Basel III

Basel III (or the Third Basel Accord) is a global, vol- • A mandatory “capital conservation buffer”, equiva-
untary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, lent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Considering
stress testing, and market liquidity risk. It was agreed the 4.5% CET1 capital ratio required, banks have
upon by the members of the Basel Committee on Bank- to hold a total of 7% CET1 capital, from 2019 on-
ing Supervision in 2010–11, and was scheduled to be wards.
introduced from 2013 until 2015; however, changes
from 1 April 2013 extended implementation until 31 • A “discretionary counter-cyclical buffer”, allowing
March 2018 and again extended to 31 March 2019. [1][2] national regulators to require up to an additional
The third installment of the Basel Accords (see Basel I, 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth.
Basel II) was developed in response to the deficiencies The level of this buffer ranges between 0% and 2.5%
in financial regulation revealed by the financial crisis of of RWA and must be met by CET1 capital.
2007–08. Basel III is intended to strengthen bank capital
requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing
bank leverage.
2.2 Leverage ratio
Basel III introduced a minimum “leverage ratio”. This is
a non-risk-based leverage ratio and is calculated by divid-
1 Overview ing Tier 1 capital by the bank’s average total consolidated
assets (sum of the exposures of all assets and non-balance
Unlike Basel I and Basel II, which focus primarily on the sheet items).[5][6] The banks are expected to maintain a
level of bank loss reserves that banks are required to hold, leverage ratio in excess of 3% under Basel III.
Basel III focuses primarily on the risk of a run on the
bank, requiring differing levels of reserves for different
forms of bank deposits and other borrowings. Therefore,
Basel III does not, for the most part, supersede the guide- Tier 1 Capital
≥ 3%
lines known as Basel I and Basel II; rather, it will work Total exposure
alongside them.
In July 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that
the minimum Basel III leverage ratio would be 6% for 8
2 Key principles Systemically important financial institution (SIFI) banks
and 5% for their insured bank holding companies.[7]
2.1 Capital requirements
2.3 Liquidity requirements
The original Basel III rule from 2010 required banks to
fund themselves with 4.5% of common equity (up from Basel III introduced two required liquidity ratios.[8]
2% in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). Since
2015, a minimum Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio
• The “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” was supposed to re-
of 4.5% must be maintained at all times by the bank.[3]
quire a bank to hold sufficient high-quality liquid as-
This ratio is calculated as follows:
sets to cover its total net cash outflows over 30 days.
Mathematically it is expressed as follows:

CET1
≥ 4.5%
RWAs
High quality liquid assets
The minimum Tier 1 capital increases from 4% in Basel LCR = Total net liquidity outflows over 30 days ≥ 100%
II to 6%,[3] applicable in 2015, over RWAs.[4] This 6%
is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an extra 1.5% of • The Net Stable Funding Ratio was to require the
Additional Tier 1 (AT1). available amount of stable funding to exceed the re-
Furthermore, Basel III introduced two additional capital quired amount of stable funding over a one-year pe-
buffers: riod of extended stress.[9]

