Interlinking of Rivers in India Internat

Interlinking of Rivers in India:
Issues and Concerns

To my teachers who have enlightened me with their knowledge, care and affection.
M. Monirul Qader Mirza

Issues and Concerns
Edited by

Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Toronto, Canada
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed

Centre for Global Change
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad

Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP)
Dhaka, Bangladesh
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Interlinking of rivers in India: issues and concerns/edited by M. Monirul Qader Mirza,

Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-415-40469-3 (hbk.)
1. River engineering–India. 2. Rivers–India. 3. Water resources development–India.
I. Mirza, M. Monirul Qader. II. Ahmed, Ahsan Uddin. III. Ahmad, Qazi Kholiquzzaman, 1943-
TC503.I5534 2006
363.6’10954-dc22
2008003168
Published by: CRC Press/Balkema

P. O. Box 447, 2300 AK Leiden, The Netherlands
e-mail: Pub.NL@taylorandfrancis.com
www.crcpress.com – www.taylorandfrancis.co.uk – www.balkema.nl
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-40469-3 (Hardback)

ISBN 13: 978-0-203-89457-6 (eBook)
Table of Contents
Preface xi
About the Editors xv
About the Contributing Authors xvii
Acronyms xxi
1
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 India’s Water Resources and Its Development 1
1.3 Globalization, Rapid Economic Development and Looming
Water Crisis 4
1.4 Interlinking of Rivers in India 5
1.5 Issues and Concerns 9
1.6 International Legal Implications 13
1.7 Alternatives of the ILR 13
1.8 Regional Cooperation 14
2
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS: EXPERIENCE FROM ACROSS THE WORLD
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed
Daria T. Smeh
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 Experience with IBT from Across the World 18
2.3 Concluding Remarks 31
vi TABLE oF CONTENTS
3
THE VITAL LINKS
Suresh Prabhu
3.1 Introduction 35
3.2 India: Looking at 2050 36
3.3 Previous Interlinking Proposals 37
3.4 The New Initiative 38
3.5 Projected Benefits Assessed by the NWDA 39
3.6 National Perspective Plan: The Himalayan Rivers Development
and Peninsular Rivers Development 41
3.7 A Holistic Approach 45
3.8 Rehabilitation and Resettlement 46
3.9 Urgent Need 48
3.10 A Pan-Asian Outlook 48
3.11 We Cannot Stop Now 49
3.12 Not Big vs Small 50
4
THE INTERLINKING OF INDIAN RIVERS: QUESTIONS ON THE
SCIENTIFIC, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF
THE PROPOSAL
Jayanta Bandyopadhyay
Shama Perveen
4.1 Background 53
4.2 Water Resources in India and the Logic for the Interlinking Project 55
4.3 Does the Interlinking Project Offer the Most Cost-Effective Option
for Domestic Water Security in Drought-Prone Areas in India? 61
4.4 Is India’s Food Security Critically Dependent on the Interlinking Project? 63
4.5 Who Will Bridge the Crucial Knowledge Gap on the Himalayan
Component? 66
4.6 Will the Interlinking of Rivers Multiply the Conflicts Related to Water? 68
4.7 Conclusions 72
5
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTERLINKING RIVERS IN
INDIA: AN EXAMINATION OF VIABILITY
S.G. Vombatkere
5.1 Introduction 77
5.2 Design of the ILR Project 78
5.3 The ILR Project: Some Key Questions 80
5.4 Risk and Consequences of System Failure 86
5.5 Conclusions 87
TABLE oF CONTENTS vii
6
IMPACT OF THE INTERLINKING OF RIVERS ON NEPAL: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
Dwarika N. Dhungel
Santa B. Pun
6.1 Introduction 91
6.2 From Concept to Reality: Walk Through History 92
6.3 Different Dimensions of the ILR 94
6.4 Major Concerns to Nepal 95
6.5 Benefit of Working Together on the Ganga-Brahmaputra Basin 104
6.6 Professional Cooperation on a Continuous Basis 105
7
MODELING THE INTERLINKING OF THE GANGES RIVER: SIMULATED
CHANGES IN FLOW
Sharon Gourdji
Carrie Knowlton
Kobi Platt
Michael J. Wiley
7.1 Introduction 107

7.2 Hydrology of Ganges Basin 109
7.3 HEC-HMS Ganges Model: Overview, Initial Setup and Data Inputs 112
7.4 Model Methods and Parameterization 114
7.5 Model Calibration and Validation 116
7.6 River Linking Simulation 119
7.7 River Linking Results 121
7.8 Implications for the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty 123
7.9 Conclusions 124
8
INDIA’S ENERGY FUTURE AND INTERLINKING OF RIVERS
Kobi Platt
Sharon Gourdji
Carrie Knowlton
Michael J. Wiley

8.2 Balancing Needs: India’s Energy Sector 130
8.3 Power Structure: India’s State Electricity Boards (SEBs) 133
8.4 Environmental Costs: Restructuring and Privatization 135
8.5 Discussion 136
viii TABLE oF CONTENTS
9
POTENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF INTERLINKING
OF RIVERS IN INDIA
Carrie Knowlton
Sharon Gourdji
Kobi Platt
Michael J. Wiley

9.2 Community Relocation and Resettlement in India 142
9.3 Water Development and Disease, Pollution and Public Health in India 145
9.4 Water Quality 147
9.5 Hydrological Modeling and Water Pollution 150
9.6 Conclusion 151
10
LIVING IN THE DOWNSTREAM: DEVELOPMENT IN PERIL
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed

10.2 Water: A Key Driver for Bangladesh’s Development 155
10.3 Learning from the Past: The Ganges Water Diversion and
Environmental Hazard 157
10.4 River Interlinking: Bangladesh’s Hydro-Environmental and
Development Security 160
11
ASSESSMENT OF THE INDIA RIVER LINKING PLAN: A CLOSER
LOOK AT THE KEN-BETWA PILOT LINK
Kelli Krueger
Frances Segovia
Monique Toubia

11.2 Potential Hydrologic Impacts 170
11.3 Potential Impacts to Wildlife 174
11.4 Social Impacts of the KBLP 181
11.5 Conclusion 184
TABLE oF CONTENTS ix
12
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA ON THE
INTERLINKING PROJECT OF INDIAN RIVERS
Murari Lal

12.2 Available Water Resources in India 189
12.3 Water and Indian Agriculture 192
12.4 Southwest Monsoon – The Primary Source of Water in India 193
12.5 Observed and Projected Climate Change in India 195
12.6 Implications of Climate Change for the Interlinking Project 208
13
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: INTERNATIONAL
AND REGIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS
M. Rafiqul Islam
Shawkat Alam

13.2 A Brief Background to the Project 220
13.3 The Interests of Bangladesh at Stake in the Project 221
13.4 The Rivers Interlinking Project in International Law 223
13.5 Conclusion 232
14
THE INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS OF WATER
MANAGEMENT IN INDIA
Rajendra Singh
14.1 The Traditional Transmission of Knowledge in India 235

14.2 The Loss of Tradition, and Its Consequences 237
14.3 Re-Awakening the Indigenous Knowledge 238
14.4 Arwari River Parliament 245
14.5 Reviving the Indigenous Transmission of Knowledge: Tarun Jal
Vidyapeeth 249
14.6 The Use of Indigenous Knowledge in TBS Work 249
x TABLE oF CONTENTS
15
WATER-BASED COOPERATION IN THE GBM REGION WITH PARTICULAR
FOCUS ON INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA
15.1 Background 253

15.2 GBM Regional Cooperation 256
15.3 Indian Scheme of Interlinking Rivers 257
15.4 Tepaimukh and Sapta-Kosi High Dams 258
15.5 Conclusion 260
16
HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH OF CHINESE AND
INDIAN PLANS ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA
Stephen Brichieri-Colombi

16.2 Hydrology of the Brahmaputra 261
16.3 Possible Major Developments 265
16.4 Hydrological Analysis of Potential Developments 267
16.5 Hydrological Impacts on Bangladesh 268
16.6 Conclusions 271
17
COULD BANGLADESH BENEFIT FROM THE RIVER LINKING PROJECT?
Stephen Brichieri-Colombi

