad during the War Minor was not a territory he understood well. He had paid a
excited no unfavourable comment "simply because nobody in flcc to Baghdad before the war of sizing
the German Government really had any idea how an Intelligence tU) ce requirements. It was a that did
Service works," Lt-Colonel Viktor von Schweinitz suggested to Itr¡t his reputation as a spy. T uence of
me. The High Command did not require him to seek permis- (lre¡rt Britain in Iraq was strong. She maintained air bases there
sion for travel abroad, and when he wanted he could turn his hy trcaty rights and had transit facilities for her a¡med forces.
aircraft towards Spain or Porrugal and find solace in these dis- 'l'lrc A<finiral therefore chose to travel with false passports,
tant and ancientrealms. Whether on this occasion his solace con- ltkin¡¡ with him his head of Abwehr II, Colonel Groscurth-
sisted in relating to Don Daniel how the Führer had raved at rcr¡xrrrsible subversive activities in enemy territory and
for
the Serbs when he had been obliged to postpone his summer Sllloutl. It was like something in a Marx Brothers farce in
offensive proper against Russia. I cannot say. llu¡lr,lnd. First Groscurth wrote his real name in the hotel
He flew in all weathers, wirh an utter indifference to his ¡lstcr; fter angrily rebuking him. gave up a
safety, resigned and philosophical in his outlook. Even those rge l)ar or laundering. It came back with a bill
who were his close friends caflnot remember the bewildering ¡trle-ou from the name tabs in his shirts and
pattern his aircraft wove over Europe, Africa and Asiá iltory goes that the package was 'paged' round the hotel by
Minor in these months. Lahousen remembers that he visited nrystiEed staff. A few hours later a curt message came to him
Rommel at his desert headquarrers west of Derna probably to rr¡ ihe British Secret Service that he was to leave Iraq forth-
acquaint him with rhe impending revolt of Rashid Ali in Iraq wlih.
and the intention of the German High Command to suppori It that a man of such cunning and perspicacity should
wns odd
Rashid Ali with arms and aircraft, using French Syria as a ñc¡lect such elementary details of his profession as a laundry
stepping-stone. Dr Paul Leverkiirhn r found Canaris sceptical of mirk, but carelessness often goes with high rank.
this revolt behind Wavell's back, and told me thar the German In tlrc early spring of r94r he was in B Pe was
Minister in Baghdad, Dr Grobba, was really the moving spirit. dlrquictcd by German trooP movements south-
When the Rashid Ali rebellion broke out in May r94r rhere poi
llttw¡¡r<ls. He seemed indiscreet to the ecurity
were pitched battles for the British air base of Habbanniyah, bur llto¡cthcr.
the Iraqi air force was largely destroyed and before German "Will Germany attack Turkeyl" asked Madame I after Allied
assistance could reach the Iraqi rebels through Syria Wavell had lntellig"t,.e reports had showed a trend of German armour to
sent up a force against General Dentz that compelled him to thc rt,uth-eatt, as if towards Asia Minor.
surrender after har,-l fighting. t'§o, we won't attack Turkey," said the Admiral; "Russia
Canaris in t}le oasis produced his secret dossier of Abwehr re-
ports on the SS at¡ocities in Europe and gave Rommel 'a lesson
on the facts of life' as he clescribed it.
1 One of the German intclligence oÉcers in Istanbul.
46
divisions of armour from Rumania to Southern Poland-oppo- Xoultl be their policy even before the campaign had even been
site Russia. The movement had indeed been countermanded deckled; fcrtilisation of the soil with the blood of the van-
when the Yugoslavs rose against the Axis--but it was neverthe- nhcrl; thc Commissars were to be shot as soon as captured,
less significant. SS were to drive the |ews, dead and dying, into mass graves.
|osef Müller of the Abwehr appeared once more in the Vati-
can city and tells me that he told the British of the planned date
of invasion of Russia. Reliable neutral diplomats in Berlin were
getting thin on the ground as country after country was invaded.
There was, however, an Abwehr agent going to Moscow as a
business man in advance of the invasion, Nicholas von Halem, Arnry groups could be pushed forward on a wide front. They
of the Admiral's personal staff. He knew a British resident there, woulil have freedom to manceuvre and they could put into prac-
but was not sure that he could safely meet him. FIis own pretext tlec rrll the theories of Canna that they had ever studied-so
for travel was simple: business men were going from Berlin to ry thought. Soon after midnight on |une zznd, t94t, the
Moscow daily to promote the economic and political co,opera- l¡rck on Russia began and the Soviet air force in forward areas
tion that continued between Germany and Russia, until June tfrw surprised and destroyed on the ground.
2rst, but he could not risk the NKVD seeing him approach an (lrcai Britain was planning military aid to Russia in the
Englishman's ofHce. FIe searched about his Moscow hotel till
he found a postcard photograph of it, which he marked with a
cro6s on his bedroom window and wrote, 'I am here for a day or
so and to have the opportunity of seeing you.' He signed
himself ts'. The postcard went through i-nternal postal
censorship without arousing suspicion.
'Keats' had been his nickname since early youth and it served moved four days' iourney into Central Russia.
well, He did not have to wair long for his visitor, who walked I arn told that the Briiish Intelligence Service picked up indi-
up to his room next day. On his way back to Berlin von Halem Gntions that Canaris was far forward when the German Army
related this to a friend in Central Army Group which was wait- ing at Moscow and that he was warning the High
ing at Borisov for the great attack. th-'at they would not reach Moscow-'and never will
Russia herself was not warned by the Germans-neither by cow,' a British officer quoted to me from memory
Fferr von der Schulenberg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, anar which we hold copies- "FIe went
whose hand Stalin seized ar a reception three days before the the fore the Caucasus áffensive in the
day of the attack, asking him with a searching stare, "I hope that would not reach their
obiective. ,.,llr,iy di<r not 0.,,'l,Tn,lr'.f'
ihi, fits in with information from another source'
"..or.rrrt
Canaris returned from the Russian front in the autumn of t94t
¡¡rd went from Berlin to Berne, where he arrived at the moment
which the world suffered; but Hitler's attack on Russia did not when the German lines were str€tched to the ulmost and the
hearten him or win his approval. He knew that his own political
ideas of an independent Ukraine and an alliance *ith th. and exhausted," he told
Russian people against their masters had no place in the minds utrun our su¡rPlies; our
of Hitler, Ribbentrop ¿¡d Rosenberg. Calculated exrerminatioo quate to maintein such
r38 139
 large formations so far forward. If the situation of Russia is bad,
i¡ can hardly be worse tha¡ ours.,' him a chance to observe the other activities of the
After the Cauca Secret Service man and special emissary. |ust after
had failed in :1942, came the
*i",.r. campaign o ¿nd Boris m,rrt haue shivered
when he heard ti¡e ap on in time here, it is to finish
the mysterious story of (that he was a dilettante) have changed in the
Berchtesgaden on liarch American embassies about George Earle,' he wrote
Bulgaria would resist a {rpatch of.Mey :,943 to Herr von Papen and Colonel Flanc.
Boris returned to Sofia and ste hh cuperior ofrcers in the Abweh.. :It ir reported that he
Turkey in May through his M ded in reaching an agreement between the Unired
was a pact of armed neutrality between Turkey Bulgaria. The negotiations took place in Istanbul but
and Bulgaria through men of Earle's in Sofia. The basis for the agree-
which would at once draw his o*r, .orrrt.y out of the
war and
¡
ofle1 the apparenr i¡ that it should be recognised that Bulgaria has acted
,pe11any ensuring against compulsion in her present policy and will return to full
an A]lied thrust from Asia M tiations were con-
ducted by the Bulgarian Minister in Ankara with y as soon as such compulsion no longer exists. Bulgaria
the Turkish cvacuate all Greek territory that she has occupied. The
Foreign Minister, M. Menemenjoglu; but when the
B,rlgrrian military attaché says that this agreement is due en-
' cuss progress, Herr Delius, the to the skill of Earle who has been in direct contact with
obtained a complete record of
:lt. A letter from the President to 'My dear George' has
phone which his agents had
a stir in the American Embassy. It has not yet been de-
Ministry.
ed Dr Leverkühn, the Abwehr
who will sign for Bulgaria-the king and his Govern-
agent in Turkey who related the incident. arc hesitating and casting about for a suitable persorr.
'.1, y:"ltonly be.possible in Bulgaria,', he replied are similar reports about Rumania.'
with a wonder, then, that Hitler should invite Boris and An-
smile, "but I had a similar report from Istanbul. The
Turkish to Germany. Walther Huppenkothen of the SS in his
generals had discussed üe i.de1 of a Turco_Bulgarian
pact and
spoke against it. I reported that to Herr uo.r'papen king account of Abwehr activities relates that Canaris
and he Boris in Sofia shordy before the last illness of the king.
torwarded my report to Berlin,,'
Walther Huppenkothen of.tle.Gestlpo, in his subsequent adds nothing-he evidently suspected political
in- which were strictly forbidden to Canaris. I find it credible
vestigarion on Canaris and Abwehr political activities,
Áentions
that the Admi¡al saw Boris in August a week ¡.f*. afr. Canaris would have advised Boris to make his peace with
firg
died; but he infers norhing from iI It appears that ] Allies as and when he could, and Leverkühn hesitantly
Hitler haE wiü me that this was not out of the question. But Boris
invited Boris to return to Germany to ,iig.., t im further
in
August and tlr¿t Boris actualll il:* a second tir". ¿qpi,. ruddenly ill in the third week of August. His brother, Prince
rumours at the time that he decjined to go. General made a brief allegation before a war crimes court in 1945
Antonescu
was also invited to Germany to discuss thl attitude i the King had been poisoned by the SS through a defective
of Rumania.
The summons to Boris and A¡ mask used on his return fight from Berchtesgaden; but
could ofier no detail of evidence, even circumstantial, to
this. Dr Leverkühn in Istanbul, who knew his Abwehr
:s of Sofia well, disbelieves the story of murder and tells
Bulgarian doctors diagnosed an embolism that mounted
atters with Gcorge Ea¡le and
hcart, and that he was found dying one rnorning in his
f40
r4Í
bath. Either the hypnotic infuence of Hitler was still strong, or
the king sensed that the walls of his palace were hollow, too, and
that the Abwehr men were close about him; for as he lay help-
less on his deathbed he murmured that he still had a faith in thc
final victory of Adolf Hitler. His words were noted and duly re-
ported to Berlin; they stuck in the memory of Leverkühn, who
repeated them to me seven years afterwards. King Boris died on
August z8th, t943, aged forty-nine, and Hitler sent a message to
Queen Giovanna that 'the overpowering news of the death of
His Maiesty the King has moved me deeply'. On what evidence
is available, I am inclined to think that King Boris died, by
accident, a natural death. His son, King Simeon, aged six,
reigned in his stead, under the regency of Prince Cyril.
Two months after this an emissary of Hungary signed a secret
declaration of surrender in Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen's
yacht off Istanbul: but it was to profit Hungary as little as
Earle's scheme helped Bulgaria.
How rHE il;,-^" "or Hrs
BAD NAME
"THrs is the paint that the Germans paint their tanks with."
Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Wintle of the First Royal Dragoons
told me how he met an excited intelligence ofñcer in the marble
corridors of üe War Office shortly before the War broke out.
"W.hat are you going to do with itl " asked the Colonel, fixing
his monocle in his eye and regarding pot and ofñcer wiü a
glassy stare.
"I am going to have it analysed."
"Whyi"
"We shall then know what üeir camoufage mixture is."
"My dear fellow, and then?" the Colonel summed up with
devastating logic. "When you have discovered how much oil,
what binding, colour and spirit, and what-not gives it that dull
finish, what will you do then ? "
There was a slow hiss of escaping ent]¡usiasm.
f42
'f said the Colonel, "you people would make it your busi-
to discover what date Hitler has selected to makc war, as I
done, you would be doing the duties proper to an intelli-
officer."
every Intelligence Service t-here was drudgery and a certain
of un¡ecessary work, while the vital operations lay in a
hands only.
1,,,
By ry42 the British Intelligence Services had multiplied in
many times in
several departments, ancient and
n, within the Service ministries and in new ministries
during the War. There were practical men, shrewd men,
itical men, theorists and paintpot analysts. Business men,
artists, scientists, men of letters, retired officers and gentle-
' then of leisure, they took up the game with alacrity and often
wlth overlapping terms of reference. Certainly the best work was
Bot begun until long after Dunkirk. When France was collapsing
lVintle had the idea of dropping in at French ai¡fields to see
.What French airmen could be persuaded to throw in their lot
ours; but his idea did not at all appeal to his senior officer
there was a sharp quarrel, after which Wintle was com-
to a brief sojourn in the Tower of London on charges of
ring a senior ofÉcer. He soon emerged after conducting
own defence-.with some success in a court martial and served
distinction in the Middle East. These were the teething
les of the new intelligence outfits, in times when it was still
to be committed to the Tower for wanting to do too much
for doing too little. The French Section of the War OfEce
in SOz (Special Operations z) began its work with the
Resistance, the planners of
Special Operations launched
into Norway to wreck the power stations which had
hainessed to produce heavy water for the German atom-
research organisation. The cloak-and-dagger men ran their
boats into üe Gironde and sank German shipping there;
inflicted pinpricks on the enemy all along three thousand
of coast. There was intense rivalry betwoen intelligence
operations staffs, because the latter were apt to stir up t]re
nest of the Gestapo by blowing bridges, burning fac-
or sinking shipping, whereas the former came and we¡t
ily, leaving no sign. The one game spoiled the other. The
and dislike was so keen that at one time neither'show'
t43
 what its activities were; once both branch that was broadcasting in German to the Wehr-
spot on the Nlor*ro ¡na¡+ ,-,irLi- -L : when I proposed that some of our talks should bc
se/r ur cdqr ouler. Ine SO or
tol¡¡ards the officers and that it was useless to try and
the German private soldier to mutiny or disaffection, my
ier replied that although he himself preferred that line of
h it was forbidden in his directives.
erman Field police. No wonder By r94z it seemed that unless we were to have a long war dq-
ground their teeth at men- led simply by weight and numbers, it was high time for this
to keep the Boche alert and t weapon against Hitler, the German opposition, to come
ope and in occupied countries play. There must be somewhere in London an officer of
it made the work of the intelli- ing and power who would aPPreciate the oPPortuoity that
at hand.
War Office was otherwise occupied. The War Ofrce
ams showed the field-grey uniform, the silver wings and
Canaris had laid his
ika emblems: 'Know Your Enemyl' The Admiralty
showed the silhouettes of German warships and their
Army in the countries to
of rank. The Air Ministry issued its models of the enemy
tion to be left belind as she ¡e
t and identification posters of the bombers that were raid-
London. It was an all-time job keeping this Wehrmacht at
'Know Your Enemyl' The night bombers few over Lon-
and dropped their loads till the glare of burning houses was
bright as sunset. The fapanese took Singapore, Burma and
'a. Rommel stood at Alamein and glowered towards the
ferrard ickell tells so vividly, ta. The War was all action and ebb and fow.
tated s long before int¡odlcing
-
neglected its secret
conscription, which had At length I came upon two intelligence officers who had heard
servlce_ dunng peace, when war became Admiral Canaris. I remember well one autumn day of ry42,
earnesr, did not scruole
lo drop *oI"¿" ¡.i1"¿ it. ..r.rny-t-irr^.f
wher¡ a¡ likely as not G.rtrpo
with an elderly Colonel in a Whitehall office.
trr;.; ;;*.d'them and ulti_ ttAh, you have ideas. You were in Germany before the Wa¡i"
mately death in the furnaces o] c
It was oppressive to think of ,I ventured to turn the subject of conversation to üe Abwehr.
"The mentality of Admiral Canaris is singular," I suggested.
irol !-1ea¡tplate of Germany ttThe man is a Greek," barked the Colonel. He took no de,
heel. Within the subdued but
evidently, in a study of the unusual; it was his profession
General Staff, the Abwehr,
so, but here at least was an ofEce, reticent and unpreten-
guided the Directors of In
London among many that seemed far busier, in which this name
-Germany could not win not totel more than a glimmer of interest. Here it seemed that the
sieg, therJ.o.rtd oot-.u.n be
st
featl-Some c.r-*-oÁ.or, tH'
ly be de- and pulses of the European capitals were registered, a¡rd
of the game were understood.
*,r.t,. it. Ái*.i. 1".r" ,,. uspected
", I found myself second British officer I met in wartime who evidently
attached for a short time in ry4r to a War all about the Abwehr had a more imaginative approach to
t pAN
Odette (a Book). of Admiral Canaris. He was a small man wiü soft,
f44 t45
 obituary notice sent to British newspaPcrs in
f942i