1
2 3 IMPLEMENTATION

2.3.1 U.S. version of the Basel Liquidity Coverage
Ratio requirements
On 24 October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors approved an interagency proposal for the U.S.
version of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (BCBS)'s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The ra-
tio would apply to certain U.S. banking organizations and
other systemically important financial institutions.[10] The
comment period for the proposal closed on 31 January
2014.
The United States’ LCR proposal came out signifi-
cantly tougher than BCBS’s version, especially for larger
bank holding companies.[11] The proposal requires finan-
cial institutions and FSOC designated nonbank financial
companies[12] to have an adequate stock of high-quality
liquid assets (HQLA) that can be quickly liquidated to
meet liquidity needs over a short period of time.
The LCR consists of two parts: the numerator is the value
of HQLA, and the denominator consists of the total net
cash outflows over a specified stress period (total expected
cash outflows minus total expected cash inflows).[13]
no haircut. Notably, the Fed chose not to include
GSE-issued securities in Level 1, despite industry
lobbying, on the basis that they are not guaranteed
by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government.
• Level 2A assets generally include assets that would
be subject to a 20% risk-weighting under Basel
III and includes assets such as GSE-issued and -
guaranteed securities. These assets would be subject
to a 15% haircut which is similar to the treatment of
such securities under the BCBS version.
• Level 2B assets include corporate debt and equity
securities and are subject to a 50% haircut. The
BCBS and U.S. version treats equities in a similar
manner, but corporate debt under the BCBS version
is split between 2A and 2B based on public credit
ratings, unlike the U.S. proposal. This treatment of
corporate debt securities is the direct impact of the
Dodd–Frank Act's Section 939, which removed ref-
erences to credit ratings, and further evidences the
conservative bias of U.S. regulators’ approach to the
LCR.

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies to U.S. banking op-

erations with assets of more than $10 billion. The pro- The proposal requires that the LCR be at least equal to
posal would require: or greater than 1.0 and includes a multiyear transition pe-
riod that would require: 80% compliance starting 1 Jan-
uary 2015, 90% compliance starting 1 January 2016, and
• Large Bank Holding Companies (BHC) – those with 100% compliance starting 1 January 2017.[15]
over $250 billion in consolidated assets, or more in
on-balance sheet foreign exposure, and to systemi- Lastly, the proposal requires both sets of firms (large bank
cally important, non-bank financial institutions;[12] holding companies and regional firms) subject to the LCR
to hold enough HQLA to cover 30 days of net cash requirements to submit remediation plans to U.S. regula-
outflow. That amount would be determined based tors to address what actions would be taken if the LCR
on the peak cumulative amount within the 30-day falls below 100% for three or more consecutive days.
period.[10]

• Regional firms (those with between $50 and $250 3 Implementation

billion in assets) would be subject to a “modified”
LCR at the (BHC) level only. The modified LCR
requires the regional firms to hold enough HQLA 3.1 Summary of originally (2010) pro-
to cover 21 days of net cash outflow. The net cash
outflow parameters are 70% of those applicable to
the larger institutions and do not include the require-
ment to calculate the peak cumulative outflows[13]
• Smaller BHCs, those under $50 billion, would re-
main subject to the prevailing qualitative supervi-
sory framework.[14]
The U.S. proposal divides qualifying HQLAs into three
specific categories (Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B).
Across the categories the combination of Level 2A and
2B assets cannot exceed 40% HQLA with 2B assets lim-
ited to a maximum of 15% of HQLA.[13]
• Level 1 represents assets that are highly liquid (gen-
erally those risk-weighted at 0% under the Basel
III standardized approach for capital) and receive
posed changes in Basel Committee lan-
guage
• First, the quality, consistency, and transparency of
the capital base will be raised.
• Tier 1 capital: the predominant form of Tier
1 capital must be common shares and retained
earnings
• Tier 2 capital: supplementary capital, how-
ever, the instruments will be harmonised
• Tier 3 capital will be eliminated.[16]
• Second, the risk coverage of the capital framework
will be strengthened.
• Promote more integrated management of mar-
ket and counterparty credit risk
3.1 Summary of originally (2010) proposed changes in Basel Committee language 3