17.2 Legitimate Shares 277
17.3 Access to Shares 278
17.4 Win-Win Solutions 280
17.5 Risks from Upstream Development on the Brahmaputra 284
17.6 Meeting WCD Criteria 285
17.7 Conclusion 287
INDEX 291
Preface
In October 2002, in response to a public interest litigation case for cleaning of the highly
polluted Yamuna River (a tributary of the Ganges), the Supreme Court of India issued
notices to the Centre and the States for completing interlinking of rivers by 2016. This
landmark directive implies long lasting consequences for water resources development
and management in South Asia. The plan includes 30 interlinking canals and hundreds of
other engineering infrastructures under its Himalayan and Peninsular components. In
compliance with the notices of the Supreme Court, the Centre set up a high powered Task
Force under Mr. Suresh Prabhu (a contributor to this anthology), a former Union Minister.
India is the largest nation among the co-basin countries of South Asia with diverse
climatic regions. The Southwest monsoon generates most of the runoff which has a very
high spatial variability. South and western parts are drier than the north and northeastern
India. Due to geographical location, orography and circulation pattern of moisture laden
monsoon air mass, and longer monsoon duration, northeastern India has more water
availability than the other regions of India. The prime objective of the river interlinking
plan is to transfer this surplus monsoon water to southern India which is plagued with
water shortages. Note that due to high seasonality of flows in the rivers, most of the Indian
sub-continent suffers from shortage of water in the dry season.
Reactions to the river interlinking plan in India are mixed. Some experts believe that
this plan is the panacea for solving water deficits faced in some parts of the country.
Population of India is growing and it needs to produce more crops to feed more than
1.5 billion or more people in a few decades. The idea is that the interlinking plan would
supply vital water for agriculture. It will also generate huge economic and social ben-
efits. Another group of experts have raised concerns about potential environmental
hazards linked with the project such as water logging, salinization, ecosystem losses,
population displacement and public health problems. They also believe that water scar-
city in some parts of India is more associated with water management than water avail-
ability. At least two leading Indian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), namely, the
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) have already
proved this notion with implementation of pilot projects in chronic drought hit areas of
Gujarat and Rajasthan, respectively.
xii PREFACE
The Indian plan of river interlinking has an international dimension because most of
the Himalayan Rivers originated beyond the boundary of India and run through coun-
tries other than India, both upstream and downstream. Bangladesh located at the down-
stream drains out flows of the string of mighty Himalayan Rivers to the Bay of Bengal.
The plan of large scale water diversion under the river interlinking plan has created
serious concerns in Bangladesh. Since 1975, the country has been a great sufferer due to
withdrawal of half of the dry season water of the Ganges River by India at Farakka, West
Bengal. The purpose of this diversion was to resuscitate the Kolkata Port which lost its
navigability over the centuries due to the natural silting process. While the effectiveness
of the diversion has been debated for decades, it has created serious hydro-environmental
hazards in Bangladesh. Backed up by these past scientific evidences, Bangladesh fears
that under the river interlinking project, any diversion of water from the Himalayan
Rivers such as the Brahmaputra will create environmental and economic disasters.
Nepal, located at the very upstream has also raised its own concerns. While the
country will not face water deficit due to the proposed transfer, Nepal’s concerns are
different in nature and dimension based on past experiences. India built a number of
barrages and other water control structures inside its own territory on some rivers
originated in Nepal. These projects already created environmental problems which
include inundation of Nepalese land, siltation and river bank erosion. Nepal also fears
that river interlinking project would have implications for the hydropower projects being
planned on various Himalayan rivers in its territorial jurisdiction that will involve
foreign investment.
In the backdrop of possible beneficial and adverse effects of river interlinking plan,
one group of scientists argues that Bangladesh could benefit from the dams and reser-
voirs to be built on the Brahmaputra River through interlinking it with the Ganges River.
India could also gain some advantages from the Chinese plan of construction of a string
of dams/reservoirs on the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra). Although at this stage these ideas are
theoretical and are dependent on hydro-engineering and political consensus, they may
have some merits.
Immediately after delivery of the directive of the Indian Supreme Court on the river
interlinking plan, various types of general analyses on its potential implications started
appearing in the print and electronic media. Scientific information was found to be very
scanty. In this context, the major objective of this anthology is to provide an authentic
debate backed up science to the readers. To implement this, scientists belonging to
opposing schools of thought from South Asia, Europe, Australia and North America have
been assembled. The contents of this anthology provide a scientific basis of understand-
ing regarding the dynamics and implications of large scale water transfer from a network
of international and national rivers. This anthology has not tried to draw any general
conclusion on the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Plan instead it has provided the likely
scenarios. Discussions contained in this anthology will facilitate a dialogue on similar
projects being implemented or at the planning stage elsewhere in the world.
PREFACE xiii
Contributors to this anthology who are scattered around four continents did very
hard work. A number of reviewers went through between the lines of the chapters and
delivered very valuable comments and suggestions. We received constant guidance
from Dr Janjaap Blom of Taylor and Francis Group on manuscript preparation. Farzana
Abdulhusein patiently prepared the camera ready copy and redrew several graphics within
this book. Mr. Kanak Dixit, Editor of HIMAL, Kathmandu, Nepal has kindly consented to
let us use the figure on the cover of this anthology. They deserve our heartfelt thanks.
Mobilizing contributors, compilation of their contributions and editing them are a time
consuming job. We took much time from our families during the preparation process of
this anthology. We are grateful to our families for their sacrifice. Finally, views presented
in this anthology belong to the authors and do not reflect the views of their respective
organizations or of the editors.

Ahsan Uddin Ahmed
About the Editors
Dr M. Monirul Qader Mirza has extensively conducted research on hydrological and

climate extremes; natural hazards and their management; climate change, water resources
and their associated vulnerability; and adaptation and environmental impacts of water
diversions from the transboundary rivers. Trained as a water resources engineer, he
received his PhD in 1998 from the International Global Change Institute (IGCI) at the
University of Waikato in Hamilton, New Zealand where he researched on climate change
and future flooding in Bangladesh. In 2004, he edited an anthology on analysis into the
environmental implications of the diversion of the Ganges waters through a barrage at
Farakka, India. Dr. Mirza has been with various assessments of the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He recently co-led the Adaptation
Chapter of the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Working Group II of the IPCC and
contributed to the IPCC’s Synthesis Report of its AR4. He has further acted as a Coordi-
nating Lead Author (CLA) of the International Assessment of Agricultural
Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) and was also involved with the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment at the capacity of a CLA. He is currently an
associate faculty at the Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences, University
of Toronto at Scarborough. He is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE), Professional Engineers, Ontario, Canada and the Canadian Water Resources
Association (CWRA).
Dr Ahsan Uddin Ahmed is currently the Executive Director, Centre for Global Change,
Dhaka, Bangladesh. He received his PhD in 1992 in chemistry from Clarkson University,
New York, USA. He completed his B.Sc. and M.Sc in Chemistry in University of Dhaka.
He has comprehensively researched on water and environmental issues of the transboundary
rivers in South Asia especially on the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) rivers
involving Bangladesh, India and Nepal. He has participated in a number of national and
international research initiatives which include: Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Development, Sustainability and
Equity (IPCC/RIVM), Climate Change and Human Choice (Battele Press Inc.), Climate
Change and Water Resources of South Asia (START/APN) and Bangladesh Water Vision
2025 (South Asia Water Partnership). He was a recipient of the United States – Asia
Environmental Partnership Fellowship. Until recently, he was Executive Director of
Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) – an independent research think tank based in
Dhaka.
xvi ABOUT THE EDITORS
Dr Qazi Kholiquzzanan Ahmad is a socio-economic specialist of international repute

and has to his credit a wide range of publications and research work on environment and
water resources, climate change, policy planning, food and agriculture, rural development,
poverty alleviation, human development, technology and employment generation, and
gender issues. He extensively studied various issues related to water resources develop-
ment and cooperation in South Asia. In the late 1980s he pioneered an extensive three
country (Bangladesh, India and Nepal) collaborative research program on the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) basins to foster regional cooperation on water and
energy development. He received his PhD in Economics from the London School of
Economics and Political Science, London University in 1976. He is Chairman and Chief
Executive, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), a Dhaka based non-government think
tank specialized in development issues. He is presently also the President of the Bangladesh
Economic Association (BEA). He was the President and International Vice-President of
the Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific
(ADIPA), Kuala Lumpur and Society for International Development (SID), Rome, respec-
tively. From 2004 to 2007, he acted as a Lead Author to the Fourth Assessment Report
(AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He also contributed to
IPCC’s Third Assessment Report as a Coordinating Lead Author.
About the Contributing Authors
Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad is the Chairman of the multidisciplinary research

organization-Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP); and President, Bangladesh Economic
Association (BEA), Dhaka. He has to his credit a wide range of research works and
publications, including on environment and water resources, regional cooperation, climate
change, policy planning, food and agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation,
human development, technology, employment generation and gender issues. In early
1990s, Dr Ahmad initiated non-government level water cooperation (also known as Track
II water cooperation) research for the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins.
Ahsan Uddin Ahmed is the Executive Director, the Centre for Global Change, Dhaka,
Bangladesh. He is also a Senior Expert in the Climate Change Cell, Department of
Environment, Government of Bangladesh. He extensively researched on transboundary
waters especially on regional cooperation in flood hazard management. His research
focuses on transboundary waters, environment, resource management, regional
cooperation, sustainable development, climate change, vulnerability and adaptation.
Shawkat Alam is a lecturer in the Department of Law at Macquarie University, Sydney,

Australia where he teaches in International Law, and International Environmental Law.
Dr Alam’s research interests include: WTO and sustainable development, developing
countries in global environmental politics, and trade – poverty and environment nexus.
Jayanta Bandyopadhyay is Professor and Head, Centre for Development and Environ-
ment Policy at the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta (IIMC), India. He has a
PhD in Engineering and focused his professional interests on science, environment and
public policy. His research in the past 27 years has been aimed at generation of trans-
disciplinary public interest knowledge on critical environmental issues, especially on water
systems.
Stephen Brichieri-Colombi is currently a Research Fellow at King’s College, London

University and a Director of SynAquaNon Ltd. He has worked as a consultant in water
resources and agricultural development projects for over 30 years in Asia, Africa, Latin
America and the UK. Dr Brichieri-Colombi’s experience covers a wide variety of water
resources planning, computer modeling, rural water supply, drainage and irrigation,
navigation and hydropower. His current interest is in the construct of the world water
crisis, especially in the way it affects the management of international rivers, and his
book on the subject “The World Water Crisis: A Failure of Resource Management” is
scheduled for publication in 2008.
xviii ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
Dwarika N. Dhungel was Executive Director and now a Senior Researcher at the Institute
for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) – an independent think tank based in
Kathmandu, Nepal. He started his career as a Lecturer and entered government’s
administrative service in 1970 as an Officer and left in 1998 after serving in various
capacities including the Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources. Then he became a freelance
social scientist and social activist. His publications include Contemporary Nepal,
Governance Situation in Nepal, Good Governance: South Asian Perspective, and Nepal
Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Peace and a host of professional articles on different
aspects of social sciences.
Sharon Gourdji is currently a PhD student in Environmental and Water Resources

