Epictetus: 254 Selected Quotes

Epictetus: 254 Selected Quotes

a personal collection by Massimo Pigliucci
City College of New York

From: Discourses and Selected Writings

translated by Robert Dobbin
Penguin Classics, 2008

and The Discourses of Epictetus

translated by P.E. Matheson
Clarendon Press, 1916

More on Stoicism at http://howtobeastoic.org

Quote Source
What decides whether a sum of money is good? The money is not going to Discourses I, 1.5
tell you; it must be the faculty that makes use of such impressions –
reason.
Being attached to many things, we are weighed down and dragged along Discourses I, 1.15
with them.
What should we do then? Make the best use of what is in our power, and Discourses I, 1.17
treat the rest in accordance with its nature.
What should we have ready at hand in a situation like this? The knowledge Discourses I, 1.21
of what is mine and what is not mine, what I can and cannot do.
‘I will throw you into prison.’ ‘Correction – it is my body you will throw Discourses I, 1.24
there.’
I have to die. If it is now, well then I die now; if later, then now I will take Discourses I, 1.32
my lunch, since the hour for lunch has arrived – and dying I will tend to
later.
Education has no goal more important than bringing our preconception of Discourses I, 2.6
what is reasonable and unreasonable in alignment with nature.
Consider at what price you sell your integrity; but please, for God’s sake, Discourses I, 2.33
don’t sell it cheap.
What is the goal of virtue, after all, except a life that flows smoothly? Discourses I, 4.5
If from the moment they get up in the morning they adhere to their ideals, Discourses I, 4.20
eating and bathing like a person of integrity, putting their principles into
practice in every situation they face – the way a runner does when he
applies the principles of running, or a singer those of musicianship – that
is where you will see true progress embodied, and find someone who has
not wasted their time making the journey here from home.
What else are tragedies but the ordeals of people who have come to value Discourses I, 4.26
externals, tricked out in tragic verse?
If a man objects to truths that are all too evident, it is no easy task finding Discourses I, 5.1
arguments that will change his mind. This is proof neither of his own
strength nor of his teacher’s weakness. When someone caught in an
argument hardens to stone, there is just no more reasoning with them.
Most of us dread the deadening of the body and will do anything to avoid Discourses I, 5.4
it. About the deadening of the soul, however, we don’t care one iota.
We pity the mentally retarded, and students with learning difficulties. But Discourses I, 5.5
if somebody’s sense of shame and respect are dead, we will actually call
this determination.
And so it is inexcusable for man to begin and end where the beasts do. He Discourses I, 6.20
should begin where they do, but only end where nature left off dealing
with him; which is to say, in contemplation and understanding.

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Quote Source
“But my nose is running!” What do you have hands for, idiot, if not to Discourses I, 6.30
wipe it? “But how is it right that there be running noses in the first place?”
Instead of thinking up protests, wouldn’t it be easier just to wipe your
nose?
For what does reason purport to do? “Establish what is true, eliminate what Discourses I, 7.5
is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases.” … What else does
reason prescribe? “To accept the consequence of what has been admitted
to be correct.”
Why are we still lazy, indifferent and dull? Why do we look for excuses to Discourses I, 7.30
avoid training and exercising our powers of reason? “Look, if I err in such
matters I haven’t killed my father, have I?” No, fool – for there was no
father there for you to kill! What did you do instead? You made the only
mistake you had the opportunity to make.
I mean, are these the only crimes, killing your father and burning down Discourses I, 7.33
the Capitol? But to use one’s impressions recklessly, carelessly and at
random, to fail to analyse an argument as either valid proof or fallacy, and,
in a word, to fail to see in the act of question and answer what agrees with
your position and what conflicts – is nothing wrong in all of that?
Don’t confuse qualities that are found in the same writer only incidentally. Discourses I, 8.12-13
If Plato had been strong and handsome, should I also try to become strong
and handsome, as if this were essential to philosophy, since there was one
particular philosopher who combined philosophy with good looks?
Ask me what the real good in man’s case is, and I can only say that it is the Discourses I, 8.16
right kind of moral character.
Do as Socrates did, never replying to the question of where he was from Discourses I, 9.1
with, ‘I am Athenian,’ or ‘I am from Corinth,’ but always, ‘I am a citizen of
the world.’
Really, such a person amounts to no more than a carcass and a little Discourses I, 9.34
blood. If he were anything more, he would realize that no one is ever
unhappy because of someone else.
It isn’t death, pain, exile or anything else you care to mention that Discourses I, 11.33
accounts for the way we act, only our opinion about death, pain and the
rest.
We, not externals, are the masters of our judgements. Discourses I, 11.37
Socrates was not in prison, because he chose to be there. Discourses I, 12.23
You ought to realize, you take up very little space in the world as a whole Discourses I, 12.26-27
– your body, that is; in reason, however, you yield to no one, not even to
the gods, because reason is not measured in size but sense. So why not
care for that side of you, where you and the gods are equals?

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If you have been placed in a position above others, are you automatically Discourses I, 13.4
going to behave like a despot? Remember who you are and whom you
govern – that they are kinsmen, brothers by nature, fellow descendants of
Zeus.
You can process in your intellect and senses a wealth of thoughts and Discourses I, 13.7
impressions simultaneously. There are impressions that you assent to,
others that you reject; sometimes you suspend judgement altogether.
Nothing important comes into being overnight; even grapes or figs need Discourses I, 15.7-8
time to ripen. If you say that you want a fig now, I will tell you to be
patient. First, you must allow the tree to flower, then put forth fruit; then
you have to wait until the fruit is ripe. So if the fruit of a fig tree is not
brought to maturity instantly or in an hour, how do you expect the human
mind to come to fruition, so quickly and easily?
Since reason is what analyses and coordinates everything, it should not go Discourses I, 17.1-2
itself unanalysed. Then what will it be analysed by? Obviously by itself or
something different. Now, this something different must either be reason
or something superior to reason – which is impossible, since there is
nothing superior to reason.
Which, I suppose, is why Stoics put logic at the head of our curriculum – Discourses I, 17.6
for the same reason that, before a quantity of grain can be measured, we
must settle on a standard of measurement.
‘What about if someone threatens me with death, though; surely he Discourses I, 17.25-26
compels me then?’ It isn’t what you’re threatened with – it’s the fact that
you prefer to do anything rather than die. It’s your set of values that
compelled you: will acting on will.
‘But the tyrant will chain –’ What will he chain? Your leg. ‘He will chop off Discourses I, 18.17
–’ What? Your head. What he will never chain or chop off is your integrity.
We should discipline ourselves in small things, and from there progress to Discourses I, 18.18-19
things of greater value. If you have a headache, practise not cursing. Don’t
curse every time you have an earache. And I’m not saying that you can’t
complain, only don’t complain with your whole being.
We use labels like ‘thief’ and ‘robber’ in connection with them, but what Discourses I, 18.3
do these words mean? They merely signify that people are confused about
what is good and what is bad. So should we be angry with them, or
should we pity them instead?
‘But I get to wear a crown of gold.’ If you have your heart set on wearing Discourses I, 19.29
crowns, why not make one out of roses – you will look even more elegant
in that.

