ARTICLES OF THE DAY

November 17, 2021

EMMA KOVAK AND ROBERT PAARLBERG, FOREIGN AFFAIRS .......................................................................... 2

ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., FOREIGN AFFAIRS ............................................................................................ 5

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY .......................................................................................................................... 9

DAMIAN WILSON, RUSSIA TODAY ................................................................................................................. 11

TOM FOWDY, RUSSIA TODAY ........................................................................................................................ 13

RAFIA ZAKARIA .............................................................................................................................................. 15

MAHIR ALI, DAWN NEWS .............................................................................................................................. 17

RYAN NABIL, THE DIPLOMAT ......................................................................................................................... 19

AHSAN MUNIR, THE NATION ......................................................................................................................... 21

 CRISPR and the Climate
Emma Kovak and Robert Paarlberg, Foreign Affairs
E
arlier this month, the
much-anticipated UN
Climate Change
Conference came to an end.
As part of the flurry of
activity, the United States and
the United Arab Emirates
launched the Agriculture
Innovation Mission for
Climate, one of the first major
international initiatives
wholly dedicated to cutting
back on farming emissions.
More than 30 countries joined.
Many states also signed on to
two other agriculture-related
pledges, one to reduce
methane emissions 30 percent
by 2030 and the other to
reverse deforestation.
The Agriculture Innovation
Mission for Climate, the
methane goal, and the
deforestation pledge all
indicate that increasingly,
states recognize the powerful
relationship between farming
and climate change. Food
systems are responsible for
one-third of global
greenhouse gas emissions.
Nitrous oxide from soil and
fertilizers can warm the earth,
as can methane from livestock
digestion and manure.
Deforestation motivated by
agricultural expansion
releases the carbon dioxide
stored by plants and is itself
responsible for more than ten
percent of all emissions. The
connection between farming
and climate change runs both
ways, and deforestation in
particular creates a vicious
cycle of warming. Climate
change has already reduced
the growth of agricultural
productivity by 21 percent
since 1961, and as time goes
by, that penalty will worsen.
To compensate, countries
could wind up converting
more forests into farms, which
will then further release
greenhouse gases.
In order to make agriculture
more environmentally
friendly, many states are
trying to encourage organic
farming. But improving
agriculture to address the twin
challenges of climate change
and deforestation will require
every tool available. That
means “natural” solutions
alone will not be enough.
Instead, states will need to
embrace modern science,
including CRISPR (clustered
regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats)
technology. CRISPR is a
recent gene-editing invention
that can help countries
decarbonize their food
systems by making crops that
can still thrive in bad
weather—reducing the need
for more farmland. Scientists
in Belgium, for example, are
using CRISPR to develop a
new kind of corn that can
withstand heat and drought.
U.S. scientists, meanwhile,
are designing drought- and
salt-tolerant soybeans and
drought-resistant corn. They
are also using CRISPR to
create cereal plants that can
better absorb nitrogen from
the soil, which could decrease
emissions and pollution from
fertilizers.
To solve climate change,
states must embrace modern
science.
But CRISPR will realize its
full potential only if many
countries embrace the
technology. And
unfortunately, plenty of
governments are letting
CRISPR fall victim to the
same regulatory and public
opinion pitfalls that have
hobbled genetically modified
organisms, or GMOs.
CRISPR technology is not the
same as GMO technology; it
does not introduce DNA from
other species into plants. Yet
many governments remain
largely opposed to using
either GMO or CRISPR
technology for crops,
shrinking the toolbox for
addressing climate change.
MISLABLED Europe may
pride itself on its climate
change measures, but in
agriculture, it is an example of
what states shouldn’t do. In
2018, the European Union’s
top court ruled that gene-
edited crops were subject to
the same stifling regulation
that has largely kept GMOs
out of European fields since
the late 1990s. That means
that instead of relying on
modern technology, the EU’s
sustainable farming plan runs
through its new Farm to Fork
strategy, which will increase
organic farming from nine
percent to at least 25 percent
of cropland in Europe. This
may seem eco-friendly in
theory, but in reality it is a
counterproductive approach
that will lower crop yields,
requiring more land use for
farming. The increase in
organic farming under Farm
to Fork, for example, would
shrink cereal crop production
in the EU by an estimated 21
percent. To compensate,
Europe would have to convert
approximately 3.7 million
acres of its forests into farms,
and the rest of the world
would have to convert an
additional 12.4 million acres.
This would increase the
amount of carbon released
from the soil and destroy
natural habits.
The EU is the main example
of anti-GMO and anti-
CRISPR government policies.
But it’s not alone. New
Zealand has explicitly stated
that gene-edited plants must
be regulated in the same
prohibitive manner as GMOs.
Mexico has not established
any unique rules for gene-
edited crops, so they are still
covered under restrictive
GMO regulations. India, the
country with the world’s
second-largest amount of
cultivatable land (after the
United States), has proposed
deregulating only some types
of gene-edited crops, and it is
still relatively unclear as to
which plants would actually
be excluded.
Europe's farming strategy will
lower crop yields, breeding
deforestation. Thankfully,
many other states are
exempting CRISPR crops
from GMO-style rules.
Following the 2018 court
ruling in Europe, a coalition of
ten countries—Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras,
Paraguay, the United States,
and Uruguay—sent a signed
statement to the World Trade
Organization arguing that
gene-edited plants should be
regulated the same way as
conventional ones. The
United Kingdom is now
freeing itself from the EU
ruling and pushing forward
with research on CRISPR
crops. Japan has signaled that
it intends not to classify gene-
edited plants as modified
organisms under the
Cartagena Protocol. China has
yet to publicly speak up, but
the country has invested
heavily in genome editing, so
it will also probably defend
CRISPR. These governments
clearly understand that
addressing the challenges
climate change poses for
agriculture requires all the
tools the world has, including
gene editing.
But even if CRISPR were
simply a new way to create
GMOs, that wouldn’t make it
inherently dangerous. GMOs
can accomplish tremendous
good—including by making
emission-friendly products
that CRISPR can’t. Genetic
modification is better than
gene editing at producing
crops resistant to pests and
diseases, which increases
yields and allows for the
production of more food on
less land, decreasing
deforestation. The use of
insect-resistant, genetically
modified Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) crops, for
example, has increased yields
by an average of 25 percent
globally. Genetic
modification is also more
effective than gene editing at
making herbicide-resistant
crops, which improves weed
control and increases yields.
And insect-resistant and
herbicide-tolerant GMO
plants have reduced tractor
use for insecticide spraying
and tillage, dramatically
cutting yearly greenhouse gas
emissions. Indeed, the yearly
reduced usage is equivalent to
taking 1.6 million cars off the
road. States clearly shouldn’t
limit modern crop
improvement to CRISPR.
