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Property: Questions, Jurisprudence & Principles
Property: Questions, Jurisprudence & Principles
1. What is property?
There are laws pertaining to the human body or body organs such as:
However, it is not clear how to properly classify the human body (dead or alive)
or the body parts, whether as property or thing. There is a dearth of discussion
on this topic. In one case, a dead body was ruled to be outside the commerce of
man and the recognition of the right to possess the same. It was ruled: “It is
generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of
man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the
corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-
property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead,
also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial
to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place
where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a
PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the
corpse from third persons” (Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
citing Arturo M. Tolentino).
The same case stated the persons who are entitled to give the dead body a
decent burial:
“Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996
of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants
of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better
right. [Emphases supplied]
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the
burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she
possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
Δ Immovable property.
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or
form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that
it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings, or other objects for use or ornamentation,
placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a
manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of
similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with
the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming
a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the
bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, thought floating, are intended by their nature
and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
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The mere fact that the parties to a contract dealt with the building separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property (Punsalan, Jr. v. vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 331 (1983);
Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390). A building by itself is a real or
immovable property distinct from the land on which it is constructed and therefore
can be a separate subject of contracts (Midway Maritime and Technological
Foundation v. Castro, 732 SCRA 192, 06 August 2014).
The parties may, however, regard the building as a personal property so that a
building maybe the subject of a chattel mortgage. However, such agreement is
valid only as between the contracting parties and does not affect third parties
(Tsai v. CA, 366 SCRA 324 (2001); Standard Oil v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil 631;
Evangelista v. Alto Surety, 103 Phil. 401). Even if the property is considered
immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating them as chattels
to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel (Tsai v. CA, 366 SCRA
324 [2001]). A building is a real property and the mere fact that the parties dealt
with it as a personal property and registered it as a chattel mortgage does not
change its character as a real property. The agreement of the parties does not
affect third parties (Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil 644).
NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine
power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. Polar assigned its
rights to FELS. The Provincial Assessor of Batangas City subsequently issued an
assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from. NPC and FELS
contested the assessment.
Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties
and therefore, not subject to real property tax.
Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “[d]ocks and structures which,
though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place
on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus power
barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature
of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of said industry or work (FELS Energy, Inc. v.
Province of Batangas, 516 SCRA 186 [2007]).
§ What is a machinery?
which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial
compounds are merely incidentals and retain their movable nature.
(Mindanao Bus v. City Assessor, 6 SCRA 197)
Ω The machines placed by Serg’s Products in its factory built on its own land
were essential and principal elements of its chocolate-making industry. Although
each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have
become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal
elements in the industry. They are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article
415 (5) of the Civil Code (Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing, 338 SCRA 499
[2000]).
It was ruled:
Unlike and in contrast to Article 415(5) of the Civil Code, the Local
Government Code considers as real property machinery which “may
or may not be attached, permanently or temporarily to the real
property,” and even those which are “mobile” (MERALCO v. The City
Assessor, GR No. 166102, 05 August 2015, 765 SCRA 52).
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Issue: Whether the submarine wires or cables used for communications may be
taxed like other real estate.
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2) MERALCO v. CBAA, 114 SCRA 273. While the two storage tanks are
not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as
improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with
some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable
quantities or oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
Poles and steel towers on a land, which are attached by means of bolts, are
movable properties. They are not buildings or construction adhered to the soil;
they are attached to square metal frames by means of bolts that could easily be
dismantled and moved from place to place, and can be separated without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object to which they are attached.
They are not machineries to fall under par. 5 of Art. 415. Even if they are, they
are not intended for industry or works on the land in which they are constructed
(Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO, 10 SCRA 68).
Δ Movable property.
Article 416 of the Civil Code states that the following things are deemed to be
movable/personal property:
In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, “personal property” is defined as “anything
susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)”
(Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 13 January 2009).
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Property
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Electricity is personal property under Article 416(3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerate “forces of nature which are brought under the control by science.”
(Laurel v. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41, 13 January 2009). Electricity, like gas, is a valuable
merchandise, and may be stolen. The true test of what may be stolen is not
whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a
person other than the owner, may appropriate the same (US v. Carlos, 21 Phil 543).
§ Interest in business.