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If you want to know just how little concerned you are about things good Discourses I, 20.12
and bad, and how serious about things indifferent, compare your attitude
to going blind with your attitude about being mentally in the dark. You
will realize, I think, how inappropriate your values really are.
When someone is properly grounded in life, they shouldn’t have to look Discourses I, 21.1
outside themselves for approval.
Who exactly are these people that you want to be admired by? Aren’t they Discourses I, 21.4
the same people you are in the habit of calling crazy? And is this your life
ambition, then – to win the approval of lunatics?
Jews, Syrians, Egyptians and Romans. They don’t dispute that what is holy Discourses I, 22.4
should be preferred above everything else and in every case pursued; but
they argue, for example, over whether it is holy or unholy to eat pork.
The operations of the will are in our power; not in our power are the body, Discourses I, 22.10
the body’s parts, property, parents, siblings, children, country or friends.
The true man is revealed in difficult times. So when trouble comes, think Discourses I, 24.1-2
of yourself as a wrestler whom God, like a trainer, has paired with a tough
young buck. For what purpose? To turn you into Olympic-class material.
But this is going to take some sweat to accomplish.
Death, [Diogenes] said, was not evil because it was not dishonourable. Discourses I, 24.6
Reputation was the empty noise of fools.
Don’t believe your situation is genuinely bad – no one can make you do Discourses I, 25.17-18
that. Is there smoke in the house? If it’s not suffocating, I will stay indoors;
if it proves too much, I’ll leave. Always remember – the door is open.
Remember that it is we who torment, we who make difficulties for Discourses I, 25.28-29
ourselves – that is, our opinions do. What, for instance, does it mean to be
insulted? Stand by a rock and insult it, and what have you accomplished?
If someone responds to insult like a rock, what has the abuser gained with
his invective?
This, then, is the beginning of philosophy – an awareness of one’s own Discourses I, 26.15
mental fitness.
Death is necessary and cannot be avoided. I mean, where am I going to Discourses I, 27.7-8
go to get away from it?
I cannot escape death, but at least I can escape the fear of it. Discourses I, 27.9-10
Passions stem from frustrated desire. Discourses I, 27.10
You Sceptics, who dismiss the evidence of the senses – do you act any Discourses I, 27.19
differently? Which one of you ever went to the mill when you were in
need of a bath?

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When someone assents to a false proposition, be sure that they did not Discourses I, 28.4-5
want to give their assent, since, as Plato says, ‘Every soul is deprived of the
truth against its will.’ They simply mistook for true something false.
The essence of good and evil consists in the condition of our character. Discourses I, 29.1-2
And externals are the means by which our character finds its particular
good and evil.
Correct judgements about externals make our character good, as perverse Discourses I, 29.3
or distorted ones make it bad.
This is how I came to lose my lamp: the thief was better than I am in Discourses I, 29.21
staying awake. But he acquired the lamp at a price: he became a thief for
its sake, for its sake, he lost his ability to be trusted, for a lamp he became
a brute. And he imagined he came out ahead!
If you didn’t learn these things in order to demonstrate them in practice, Discourses I, 29.35
what did you learn them for?
Anyone who affirms that, in a circle, lines that extend from the centre to Discourses I, 29.53-54
the circumference can be unequal is not going to win the respect of
mathematicians. So – a true philosopher is under no obligation to respect
vulgar opinion as to what is religious or irreligious, what is just or unjust.
‘Define for me now what the “indifferents” are.’ ‘Whatever things we Discourses I, 30.3
cannot control.’‘Tell me the upshot.’ ‘They are nothing to me.’
Death and pain are not frightening, it’s the fear of pain and death we need Discourses II, 1.13
to fear. Which is why we praise the poet who wrote, ‘Death is not fearful,
but dying like a coward is.’
Pain too is just a scary mask: look under it and you will see. The body Discourses II, 1.19
sometimes suffers, but relief is never far behind. And if that isn’t good
enough for you, the door stands open; otherwise put up with it. The door
needs to stay open whatever the circumstances, with the result that our
problems disappear.
The masses are wrong to say that only freeborn men are entitled to an Discourses II, 1.22
education; believe the philosophers instead, who say that only educated
people are entitled to be called free.
If you want to be a man of honour and a man of your word, who is going Discourses II, 2.4
to stop you? You say you don’t want to be obstructed or forced to do
something against your will – well, who is going to force you to desire
things that you don’t approve, or dislike something against your better
judgement?
Whenever externals are more important to you than your own integrity, Discourses II, 2.12
then be prepared to serve them the remainder of your life.
Never get into family fights over material things; give them up willingly, Discourses II, 10.8
and your moral standing will increase in proportion.

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Reflect on the other social roles you play. If you are a council member, Discourses II, 10.10
consider what a council member should do. If you are young, what does
being young mean, if you are old, what does age imply, if you are a father,
what does fatherhood entail? Each of our titles, when reflected upon,
suggests the acts appropriate to it.
If you lost the capacity to read, or play music, you would think it was a Discourses II, 10.15
disaster, but you think nothing of losing the capacity to be honest, decent
and civilized.
If money is your only standard, then consider that, by your lights, Discourses II, 10.20
someone who loses their nose does not suffer any harm.
If ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ really relate to our choices, then consider Discourses II, 10.25-26
whether your position does not amount to saying something like, ‘Well,
since that guy hurt himself with the injustice he did me, shouldn’t I wrong
him in order to hurt myself in retaliation?’
‘Well, whatever you may say, I know good from bad, and have an idea of Discourses II, 11.7-8
the good.’ You have one, I allow. ‘And I put it into practice.’ You use it in
specific instances, yes. ‘And I use it correctly.’ Well, that’s the crux,
because this is where opinions become an issue.
Here you have philosophy’s starting point: we find that people cannot Discourses II, 11.13
agree among themselves, and we go in search of the source of their
disagreement.
Something good should be a source of pride, correct? ‘Yes.’ And can one Discourses II, 11.22
really take pride in a momentary pleasure? Please don’t say yes.
When a guide meets up with someone who is lost, ordinarily his reaction Discourses II, 12.3-4
is to direct him on the right path, not mock or malign him, then turn on
his heel and walk away. As for you, lead someone to the truth and you will
find that he can follow. But as long as you don’t point it out to him, don’t
make fun of him; be aware of what you need to work on instead.
That is what Socrates would do: he would quit only after he had fleshed Discourses II, 12.9
out an idea and explored its implications. He wouldn’t just say, ‘Define
envy for me,’ then, when his discourses interlocutor had ventured on a
definition, say, ‘Wrong: your definiens is not extensionally equivalent to
the definiendum.’
Now that is the first thing Socrates was known for – never turning dialogue Discourses II, 12.14
into dispute, never introducing rudeness or invective, although he would
put up with the insults of others in order to avoid a fight.
At this point you run the risk of him saying, ‘What business is that of Discourses II, 12.24-25
yours, sir? What are you to me?’ Pester him further, and he is liable to
punch you in the nose. I myself was once keen for this sort of discourse,
until I met with just such a reception.

