NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHA

LABOUR LAW PROJECT ON

A CRITICAL NOTE ON BANGLORE WATER SUPPLY CASE

SUBMITTED TO:
Ms. Vipasha Ghangoria,
(Professor of Law)
SUBMITTED BY:
Ajeet Kotwal ( 18bba002)

Sarthak Sharma (18bba043)

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to express our sincere gratitude and indebtedness to Ms. Vipasha Ghangoria for
their enlightening lectures. We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to our teaching
staff for guiding me the path towards gaining knowledge.
We would like to thank the Library Staff of National Law University Odisha as well for their co-
operation.
We would also like to thank our parents for providing the strength and will for completion of
every task undertaken.

2|Page
 TABLE OF CONTENT

TABLE OF CASES ___________________________________________________________ 4

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT _______________________________________________ 5

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT _____________________________________________ 5

SCOPE OF THE STUDY _______________________________________________________ 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY _________________________________________________ 5

ABSTRACT _________________________________________________________________ 6

INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________ 7

CASE ANALYSIS ____________________________________________________________ 8

FACTS OF THE CASE ________________________________________________________ 8

ISSUES INVOLVED __________________________________________________________ 9

RULES/ LAWS APPLICABLE _________________________________________________ 10

JUDGMENT ________________________________________________________________ 12

A DETAILED ANALYSIS ____________________________________________________ 13

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS __________________________________________________ 18

CONCLUSION ______________________________________________________________ 18

3|Page
 TABLE OF CASES

Amritsar of Church of North India v Buta Anayat Masih _____________________________ 18

Himanshu Kumar Vidyarathi and others v. State of Bihar _____________________________ 17
Shrimali v. District Development Officer __________________________________________ 19
Soni Photostat Centre v. Basudev Gupta __________________________________________ 18
State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsingh Parmar __________________________________ 17
State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi lal ________________________________________________ 17
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jasbir Singh _____________________________________________ 14

4|Page
 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT
The main objective of the project is to know whether what all fall under the ambit of Industry.
And give a detailed note on the landmark case i.e., Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
v. A Rajappa and the principles discussed in this case which are helpful in further to determine
whether what falls under the ambit of industry and what not.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT

The significance of the project is to make the readers aware about the principles laid down in the
case in order to determine what Industry is.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The Project is limited to the landmark case Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A
Rajappa, where a detailed note is given on what is Industry and how did the next cases after this
landmark judgement follow the principles laid down in this case. And also to discuss the triple
test laid down in this case and phases earlier to this case.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology used was doctrinal methodology. Doctrinal methodology includes doing
research from books, articles, journal, case study, newspapers and also taking the help of web
article and pdf.

5|Page
 ABSTRACT
Topic: A critical note on Banglore Water supply case, i.e., Banglore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board v. A Rajappa.

The attention of the Supreme court has recently been drawn to the definition of the term
“industry” as stated in the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The uncertainty with regard to the
definition assumes great importance as the machinery for the settlement of industrial disputed
can only be set in motion when there exists a dispute relating to “industry”. However, it tis next
to impossible to classify a dispute as industrial or non-industrial without being certain of what
exactly the term, “industry” encompasses with its scope.

One of the most momentous decisions in this regard was Banglore Water Supply and Sewerage
Board v. A Rajappa which overruled numerous other decisions of the Supreme court but
simplified the task for the legislature by placing major issues in the right perspective, major
policy issues being best decided by the legislature and not by the judicial process. It is the
analysis of this very judgment which is the subject of this paper.

Industry involves an employer and employee, and progress postulates harmony and justice in
industrial relations. Whether the system is capitalist or socialist, if friction and break-down afflict
the smooth working of an industry, flames of strike and lock-out will spoil production and
victimize the society which is ultimate beneficiary of the industrial discipline and the consequent
flow of goods ad services.