Wr¿¡ur¡¡ C¿Nen¡s Germany's Master Spy, Evil Genrus

the Reich.
Implacable enemy of Britain, the evil genius of Hitler's Reich,
exactly what is in his mind." master spy and cold-blooded assassin of all who stood
W.e State the policies of nations, his path, are but few of the epitaphs that can be applied to
of the nd it . He seemed to under- miral Wilhelm Canaris, the man who did much to bring thc
stand ts of was srill not set in the to power, and who, in time wondered whether he ought
mould, when several great alternative vistas were open to us. 'h rcgard the man as much as foe as an ally.
Once he startled me by saying:
"Would you like to meet'Cañaris?" This script then credits Canaris with the assassination of
in
The.re was something that
on eight
von Schleicher (whom Góring and Himmler had mur-
ofi my mind. The Admira ently f and with the killing of General von Fritsch, his old
A few weeks later, in S 1942, I man (who purposely walked into a beaten zone seeking death
with the soft voice and expressive hands. He was saddened and the advance on Warsaw).
depressed by a sensational report in an American newspaper l,Other and similar articles published before and afterwards
that the Admiral had been plorting against Hitler and the
-Nizi out Canaris as the trainer of Heydrich and Himmler in
feglme. ¡rts of murder, the lover and employer of Mata Hari and a
"Every time we build something üp," he said, "something like of Quislings all over Europe. 'The world will be a
this happens and destroys whar we have built," and purer place without him,' two commentaries con-
I suggested to him that the position of Admiral Canaris might
not be shaken by this report. It mi§ht be regarded as a maliciáus thought at the time that the report of Canaris plotting against
might have been politically inspired to embarrass him.
It became better known that there was deep opposition to
in the German General Staff, uneasiness seized some of
fner-r in Britain's wartime proPaganda services-a revolt from
did-not accord at all with thei¡ ideas of the future of
"I could do it myself," I said; but at that time I was a serving Europe. It would be fair to say also that the idea was
officer in the Royal Marines, out of touch with newspapers, and
in more serious minds at this moment that the General
hardly ever saw members of the Intelligence Services. Someone
of Germany must not be allowed to shuffie off its joint
else, I think, was soon encouraged to write about the Admiral in
ity with Hitler for the wrongs which it had been
t}re sense I had suggested, though I thought the tone of the sub-
s€quént articles somewhat more violent than was really neces-
in preparing and carrying out.
sary. I record them here for two reasons: firstly, to undeceive ou may understand the Admiral's mind," I thought, as I
those English readers who may have been given a false impres- Ieavc of the man who had grasped the essentials of things.
sion of the Admiral by what they read in contemporary news- and he could work out a short way out of this prolonged
papers, and secondly, to convince some of his German friends, aod misery, but the machinery of your Service and his Ser-
highly indignant at the time, that there were good intentions will kecp each of you in your place until üe one machine
behind a faEade of wild and impalpable abuse. other is broken."
r46 r47
 1
,,;;^;;;;,""
HrruulBn and Heydrich were not satisfied rhat the Abwehr
Then they all went to Horchers together for one of the fort-
nightly lunches that Heydrich and óanaris took togeüer. SS
r48
oup-Irader Müller (Gestapo Müller) joined them,
on Bentivegni, the departmental chief of Abwehr III
), Canaris's-deputy, Admiral Bürckner and Colonel
n.
Horch.r', food was excellent, brought in from Denmark, and
French wines were bought with occupation francs at con-
prices. The intimate in WestBerlin,wh
te. and Ribbentrop h the Duke of Wind
t!l/, had been abandoned for a safer villa in W.annsee suburb
í.iing,*otg trees on a sand ridge above the lake' Here
Piekenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence I, joined the
v. The manager, Flerr Haeckh, whose solicitude and art in
'cuisi.r. I *.ii ,.rr,.*ber, the placid and faiüful Haeckh,
;Snlled and bowed to his important guests. Cana¡is
had helped
lHorch.., to open their famous restaurant in Madrid, where per-
Sfpt hit deaf mutes_watched tht con¡¿ersations of the diplomats'
Há ,rt a powerful Patron. Heydrich was another important
gentlemen chatted so openly with each other, though the
s in their words probed at vital secrets and closely guarded
mental privileges. Here was 'Piecki', grand seigneur,
so friendiy with the black butchers of whom he said in his
t'Keitel must eventually tell his Herr Hitler that the military
Abwehr is not an organisation of murderers like the SS and
Huppenkothen noticed how friendly !1a1is. 11d Heydrich
er.;'brrt he remembered that Reinhard Heydrich had warned
hlm beforehand: "Canaris is an old fox and not to be trusted'"
¡tr for the old fox, he had written in his diary of-Heydrich when
h" firr, m€t him: 'It will hardly be possible for me to work
selv with Heydrich, because he is a brutal fanatic" There
s iothing to L. ,..r, of such antiPathy during the Horcher
§t.
uppenkothen met Canaris again in --Heydrich's villa in
,iht..rto and then at the Canaris villa. They seemed on
good terms. FIe went to the Abwehr mess in the Army
-Co-mat d Headquarters at Zossen, south of Berlin¡ and
thcn they met in Horcher's again._
,' The division of responsibility that left Canaris the freld of in-
r49
 Bentivegni with orders not to come away until he had
Heydrich. Out came SS Müller and prevailed upon Benti-
i to go away t@. Canaris went to Keitel. Keitel rang up
lrich, and Reinhard at length agreed to take up negotiations
He even suggested a luncheon at Horcher's, In that suave
phere they formulated the new terms of reference and
I them afterwards. The Gestapo could take over in Franqe.
would take charge of Odette and Captain Peter Churc,hill
years later, they would hunt the RAF escape organisations,
break the British 'circuits',theywould round up the canisters
arms üat the British dropped. They would liquidate the
,quis with terrible brutalities. W'as success reflected in the
of Heydrich's life mask? He had reason to be exultant;
it would be a year before the agreement was worked out in

Meanwhile Huppenkothen saw something more of Canaris.

|rhc SS had made some play in conversation with the story of
Greek antecedents. Oh vanity of boasting illustrious ancestry I
iHe mry have claimed relationship with the Greek naval hero of
Admiral Konstantin Kanaris; but the Greeks were now
This
ies, whereas the Italians, his real forebears, were allies.
sion may have been faintly embarrassing. One day he
nded Huppenkothen a copy of his family tree that showed
t the Canaris family originally came from Italy.
"This will complete your dossier," he whispered.
Heydrich ranged through occupied Europe under his new
of Commissar"General for the Security of Occupied
ntries. Shoot them: senior officers, professors, Communists,
and Maquis alike ! The rule of General von Falkenhausen
Belgium was altogether too mild for him. He wanted the
to flow, His master was after more blood, too. General
had escaped early in 1942 frolr, Kónigstein fortress in
and somehow contrived to find his way to unoccupied
nte. The Abwehr had been ordered to liquidate General
Weygand in North Africa in tg4o after Hitler had written to
Mussolini: 'I am not satisfied with the choice of General Wey-
I gand to restore order in North Africa.' FIe feared that Weygand
Heydrich
Canaris

w
uanarls
:#,:Í:,tlxfi:r,*j::m::. would go over to the Allies. And now, Giraud, Then it was that
Piekenbrock made his drastic remark that "Keitel must eventu-
s in the anteroom, then he departed, ally be told quite clearly to report to his Herr Hitler that we of
r50 f5r
 military Abwehr are not an orsanisatinn af m,,.J----^ t:r-^
The two Czochs fed for refuge to a little church in
the SS and SD.', The Admiral whi
to Keitel, and the Field_Mars ral,
is met Huppenkothen at dre funeral of Heydrich. The
ar,yway, agreed that the Abwehr should
I:.doi"g
hand f."ltdr
over the job to the S'ó.
blue eyes overbrimmed with tears, heavy tears rolled
anyone about it.
ó"rr".i, J¿--".,frl*
mg ilJfi; his cheeks. He had to be a hypocrite or he could never
his game for so long.
Heydrich had meanwhile added to his titles that
of protector offered us the condolences of his Service and himself,
ation of the war in Russia made ted Huppenkothen. "FIe assured me that he had lost
r. Baron vo¡ Neurath was too man and a true friend in Reinhard Heydrich."
cceeded him, proclaimed ,a state spoke the oration of "this man of purest charac-
er r94r' and passed decree laws r¡rd pinned a medal on Heydrich's breast. The SS killed
licable to minor offences of dis_ one hundred and fifry hostages and proclaimed that any
ome r,roo prominent Czechs had of military age found without identity cards would be
to inspect the Security police in arily shot. A Czech wavered and Lidice was betrayed to
shifted SS General Oberg from as thb village that harboured the assassins. They surroun-
r.942, to cope with the swelling the church, the parachutists died-fighting. The Gestapo
e Flague to supervise mass shoot] ished all human life in Lidice before razing every stone
, where planting grass over the foundations and the roads to con-
young the very place where it had stood.
say üat Canaris lost in Heydrich a man whose measure
taken and could curb because he held documents proving
police, the crimi¡al pou..,
tn.
the stone halls of the Hradschin palace
3t'fi:T."ilT#:il$17 ish parentage, Others, that he lost an intimate colleague.
of frrgu.. Himmler and believe Huppenkothen, we must doubt both sugggstions.
Heydrich called a congress to annouoce the the whim seized Hitler again that he must have Giraud's
niw order of interi-
the SD taking charge of counter-espionage It was long overdue. The Abwehr must report exactly
uming a subordinate r6le. By ,ro*H.ydri.h:, eteps had been taken or what had been arranged with the
n.
one night, possibly while about Operation Gustav?" Keitel, using the code name
held. It dropped three murder plan, fired üis question at Lahousen, as depart-
ak Brigade armed with chief, when the Admiral was in France, Lahousen
.

frequently passed. rt would o.
corner.
f52
ion group hid them and showed anxiously to Paris a¡d met his chief in the Hotel Lutetia.
what Keitel had asked him. Canaris said nothing for
#rTj1'"",ilIT#;1Í;il;1 but over a glass of wine :
, tell me the date that Giraud fed," muttered Canaris,
üe date that I was ordered to murder him, and the date that
p near dre corner, two men was killed. Don't you seel We can say that we handed
h's car slowed down, one man
that whole business in Prague-to Heydrich personally."
with his Sten gun. The
stantly, the offieer with
cap sank back mortally
r53
 High Command, in early November gave this official
of the Mediterranean situation : "We are convinced that
in attempt by the Allies to relieve the island of Malta
is being heavily bombarded. No landing in North Africa
CHAPTER XVIII be apprehended; the British and Americans lack the forces
experience for such an enterprise." In fact üe Abwehr
THE PLASTIC BOMB pointed to Malta as the destination of the huge Allied
in the Mediterranean and Atlantic approache"s to Gibl
. The British and US forces were carried in no fewer than
.,hundred ships with three hundred and fifty naval escort
it is hard to imagine that Malta alone could have been
destination.t On November 7th the German Ambassador,
Stohrer, and his naval attaché were at dinner with officers
e Spanish armada, who insisted that the convoys would
on the North African coast in the rea¡ of Rommel. Stohrer
ted for some hours before reporting to his government, and
he added his own views that these ships were destined for
or Alexandria. Before the telegram had been deciphered
Berlin, the landing of Lieutenant-General Eisenhower's
ied forces in Morocco and Algeria had begun. General Giraud
ived in Algeria on November 9th to assume leadership of the
:nch in North Africa-it has always amazed me that a senior
general with one arm could have escaped from Saxony
made his way undiscovered across Germany into France.
British submarine had taken him on the first part of his
f¡om the Vichy State-safe from Hider's Operation