Engineering at the University of Michigan, USA. She holds a B.A. in Mathematics from
Columbia University, and an M.S. in Natural Resources and Environment and an M.A. in
Applied Economics from the University of Michigan. She is currently researching the
identification and attribution of carbon dioxide sources and sinks at both global and
regional levels using geostatistical inverse modeling.
M. Rafiqul Islam is a Professor, Division of Law, Macquarie University, Sydney,

Australia. His teaching and research interests include: public international law, inter-
national security law, international trade law, international law of foreign investment, law
of international economic institutions, international human rights and humanitarian law,
law of International organizations, international environmental law, constitutional law of
Bangladesh, etc. Before joining Macquarie University, he taught in University of Papua
New Guinea and Rajshahi University, Bangladesh.
Carrie Knowlton is currently posted at the US Environmental Protection Agency as an

Environmental Health Fellow with the Association of Schools of Public Health. In 2006,
she received an M.S./M.P.H. in Resource Ecology and Management with a focus on
Aquatic Ecosystems from the Schools of Natural Resources and Environment and Public
Health at the University of Michigan. From the same school, Ms. Knowlton received a
B.S. in Resource Ecology and Management in 1997.
Kelli Krueger currently works for The Nature Conservancy at the Oak Openings Project
Office outside of Toledo, Ohio, USA. Ms. Krueger has her B.A. in Environmental Policy
as well as an M.S. in Resource Ecology and Management, with a focus on Aquatic
Ecosystems. Her research interests include the use of Geographic Information Systems as
a tool for solving water management issues and other topics related to watershed
management.
Murari Lal is currently the Chairman, Climate, Energy and Sustainable Development
Analysis Centre (CESDAC), New Delhi, India. Prior to this, he was Chief Scientific
Officer at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), New Delhi and Professor at University
of the South Pacific. His research interests include: global and regional climate, model-
ing the climate and its variability, regional environmental change-integrated approach,
vulnerability assessment and regional adaptation and mitigation potentials.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS xix
M. Monirul Qader Mirza is an Adjunct Professor, Department of Physical and

Environmental Sciences, University of Toronto at Scarborough. His research focuses on
transboundary waters, extreme weather events, energy, climate change, vulnerability and
adaptation. He has extensively researched on transboundary water issues especially
on environmental effects of large scale water withdrawals from the Ganges River at Farakka,
India.
Kobi Platt currently works as an Industry Economist for the United States Energy
Information Administration (EIA). He holds a B.Phil. in Interdisciplinary Studies with a
focus in Natural Resource Economics from Miami (OH) University, USA. He has also
obtained an M.S. in Natural Resources and Environment and an M.A. in Applied
Economics at the University of Michigan. His current research work is focused on
forecasting and analysis associated with US natural gas markets in the near-term.
Shama Perveen is a final year doctoral student in the Department of Geography at the
University of South Carolina. Her primary research interests include water resources
management and policy, with particular emphasis on freshwater supply and demand,
stress, scarcity and water resource-based vulnerability. She is also interested in studying
virtual water as a possible coping strategy for alleviating regional freshwater shortages.
She is currently doing research on multi-scale analyses of water resources data. She was
previously associated with “Centre for Development and Environment Policy”, Indian
Institute of Management Calcutta, India.
Suresh Prabhu is presently a Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), India. A professional

Chartered Accountant, Mr. Prabhu entered public life with his election to the 11th Lok
Sabha (Rajapur constituency of Maharashtra) in 1996 and got elected in the subsequent
general elections. He was Union Cabinet Minister for Power, Heavy Industries and Public
Enterprises, Environment & Forests and Industry in different terms. From December 2002
to April 2004, he was Chairman, Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers with the rank and
status of a Union Cabinet Minister.
Santa B. Pun is an Electrical Engineer, who obtained his B.E. from the then East Pakistan
University of Engineering and Technology, Dacca (now renamed BUET). Starting as an
Assistant Engineer in 1967 with Nepal Electricity Corporation, he handled transmission,
distribution, consumer services and corporate development. He was General Manager of
Eastern Electricity Corporation, Biratnagar and Managing Director of Nepal Electricity
Authority (NEA) in 1995. Before his retirement, he was at the Ministry of Water
Resources as Officer on Special Duty (OSD) involved basically with water and power
development policies related to multi-lateral donors. He has since then engaged himself
with water and power issues contributing papers on topics like dispute over the Ganga
waters, regional cooperation on transboundary rivers, national and regional implications
of energy policy, etc.
xx ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
Frances Segovia has received her M.S. in Resource Policy and Behavior at the University
of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment. She is particularly interested
in understanding the social aspects of wildlife conservation. Frances graduated from
the University of Redlands, California with a B.A. in Environmental Studies. As an
undergraduate, she investigated the exploitation of wildlife as exotic pets within the
United States. She has worked with various sanctuaries that care for domestic as well as
exotic animals and has participated in educational programs to inform the public about
action that can be taken to protect wildlife.
Rajendra Singh heads Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) – a grassroots level organization based
in Alwar District, Rajasthan, India. He started rural development and employment
generation in 1985 at Gopalpura village by Water Conservation. Guided by the Mahatma
Gandhi’s teachings of local autonomy and self-reliance, he has introduced community
led institutions to many villages in Rajasthan. He also initiated several activities in the
State in association with Government. Mr. Singh was awarded Ramon Magsaysay Award
(named after former President of the Philippines) in 2001 for his contributions towards
reviving ancient water conservation techniques, mass awareness and rural development.
Daria T. Smeh received her B.A. in Environment and Resource Management in the
Department of Geography at University of Toronto and her M.A. in Environment and
Development at King’s College London. Her research focuses on the water, waste and
forestry sectors, climate change, vulnerability and adaptation in the context of
sub-Saharan Africa, Canada, India and Bangladesh. She is currently working as an
independent consultant.
Monique Toubia is currently assessing a Payment for Environmental Services (PES)

project for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) – Indonesia within their Community Empow-
erment Unit. Her research and professional interests include the wise use and equitable
distribution of natural resources in marginalized and impoverished communities, with a
particular focus on water. She has worked for local environmental organizations in the
United States, Uganda and India on various projects that encompass environmental
interpretation, sustainable livelihood initiatives, land conservation and water
management. Monique received her undergraduate degree in Environmental Studies and
a graduate degree in Natural Resource Policy with a focus on global environmental
justice.
S.G. Vombatkere (Major General S.G. Vombatkere) holds a PhD in structural dynamics
from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Madras (now Chennai). He joined the Indian
Army in 1961, was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, and retired as Additional
Director General (Discipline and Vigilance) in Army Headquarters, New Delhi, in 1996.
Settled in Mysore where he is engaged in voluntary work in the social, civic and environ-
mental fields. Since retirement, he is also teaching a semester course on Science, Technol-
ogy and Sustainable Development for undergraduate students of University of Iowa,
USA, Studies in South India at Dhvanyaloka Centre for Indian Studies, Mysore.
Michael J. Wiley is a Professor of Aquatic Ecology at the School of Natural Resources

and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His research interests focus on
river ecology, fisheries, and watershed management.
Acronyms
BCM Billion Cubic Meters

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BUP Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad
BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board
CAP Central Arizona Project
CEA Central Electricity Authority
CEE Centre for Environment Education
CGWB Central Ground Water Board
COE Committee of Experts
CPR Centre for Policy Research
CRL Chinese River Linking
CWC Central Water Commission
DEM Digital Elevation Model
DPRs Detailed Project Reports
EIA Energy Information Agency
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FPMC Farakka-Paksi-Mawa-Complex
FRs Feasibility Reports
GAP Ganga Action Plan
GBM Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GGD Greater Gangu Dam
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GWT Ganges Water Treaty
HEC Hydrologic Engineering Center
HMGN His Majesty’s Government of Nepal
HPC Himalayan Power Consultants
IBT Inter-basin Transfer
ICJ International Court of Justice
IECO International Engineering Company
IGNP Indira Gandhi Nahar Project
IIDS Institute for Integrated Development Studies
ILA International Law Association
ILC International Law Commission
ILR Interlinking of rivers
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN World Conservation Union
xxii ACRONYMS
JCE Joint Committee of Experts

JCWR Joint Committee on Water Resources
JRC Joint Rivers Commission
KBLP Ken-Betwa Link Project
LHWP Lesotho Highland Water Project
LMR Lower Meghna River
MCM Million Cubic Meters
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MNCs Multi-National Corporations
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoWR Ministry of Water Resources
NCA Net Cultivable Area
NCIWRDP National Commission for Integrated Water Resource
Development Plan
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
NRM Natural Resources Management
NWDA National Water Development Agency
NWDT Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
PAPs Project Affected Persons
PIL Public Interest Litigation
RMG Ready-Made Garments
RPT Randel Palmer and Tritton
SHGs Self Help Groups
SNRE School of Natural Resources & Environment
SPIESR Sardar Patel Institute of economic and Social Research
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle
TBS Tarun Bharat Sangh
TGD Three Gorges Dam
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UP Uttar Pradesh
UPA United Progressive Alliance
USAID United Stated Agency for International Development
VWC Village Water Council
WARPO Water Resources Planning Organization
WCD World Commission on Dams
WHO World Health Organization
WWF Worldwide Fund for Nature
1