In this case a seven-judge bench was constituted especially to examine the definition of
“industry” and lay down the law on the subject. The bench was presided over by Justice V R
Krishna Iyer who drafted a new definition of the term industry. Their ruling was a result of
various disputed arising in establishing that are not manufacturing industries but belong to
categories of hospitals, educational and research institutions, Governmental departments, public
utility services, professionals and clubs. The definition was accordingly expanded to cover those
establishments which involved an employer-employee relationship of the objectives of the
organization in question.

6|Page
 INTRODUCTION
“INDUSTRY”

According to section 2(j), ‘industry’ “means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or
calling and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or
avocation of workmen”. The Australian interpretation is broad and comprehensive. The Indian
definition, on the other hand, encompasses both "means" and "includes." As a result, it serves as
both a constraint and a source of expansion. The urgent necessity, it is likely, when the Act was
introduced, was a practical definition of "industry," which was met by emulating the Australian
term without respect for the interpretations imposed on the definition by the Australian Courts.

Following a review of the Supreme Court's prior rulings defining the concept of industry, a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Rajappa, consolidated the key characteristics that
an activity must exhibit before it can be regarded as coming within the term's scope. Any action,
according to Rajappa Court, is "industry."

The world continues to revolve, with industrialization serving as the barometer of "progress." In
industry, there is an employer and an employee, and success necessitates industrial relations that
are harmonious and equitable. Whether the system is capitalism or socialism, if friction and
breakdown plague the smooth operation of an enterprise, fires of "strike" and "lock-out" will ruin
or stop output, victimising the community that benefits most from industrial discipline and the
resulting flow of products and services.

The Industrial Dispute Act was created with the goal of creating machinery for the resolution of
industrial disputes, which had become a regular occurrence in the postwar period as a result of
persistent conflict between employers and employees. The result was a decrease in output.

This definition has its roots embedded in section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and
Arbitration Act, 1904 of Australia which states the definition of industry as (i) any business,
trade, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers on land or water, (ii) any calling,
service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of employers on land or
water, and (iii) any branch of an industry or a group of industries.

7|Page
In the Banglore water supply case, a seven-judge bench was established especially to examine
the concept of "industry" and lay down the law on the subject. Justice V.R Krishna Iyerpresided
over the bench and drafted a new definition of the term "industry" as a crusader-legislator. Their
decision was based on a number of conflicts that arose in hospitals, educational and research
institutions, government agencies, public utility services, professions, and clubs, which are not
manufacturing industries.As a result, the term was broadened to include any businesses that
featured an employer-employee relationship, regardless of the organization's goals.

CASE ANALYSIS
Bangalore Water-Supply Vs R. Rajappa & Others

CITATIONS-

1978 AIR 548, 1978 SCR (3) 207

CORUM-

Beg, M. Hameedullah (Cj), Chandrachud, Y.V., Bhagwati, P.N., Krishnaiyer, V.R.

&Tulzapurkar, V.D., Desai, D.A. & Singh, Jaswant

PETITIONER-

BANGALORE WATER-SUPPLY & SEWERAGE BOARD, ETC.

RESPONDENT-

R. RAJAPPA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT-

21/02/1978

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant found respondent workers responsible for misbehavior and collected various sums
from them. As a result, they filed a Claims Application No. 5/72, under Section 33C (2) of the

8|Page
Industrial Disputes Act, stating that the punishment was imposed in breach of natural justice
principles.

The appellant Board filed a preliminary objection with the Labour Court, claiming that the
Board, as a statutory body performing what is essentially a regal function by providing basic
amenities to citizens, is not an industry within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, and thus the employees were not workmen, and the Labour Court lacked
jurisdiction to decide the workmen's claim.

Following the overruling of this objection, the appellant Board filed two WritPetitions in the
Karnataka High Court in Bangalore. The petitions were rejected by the Division Bench of the
High Court, which found that the appellant Board is "industry" within the sense of section 2(i) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The appeals by Special Leave were sent to a larger Bench for consideration, citing “the
possibility of confusion from the crop of cases in an area where the common man has to
understand and apply the law and the desirability of a comprehensive, clear, and conclusive
declaration as to what is an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act as it stands.”

ISSUES INVOLVED
1. The major question was whether the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board would fit
under the definition of industry under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act?