• Add the credit valuation adjustment–risk due • Improved calibration of the risk func-
to deterioration in counterparty’s credit rating tions, which convert loss estimates into
• Strengthen the capital requirements for coun- regulatory capital requirements.
terparty credit exposures arising from banks’ • Banks must conduct stress tests that in-
derivatives, repo and securities financing trans- clude widening credit spreads in reces-
actions sionary scenarios.
• Raise the capital buffers backing these expo-
• Promoting stronger provisioning practices
sures
(forward-looking provisioning):
• Reduce procyclicality and
• Advocating a change in the account-
• Provide additional incentives to move OTC
ing standards towards an expected loss
derivative contracts to qualifying central coun-
(EL) approach (usually, EL amount :=
terparties (probably clearing houses). Cur-
LGD*PD*EAD).[17]
rently, the BCBS has stated derivatives cleared
with a QCCP will be risk-weighted at 2% (The
rule is still yet to be finalized in the U.S.) • Fifth,a global minimum liquidity standard for inter-
• Provide incentives to strengthen the risk man- nationally active banks is introduced that includes
agement of counterparty credit exposures a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement un-
derpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ra-
• Raise counterparty credit risk management
tio called the Net Stable Funding Ratio. (In January
standards by including wrong-way risk
2012, the oversight panel of the Basel Committee
• Third, a leverage ratio will be introduced as a on Banking Supervision issued a statement saying
supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based that regulators will allow banks to dip below their
framework. required liquidity levels, the liquidity coverage ra-
tio, during periods of stress.[18] )
• intended to achieve the following objectives:
• Put a floor under the buildup of leverage • The Committee also is reviewing the need for
in the banking sector additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory
• Introduce additional safeguards against measures to reduce the externalities created by
model risk and measurement error by sup- systemically important institutions.
plementing the risk based measure with a
simpler measure that is based on gross ex-
posures. As of September 2010, proposed Basel III norms asked
for ratios as: 7–9.5% (4.5% + 2.5% (conservation buffer)
• Fourth, a series of measures is introduced to pro- + 0–2.5% (seasonal buffer)) for common equity and 8.5–
mote the buildup of capital buffers in good times 11% for Tier 1 capital and 10.5–13% for total capital.[19]
that can be drawn upon in periods of stress (“Re-
ducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical On April 15, 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
buffers”). pervision (BCBS) released the final version of its “Super-
visory Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large
• Measures to address procyclicality: Exposures” (SFLE) that builds on longstanding BCBS
guidance on credit exposure concentrations.[20]
• Dampen excess cyclicality of the mini-
mum capital requirement; On 3 September 2014, the U.S. banking agencies (Fed-
• Promote more forward looking provi- eral Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
sions; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) issued their
final rule implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
• Conserve capital to build buffers at indi-
(LCR).[21] The LCR is a short-term liquidity measure in-
vidual banks and the banking sector that
tended to ensure that banking organizations maintain a
can be used in stress; and
sufficient pool of liquid assets to cover net cash outflows
• Achieve the broader macroprudential goal of over a 30-day stress period.
protecting the banking sector from periods of
On March 11, 2016, the Basel Committee on Banking
excess credit growth.
Supervision released the second of three proposals on
• Requirement to use long-term data hori- public disclosure of regulatory metrics and qualitative
zons to estimate probabilities of default, data by banking institutions. The proposal requires dis-
• downturn loss-given-default estimates, closures on market risk to be more granular for both the
recommended in Basel II, to become standardized approach and regulatory approval of inter-
mandatory nal models.[22]
4 4 ANALYSIS OF BASEL III IMPACT