Issues and Concerns
M. MONIRUL QADER MIRZA

QAZI KHOLIQUZZAMAN AHMAD
1.1 INTRODUCTION
During our journey throughout the history, many past civilizations in the world were
developed around water. In the Indian sub-continent, the Harappa and Mohenjodaro
civilizations were evolved in the Indus River basin five thousand years ago. In the modern
times, water has also been playing a pivotal role in the development and sustenance of
livelihoods of people of India.
After independence in 1947, India required millions of tons of food to feed its
impoverished growing population. The country became a massive importer of food grains
which rose to 10 million tons in 1966. Importation, particularly of food grains, persistently
drained out the country’s precious foreign currency and was a cause of its high level of
dependence on outside assistance. In a move to attain self sufficiency in food crops, India
opted for the ‘green revolution’, beginning with wheat and then expanding to rice
(Ahluwalia, 2006). Under this program, the country invested resources in agricultural
science and technology and water resources development.
1.2 INDIA’S WATER RESOURCES AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
1.2.1 Water resources of India
Like the availability of water in India, precipitation in India is unevenly distributed in

time and space. The country receives 4,000 km3 of precipitation in a given year or
1,220 mm. Indian precipitation has two major characteristics. First, temporally, precipita-
tion is highly variable. Annually, about 73 per cent of total annual precipitation occurs
during four summer monsoon months (June–September). The remaining 27 per cent
occurs in the other eight months of the year (Prabhakar, 2005). Fifty per cent of the
precipitation takes place in about 15 days and altogether less than 100 hours in a year.
Second, the country is faced with high spatial variability of precipitation (Figure 1.1),
which has a distinct pattern of distribution from east to the west. This is mainly because
of the direction of the movement of moisture laden monsoon air mass, as well as due to
orographic influence. As a result, northeastern India experiences very high rainfall, while
the western India is a low rainfall area. The northern extent of the monsoon in India and
2 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS
Nepal is governed by the presence of the Himalayas. The Western Ghats play a significant
role in orographic lifting of moisture-laden southwest monsoon winds, which leads to
heavy rainfall along the west coast of India and provides water supply to all major rivers of
the peninsular India (Pant and Kumar, 1997).
Fig. 1.1 Spatial distribution of annual precipitation (mm) of India (Source: India Meteorological
Department).
Influenced by the precipitation pattern and orography, water resources in India show
a high spatial variability. About 62 per cent (1,202 km3) of annual water availability in India
generated in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna river systems, which accounts for
33 per cent of the geographical area of the country. On the other hand, 10 per cent is to be
found from the west flowing rivers south of Tapi, which covers only 3 per cent of the area,
and the remaining 28 per cent comes from the other river systems distributed over
64 per cent of the land area (Kumar et al., 2005).
Since, overall the climate is hot; runoff in India is highly influenced by very high
evaporation. Of the total precipitation only 47 per cent is transformed into runoff. High
M.M.Q. MIRZA AND Q.K. AHMAD 3
summer temperature and other meteorological factors evaporate roughly 45 per cent of the
precipitation. Only 8.5 per cent of the precipitation replenishes groundwater. Further, the
occurrences of droughts are also characteristic of India. Droughts are closely related with
precipitation (magnitude, number of spells and their duration, timing, etc.) over a particular
area. Droughts are usually caused by lack of or inadequate precipitation. Table 1.1
provides an overview of the national water resources of India.
Table 1.1 National water resources of India
Resource Quantity Precipitation (%)

3
Annual precipitation (including snowfall) 4,000 km 100
3
Evaporation + groundwater recharge 2,131 km 53.3
Average annual potential flows in rivers 1,869 km3 46.7
Estimated utilizable water resources 1,122 km3 28.1

Surface water 690 km3 17.3
Groundwater 432 km3* 10.8
1 km3 ⫽ 109 m3 ⫽ 1 billion cubic meter (BCM) ⫽ 0.10 million hectare meter.
* Natural recharge from rainfall (~342.4 km3) ⫹ potential due to augmentation from canal irrigation
system (~89.5 km3).
Source: MoWR (1999).
1.2.2 Water resources development: The major thrusts
After independence, the development of India’s water resources (Table 1.1) has taken
place in the backdrop of high temporal and spatial variability, which has faced several
major challenges.
First, India inherited some water infrastructures from colonial times, but they were
insufficient to satisfy the increasing requirements of the country. A major focus of water
development was to expand irrigation facilities by mainly utilizing surface water resources
through construction of infrastructure such as dams, reservoirs, barrages, weirs, irrigation
canals, etc. Large scale investment was made in canal irrigation infrastructures. Irrigation
by canal water (using water from surface sources) was overtaken by groundwater
irrigation by the early 1970s. In fact, the area irrigated by canal water was larger than the
area irrigated by groundwater until 1972–1973 but the pattern changed since then and
currently groundwater irrigated area is nearly double compared to canal irrigated area
(Bhattarai and Narayanamoorthy, 2003).
Second, India faces the daunting challenge of flood and drought hazard mitigation,
which is required to reduce economic losses in agriculture and other sectors; flood
mitigation is particularly important for India. During the colonial time, India experienced
many famines and many Indians faced hunger, which were partly attributed1 to natural
hazards, yet little was done to mitigate the destruction caused by these hazards. Since
1
Natural hazards alone cannot always trigger a famine. Empirical studies from various regions of the
world suggest failures of political and administrative factors to respond to an emerging food access
problem as well. For example, the 1943 famine in Bengal and 1974 famine in Bangladesh resulted due
largely to political and administrative failures to respond to emerging food access crisis (Sen, 2001).
independence, both structural and non-structural measures have been implemented to

mitigate flood hazard. The area protected prior to 1954 is assessed to have been 3 million
hectares (Mha). From 1954 and 2000, 33,630 km of new embankments and 37,904 km of
drainage channels have been constructed. In addition, a total of 2,337 town protection
works have been completed and 4,705 villages have been raised above flood level. All
these measures give reasonable protection to an estimated 15.8 Mha (Planning Commis-
sion, 2002). Despite all these structural efforts, the flood vulnerable areas constitute
40 Mha as of 2002 to 2003 (D’Souza, 2003) and the damages caused by floods have
been high.
Droughts are a more serious natural hazard in India than floods. More than 26 per cent
of India’s total population faces the consequences of recurring droughts (Mirza, 2007).
In particular, the Indian states of Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab are highly
vulnerable to droughts, particularly their agriculture sector. Droughts can cause
significant adverse impact on agriculture and therefore on the national economy. For
example, the Tenth Plan (2002 to 2007) of India set agricultural target growth rate at
4 per cent per annum. However, agricultural growth rate in the first year (2002 to 2003) of
the Plan was negative (⫺6.9 per cent) due to a severe drought that occurred in 2002
(MoF, 2007). As a result, overall GDP growth rate for the 2002 to 2003 financial years
declined to 3.8 per cent from the preceding five-year average of 5.5 per cent. Drought
management in India is still ad-hoc and interventions are largely carried out by providing
instant relief to prevent starvation.
Third, at the time of independence, a very small fraction of the population had access
to electricity because it was mainly concentrated in urban areas. At that time, hydro-
electric projects were popular for cheap source of energy in many parts of the World,
especially in North America. To expand the energy supply, India focused its
attention on hydropower from large multipurpose dams. However, by 2002, only 6 per cent
of the India’s supply came from hydropower (Planning Commission, 2002). The Central
Electricity Authority (CEA) has recently assessed India’s hydro potential to be about
148,700 MW. The hydroelectric capacity currently under operation is about 26,000 MW
and 16,083 MW is under various stages of development. The CEA has also identified 56
sites for pumped storage schemes with an estimated aggregate installed capacity of
94,000 MW. Over the years, growth in hydropower generation has actually been slow.
There are a host of reasons that explain this slow growth, including a long implementa-
tion period, lack of investment particularly foreign, and public opposition to hydro projects
(Tehri, Narmada and many others), to name a few.
1.3 GLOBALIZATION, RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AND LOOMING WATER CRISIS
India is the largest country in South Asia and is not far away from becoming one of the
largest economies in the world. The country has succeeded in accelerating its economic
growth in recent years. India joined the globalization process through a wide-scale
economic reform programme initiated in 1991 and has been expanding and deepening the
process since then. After decades of slow economic growth, India has, in recent years,
sustained a high economic growth which has significantly contributed towards increasing
per capita income and reducing poverty (Sachs, 2005), although about 34.7 per cent (UNDP,
2006) of the population still has to make do with less ppp2 $1 a day per person. The
2
Purchasing-power parity theory states that the exchange rate between one currency and another is in
equilibrium when their domestic purchasing powers at that rate of exchange are equivalent.
country’s rapidly growing urban population and income and improved lifestyles of the
beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth, expanding industry and development of rural
centers have all triggered high water and energy demand. Further, the regional imbalance
in water availability, problems emerging from the legacy of past water development policy
and fast economic growth has caused India’s water development to face critical
challenges.
The water crisis in India is alarmingly serious, but how can this be resolved? While
the potential negative consequences of past water development projects are widely
recognized and debated, many (e.g. government officials and technocrats) still argue that
larger-scale dams, irrigation projects, and inter-basin transfers are the only viable solution
to the problem of water scarcity in India (Gourdji et al., 2005). However, there are opposing
views on resolving this crisis. Many traditional methods have been suggested as
alternatives to larger scale projects, including roof-top rainwater harvesting, check dams
and other traditional water harvesting techniques, village recharge ponds, increasing
irrigation water application efficiency, high yielding crop varieties that require low
irrigation, crop diversification, increasing yield in rainfed agriculture, to name a few. There
are also many critics of these alternative measures. Adhering to the historical legacy of
large scale water infrastructure development policy, policymakers in India eventually opted
in 2002 for the option to link major rivers to resolve the looming water crisis.
1.4 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA
The interlinking of rivers in India is not a new idea. In the background of high temporal and
spatial variations in the availability of water resources in India, the vision to interlink rivers
for the purpose of inter-basin water transfer, at a national scale, has been in the thoughts
of well meaning individuals and even engineers for more than a century (Prasad, 2004).
1.4.1 Past proposals
During the British colonial rule, eminent civil engineer Sir Arthur Cotton, put forward an
interlinking plan for southern India to facilitate trade through navigation canals. More
recently, in 1972, Dr K.L. Rao, the Minister of Irrigation in the Cabinet of the late
Mrs. Indira Gandhi re-proposed the idea but in a different manner, scale and purpose. In
1977, Captain Dinshaw Dastur, an engineer, but a pilot by profession, proposed the
construction of the Garland Canal which mainly consisted of two canals: (a) a 4,200 km
long, 300 m wide Himalayan Canal and (b) a 9,300 km long Garland Canal aligned along the
southern slopes of the Himalayas, bounded by the Ravi in the west, connected to the
Brahmaputra in the east and beyond. The main features of these proposals are presented
in Table 1.2.
1.4.2 Present proposal
In August 1980, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) and the Ministry of
Water Resources published a report entitled ‘National Perspectives for Water Resources
Development’. This document outlined a water development plan comprised of the
Himalayan and Peninsular components. The plan was subsequently abandoned because
it was a non-starter for various reasons (Iyer, 2003). But the report re-surfaced again when
the National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP)
finally submitted a report on the original NWDA proposals. The report by the NCIWRDP
did not discuss the proposed Himalayan links in detail because the data were classified as
confidential, but the report did state that the financial costs involved and the resulting
environmental problems would be enormous (Iyer, 2003). The NCIWRDP identified the
peninsular component as being unnecessary and recommended intra-basin development
as opposed to massive inter-basin water transfer (Gourdji et al., 2005).
Table 1.2 Earlier interlinking proposals and their major features
Proposed by Year Features