PLANTING THE SEEDSAt
least in the United States, the
public isn’t reflexively
opposed to genetic
engineering. Instead, polls
suggest that acceptance of the
practice varies widely based
on the type of application. In a
Pew Research Center survey,
for example, only 21 percent
of respondents said genetic
engineering was acceptable if
used to create glowing
aquarium fish. But 70 percent
said that limiting mosquito
reproduction to reduce disease
is an “appropriate use of
technology,” and 57 percent
said the same of breeding
animals with tissue and organs
that could be given to humans.
Some environmentalist
groups have also signaled that
they are open to genetic
engineering, provided it
advances their causes. The
preservationist Sierra Club—
which has historically
opposed all genetically
modified organisms—
recently indicated it is
receptive to planting
genetically modified
American chestnut trees,
which could help restore a
species that dominated eastern
U.S. forests until it was nearly
wiped out by blight in the late
1800s. That means gene
editing has an opening. The
vast majority of the world is
concerned about climate
change, as are most
environmentalist
organizations. It is possible
that they will come to endorse,
or at least accept, using
CRISPR and GMOs to cut
agricultural emissions
But unlocking the potential of
genetic engineering requires
more than just favorable
public opinion and
environmentalist
acquiescence. In order to get a
wide range of CRISPR
products that address climate
change and appeal to
consumers, developers and
countries need better access to
the technology. Various
iterations of CRISPR gene
editing are covered by over
6,000 patents in the United
States alone, with 200 more
filed every month. This
complicated structure means
that a developer may have to
license many different patents
in order to commercialize a
single product. Without
reform, this messy system
may inhibit development.
States need to change their
intellectual property laws. But
even if they won’t, there are
steps that private actors can
take to make gene editing
more accessible. Wageningen
University & Research in the
Netherlands recently pledged
to license its CRISPR patents
for free to nonprofit
organizations that are using
the technology for
noncommercial applications,
a step that other patent holders
should follow. Holders should
also make sure their
inventions are affordable for
small developers and poor
countries that don’t have the
money for massive licensing
fees. They can do so through
patent-sharing agreements,
patent consolidation, and
transparent pricing, which
would go a long way toward
allowing a variety of
companies to commercialize
CRISPR gene-edited crops.
These measures would also
help breed innovation: more
developers means a wider
variety of products.
Finally, regulatory bodies
should increase the
transparency of their decision-
making processes regarding
CRISPR by requiring that
agricultural companies
provide the same kind of
information on gene-edited
crops exempt from GMO
regulations as they do for
crops subject to GMO rules.
To allow the technology to
earn more consumer trust and
to reduce public skepticism,
developers should also
provide product assessments
that go beyond safety and
show buyers evidence of the
environmental benefits. The
European Union’s Farm to
Fork strategy suggests that in
many countries, officials and
publics are still generally
opposed to using modern
biotechnology to make
farming more sustainable.
Fighting climate change and
improving agriculture’s
resilience requires a change of
mindset. Companies and
regulators need to act quickly
to prevent unfounded fears of
CRISPR from taking root; as
the entrenched opposition to
GMOs demonstrates, it can be
difficult to win people over to
a new technology or method
once distrust has set in. The
world cannot allow a similar
dynamic to prevent CRISPR
from helping stave off the
worst-case climate scenarios.
 The U.S. Military and the Coming Great-Power Challenge
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Foreign Affairs
F
or many of the last 30
years, the notion that
the United States was
locked in direct contest with
other great powers seemed as
outdated as the Cold War
itself. Instead, successive U.S.
administrations have pursued
collective security on the
assumption that the world’s
great powers shared a
common interest in preserving
the existing international
order.
U.S. leaders have often
promoted collective security
following a great-power
struggle. After World War I,
President Woodrow Wilson
pushed for the League of
Nations, and in the 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
future Axis powers Germany,
Italy, and Japan joined the
Western democracies in
renouncing war as a means of
resolving international
disputes. Yet war began in the
Far East only three years later
and a world war less than a
decade after that.
With victory on the horizon in
World War II, President
Franklin Roosevelt reprised
Wilson’s approach. Calling
for the formation of the United
Nations, FDR wagered that
the “Four Policemen”—the
United Kingdom, nationalist
China, Soviet Russia, and the
United States—shared
sufficient common security
interests to maintain peace
and order. His hopes were
quickly dashed by Joseph
Stalin’s subjugation of
Eastern Europe and the fall of
nationalist China to the
communists. After the Cold
War, the pattern was repeated.
With Soviet communism revanchist Russia and a rising
defeated, the administration of China. Although it identified
President Bill Clinton these threats to the
envisioned a U.S.-led liberal international order, however,
democratic order centered the NDS did not advance a
around “Cooperative robust new strategy to address
Security” and a “Partnership them.
for Peace.” In the early years
This task has now been taken
of this century, despite
up by one of the NDS’s
growing tensions with Russia
principal architects, Elbridge
and China, President George
Colby, who served in the
W. Bush declared he found
administration of President
Russian President Vladimir
Donald Trump as a deputy
Putin “trustworthy” and
assistant secretary of defense.
accepted China’s membership
In his book The Strategy of
in the World Trade
Denial: American Defense in
Organization. Doubling down
an Age of Great Power
on this approach, President
Conflict, Colby provides a
Barack Obama attempted to
timely exposition of—and
“reset” relations with Russia
argument for—a new U.S.
while pursuing “engagement”
defense posture. Colby’s
with China. By the late 2010s,
strategy focuses on the United
however, it was increasingly
States’ century-old objective
clear that these efforts had
of preventing a rival power
failed. Russia seized the
from establishing hegemony
Crimea from Ukraine and
on the Eurasian landmass.
supported its proxies in
Colby accepts that the United
occupying parts of that
States’ “unipolar moment” is
country’s Donbas region. And
over and warns that we now
despite reassurances to the
face a “new reality” in which
contrary, China militarized
Washington must accept that a
the South China Sea islands.
war between great powers,
Simply put, China and Russia
“which once seemed a thing of
had no interest in joining a
the past...now seems
U.S.-led international order.
considerably more plausible.”
They had long rejected it.
They had only lacked the THE TAIWAN PROBLEMIn
means to openly contest it. describing this dangerous new
world, The Strategy of Denial
Hence the growing
touches on a range of topics,
recognition among U.S.
including the challenge posed
policymakers that “great-
to NATO from a resurgent
power competition” had never
Russia, rival nuclear arsenal
ceased following the Cold
growth, an unstable Middle
War. This was formalized in
East, and global terrorism.
the 2017 National Security
Colby’s overwhelming focus,
Strategy, and the challenge
however, is on China. Since
was given a full airing in the
President Xi Jinping came to
2018 National Defense
power in 2012, China has
Strategy, which prioritized the
leveraged its rapid economic
growing challenge posed by a
growth to acquire advanced
military technology, seeking
to match or even exceed U.S.
capabilities in many areas. As
an “aspiring hegemon,” Colby
writes, China may be tempted
to use its increasingly capable
armed forces to secure its
“core interests,” which
include absorbing Taiwan and
the islands within the South
China Sea’s “nine-dash line.”