3.2 U.S. implementation

The U.S. Federal Reserve announced in December 2011
that it would implement substantially all of the Basel III
rules.[23] It summarized them as follows, and made clear
they would apply not only to banks but also to all institu-
tions with more than US$50 billion in assets:
• “Risk-based capital and leverage requirements” in- Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49).[27]
cluding first annual capital plans, conduct stress
tests, and capital adequacy “including a tier one
common risk-based capital ratio greater than 5 per- 3.4 Key milestones
cent, under both expected and stressed conditions”
– see scenario analysis on this. A risk-based capital 3.4.1 Capital requirements
surcharge
• Market liquidity, first based on the United States’
own "interagency liquidity risk-management guid-
ance issued in March 2010” that require liquidity
stress tests and set internal quantitative limits, later
moving to a full Basel III regime - see below.
• The Federal Reserve Board itself would conduct
tests annually “using three economic and financial
market scenarios”. Institutions would be encour-
aged to use at least five scenarios reflecting improb-
able events, and especially those considered impos-
sible by management, but no standards apply yet to
extreme scenarios. Only a summary of the three of-
ficial Fed scenarios “including company-specific in-
formation, would be made public” but one or more
internal company-run stress tests must be run each
year with summaries published.
• Single-counterparty credit limits to cut "credit expo-
sure of a covered financial firm to a single counter-
party as a percentage of the firm’s regulatory capital.
Credit exposure between the largest financial com-
panies would be subject to a tighter limit”.
• “Early remediation requirements” to ensure that
“financial weaknesses are addressed at an early
stage”. One or more “triggers for remediation—
such as capital levels, stress test results, and risk-
management weaknesses—in some cases calibrated
to be forward-looking” would be proposed by the
Board in 2012. “Required actions would vary based
on the severity of the situation, but could include re-
strictions on growth, capital distributions, and exec-
utive compensation, as well as capital raising or asset
sales”.[24]
The implementing act of the Basel III agreements in the
European Union has been the new legislative package
comprising Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Reg-
ulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on prudential requirements
for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR).[26]
The new package, approved in 2013, replaced the Capital
3.4.2 Leverage ratio
3.4.3 Liquidity requirements
4 Analysis of Basel III impact
In the United States higher capital requirements resulted
in contractions in trading operations and the number of
personnel employed on trading floors.[28]
4.1 Macroeconomic impact
An OECD study released on 17 February 2011, estimated
that the medium-term impact of Basel III implementa-
tion on GDP growth would be in the range of −0.05% to
−0.15% per year.[29] Economic output would be mainly
affected by an increase in bank lending spreads, as banks
pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capi-
tal requirements, to their customers. To meet the capi-
tal requirements originally effective in 2015 banks were
estimated to increase their lending spreads on average
by about 15 basis points. Capital requirements effec-
tive as of 2019 (7% for the common equity ratio, 8.5%
for the Tier 1 capital ratio) could increase bank lending
spreads by about 50 basis points.[30] The estimated effects
on GDP growth assume no active response from mone-
tary policy. To the extent that monetary policy would no
longer be constrained by the zero lower bound, the Basel
III impact on economic output could be offset by a re-
duction (or delayed increase) in monetary policy rates by
about 30 to 80 basis points.[29]

As of January 2014, the United States has been on track 4.2 Criticism
to implement many of the Basel III rules, despite differ-
ences in ratio requirements and calculations.[25] Think tanks such as the World Pensions Council have ar-
gued that Basel III merely builds on and further expands
the existing Basel II regulatory base without fundamen-
3.3 Europe implementation tally questioning its core tenets, notably the ever-growing
reliance on standardized assessments of “credit risk” mar-
Main article: Capital Requirements Regulation and keted by two private sector agencies- Moody’s and S&P,
Directive thus using public policy to strengthen anti-competitive
4.3 Further studies 5

duopolistic practices.[31][32] The conflicted and unreliable capital holdings dramatically on mortgage and small busi-
credit ratings of these agencies is generally seen as a ma- ness loans”.[41]
jor contributor to the US housing bubble. Others have argued that Basel III did not go far enough
Opaque treatment of all derivatives contracts is also crit- to regulate banks as inadequate regulation was a cause of
icized. While institutions have many legitimate (“hedg- the financial crisis.[42] However, these arguments should
ing”, “insurance”) risk reduction reasons to deal in deriva- be examined closely, as Basel III was not in effect until
tives, the Basel III accords: after the financial crisis occurred. On 6 January 2013 the
global banking sector won a significant easing of Basel
• treat insurance buyers and sellers equally even III Rules, when the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
though sellers take on more concentrated risks (liter- vision extended not only the implementation schedule [43]
to
ally purchasing them) which they are then expected 2019, but broadened the definition of liquid assets.
to offset correctly without regulation