Sir A. Cotton 1839 He conceived a plan to link rivers in
Southern India for inland navigation. While
the project was partially implemented, the
river linking canals could not survive in the
face of rapid development of railways.
Dr K.L. Rao 1972 Linking the northern Ganga (Ganges) River

with the southern Couvery River;
Diverting 1,700 m3/sec surplus monsoon water
through a 2,640 km long canal;
Required lifting of water over 450 m;
Envisaged to supply water to drought prone
areas of South Uttar Pradesh and South Bihar
located within the Ganga basin;
Discarded because of high financial cost and
very large energy requirements.
Captain D.J. Dastur 1977 Proposed the Himalayan and Garland canals
to be inter-connected at two points (Delhi and
Patna) by five pipelines of 3.7 m in diameter;
Surplus waters in the country to be utilized to
irrigate 219 Mha of agricultural land;
Found to be technically infeasible.
In October 2002, the Supreme Court of India mandated that the Central Government
immediately start working on a project that linked all the major Indian rivers so as to
provide water to drought prone states in the south for irrigation and other uses. This
mandate came in response to a public interest litigation (PIL) filed by one advocate, which
he had originally filed for the cleaning of the Yamuna River, a tributary of the Ganges.
Thus, in September 2002 for the first time, the issue arose in the Supreme Court of India.
Justice B.N. Kirpal, the then Chief Justice of India headed the Supreme Court bench and
responded enthusiastically to the PIL. He converted the PIL for the cleaning of the Yamuna
into an independent writ petition and issued notices to the Centre and the States for
interlinking of rivers (ILR).
The proposal that has recently been taken up is based on the work that the NWDA
had conducted between 1980 and 2000. There are two main components of the proposal
on interlinking of rivers in India (ILR), namely the Himalayan Rivers component and the
Peninsular Rivers component (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). The Himilayan component envisaged
the transfer of water from the Brahmaputra and Ganga system to flow westwards to
southern Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, and eventually to the southwest
Peninsular system. The Peninsular Rivers component is concerned with connecting
Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar and Cauvery, Ken-Betwa, Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal,
Par-Tapi-Narmada, Damanganga-Pinjal, etc. There was also a notion to partially divert
certain rivers flowing eastward into the Arabian Sea, and link them with rivers flowing into
the Bay of Bengal.
GHAGRA
MANAS
DA
5
SAR
TISTA
GANDAK
SANKOSH
1
4
MECHI
YA
M
KOSI
UN
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NG 3 2 UTR 11
A
A L A GHA
AHMAP
NI AMB GO GRA
GAN 10 BR
LU CH MT
I GA
AK
A
BAR
TW
MATI
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9
NE
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BAR
12
PA R
SU DA
SA
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RMA DA
B AT
NA MA H A RN R
NA AR
EK
I
TAPI D HA
I
1. Kosi - Mechi 8. Chunar - Sone Barrage * FR Completed

2. Kosi - Ghagra 9. Sone Dam - Southern Tributaries of Ganga
3. Gandak - Ganga 10. Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga
4. Ghagra - Yamuna* 11. Jogighopa - Tista - Farakka (Alternate)
5. Sarda - Yamuna* 12. Farakka - Sunderbans
6. Yamuna - Rajasthan 13. Ganga (Farakka) - Damodar - Subernarekha
7. Rajasthan - Sebermati 14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi
Fig. 1.2 Himalayan component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).
The ILR project has been designed such that it will help improve the living standard of
people as it will facilitate growth in the Indian economy. The completion of this project
would generate regular supply of water for domestic use, agriculture and industries, coupled
with flood control and improvements in water flow, navigation, food security, etc. To
achieve these results, 334 billion cubic meters of water must be transferred through
30 constructed inter-river links, 36 big dams, 94 tunnels and 10,876 kilometers of canals.
Construction of the dams, canals, etc. and their maintenance will create opportunities for
new employment, which will check the migration of people from villages to cities
(Ali, 2004).
A
TR
GA APU
BA
L GO NGA HM
I GA BRA
LUN H AM MT NG
A
C I
11
K
RA
A
10
TW
I
BA
KALISINDH
MAT
NE
BE
SO
KE
AR
DA
BARB
A SU MO
AB MAD BE DA
WAINGANGA
S NAR MAHAN
RN R
ATI
A AR
TAPI EK
HA
DI
12
PAR GO PENGAN
DA GA
13 VAR 1
MA I
NE
G
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O
3 AV
KR AR
IS 2 4 I
HN
A
14
6 7
ARABIAN 5 PENN
AR BAY
SEA 15
OF
CA PA
UV
ER LA 8 BENGAL
Y R
16 9
VA
IG ANDAMAN & NICOBAR
AI
VAIP
PAR
INDIAN OCEAN
1. Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowislaiswaram) 9. Cauvery (Kattalai) - Veigai - Gunder*