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Take a lyre player: he’s relaxed when he performs alone, but put him in Discourses II, 13.2
front of an audience, and it’s a different story, no matter how beautiful his
voice or how well he plays the instrument. Why? Because he not only
wants to perform well, he wants to be well received – and the latter lies
outside his control.
It was Antigonus who was anxious before their meeting. Naturally – he Discourses II, 13, 15
wanted to make a good impression, which was beyond his control. Zeno,
for his part, had no wish to please the king; no expert needs validation
from an amateur.
Becoming a carpenter or pilot, we realize, requires some formal training. Discourses II, 14.10
Is it unreasonable to suppose that it will take more than just the desire to
be good or bad – that the student of philosophy will also have to learn a
few things of his own?
And yet I won’t have done you any harm – any more than a mirror is to Discourses II, 14.21-22
blame when it shows a plain person what they look like; or a doctor is
mean if he tells a patient, ‘Look, you may think this is insignificant, but
you’re really sick; no food for you today, only water.’ No one thinks, ‘How
rude!’ But say to someone, ‘Your desires are unhealthy, your powers of
aversion are weak, your plans are incoherent, your impulses are at odds
with nature and your system of values is false and confused,’ – and off
they go alleging slander.
‘But we must stick with a decision.’ ‘For heaven’s sake, man, that rule only Discourses II, 15.7
applies to sound decisions. I suppose next you will decide that it is night
now, and refuse to change your mind because you don’t want to.
‘A fool cannot be convinced or even compelled to renounce his folly.’ Discourses II, 15.13-14
God save me from fools with a little philosophy – no one is more difficult
to reach.
Where does the good lie? ‘In the will.’ And evil? ‘Also in the will.’ And Discourses II, 16.1
things neither good nor bad – ‘… lie in whatever is external to the will.’
You might as well get on your knees and pray that your nose won’t run. A Discourses II, 16.13-14
better idea would be to wipe your nose and forgo the prayer. The point is,
isn’t there anything God gave you for your present problem? You have the
gifts of courage, fortitude and endurance. With ‘hands’ like these, do you
still need somebody to help wipe your nose?
Show me one person who cares how they act, someone for whom success Discourses II, 16.15
is less important than the manner in which it is achieved. While out
walking, who gives any thought to the act of walking itself? Who pays
attention to the process of planning, not just the outcome?
The first thing a pretender to philosophy must do is get rid of their Discourses II, 17.1
presuppositions; a person is not going to undertake to learn anything that
they think they already know.

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This presumption that you possess knowledge of any use has to be Discourses II, 17.39
dropped before you approach philosophy – just as if we were enrolling in
a school of music or mathematics.
If you like doing something, do it regularly; if you don’t like doing Discourses II, 18.4-5
something, make a habit of doing something different. The same goes for
moral inclinations. When you get angry, you should know that you aren’t
guilty of an isolated lapse, you’ve encouraged a trend and thrown fuel on
the fire.
If you don’t want to be cantankerous, don’t feed your temper, or multiply Discourses II, 18.12
incidents of anger. Suppress the first impulse to be angry, then begin to
count the days on which you don’t get mad.
It will even do to socialize with men of good character, in order to model Discourses II, 18.21
your life on theirs, whether you choose someone living or someone from
the past.
Don’t let the force of the impression when first it hits you knock you off Discourses II, 18.24
your feet; just say to it, ‘Hold on a moment; let me see who you are and
what you represent. Let me put you to the test.’
Today people care only for academic discussion, nothing beyond that. But Discourses II, 18.26-27
I’m presenting to you the real athlete, namely the one training to face off
against the most formidable of impressions.
Show me someone untroubled with disturbing thoughts about illness, Discourses II, 19.24
danger, death, exile or loss of reputation. By all the gods, I want to see a
Stoic!
Even people who deny that statements can be valid or impressions clear Discourses II, 20.1
are obliged to make use of both. You might almost say that nothing proves
the validity of a statement more than finding someone forced to use it
while at the same time denying that it is sound.
A vine cannot behave olively, nor an olive tree vinely – it is impossible, Discourses II, 20.18-19
inconceivable. No more can a human being wholly efface his native
disposition.
What illusion about myself do I entertain? Discourses II, 21.9
Don’t be disappointed if you return home with the very same set of ideas Discourses II, 21.16
you arrived with. Because you had no intention of changing, correcting or
adopting others in their place.
You say the speculative topics are useless. Useless to whom? Only to Discourses II, 21.20
people who don’t use them as they should. I mean, salves and ointments
are not useless to people who apply them when and how they’re supposed
to; weights are not useless in themselves, they’re useful to some people,
worthless to others.

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If someone is incapable of distinguishing good things from bad and Discourses II, 22.3
neutral things from either – well, how could such a person be capable of
love? The power to love, then, belongs only to the wise man.
You’re subject to sorrow, fear, jealousy, anger and inconsistency. That’s the Discourses II, 22.6
real reason you should admit that you are not wise.
No doubt you have seen dogs playing with, and fawning before, each Discourses II, 22.9
other, and thought, ‘Nothing could be friendlier.’ But just throw some meat
in the middle, and then you’ll know what friendship amounts to.
Paris was Menelaus’ guest, and anyone who saw how well they treated Discourses II, 22.23
each other would have laughed at anyone who said they weren’t friends.
But between the two a bit of temptation was thrown in the form of a
beautiful woman, and over that there arose war.
Just ask whether they put their self-interest in externals or in moral choice. Discourses II, 22.26-27
If it’s in externals, you cannot call them friends, any more than you can
call them trustworthy, consistent, courageous or free.
For where else is friendship found if not with fairness, reliability and Discourses II, 22.30
respect for virtue only?
[Treat] unenlightened souls with sympathy and indulgence, remembering Discourses II, 22.36
that they are ignorant or mistaken about what’s most important. Never be
harsh, remember Plato’s dictum: ‘Every soul is deprived of the truth against
its will.’
An eye, when open, has no option but to see. The decision whether to Discourses II, 23.11-13
look at a particular man’s wife, however, and how, belongs to the will.
And the determination whether to trust what someone says, and then, if
we trust them, whether we should be angered by it – that also belongs to
the will.
People act like a traveller headed for home who stops at an inn and, Discourses II, 23.36-37
finding it comfortable, decides to remain there. You’ve lost sight of your
goal, man. You were supposed to drive through the inn, not park there.
Some students [of philosophy] become captivated by all these things and Discourses II, 23.41
don’t want to proceed further. One is captivated by diction, another by
deductive or equivocal arguments, someone else by yet another ‘inn’ of
this kind; and there they stay and rot as if seduced by the Sirens.
When I see that one thing [virtue] is supreme and most important, I cannot Discourses II, 23.47
say that something else is, just to make you happy.
We know how to analyse arguments, and have the skill a person needs to Discourses II, 3.4-5
evaluate competent logicians. But in life what do I do? What today I say is
good tomorrow I will swear is bad. And the reason is that, compared to
what I know about syllogisms, my knowledge and experience of life fall
far behind.