• do not require organizations to investigate correla- 4.3 Further studies

tions of all internal risks they own
In addition to articles used for references (see Refer-
• do not tax or charge institutions for the systematic or ences), this section lists links to publicly available high-
aggressive externalization or conflicted marketing of quality studies on Basel III. This section may be updated
risk - other than requiring an orderly unravelling of frequently as Basel III remains under development.
derivatives in a crisis and stricter record keeping

Since derivatives present major unknowns in a crisis these 5 See also

are seen as major failings by some critics [33] causing sev-
eral to claim that the “too big to fail” status remains with
• Basel I
respect to major derivatives dealers who aggressively took
on risk of an event they did not believe would happen - • Basel II
but did. As Basel III does not absolutely require extreme
scenarios that management flatly rejects to be included • Basel 4
in stress testing this remains a vulnerability. Standard-
ized external auditing and modelling is an issue proposed • Systemically important financial institution
to be addressed in Basel 4 however.
• Operational risk
A few critics argue that capitalization regulation is inher-
ently fruitless due to these and similar problems and - de- • Operational risk management
spite an opposite ideological view of regulation - agree
that “too big to fail” persists.[34]
Basel III has been criticized similarly for its paper burden 6 References
and risk inhibition by banks, organized in the Institute
of International Finance, an international association of [1] “Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision an-
global banks based in Washington, D.C., who argue nounces higher global minimum capital standards” (pdf).
that it would “hurt” both their business and overall eco- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 12 September
nomic growth. The OECD estimated that implemen- 2010.
tation of Basel III would decrease annual GDP growth
by 0.05–0.15%,[29][35] blaming the slow recovery from [2] Financial Times report Oct 2012
the financial crisis of 2007–08 on the regulation.[36][37]
[3] http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_
Basel III was also criticized as negatively affecting the
arrangements.pdf
stability of the financial system by increasing incen-
tives of banks to game the regulatory framework.[38] The [4] http://www.riskbank.com.br/anexo/boletim0910.pdf
American Bankers Association,[39] community banks
organized in the Independent Community Bankers of [5] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf
America, and some of the most liberal Democrats in the
U.S. Congress, including the entire Maryland congres- [6] http://www.allbankingsolutions.com/banking-tutor/
sional delegation with Democratic Senators Ben Cardin basel-iii-accord-basel-3-norms.shtml
and Barbara Mikulski and Representatives Chris Van
[7] “US Federal Reserve Bank announces the minimum Basel
Hollen and Elijah Cummings, voiced opposition to Basel III leverage ratio”. Archived from the original on 12 July
III in their comments to the Federal Deposit Insurance 2013.
Corporation,[40] saying that the Basel III proposals, if im-
plemented, would hurt small banks by increasing “their [8] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
6 6
[9] Hal S. Scott (16 June 2011). “Testimony of Hal S. Scott
before the Committee on Financial Services” (pdf). Com-
mittee on Financial Services, United States House of Rep-
resentatives. pp. 12–13. Retrieved 17 November 2012.
[10] http://www.federalreserve.gov/FR_notice_lcr_
20131024.pdf
[11] “Fed Liquidity Proposal Seen Trading Safety for Costlier
Credit”. Bloomberg.
[12] “Nonbank SIFIs: FSOC proposes initial designations
more names to follow”. http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/
fs-reg-brief-nonbank-sifi.pdf, June 2013. External link
in |website= (help)
[13] “Liquidity coverage ratio: another brick in
the wall”. http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/
fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-act-basel-iii-fed-liquidity-coverage-ratio.
[29] Patrick Slovik; Boris Cournède (2011). “Macroe-
pdf, October 2013. External link in |website= (help)
[14] http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20131024a.htm
[15] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
9f61345c-3cb1-11e3-a8c4-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2jWZZfSmH
[16] “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector” (pdf).