2. Godavari (Incharmpalli) - Krishna (Nagarjunasagar)* 10. Ken - Netwa*
3. Godavari (Inchampalli) - Krishna (Pulichintala)* 12. Par - Tapi - Narmada*
4. Godavari (Polavarem) - Krishna (Vijayawada)* 13. Damangange - Pinjal*
5. Krishna (Srisailam) - Pennar* 14. Bedti - Varda
6. Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) - Pennar (Somasila)* 15. Netravati - Hemavati
7. Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)* 16. Pamba - Achankovil - Vaippar*
8. Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)*
Fig. 1.3 Peninsular component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).
To oversee the preparation of the feasibility reports, a Task Force (see Chapter 3 for
details) was constituted in 2002, headed by Mr. Suresh Prabhu, former Cabinet Minister for
Environment and Forests and Power. Feasibility Reports (FRs) of 16 links (14 Peninsular
and 2 Himalayan) have so far been completed, but only the FRs of the Peninsular links are
available in the NWDA website (http://www.nwda.gov.in) for public scrutiny. Three months
before the political change that took place in New Delhi in May 2004, Mr. Prabhu resigned
as Chairman of the Task Force to compete in the election. The Task Force was dismantled
in August 2004. But a special cell on ILR was constituted in December of the same year to
look after the residual routine work of the Task Force. In addition, a separate ‘Committee
of Experts’ (COE) was also setup in September 2006. The role of the COE is to investigate
the environmental and socio-economic aspects of the interlinking plan and to make
recommendations based on their findings (Gourdji et al., 2005).
The ILR project has entered into the implementation phase. The Chief Ministers of
Uttar Pradesh and Madhaya Pradesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August
2005 to implement one link (the Ken-Betwa Link Project or KBLP) of the Peninsular
component. Although these two rivers are grouped into the Peninsular component due to
their place of origin, they supply water to the Yamuna River, a tributary of the disputed
Ganges River. The KBLP involves connecting the Ken and Betwa rivers through creation
of water storage and supply infrastructures to divert water for irrigation and other
consumptive uses.
1.5 ISSUES AND CONCERNS
The interlinking of major rivers as a way to resolve the water crisis has become a highly
debated topic in India and in neighboring Bangladesh and Nepal, the two countries
which have substantial stakes in this project. The ILR project has also generated interest
among academia and researchers from around the world in relation to its likely implica-
tions. The major objective of this anthology is to address some of the following issues and
concerns.
1.5.1 Experiences from Inter-Basin Water Transfers (IBTs)
For over more than a century, many IBT projects have been implemented in many parts of
the world especially in the arid and semiarid regions, including in India. Notable IBTs in
India include: Periyar Project, Parambikulam Aliyar, Kurnool Cudappah Canal, Telugu
Ganga Project, and Ravi-Beas-Sutlej-Indira Gandhi Nahar Project. Descriptions of these
projects are available in the website of the NWDA of India (http://www.nwda.gov.in).
A number of beneficial impacts generated by these projects are listed, but no information
is included on their adverse environmental impacts. Chapters 2, 7, 9 and 11 discuss
environmental issues related to large scale water transfer projects with examples from
many parts of the world including India. The purpose of these chapters is to brief the
readers about the likely environmental impacts of river interlinking/water transfer projects.
Overall, an assessment of the available literature demonstrates that, in general, adverse
environmental impacts of IBT projects outweigh their beneficial impacts.
1.5.2 Growing food demand and irrigation
Indian agricultural growth has reached a point of stagnancy. Despite large scale expansion
of irrigation, the introduction of high yielding varieties and the uses of chemical fertilizers
and pesticides, the total per hectare yield of crops is substantially lower compared to many
other countries in the region. In particular, rice yield is 25 per cent lower than the global
average; while wheat yield in neighboring China is 40 per cent higher than that of India.
As against a reduced prospect of yields, population is growing and incomes are rising,
implying continuously increasing demand for staple foods during the next few decades
(Dyson et al., 2000). The projected total cereal requirement for 2020 may vary from
224 million tons to 250 million tons for a population of 1,315 million (Dyson et al., 2000;
Bhalla et al., 1997). The major objective of interlinking rivers is to expand food production
to meet the growing food demand. It is argued that the agriculture sector would benefit
from water transfers making for expanded irrigation and would as a result ensure food
security (Chapters 3 and 12). However, opposing views of the ability of ILR to ensure food
security is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
1.5.3 Hydrological implications
The implementation of the project component(s) will alter the hydrological settings of the
river basins. The entire ILR project is designed based on the concept of transferring water
from ‘areas of surplus to the deficit areas’. Many authors (Chapters 4 and 5) have
challenged this, the very foundation of the ILR project. The general concept of ‘too much’
water in the monsoon (June–September) and ‘too little’ in the remaining months of the
year in the Indian rivers is arguable. A seasonal average water surplus area could face
water deficit because, temporally and spatially, water requirements maintain some unique
patterns depending on the demands from agriculture, industry, domestic and other
economic sectors (Prasad, 2004). Areas downstream of Patna will experience severe water
shortages due to river interlinking (Chapter 7). Alteration of hydrological changes could
also occur beyond the borders of India. In the upstream, Nepal would likely experience
inundations from planned structures as they would be built near the border of India
and Nepal. Further, if any structure(s) were built inside Nepal, hydrological changes
would also likely occur in the river basins (Chapter 6). In the downstream, due to the ILR,
Bangladesh could experience hydrological droughts in the Ganges and Brahmaputra
rivers (Chapter 10).
1.5.4 Risk and security
The Himalayan and the Peninsular components are now treated as independent
components but they are actually interconnected. The Peninsular component has two
sub-components, one for interlinking the peninsular rivers themselves and the other for
linking the Ganges to the peninsular rivers. Water will be transferred either by gravity
flows (tunneling through mountains) or by lifting across natural barriers. Critics argue that
the entire linking project should be treated from a ‘systemic’ point of view otherwise it will
run a risk of failure (Chapter 5). The interlinking infrastructure will also require unpre-
cedented security arrangements and enormous resources, over extending the capacity of
defence and police forces (Chapter 5). Similar hydrological and environmental risk and
security issues are discussed in more detail later in this book (Chapters 10 and 11).
1.5.5 Flood vs drought mitigation
One of the major objectives of the ILR is to mitigate floods and drought hazards by
storing waters in reservoirs in the monsoon and releasing it in the dry season. However, in
the context of high seasonal variations in the hydrology of Indian rivers, floods and
droughts are very complex issues. For example, the highest flood discharge recorded in
the Brahmaputra River at Pandu, Assam was 72,748 m3/sec (1962). This magnitude is
approximately 25 times the minimum flow observed at exactly the same station that same
year (Goswami, 1998). It is very common that a river causes floods in certain parts of its
basin while simultaneously the other parts of the basin face droughts (Prasad, 2004).
Current plan under the ILR to store water in 36 dams/reservoirs is of insignificant
consequence compared to flood flows in the Indian rivers. Similar flood and drought
management strategies in the past produced limited success in India. In fact, doubts have
been expressed about the planned flood moderation in India under the current plan
(Chapter 5) because storing large volumes of water in a normal flooding year will adversely
impact agriculture and river morphology in the downstream areas, especially in Bangladesh
(Chapter 10).
1.5.6 Energy future
Energy is one of the most important determinants of social and economic development.
Per capita energy consumption and percentage of population having access to energy
reflects a country’s development situation. India’s per capita total energy consumption is
one of the lowest in the world with 479 kgoe (kilograms oil equivalent). India’s con-
sumption is only about 20 per cent of the global average reported in 1997 and compares
poorly with the per capita consumption of Thailand (1,319 kgoe), Brazil (1,051 kgoe)
and China (907 kgoe) (Planning Commission, 2002). The country’s rising population
and changes in lifestyles are consistent with rapid economic growth and have accelerated
the energy demand. Estimated energy demand in 2006 to 2007 is 563 mtoe (million
tonnes oil equivalent) and projected to rise to 724 mtoe by 2011 to 2012.
India’s current power generation capacity falls short of the demand for it by about
30 per cent. To reduce the gap between power demand and supply, hydropower develop-
ment has become one of the major priorities. Under the ILR, India is planning to develop
34,000 MW of hydropower mainly from the Himalayan component. It is unclear from
India’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2002 to 2007) whether hydropower dams or reservoirs are
planned under the ILR in the sites already identified. The ILR presents, it is argued,
opportunity for India to diversify its energy portfolio that is heavily reliant on fossil
fuels. Although hydropower is presently an attractive option due mainly to high energy
demand, environmental and social costs are potentially very high. The ILR will require
significant energy inputs to lift water across basin boundaries, and this energy require-
ment could substantially reduce the net electricity generated by the hydropower compo-
nent of the ILR. Instead of investing resources in the ILR, India can expand its existing
cooperation with Bhutan to further develop its hydropower and purchase supplies from
there (Chapter 8).
1.5.7 Health concerns
Health issues concerning large scale water development projects are well documented.
Dams and reservoirs impound water that create favorable environments for the growth of
various vectors. An outbreak is more likely to occur because long irrigation canals
transport vectors from one area to another. The growth of vectors can cause an outbreak
of many infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria, guinea worm, schistosomiasis
(bilharzia), river blindness and various types of diarrhoeal diseases, as recorded in large
water projects. In fact, some of these diseases have already been identified in water projects
in India (Chapter 9). An environment polluted by fertilizers, pesticides, household efflu-
ents and hazardous chemicals and water and soil salinisation endanger the availability of
freshwater and jeopardize public health.
Under the current ILR scheme, there are many large dams and reservoirs, along with
thousands of kilometers of irrigation canals and other associated structures. Combined,
these schemes will alter micro-climatic and environmental settings of large areas in India.
At this moment, the exact health implications of the interlinking plan are difficult to
ascertain. But anecdotal evidence from past projects suggests that heath implications be
taken into account during project design and post-implementation monitoring programs
(Chapter 9).
1.5.8 Pollution
In general Indian rivers are highly polluted, particularly in the dry season, when flows
are insignificant compared to the monsoon months. Floods during the monsoon, flush
industrial and municipal pollution into the Ganges and into many other rivers that flow
out to the ocean. The Ganges is the one of the most polluted rivers in the world (Naser
et al., 2004) and will become even more polluted as a result of the reduced flow that will
be caused by the diversions planned under the ILR scheme. Diversions at specific reaches
below Allahabad in the Ganges will particularly increase the concentration of pollution
(Chapter 7). Due to the ILR scheme, the concentration of pollution will also increase and
adversely affect the Yamuna River. The state of Haryana and the city of Delhi draw so
much water from the Yamuna River that it barely flows beyond Delhi. Due to the reduced
flow the water quality in Delhi is very poor. Under the interlinking scheme, water from the
Ken River, a tributary of the Yamuna will also be diverted to the Betwa River (Chapter 11).
This diversion will reduce the supply of water to the Yamuna River and thus the
concentration of pollution may become worse in future. Under the ILR scheme, water from
the Ganges will also be transferred to the South through the Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha
and Subernarekha-Mahanadi links (Figure 1.2). As the Ganga is already polluted, the
interlinking of a polluted river with a relatively non-polluted one will have adverse impacts
on the ecosystems of the latter and the people dependent on its waters.
1.5.9 Climate change and variability
Climate change and variability have emerged as the most important environmental
challenges. The recently released Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that anthropogenic warming has
already caused discernible influence on many physical systems, including changes in
snow, ice and glaciers. Himalayan glaciers are melting at a faster rate than before and
many of them have significantly shrunk in the last few decades (Cruz et al., 2007). Future
changes in the South Asian climates will have significant impacts on water supply and
demand, and eventually will have profound effects on various economic sectors and the
livelihoods of millions of people. The melting of the Himalayan glaciers is projected to
increase water supply within the next two to three decades, but in the long-run water
supply will decrease due to the recession of the glaciers. Freshwater availability in South
Asia is also projected to decrease due to climate change although monsoon precipitation
will increase (Cruz et al., 2007). Climate change will have substantial implications for
the ILR scheme (Chapter 12). Many hydrological impacts will be experienced in the
economic and engineering life-cycles of interlinking infrastructures. It is therefore
important to factor in climate change in the engineering designs of the ILR (Chapter 12).
This would be a huge and a highly complex undertaking and may prove intractable in
practice, given the size and the multifarious consequences of the scheme.
1.5.10 Water for ecosystem
Ecosystems provide invaluable services for human well-being. Healthy water dependent
ecosystems contribute to the health of the water resources that sustain our industries and
the community’s economic, social and environmental standards (GSA, 2007). Ecosystem
integrity, productivity and long term sustainability is highly dependent on adequate water
flows which are required in watercourses, riparian zones, wetlands, floodplains, estuaries,
etc. Flood waters maintain interactions between the floodplain and the water courses,
which is especially important for many fish species. Nutrients from flood waters enrich
soils in the floodplain and also the growth of blue-green algae supply nutrients to
post-flooding planted crops (Chapter 4). Wetlands contribute to storing flood waters and
help purifying water. Coastal estuaries play a significant role in the interaction between
freshwater and brackish water ecosystems. Adequate supply of freshwater is required for
the sustenance of fragile coastal ecosystem. Evidence suggests that the withdrawal of the
Ganges waters at Farakka and in other upstream locations has already significantly
damaged ‘mangrove ecosystem’ in Bangladesh (Chapter 7 and 10). Freshwater flows also
push back the intrusion of saline sea water. Therefore, to maintain morphological balance,
watercourses require specific water flows (Chapter 10).
1.5.11 Social and ecological impacts
Large scale water projects cause a host of social and ecological impacts relating to
population and wildlife displacements (Chapter 2). We have decided to include a Chapter
on the Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP) to examine the potential social and ecological
impacts of ILR. The KBLP is the pilot component of the ILR which has become a primary
point of controversy in India. The Indian government has released a Feasibility Report on
this project which discusses the potential impacts of the project on the surrounding
environment. The chapter uses GIS analysis, literature reviews, and focus group
interviews, to discuss three major points of criticism surrounding the KBLP: hydrologic,
wildlife, and social impacts. As illustrated in the chapter, it seems that the project planners
have not adequately analyzed the social and environmental implications to the landscape
and people who depend on it (Chapter 11).
1.6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The ILR is not a self contained project within India although it has been made public
unilaterally. Official mechanisms for water cooperation exist between India-Bangladesh
and India-Nepal. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was set up in
1972 to foster water cooperation between India and Bangladesh. A Nepal-India Joint
Committee on Water Resources (JCWR), headed by Water Resources Secretaries from the
two countries, is functioning to have interactions at higher levels in the water sector,
including implementing various cooperative agreements and understandings. Nepal and
Bangladesh are, respectively located at the upstream and downstream of the Ganges;
each has a large stake in this project. International law governs the utilization of common
rivers to ensure just and equitable shares of waters for all competing claimants and inter-
ests. It confers specific rights and imposes definite obligations on riparian states so that
their legitimate rights are protected and the abusive action prevented. The economic
justification from the point of view of a particular nation, India in this case, of the ILR
project which involves international rivers is not enough. The planning, construction
and commissioning of the project must comply with the rules, principles and norms of
international law governing the utilization of international rivers (Chapter 13).
1.7 ALTERNATIVES OF THE ILR
The ILR project is the largest inter-basin water transfer initiative ever undertaken in the
world. The estimated cost is in the range of US$ 125 to 200 billion, with the lower cost
estimate totaling more than the value of India’s total export in 2006 (US$ 112 billion). If
this project has to be completed in the next 10 years (as per directive of the Supreme
Court), India needs to invest US$ 12.5 to 20 billion per year (at 2002 prices). However,
due to cost escalation (400 to 500 per cent as is often the case in India), the final project
cost would be in the range of US$ 600 to 800 billion. But, are there other alternatives to
this costly project? According to some, the answer is yes; and several alternatives have
been suggested in some detail.
First, a huge amount of water is lost via evapotranspiration, distribution losses,
seepage through unlined channels and excess application in the crop fields. Canal
irrigation water application efficiency in India is estimated at 35 to 40 per cent, which has
remained at the same level for the last six decades. Water losses in the domestic and
industrial uses are also believed to be 30 to 40 per cent. Therefore, investment of resources
in increasing irrigation, domestic and industrial water use efficiency can reduce demand
for water and additional areas can be brought under irrigation with the water saved
(Chapter 4). Second, enormous potential exists to increase the productivity of water in
agriculture by raising crop productivity, combined with better water management
practices. Deep soil chiseling prior to planting can dramatically improve water retention by
the soil, while simultaneously reduce runoff and flooding. Crops grown in these
conditions require less irrigation and generate much higher yields. Third, the phasing out
of subsidies in power and water can save resources by reducing their wasteful uses
(Chapter 4). Fourth, increasing the ability to efficiently use the available water for
maximum benefit. Rainwater harvesting techniques in both urban and rural environment
can substantially enhance the availability of water. Some of these techniques are already in
use and some of the ancient techniques have even been revived in many parts of India.
Public education on rainwater harvesting and water conservation has been found to be
very effective tools in tackling water shortages and droughts (Chapter 14).
1.8 REGIONAL COOPERATION
The Himalayan component of the ILR involves two of the largest rivers in South Asia: the
Ganges and Brahmaputra. These two rivers are international and their basin areas are
shared by China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Under the Himalayan component, there are
five links which directly involve Nepal: Kosi-Mechi, Kosi-Ghagra, Gandak-Ganga,
Ghagra-Yamuna and Sarada-Yamuna. Nepal has to play a very crucial role for the
Himalayan component because the Nepalese rivers supply almost half of the annual flow
of the Ganges River. In the dry season, 75 per cent of the Ganges flow comes from Nepal.
In order to implement these five links, a string of storage reservoirs and other infrastruc-
tures must be constructed on the Nepalese soil (Chapter 6).
China is also planning to build a number of dams and reservoirs on the Brahmputra
(Tsangpo) just above the spot where the river enters India. China’s objective is to transfer
large quantities of water to its water starved northern region. The Chinese plan will affect
India’s ILR project in relation to the transferring of water from the Brahmaputra to the
Ganges and eventually to Southern India.
At the downstream, Bangladesh is very concerned because over 92 per cent of the
water that annually flows through the country is generated in the upstream. Bangladesh
and India has 54 common rivers. Thus, the impacts of the ILR on Bangladesh will be
the result of many factors, including the alteration of hydrology (both surface and
groundwater), river dynamics, ecosystem changes, agricultural productivity, intrusion of
salinity, and public heath (Chapter 10). While both Nepal and Bangladesh have crucial
stakes in this project, they have not been officially notified about plans for the ILR
project. The issue of regional cooperation with respect to water resources of the basins of
the common river systems, viz the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna (GBM), has
been under discussion for 36 years. Yet, so far no significant breakthrough has been
achieved (Chapter 15), except for the Ganges [water sharing] Treaty signed in 1996.
China, India and Bangladesh may mutually benefit from cooperation on the Brahmaputra
River (Chapters 16 and 17). But this concept needs to be comprehensively investigated
with the participation of all three countries.
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2
Interlinking of Rivers: Experience