[t is amazing, too, that Canaris came unscathed out of the

rman inquest on Operation Torch, because this was his
insula and the sea was his element. Yet he had failed to guess
failed to report what the Spanish armada knew about the
ied convoys. I have met plenty of German intelligence off.cers
the War who claim to have correctly forecast from Spain
meaning of the Allied naval concentrations before Opera-
Torch. Captain Lenz i¡ Madrid and Lieutenant |oachim
naris apparently both did so. Yet üe appreciation made in
Yet although the rlin at High Command Fleadquarters was obviously wrong.
. e Span em_
phatically of an im ion of ¡'I reported to Berlin from Hanburg about October z6th,' writes
b.re."l Heusinger, Chief 1l: ,m-r.á.. Wichmann, 'that üe biggest convoy eve¡ assembled was about
liod Allied forces on the North Coast of Afric¿.'
r54
$5
This may be attributed in part to the fact that some of the prin-
cipal enemies of tle Hitler regime were established in what is
the Central Office of the German Military Iotelli-
ce. These men even altered some intelligence reports
ibution in order to infuence events and further their
secret policy. Yet the
have been guite certai
a forecast would have
German efficiency was
possibly .I
asked a
Captain :::
what th
"I don't think they ever did us any particular harm," was
his reply. My friend, H. C. O'Neill (Strategicus), remembers
seeing some of the Canaris reports after Wavell's victories over
Grazia¡i in the desert. "He vastly overrared Wavell's forces,"
Strategicus told me. "Canaris must have known exactly how
many----or how few-divisions we really had in the Middle East
at that time to send elsewhere. Now that you mention'to me that
Canaris was working against Hitler, I can see a possible explana-
tion for much that has long p:uzzled,me."
Edward Crankshaw, an authority on Russia, who also studied
the secret reports of the Admiral in wartime, found himself
puzzled in oractly the same way, 'There's something wrong with
this,' was his reaction to some of them- Was British deception
so good, or were German agents so badl Lahousen offers a pos-
sible explanation: "Even'if the Chief doubted the reliability of
an agerit's report, he will have passed it on if it agreed with his
own line-that of impressing Hitler and the Party with the real
strength of the Allies whom they were continually underrating."
It is, however, a wide step from that to submitting misleading
reports about impending operations.
Algeciras was ore of his strongest points and yet it failed him.
"Ffe was always going down there," remarked one of the British
officers whom I questioned. I remember the picture given by
Abshagen of Cenaris in Algeciras on the last night oÉ 1942,
dressed in a chef's ¡ap and white apron and cooking üe New
Year's dinncr for the Abwehr officers at Algeciras.
I'6
was a first-class cook," a senior British intelligence ofñcer
to me in dre course of conversation.
of the German offcers went on from the dinner to the
Reina Maria Christina, where there was a New Year's
and danced üere on the same floor as the British officers
Gibraltar.
you know that there was a British plot to kidnap Canaris
he was staying in Algeciras?" This startling question was
to me by a fellow journalist.
was in the time that General Mason-Macfarlane was
of Gibraltar. The whole operation was prepared."
happened. . . ?"
tar received a message from London cancelling the
it say-leave our man alone?"
it did not say quite that: it said that he was far more
where he was."
Axis forces in North Africa were taken unaware by
', and though German airborne troops were quickly
in Tunisia and Hitler pressed the button for Operatioo
and marched down the Rhone Val§, the Afrika Corps
lost; Italy quaked for fear or hope of liberation, and France
r the Vichy police and the SD began to stir perilously. The
n military governor had clashes of authority with the
in their territory, as the d¡e¿ded 'Night and Fog decree' took
and men and women wcre spirited away wiüout trace
the reach of their kin.
Operations Branch in London increased its weapons
ies to the patriots in France. Canisters were dropped by
ute far and wide over France. Colonel Relling, Chief of
III, working from the Hotel Lutetia in Paris, reported
March that he had initiated Operation Grand Duke-üe
ing of the French Resistance grouPs and the caPture of
British confederates. One of his principal agenm was that
Bleicher, Sergeant-Major of Abwehr III, risen from t}te
Police, who arrested Odette and Captain Peter Churchill
Torioz and so broke up an active British intelligence and
circuit in France. Bleicher ha.d phenomenal success in
Grand Dtike, due to his gift for assuming the role of
and enlightened Germau who wants to makc
157
 !-rrF¡srr rytIf rlr,it,iii.i
",.*q t$_¿"

common cause with the AIIies against Hitler. So he 'ivon to his rtral Army Group in Strt,rletr¡h rhnr lt wrt tthlfr.
side the more gullible of the French Patriots who fell into his " The Admiral set out lol Srrrolettrlr lrr tlre ¡áctlfld
hands, and, thi"nkin§ Captain Churchill to be a relative of the ry, accomPanied by many ollitct.l ill lrlr r'trlrrtllÉfl,
British Prime Minibter, he temPted him with curious ofiers that n *rt conference of army intclli¡crrt'c ,llt* t¡. A ll
"
tber of his stafi carried a small package of thc ¡rl:rriti' ltnr¡er
t
sounded like the mission of Rudolf Hess.
set of time fuses. Hans von Dohnanyi of his pcrs"ttrrl rrllltG
Bleicher in his heyday had broken in enough Frenchmen.to
form a team who went round among the Resistar¡ce sharing the ent into conference at Smolensk wiü General von l'rcst.kt¡w
task of collecting British arms canisters by night and stowing and Lieutenant von Schlabrendorfi, his adiutant' They agrcetl
away tel of the secret Ár, attempt should be made on the life of Hitler when he
"" ouP.TheY exPlosion in
we¿Ipons arranged for
them to seem to have soihat his an accident'
what was the detail to
betrayed them, such as the a¡rest of one of the dump watch-
men.
French traitors working for him told new British agents on That evening there was a Party in headquarters mess, at which
ld be quickly suP ,naris mentiáned that he-was flying to Berchtesgaden to see
i;;i.t next day. He smiled at t(e cñafi of the younger ofÉcers
J.Hl#t?:'i,'I io him Éow he could possibly shaké hands with such-
"rk.d
oeoole. He had in mind to aik Himmler for the release
of
agents for use in
i.uÉr"t fews whom he would smuggle abroad af.tet a Pretence
false identity cards, and adds that the papers were in fact made
out for them in the Abwehr Office III in the Hotel Lutetia. The i.ri"l"g them as Abwehr ofrcers' Hitler had exclaimed to
photographs were copied for Gestapo and Abwehr files. Re¡orts .r.i* iñ a frantic temPer after nine young Nazi sabotagc
ón th. loirtities where these agents were active, and samples of been captured in America: "You should use crimin-
the weapons and explosives dropped, were sent to Berlin. instead." "I have exPress orders from the Führer to
The Abwehr showed an almost morbid interest in the new tsmploy )ews for this work," was üe argum€nt üat Canari¡
;urá *iÁ some success to Heydrich and Himmler' ,
A month later, on March i3th, 1943, the exPlosive chrrr'¡¡c wAr
placed in the aircraft of Adoli fli.tler, as he left Sn¡tl]"ll:I.'iT:
á virit of inspection to Central Army Group' Lictrtcrt¡tltl vlrl
i.hlrbr.rrdorá had dirguired the bomb a' " p"k"¡t r»l lrrlttrl|
:tles which he entruited to Colonel Brandt .[ tlrc
cttt,ttrn¡l
striker pin. Canaris received rePorts of German tests carried out
wiü these materials by Abwehr II, the Sabotage Branch. , 3if,; to an ofEcer at SuPreme H-eadquartcr'r' tlllet,ll{
As wi L B-oLrrrk to Rastenburg in East Prussi:r witlr .tlrr ¡ri
ar sralin h:" ñI4ñF o.á the acid fuse ete its waY thr,'rr¡¡lt tlto lél
c,,l,l liu,l rFllrléf€d
without
lcrl t,, r'rIhrllñ, 'Ih
strewed
war lrrrr¡ rrttrl tFllltwa
was ráised on )anuary
hysteria could see plainly Like before it had been opened. In thir rrruttltel llu U
a knell from Casablanca c velt: üe British dropped into Eurr'¡rc l'r'r llle lluffHlt
'Unconditional surrender.' A month later Canaris's personal ing German war Potential founrl tlrcir Wny VffI
etafi received a message from General von Tresckow of the ,.ñ. org.,, via thi man whosc oLgrrrlmtltttl Wll
r58 r59

British Secret Service all over Europe. Dr Abshagen says that
Canaris "was more than half aware but did not *"rrt to b. too
mu¡h. io the picture" when this attempt on Hitler was planned
and that "Canaris knew that Abwehr Branch II was working
on the fuses" and that "in fact he himself took fuses of thil
type in his aircraft when he flew to Smolensk". Some of the
drawing-room opposition to Hitler was wont to chafe i¡ inactiv-
"I have just had a message from Admiral Canaris."
Far away from the snows of Smolensk there was another
nervous tremor. George Earle had descended from the rank of
American Minister in Sofia to that of American naval attaché
in Istanbul, since America and Bulgaria were now in the war
on opposite sides. Cedric Salter, whom I have asked to search
King Boris of Bulgaria and President
Roosevelt to whom he re-
prepared to consider."
It would be interesting to know the exact date of these com-
munications from Canaris. It appcars f¡om the context in which
Salter writes that the approaches were made to Earle about the
time of the Casablanca Conference. Evidently Roosevelt had
r A bomb placed in Earle's baggage blew up the day he arrived from
Bulgaria and wrecked the lounge oÍ üi Puc Hotil,
¡6o
:hing very much in mind when he proclaimed Allied war ''.
to be 'unconditional surrender'. This formula is recorded
the foint Chiefs of Staff minutes of fanuary 7rJi,, 1943, and
therefore have been discussed as a serious policy in Wash-
before Roosevelt left for Casablanca. There is no clue to
message received from Canaris in the Hopkins Papers. We
elsewhere the testimony of Allen Dulles that Canaris's man
Berne, Gisevius, had been trying hard to 6nd out what Alliüd
terms would be.
Did a revolt against Hitler no longer suit the Allies' grand
letegy? Canaris, who knew of all the soundings and the
echoes that reached him from Berne, from Ankara and
Lisbon, had reasons to be pessimistic. His bomb did not
his overtures met with silence, and then t-he summons
'unconditional surrender'.
Mr Churchill has given in the fourth volume of his war
his considered views on the meaning and effect of the
itional surrender' declaration on the history of the War.
tells us that the proposed peace terms, once set out in draft,
far more severe than mere 'unconditional surrender'
Stalin about this time devised a more subtle declaration of
war aims when he said in a speech that he believed "that
cannot be destroyed, but that Hiderism can and must
I Eisenhower has revealed i¡ Crusade in Ewope that
tunconditional surrender' formula
was mentioned in the
Chiefs of Stafi minutes of fanuary 7th, 1943, and there-
rnust have been discussed as a serious policy before the
left for Casablanca. It seemed to those who studied the
policy of nations that this meant that the War would be
t to the end, that no arrangement would be sought with
is or with any other group opposed to Hider, that the
power of Germany would be abolished and the con-
nt dominating position of Russia in Europe acccpted as a
for peace. A debate in the House of Lords in March 1943
what divergent views were held on this mighty problem
tlme.
is reckoned with the'unconditional surrender' policy
not surprised when it was announced," Lahousen told
mystic and pessimistic mind foresaw the end of Ger-
-G t6t
 mon,, far ofl end he regarded it as the deserved punishment of
dcstiny ft¡r thc barbarities of the National-socialist system.
Cnnaris was at the bottom a fata ist.
"'We will all have to pay for this, for we have all become
responsible for itl' was one of his oft-repeated remarks.
"Nevertheless he thought that the Casablanca declaration was
a calamitous mistake at the time, that could only prolong the
War. For as long as there was no complete defeat, even the
military leaders who were at heart opposed to Hitler could not
be expected to accept such terms that were incompatible with
their conception of honour. Canaris said to me after the Casa-
blanca Conference:
"'You know, my dear Lahousen, the students of history will
not need to trouble their heads after this war, as they did after
the last, to determine who was guilty of starting it. The case is,
however, different when we consider güilt foi prolonging the
War. I believe that the other side have now disarmed us of the
last weapon with which we could have ended it. Unconditional
Surrender, no, our generals will not swallow that. Now I of him when he was in Portugal. He usually came accom-
cannotsee any solution.' "
ASSArr,-;;;"ñcHrLL r
Ass¡,ssrutrr Churchilll There is no doubt from what senior
German intelligence ofrcers have revealed to me that orders to
It seems that there were two orders, one to assassinate him
while abroad, the other to shoot down his aircraft. Of the Luft-
waffe plans there is still something to be learned from Lisbon.
Lisbon lay athwart the Allies' lines of communication; from
Portugal the passage oÍ. aircraft, ships and passengers could be
162
lixvcd by the Germans. It was plain from the first days of the
er that there lay great possibilities, and so Admiral Caneris
6¡st to test the ground with the German Ambassador, Baron
ld vo¡r Hoiningen-Hüne, who was well aware that he was
a country which, although neutral, was the oldest ally of
itain. It was a severely Ch¡istian state with a bias against both
ional Socialism and liberal democracy. Dr Salazar, the
', was determined that it should not be drawn into úe
Iamitous struggle between Germany and the Allies.
The Baron held a secret conference with Canaris in Lisbon
üe beginning of the War. "We reached an agreement that no
ionary or sabotage actions would be undertaken by üe
military personnel in Portugal," Baron Hoiningen-
üne told me. "Although certain German quarters envisaged
actionswith time bombs to sabotageAllied ships anchored
!n Portuguese ports, Admiral Canaris and his representatives
Lnew how to stop these attempts to my full satisfaction.
"Canaris was a man of integrity and good will. I saw very
by one of his senior officers and conversed mainly with
own subordinates, the attachés, Colonel von Cremer-Auerode
also worked under the name of von Karsthof, and his
, Captain Fritz Cramer. I was also told nothing of his
l activities while in Portugal, but he seemed to be seeking
links and contacts with the enemy in greatest secrecy and
contravention of the policy of Hitler."
Plainly üis inactivity in such a promising area could not be
to last I Nor did it. The lull in Portugal seems to have
on the nerves of Hitler. Keitel at a conference at the beginning
ry42 abrtptly ordered Canaris to get results on the Air Stáff
to sabotage the New York-Lisbon Atlantic Clipper air-
General Lahousen was present. The Admiral nervously
to him and passed the command straight on. They were
y so disconcerted that the results were soon forth-
ing. A time bomb was placed in the AmericanClipperfying-
shordy afterwards as she lay in the Tagus estuary. "There
a complete ban on all such acts of terrorism laid down by
Admiral and written on page 256 of my Departmental Wat
ry," General Lahousen told me. "MI5 has üe photo<opies
The original is in Washingtoo."
ú3
 But what use was a secret directive against m.urder and assassi-
nution if peremptory orders come from abovel Canaris happened
to be soon in Portugal and was told, to his consternation, by
his ofncers that the bomb was already in the Clipper. He ordered
it to be removed, and as the Clipper was delayed by rough
weather this could successfully be done. "Trevor-Roper is right
when he asserts that Canaris was not always able to prevent acts
of terrorism," concluded Lahousen. "Sometimes it was techni-
cally impossible. Sometimes it was a question of personality.
That he was always opposed to it is without question,"
It appears that the Germans knew of an impending meeting
between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt in January 1943,
Comma¡der Wichmann in his Hamburg office learned about a
week beforehand that a meeting was to take place. There was
some rumour of it in Spain, too, where an indignant business
man turned up after being ejected in advance from hls room in
one of the Casablanca hotels. The opinion in Berlin was, how-
ever, that the meeting was to take place at the White House and
that the word 'Casablanca', which had leaked out to them,
was merely a code name for the White House, the Washington
residence of the American President. But the Luftwaffe was
alerted, and Colonel W. |enke r tells me üat a special recon-
naissance aircraft used by Department I of the German
Intelligence (probably in Section IL(Luf) and maintained at an
airport on the Peninsula for highJevel photography,was ordered
out to reconnoitre and spotted Írom a great height a British
bomber fying souüwards wiü fighter escort, which turned
around in the vicinity of Lisbon so that the bomber flew on
alone. Was this the furnished hulk in which Mr Churchill des-
cribes his uncomfortable journey with Lord Portal and others
to the Casablanca Conference? |enke believes that it was, and
that the British bomber also sighted this German aircraft which
belonged to tl're Rowehl reconnaissance squadron. Canaris had
not organised the second stage of this operation, he said, which
would have been fighter pursuit also from the peninsula.
"I know nothing of the air reconnaissance activities against
Churchill," said Lahousen. "As to my own department, I do
remember that after Mr Churchill had arrived in Casablanca
Kéitel passed to me the request, probably from üe Führer, to
l Adjutant to Canaris,
ú4
Churchill assassinated by nationalist Arabs. Hitler wn¡
bly thinking of some of our Spanish Moroccan agcnts,
apart from the technical impossibility of pulling an opcra-
like that out of a hat, there was üe Admiral's own ban on
activities. All attempts on Churchill, as far as I know,
ordered alterhis arrival in Casablanca."
I have ¡eceived confirmation from Colonel of the Luftwaffe
'Theo
Rowehl, commander of an air intelligence squadron, tl¡at
is mentioned to him in utmost secrecy the assassination
Of course the Luftwaffe was on its mettle when the Casa-
nca Conference had ended. The Biscay squadrons ranged far
wide. Otto fohn, a Lufthansa official, remembers how one of
the Lufthansa air-liners was suddenly ordered about this time to
I its Lisbon-Madrid fight 'owing to engine trouble' and
make a'test fight' instead in a wide sweep out to sea; what t}te
pilot was to watch for, fohn could not say.
Mr Churchill set out from England a second time five months
is time really to the White Flouse and refir¡ed aia
lgiers after üe second Washington Conference, meeting Mr
in North Africa on May 3oth, 1943. There naturally his
was reported to Berlin by German agents and the Luft-
,tuafie alerted a second time to intercept his
aircraft. It is probably
Itb these circumstances that we owed the loss, so he believes, of
;thl British Overseas Airways liner that was shot down on |une
llt, 1943, out at sea by the Luftwafie on its return fight to
n. The thirteen passengers and the crew all lost tleir
and the Wehrmacht communiqué of the day claimed it as
'transport aircraft'. Leslie Howard and Mr Alfred Chenfalls,
financial expertwho bore a certain resemblance to MrChurchill
srrioked cigars, were on board this aircraft and lost their
with the rest, men, women and children. Mr Churchill be-
that Chenfalls, crossing over to the airfield to the BOAC
ne, may have been mistaken for himself and so provided a
tive for this singular crime-for the BOAC air-liner carry-
freight and some diplomatic correspondence to and fro had
allowed to run unmolested by the Luftwaffe all these yearo.
Soon after that Lisbon became the scene of a strange encounter
which Canaris himself may have met an, Allied officer.
had never accepted a Sovief ambassador or even a
Í65
§ovlet consul on her soil. Salazar and his people in their deep-
rootcd religious convictions saw atheistic States as their declared
enemies. FIer treaty with Russia had not made Germany any
more popular in Lisbon. It followed that the Poles, because they
were attacked by two powers that had forsaken Christianit¡
were treated with consideration by the Portuguese and allowed
to maintain their Legation at Lisbon as well as certain intelli-
gence agents.
Colonel fan Kowalewski was an officer of the Polish General
Stafi with the deep-rooted mistrust of his nation for the Germans.
Düring üe years when he was studying as a young officer he had
to travel to the military academies of Belgium and France and
crossed Germany many times. "But I never spent a night in Ger-
máD/," he told me. "Instinctively I passed through as quickly
as I could." He served his country as military attaché in Moscow,
escaped from the defeat of the Polish armies and was sent by
General Sikorski to Lisbon to work es representative of the
Free Poles. He kept his distance from the Polish Legation. It was
one of his tasks to get in touch with the Polish communities of
Europe, labourers in the Todt organisation, miners in France
and Germany, and beyond, the people of enslaved Poland itself.
He must be wary of his movements,even in Lisbon; for although
British influence was strong, there were many nationalities in
Portugal--Cermans, Italians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Hungar-
ians, Spaniards and many more besides. Colonel Kowalewski
was a man of simple habits, stocky and solid in appearance. With
his broad face and blunt features, he could easily pass for a
peasant or a labourer raüer than a highly trained staff officer.
He settled down unobtrusively in a small furnished aPartment
in Lisbon, took stock of his surroundings, informed himself as to
who there might be in the diplomatic and consular services,
friends, neutrals and enemies, and took up some of the threads
that ran out of Lisbon into occupied Europe.
Colonel Kowalewski soon learned of the state of mind of the
German Ambassador, and perceived that fate had struck a bad
blow at üe Baron Hoiningen-Hüne. Under Hitler's treaty of
friendship with Russia all German minorities were withdrawn
from East Poland and the Baltic States which Russia had occu-
pied. The Ambassador thus lost his ancestral home. His old
mother was obliged to remove westwards, where a castle was
t66
for her in the enslavéd provinces of Poland, The castle in
uania was immense; an equally large castle in Poland was
, where the old lady was set down with her belongings.
did not move about mucti in her new domain to begin with
, being over seventy, she had to overcome the fatigues of-the
, the strangeness of her new surroundings, üe wrench of
rture. After a time she set out to explore one storey after
of the castle in Poland and in the course of her wander-
she suddenly encountered two ladies like herself walliing
the place. She asked them who they were and whether she
do anything for them.
"This was oui home," they answered. "The civil governor
given us permission to stay on in two rooms until we can
somewhere to go."
The Baroness Hoiningen-Hüne realised to her amazement
a family of the Polish nobility were being turned out of
ir own castle to make room for her. This was a great shock
an old lady who itill lived by the standards of the nineteenth
tury. She decided to go to Berlin and find out if people in the
nment really knew what was going on. At first the officials
whom she spoke in the Wilhelmstrasse showed some em-
'rassment, then she met other ofEcials who showed no concern
all. This was merely part of the pattern of eliminating the
sh intelligentsia. That prompted her to go about saying
hard things to people in offiqial positions, until she was
that she had better stop agitating about the Poles or she
d be in t¡ouble. The old lady died soon afterwards, early in
The Ambassador went to Berlin for the funeral and re-
:d embittered to his post at Lisbon, hardly a trustwordJy
nt for the Führer.
It was after the German war with Russia had started that
I Kowalewski, who had by then found stealthy contact
sorne of the small allies of Germany, in Lisbon, received
:ssage from a Rumañian diplomat whom he could trust. It
him that the German Ambassador had a confidential agent
he wished to meet Colonel Kowalewski.
e Colonel took every precaution before the meeting. He
out to the rendezvous with his Rumanian friend; a group
followed him in a second car. As they reached it he
167

