Leadership Communication in Crisis

Introduction

According to Ulmer et al (2007, p.7) crisis is defined as a “specific, unexpected, and non-
routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived
to threaten an organization’s high-priority goals”. Companies during crisis will inevitably have to deal
with an active hunt for information. The media, during crisis situations, will play multiple roles,
having informers to indicate several aspects of the crisis and reporters evaluating crisis response
from different authorities (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007). Therefore, one of the main goals is to know
how to lead communication during crises. While defining a leader can be quite complex, Cornelissen
(2014) suggests that two perspectives have shaped how many people think about the subject: either
leaders have natural attributes and skills such as courage and charisma or leadership can be
acquired by articulating changes or opportunities and by getting others to follow them. By
considering both perspectives, this study aims to provide an analysis on how to effectively
communicate leadership during turbulent times. Therefore, both positive and negative case studies
on leadership during crisis periods will be presented and compared, thus creating a balanced setting
where efficient strategies and undesired methods are clearly understood. The examples presented
will reflect the illustrations of crisis leadership according to Seeger et al (2003, p.250. See Appendix
1) and the crisis type matrix by Coombs (1995. See Appendix 2).

Importance and responsibility of the CEO as a leader

Lucero et al (2009) highlight the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) in helping the
organization to overcome crisis. In fact, several scholars agree on the importance of the CEO in
assuming a position as the organization’s spokesperson to assert leadership (Englehardt et al. 2004;
Mintzberg. 1998; Nadler, 2006; Petersen and Martin, 1996). The CEO is a key element in showing
that the organization is placing importance on the crisis and to eliminate any notion that the
organization is ignoring its responsibilities facing stakeholders (Ulmer et al, 2007). His appearance
will determine how different publics perceive the organization’s engagement to crisis by
determining what the organization’s stances on the matter are (Lucero et al, 2009).
As an authority, the CEO will need to focus on the terms used to characterize responses to
crisis considering the privileged position of media (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007). However, as stated
by Mittroff (1988, p.16), even though “PR firms emphasize the importance of media training before
a crisis occurs, they usually come on the scene after the fact”. While Lucero et al (2009) insist on
having the CEO stepping up at the beginning of the crisis, the reality described by Mittroff almost
two decades ago remains today. From my own previous work experience when doing an internship
for a Portuguese PR agency focused on crisis management and media training, our senior members
would only be hired by CEO’s when the crisis was already “awake”. Therefore, the necessity to solve
the problems would be immediate and urgent. Obviously, assuming such a complex task in short
notice does not reflect the best results.
Challenges facing crisis leadership

Boin et al (2013, p.85) highlight the challenge of leaders to present a convincing story. By
achieving this goal, they will “impose a dominant frame through which events are viewed and
interpreted”. In fact, according to the news framing theory, the way a situation is explained has a
direct impact on how audiences perceive it (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p.140). While Greenwald &
Leavitt (1984) had suggested that variations in the consumer involvement can modify media effects,
the reality as pointed out by Choi and Lin (2008, p.18) is that there is still a dominant assumption
that people “will perceive a crisis according to how media perceives the crisis”.
Furthermore, leaders need to be aware of the communication strategies as they will ideally
be the spokespersons for the organization throughout the crisis (Seeger et al, 2003). Therefore, the
image repair theory (Benoit, 1995) can be applied to leadership; more specifically the five general
image repair strategies should be considered: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing
offensiveness of event, corrective action and mortification. However, it is important to consider that
these strategies can be criticized based on the assumption that they are unethical since they
sometimes try to confuse to avoid responsibility (Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger, 2011). In terms of
ethics, Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) suggest that accepting responsibility for the results of one’s actions
is generally considered ethical.