from Across the World
AHSAN UDDIN AHMED

DARIA T. SMEH
M. MONIRUL QADER MIRZA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Large scale inter-basin transfer (IBT) of water from one basin to the other is not a new
phenomenon. In fact, large dams, and more broadly water transfer projects, have been
integral in the development of “civilizations” for thousands of years. For example, Middle
Eastern countries that share the waters of Nile River planned to divert water from the basin
to replenish the Jordan River as early as 1902. Even now, in many places all over the world,
water transfer projects have been implemented and many are continually being conceived.
The common purpose of IBT over the past hundred years is due largely to increases
in population and subsequent increases in demand for freshwater for agriculture and/or to
support urban activities. Most of the planning exercises for these projects have taken
place during the past four decades. In fact, significant activities have taken place since the
1960s again in response to increasing population and demand of freshwater, but in
circumstances in which demand exceeded the ability of the recipient river basin to provide.
The degree to which the current stage of development and construction of IBT projects
diverges from the past is in the magnitude of the players and their involvement in the
projects. Currently, multi-lateral institutions and multi-national corporations tend “… to
propose, negotiate, fund, and set the terms for the feasibility of dams and inter-basin water
transfer projects with national governments” (Braun, 2005).
This chapter presents evidence about the positive and adverse implications (Box 2.1)
that result from large scale water transfers, as well as efforts for micro-scale transfers
across different basins in various geographic areas worldwide. The chapter also provides
a discussion on the purpose of interlinking rivers in South Asia, as well as, documented
experience with ILR in that region.
This chapter attempts to present a balanced argument regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of IBT. Yet, an overall assessment of the available literature demonstrates
that, in general, adverse environmental impacts of IBT projects outweigh their beneficial
impacts.
18 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS: EXPERIENCE FROM ACROSS THE WORLD
Box 2.1 Beneficial and adverse impacts of inter-basin water transfer projects
Some of the primary potential benefits of inter-basin water transfer include:
Economic growth;
Improved livelihoods; and
Improvements in interregional relationships; and
On the other hand, some of the primary adverse implications include (Braun,
2005):
Resettlement, dislocation or lack of relocation;