t¡oduced to him. It was Captain Fritz Cramer, the Canaris
officer of the German Embassy.
meetings that were usually held at
"You a¡e Peter in Lisbonl'i asked Cramer
"Yes, that is so l"
"We have arrested your man in Paris. He gave us your name.
,'
If you are anxious to save his life, perhaps we can do something
about it."
Kowalewski was anxious to help the man in Paris and said so.
Some days elapsed and Cramer came to the nighdy meeting,
bringing with him a bundle of papers. It was, he said, the re-
ports of the man in Paris which he could see no harm in handing
over. Kowalewski learned more of the state of mind of Baron
von Hoiningen-Hüne. Sometimes there was a little intelligence
business to do, but he noticed that Cramer always tended to
want to discuss the general situation, the future, the issue of the
War, the frame of mind of the Allies. Kowelewski told him with
great plainness what in his view had been the capital mistakes
of the Germans. So began his secret contacts wiü the men of
Canaris in Portugal.
- One day, in the summer of ry43, one of the Canaris officers
came to the appointment in a state of suppressed excitement. He
spoke of strange new weapons that Germany was busy perfect-
ing-rockets and bombs that were being mass-produced and
could be fi¡ed at England in endless streams from bases in
France. Aircraft could not intercept them; they could be launched
night and day from bombproof concrete bases. When they were
released they would fall in hundreds and London would be
devastated. This was a full year before Hitler gave the order for
the V-weapons to be used and the fust buzz-bombs droned over
' Britain, though it seems that aerial retonnaissance had already
revealed to the British what was going on in Peenemünde, and
they had received an accurate sketch of a V-r from a source in
Switzerland. Some indication that rocket bombs were being
in the Oslo letter which we
designed and tested was contained
¡68
already mentioned as having been posted to the British
attaché in Oslo early.in the War by a German scientist.
was the purpose of tlis communication made in Lisbonl
it was simply intended to make the British abate their
ing offensive against Germany. Perhaps, also, it was in-
as an earnest of good will on the part of these German
ligence officers, as a prelude to talks about ending the War.
,aps it was merely talkativeness on the part of men whó
convinced that they were fighting on the wrong side and
part in the destruction of European civilisation.
was Cramer another evening who mentioned his 'chief',
might visit Portugal and would like to meet Colonel
i, He would come at üe time arranged for. the
men's talks. "That will be Canaris," the Polish diplo-
in Lisbon told him beneath tleir breath" Kowalewski, who
never heard of this man, waited at his apartment at the time
üe usual German visits. His visitor t}lat evening
was an older
whose hair he remembers was nearly white, his skin sal-
who spoke rapidly and seemed to be in a high state of ner-
tension. He did not introduce himself, moved about the
as he spoke and seemed to be a person of high authority.
wanted me to repeat to him what I had previously said
about the mistakes of Germany," Kowalewski told
t "I explained to him that the capital mistake in strategy was
illowing Russia in 1939 to advance westwards as far as t}re
ians. While Russian troops sat on fhe Carpathians, so
to Vienna and the Danube Valley, the whole of Cent¡al
was permanently unsafe. Germany could neither move
nt troops against England nor against Africa. Her main
were tied to the eastern frontier.
cast questions at me, brusquely, with traces of the im-
authority that becomes a habit in some high officers, and
a rapid grasp for my answers. He asked me why it was not
for Germans to get the co-operation of the countries that
occupied. I gave him a very simple answer to that. As long
many did not change her méthods that was not possible,"
ry do you think thát he should go to s€e youl "
o exchange ideas on these strategic matters and Germany's
üis stranger Canarisl I recalled the Canaris conversa-
t69
 Silesia in Septemb<i r9y¡, think that it was Canaris with whom you spoke?"
s had told me of his reporrrr
on th. ¡v¡u§!u\ / rronr and tne caucasus ;fi;r..
FIe did not
need to travel to Lisbon at a certain
risk to himself to recite rlre uced two or üree taken of the Admiral about that time
clothés.
that may have been him," sáid Kowalewski as he stared
pictures. "Perhaps his hair was not suite so white as it
here; it is possible that this was the same man.'n t
tion of all. It would soon be
communications. At this time, September Cramer, wirom I traced from Lisbon to Hamburg eaiiy
1943, the Russians told Leverkühn that it was not Canaris, and he should
-*. P:g:"jng to approach the ' 'i;tand. The dis.
, But he did not say who his 'chief' was on this occasion.
mayed Polish Governme¡t in I on
, r"r"g"d counrry or four visits by Canaris to Portugal during the Wa¡
about to become a battlefield for
iime. The polish were noticed by the Allies. His arrival caused less appre-
sent Canaris soon with a huge üan it did in Madrid where the silent warfare of
ainly to solve with more blooá- and the Secret Service was more intense.
to welcome the Russians in their Canaris did visit Portugal he saw Cramer and
lled at the thought. president something of what was in his mind. He enjoined him
on was at this time the advocate Jy against acts of sabotage, and he never mentioned the
of Hitler to assassinate Churchill, üough he yarned
American and British
standing with the West.
-". 1.,¿.1'.1ilI s,ff:'.t,*:':',j i:*: him about the British war leader.
a

¡¡sedto have some contact with Churchill before the War,"

"During my work in Lisbon with these men of the German vaguely. "The most important statesman of our times-
alevolence of the Czechs,,' said Stalin."
for the Germans, but I could star of Canaris was waning in the peninsula. The British
Service at lower grades was pressing the Abwehr hard in
tff in; his own position at home was threatened. A new emissary
Governmenr in exile. oo th.,igll:1;l;:tH:ír,T, ,IllI: a young official of the German Lufthansa civil air
h:gr
.wi1do1 an{ ¡í-*,h;
:_1,:lj,: fying ;iá.G#il; ;?.,
bombs *r,i.r, ti. c"";;t.';" had foretold;
Otto fohn, who found his way to British ofEcials in Lis-
Í:TJl.^*:, -made
good use.r tr,. i"i.,,,i;ñffi;11,".;
in the summer of ry44 and told them that a revolt against
lIljl..i5:had
V-bomb bases. was imminent, Within a year ot the meeting between the
"I was for ever making con and Kowalewski, destiny was to set its heel on both
secret movements that they represented. The Polish patriots
ing for peacer" Kowalewski
who was so nervous of the city in 'Warsaw and fought their terrible battle with the SS,
iri the mistrustful Russians let the blood of these heroic men
quarries outside. There w
unsuccoured. These fighting Poles were not the men that
wanted to emerge in command. The German revolt in
transfer the talks to another about the same time was forlorn and unspectacular by
tanbul-and I knew nothing ison and the SS rnastered it with one hand.
de you feel that opportunitiel