More likely, however, Beijing
calculates that absent a
countervailing U.S. effort, its
growing military power will
enable it to “Finlandize” its
neighbors without direct
force.
To accomplish these goals,
Colby argues, China will
likely pursue a “focused and
sequential strategy,” isolating
its targets from effective U.S.
support and then dealing with
them one by one. Should this
effort succeed, China could
attempt what Colby calls an
armed “fait accompli” against
targeted territories such as
Taiwan. In military strategy, a
fait accompli describes a
situation in which an
aggressor achieves its
objectives rapidly, before an
effective defense can be
mounted. It also implies that
once the territory has been
seized, attempts to retake it
will be viewed by the victim
and its allies as prohibitively
expensive. Colby argues that a
fait accompli invasion of
Taiwan could create a new
reality in Asia, much as Adolf
Hitler’s sequential rapid—and
bloodless—seizures of
Austria and the remains of
Czechoslovakia shifted the
European military balance and
destroyed the Western
democracies’ credibility with
Soviet Russia.
Even if a U.S.-led coalition
held together in the wake of a
successful Chinese fait
accompli against Taiwan,
Colby finds that a military
campaign to retake that
country from Beijing would
be both very costly and
extremely difficult, and thus
highly unlikely to succeed.
Consequently, he writes, the
United States must do
everything in its power to
deter China from attempting a
fait accompli against Taiwan
or any other U.S. western
Pacific ally or quasi ally. And
should deterrence fail, it must
defeat such an attempt at the
point of attack. This is the
“strategy of denial” from
which Colby takes his title.
Should a Chinese fait
accompli succeed against
Taiwan, Colby argues that a
U.S. strategy focused on
“punishment” would prove
ineffective. If the United
States chose to escalate the
war by seizing Chinese assets
in other parts of the world, for
example, or to impose an
economic embargo, any pain
suffered by Beijing would be
insufficient to cause it to
forfeit Taiwan. And if instead
the United States opted to
escalate the war’s intensity—
for example, by conducting
large-scale attacks on China’s
critical infrastructure—the
conflict could morph from
limited to total war, in which
both belligerents could incur
costs out of all proportion to
any prospective gains.
STRENGTHENING THE
SKELETONBy Colby’s own
account, preventing China
from executing a fait accompli
will require formidable
political and military
resources. To begin with,
Washington will need to play
a far more active role in Asia.
And since U.S. military
dominance in the region no
longer exists, and cannot be
restored, the United States
cannot simply declare its
intention to “pivot” or
“rebalance” its political and
military resources to the
western Pacific. To establish a
favorable military balance,
Colby argues, the United
States will also have to build
an “anti-hegemonic coalition”
whose combined military
power exceeds China’s.
The new coalition that Colby
calls for is not an alliance and
certainly not a latter-day
NATO. Instead, he envisions
a confederation of nations,
including U.S. allies and a
larger group of regional
partners. Colby sees the
coalition’s “steel skeleton”
formed by Washington’s “hub
and spoke” allies—Australia,
Japan, the Philippines, and
South Korea—as well as
Taiwan. Led by the United
States, this core group must be
bolstered by a broader array of
security partners. At the top of
Colby’s prospective list is
India, a great power and the
fourth member of the
increasingly prominent
“Quad,” the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue that also
includes Australia, Japan, and
the United States. Colby finds
Indonesia’s size and strategic
location attractive and would
also welcome Malaysia and
Singapore as members. But he
is hesitant about Vietnam,
which he sees as a potentially
valuable coalition member but
highly vulnerable to a Chinese
fait accompli, given its
common land border with
Beijing.
Although he argues for
Washington to take the lead in
forming the coalition, Colby is
clear-eyed about the means
the United States has available
to achieve it. He observes that
any strategy of denial must be
realistic about what the U.S.
military can—and cannot—
do. Despite the temptation to
hold back resources to address
other global threats, he warns
that Washington must remain
focused on China. Attempts to
sustain a coalition on the
cheap could compromise
efforts to convince partner
governments that the United
States is “all in.” And if push
comes to shove, Colby argues,
the United States must adopt a
“one-war posture” toward
China and accept increased
risk in dealing with other
threats. While acknowledging
the danger of Russian
aggression against NATO
states in Europe, he asserts
that a fait accompli by China
would be far more difficult to
reverse than a similar act of
Russian aggression against
one of NATO’s frontline
states. Simply put, the United
States “should not size, shape,
or posture its military to deal
simultaneously with any other
scenario alongside a war with
China over Taiwan.”
If push comes to shove, Colby
argues, the U.S. must be "all-
in" with China. What would a
one-war posture within the
framework of an anti-
hegemonic coalition look
like? In The Strategy of
Denial, Colby outlines a series
of steps that the U.S. military
should take. To be able to
respond effectively and
rapidly, U.S. forces in the
Indo-Pacific region will need
to be expanded. Given the risk
of “Pearl Harbor” attacks
against the few large existing
U.S. bases in places such as
Guam, Kadena in Japan, and
Osan in South Korea, he also
argues for dispersing U.S.
forces among a larger number
of coalition members. Such a
shift, Colby notes, would also
reassure the host coalition
partners of the U.S.
commitment to their defense.
Although the principal
objective of Colby’s anti-
hegemonic coalition is to
deter Chinese aggression in
the first place, he recognizes
the need to confront a Chinese
fait accompli with force
should deterrence fail. Yet
even if a military response
succeeds, China could still
choose to continue the war,
perhaps by mobilizing
additional forces for a more
methodical attack on Taiwan
or by escalating the conflict to
a higher level of intensity. But
China would, he believes,
likely be reluctant to
contemplate a larger, far more
costly war, and in either case
the burden of escalation
would rest uncomfortably on
its shoulders. In the case of the
former, however, it’s far from
certain that the United States
and its allies could defeat a
redoubled Chinese offensive
on Taiwan. China’s current
production of military
hardware, including
submarines, planes, missiles,
and warships, exceeds that of
the United States, and by a
significant margin. If the war
became a race to “reload,” as
it currently stands Colby’s
anti-hegemonic coalition runs
a high probability of coming
out second best.
THE PRICE OF
PREVENTIONAs with all
strategies, Colby’s is not
without risk. Until now,
Washington’s NATO allies
have shown little inclination
to pick up the strategic slack
against Russia as the United
States concentrates more
attention on China. If Vietnam
is left out of new U.S. security
arrangements, as Colby
suggests, it could become an
early victim of Chinese
regional expansion, thus
compromising Colby’s anti-
hegemonic coalition before its
foundations are securely
established.
Yet already, several of
Colby’s designated core
members seem to have
acquired a new resolve to
band against the aspiring
Asian hegemon. Japan has
promised to boost—even
double—the percentage of its
GDP devoted to defense.