2. Whether Charitable Institutions can come within the meaning Industries?

3. Do clubs and other organisations that focus on fellowship and self-service rather than profit fit
inside the definitional circle?

4. Would a university or college or school or research institute be called an industry?

5. Could a legal firm, a chartered accountant's office, a doctor's clinic, or any other liberal
profession's work or calling be classified as an industry?

9|Page
6. Are governmental functions, in the strictest sense, industrial, and if not, what is the scope of
government instrumentalities' immunity?

7. Whether Sovereign or Regal functions will be industry?

8. Whether Municipal Corporations Industry?

9. Whether Hospital is Industry?

10. What is the meaning of the term ‘industry’?

RULES/ LAWS APPLICABLE

Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 2(j)- “industry means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an
employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or
by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of
goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes
which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not -

(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or

(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes--

(a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948 );

(b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an
establishment. but does not include--

(1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an
integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the
foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. Explanation -
For the purposes of this sub- clause," agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried
on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of
1951 ); or
10 | P a g e
(2) hospitals or dispensaries; or

(3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or

(4) institutions owned or managed by organizations wholly or substantially engaged in any

charitable, social or philanthropic service; or

(5) khadi or village industries; or

(6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government
including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with
defence research, atomic energy and space; or

(7) any domestic service; or

(8) any activity, being a profession practiced by an individual or body or individuals, if the
number of persons employed by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such
profession is less than ten; or

(9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co- operative society or a club or any other like
body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co- operative society, club or
other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten.”

Section 33C in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 33C (2)- “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or
any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as
to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then
the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such
Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; within a period
not exceeding three months:] 2Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court
considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend
such period by such further period as he may think fit.”

11 | P a g e
 JUDGMENT
It was decided that the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board would be included in the
definition of industry, and it justified this decision by providing a more detailed definition of
industry. The term 'industry,' as defined in Section 2(j) and clarified by Banerjee, has a broad
meaning:

(a) There is a 'industry' in that enterprise where (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by co-
operation between employer and employee, (the direct and substantial element is chimerical) (iii)
for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants
and wishes.

(b)activity is in the public, joint private, or other sector, the absence of a profit motivation or a
profitable aim is immaterial.

(c) The actual focus is functional, and the nature of the activity, with a specific emphasis on the
employer-employee relationship, is the deciding factor.

(d) If the organisation is a trade or company, it does not cease to be one due to the presence of
philanthropy.

Despite the fact that Section 2(j) utilises terms with the greatest amplitude in its two arms, their
meaning cannot be exaggerated to the point of overreach.

As noted in Banerjee and in this judgement, 'undertaking', as well as service, calling, and the
like, must undergo a contextual and associational shrinkage. This leads to the conclusion that any
organised activity with the triple characteristics, but not trade or business, can still be classified
as 'industry' (if the nature of the activity, i.e. the employer-employee relationship, is similar to
what we see in trade or business).This includes 'industry' undertakings, callings, and services
adventures that are 'analogous' to the conduct of commerce or business. Other than the methods
for carrying out the task, such as establishing employer-employee cooperation, all characteristics
may be distinct. It makes no difference if there is an equivalent in terms of employment.

By invoking faiths, cults, inner senses of incongruity, or other senses of motivation for or
consequent of economic activities, the application of these principles should not stop short of its

12 | P a g e
logical reach. The breadth of this legislative ideology must influence the reach of the statutory
definition, with the Act's ideology being industrial peace, regulation, and settlement of industrial
disputes between employers and employees.

A DETAILED ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision, which recommends the formation of a bigger bench to evaluate
the concept of "industry" as defined in law since 1978, should serve as a wake-up call to the
legislature and the administration. The central question before the court in State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Jasbir Singh1, which was heard alongside nine other civil appeals, was whether the Bangalore
Water Supply case, which expanded the definition of "industry," should continue to be the law of
the land for the purposes of applying the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.