170
17Í
 re people say the British Intelligence Service is very
Others say it is good. I wouldn't know. I don't suppose
would eithér. I wónder if anyone does. But the Ambas.
's daughter was going to be married and the family pearls
CHAPTER XX brought out from England. The Ambassador kept them
his bedroom against the day when he would bestow tiem on
THE RAT RUN daughter. Do you know, they vanished out of his bed-
Who could it have beenl Of course, suspicion fell
"Slvr us from the security sense of our ambassadorsl" said the butler. There was not a bit of prmf in üe mattir,
the security officer. but this time the Ambassador was quite firm-and the
I asked him whether ambassadors were any more fallible than went. There was no other servant who could be suspected
ordinary people. the same degree. Oddly enough the pearls were recovered
i.s not that they are worse than anyone else,', he answered, afterwards-in time for the wedding."
-.."It
"but the result of their rashness can be so much worse.,, .t'Sounds very odd," I ventured.
"Are you thinking of the case bf Cicero ? ', I asked. t'Odd is the word-but the main thing is that the buder went.
"No, not at the moment. I was thinking of the Ambassador,s . Yes, that was long before the days of Cicero;"
pearl necklace. Cicero was by no means tL 6rst valet or burler "'Iam intetested in the activities of the German espionage in
. I cannot imagine why we don't key," I said. "Can you suggest why, fot instance, Admiral
y in rhe diplomatic service. They ris should have employed deaf mutes, particularly in
t'Did he, eh? Poor old Knatchbull ! First of all Cicero, and
be followed around by deaf mute§. Sounds eerie, doesn't

t'Not followed around, watched in restaurants. Reading his

German Abwehr ofEcer told me about it."
"Ah, yes." The security man nodded slowly. "I see some sense
that. In Anka¡a tlere's only about three restaurants he could
to. Not like Madrid or Istanbul lt' Here he pulled out a scrap
paper and began to trace out a sketch map of Ataturk's capital.
When Kemal Ataturk moved his capital from Istanbul into
"Then somebody warned the Ambassad6¡-', ia Minor, he dragged üe diplomatic corps after him up the
matter what 'ee-thousand-foot plateau on which stood Ankara, hot and
man. There in the summer and severely cold in wi¡ter. It was a new
. He refused , though
tougn üre ruins of rne
the nun§ the clüroel were pre-Hittite,
citadel w€re Pre-Hfiure, and its
Iife went up and down the three-mile length of acacia
ll-S_uppose
t}re Permanenf Under-secretary-,, that was called the Boulevard Atatu¡k. In the older and
"Yes, but it's ticklish going over *r.r', head in his own embassies and legations of Istanbul, the Consuls-General
ng else happened.', " their staffs and the naval attachés spread t-l'remselves after
forgotten Ankara in the story of the Ambassa_ Chanceries had moved to Ankara and enjoyed tfie cosmopoli-
life of the Porte. The Ambassadors came down to Istanbul in
Í72 173
 | lrgv8fl§.nqt-w$fftrTi" I'
tl¡l rumme¡ months; although ir was just as hot as Ankara,
w!¡e lca breezes.
The aew embassies and legations in Ankara were all grouped
round the Boulevard Ataturk. The British Embassy, th; án-
sisting of a residence and a chancery in a sort of cámpound of
several acres, stood on a hill at the eastern end not far from the
President's palace. The Swiss and Czechoslovak are nearby, the
French and American Embassi s set a little back from the Éá,rL-
vard across the way from the Poles, the persians, the Chinese,
the lraquis and the Brazilians. The Italian and German com-
pounds lie on ttrre south side of üe boulevard adjacent to
Now no British ambassador could ever dine at a place called the
Station Restaurant however good tle food, so ihat the choice
was nar¡owed down to three. papa Karpics was a favourite
If you stood at a
ce or the other.
Boulevard Ataturk, you would
see in one day all the diplomats and ofEcials who Áattered in
Tu¡key_passing up and down. So one of the diplomats christenecl
it'The Rat Run'.
Turkey lay athwart the path of Germany to the oil wells of
the Middle East and the áelta. This frieÁd and later ally of
h, discreet and immensely valuable *.í in
perhaps the gr( atest acquisition to the British
e two wars whe
fapan to reassur
firm neutral atti
to Baghdad and If and was a powerful factor in
bringing about the clash between Germany aná Rrrrria. yet Tur-
key watched this gigantic struggle disconsálately, because, which-
ever side won, she would suffer for it. The
was best guaranteed if Germany and Russia
stre¡gth. Such was the view .that a senio
Turkey wishes to report home, and when His Excellency
174
there with him, he remarked: "The only reason for not send-
home this telegram is that the argument is obvious," Turkey
the defeat of eiüer side and was almost tempted to enter
war against Germany in order to save the Balkans from
domination.
Churchill and President Inonu met secredy in Adana in
ry43 and discussed the security of Turkey and how she
defensively equipped from the arsenals of the Middle
General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
and Sir Alexander Cadogan were present. The year 1943
the d by and Allied victories mounted. Mussolini resigned in
and was arrested; Italy surrendered in September. President
evelt, Mr Churchill and General Chiang Kaishek mer in
o on Novembe r zznd to agree upon future operations against
n. The meeting with Stalin at Teheran took place a week
. Stalin was angry and impatient that there should be no
nd front yet, and he definitely did not want such a front to
in the Balkans. Éfe was emphatic that there must be a direct
It in Western Europe, and President Roosevelt was inclined
r¡oe his arguments. To pacify him, Mr Churchill gave a rough
of Operation Overlord, the invasion plan for Western
According to the Royal Institute of International Afiairs'
nology of the War, 'the approximate date of invasion of
n Europe was decided' at Teheran.
üe scene shifted to Cairo again, where President Roose-
Mr Churchill and President Inonu met, with Harry
ins,Mr Eden, the Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Mene
loglu and Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen present. Mr.
lI discussed with the Turkish President the possibility of
placing 75oo British Service personnel at Turkish ai¡-
ip of ls as a preliminary to Turkey entering the War. It is disturb-
The to think that the minutes of some of these me€tings and the
road of Operation Overlord should have fallen almost at once
the hands of the Germans. 'The results of the Teheran Con-
were soon known to Flitler, but he failed to draw the
conclusions,' writes General Hans Speidel, Rommel's last
of Staff.1 How did it happen?
Albanian valet, named Diello, in tlre service of Sir Hughe
ugessen made himself known mysteriously to the
dis_ t lnuasion t944.
t75
 te British flying personnel into Turkey, and adding up, with
nation, tlre stete secrets t-h¿t must have been lost this way.
lc.cs-were accepted.Cicer |ied with new security officer was attached to the British Embassy in
s of documents that he from the rkara, All sorts of precautions were taken now that üe iat had
Ambassador's dispatch box a October
Cicero
orooo a
"Ambassadors can be careless," it was Paul Leverkühn, the
tes, So ncipal German intelligence officer in Turkey, telling his slde
another to the Germans as fast the story, as we sat in a Greek restarant in London. Nearby
m London. Moyzisch reported hung a portrait of the old Greek hero, Admiral Konstantin
November 1943, rc interested is. The waiter brought us a carafe of Spartan wine.
papers. He tll mean von Papen this time." Leverkühn, former German
believe tl-re istant military attaché in Istanbü, returned to his respectable
o-American time profession of the law, thought back to the days when
rcetime
war effort and their concerted strategy, in which his own
doom von Papen gave away to tle Tu¡kish Foreign Minister how
. he had learned about the Turkish military agreements
the Allies.
"Hider placed von Papen in Ankara so that he might sound
to Heydrich as Chief
successor
Allies on a peace solution," Leverkühn concluded.
to know all he could about this Albanian a¡d what his
motives "But he riever trusted Papen and never let the entire Papen
nily out of Germany at any one time," said Thomas Marfiy,
of the Hungarian diplomats in Ankara. "As for Cicero, I
.ffi':T1*: ve he was really a Tu¡kiü agent making a little on the

After the War I set out in search of Cicero and found him in
anbul, working in a small, dingy ofrce in the business quarter
Pera, a stout, greasy man with a nervous .rwitdr, who looked
r,like Lenin, pretended he could not speak English and
:d to be perpetually on the run from infuriated-creditors
had accepted his false banknotes, FIe was short of money,
e_was
_very
litde like the suave, efficient valet you would imagine
B¡itish Ambassadoremplpying; and rhere he lives to this di¡ I
ieve, a precarious existence, maddened by his own failure and
duplicity of the Germans.

176
Í77
 hat that Leverkühn was wearing pleased the Admi¡al
much that he seized it and put it on in place of his uniform
r. So they rode on together, the Admiral quietly enjoying üe
,velty of his headgear.
CHAPTER XX¡ "Then he asked me whom I would recommend for this or
intelligence post-quite regardless of the fact that I was a
CONS TANTINOPLE -' captain and these were the posts of colonels and generals.
t was entirely unheard of in the Ge-rman forces." 'ú

They drove to the villa in Schlachtensee for lunch, where

ühn saw a modest good taste in his style of living. He
bered a coloured prin[ on the ofÉce wall of Konstantin
ris in fowing dress with a scimitar in his hand. In the villa

without register or indexes, and without a typewriter. He

riot attempt to create a system of German-born agents, but
d the material that lay to hand, émigré Austrians, Turkish
itical leaders, small Moslem sects who served him with the
I of hatred because the British were using Levantines and
nenians for preference. Finally he came into collaboration
ith the Turkish Intelligence Service and interrogated some of
r Russian security suspects. What did the Turks get out of
They listened and noted from the sort o{ questions he asked
ivhat it was that the Germans sought to know about Russia,
. "Calaris-had never- spoken a word to me about peace negotia-
" said Leverkühn, "but I have no doubt now thát he
;ted me to Istanbul to take up whatever threads might be put
my hand. He knew that one of my American friends of pre-
r days was General William Donovan who became Chiei of
Strategic Services."
As Leverkühn's work grew more execting, he asked for an
¡istant and was sent the son of an old friend and business
of Hamburg, young Erich Vermehren, son of Dr Kurt
ry8 179
 and his two Russian accomplices, Pavlov and Komilaff,
sentenced to imprisonment. r
"The ne:<t contact came from the Turkish Foreign Minister,
man Menemenjoglu," related Leverkühn. "He told Papen
March 1943 that Cardinal Spellman would visit Ameriqan
mind had been proposed before in the Middle East as Roman Catholic primate of
shtp and turned down on the ica and would like to speak with Papen or a man who pos-
grounds of his negadve attitude to
National Socialism. his confidence. Flerr Moyzisch, the security officer at the
kverkühn does not know r got to hear of this offer, so Papen was obliged to report
o
to Ribbentrop and suggested that I should take up üis invita-
. There was a sour negative reply from Ribbentrop that 'it
was no use discussing peace'and a violent reaction from Papen
who cabled that he saw no sense in that case in maintaining
from Canaris to George Earle 1,, missions abroad.
"Perhaps Moltke "There was another message from George Earle in April ry44,
did."
that was t¡ansmitted to me in Germany. He let me know that
ingrad disaster that the first Allied preparations to invade Europe were technically so com-
mericans,,, said Leverktihn. plgte that the invasion must succeed, but victory in the West
must also mean victory in the East and the end of European
civilisation. W.as there then no possibility for another talk about
a solutionl I reported this to Colonel Hansen, the new chief of
Military Intelligence, but I was not allowed to return to Turkey.
The talks were conducted with Herr von Lersner, who was
living in Istanbul as President of the German Orient Society,
and I believe that Herr von Papen had talks wiü Americans
also."
In the meanwhile an awkward mishap had overtaken the Ger-
man Intelligence Service in Istanbul.
a

It was the business of tle German Abwehr office in Istanbul

to pass out genuine and spurious information to the British, to
serve certain purposes and perhaps gain some goodwill. But in
were extended to Europe.,, this dangerous contact with the enemy inward loyalty meant
The last remarks w-ere meant ever¡hing. Every man in the German consulate and attaché
tJ:rT
u¡as angr), and mistrustful. The group in Istanbul watched his neighbour. Was X really spying
on the British, or was he working with them? Vermehren was
West.
already known to the Gestapo for his negative attitude to
pen in National Socialism, and when it become a question of his retu¡n-
whose
ing to Germany fear for his wife and himself seized him and he
police took up contact with the British with the idea of finding refuge
a Rus. with the Allies.
¡8o
¡8r
 :rE rt ¡'i ! I

llrltlsh Secret Service decided to spirit the Vermehrens fooling whom; and Greeks, Albanians, Levantines, Turks,
giving the afrair a mysterious aspect so that the Germans Bulgarians, Italians came and went across the Bos-
hardly_guess whether this was a .Night and Fog, action The Vermehrens hoped that they would be able to
mple desertion, but news of the scandal leaked oit to the some understanding and enlighten some of their own
rted from an independent posiúon outside Germany, but, like
ofa human purposes that run counter to destin¡ tÉe efiect of
and their striving was üe opposite to what was intended. The force
within Germany that was secretly working for p€ace was shaken¡
ideas of putting the 'l "Vermeh¡en tells me he did not take any code booksr" I said
campaign against not ito Leverkiihn when he had ñnished his nariative.
nding in London cial "Yes," replied Leverkuehn, "I have met Vermehren and had
save himself. They were

he dogs?"
u see, when he travelled,
Canaris often used to book a double room üd the dogs slept on
the other bed."
"That's not at all the German way with dogs.',
. "Ffe'could be quite infuriating the wá'y he talked about
them-',
The Germans related among themselves th¿t Vermehren had "And the stories of high treaso,n?"
run with the code books of the Abwehr.
him years

phatically,
' Hi, *if., the Countess Elizabeth, upright, incisive, dressed in
stiff gold brocade, led the conversation.
"Ah, Canarisr" she said,
German soci«y in Berlin "He didn't get much credit for his intenrions-from either
the defection of the Vermeh side."
religious antipathy of the
Third Reich. The story circulated that the Vermehrens had been
member of the Trinity and
state of Germany, "but,,, said
ave, "do not forget to take the