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What are we really doing when we throw away our innate faithfulness, to Discourses II, 4.2-3
intrigue with our neighbour’s wife? We are ruining and destroying – well,
what? How about the man of trust, principle and piety that once was? And
is that all? Aren’t we also ruining the idea of neighbourliness, friendship
and community? What position are we putting ourselves in? How am I
supposed to deal with you now? As a neighbour? A friend? Some friend! A
fellow citizen? But how can a fellow citizen like you be trusted?
Material things per se are indifferent, but the use we make of them is not Discourses II, 5.1
indifferent.
Getting those things is not in my control – and not good or bad in any Discourses II, 5.8
case. But the way I use them is good or bad, and depends on me.
It’s something like going on an ocean voyage. What can I do? Pick the Discourses II, 5.10-12
captain, the boat, the date, and the best time to sail. But then a storm hits.
Well, it’s no longer my business; I have done everything I could. It’s
somebody else’s problem now – namely the captain’s. But then the boat
actually begins to sink. What are my options? I do the only thing I am in a
position to do, drown – but fearlessly, without bawling or crying out to
God, because I know that what is born must also die.
To be sure, external things of whatever kind require skill in their use, but Discourses II, 5.21
we must not grow attached to them; whatever they are, they should only
serve for us to show how skilled we are in our handling of them.
What are you? A human being. If you think of yourself as a unit apart, then Discourses II, 5.25
it is in accordance with your nature to live to old age, to be rich, and be
healthy. But if your view of yourself involves being part of a whole, then,
for the sake of the whole, circumstances may make it right for you to be
sick, go on a dangerous journey, endure poverty, even die before your
time.
Because what is a human being? Part of a community – the community of Discourses II, 5.26
gods and men, primarily, and secondarily that of the city we happen to
inhabit, which is only a microcosm of the universe in toto.
So when you hear that even life and the like are indifferent, don’t become Discourses II, 6.2
apathetic; and by the same token, when you’re advised to care about
them, don’t become superficial and conceive a passion for externals.
Because we’re the only animals who not only die but are conscious of it Discourses II, 6.14
even while it happens, we are beset by anxiety.
‘My God, what if I’m sent to Gyara?’ Well, if that’s tolerable for you, you Discourses II, 6.22
will go; if not, you have the choice of another destination, the place even
the person who sent you to Gyara is headed, whether they like it or not.
You think I can listen to poetry in my position?’ ‘Why, what is it?’ ‘I’m Discourses II, 6.27
sentenced to death!’ ‘And the rest of us aren’t?’

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Since plants do not even have the power of perception, ‘good’ and ‘evil’ Discourses II, 8.4
are not applicable to them. Evidently, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ presume the power
of using impressions.
A will that never fails to get what it wants, a faculty of aversion that always Discourses II, 8.29
avoids what it dislikes, proper impulse, careful purpose and disciplined
assent. That’s the human specimen you should prepare yourselves to see.
It is no ordinary task merely to fulfil man's promise. For what is Man? A Discourses II, 9
rational animal, subject to death. At once we ask, from what does the
rational element distinguish us? From wild beasts. Look to it then that you
do nothing like a wild beast, else you destroy the Man in you and fail to
fulfil his promise. See that you do not act like a sheep, or else again the
Man in you perishes. You ask how we act like sheep? When we consult
the belly, or our passions, when our actions are random or dirty or
inconsiderate, are we not falling away to the state of sheep? What do we
destroy? The faculty of reason. When our actions are combative,
mischievous, angry, and rude, do we not fall away and become wild
beasts?
If a man gets the habit of writing ungrammatically, his art is bound to be Discourses II, 9
destroyed and perish. In the same way the modest man is made by modest
acts and ruined by immodest acts, the man of honour keeps his character
by honest acts and loses it by dishonest. ... That is why philosophers enjoin
upon us 'not to be content with learning only, but to add practice as well
and then training'. For we have acquired wrong habits in course of years
and have adopted for our use conceptions opposite to the true, and
therefore if we do not adopt true conceptions for our use we shall be
nothing else but interpreters of judgements which are not our own.
Such a man will not follow nature in his will to get or to avoid, in his Discourses II, 24
impulses or designs, in assent, refusal, or withholding of assent; to sum up,
he will go about the world deaf and blind, thinking himself somebody,
when he is really nobody. Do you think there is anything new in this? Ever
since the race of men began, have not all errors and misfortunes arisen
from this ignorance?
When one of his audience said, 'Convince me that logic is useful,' he Discourses II, 25
said, Would you have me demonstrate it? 'Yes.' Well, then, must I not use
a demonstrative argument? And, when the other agreed, he said, How
then shall you know if I impose upon you? And when the man had no
answer, he said, You see how you yourself admit that logic is necessary, if
without it you are not even able to learn this much--whether it is
necessary or not.

11
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Every error implies conflict; for since he who errs does not wish to go Discourses II, 26
wrong but to go right, plainly he is not doing what he wishes. For what
does the thief wish to do? What is to his interest. If then thieving is against
his interest, he is not doing what he wishes. But every rational soul by
nature dislikes conflict; and so, as long as a man does not understand that
he is in conflict, there is nothing to prevent him from doing conflicting
acts, but, whenever he understands, strong necessity makes him abandon
the conflict and avoid it.
See what Socrates says to Alcibiades, most beautiful and charming of men: Discourses III, 1
'Strive then to attain beauty.' What does he say to him? Does he say,
'Arrange your hair and smooth your legs'? God forbid! but 'Set your will in
order, rid it of bad judgements.'
There are three departments in which a man who is to be good and noble Discourses III, 2
must be trained. The first concerns the will to get and will to avoid; he
must be trained not to fail to get what he wills to get nor fall into what he
wills to avoid. The second is concerned with impulse to act and not to act,
and, in a word, the sphere of what is fitting: that we should act in order,
with due consideration, and with proper care. The object of the third is
that we may not be deceived, and may not judge at random, and generally
it is concerned with assent.
I must not be without feeling like a statue, but must maintain my natural Discourses III, 2
and acquired relations, as a religious man, as son, brother, father, citizen.
The body is the raw material of the doctor and physical therapist. Land is Discourses III, 3.1
the farmer’s raw material. The raw material of the good man is his mind –
his goal being to respond to impressions the way nature intended.
What, after all, are sighing and crying, except opinions? What is Discourses III, 3.18-19
‘misfortune’? An opinion. And sectarian strife, dissension, blame and
accusation, ranting and raving – they all are mere opinion, the opinion
that good and bad lie outside us.
Speaking for myself, I hope death overtakes me when I’m occupied solely Discourses III, 5.7
with the care of my character, in an effort to make it passionless, free,
unrestricted and unrestrained.
What does Socrates say? ‘One person likes tending to his farm, another to Discourses III, 5.14
his horse; I like to daily monitor my self-improvement.’
On what has the effort been spent, and in what was the greater progress in Discourses III, 6
the past? For you will find that progress to-day corresponds exactly to the
effort spent. The fact is that to-day men have spent their effort on the
analysis of syllogisms, and progress is made in that: in old days men spent
their effort on maintaining their mind in accord with Nature, and they
made progress in that.