Employers in a variety of service firms and government institutions, enraged by the judgement in
the Bangalore Water Supply case, demanded that they be exempted from the IDA's reach. In
1982, Parliament enacted an amendment to the IDA that attempted to remove a wide range of
establishments from the criteria. The change, however, was never made public.

The Iyer Bench judgement has to be reviewed, according to the recent order of the Bench led by
Justice N. Santosh Hegde, because the executive failed to announce and implement the modified
restricted definition of "industry." The Government had stated to the courts that the 1982
amendment was not announced because no alternative mechanism for redressing employee
concerns in enterprises exempt from the amendment had been developed.

The Hegde Bench has stated that the apex court issued its ruling in 1978 only because the IDA
lacked an unambiguous definition of industry, and that Justice Krishna Iyer stated at the time that
“our judgement has no pontifical flavour but seeks to serve the future hour until changes in the
law or in industrial culture occur.”

The need for a distinct piece of industrial relations law for service businesses is becoming
increasingly important as the service sector's position in the economy grows. Services are also
becoming a topic of international trade talks and are growing more accessible to foreign

1
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jasbir Singh, 2017 (153) FLR 2.

13 | P a g e
investors. Many services that were formerly the responsibility or prerogative of governments,
such as health care, education, water, and electricity supply, are now carried out by private
businesses.

On the one hand, it is necessary to defend the legitimate interests and democratic rights of
employees in these sectors, and on the other, to reduce the potential for industrial disputes in
these critical areas in order to protect the public's interests. All of these factors are significant
enough to justify a distinct legislation governing these services.

However, several of the Hegde Bench's arguments in favour of a judicial review of the 1978
judgement are diametrically opposed and extremely disputed. According to the ruling, there is a
“overemphasis on workers' rights” in industrial law, which has resulted in the payment of “vast
amounts as back payments” to workers who have been unlawfully terminated or retrenched, and
these awards “can take away the fundamental substratum of industry.”

Justice Krishna Iyer had remarked in his ruling (quoted by the Hegde order itself) that the
“working class, unfamiliar with the sophistications of definitions and shower of decisions, unable
to secure expert legal opinion, what with poverty pricing them out of the justice market and
denying them the staying power to withstand the multi-decked litigated process, de facto is
denied social justice if legal drafting is vagarious, definitions indefinite and court rulings
contradictory”. These remarks were made in support of an expansive definition of “industry”.

The Hegde Bench ruling attributes what it calls “the inhibitions and the difficulties which are
being exercised by the legislature and the executive in bringing into force the amended industrial
law” to the interpretation of the definition of “industry” in the 1978 judgment. This also ignores
the explanation given by the Government for non-enforcement of the restrictive amendment.

The apex court says that “an over-expansive interpretation of the definition of industry might be
a deterrent to private enterprise in India where public employment opportunities are scarce”.
However, neither economic theory nor the decades of growth of the market economy in
developed countries testifies to protection of employees’ basic rights being a hurdle to progress.
Thus the remarks on macroeconomic tendencies made by the latest ruling seem to be no more
than assumptions.

14 | P a g e
Justice Chandrachud, a member of the Bench that delivered the 1978 verdict, had said that the
“problem [of definition of industry] is far too policy-oriented to be satisfactorily settled by
judicial decisions. Parliament must step in and legislate in a manner which will leave no doubt as
to its intention”. These, are wise words.

In the present case the court by applying liberal interpretation gave a wider meaning to the
definition of industry so as to include all kinds of activities wherein there is an employer and
employee relationship.

Triple Test

After the judgment in the case of Bangalore Supply Judgment, the Apex Court adopted a
principle to adjudicate about what shall be termed as industry. The following test was:-

• Systematic activity should be carried out,

• With the coordination of the employees and the employer,
• To carry out activities such as production and distribution of the goods or services for the
public.2

On top of that, it would be worthwhile to mention that highlight was also drawn by the court
upon the below mentioned points:-

1. An industry would not include any religious or spiritual services working towards
attainment of spirituality.
2. Any venture either in public, private or any other sector shall not be adjudicated
regarding its absence of profitability or not.
3. The main focus shall be upon the kind of activity undertaken with due importance upon
the relationship between the employer and the employees.