Laurel was charged with theft for unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use
the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave
frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of
the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from
PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the
damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
Laurel filed a motion to quash claiming that the factual allegations in the
information do not constitute the felony of theft. He said that a telephone call or
coversation is not synonymous to electric current and not considered as personal
property that is susceptible of appropriation. PLDT does not produce or generate
telephone calls but only provides the facilities or services for the transmission
and swtiching of the calls. Laurel added that the business of PLDT is not
personal property.
Issue: Whether or not the international calls as well as the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation that can be objects of theft.
However, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were
personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances,
decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls,
then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its
consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of
PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business.
§ Public plaza.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of
lease or any other contractual undertaking (Villanueva v. Castañeda, 154 SCRA
142).
§ Military Reservation
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the indigenous cultural communities
(ICCs) or indigenous people (IPs). [Separate opinion of Justice Puno] (Cruz v.
Sec. of ENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)
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Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
Section 12, Chapter III of the IPRA Law states that individually owned ancestral
lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
18% or more, are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-
conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches,
have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way
since before the Spanish Conquest." To reiterate, they are considered to have
never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held
that way.
It appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an
exception to the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
The IPRA Law expressly provides that ancestral lands are considered public
agricultural lands, the provisions of the Public Land Act or C.A. No. 141 govern
the registration of the subject land.
§ Homestead Patent
Only lands of the public domain which have been classified as public
agricultural lands may be disposed of through homestead settlement.
When the property covered by a homestead patent is part of the inalienable land
of the public domain, the title issued pursuant to it is null and void, and the
rule on indefeasibility of title will not apply.
(Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, GR No. 193657, 04 September 2018, J.
Leonen)
§ Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Land reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form
part of the public domain (Chavez v. PEA, GR No. 133250, 09 July 2002).
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Property
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Foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and
were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable land open to
disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact
that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the Public Estate
Authority (PEA) (now Philippine Reclamation Authority [PRA]) and issued land
patents or certificates of title in PEA's name did not automatically make such
lands private (Republic v. City of Parañaque, 677 SCRA 246, 18 July 2012).
Ω Case:
The Roppongi property is classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code. It is a property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership “until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Dir. of Lands, 108 Phil 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service
and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the
non-use was attributable not to the government’s own deliberate and indubitable
will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See heirs
of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]. Abandonment must be a
certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
RA No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does not authorize the Executive Department to
sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created
under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously, any property outside of the
commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds. (Laurel v. Garcia, 187
SCRA 797)
§ Art. 422 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State. Will the mere non-use of the property
for public dominion convert it into a patrimonial property?
Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial
property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable,
together with an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
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Property
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wealth (Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. BCDA, 702 SCRA 222,
24 July 2013).
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive
act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purpose (Director of Lands v. IAC, 219
SCRA 339).
There must be an official declaration by the State that that public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service or for the
development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a
mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is
already alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of registration
under Section 12(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 (Republic v. Heirs of
Sps. Tomasa Estacio and Eulalio Ocol, 808 SCRA 549, 14 November 2016).
§ The general law governing the classification and disposition of land of the public
domain.
The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141, until this day, is the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain, except for timber and mineral lands. Under the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in our Constitution, land that had not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase, grant, or any other mode recognized by law,
belongs to the State as part of the public domain (Republic v. Jaralve, 684 SCRA
495, 24 October 2012).
It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into
patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and occupation by an
individual over a long period of time (Republic v. Bacas, 710 SCRA 411, 20
November 2013).
Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private
property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of national wealth (Tan v.
Republic, 669 SCRA 499, 16 April 2012).
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators; and legislative act or
statute (Buenaventura v. Pascual, 572 SCRA 143 (27 Nov. 2008)
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Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
Any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, 03
September 2013). Only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of public dominion begin to run
(Republic v. Gielcyzk, GR No. 179990, 23 October 2013).
Any application for a homestead settlement recognizes that the land belongs to
the public domain. Prior to its disposition, the public land has to be classified first
as alienable and disposable through a positive act of the government. This act
must be direct and express, not merely inferred from an instrument such as the
homestead patent. The State has the right to institute an action for the
reversion of an inalienable land of the public domain erroneously awarded by its
officials and agents.
Despite the registration of the land and the issuance of a Torrens title, the State
may still file an action for reversion of a homestead land that was granted in
violation of the law. The action is not barred by the statute of limitations,
especially against the State.
The State may recover non-disposable public lands registered under the Land
Registration Act "at any time and the defense of res judicata would not apply as
courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands of the public domain."