Australia is seeking to enlarge
its major air and naval bases to
welcome an expanded U.S.
military presence, even as it
moves to introduce nuclear
attack submarines into its fleet
with the AUKUS (Australia–
United Kingdom–United
States) security pact. From
India to Vietnam, from
Indonesia to South Korea,
there are signs that Colby’s
anti-hegemonic coalition is
not simply an aspiration but a
real possibility—if the United
States is prepared to take the
lead.
Even with these encouraging
developments, though, Colby
warns that success will not
come “easy or cheap.” The
United States cannot afford to
hold defense budgets flat lest
its strategy become one of
“big hat, no cattle.” Nor, after
nearly a decade of intellectual
drift, can the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff continue to delay in
providing a credible
“operational concept” for
defending the western Pacific
to inform defense budget
priorities.
The Strategy of Denial shows
the breadth and depth of
Colby’s insights into the
challenges posed by the
revisionist great powers to
U.S. security and the
international system. Like all
serious strategies, Colby’s
acknowledges that U.S.
resources are limited and that
tough choices must be made.
In brief, Colby’s well-crafted
and insightful Strategy of departure point for an urgent
Denial provides a superb and, and much-needed debate over
one suspects, essential U.S. defense strategy.
 The Biden-Xi summit has changed very little. Here’s why
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
T
he United States and
China’s virtual summit
is unlikely to achieve
anything significant, with
President Biden boxed in by
the ‘America first’ attitude
still prevalent in the US, and
Xi Jinping unwilling to make
any concessions. On Monday,
Biden and Xi held their
‘virtual summit’, marking the
first formalized meeting
between the pair since the
former took office.
The summit came amid
growing tensions between the
two countries on a host of
issues, with the importance of
managing competition
responsibly one of its key
themes. The Biden
administration has made the
conscious decision to continue
to see Beijing as the major
geopolitical rival of the US,
and aims to set the “rules of
the road for the 21st century”
– in other words, US
hegemony.
Despite this, the official White
House readout of the meeting
was very carefully worded
and spoke of securing
“common-sense guardrails to
ensure that competition does
not veer into conflict.” What
this really means is that
although Biden is not
pursuing a friendly
relationship with China, he
hopes to avoid things slipping
into a mutually destructive
worst-case scenario, which his
predecessor Donald Trump
seemed quite content to let
happen.
Afterwards, as you would
expect, both sides then gave
their own version of the
substance of the meeting, with
both keen to control the
narrative on matters such as
Taiwan, trade and the general
nature of the relationship.
So while China claimed that
the US said it does not support
independence for Taiwan,
Washington went with the line
that it “strongly opposes
unilateral efforts to change the
status quo or undermine peace
and stability across the
Taiwan Strait” – a clear
warning for China What the
meeting demonstrates is that
while both powers have
increasingly different
agendas, they are nonetheless
the world’s two largest
individual stakeholders and
are mutually constrained by a
sense of structural
interdependence which
obligates them to work with
each other to some degree on
matters such as economics,
climate change and global
security.
Whilst Beijing has always
publicly recognized this and
has been more open about the
need for a balanced
relationship with the US,
Washington has largely been
in a public state of denial
about any need to deal
pragmatically with China.
Under Trump and Biden, it
has repeatedly struck a hostile
tone and tried to position itself
as being tough and
uncompromising when
engaging with Beijing – even
when this is blatantly against
America’s interests.
Biden, individually, may be
more prudent than Trump –
which is probably why this
summit happened in the first
place – but he has
unquestionably been ‘boxed
in’ by the new consensus of
US foreign policy set out by
his predecessor, giving him
little option in practice in how
to work with China.
Given his position, this
summit was probably about as
cordial as it could be, but still
included a US statement
complaining about “unfair
economic practices.” This
amply demonstrates the
constant need to justify every
positive move with China, a
country Trump to all intents
and purposes positioned as an
enemy of the Americans.
As a result, does this meeting
change much? The answer is
not really, because mostly it
consisted of both sides paying
lip service whilst reaffirming
their positions, refusing to
commit to any form of change
or compromise. Taiwan is an
interesting issue to use as a
medium to view this. The US
claim that it “does not support
Taiwan independence” is not
a reassurance or change of
course as much as it is a
reiteration of its existing
position (which it is accused
of hollowing out in practice
anyway).
Over the weekend, hawkish
pro-Taiwan think tank analyst
Bonnie Glaser pointed out in a
Twitter conversation that
America's claim of “not
supporting independence” is
deliberately distinct in
wording from the notion of
“opposing Taiwan
independence,” which is how
China depicts the American
position and is not the stance
of the US. In other words, its
position is ambiguous,
making it an empty
reassurance to Beijing.
Meanwhile, Xi Jinping
doubled down on a hardline
position, noting that if Tsai
Ing-wen’s ruling DPP
“provokes the issue” or
“crosses the redline, the
mainland will have to take
resolute measures.” Both
sides might not want a disaster
in the Taiwan Strait, and
might in turn agree not to
create one, but what has the
summit truly changed?
Nothing. Both positions will
continue as usual.
All the existing fault lines of
the US-China relationship
remain, and in turn create the
fundamental distrust and
apprehension which drives
tensions. The US will
continue to encourage support
for Taiwan; China will
continue to demand
reunification; the US will
continue to militarize China’s
periphery through deals like
AUKUS; China will continue
to respond by building up its
nuclear capabilities; and so
on.
One summit does not nullify
the rivalry or correct its
course, but it was never
intended to. If Biden wants to
make progress, he will need to
make concessions to Beijing
which will be politically
costly to him at home.
As the most notable example,
with surging inflation in
America and the initiation of
trade dialogue, it is plainly
obvious that the US needs to
lift tariffs on Chinese goods.
But Biden cannot feasibly do
so without making
concessions to China, and that
will be unpopular because the
political agenda at home is
still locked into the idea of
protectionism and ‘America
first’. The tariffs are
economically disastrous, but
seemingly occupy a sacred
position as they are seen to put
US jobs first and as being
tough on China. Republicans
would vilify Biden if they
were lifted. In this case, is the
White House prepared to take
the risk of de-escalating
tensions with China further
beyond these summits? The
dialogue invoked suggests
not.
In conclusion, it has to be said
that if actions cannot follow
words, this summit will have
minimal lasting significance.
The two sides met in an
attempt to understand each
other's red lines, but
ultimately only reiterated their
positions without addressing
directly the issues that have
escalated geopolitical rivalry.
Biden has vowed merely to
pursue the same policies, but
without the inclination to
cause a disaster. Ultimately,
though, the status quo that he
is pursuing for the US – where
effectively the tail wags the
dog – will raise tensions
anyway. In many instances,
the middle ground is gone.
It remains unlikely that Biden
has the political space or will
to drive the relationship out of
the rut it is now in, or that
Beijing will compromise on
so many issues the US deems
now to be unacceptable.