12
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'Well, but I can put any one I wish in prison.' As you may a stone! 'But I Discourses III, 7
can cudgel to death any one I wish.' As you can an ass! This is not
governing men. Govern us as rational creatures by showing us what is
expedient, and we will follow it: show us what is inexpedient and we will
turn away from it. Make us admire and emulate you, as Socrates made
men do.
You have vessels of gold, but your reason--judgements, assent, impulse, Discourses III, 9
will--is of common clay.
We should have each judgement ready at the moment when it is needed: Discourses III, 10
judgements on dinner at dinner-time, on the bath at bathing-time, on bed
at bedtime. Admit not sleep into your tender eyelids Till you have
reckoned up each deed of the day--How have I erred, what done or left
undone? So start, and so review your acts, and then For vile deeds chide
yourself, for good be glad.
If now is the time for fever, take your fever in the right way; if for thirst, Discourses III, 10
thirst in the right way, if for hunger, hunger aright. Is it not in your power?
Who will hinder you?
Here is the test of the matter, this is how the philosopher is proved. For Discourses III, 10
fever too is a part of life, like walking, sailing, travelling. Do you read
when you are walking? No. Nor do you in a fever: but if you walk aright,
you have done your part as a walker; if you bear your fever aright, you
have done your part as a sick man.
My brother ought not to have behaved so to me.' No, but it is his business Discourses III, 10
to look to that; however he may behave, I will deal with him as I ought.
Man, train yourself, if you are arrogant, to bear with being reviled, and not Discourses III, 12
to be annoyed when you are disparaged. Then you will make such
progress that, even if you are struck, you will say to yourself, 'Imagine that
you have embraced a statue.'
For, as Socrates bade men 'not live a life without examination', so you Discourses III, 12
ought not to accept an impression without examination, but say, 'Wait, let
me see who you are and whence you come', just as the night-watch say,
'Show me your token.' 'Have you the token given by nature, which the
impression that is to be accepted must have?'
The 'forlorn' state is the condition of one without help. For a man is not Discourses III, 13
forlorn simply because he is alone, any more than a man in a crowd is
unforlorn.
When a man drinks water, or puts himself in training in any way, he tells Discourses III, 14
everybody at every opportunity, 'I am a water-drinker.' What? Do you
drink water for the sake of drinking it? Man, if it is to your profit to drink it,
drink; if not, your conduct is absurd. I say, if you drink water because it
does you good, say nothing to those who dislike it.

13
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'I am better than you, for my father is of consular rank.' Another says, 'I Discourses III, 14
have been tribune, and you have not.' If we were horses you would say,
'My sire was swifter', or, 'I have plenty of barley and fodder', or, 'I have
fine trappings.'
Keep well out of the sun, then, so long as your principles are as pliant as Discourses III, 16.10
wax.
'But the unjust man', you say, 'is better off.' In what? In money: for in Discourses III, 17
regard to this he has the advantage over you, because he flatters, is
shameless, is vigilant. Is this surprising? But look whether he is better off
than you in being trustworthy and self-respecting.
So even when we are grown up we appear like children: for it is being a Discourses III, 19
child to be unmusical in musical things, ungrammatical in grammar,
uneducated in life.
‘Being healthy is good, being sick is bad.’ No, my friend: enjoying health Discourses III, 20.4
in the right way is good; making bad use of your health is bad.
For God’s sake, stop honouring externals, quit turning yourself into the Discourses III, 20.8
tool of mere matter, or of people who can supply you or deny you those
material things.
A boxer derives the greatest advantage from his sparring partner – and my Discourses III, 20.9
accuser is my sparring partner. He trains me in patience, civility and even
temper.
I have a bad neighbour – bad, that is, for himself. For me, though, he is Discourses III, 20.11
good: he exercises my powers of fairness and sociability.
My mind represents for me my medium – like wood to a carpenter, or Discourses III, 20.20
leather to a shoemaker. The goal in my case is the correct use of
impressions.
Those who have learnt precepts and nothing more are anxious to give Discourses III, 21
them out at once, just as men with weak stomachs vomit food.
The carpenter does not come and say, 'Hear me discourse on carpentry', Discourses III, 21
but he undertakes a contract and builds a house and so shows that he has
acquired the art. Do you likewise: eat as a man, drink as a man, adorn
yourself, marry, get children, live a citizen's life; endure revilings, bear
with an inconsiderate brother, bear with a father, a son, a travelling
companion. Show us that you can do this, and then we shall see that you
have in truth learnt something from the philosophers.
And how are you to impart to them what you do not possess yourself? For Discourses III, 21
your sole occupation from the first has been this--how you are to resolve
syllogisms and variable arguments, and arguments concluding with a
question.

14
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Why then do you play at hazard with matters of highest moment, why are Discourses III, 21
you reckless, why do you take in hand a task unsuited to your powers?
Leave it to those who can do it and do it with distinction. Do not bring
disgrace upon philosophy by your personal act, nor join those who
disparage the profession.
Look, can you be forced to assent to what appears to you wrong?’ ‘No.’ Discourses III, 22.42
‘Or to dissent from the plain truth?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then you see you do have
within you a share of freedom.’
All our efforts must be directed towards an end, or we will act in vain. If it Discourses III, 23.3
is not the right end, we will fail utterly.
Do you want to know if you are educated? Show us your values, Discourses III, 23.9
philosopher.
He’s a clever young man and a fan of rhetoric.’ ‘How do you know?’ ‘He Discourses III, 23.14
praises me.’ Oh, well, that proves it, of course.
Understand what words you use first, then use them. Discourses III, 23.18
Friends, the school of a philosopher is a hospital. When you leave, you Discourses III, 23.30
should have suffered, not enjoyed yourself.
How can you wish at the same time to grow old and not to see the death Discourses III, 24
of any that you love?
'Is there no further reward?' Do you look for any greater reward for a good Discourses III, 24
man than to do what is noble and right? At Olympia you do not want
anything else; you are content to have been crowned at Olympia. Does it
seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be noble and good and
happy?
When a man is not overcome by pleasure, or pain, or reputation, or Discourses III, 24
wealth, and, when it seems good to him, can spit his whole body in the
tyrant's face, and so leave this world, whose slave can you call him any
more? To whom is he subject?
What harm has philosophy done you, how has Chrysippus wronged you, Discourses III, 24
that you should prove his labours to be useless by your own act?
You must remind yourself that you love a mortal, and that nothing that you Discourses III, 24
love is your very own; it is given you for the moment, not for ever nor
inseparably, but like a fig or a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of
the year, and if you long for it in winter you are a fool. So too if you long
for your son or your friend, when it is not given you to have him, know
that you are longing for a fig in winter time.