Lands of the public domain can only be classified as alienable and disposable
through a positive act of the government. The State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents. It may revert the land at any
time, where the concession or disposition is void ab initio.
(Republic v. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, GR No. 193657, 04 September 2018, J.
Leonen)
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit:
In Art. XII, Sec. 3, Constitution, lands of the public domain are classified into 4
categories:
1) agricultural
2) forest or timber lands
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3) mineral lands
4) national parks
Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands,
and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Public land that has
not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land
derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable
nature of the land (Fortuna v. Republic, 718 SCRA 35, 05 March 2014).
An agricultural land, according to Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, is one that is
devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land (Holy Trinity Realty & Dev’t. Corp. v. de la Cruz,
739 SCRA 229, 22 October 2014).
The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like (Yu Chang v. Republic,
GR No. 171726, 23 Feb. 2011).
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution; Chavez v. PEA, GR
No. 133250, 09 July 2002). They are reserved in favor of Philippine citizens who
are natural persons. Private corporations may acquire private lands but NOT
alienable public lands.
Art. XII, Sec. 2, Constitution: All mineral land and other natural resources found
either in public or private lands are owned by the State.
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands
and, as such, is the general source of all private titles (Republic v. Espinosa, 677
SCRA 92, 18 July 2012).
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part
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Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive
act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purpose (Director of Lands v. IAC, 219
SCRA 339).
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the restrictions or limitations established by law and the rights of others (Arts. 427
& 428).
12.2. Who owns the hidden treasure if it is of interest to the science or the
arts?
- The State may acquire them at their just price, which price shall be paid
to the owner if he is also the finder. It shall be divided equally between the owner
and the finder if they are different persons.
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c) civil fruits: The rents of buildings, price or lease of land and other
property and other similar income.
The term "builder in good faith" as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil
Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds on that land
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the land, builds on that land,
believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. (Sps. Aquino v. Sps. Aguilar, G.R. No. 182754, June 29, 2015)
§ Builders in good faith: the owner of the land and the builder are two
distinct persons.
The Civil Code provisions on builders in good faith presuppose that the owner of
the land and the builder are two distinct persons who are not bound either by
specific legislation on the subject property or by contract.
Properties recorded in accordance with Section 41 of Republic Act No. 47262
(otherwise known as the Condominium Act) are governed by said Act; while the
Master Deed and the By Laws of the condominium corporation establish the
contractual relations between said condominium corporation and the unit owners.
(Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers, Inc., GR No. 199353, 04
April 2018)
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15.2. Will you apply Art. 448 if the buildings/improvements are merely
transferable?
- NO. Art. 448 shall not apply if the improvements/construction are
transferable in nature. Tolentino explains: “To fall within the provision of this
article, the construction must be of permanent character, attached to the soil with
an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character or is transferable, there is
no accession, and the builder must remove the construction. The proper remedy
of the landowner is an action to eject the builder from the land.” (Sps. Alviola v.
CA, 24 April 1988, 289 SCRA 537)
15.4. May the right of choice shift from the landowner to the builder?
- NO. The right of choice belongs solely and exclusively to the landowner.
It will never shift. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter or sower’s bad
faith shifts this option to him per Art. 450 of the Civil Code (Sps. Benitez v. CA,
266 SCRA 242).
15.5. May the courts dictate upon the landowner which option to select?
- NO. The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts (Ignao v.
IAC, 193 SCRA 17).
15.7. May the landowner refuse to exercise his options? May the
landowner compel the builder to remove the improvements?
- NO. The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs
to the owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option
lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner
of the building to remove it from the land. The raison d’etre for this provision has
been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good
faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of he improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. (Tuatis v. Escol, 604 SCRA 471, 27 October 2009).
Page 22 of 28
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PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
15.8. May the builder in good faith compel the landowner to sell the land?
- NO. Under Article 448, the right to appropriate the works or
improvements or “to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land” belongs to the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good
faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements; the builder cannot
compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former (Quemuel v. Olaes, 1
SCRA 1159 (1961).
- The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land,
a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows
the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose
one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either the option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner
may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same. (Luciano/Nelly Briones v. Jose Macabagdal, et al., GR No.
150666 [2010])
15.9. What are the remedies of the landowner in case the builder fails to
pay the value of the land, which is not considerably higher than the value of the
improvement?