Thus, with reference to the following judgment, places such as a club, research institute,
charitable projects and several other such places shall not be exempted from Section 2(j) of the
Act.

2
1978 2 SCC 213.

15 | P a g e
Further, in the judgment of State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, it was determined by the Apex
Court that the Law Department was not to be classified as an industry. In the present case, the
Respondent had been employed as a peon under a public prosecutor on the basis of a contract
employee, according to the Act of 1947. Though the court considered the dismissal of the
Respondent, however, it was further mentioned by the court that the rule of determining the
industry could not be applicable to the Law Department of the Government. Despite the fact that
the Court did not delve into whether a legal department could be termed as an industry or not, it
was determined that it was not.3

The crux of the judgment of State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsingh Parmar was that "forest
department is not an enterprise." The case expressly states that a government agency cannot be
considered a business, but rather a component of the sovereign function and it is up to the
individual making the claim to show it. It was explicitly stated by the Court that the Census
Department shall not be industry according to the Act. This was further concluded by the court in
the case of Md. Raj Mohammad v. Industrial Tribunal where the Petitioner, employed in the
capacity of a Tabulator with salary of Rs. 280.00 per month had been working in the office of the
Regional Joint Director of Census, Khammam.4

After his service was terminated, the petitioner sought the respondent on many times in an
attempt to find him work, but his attempts were futile. Due to the termination, it was difficult for
the Petitioner to find another work, and owing to unemployment and financial hardship, he has
been unable to contact the Tribunal quickly. As a result, there has been a delay in approaching
the Industrial Tribunal, which must be considered mildly. Later, it was applied to the tribunal for
reinstating the services, and he received it. However, at the first place, the Court reiterated the
principles of Himanshu Kumar Vidyarathi and others v. State of Bihar.5

An employer who placed a Photostat machine in a 12" x 8' room and worked himself with the
assistance of an operator, as well as the shop itself being tiny in nature, would not fall under the
ambit of 'industry' as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act. This had place at the Soni Photostat

3
State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi lal, (2014) 5 SCC 744.
4
State of Gujarat v. Pratam Singh Narsingh Parmar, (2014) 7 SCC 716
5
Himanshu Kumar Vidyarathi and others v. State of Bihar, 997(2) L.L.N. 982.

16 | P a g e
Centre v. Basudev Gupta.6 The petitioner had a Photostat machine placed in a 128 square foot
chamber, according to the short facts of the case as they appear on the record. The shop was
registered with the Director of Industries with the number SSI 53612. In the store, there were two
electrostatic machines. It is claimed that the worker needed an experience certificate in order to
apply for other jobs, and that the proprietor of the business provided him with one on 8.12.1990.
Following then, the worker worked as an assistant at the petitioner's firm till 10.12.1990. The
petitioner claimed that after obtaining an experience certificate, he quit his employment in search
of greater opportunities. The fundamental question in this case was whether the Photostat Centre
qualified as a "industry." It was said that "a solitary lawyer, a rural medical practitioner, or an
urban doctor with a small assistant and/or menial servant may practice a profession but cannot be
called to operate an enterprise." That is not because the employee does not contribute, nor
because the profession is too high to be categorized as a trade or industry with its commercial
implications, but because such employment contains nothing like organized labor.

In the case of Diocese of Amritsar of Church of North India and others v Buta Anayat Masih and
others, it was determined that the Diocese of Church was not a "enterprise." In the
aforementioned instance, the Respondent worked as an Evangelist for the petitioners' church on a
monthly pay until being fired. The Respondent petitioned the Labour Court for reinstatement,
continuation of employment, and back pay. According to the Respondent, the termination of
service, notice, charge-sheet, and enquiry were all illegal under the Act, and the Court accepted
the Respondent's arguments and passed an ex-parte injunction. An application to dismiss the ex-
parte award was brought more than 30 days after the award was published, and it was denied.
And the current petition's issue was whether the writ Petition filed by Petitioner was
maintainable. While referring to the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A.
Rajappa and others, the court and held that, “any systematic activity organized by co-operation
between employer and employee for production/or and distribution of goods services to satisfy
human wants and wishes was industry as defined by the Act”.7

In Shrimali v. District Development Officer, the State government undertook famine and drought
relief works by creating specific programmes to provide help, and certain some assignments

6
Soni Photostat Centre v. Basudev Gupta , ( 2004 ) 1 UPLBEC 252
7
Amritsar of Church of North India v Buta Anayat Masih, 2010 LLR 407.