Even in the midst of the Cold
War, the US and Soviet Union
managed to pursue a working
relationship amidst all the
suspicion and tensions,
illustrating that the summit
has not secured the “common
sense guardrails” Biden hoped
for – but instead highlighted
the issues which have the
potency to make things worse
are all still unaddressed.
 Is an EU army really the answer to the bloc's ‘strategic gaps’?
Damian Wilson, Russia Today
R
enewed pressure from
Brussels to fund an
EU army under a new
‘strategic compass’ plan
ignores the reality that the idea
will never fly because no
sovereign nation wants armed
outsiders in their face on
domestic security issues. For
an organisation that hijacked
Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ as
its supranational anthem,
there seems to be a
surprisingly hearty appetite
for turning the European
Union into something far
beyond its original scope as a
club for political elites and a
mutually beneficial trade
alliance.
And no one typifies that
outlook than the EU High
Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security, Josep
Borrell, a 74-year-old Catalan
career politician who
continues to demonstrate
consistent overreach with his
ambition to establish a
European army that can be
sent into battle when and
where the unelected
bureaucrats of Brussels, like
Borrell, decide. In his recent
strategic report for the bloc
ahead of this week’s meeting
of foreign ministers, he
envisions a hi-tech battle-
ready military force that the
EU can call on should the need
arise to fight any sort of war,
on land, in cyberspace or, in
fact, even in space itself. The
question of ‘Who wants this?’
never seems to occur to
Borrell.
Warming to his theme in his
‘operational guide for the
European Union’s
development and decision-
making on security and If Frontex really was the
defense’ Borrell bemoans answer to Europe’s
what he terms the ‘strategic immigration issues, then why
shrinkage’ of Europe. are its officers not patrolling
the beaches of northern
“Thirty years ago, the EU
France right now? Because no
represented one-quarter of the
sovereign nation – and despite
world’s wealth; in 20 years, it
surrendering so many powers
will account for just over
to Brussels, each and every
10%,” he says. “Our
one of the EU members still
demographic shrinkage
see themselves as such –
develops similarly: By the end
wants outsiders meddling in
of this century, Europe will
their security issues,
account for less than 5% of the
particularly when those
world’s population.” This
outsiders are carrying
would seem an issue of
weapons. It’s not good for the
demographics and population
optics. Borrell can try and flog
growth, not preparedness for
the same old idea as some sort
war.
of shiny new ‘Strategic
A common foreign affairs Compass’ but no one is
policy has long avoided the rushing to sign up to an EU
EU, and understandably so, Army GoFundMe page.
because 27 nations with their
That, however, doesn’t stop
own historical allegiances and
Borrell from daydreaming.
differences would be
He’s old enough to remember
impossible to convince that a
the Cold War warriors that
single diplomatic route was
strode the globe post-1945.
the best fit for all. It will never
Khrushchev, Truman,
happen.
Churchill, Brezhnev, Reagan,
So, for argument’s sake, say Tito, Kennedy, Thatcher and
an EU army was Castro. Names never to be
commissioned, who would forgotten thanks, in the main,
make the decision about for their determination not to
sending its personnel into see international differences
battle? Would there be a veto? escalate, thus avoiding an
Just look at the enthusiasm atomic apocalypse.
with which the heavily-armed
Sure there are still tensions,
Frontex (European Border and
and some of those are residue
Coast Guard Agency) border
from the Cold War but
force is welcomed across the
nothing like those years of
EU. Its lumpen approach to
fear when, at times, the whole
dealing with migrants in the
world held its breath. You
boats crossing the
would think that a central
Mediterranean has seen
figure in a political project
subsequent offers of their
that was born with the sole
services politely declined by
intention of maintaining peace
EU member nations such as
throughout Europe would be a
Spain earlier this year and,
little more circumspect before
more recently, Poland, with a
indulging in sabre rattling.
firm “Thanks, but no thanks.”
I’m not sure it can ever be
realistic to imagine, as Borrell
proposes that all 27 members
of the EU agree to, “boosting
intelligence capacities and
expanding the suite of tools
for countering hybrid and
cyberattacks as well as foreign
disinformation and
interference.”
Or that Portugal, for instance,
would be happy to agree with
Romania over the need and
focus of financial
contributions aimed at
equipping a pan-European
military force and what
exactly that army’s
capabilities and technologies
might comprise. Borrell is all
about filling ‘strategic gaps’.
Maybe this does need to be
addressed but is Brussels
really the answer? Individual
nations know their own
shortcomings and, more
importantly, their own voters,
best.
With Britain no longer around
to put its foot down, the
Germans have made it clear
they do not want an EU army
and while French president
Emmanuel Macron has
suggested he’s up for it, there
is the suspicion that his
support has more to do with
his ongoing niggles with the
USA. An EU army would, of
course, rub up against NATO,
which ties the Americans into
European foreign affairs and
reminds anyone who needs
reminding, that aggression
towards a single NATO
member is the same as
aggression towards all.
All this is, of course, Brussels
struggling to provide an
answer to Henry Kissinger’s
famous puzzler, “Who do I
call if I want to call Europe?”
And while most realists would
acknowledge, that’s a
conference call with Paris and
Berlin, nowhere in the world
outside the office of the High
Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security is that
answer ‘Josep Borrell’.
 China’s nuclear weapons build-up signals a new arms race
Tom Fowdy, Russia Today
R
eports from America
suggesting Beijing is
dramatically
increasing its number of
nuclear weapons have a
definite agenda – to raise the
appetite for greater spending
on the US military. A new
arms race will be the result.
Over the past few weeks, the
Financial Times has carried a
number of stories based
around deliberate leaks and
interviews from the Pentagon.
It was the FT, for example,
that broke the news about
China’s apparent hypersonic
missile test.
The stories all have a common
theme and focus – to
dramatically hype up the
supposed ‘military threat’
from Beijing, warn of its
increased capabilities, and
drum up demand for the US to
do more to counter it. The
latest story of this nature
appeared on Monday. In an
interview with the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Mark Milley, the FT
reports that the Pentagon is
apparently “stunned” that
China is dramatically scaling
up its nuclear warheads and
will have over 1,000 by the
end of this decade.
If true, the story is noteworthy
because it marks a clear shift
in China’s nuclear weapons
policy, which for over half a
century has been based on the
idea of having a minimum
deterrent. The timing is
significant, too, because it was
published just hours before
the highly anticipated virtual
summit between Xi Jinping
and Joe Biden. The article
pursues a predictable agenda,
with Milley quoted as saying,
“We need to act with urgency
to develop capabilities across
all domains – land, sea, air,
space, cyber and our strategic
nuclear forces – to address this
evolving global landscape.”
In other words, it’s a call for
US military spending to be
dramatically increased. Little
wonder then, that the headline
highlights Milley’s claim that
China’s apparent nuclear
build-up is “one of the largest
shifts in geostrategic power
ever.”