- The remedies of the landowner are:
a) Assume the relation of lessor-lessee;
b) Landowner may file an action for the recovery of the land OR to have
the improvements removed as the builder’s expense.
15.10. May the builder in good faith compel the landowner to sell the land?
15.12. What is the builder’s right of retention? May the builder retain
both the land and the improvements in case the landowner does not pay him
after the latter opts to appropriate the improvements?
- The owner of a building erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
Page 23 of 28
WARNING: No part of this presentation may be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written
permission from the Villasis Law Center. Villasis Law Center operates a zero tolerance policy in relation to inappropriate behavior of students. Violators shall be
subject to prosecution under the law. All rights reserved by Villasis Law Center.
PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
building under Art. 546 (Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 122). Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made (Republic v. Ballocanag, 572 SCRA 436 (28 November 2008).
Article 448 applies only when the builder, planter or sower believes that he
has the right so to build, plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or
believes himself to have a claim of title (Floreza v. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130
(1980).
a) Art. 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or
donation (Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407).
As a general rule, Art. 448 on builders on good faith does not apply when
there is a contractual relation between the parties.
Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders on good faith are therefore
inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject
property (the Condominium Act, and by contract (the Master Deed and Bylaws of
the condominium corporation). (Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi
Towers, Inc., GR No. 199353, 04 April 2018)
16.1. May the landowner compel the builder in bad faith to buy the land
even if it is considerably higher than the value of the improvement?
- Yes. (Art. 450)
b) The alluvion must be the result of the action of the current of the waters
of the river, lake (like the Laguna de Bay) (Republic v. CA, 131 SCRA
532) or creek (Zapata v. Dir. of Lands, 6 SCRA 335 [1962]).
- Not by the sea (like the Manila Bay) (Heirs of Navarro v. IAC, 268
SCRA 78).
- Not man made (Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 589 (1996).
Page 25 of 28
WARNING: No part of this presentation may be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written
permission from the Villasis Law Center. Villasis Law Center operates a zero tolerance policy in relation to inappropriate behavior of students. Violators shall be
subject to prosecution under the law. All rights reserved by Villasis Law Center.
PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
18.1. Within what period should the owner recover the transferred
estate/uprooted trees?
- Two (2) years for the estate and six (6) months for the uprooted trees.
Otherwise, they shall belong to the owner of the land upon which they may be
cast (Arts. 459 & 460)
19. May repairs for preservation be undertaken by one of the co-owners even
without the consent of the other co-owners?
- YES. The co-owner need only, if practicable, first notify the other co-
owners (Art. 489).
The lack of notice will not exempt the other co-owners from contributing. In
fact, a c-owner may compel the other co-owners to contribute expenses for the
preservation of the right owned in common (Arts. 488 & 492).
19.2. May a co-owner alter a property owned in common even without the
consent of the other co-owners?
- NO. The unanimous consent of the other co-owners is required (Art.
491).
22. What are the requirements for an easement right of way to be compulsory
and legally demandable?
Page 26 of 28
WARNING: No part of this presentation may be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written
permission from the Villasis Law Center. Villasis Law Center operates a zero tolerance policy in relation to inappropriate behavior of students. Violators shall be
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PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
22.1. Can one acquire easement of light and view via prescription? If yes,
when shall prescription commence?
- YES. In cases of positive easement, it shall be counted from the opening
of the easement on a party wall or on a balcony or a projection extending over
the adjoining owner. For a negative easement (made on a wall/construction on
the dominant estate), it will commence upon a formal prohibition (Art. 668) and
the observance of the distances in Art. 670 (2 meters for direct view and 60cm
for oblique view). The said distance shall not apply to buildings separated by a
public way or alley which is not less than 3meters wide (Art. 672).
Page 27 of 28
WARNING: No part of this presentation may be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written
permission from the Villasis Law Center. Villasis Law Center operates a zero tolerance policy in relation to inappropriate behavior of students. Violators shall be
subject to prosecution under the law. All rights reserved by Villasis Law Center.
PRE - BAR REVIEW
Property
Prof. Larry P. Ignacio
*****LPI*****
Page 28 of 28
WARNING: No part of this presentation may be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without prior written
permission from the Villasis Law Center. Villasis Law Center operates a zero tolerance policy in relation to inappropriate behavior of students. Violators shall be
subject to prosecution under the law. All rights reserved by Villasis Law Center.