Mattel crisis leadership

Robert Eckert took over as chief executive officer of the world’s largest toy company, Mattel,
in May 2000. His leader skills were demonstrated from the very beginning: he managed to set new
values for a company that was suffering from a lack of morality and accountability by its employees
(Teagarden, 2009). Eckert engaged the organisation with such a strong vision in teamwork that the
company became eventually known as One Mattel (Ready and Conger, 2008). However, in July 2007,
the CEO had the real challenge as a leader: a European retailer had found evidence of toxic lead
paints in potentially millions of toys. Given the situation, Eckert immediately issued a statement to
the public (Hurley 2012). His communication strategies, according to Benoit’s (1997) image
restoration theory, were corrective action (planning to solve the problem) and mortification
(apologizing for what had happened).
Considering that the strategies were applied right at the beginning of the crisis, the CEO was,
according to Lucero et al (2009, p.243) using a positive practice in terms of leadership: “it is
recommended that the CEO steps up immediately as the crisis begins to hit (…) having the
organization’s top man face the public shows the severity at which the organization views the crisis,
and their resolve to return the situation into normalcy”.
Throughout the rest of the crisis period, Mattel’s capability of dealing with crisis proved to
be very fast and consistent, showing a clear leadership from the CEO: the factory in China that
produced the tainted toys was identified just after a few days and Mattel was already recalling 1.5
million toys not even one month after (2 August), having two remaining recalls after, in the middle of
August and beginning of September. The company even took advantage of the situation to recall
millions of toys with magnets just because they could injure children if ingested (Hurley, 2012).
Eckert’s use of Seeger et al’s (2003) illustrations of crisis leadership is perceived: first, the
CEO always showed care about children’s safety. In his own words, Eckert (2007) stressed the
commitment to the potential victims: “Nothing is more important than the safety of the children”;
secondly, a strong initial crisis response was presented. As stated by Benoit (1995) this response
should be planned before a crisis occurs, which may bring advantages such as reducing response
time and prevent missteps in an organization’s initial response. In fact, Eckert’s crisis plan had
already been ready before, with a 114 page crisis plan to help him form the narrative.
Mattel’s internal and unintentional crisis (Coombs, 1995) was handled by a leader who
understands his responsibilities as a CEO. Not only did Eckert serve as an open spokesperson (in his
own words, he showed his dedication to open communication with the public throughout the crisis:
“there is always room to be better… we are communicating frequently and openly”), but also he
strategically had planned his approaches to crisis quite before it actually happened. As stated before,
even though this has been highlighted as important (Mittroff, 1988), there is still a long path ahead
(as seen in the Portuguese case). Eckert’s planned tactics, such as his video appearance on the
company’s website and his statements to the media (Gabbur, 2008) helped him to build a favourable
frame for the company, based on the fact that consumers felt involved with his engagement to the
cause (as pointed out by Greenwald & Leavitt, 1984).