There is good reason to
believe that China is indeed
recalibrating its nuclear
policy, but not in the way the
US says it is. The
abandonment of the
‘minimum deterrent’ position
comes in response to the
shifting geopolitical
landscape, whereby the US
has attempted to pursue an all-
embracing military
containment of Beijing in
multiple areas on its own
periphery.
This includes regularly sailing
aircraft carriers up close to
China’s territory, pursuing
constant military exercises
(and encouraging allies to do
so too), forming military
coalitions against China
through the likes of the Quad
and AUKUS, increasing arms
sales to Taiwan, and so on.
Whilst it might be tempting to
describe this build-up as
similar to the Cold War
nuclear arms race between the
US and the USSR, Beijing’s
objectives are more limited
and specific than amounting
to a question of hegemony.
First of all, this is all focused
on a specific region rather
than having global scope. It is
not comparable to the Cold
War, where the USSR had
amassed nearly 50,000
nuclear warheads by the time
of its collapse.
China is not attempting to
compete globally with the US
– which sustains over 4,400
active warheads – but rather
achieve the upper hand in the
Asia-Pacific region, with the
aim of consolidating its hand
over Taiwan and the South
China Sea.
Despite this, China has not
officially denounced its ‘no
first use’ policy and continues
to pay lip service to it. This
means that unless it says
otherwise, these warheads
remain as a deterrent, and will
not be used in offensive
action.
Despite the ‘no first use’
policy, everyone knows the
strategic and political
considerations of nuclear
weapons are based on
potential, and influence the
balance of power accordingly.
And herein lies the key point
which constitutes the
“geostrategic power shift” that
the article alludes to – as
exaggerated as parts of it may
be. The intention by Beijing is
clear – by building up its
nuclear arsenal, China is
seeking to nullify the
probability that in a war
scenario, the US would, under
its own ‘first use’ policy,
launch or propose a pre-
emptive nuclear attack on
China to, for example, save
Taiwan.
Beijing’s arms build-up serves
to negate that potential
scenario by raising the stakes
to vastly increase the
retaliatory destructive power
it could unleash on the US or
its allies. This kind of
consideration could have a
significant impact on the
policies of surrounding
countries, such as Japan or
Australia. Because even if
Beijing vows not to use a
nuclear weapon first, the more
relevant question is: Are you
willing to engage in military
action against a nuclear
superpower? Words alone
mean little when war begins
and the risks become bigger.
While putting together an
arsenal of 1,000 warheads is
not an attempt to compete
with the US head on, it is
sufficient to make countries –
including America itself – see
China in a different light. This simply allow China to shift the
is where China’s regional balance of power – but the
advantage comes into play. reality is that Beijing’s actions
Beijing would like to show are a response to moves by the
that it is capable of taking Americans.
Taiwan without the US and its
In conclusion, it seems highly
allies having the capability or
probable that China has
will to respond, giving it the
changed course on its nuclear
potential to do so without
policy. From keeping a
firing a single shot – in which
minimum deterrent, it is now
case the ‘no first use’ policy
said to be pursuing a build-up
would be irrelevant. For
which will escalate its arsenal
Washington in particular, this
to four times its last reported
changes the scenario to a
size. This is a strategic
question of whether a war
response to the ongoing
against China could ever be
American efforts to contain
won. And this at a time when
Beijing, with the goal of
there are some in Washington
making a war scenario a non-
who want the US to commit to
starter.
a war to ‘save Taiwan’. How
could it do so in this case? China is not seeking to be a
nuclear hegemon on a global
But it also means the US will
scale, but it has nonetheless
respond – as the agenda of the
decided that it needs to show
FT article makes clear – and
it is a serious player. As the FT
pursue a nuclear build-up of
article proves, the US will
its own. In that case, we must
willingly highlight this to
acknowledge that the threat of
push for funds for an arms
a new nuclear arms race
build-up – and that’s exactly
becomes a very real
what we’re now getting.
possibility and is arguably
happening already. There is
no chance that the US will
 Rushing towards a calamity
T
HE climate summit
held in Glasgow did
not produce the
agreement that the ailing
planet that we all inhabit so
desperately needed. Many
thousands of people attended,
Covid-19 restrictions
notwithstanding. Most came
from the Western countries
that are directly responsible
for producing the crisis itself,
and few, according to Mary
Robinson, a former Prime
Minister of Ireland, came with
a “crisis” mindset that would
lead to any sort of urgency in
coming to a consensus.
When things wrapped up on
Sunday, an agreement was
reached, but it was lukewarm,
with its most certain promise
being another climate summit
to be held in Egypt next year.
The destination, that elusive
master agreement to reduce
emissions and reliance on
fossil fuels, the hopeful seem
to have decided, could
perhaps be reached then.
China and India, the two
major countries currently
responsible for much of the
world’s emissions, that could
not be persuaded to make
concrete commitments this
year, would perhaps feel the
urgency to make changes
more acutely another year
from now.
Pollution levels in Lahore
show why addressing the
climate challenge cannot be
put off to a later time.
This would be the most
hopeful characterisation of the
climate summit that was. A
harsher assessment would be
Rafia Zakaria
that this entire model of glitzy
and massive diplomatic
convenings, one that permits
huge droves of bureaucrats
within the world’s largely
inept international
institutions, mischaracterises
the entire nature of the
problem that sits before the
world at this moment. There is
no deep diving required to see
why; the idea of thousands of
delegates from all sorts of
countries taking innumerable
plane trips, burning thousands
of gallons of fossil fuels to
reach a destination where they
hobnob with all the people
that they haven’t been able to
because of the Covid-19
pandemic, seems like the
stupidest plan ever. If
anything, the summit seems to
be a raucous comeback event
for the purveyors of global
diplomacy and bureaucracy to
announce that they were
indeed back in business. That
the format and waste that this
meeting (to prevent waste and
pollution) would produce was
in itself an ironic example of
how we got here as it seemed
to be largely lost on those
arranging, organising and then
attending the discussions.
The truth of this could be
heard through the statements
made by those whose
countries are actually in peril.
One official from the
Maldives, whose many island
outposts stand to sink with the
unceasing rise in sea levels,
noted just this when she
declared that whatever little
agreements were cobbled
together to make the whole
get-together seem worthwhile
were not enough to save her
little country — this was in
addition to the fact that most
delegates from countries in
the Global South could not
even attend the summit
because of the protracted
Covid-19 precautions. Those
countries, unlike nearly all the
Western world, do not have
ready access to Covid-19
vaccines and therefore could
not produce all kinds of
documentation or follow the
quarantine requirements put in
place for the summit.
One of the stumbling blocks in
reaching global consensus on
climate is the issue of money.
At this moment, the global
market in carbon offsets (via
which polluting companies
pay money for the pollution
that they produce) means that
rich countries get money from
companies and corporations.
Since rich countries are
historically responsible for the
pollution that now threatens
the world, poor countries want
access to some of the money
from the sale of carbon
offsets. They could then use
this money to better fund
measures that allow their
populations to deal with
climate-related illnesses. The
United States and the
European Union were against
such a proposition.