15
Quote Source
Let these thoughts be at your command by night and day: write them, read Discourses III, 24
them, talk of them, to yourself and to your neighbour. Go first to one and
then to another, asking him, 'Can you help me towards this?' Then if some
so-called 'undesirable' event befall you, the first immediate relief to you
will be, that it was not unexpected.
If you are in Gyara do not imagine your way of life in Rome, and the great Discourses III, 24
delights you enjoyed when you lived there and that you would enjoy on
your return. No, make your one effort there, to live a brave life in Gyara,
as one who lives in Gyara should.
In this competition, even if we give in for the moment, nothing prevents us Discourses III, 25
from returning to the struggle; we have not to wait for another four years
for the next Olympic Games to come. At once you may recover yourself,
and pull yourself together, and renew the struggle with the same energy as
before; and if you grow faint again, you may renew it again, and if you
once attain to victory you are as one who has never failed.
If your parents were poor, or if they made others their heirs instead of you, Discourses III, 26
if they give you no help while they are alive, is this any disgrace to you? Is
this what you learnt with the philosophers? Did you never hear that what
is disgraceful is blameable, and the blameable is what deserves blame,
and it is absurd to blame a man for what is not his own act, done by
himself? Well, did you make your father what he is, or is it in your power
to mend his character? Is this given you? What follows?
'What then, if I fall ill?' You shall bear illness well. 'Who shall tend me?' Discourses III, 26
God, and your friends. 'I shall lie on a hard bed.' But you can do it like a
man. 'I shall not have a proper house.' If you have one, you will be ill all
the same.
Will you realize once for all that it is not death that is the source of all Discourses III, 26
man's evils, and of a mean and cowardly spirit, but rather the fear of
death? Against this fear then I would have you discipline yourself; to this
let all your reasonings, your lectures, and your trainings be directed; and
then you will know that only so do men achieve their freedom.
Is everything judged by its outward form alone? On that principle you Discourses IV, 1
must call your waxen apple an apple. No, it must smell and taste like an
apple: the outward semblance is not enough. So, when you judge man,
nose and eyes are not sufficient, you must see if he has the judgements of
a man.
Who wants to live with delusion and prejudice, being unjust, Discourses IV, 1.2
undisciplined, mean and ungrateful? ‘No one.’ No bad person, then, lives
the way he wants, and no bad man is free.
So you admit that you have at least one master. And don’t let the fact that Discourses IV, 1.13
Caesar rules over everyone, as you say, console you: it only means that
you’re a slave in a very large household.

16
Quote Source
‘Do we have that many masters?’ We do. Because over and above the rest Discourses IV, 1.59
we have masters in the form of circumstances, which are legion. And
anyone who controls any one of them controls us as well.
What makes for freedom and fluency in the practice of writing? Discourses IV, 1.63
Knowledge of how to write. The same goes for the practice of playing an
instrument. It follows that, in the conduct of life, there must be a science
to living well.
But suppose I choose to walk, and someone obstructs me?’ What part of Discourses IV, 1.72-73
you will they obstruct? Certainly not your power of assent? ‘No, my body.’
Your body, yes – as they might obstruct a rock. ‘Perhaps; but the upshot is,
now I’m not allowed to walk.’ Whoever told you, ‘Walking is your
irrevocable privilege’? I said only that the will to walk could not be
obstructed.
A plant or animal fares poorly when it acts contrary to its nature; and a Discourses IV, 1.121-122
human being is no different. Well, then, biting, kicking, wanton
imprisonment and beheading – is that what our nature entails? No; rather,
acts of kindness, cooperation and good will. And so, whether you like it or
not, a person fares poorly whenever he acts like an insensitive brute.
People to whom such things are still denied come to imagine that Discourses IV, 1.174-175
everything good will be theirs if only they could acquire them. Then they
get them: and their longing is unchanged, their anxiety is unchanged, their
disgust is no less, and they still long for whatever is lacking. Freedom is
not achieved by satisfying desire, but by eliminating it.
Formerly, when you were devoted to worthless pursuits, your friends found Discourses IV, 2.6-7
you congenial company. But you can’t be a hit in both roles. To the extent
you cultivate one you will fall short in the other.
If you forfeit an external possession, make sure to notice what you get in Discourses IV, 3.1
return. If it is something more valuable, never say, ‘I have suffered a loss.’
Very little is needed for everything to be upset and ruined, only a slight Discourses IV, 3.4-5
lapse in reason. It’s much easier for a mariner to wreck his ship than it is
for him to keep it sailing safely; all he has to do is head a little more
upwind and disaster is instantaneous. In fact, he does not have to do
anything: a momentary loss of attention will produce the same result.
The more we value things outside our control, the less control we have. Discourses IV, 4.23
Either you’re going to be depressed when your wish is not realized or Discourses IV, 4.35
foolishly pleased with yourself if it is, overjoyed for the wrong reasons.
'What then? Do you want me to be despised?' By whom? By those who Discourses IV, 5
know? Nay, how will those who know despise one who is gentle and self-
respecting? By those who do not know? What do you care for them? No
craftsman cares for those who have no skill!