17 | P a g e
were also supplied to the effected people, rather than giving doles. The question of sovereignty
of the duties was decided that such an endeavour would not be a part of an industry.8

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Pursuant to the case of Bangalore Water Supply case, it was unclear as to what shall be a
sovereign function. Also, the matter got confused and complicated as there was diverse opinion
by the judiciary in the case of Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath Maruti Kondare, where
the court stated that a forest department is an industry, while in the case of State of Gujarat v.
Pratamsingh Narsingh Parmar, it was held that the forest department shall not be a part of the
industry.

The court in the case of Banglore Water Supply seemed to have narrowed down the sovereign
functions that are a part of the industry. The principle of sovereignty was only restricted by the
court under three constitutional heads- legislative, executive and judiciary. It is the duty of the
government to work for the welfare of the society and strive towards a better society. But, any
sovereign function of the state to fulfil its constitutional duty shall fall outside the scope of the
industry. However, the employer-employee relation in a government duty cannot be termed as
industry due to the definition of industry in the Act. Further, in the case of Coir Board in 1998,
the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Kerela High Court adjudicated that the High Court was bound
by the decision of the Apex Court. Further, the court subtly mentioned that the it shall not
intervene where the administrations deems it fir.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the court in the Banglore Water Supply provided a better understanding of
‘industry’. The court provided a little broader definition of the industry, which had been well
implemented in the country.

The definition of industry adopted by the parliament narrowed the meaning of the industry as it
excluded hospitals, training institutes, etc. but, providing a broader definition of the industry by

8
Shrimali v. District Development Officer, (1989) 1 GLR 396.

18 | P a g e
the court in the Bangalore Supply Case, has provided opportunities for both the employer and the
employee to raise concerns, with one attempting to escape this term in order to avoid the clutches
of the Act, and the other bringing it inside it in order to gain advantages under it. Despite the
Court's numerous decisions, there is a tug-of-war between the two due to the breadth of the
perimeter of the word "industry."

The current legislation is based on Rajappa's Case's adaptation of Section 2(j) of the Act. The
present judgment is clearly prolabor, since it attempts to bring additional operations under the
purview of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. In practice, the country's labor forces are in a far
better situation, had Section 2(j) been modified, this is because, as the changed Section 2(j)
restricts a few employment that falls under the Rajappa's case. An analysis of the section would
portray that it is poles apart from the original piece of legislation. But, the main question was
whether the judiciary could out reach its powers to form a perfect legislation. Thus, in the
Rajappa judgment, the court went well beyond just filling the holes left by the legislative.

In today's world, an industry has become an essential component in a society's flawless operation
and no employee-employer relation in an industry can topple the functioning of the society.
When the legislation itself is unclear about the phrase "industry," it will undoubtedly have a
major impact on the sector. The current legislation is an interpretation of the original Section 2.
(j). Judgment has been taken into account while focusing only on the merits of the case. The
judgment is clearly pro-labor, since it attempts to bring additional operations under the purview
of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. In practice, the country's labor force is in a lot better
situation presently.

This is because the revised S. 2(j) eliminates some types of employment that fall clearly within
the purview of Rajappa's case. Of the same time, a quick scan at the decision suggests that it is a
completely different legislation from the original S. 2 (j). The fundamental question is whether
the judiciary has the authority to go on such an adventure. Even in a democracy, the court has
implicit jurisdiction to fill the gaps left by the legislative, according to the doctrine of separation
of powers. There has been no such astounding decision since the Jai Bir Singh case that has
changed the meaning. To close the gaps, a critical step must be done.

19 | P a g e