Yo m the citY of
lge nd German i
by and tried to
t8z r83
 mly rhr outmtnrttns brow
tÍi[,f, ot tlrc nuthority from Rome lay'safely in the steel chest of Colonel
, a trusted friend of Admiral Canaris, in Army Com-
The ¿d¡oit fosef Müller_came and went
between Munich nntl Headquarters.
}::Xl*,,11,1d.1":. r,.-s.o*-i.; ;;;;;,^ r^ .'-^emt,(,r said to the court, conducting my own defence, either I was
1942. Colonel Helferrich, theintel
who his motives,
Rorrrc innocent or entirely guilty and that I demanded
s.uspected had ers r¡f or the death perulty. The court acquitted me, büt I
Canaris. Otto fohn, an autÁo.ity
on the Germa" Abrr.h;t:.;i:
me tlrat a cautious question m e cle.ir i- th^ kept in military arrest because the Gestapo would otherwise
-^.^.--^ -_ r .t ,
itaken me into custody for special interrogation."
had his fust official conference with Ernst Kalten-
in Munich in February 1943, when these investigations
still not completed. It so happened that two sn-rdents, one a
had just been hanged at Munich University for making
a against the regime out of the Stalingrad disaster.
Admi¡al found Kaltenbrunner úary and critical. Though
dunning than his predecessor, Heydrich, he was a grim and
ruth opponent. Canaris sized up the broad shoulders, mas-
affair. He was himself ,attached i"-,fr.'üt"""ich head and thin violent eyes and was consternated by the size
office of thc hands; 'real murderer's paws,' he described them to one of
was at once acquainted with the
officers afterwards. Kaltenbrunner criticised o,ne of Canaris's
or ro work with a Colonel Roder
the Chief Intelligence OfEcer of Vienna, Count Marogna-
ral's department. They starte<l itz. He asserted that the count was in close touch with the
before they ñrst visiteá Canaris
vative opposition in Hungary and was on friendly terms
suspect members of the Hungarian Intelligence Service
for their pro-British attitude.
unner was in fact implying that a senior member of
German Intelligence Service was in touch with such per-
as were most likely to be themselves in touch with tle

plot against rhe life ofEcers noted that Canaris reacted instantly, speaking in
and pastor Bonhoerfer were rapid, persuasive manner that he showed when excited.
.5 %#*fX were, he argued, üe very best reasons for watching
ointment
rians of all parties. The duties of an intelligence officer
court_ma
that he should have some knowledge of the activities
groups. It seemed as if Kaltenbrunner was partly reassured.
Hungarian Intelligence Service never lost touch with the
ish throughout.the'War," a senior Hungarian diplomat told
when I mentioned this incident. "It is easy to understand
cumentary menace that Kaltenbruhner's criticisms embtdied. Hungary
there had such good contact with the British that we signed articles
that I had on board Sir Hughe -Knatchbull-Hugessen's yacht
¡86
t87
 L ,r,lt,q§

the Admiral. "I recollec that just before the Anzio land-
rI asked him where the British batdeships were.
'We a¡e looking after them--don't you worry,' answered the
but he gave no po,sitive answer on their whereabouts,
en they appeared in support of the Anzio landings imme-
afterwards, we knew where t-tre British battleships were.
I say he was a bad intelligence ofrcer."
's why
Doubtless üe Admiral was genuinely unaware that Anzio
ts impending. I find it hard to believe the same o,f North
rica. Herbert Wiéhmann from Hamburg, perhaps in the face
conficting reports, gave him the correct destination of the
rü' convoys. Maybe Canaris had an idea, too, but simply let
General Stafi and the High Command draw their own con-
.t:._!o pursue his course agains
rsions. It is positive that he knew of the impending defection
"Oh, yes, Admiral Caiaris warned Switzerland
October 1942," August- Li again in Italy and made a point of reporting to the SD in the opposite
,fr. pr*r-rrir".il¿ the Swiss It is impossible to say whether he knew of Count Grandi's
Legation in London told m "f t to Portugal to treat with the Allies; but he was on the most
terms with his Italian colleague, the Chief of Servizio
nzione Militare, General Cesare Amé. It appears üat
t a questionnaire to the German rya§ acting
is was like a man
acLrrtt rtr(c marr wno
who lsis rrylng
trying to oemolrsn
demolish a coD-
con-
to report what reserves of food building by dismantling the roof first and then the
No doubt Ribbentroo stones, Bulgaria, ftaly, Hungary, so rhat t}re final col-
could be blamed. A littte advantage would be less disastrous, whereas others were intent on
ing this. linking-territory_betw:á -".,09J,1':lffitl,r:
the Italiai froat and Ger_
ing every stone together so that when üe foundations went
collapse would be all the more disastrous.
Mussolini resigned and was arrested on July 25th after a vote
censure by the Fascist Grand Council. It was then a delicate
atter for Hitler whether to believe the professions of King
ictor Emanuel and Marshal Badoglio. He could ill afiord tó
arm his Italian ally while Italy was still fighting the Allies;
t he brooded over plans to kidnap the King of ILly and the
and to free Mussolini, Skorzeny was able to cerry out the
-'
of these plans for him. Canaris, when he heard that such
ns were in the mind of his Führer, decided that he himself
rld very well make a perso,nal journey to Italy on the pretext
assessing the will of Italy to resisr, but General Lahousén tells
üat his purpose was to warn Ihe Italians of the Führer's
ns.
So he arrived at Venice in August :,943 and stayed at the
the same hotel where he had met and persuaded the
r88 r89
Rumanians in r94o to let him infiltrate Germans into Ploesti a
a guard for the oil wells. The scene had dranged mightily i
those three years.
Amé, a tall blonde Tyrolean type, slow of speech and mort
German in appearance than Italian, brought a number of hir
ofEcers to Venice. Canaris was accompanied by Lahousen, whu
was about to leave him and go to field duties, and Colonel von
Freytag-Loringhaven, who would take over from Lahouscn
Department II of the Intelligence.
Lahousen relates üat üere was a large and formal breakfast
at the Hotel Danieli. Canaris and Amé went alone to the Lido
that afternoon and spent an hour and a half together. It wal
during this time at the Lido that Canaris warned his friend of
the kidnapping plans. He indicated ro Lahousen on his return
that the warning had been given and that Amé for his part harl
been equally frank with him. Capitulation was in the áir. Italy
was about to change sides. Amé and Canaris met next day for i
formal leave-taking in the presence of thek assembled stafls.
The Italian loudly and clearly assured the Germans that the
brot Italy
the
was
ft::l
him out with wonderful seriousness in
the presence of them all.
Back at Zossen Canaris sat at dinner table and regaled Ernsl
Kaltenbrunner and Walther Huppenkothen with his memoricc
for a separate peace. Amé? Weil yes, he had since learned thrt
Amé had been sent to command a division immediately after thc
Venice meeting. Badoglio had returned him to 6eld duties, 1
he, Canaris, had been told that Amé disappeared on his way
his new appointment and assumed that há had been murd
by the anti-German party.
I9ro
vhat silence or wiü what disbelieving stares Schellenberg
this story, Huppenkothen does not say.
I'the treachery of Italy did not come enrirely as a surprise and
§S was able to round up and transport to Germany large
crs of Allied prisoners of war in Italian camps, it was due
er information than that which Canaris brought back from
visit to Italy. The Intelligence Division of üe
Control Commission interrogated an Abwehr specialist
i! ,g+Z who had been at a Wehrmacht listening post iD
in September 1943 picking up Allied signals. flie Ger-
had managed to master the secret of the PE or scrambler
one that blurs all conversation to thwart 'tapping' and
restores it to articulate sounds through a special attachment
receiving end..This is secure enough if the line used is a
,ne cable, to which it would be unlikely that a spy could
the bulky unscrambling apparatus. But if the telephone
,ation is beamed by wireless, a variable 'unscrambling'
in enemy territory could be fairly quickly attuned to
Bame frequency as the two ot.her PE sets.
it was that the German Abwehr in the Pas de Calais
up a scrambler telephone conversation between President
:lt and Mr Churchill that, unknown to the two war
had been passed over the transadantic wireless link in-
of the cable. There was a guarded reference in their con-
ion to 'arming our prisoners'.
his made it plain to me," the Abwehr ofEcer told the In-
Division of the British Control Commission, "that the
of Italy was at hand; there was an SD man beside me
every word I wrote down."
Russia advanced in tlre East and Kesselring fell back out of
, the drawing-room Fronde in Berlin grew more vocal and
ry44 the Gestapo pounced on a group of disafiected
A Gestapo agent informed against Frau Solf, widow
former German Ambassador to ]apan, after being at a tea
in her home. There had been present among other dis-
persons a reti¡ed diplo,mat, Otto Kiep, who was at the
one of Canaris's subordinates, attached for war .duties.
Helmut von Moltke and his friends were arrested as a
of this. General Oster had been finally relieved of
work and retired in December 1943. Then Kiep
19I
 Fffi¡¿!, A that the Vermehrens and tlen rwo other (a) I appoint the Reichsführer SS to command the Secret Service.
He will agree with the Chief of High Command on what condi-
, tions the military intelligence service is to be incorporated in the
Secret Service.

*Is there anything'else you require?" asked Hitler when

tenbrunner showed him the scheme for the new unified in-
ligence organisation, and Kaltenbrunner promptly laid claim q.

the intelligence service of the Foreign Ministry. But rfiar would.

ve gone against Hitler's own policy of 'divide and rule'.
Canaris ce¿sed to be Chief of Military Intelligence in February
{{, ar uluc
little more than
ulafl Illne
nine years arter taKlng up the
after taking ule appomt-
appoini-
but to cover the real causes for his dismissal an economic
was found for him in the Wehrmacht. Kaltenbrunner took
' in such haste that Canaris had no time to make the turn-
of duties required by the customsof theservice.Thefaithful
flitted round tle secretaries to ascertain that no portions
üe Admiral's diary were left behind. The SD were now in
Maibach citadel, next to the General Stafi. They ordered
is to leave the Halder cottage and not return to it.
ffe sat alone in his Schlachtensee villa, and the military in-
lligence service tlat he had held together disintegrated rapidly.
"When üe Admiral was no longer tlere," said Richard Protze
/, "I no longer forwarded everyüing to Berlin from my
ligence office in Holland. We had no confidence in thé
without him."
"Canaris was unprotected," said Willy |enke. "Ffe was afraid
r his life, and yet he would not budge. We urged him to flee
Spain with his wife and family. General Franco would have
r to his safety. The Military Intelligence could have put an
peace talks vr
of I*vErÁuru. At any ¡ate he Wa
Leverkiihn. .át raft at his disposal; but he rld not go."
was dismissed the
presence and told to leave his intellieence behind. fenke shook his head as he recalled his vain arguments with
e Admiral, who was facing up to calamit¡ aná prepared to
for the crimes of his countrymen,

(r)"1.,Í:r üe establishment of a unified German secret Inr¿lligence

§ervrce.

r92
H,S,E.-7 r93

CHAPTER XXIII
OPERATION VALKYRIE
TrrB German front in Normandy was s
in the middle of July ry44 and tle
through Rumania and poland toward
I Not to be confused with Franz von Staufienberg,
who ran the Ge¡man military intelligence in Switze.lland,
tg4
árrest of Karl Goerdeler, the politicál leader of the whole con-
. No wonder üat Stauffenberg and his friends hastened
leir plan of action. It was very nearly foiled altogether.
Canaris sat in his house in Schlachtensee and waited pessi-
lly on events. Although no more than fifty-seven, inren-
and nervous concentration over the past nine years had worn
physically.
Working in the heights of intelligence, rhough his brain was.
keen as ever, his powers of action had receded; moreover, the
Rus mdings that he had taken with the Allies in past years seemed
offer nothing positive to the insurgents to build upon. He had
t his wife and two daughters ro Bavaria, where they were
from the mass air raids, and in fuly he was living alone in
in with his Polish cook and Mohamrned, his Algerian ser-
is distractions the parrot, the rough-haired dachshunds,
ional visits from neighbours and the work in his new
nomic study group in Eiche.
Stauffenberg carried a bomb constructed of the same materials
Canaris's staff had taken to Smolensk in r943-British plastic
and detonators with acid-tube time fuses. This was con-
in the brief-case which he intended to leave in a confer-
room with Hitler, Himmler and as many other Nazi
present as could be found together. It was nor easy to
a Service pretext for reporting to the Führer, still less
to find Hitler and Himmler in one room. Once Stauffen-
was ready to make the attempt, but the Führer did not
r. On ]uly r5th he managed to be present at a conference
Berchtesgaden where Hitler and Himmler were both in the
but just when he was about to press the acid capsule
itler walked out and did not return. Twice he reported failure
the reports ran to the British Intelligence Service in Lisbon
there had been a postponement. Finally Stauffenberg was
ven the task of reporting to Hitler on )uly 2orh at Rastenburg
r the subject of replacements out of Flome Forces for casualtiei
the Russian front, He few from Berlin to Rastenburg with
adiutant, Lieutenant Werner von Flaeften, passed through
three security cordons and reached the citadel, where he ie-
ted to Marshal Keitel a few minutes before the twelve-rhirty
alias Uncle Franz, ference, clutching the brief-case in his three sound fingers.
they walked togeüer to the conference, Stauffenberg noticed
f95
 ' ' {,:flFfl I',!
I

Eisenhower for an immediate parley; but he was uicertain

himself and, after telephone conversations with Beck,
Hoeppner and others in Berlin, he decided to do noth-
Meanwhile the plotters sent out t-tre code word 'Valkyrie' to
ne Forces, the garrison of Berlin was ordered out to protect
Bendlerstrasse from the SS, the nearest troops outside Berlin
ordered to march into the capital-and Fromm was told
4 pm by General Olbricht that Hitler was dead.
"Who has told you that?" asked General Fromm cautiously.'
"The information comes from General Fellgiebel."
The wary Fromm took the precaution of demanding to speak
Führer Fleadquarters and immediately was connected to
I Keitel.
"What is happening at headquarters? There a¡e the wildest
rs here in Berlin," asked Fromm.
"What do they say? Everything is in order herg" parried
itel.
"I have just had it reported that the Führer has been assassin-

"That is nonsense. An attempt h4s been made, but it failed.

By the way, where is your Chief of Staff, Stauffenberg?"
"Stauffenberg has not yet arrived here."
IJnaware that the orders had been unsealed all over Germany
bnd troops set on the move, Fromm decided to take no furüer
ion. At 4.3o pm Staufienberg arrived in Berlin and reported
to the Bendlerstrasse to tell Fromm that he had seen Hitler
ied dead out of the wreckage. Fromm confronted him with
words of Keitel. Stauffenberg retorted:
"Keitel is lying as usual," but he knew that Keitel had been
the hut and that he at any rate had survived. The revok must
ahead cost what it might I The plotters had to overpower the
ireluctant Fromm and put him and other staff officers under