17
Quote Source
But though we are capable of writing and reading these sentiments, Discourses IV, 5
though we can praise them as we read, yet they do not bring conviction to
us, nor anything like it. Wherefore the proverb about the Lacedaemonians,
Lions at home, foxes at Ephesus, will fit us too. In the lecture-room we are
lions, and foxes in the world outside!
I am poor, but I hold a right judgement on poverty: what do I care then, Discourses IV, 6
whether they pity me for poverty? I am not in office and others are; but I
hold the right opinion as to being in office and out of it. Those who pity
me shall take their own views: I have neither hunger nor thirst nor cold,
but their own hunger or thirst makes them imagine the same of me.
'Exile?' Wherever I go, it will be well with me: for even here it was not the Discourses IV, 7
place that made me well off, but my judgements, and these I shall carry
away with me, for no one can rob me of them.
'But now the time is come to die.' What do you mean by 'die'? Do not use Discourses IV, 7
fine words, but state the facts as they are. 'Now is the time for your
material part to be restored to the elements of which it was composed.'
What is there dreadful in that? What loss to the universe will this mean,
what strange or irrational event?
When I hear a man called happy because he is honoured by Caesar I say, Discourses IV, 7
'What is his portion?' 'A province or a procuratorship.' Does he also get a
judgement, such as a governor should have? Does he get the skill to use a
procuratorship?
Never bestow praise or blame on any one for qualities which are Discourses IV, 8
indifferent, nor credit them with skill or want of skill; then you will escape
at once from recklessness and malice. 'This man washes hastily.' Does he
do evil then? Not at all. What is it he does then? He washes hastily.
If one hears a man singing badly, one does not say, 'See how badly Discourses IV, 8
musicians sing', but rather, 'This man is no musician.' It is only in regard
to philosophy that men behave so: when they see any one acting contrary
to the philosopher's profession, instead of refusing him the name, they
assume that he is a philosopher, and then finding from the facts that he is
misbehaving, they infer that there is no use in being a philosopher.
What then is the subject-matter of the philosopher? Is it a cloak? No, it is Discourses IV, 8
reason. What is his end? Is it to wear a cloak? No, but to keep his reason
right. What are his principles? Are they concerned with how to grow a
long beard or thick hair? No, but rather, as Zeno says, to understand the
elements of reason, the true nature of each, and how they are duly related
to one another, and all that is consequential on this.

18
Quote Source
Do you not know what the thirst of a man in a fever is like, how different Discourses IV, 9
from the thirst of a man in health? The healthy man drinks and his thirst is
gone: the other is delighted for a moment and then grows giddy, the water
turns to gall, and he vomits and has colic, and is more exceeding thirsty.
Such is the condition of the man who is haunted by desire in wealth or in
office, and in wedlock with a lovely woman: jealousy clings to him, fear
of loss, shameful words, shameful thoughts, unseemly deeds.
'Get up', says the trainer, 'and wrestle again, until you are made strong.' Discourses IV, 9
Let this be your attitude; for know that nothing is more amenable than the
mind of man. You have but to will a thing and it is done, and all is right;
on the other hand you have but to relax your effort and all is lost. For
destruction and deliverance lie within you.
'What good do I get then?' What greater good do you look for than this? Discourses IV, 9
You were shameless and shall be self-respecting, you were undisciplined
and shall be disciplined, untrustworthy and you shall be trusted, dissolute
and you shall be self-controlled. If you look for greater things than these,
go on doing as you do now: not even a god can save you.
'But if I die thus?' You will die a good man, fulfilling a noble action. For Discourses IV, 10
since you must die in any case, you must be found doing something--
whatever it be--farming or digging or trading or holding the counsulship or
suffering indigestion or diarrhoea. What then would you have death find
you doing? For my part I would be found busy with some humane task,
whatever it be--something noble, beneficent, advancing the common
weal.
As it is, you say, 'I will fix my attention to-morrow': which means, let me Discourses IV, 12
tell you, 'To-day I will be shameless, inopportune, abject: others shall have
power to vex me: to-day I will harbour anger and envy.' Look what evils
you allow yourself. Nay, if it is well to fix my attention to-morrow, how
much better to do so to-day! If it is profitable to-morrow, much more so is
it to-day: that you may be able to do the same to-morrow, and not put off
again to the day after.
When you relax your attention for a little, do not imagine that you will Discourses IV, 12
recover it wherever you wish, but bear this well in mind, that your error of
to-day must of necessity put you in a worse position for other occasions.
For in the first place--and this is the most serious thing--a habit of
inattention is formed, and next a habit of deferring attention: and you get
into the way of putting off from one time to another the tranquil and
becoming life, the state and behaviour which nature prescribes. Now if
such postponement of attention is profitable, it would be still more
profitable to abandon it altogether: but if it is not profitable, why do you
not keep up your attention continuously?

19
Quote Source
Is any part of life excluded, on which attention has no bearing, any that Discourses IV, 12
you will make worse by attention, and better by inattention? Nay, is there
anything in life generally which is done better by those who do not attend?
Does the carpenter by inattention do his work better? Does the helmsman
by inattention steer more safely? And is any of the minor duties of life
fulfilled better by inattention?
Is it possible to escape error altogether? No, it is impossible: but it is Discourses IV, 12
possible to set one's mind continuously on avoiding error.
Just prove to me that you are trustworthy, high-minded and reliable, and Discourses IV, 13.15
that your intentions are benign – prove to me that your jar doesn’t have a
hole in it – and you’ll find that I won’t even wait for you to open your
heart to me, I’ll be the first to implore you to lend an ear to my own
affairs.
We are responsible for some things, while there are others for which we Enchiridion 1.1
cannot be held responsible.
If you have the right idea about what really belongs to you and what does Enchiridion 1.3
not, you will never be subject to force or hindrance, you will never blame
or criticize anyone, and everything you do will be done willingly.
So make a practice at once of saying to every strong impression: ‘An Enchiridion 1.5
impression is all you are, not the source of the impression.’ Then test and
assess it with your criteria, but one primarily: ask, ‘Is this something that
is, or is not, in my control?’
The faculty of desire purports to aim at securing what you want, while Enchiridion 2.1
aversion purports to shield you from what you don’t. If you fail in your
desire, you are unfortunate, if you experience what you would rather
avoid you are unhappy.
It is not events that disturb people, it is their judgements concerning them. Enchiridion 5
An ignorant person is inclined to blame others for his own misfortune. To Enchiridion 5
blame oneself is proof of progress. But the wise man never has to blame
another or himself.
What quality belongs to you? The intelligent use of impressions. If you use Enchiridion 6
impressions as nature enchiridion prescribes, go ahead and indulge your
pride, because then you will be celebrating a quality distinctly your own.
Don’t hope that events will turn out the way you want, welcome events in Enchiridion 8
whichever way they happen: this is the path to peace.
Provoked by the sight of a handsome man or a beautiful woman, you will Enchiridion 10
discover within you the contrary power of self-restraint. Faced with pain,
you will discover the power of endurance. If you are insulted, you will
discover patience. In time, you will grow to be confident that there is not a
single impression that you will not have the moral means to tolerate.