BCBS. December 2009. p. 15. Tier 3 will be abolished
to ensure that market risks are met with the same quality
of capital as credit and operational risks.
[17] “Basel II Comprehensive version part 2: The First Pillar –
Minimum Capital Requirements” (pdf). November 2005.
p. 86.
[18] Susanne Craig (8 January 2012). “Bank Regulators to Al-
low Leeway on Liquidity Rule”. New York Times. Re-
trieved 10 January 2012.
[19] Proposed Basel III Guidelines: A Credit Positive for Indian
Banks
[20] “Stress testing: First take: Basel large exposures frame-
work”. http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/
regulatory-services/publications/index.jhtml. PwC Finan-
cial Services Regulatory Practice, April 2014. External
link in |website= (help)
[21] “First take: Liquidity coverage ratio”. http://www.
pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-services/
publications/first-take-liquidity-coverage-ratio.jhtml.
PwC Financial Services Regulatory Practice, September,
2014. External link in |website= (help)
[22] “Five key points from Basel’s enhanced disclosure pro-
posal”. PwC Financial Services Risk and Regulatory
Practice, March, 2016.
[23] Edward Wyatt (20 December 2011). “Fed Proposes New
Capital Rules for Banks”. New York Times. Retrieved 6
July 2012.
[24] “Press Release”. Federal Reserve Bank. 20 December
2011. Retrieved 6 July 2012.
REFERENCES
[25] “Basel leverage ratio: No cover for US
banks” (PDF). http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/
dodd-frank-basel-leverage-ratio.jhtml. PwC Financial
Services Regulatory Practice, January 2014. External
link in |website= (help)
[26] http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/
legislation-in-force/index_en.htm
[27] http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/
implementing-basel-iii-europe
[28] Nathaniel Popper (July 23, 2015). “In Connecticut, the
Twilight of a Trading Hub”. The New York Times. Re-
trieved July 26, 2015. ...the set of international banking
rules that have had the single largest impact require banks
to hold capital as a buffer against trading losses — rules
broadly referred to as Basel III.
conomic Impact of Basel III”. OECD Economics
Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing.
doi:10.1787/5kghwnhkkjs8-en.
[30] ?
[31] M. Nicolas J. Firzli, “A Critique of the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision” Revue Analyse Financière,
10 November 2011 & Q2 2012
[32] Barr, David G. (23 November 2013). “What We Thought
We Knew: The Financial System and Its Vulnerabilities”
(pdf). Bank of England.
[33] http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/vstavrak/files/
derivregntr_article.pdf
[34] http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/
basel-iii-capital-standards-do-not-reduce-the-too-big-to-fail-problem
[35] Jones, Huw (September 2010). “Basel rules to have little
impact on economy” (pdf). Reuters.
[36] John Taylor (September 2012). “Regulatory Expansion
Versus Economic Expansion in Two Recoveries”.
[37] Philip Suttle (3 March 2011). “The Macroeconomic Im-
plications of Basel III”. Institute of International Finance.
Retrieved 17 November 2012.
[38] Patrick Slovik (2012). “Systemically Important Banks
and Capital Regulations Challenges”. OECD Eco-
nomics Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing.
doi:10.1787/5kg0ps8cq8q6-en.
[39] Comment Letter on Proposals to Comprehensively Re-
vise the Regulatory Capital Framework for U.S.Banking
Organizations(22 October 2012, http://www.sifma.org/
workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589940758
[40] 95 entities listed at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2012-ad-95-96-97/2012-ad95.html Retrieved
13 March 2013
[41] http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test112912.
pdf
 7

[42] Reich, Robert. “Wall Street is Still Out of Control, and

Why Obama Should Call for Glass-Steagall and a Breakup
of Big Banks”. Robert Reich.org. Retrieved 2 March
2013.

[43] NY Times 1 July 2013 http://

dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/
easing-of-rules-for-banks-acknowledges-reality/

7 External links
• Basel III capital rules

• Basel III liquidity rules

• Bank Management and Control, Springer – Man-
agement for Professionals, 2014
• U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regula-
tory Framework Congressional Research Service
• - Basel III in India

• How Basel III Affects SME Borrowing Capacity

8 8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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