Abercrombie & Fitch crisis leadership

“Abercrombie’s aggressive approach to building a pretty and handsome sales force” (New
York Times, 2013) has always been quite noticeable and criticized by private and government
authorities. However, as pointed out by Greenhouse (2013) hiring attractive people is not
necessarily illegal. Nevertheless, it is quite a grey area considering that discriminating for sex, age
and ethnicity is in fact illegal. Several critiques have therefore been related to the brand (as
evidenced by McBride’s 2005 “Why I hate Abercrombie & Fitch: Essays on Race and Sexuality”) and
Mike Jeffries, as former Abercrombie’s CEO, should have considered how sensible this issue was
already. However, he did not.
Jeffries showed a lack of leadership skills during a crisis situation in 2013, which lead to a
negative reputation for the company and to his dismissal as chief executive officer (Chen, 2016). The
crisis started in May 2013, after an article from Business Insider came out, resurfacing some
offensive comments the former CEO had made in 2006, where the values of the company were
questioned (See Appendix 3). After the news became viral, Jeffries response to the public on social
media (See Appendix 4) was not seen as meaningful, rather as a solution to increase sales. By
showing a clear image-vision gap as a leader, Jeffries created a conflict between outsider’s images
and the management’s strategic vision (Hatch & Schultz, 2001).
In terms of crisis response, it took 10 days for Jeffries Facebook statement to be released,
which contradicts Lucero et al’s (2009) theory on how the CEO should step at the beginning of the
crisis. The lack of a fast response gave protesters the opportunity to create social media content and
online petition movements against the company (Chen, 2016). Also, Jeffries tone on his statement
was not seen as honest. Now, according to Littlefield & Quenette (2007, p.44) leaders in crisis
situations “need to acknowledge the privileged position of media and monitor closely the terms they
use to characterize responses to the crises”. Jeffries legalistic response suggests an evasion of
responsibility (Benoit, 1995) by criticizing the article, emphasizing on how the words were out of
context. Therefore, it is clear to assume that the leader avoid the issue and challenged the power of
media.
As a leader, Jeffries decided to eliminate the crisis by applying a non-existence strategy,
more specifically clarification (Coombs, 1995). While trying to convince the public that the supposed
interview was said to be untrue in some way (Allen & Caillouet, 1994), he previously had already
failed to communicate the core values of the company, which is vital for crisis leadership, as stated
by Seeger et al (2003).
The company’s faux pas crisis (Coombs, 1995) demanded for another communication
strategy in order “to project a more favourable image” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p.168). Since the
former CEO’s statements were the main reason behind the wake of the crisis, his role would be
determinant for the consequences facing the reputation of the brand. Potentially for the case, the
only viable solution would be for Jeffries to assume total responsibility for what he did (Ulmer and
Sellnow, 2000).

Conclusion

The case studies presented show major differences between two leaders that, in crisis
situations, behaved in opposite ways. Even though Leonard and Howitt (2009) highlight on the
importance of leaders to provide an authentic hope and confidence, no traces of Jeffrey’s genuine
attitudes can be found during and after the crisis. This aspect sets the major differences between
Robert Eckert’s response to Mattel crisis and Mike Jeffrey’s response to Abercrombie & Fitch
turbulent period.
While Jeffrey’s challenge can be seen as more demanding (since his name directly involved
in the scandal), Mattel’s crisis had severe implications such as children’s health at risk. Therefore, it
is the leader’s consistency in the tone of voice, his capability to show interest about people’s
concerns towards the crisis situations that will shape up the success or failure of his leadership. As
leaders can, according to Cornelissen (2014), develop their leadership skills without necessarily being
born as leaders, their skills in managing crisis situations can be acquired. However, for that to
happen, it is fundamental to have the capacity to learn (Comfort, 1999).

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Appendix

Appendix 1. Illustrations of crisis leadership by Seeger et al (2003, p.250):

 initiating a crisis response;

 mitigating the harm;
 serving as a spokesperson;
 expressing sympathy to victims;
 framing meaning;
 remaining accessible and open;
 facilitating the flow of information;
 acting decisively;
 coordinating actions among the various response groups and agencies;
 reconnecting with stakeholders;
 maintaining decision vigilance;
 prioritizing activities and resources;
 communicating core values;
 paying symbolic attention to the crisis;
 maintaining appropriate flexibility;
 facilitating renewal via public commitments.

Appendix 2. Crisis Type Matrix by Coombs (1995)

Appendix 3. Mike Jeffrey’s initial discriminatory statements on his interview for Salon (2006)

“In every school there are the cool and popular kids, and then there are the not-so-cool kids,” he
told the site. “Candidly, we go after the cool kids. We go after the attractive all-American kid with a
great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot of people don’t belong [in our clothes], and they can’t
belong. Are we exclusionary? Absolutely. Those companies that are in trouble are trying to target
everybody: young, old, fat, skinny. But then you become totally vanilla. You don’t alienate anybody,
but you don’t excite anybody, either.”

Appendix 4. Jeffrey’s statement on Facebook (2013)