This was not the only
reservation regarding money.
Another was over the fact that
10 years ago countries came
together to create a $100
billion fund that would
provide money to developing
countries as ‘climate finance’,
which would help them deal
with the repercussions of
climate change. This ‘fund’ is
billions of dollars short
because wealthy countries that
promised to make large
contributions have simply not
paid up.
Then there is the other
elephant in the room. It is
perhaps best summed up by a
quote from Malik Amin
Aslam, an advisor to the prime
minister of Pakistan on
climate change. Scoffing at
the distant net-zero goals
being promised by countries
like India, Aslam said: “With
the average age of 60 I don’t
think anyone in the
negotiating room would live
to experience that. That’s net
zero in 2070.”
The statement is telling; in a world where smog and
wealthy countries that have breathing issues were not part
already moved on from the and parcel of living in any
heavy industry that produces large city.
the bulk of emissions and
Even as the climate summit
raises the global temperature
was gearing up, Lahore in
are having trouble making the
Pakistan was declared the
case to poorer countries, like
world’s most polluted city on
India and even China, who
Thursday last week, when the
still see manufacturing as the
Air Quality Index rose above
mainstay for their economies.
700. This was the highest level
So far, there does not seem to
the metropolis had ever
be much progress on this front
recorded. The AQI has
or in convincing India and
improved somewhat since
China that there may not be a
then, but the fact remains that
habitable world remaining for
in the Global South, the rapid
them to parade the power they
deterioration of living and
would earn from continuing to
breathing conditions is not
pollute in exchange for getting
something that can be
rich. The issue about age is
postponed to a later date.
also very pertinent. There is a
huge generation gap between
those who are 50 or older and
have largely spent their lives

HERE isn’t a great
T
deal to be said for
sprawling international
conferences, at least as far as
outcomes are concerned.
Perhaps everyone represented
gets to have their say on the
conference floor. You can rest
assured, though, that most of
the words — particularly
words of wisdom — will fall
on deaf ears.
There was no reason to expect
that the UN-sponsored
Conference of the Parties in
Glasgow, COP26, would be
any different.
It was hyped up as the last
chance for humanity to
preserve its habitat. But even
that is hardly a novelty.
Similar slogans have echoed
since the first COP in Rio
almost 30 years ago. That does
not mean they are unduly
alarmist. If anything, it is a
reminder that the world would
be in a rather different place
had it seriously begun heeding
the warnings back in the early
1990s.
The value of action was
already apparent during that
decade. The ban on
chloroflurocarbons (CFCs)
was eminently effective.
Depletion of the ozone layer
has barely been a concern in
the 21st century. That’s
obviously welcome, but it
barely qualifies as tinkering
on the edges of a vast
problem. Banishing CFCs did
not threaten the broader
supremacy of global capital. It
was an easy compromise.
Fossil fuels are in a different
category altogether. They are
seen to sustain certain nations
Down but not out
Mahir Ali, Dawn News
as well as some of the world’s
on fossil fuels for much longer
largest MNCs. than developing nations to
power its growth, and
The Glasgow gabfest failed to
historically bears
forestall a catastrophe.
responsibility for a far higher
Some of the biggest offenders level of emissions.
have known for more than six
The West’s ambitions on
decades that their relentless
climate action rarely reflect
quest for oil, coal and gas
this advantage. Even the $100
deposits, and the deployment
billion promised by the North
of these fuels, entailed
to the South at the Paris
deleterious environmental
conference in 2015 has not
consequences. That damning
been delivered so far. That is
information was successfully
anyhow paltry compensation
sequestered for a long time.
for decades of colonial
It’s much harder to bury
robbery, followed in many
carbon, which continues to be
cases by neocolonial
bandied about as an emissions
exploitation — and a plethora
reduction mechanism.
of criminal actions to ward off
Even if this could technically democratic developments that
be part of the solution, it’s threatened to halt the plunder
again tantamount to tinkering of natural resources.
on the fringes. Alongside
If that’s a bridge too far, the
‘clean’ or ‘green’ coal, gas
very least developed nations
and oil, it’s part of the effort to
could do would be to rapidly
deflect criticism of fossil fuels
reduce their own dependence
by pretending that their
on fossil fuels before they
exploitation for decades to
pressure India or China to
come will progressively
catch up. Let’s also not forget
become ‘safer’ alongside
that even though China is
token efforts at mitigation.
today the world’s largest
Remarkably, until the greenhouse gas emitter, its per
Glasgow conference the capita carbon footprint is
emissions reduction agenda considerably smaller than that
all but ignored fossil fuels. of the US — and India’s is
When it came to formally minuscule in comparison.
pronouncing a long overdue
Comprehensive climate
death sentence on coal, India
justice wasn’t on the Glasgow
and China stood in the way.
agenda, though — even if
The delayed final declaration
even Western activists
was eventually watered down
acknowledge its importance.
to seeking a phase-down
But activists were mostly on
rather than a phase-out of coal.
the fringes, while the corridors
At one level, the semantics are were crawling with fossil fuel
superfluous. Nations routinely lobbyists keen to parade their
fall short of their recently acquired
commitments. Besides, cre---dentials as conv-erts to
there’s a certain logic behind environ---men--talism.
India and China’s resistance:
the developed West has relied
At least some of the oil, coal
and gas conglomerates are
happy to wear a green mask,
provided it proves profitable
in the short run. If the prospect
involves delayed gratification,
they would rather not risk
their own resources. But even
public funding is seen as
unacceptable if it involves
higher taxes for those who can
easily afford them. The fate of
Joe Biden’s Build Back Better
bill speaks for itself.
In the unlikely event that the
half-baked pledges made at
Glasgow are religiously
adhered to, the planet is
headed for 2.4 degrees Celsius
of warming this century. That
may well be a conservative
estimate. The consequences
could deteriorate far more
sharply than anticipated.
Many young people at the
forefront of climate agitation
seem to understand that
systemic changes in the way
the world is organised will be
necessary to shift the global
trajectory. But there are older
generations relentlessly
paving the path to disaster.
Wasting the crucial present
decade in greenwashing and
related blah, blah, blah would
be the biggest crime ever
committed against humanity.
 AUKUS Is Only Half the Equation
Ryan Nabil, The Diplomat
T
he United States and
the United
Kingdom’s recent
decision to expand their Asian
security presence has the
potential to deter China, but
Washington and London
should recognize its limits.
The U.S. and U.K.
governments need to build
stronger trade and investment
ties to create a sustainable and
long-lasting diplomatic
presence across Asia.
As China pursues an
increasingly assertive foreign
policy, Anglo-American
strategic cooperation with
regional partners like
Australia could help check
Chinese ambitions in the
region. In September, the
Biden administration and the
Boris Johnson government
announced a new Indo-Pacific
defense alliance between
Australia, the U.K., and the
U.S. – AUKUS for short.