Stauffenberg had telephoned to Canaris, probably from Staa-

Airport, Berlin, as soor as he arrived to say that Hitler was
after a bomb attempt on his life.
"Great heavens, dead?" replied the Admiral. "Who did it?
Russians?" He was well aware that even telephone calls to
home were noted and recorded, Within an hour of this call,
after 43o pm, there was a second telephone call from
r96 - r97
 r1
enother of the conspirators to say that the attempt had been
madc, but that it had failed and the Führer was still alive.
Tlereupon Canaris drove to his ofEce at Eiche and arrived just
in time to approve a staff telegram of congratulations to tle
Führer on his lucky escape.
Meanwhile the generals in the Bendlerstrasse had ordered the
watch regiment to seize Berlin radio hoping to prevent the news
from spreading; but Major Remer, commander of the regiment,
became suspicious of his instructións. One of his ofEcers sug-
gested that they should asL Dr Goebbels for confirmation of the
reports that Hitler was dead. Goebbels acted quickly, connected
Remer with Hitler himself, and the Führer in that unmistakable
vibrant voice gave Remer full powers to suppress the revolt. Two
ofÉcers in the plot, arriving at the ofHce to arrest Goebbels,
found themselves arrested in turn. It was obvious to the Plotters
by 6 pm that Hitler was still alive.. They saw copies of signals
from Führer Headquarters going out direct to commands
countermanding the 'Valkyrie' orders and their own com-
muniqué. Remer turned his cordon round on the Bendlerst¡asse
and would let nobody out. They were trapped. Fromm broke
out of his mild state of arrest about ro pm, turned the tables on
the plotters and ordered the summary execution of Stauffenberg,
Olbricht, Colonel Merz von Quirnheim and Lieutenant W'erner
I
von Haeften. They were shot in the glare of motor transPort
headlights in the courtyard before Himmler could intervene to
forbid any more executions and demand that all susPects should
be turned over to the Gestapo. Beck attempted to take his own
life, wounded himself, and was given the coup de gráce as he lay
dying. Hitler broadcast to the nation at midnight. He said that
"a miserable clique of military traitors had attempted to anni-
hilate him and with him the High Command." That day he ap-
pointed one of his most trusted generals, Guderian, to the post
of Chief of General Staff. This was the same Guderian who
had so much bothe¡ over Sosnowski's thefts from IN6 at the
beginning of our story.
What had happened meanwhile at Rastenburg? Hitler had
been leaning on the map table when the bomb exploded. The
force of the plastic charge was so instantaneous that it blew the
flimsy walls of the hut apart and sPent its fierceness in the open.
Had the conference taken place in the concrete citadel from
r98
ch the explosive force could not have escaped, the history of
world would perhaps have taken another course. A cone of
munity remained in the centre of the hut and in it stood Adolf
itler leaning on the table which collapsed under him. They
all blown flat, the Führer's trousers were scorched off, his
ir singed, his shoulder badly bruised-and that was all his
perficial injury. The fust voice heard in the wreckage was that
Keitel: "W'here is the Führer '"
Colonel Brandt was dead, one stenographer and a secretary.
were more or less seriously injured; but Hitler had his
s dressed and was quickly on the move again, wildly ex-
larated casuakv ward beds with the
m unit e baridagea forms that lay like
:ge wh ed despite their cerements at
approach. He joked about having had a short haircut, and
n somebody sniggered at his painful attempr to give the
i salute, Hitler did not turn on him, but merely remarked
-he could not raise his
arm properly and must be content
the bourgeois greeting. That afternoon he hurried to the
ilway station to receive Mussolini and Marshal Graziani, who
arrived from Italy to seek aid and counsel, There was a tea-
rrty at Rastenburg with Góring and Ribbentrop. This was the
rmous occasion when Góring rhreatened the Foreign Minister
rith his baton, and the inevitable reaction to the shock of
the
sion came in a violent brainstorm with the Führer raving
: the appalled Italians that the German people were un-
:thy of him and that he would wreak terrible vengeance or
enemies. Then he lapsed into moody silence.
The revolt lasted altogether no more than eleven hours. Those
ted with it, if not already shot or arrested, committed
ide, disappeared into hiding, or just went abour their daily
k as if they were in no way implicated. Guderian and Keitel
omptly turned over all military suspects to the Gestapo.
Canaris made no attempt to escape. Apart from a chance re-
k to an old friend-"Of course you can't do things that
. Ring me up in a few days' time"-he went about his work
the economic staff, as if he had never plotted against Hitler.
neral von Tresckow, one of the chief architects of the plan
íze power 1n
erze in uermany,
Germany, chose the other course. He walked
into the neman's-land of the Central Army Group towards
r99
 ].': i

fm¡well tn h Ar)C a.rrrt thc,, rtrew the pin of

[H{f.Ullf
lñd.¡rr_rutle wh lr hc lreru ugnirrst his ncck so that it blew
with the door permanently open and permitted to speak to
hclrl olf hlr nl¡ou lers. ody. No prisoner was allowed to speak to another, but when
Fllntnllcr wr$ not in Berlin when the insurrection air-raid alerts sounded they had all to shuffie out to shelters
started but that gave them a chance for whispered conversations. Their
he arrived in the afternoon of
July ,"rh;;;;;;.red that his own were left open for rounds and then they could whisper
counter-operation should begin- at
dawn next dry.H. hrJ gh the hinges to each other. It surprised his fellow pri-
plains laid ro arrest ,ll enemles
J*. ,.gái no marter how s and the Gestapo that Canaris srill talked with an up-to-
highly placed, no matter how ,.rro*.r.d
1".rJ t¡,.1, names in knowledge of the War, although he was cut off from all
ar dawn on July z¡st and contact. FIe was thereupon forbidden to ask his guards
h time hundreds Lf eminent ir the Wehrmacht communiqué of the day. Yet his grasp was
ill amazing, as if his mind still assimilated intelligence from the
when the threads were severed. Lieutenant von Schlabren-
was in a nearby cell and recalls the vague and naive
uestions with which Canaris tricked his guards into giving
sltuatlon rePorts.
"I suppose by now we are pushing the Russians back over
Vistula."
"Ach, what nonsense I They are approaching the Oder."
One day in midwinter a Gestapo detachment went to fetch
an SS tó the villa Schlabrendorfi from his cell and take him to the Sachsen-
Itgot Himmler,s Concentration Camp. They had suspicions that General
lanari f the house von Tresckow had taken his own life, and so opened his grave.
in the Dianastrasse and away in tre car with the When they prised open the cofEn and examined the corpse their
man who had become h,. [:iil:n suspicions deepened and they decided to cross-examine his former
adjutant, Schlabrendorfi, who had been arrested on supposition
of treasonable activities. Thinking that his last day had come,
he walked out of his cell.
CHAPTER XXIV "Put on your overcoatr" shouted the guards.
"I have no overcoatr" he answered,
THE LAST THROW "Then borrow one from the nearest prisoner."
TsB cells of the Reich Securi The only cell door that stood open u/as that of Canaris, as it
prominent men in Germ stood, day and night, with the lights on. FIe must have sufiered
diplomats, politicians, land much that winter from his thin blood in a cell sometimes un-
the small cells-men like out of the cell into the gang-
Schulenberg, Fromm, popit gratefully and put it on, and
look, as he did later at Nu he pockets he found a scrap of
companions. fosef Müller was in the black maria that drove
and úansfe¡red to Gestapo k him out to be confronted with the corpse of his general. The
orders for the security of Can note read:
'Your case comes up on the z3rd.'
2o,0
20r.
 Kaltenbrunner with his security branch man, SS
General "'Yet for months Canaris baffied them wiü one ruse after
)ftille5,,
and the.painstaking Huppánkothen began their
search ," related Schlabrendorff. "His skill in acting a part, his
tor evldence against Canaris. They sent an agent
to Switzerland ing, his imagination, the ease with which he affected naive
t9 spy on the Allied military It wi hard to find anv- dity and then emerged into the most subtle reasoning dis'
thing that.implicated Canarí, "ttr.hér.
directly. Hir.*. ned ihe security agents who interrogated him."
irm.i;;i
man who had been in such a high plsition,
a friend of General "It was not so much lying," said Lahousen with a chuckle, "as
Franco from whom they hoped"peri artistic distortion of the truth."
t'
peace terms with the West, coulá ha Kleist was interrogated about the letter from Winston
hook just like those other b-lundering Churchill that had beén tound in his desk: "That was simply
'kothen noriced
that Colonel Schrit rhe result of an ofEcial mission to find out whether the British
canaris, had committed suicide immediately iwould make war on us over the Czechoslovak issue," explained
after the insurrec-
tion of fuly zoth had failed. He inrerrogat.á'hi, l'Kl.ir, ao SS Müller. No doubt Canaris gave üe same answer'
d.ir.r; the man
:"tlg any his"master should Áave been I have t¡ied from the shreds of evidence on his behaviour to
implic d; d did not see many people_ work out what would ha tance, the
but th rem n files entrusted to him, for Gestapo had di 'Viking' d and the
warning of an threathe s in 1943'
To the accusation of treason in giving the Swrss a hint to
mobilise it would have been possible for him to reply in this

"The case is entirely dif[erent. We did not warn the Swiss of

The box contained ,
*ir..llronpytt,
¿ oro.rr.
L r---- There were the a real danger that they would be invaded. The Abwehr had in-
medical history sheets of Co formation on Allied Pressure on the Swiss !o cut all rail com-
observations of the Comma munications between Germany and Italy, slow it down, and
Pasewalk in Pomera¡ia, wher allow Allied agents to blow up the St Gothard tuunel' Our in-
First World War. The rema tention with tñe warning was in fact to convey a threat and so
hysteri keep our rail communications open, -which in- fact--wc did'
sanity. rNoÜodv in their senses wanted to invade Switzerland'"
Canari I emihasise that the above_is an.exercise of the imagination
PaPefs and thát Canaris may never have been asked that que-stion or
have given that answer. It serves 1o-lely to show what fine con-
y going between Sir D,Arcv st¡ucti"ons can be put on any one of his actio¡rs and gives an idea
the visiting card of Laiber stiíl of the time and sludy that would be needed to disprove suih an
so careful to destroy these
drafts as the y h"a b..r,fttn e negotiati ained
hrd ,g 'post
Se
(the Reich a time to size up r war
-_-.
when -I suspic
Admiral Canaris orated Eust or m their
'ed Ernst in his purpose by suggesting that Germany was not going to Prosecute
scertained the irria thefu[. Únleti Kalte.tbrut ner really knew what Canaris's
en he said this nts had told the Allies, he could not say for certain that such
safe. vities were treason-and there must have been always at the
202 203
I

s l.rad in li
to his master. Bernadotte told in Fall ol the Curnin
he had seen General Eisenhower in tl¡e autumn oi t944,
gives no hint of any mission entrusted to him other than his
purpose of serving the welfare of some Swedish \ryomen
to Germans, whom he hoped to repatriate to Sweden, I
that the Allies hoped he would disrupt the Nazi leaders.
ingratiate himself with Himmler he bought him a gift of a
on Nordic runes, which Himmler received with tears in
cyes. Then began the struggle of Schellenberg to break the
Chief and tha
Il^._1..*.,1y of Himmler to his leader and induce him secretly to
a surrender.
ou may think it sentimental, even absurd," Himmler con-
in Bernadotte when they first met, "but I have sworn an
of loyalty to Adolf Hitler, and as a soldier and a German I
lt go back on my oath."
he and Kaltenbrunner havered through March and April,
ing East and West at their torn and shrinking fronts and
ing the glowering Hitler in his Chancellery, intervening
no purpos€ in the battle and yelling his imprecations upon his
pnotised staff. By the early days of April the Russians were in
: outskirts of Vienna, üe Ruhr was encircled, the British
through Minden, the Americans crossed the Weser at
ine. The Germans strained to hold the Oder front. Hitler
between insane and terrible paroxysms of rage and
periods of calm, when he would walk out and engage
ies in philosophical talk interspersed with mystic and
ish remembrances of his youth, his father Alois, his home
and early career, wandering thence into abstract specula-
on the world and eternity. Sometimes between his rages
his calms he must have instructed Kaltenbrunner to deal
the prisoners in Flossenbürg, and Kaltenbrunner sent
n off to Bavaria with instructions for a summary

"These men must be snu-ffed out, witlout much ceremony,"

Hitler after the terse pages of tle Canaris diary and Oster's
y curios had been laid before him.
Flossenbürg, set among woodland in a forbidden zone of Fran-
ia, contained 'the prominent men', destined either to be
or to await death. They did not know which. When
20.4 arrived there after Ieaving Berlin on February 7th, he
205
 ate block, in which the brains of
was pur in a cell next to that of
under
tion of
togethe
tenant-Colonel )ack Churchill
ought t. h. " -"1,,^r-1. h;r;;;;
wt;;-¿;;nli¡.'.1b',.-i'.i'fl ;:ffiff;
never knew,', ¡osef'Mtiller told
me, .,had been *Or"reJ:ffi ];
attempt to blow up the Iron Gates
and blr.k th: Drrrrb. ;lip-
ping. He could nlt even wrire home lest
ner Starvitzki and ordered that a summary court should
immediately with the chiefs of the German Intelligence'
)enkothen ád-itt d at his own trial six years later that a
ii"ry .o.rr, was held on April Sth with SS |udge Thorbeck
siding, which found Canarii guilty of high treason, ahd üat
then-returned to Berlin. Others assert üat he waited to see
the sentences had been executed before leaving. Iosef
er was sitting fettered in his cell on April 8th, when the door
fung open ind SS man shouted to him-.to ge1 ready t9
"n
. fvf,íff.i tidied his cell. He was taken out stillin fetters and
laway towards the gallows Yard.
"Noi the play is áding,"-shouted one of his guards' "This
the last act. But you wili be hanged a head lower than your
I Canaris."
As he stood at üe gates of the execution yard, Stavitzki

revealed."
hi.;-. should be to him:
"H"ppy iourney, gallows bird.'
#:X*ll.*:ffT,Ti:Jllities now sat in the same grim After sianding irif ,, hour motionless, Müller was led away
G;l*j ; ; ;;fi ,T,H
;;ffi-.#;.*. rcc, ff.;
th ch who e
his cell. He ñad not been there long before he was led out
ie_r. a
1"1'f 1,:TT 11i ¡ñe
together of Himmler,s
s

-*L :t::ll. v

I*;'l::'"'-*:"j:.,".:,:1"i,-:;"ti";;;;;.'.nbürg;the A second time he stood at the threshold of the gallows, as if

S"'::-*:.T::r':.-r9:yÍ::i.;til;;#J;.:il:l'";I;
r,i- ,gr;"r,;'**. n';:líi::,ffi'J authority were awaited for his execution. Then the SS came
fl*' i".1yf questioned lead him away agaitt, shouting:
.rec"s"i,'.J ;;il "1i;; ;:"::.?,:'.',:
and he
3:T:^l:p,lg .: e "You've been forgotten for today-"
::lty il;, .,i gh ti_. whllr
*hl.
: :TÍ weri t.rt-of .r.rtT&.:",iJ;i
:l"o guards
the .:. t_
Did the distant lumination of Himmler save him, or the
"r,ii.., :}.':',.1'lls,t-ume
used the prifo.r.rr' ,y.t
of ,ivi.ri.o .r.^ .r^"^r^.'1ll*;Th.yn". j,.'il - of Müller himself, who knew all the laws of the
::"i'J'r'.':q :1'.f]t1*l'"" ""d
r. ttí ¡i'
ü;ü
;.;i5,0: r"
#: :'#
nces
lhird Reich, and protested that he must have a ProPer gial' ..
fl:T il: of :iÍ,.*:::f tap Ío
1.,.h-
the rnteuigence service k.;; ;;;;;:; ,"ff;dli: , Late on that ,aÁe day Canaris was brought back to his
cell
lXr..iliÍ'
cell wall. ":T what was named a summary trial, but could have been no
. Colonel Lunding noticed t s than an interrogation with torture. Colonel Lunding in
clothes, whereas others wore next cell could hear him moving and then the last slow
ppings began.
.-. will . . . have.. . been' . . the last. .' I think'
"fnát.
. Badlymishandled.. .' Nose broken. . . ."
Then as far as tunding remembers he tapped out the words
at his gaolers had been trying to extract from him for months:

mlsslon.
"I dieior my Fatherland. I have a clean conscience' I only
my duty to my country when I tried to oPPo§e the criminal
Huppenkothen arrived at Flosse¡bürg
with Gestapo Com_ 'oi Hitl.r leading Germany to dest¡uction."
zo6 207
 , lost them the War. I have asked a high officer of the
itish Intelligence Service for his opinion-and the British
accept the version that was related by his guards on that same
morning as they returned to their breakfast.
The stoic Ewald von Kleist who had plotted with Canaris
April r6th.
before the war was hanged in Berlin on
úller in Munich. Heu.

give evid,encer" said

in an i¡on collar and
took half an hour.Io die.,,

while he waited his turn for execution. Then there was some
knocking on the door of his cell and a voice said:
"Do you speak Englishl"
"Yes."
"Are you one of those high officers who were meant to be
hanged?"
"I believe so."
"That does not seem to be so. They are being burned at this
moment.tt
Müller, on the verge of hallucinations, believes that it was
Captain Peter Churchill who whispered this to him.
':No, I could no,t have done," Peter Churchill told me. "I did
not know about the executions. I only whispered to him some-
thing like-keep cheerful, the Allies are not far away."
Mtiller sat and waited for the summons to death that had

t}re worst of all."