20
Quote Source
Under no circumstances ever say ‘I have lost something,’ only ‘I returned Enchiridion 11
it.’
Starting with things of little value – a bit of spilled oil, a little stolen wine – Enchiridion 12.2
repeat to yourself: ‘For such a small price I buy tranquillity and peace of
mind.’
You have to realize, it isn’t easy to keep your will in agreement with Enchiridion 13
nature, as well as externals. Caring about the one inevitably means you
are going to shortchange the other.
Remember to act always as if you were at a symposium. When the food or Enchiridion 15
drink comes around, reach out and take some politely; if it passes you by
don’t try pulling it back. And if it has not reached you yet, don’t let your
desire run ahead of you, be patient until your turn comes.
Don’t let outward appearances mislead you into thinking that someone Enchiridion 19.2
with more prestige, power or some other distinction must on that account
be happy.
Remember, it is not enough to be hit or insulted to be harmed, you must Enchiridion 20
believe that you are being harmed. If someone succeeds in provoking you,
realize that your mind is complicit in the provocation. … Take a moment
before reacting, and you will find it is easier to maintain control.
If you commit to philosophy, be prepared at once to be laughed at and Enchiridion 22
made the butt of many snide remarks.
If I can make money while remaining honest, trustworthy and dignified, Enchiridion 24.3
show me how and I will do it. But if you expect me to sacrifice my own
values, just so you can get your hands on things that aren’t even good –
well, you can see yourself how thoughtless and unfair you’re being.
‘Well, what will my profession in the community be?’ Whatever position Enchiridion 24.4
you are equipped to fill, so long as you preserve the man of trust and
integrity.
When somebody’s wife or child dies, to a man we all routinely say, ‘Well, Enchiridion 26
that’s part of life.’ But if one of our own family is involved, then right away
it’s ‘Poor, poor me!’ We would do better to remember how we react when
a similar loss afflicts others.
If your body was turned over to just anyone, you would doubtless take Enchiridion 28
exception. Why aren’t you ashamed that you have made your mind
vulnerable to anyone who happens to criticize you, so that it
automatically becomes confused and upset?
‘My brother is unfair to me.’ Well then, keep up your side of the Enchiridion 30
relationship; don’t concern yourself with his behaviour, only with what
you must do to keep your will in tune with nature. Another person will not
hurt you without your cooperation; you are hurt the moment you believe
yourself to be.

21
Quote Source
Settle on the type of person you want to be and stick to it, whether alone Enchiridion 33.1
or in company.
In your conversation, don’t dwell at excessive length on your own deeds Enchiridion 33.14
or adventures. Just because you enjoy recounting your exploits doesn’t
mean that others derive the same pleasure from hearing about them.
When you’re called upon to speak, then speak, but never about banalities Enchiridion 33.2
like gladiators, horses, sports, food and drink – common-place stuff.
Above all don’t gossip about people, praising, blaming or comparing
them.
If you learn that someone is speaking ill of you, don’t try to defend Enchiridion 33.9
yourself against the rumours; respond instead with, ‘Yes, and he doesn’t
know the half of it, because he could have said more.’
Take a minute and let the matter wait on you. Then reflect on both Enchiridion 34
intervals of time: the time you will have to experience the pleasure, and
the time after its enjoyment that you will beat yourself up over it.
As you are careful when you walk not to step on a nail or turn your ankle, Enchiridion 38
so you should take care not to do any injury to your character at the same
time.
Whenever anyone criticizes or wrongs you, remember that they are only Enchiridion 42
doing or saying what they think is right. They cannot be guided by your
views, only their own; so if their views are wrong, they are the ones who
suffer insofar as they are misguided. I mean, if someone declares a true
conjunctive proposition to be false, the proposition is unaffected, it is they
who come off worse for having their ignorance exposed.
[When someone does something you don't like] Say to yourself each time, Enchiridion 42
‘He did what he believed was right.’
If your brother mistreats you, don’t try to come to grips with it by dwelling Enchiridion 43
on the wrong he’s done (because that approach makes it unbearable);
remind yourself that he’s your brother, that you two grew up together; then
you’ll find that you can bear it.
The following are non-sequiturs: ‘I am richer, therefore superior to you’; or Enchiridion 44
‘I am a better speaker, therefore a better person, than you.’
Someone bathes in haste; don’t say he bathes badly, but in haste. Enchiridion 45
Someone drinks a lot of wine; don’t say he drinks badly, but a lot. Until
you know their reasons, how do you know that their actions are vicious?
The mark and attitude of the ordinary man: never look for help or harm Enchiridion 48
from yourself, only from outsiders. The mark and attitude of the
philosopher: look for help and harm exclusively from yourself.

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Quote Source
If I admire the interpretation [of a philosophical treatise], I have turned Enchiridion 49
into a literary critic instead of a philosopher, the only difference being
that, instead of Homer, I’m interpreting Chrysippus.
How long will you wait before you demand the best of yourself, and trust Enchiridion 51.1
reason to determine what is best?
When faced with anything painful or pleasurable, anything bringing glory Enchiridion 51.2
or disrepute, realize that the crisis is now, that the Olympics have started,
and waiting is no longer an option; that the chance for progress, to keep or
lose, turns on the events of a single day.
[on valuing theoretical over practical philosophy] The result is that we lie – Enchiridion 52.2
but have no difficulty proving why we shouldn’t.
If we try to adapt our mind to the regular sequence of changes and accept Fragments 8
the inevitable with good grace, our life will proceed quite smoothly and
harmoniously.
Impressions (which philosophers call), striking a person’s mind as soon as Fragments 9
he perceives something within range of his senses, are not voluntary or
subject to his will, they impose themselves on people’s attention almost
with a will of their own. But the act of assent (which they call) which
endorses these impressions is voluntary and a function of the human will.
Most apparent philosophers were philosophers not in their actions, only Fragments 10
their words.
There were two vices much blacker and more serious than the rest: lack of Fragments 10
persistence and lack of self-control … persist and resist.
I say that virtue is more valuable than wealth to the same degree that eyes Fragments 13
are more valuable than fingernails.
I blush deeply whenever I catch myself saying anything disgraceful. It’s this Fragments 14
reflex that will not allow me to propose pleasure as the good and the goal
of life.
It is just charming how people boast about qualities beyond their control. Fragments 18
For instance, ‘I am better than you because I have many estates, while you
are practically starving’; or, ‘I’m a consul,’ ‘I’m a governor,’ or ‘I have fine
curly hair.’
People who are physically ill are unhappy with a doctor who doesn’t give Fragments 19
them advice, because they think he has given up on them. Shouldn’t we
feel the same towards a philosopher – and assume that he has given up
hope of our ever becoming rational – if he will no longer tell us what we
need (but may not like) to hear?
People with a strong physical constitution can tolerate extremes of hot and Fragments 20
cold; people of strong mental health can handle anger, grief, joy and the
other emotions.

23
Quote Source
Once, when [Agrippinus] was preparing for lunch, a messenger arrived Fragments 21
from Rome announcing that Nero had sentenced him to exile. Unflustered
he replied, ‘Then why don’t we just move our lunch to Aricia.’
So does this misfortune prevent you in any way from being just, generous, Fragments 28b
sober, reasonable, careful, free from error, courteous, free, etc. – all of
which together make human nature complete?

24
The theater at Hierapolis, where Epictetus was born
(Photo by M. Pigliucci)