While the alliance will
initially help Australia build a
nuclear-powered submarine, it
ultimately seeks to deepen
trilateral security cooperation
in Asia. Although the decision
was seen as a snub by France,
it was a welcome distraction
for the Biden administration
following its botched
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The move was also a
diplomatic win for Downing
Street as it seeks to expand
Britain’s diplomatic presence
beyond Europe.
However, the United States
and Britain should not
overemphasize security
arrangements in the emerging
pivot to Asia. Both countries
could take a lesson from
Beijing’s playbook. After the
U.S., Britain, and Australia
announced the AUKUS deal,
the Chinese government did
not make any security
overtures. Instead, Beijing
announced its bid to join the
Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) – the successor to
the Trans-Pacific Partnership
that the United States helped
negotiate but from which it
ultimately withdrew. It is
unclear whether China’s
application will be successful
– especially considering
Taiwan’s application to join
the CPTPP – but it
nevertheless sends a powerful
message to Asian countries.
Unlike the U.S. and Britain,
China seeks to project itself as
an economic power instead of
a military power.
Indeed, there are good reasons
for the United States and
Britain to prioritize economic
ties over a military build-up in
Asia. Many Indo-Pacific
nations – apart from Japan,
Taiwan, Vietnam, and India –
view their relationship with
China primarily in economic
rather than security terms.
Even countries like India,
where leaders are increasingly
skeptical of China’s strategic
objectives, do not want their
country to become pawns in
increasingly hostile Sino-
American relations.
That is especially the case for
high-growth emerging Asian
economies like Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and the
Philippines. These countries
still face significant economic
development challenges, so
their governments often
prioritize commercial ties
over security alliances. Many
are especially concerned that
worsening Sino-American
relations and growing
militarization in the region
could hamper national
economic development
efforts. Following the
AUKUS agreement, Malaysia
and Indonesia expressed
concerns about a growing
Asian arms race and its
potential impact on regional
stability. Anglo-American
diplomacy that prioritizes
commercial rather than
security issues will better
appeal to leaders in these
economically orientated
Asian nations.
Both Britain and the United
States can design foreign
policies better suited to Asian
nations’ economic priorities.
Earlier this year, Britain
became the first country to
pursue negotiations to join the
CPTPP. Joining such
multilateral agreements and
strengthening existing
bilateral trade arrangements
can be an effective way to
signal Washington and
Westminster’s commitment to
strengthening Asian economic
ties.
The U.K. and U.S. should also
pay special attention to trade
in digital services and cross-
border data flows, which
could well grow faster than
trade in goods. As China has
made significant headways in
developing the digital
infrastructure across South
and Southeast Asia, the U.S.
and the U.K. have fallen
behind. However, America
and Britain can work with
Australia, Japan, and the
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries to sign agreements
to liberalize cross-border data
flows and digital trade.
An increased economic
emphasis does not necessarily
mean that the United States
and Britain should neglect a
military presence, but they
should take steps to improve
Asian perceptions of
transatlantic security
cooperation. For
policymakers in many Asian
countries, it is easy to view
AUKUS as a Western
maritime coalition seeking to
prevent the rise of an
emerging Asian nation.
Likewise, some argue that
India could provide a
counterweight to China, but
relying too much on India
risks alienating its neighbors,
incentivizing them to pursue
closer ties with China.
Building ties and strategic
cooperation with Asian
nations – instead of military
competition with China –
should be the focus of the
emerging Anglo-American
pivot to Asia. To that end, the
U.S. and U.K. should seek a
broader coalition that includes
both major and minor regional
powers. Britain is especially
well-suited for such an
approach, since its technical
expertise and military
knowhow far surpass its hard
security assets in the region.
By enabling regional players
and cooperating with a diverse
array of Asian countries,
Britain can play an outsized
role in the region.
 Narrative on Afghanistan
Ahsan Munir, The Nation
S
ince 9/11, western
armies occupied
Afghanistan for about
two decades without any clear
aims and objectives, amplified
by the sudden and immediate
pullout of western forces—
leaving behind nothing but
huge piles of weaponry as a
parting gift to the people of
Afghanistan.
Presently, the west is
analysing only its military
failure and tomes will be
written on lessons learned
from the Afghan military
debacle, a déjà vu of Vietnam
invasion, and the new
strategies developed would
again be put to use in a new
foreign military invasion or
occupation. The memory of
imperialism is thoroughly
manifested again in recent
invasions such as Libya,
Syria, and Iraq, which left
nothing but destruction and
destitution in once-prosperous
countries.
The vacuum left by the pullout
of Western forces has been
filled by their opponents in the
war—the Taliban. However,
instead of being thankful that
a strong force existed which
could fill the vacuum and hold
a fractious country together,
the Taliban are being
demonised through a well-
orchestrated narrative to hide
the failures of the departed
occupational forces. During
about two decades of Afghan
occupation, billions of dollars
were sunk in defence
industries of the west but how
much was spent on building
road networks, hospitals,
educational hospitals and
other amenities to win the
hearts and minds of the local
populace is a question not
much asked. Now, the Taliban
are trying to build a civilian
infrastructure to run the
country and should be
credited with coming up with
a governmental framework.
Ministers have been appointed
and efforts are being made to
make various ministries
functional again to serve the
people. Similarly, the Taliban
government is active on the
diplomatic front and even
engaged with naysayers to
allay any fears created by
vested powers and interests.
Further, the Taliban are
engaged in establishing the
writ of the state which was
never achieved during the two
decades of foreign
occupation. The Taliban were
successful in establishing the
writ of the state after the
Soviet exit and hopefully
would do so again without
suppressing any ethnic or
political group. The Afghan
people, after more than four
decades of war and violence,
need peace and stability, and
non-interference from
external powers.
To help the Taliban
government perform its
functions and serve the
people, it needs monetary
resources. The Afghan
government needs its rightful
money to feed its famine-
stricken population, to pay its
public-sector employees, to
run hospitals, banks, and other
public services, but as in other
developing countries, it is
being weaned on
humanitarian aid to avoid an
impending humanitarian
disaster. Thus, the Afghans
are being dictated by the
former occupational forces to
fulfil their desired conditions,
again a manifestation of
western colonialism and
hubris. If the west is so
worried about Afghanistan,
then during its two decades of
occupation, it should have had
given it a credible
government, functioning
institutions, and a strong
defence which but all
crumpled when western
support was removed. Puppet
governments were installed
through questionable
elections and never
represented the interests of the
people. Political leaders and
various pressure groups lined
their pockets and fled at the
first sign of opposition
because they knew they never
commanded the hearts and
minds of their people.
Thus, even after the exit, a
narrative to help felicitate
continued interference with
the political and economic
stability of Afghanistan is
being propagated, which
instead should be provided
with its rightful resources, and
for once, the Afghan people
should decide their future
without any interference.