What had happened in the SS summary Court? Did Canaris
I The Munich after
ving evidence at the t¡ial of ;^ ,confessl For a time Huppenkothen walked about
Febru_ary t thLe was,oo. i;; ;;r" ithe war as if he had nothing on his conscience, still wearing his
and that for one ro dil
ws
uniform leather coat but with the badges remo,ved. After |osef
il;;.;;;;
2C,8 209
 cerrainly to Oster.'There were times when he had kept secrets
to the re-
se against Upon that the SS Court passed its sentences as Hitler had in-
it, and snuffed out the Chief of Intelligence.
up from his post-war legal In the autumn oÍ ry55 Huppenkothen and Thorbeck were
Pr ce. for their part in these summary executions.
before?" asked t}le amazed Dr Alfred Seidel, defending counsel for Huppenkothen, asked
|u I Franz Halder, former Chief of the German General
wa.s never questioned about this case,,' replied Thorbeck. ff and one of the witnesses, "Is it not true that almost every-
,.-'-I
"I found.no space provided for such matrers in the Allied ques_ ng was betrayed to the enemyl"
Lionnaire." Halder replied: "Every time zero hour was fixed for the in-
ion of France, the enemy knew it as soon as we did. The
ians even-knew the time of the invasion of Russia before
of our army commands, Such leakages pozzled us but of
there was also strategic deception . . . sometimes we were
isinforming the enemy too."
And the general gave it as his opinion that the betrayal of
It had been to establish that Canaris ilitary secrets that had taken place made no real difference to
had been conn insr Hitler. His scope did course of the War. Germany had lost it anyway.
not extend to c
All the in d tha anaris ad_
mitted their miral SS agreed
that Canaris rema CHAPTER XXV

THE POST-MORTEM
METHTNG of the pathos of his death affected those deeply
had been once his rivals, the Chiefs of the Allied Secret
ices. Although in itself an insignificant event in the catas-
phic war still raging in the world, I examined such accounts
exist with the same sense of tragedy as I felt when reading of
"Of murder of Admiral Coligny in the religious wars of France'
ch drings," parried Canaris.
"Afrer man himself is old and past the age of impetuous quarrel-
g..r... I haá to be ready to
ng, but the cause he represents must be annihilated if the tyrant
Preven
Oster demurred, according to the SS. to have peace, even for a short while. At first nobody in the
estern zones of Germany came forward to testify that he saw
"Oster,' miral, advancing a step towards the man
body of Admiral Canaris, and there was some doubt about
whom.he protected, "allow me to say that I only
exact manner and time of his death until February r95Í.
pretended
nding saw him go naked to the place o[ execution; but fosef
"I cannot say anything more than I know,,' was the answer iller described to me how he himself was led twice to the
2It
 vious day andtaken uable ns. American forces freed Dachau Corrcerrtrutltfl fllñp
Admiral lgss valua have il z4th and pushed on southwards' Góring lurl tele¡rl¡t
it was less evident r. So ,tii;,ÍJ;l; ir. s.rr.ir., 'redoubt' onz8th
the
legends flourish. ffered to try and make peace' On April
I heard one myself in December r95o when a tall old
man, Himmler had been discussing Peace terms wlrll 'E'crr¡duu!L!'
t-gr_ey hair, was shown into my
+L
^+ rl, o,,,vere unaccepubte. ÍLe y.1l,r^yo: jrJt*F_ l!-1i,;
captured on Airil.z8th'Hitler married
t of Canaris, had come up from "íJtft*bunker án the mor¡ow' She took
s of detail. I asked him what he th" Ch"r,..iit'y *'

e death of Admiral Canaris and

ilf,TI.Í"':.*::
the chief account-

about_Aprit zotl under ctose escort and adds ,ff:l'Jl":l'J'r':

quently told that the Admiaal had been shot and buried in
a
bomb crater.on April z3rd, at a rime when Hitler was ordering
some of the last executions.,'
srood under the gallows like
hanged, perhaps was even
and then driven to Berlin as
story of his first hanging and
this strange version. Buinone

War, vouchsafed him i¡ The

an inefficient inrriguer, but has

his favour.
H¿':it','ii',r.,.tJJ,T,:;"T l;
The survivors of Flossenbürg were driven
the Americans advanced, and then taken s
until the disintegrating morale o t their guards
Army un lives.
I
ve been aptain peter Churchill
of Hitler the bunker. But the SS
ofEcer in cla¡g¡ the Foreign O
9f us saw that things had gone so far by then ,'We in Europe after this war" In other
that he would do better to stay his hand.,' want
words, if the eral §taff was destroyed ttrere
. Trevor-Roper describes the'affiicted and shaking Hitler shout_ 1ou]j
the nature and
ing for hostages to be shot after one of his traniendent brain_ ";.";:;;. i't no, think that after fanuary 1943

2t2 2r3
 I r lcllr ls wcre
ndents and stopped their pensions. In her case these orders
simply prolonged those of Hider.
One day in 1948 two Spanish diplomats a¡rived in Munich
racuperating f¡om o --r rv¡¡ílr¡¡Lr ¡rr uaPrl ror a whtle'
their td arranged in utmost secrecy for Frau Canaris to go to
thev live, rnaa¡L-_ _ -ordeal. In the 6rst days ofj:',.J.",i:;
liberation
. On arrival there she was invited by General Franco'
ffi .*..1f**",::^:":i=;,,J:;::i,":il::j
$::"T::.I::+__.'""d,ü['J.il;ffi i;;,i:Jl;i:TE:::I!
proqeed to Spain as a guest of the State, where she was given
home in Barcelona. The Caudillo was rememberi ng a Promlse
I;"..*:f
abode and ll.""_r,,,.,,i.,i.":'.iolll#lliill,j,T..i,::l:*
,r,.y *.,. ,.iffi; ;:":,ñ:::: rd paying a debt of gratitude.
'"

regret. ffil,.i;Ti;:::; Another old friend, Fabian von Schlabrendorfi, went to the
native Bavaria, where he became house on the Luneburger Heide where Frau Schrader
ristian-socialists and Mi"irt., had been entrusted with üe only complete diary of Admiral
oi is, in which he had secretly noted his acts and missions
mocracy. was painsrakingly
begun
rnances began to rebuild _hrt ng these terrible years. Frau Schrader declared that under
lm the strain of the events after fuly zorh, 19,4,4, fearing that the
G€stapo investigations would lead to its discovery, she had re-
moved the diary from its hiding place and burned it.
"I do not believe it is destroyed," Willy fenke told me as ive
talked over the closing scenes of the tragedy; but he could not
produce any argument to bear out his assertion. The SS at the
Itrial of Huppenkothen admitted to having made mico-films of
'§uch
parts of the diary as they had seized in Zossen. I remem-
bered hearing a naval intelligence officer say that the Foreign
Office had possession of some diary and wondered whether it
still survived in the material about Admiral Canaris to which I
had been refused access, but he was probably referring to the
departmental diary of Abwehr II that was raken to Washington.
' "Did Canaris ever meet the British himself?" I asked fenke.
"Ffe seemed to be always expectiDg them to throw him a life-
line."
"Not that I know of," replied |enke. "I can't vouch for his
activities abroad; but I do remember making arrangements in
t943 tor an English visitor who was to have come out to Ger-
many-"
"What, to Germany in wartime?"
"Soit seems, but nothing came of it. They dropped the idea
on the other side."
He nodded vaguely across the Elbe over Hamburg and the
North Sea.
"So his liking for the British was instinctive and perhaps part
2f4 of his fixation against Hitlerl"
2r5
d him tell of any English friends,,,
at the head of á sec.ét ,.rui..
said fenke. historians who want the flesh and blood and the spirit of this
h", to be careful and are not content with the massive bones of the document
the
centres will see his elusive anxious figure hovering behind
brotal tragedians and spoiling their.destlny'
brutal an¡ mau
C4ita any
their.déstiny. uoulo 3'",t1-¡u
[k;;;i; have achieved áor. th^t' thát without being de'
tected?
, ih. G..-"n Intelligence Service was §cattered by the dissolu-,
ot ''
tion of the armed fories. Piekenbrock, for a long time Chief
Department I, was captured in fre !:tl . bl the Russians;
í"i,i.., the Sianish ,p..irli,, and then Chief of III' deserted to
them from his own command; his successor, General
von Benti-
revolt' Lahousen
vesni. shot himself after the failure of the fuly
,pirr,'ro*. uncomfortable weeks in Nienburg tT]"T:*::il
. Hi".. l.-*rt discovered and taken out tó give evidence in
live out his days in
-' Ñ"t.-U..g. Then he retired to the Tyrol toagain when Gencral
found a powerful íriend
""l.i.Lr.1f."ehn

2f7
 I have saved to the end this obli<1uc tribute tr¡ Cultarlr frl¡m
s chief opponent in Britain-a tribute to a man who oftcn
thought too- rapidly for his oPPonents, even when he helped
them, who opened his mind to them to an extraordinary degree
and was not fully understood until it was too late. The under'
standing which he sought in Europe against one tyranny may
be achieved against another.

ffr. irrqo.* *r, oro.

We have seen little of the Canaris family in these years. They
did not go out in the gaudy society of the Third Reich, not to
Góring's- hunting prtti.. ot Goebbels' island festivals' They
knew"little abou"t ihe work that was done by the Chief of
Intelligence, except that he was up early and home late and often
vanishid to the ofñce on Sundays. The Abwehr was to Frau
Erika Canaris a book with seven seals.
Their reticence and my desire to write an independent study
of the man were two ,.riot, why we did not meet at the outset
of this book. His widow had first to run the gauntlet of the War
correspondents eager for the story of the master spy and en-
quiring after thetia.y. What could she tell them?-about as
"",
á,r.h the scientist's wife miglrt have gathered at tablc about
atomic fission. After seeing the whitcwash llrush applicd so
liberatly to much less worihy mctnorics, it w:rs rcfrcsltirrg to
encounter this digniñed silence.
She recoiled eiery time she heard of rlcw publiciltiotrs lrlxrut
I

w:rs' cvcll
her husband, knowing how terribly hald to dcfinc hc
for those who knew Ñm. She had no family papcrs olr his work
excePt her personal memories of him end his ¡rcrsonal
-nothing nothing
letters. Tiey ná¿ ¡otÉ been very cautiou-s and there was
in them about intelligence matters or politics'
The Abwehr hadlemained to her a book with seven scals'
perhaps instihctivelY because
ierritory. OccasionallY she P
conversation of guests, and
minent topic. But time and th
and she cluld hardly summon up any recollections on service
matters.
2t9
 ,l{r§ry'""
tho was not anxious for her
Valhalla which is probably reserved for Army officers
even if it was a question
Yet it seems ,i if th. of the German General Staff, that very thought will probably
Our move him to an ironic smile, as he looks down on Europe twelve
situa
his death, and seeswhat Of them
ly the greatest problemis to gather
evaluate it, and above all t.
[!i, 0"., the h is rori an *r, 0,,..1]Til.' :L:.: T T.1.::,L*:
poraries and see them as they were.
Canaris rendered accounr to no earthly
tribunal foi his deeds
and omissions and cared little for
He followed what Goethe hrd .;if.á-"pp;;J ;; censure of men.
:iÁJ i.,a.p..raent
con_
science'. To those who knew himwell,
,lr. ,..¿i., in theMunich
r
jt-id _o_f Huppenkothen was a matter'J no ,i!nln.rn...
Iike Huppenkothen had his role rpp.i"iJi"r"him A man
by the inex-

of the Chief of Intelligence,

then trial and we *1lk.a
e.A
cter_
sun-
lit weather. The GIs strolled
by, the .g.r.¿ latest from Ko..r. Th. *:l;Í
".**.r¿"*
. ft had seen dimly the tragedy
nning to forget it. What wáulá
deeper story? What did she
still to ask? Wilhelm Canaris

Allies, but they could

might h
,.rr., *r--ffi',ff:t:§lrff:l ;rf;
stronger ln a

had áe Nor
towards t'l
said in 1943, 'no problems after
as lt
th
If Admiral Wilhelm Canaris has somehow slipped into
r Three years, impnsonment.
that
 PAN Books of True War Adventure
(N,8, Ooittg to erumou &mctd, twa oJ tbte hokt D¿, h hfl?cÚil' Mb'¿irubh)

H. R. TREVOR.ROPER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Last DaYs of Hitler

JEAN OVERTON FI.JLLER

Born for Sacrifice
autiful Noor InaYat Khan, a
ho was shot bY the Germans
e George Cross f<'r hcr suPcrh
bF)

Entre les Pyrenées et Gibraltar, by R. Serrano Suñer. JERRARD TICKELL

du Cheval Ailé.
ks Editions
Orlette: The Story of a British Agent
Warburg. The storv of Odette Churchill, GC, MBE' No war l:ot»k sur-
g,Zwich.
r%r39
;i " ;oÁ"'','.,p"b courase'
"' ""'ü!,
üii'l,ñ:,-';;;;d
a, Br;ra;n and Germany. British
ANNE-MARIE WALTERS' MBE
c¡ Series D. Vol. lll, Germany
Moonrlrop to GasconY
oersonal storv of a twenty-yqrr-old who- was parachuted
ñ;;;.. ;; Éritith liri'oí áfficer with the French Resis-
; ;;;;;;;"it t ttt u."utd death, torturc and the loss of
iri.Jr.---tt.n, cariying vital despatches for.I'ondon'- she

;J,h; Py;;;;' tá. Lrá,y, wearing borrowed 'gym' shoes

 \
GEORGE MTLLAR, DSO, MC

Maquis

I
Grca¿ PAN. @fi)

GEORGE MILLAR, DSO, MC

Horned Pigeon

For a full list of PAN War Books

see the current edition of pAN RECORD

An Invitation to you!
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