Changes in river basin ecology;
Loss of means of production;
Loss of arable agricultural land;
Loss of dry season grazing land;
Changes in fisheries practices, fish life-cycle and fish stocks;
Socio-cultural, socio-economic and psycho-physiological effects;
Increased risk of impoverishment;
Changes in household and community dynamics;
Alterations in gender relations; and
Changes in natural resource access.
2.2 EXPERIENCE WITH IBT FROM ACROSS THE WORLD
The United States planned to transfer large quantum of water from Canada to the semiarid
Southeastern states in the 1960s. The Soviet Union planned to meet the challenge of
increasing water shortages and the shrinking of the Aral Sea at the expense of Siberian
Rivers in 1973. Following the pursuits of the then super powers, Chile planned to divert
water from other basins to replenish the Maipo River in the 1980s, in a bid to compensate
for the increase in water use by the capital, Santiago. China, as well, has already
implemented several large IBT projects. For example, it diverted roughly 10 BCM (billion
cubic meters) from the Chang into the Huai basin, and 8 BCM from the lower Huang into
the Hai and Huai in 1980 (Nickum, 1997). Recently, in a bid to continue agricultural
development in the North China Plain and to provide water in the rapidly growing capital,
the city of Beijing decided to implement the proposed middle route of the South-to-North
Water Transfer Project. Meanwhile, the northern African country of Libya tried the most
drastic measure to address water shortage problems: they created a man-made river and
have since been transferring water from the arid south to the coastal regions since 1996.
The entire intervention allows the transfer of 6.1 MCM of water through a pipeline network
of about 5,000 km, to ensure water supply for 50 to 100 years at a cost of US$ 25 billion
(Garay and Sugheiar, 1997).
It is intriguing to note that, most of the large scale IBT projects proposed worldwide
have never materialized and have remained as wishful proposals despite increasing needs
of the respective “recipient basins”. Inaction can be explained by a number of reasons,
including: huge capital costs, substantial scope for less capital-intensive alternative water
savings, and increasing concerns about negative economic, environmental, and social
AHSAN UDDIN AHMED ET AL. 19
impacts in the exporting basin, such as the potential cutting off of future development
opportunities, social disruption, irreparable environmental damage, and rural-urban
migration (Rosegrant and Ringler, 1999). Infact, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
for inter-basin transfer projects can usually describe the numerous adverse in-stream
ecological effects that are caused by many of these projects. Yet, because EIAs tend to be
undertaken after the important project elements have already been designed many of the
concerns for these adverse effects are excluded in the decision-making process (Matete
and Hassan, 2006).
2.2.1 North America
In the US, large scale as well as micro-scale water transfers have been undertaken across
basins (Rosegrant and Ringler, 1999). In order to transfer freshwater to LA, the city of
Los Angeles plan to construct a large scale water transfer project meant water rights were
bought from the Owens Valley of Eastern California. Unfortunately, when the Owens
Valley gave away water rights, they suffered irreparable losses in terms of curtailing
agricultural opportunities (US Office of Technology Assessment, 1993).
In contrast, the Imperial Valley partnered with the Metropolitan Water District in
California into a 35-year contract to receive payments for conservation projects in the
valley in exchange for water from the valley, only ensuring that its water rights are retained.
As a result, the Imperial Valley did not suffer any reduction in levels of water use (Postel,
1992).
In the United States, there have also been numerous efforts in recent years to transfer
water across river basins at micro-scales. London and Miley (1990) observed that several
states in the US have drafted IBT legislation. The state of Texas currently has about
80 active inter-basin transfer permits, in order to serve the rapidly growing cities. It appears
to be a general trend in the US to engage in an IBT agreement to solve a water crisis in the
recipient basins, particularly in arid and semiarid regions. But by replenishing freshwater
from exporting basins, controversies have arisen regarding the environmental concerns,
as well as the consideration of other viable economic approaches to solve the problem.
The state of Georgia has been implementing about 25 IBT projects over the years,
most of which are small scale projects. Although the legislative provisions in the US are
strictly followed and respected by all concerned parties, resentments have grown regard-
ing environmental consequences of these IBTs. Since there is a strong possibility that an
increasing number of projects or arrangements will have to be put in place to meet the
growing requirements, especially to serve the urban sector, it is feared that the old legis-
lative provisions would not be sufficient to resolve the outstanding issues. As observed
by DeVinney and Johnson (undated), “… most experts agree that Georgia’s current inter-
basin transfer policy needs updating”. They also commented that, “… a more detailed
inter-basin transfer policy than now exists, or an amendment to current law, could put
additional limitations on interbasin water transfers,” implying that the future IBT initia-
tives could not be successful unless a holistic consideration is put in place.
According to DeVinney and Johnson (undated), two concerns are continually being
expressed regarding inter-basin transfers in Georgia. The first concern is the perception
that the metro Atlanta population growth engine will siphon water from far away places in
Georgia to support continued growth, resulting in harm to the water resources, the economy,
the environment, and the people of the source basins. The second concern is that inter-
basin transfers, regardless of the destination of the water, will result in unacceptable
adverse effects on the streams in the basins where water is withdrawn but not returned.
Although some of the adverse effects are as yet unknown, DeVinney and Johnson
(undated) anticipated a potential impasse and recommended that “additional new
transfers or expansion of existing inter-basin transfers should be allowed only if certain
conditions could be met. Those conditions should include, but not be limited to, such
things as meeting instream flow requirements and water quality standards in both
withdrawal and receiving basins.” The recommendations suggest that instream flow
management and water quality maintenance become contagious issues in IBT projects,
even if legislative provisions are well defined and obeyed by all parties concerned.
2.2.2 Africa
IBT projects have also been commonly documented to exist throughout Africa. In early
days of IBT project implementation, the thrust was to provide more irrigation water to
water-scarce basins. With economic development, it was soon realized that the solution
could lie in designing economic incentives and disincentives and to enhance water use
efficiency. Meanwhile, urban areas started to play an increasing economic role, which also
drew an increasing number of people and escalated demand for freshwater use. As a
solution to growing problems, IBT was chosen to be the viable respite, like the project
constructed in South Africa and Lesotho.
Adverse ecological implications of other micro and macro IBT schemes in other
dryland environments in South Africa have been analyzed by Davies and Snaddon (2000).
The results raised grave concerns, not only for the exporting basin, but also for the
recipient basin. Since Pretoria’s economic growth has largely been supported by IBT
projects, Cyrus et al. (2000) analyzed a number of aspects of environmental consequences
of such large scale IBT projects. The scale issue has again been raised by Wishart and
Davies (2002a) who concluded that large scale IBT might challenge river basin integrity.
The limnological issue of IBT projects in South Africa highlighted the environmental
consequence in terms of benthic structure of the aquatic environment and lotic biodiversity
(Wishart and Davies, 2002b; Wishart and Davies, 2003). From the South African experi-
ence, one can easily see how the country has been managing to sustain its economic
growth, almost disregarding the environmental consequence of large scale IBT projects.
It is known globally that the heart of economic activity – the Gauteng area – has now been
fully dependent on waters imported from outside basins.
Of course, the tendency of the pro-IBT groups is to forecast the economic aspects of
such projects, frequently undermining concerns raised by environmental groups. Despite
the works of a large number of researchers, Muller (undated) commented that “… There
remains considerable interest in the ecological effects of IBTs although there are, to date,
few indications of major negative impacts”. However, he commented that the receiving
rivers, which are often used as a conduit for transferred water, often run into the generic
danger of offering conditions favourable for pest species of flora and fauna. Such
conditions have been existing in the Great Fish River, part of the transfer route from the
Orange River to the Eastern Cape, as a result of almost continuous flow in a previously
seasonal river. It is recognized that the biting black fly simulium chutterii has proliferated
under this altered hydraulic regime, causing significant stock losses among cattle. In
response, the administrator appropriately commented that, “… in addition to rigorous
evaluations of social, political and economic implications of IBTs, environmental impact
assessments will continue to pay particular attention to such matters” (Muller, undated).
By 2003, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was the largest water
transfer infrastructure project being constructed in southern Africa (Keketso, 2003). The
construction of the project began in 1991 (Boniface, 1999) and was instituted by the LHWP
Treaty (1986; Conely and Niekerk, 2000). The project diverts water from the Orange-Senque
River in Lesotho to the Vaal River Basin in South Africa; this water is stored in Lesotho and
transferred to South Africa by gravity (Matete and Hassan, 2006). The project is composed
of 5 dams and 200 km of tunnel and upon completion in 2020, it is expected to generate
182 MW of hydropower for Lesotho and transfer water at 70 m3/sec to Guateng Province,
South Africa (Keketso, 2003).
Several social and ecological implications have been observed since construction of
the LHWP began. Villages along the river where the Katse Dam is constructed have
experienced earth tremors, causing damage to traditional houses, etc. (Conely and Niekerk,
2000). The tremors have since forced water project authorities to repair housing
infrastructure in the area and construct more resilient infrastructure. Villagers have also
been forced to be moved to more secure locations (Braun, 2005; Hoover, undated; Keketso,
2003). Further, villagers in the area have not been connected to a water supply, requiring
them to walk long distances to fetch water. Moreover, the water transfer has reduced
access to fuel supply that is derived from trees and primarily used for cooking; this
is because infrastructure is constructed on or water is now overflowed onto this land
(Keketso, 2003). In fact, trees now tend to grow only in the riparian areas, and are scarcer
in the mountainous regions (Hoover, undated).
The LHWP also appropriated agricultural fields, river basins, and pastoral lands,
which comprised most of the arable land in the country. The land was either flooded or had
roads and buildings constructed on it (Braun, 2005). The remaining arable land is also
subject to poor drainage systems along the roads constructed for the LHWP. The runoff
from these culverts creates gullies that are continually widening, which, in some cases, has
“forced farmers to plough against the contour of the hillside, accelerating erosion even
further” (Hoover, undated, p.7). Materials left over from road construction has also
destroyed other fields as the large rocks are either too big to move or there are too many to
move making it impossible to plough around (Hoover, undated).
Further, although commonly managed resources total the majority of resources lost
(e.g. agricultural and non-cultivated lands and river basins), they have not been compen-
sated in the same way “privately owned” fields have been; yet even “privately owned”
lands have been poorly compensated as they are compensated based on the values out-
lined by development authorities and their policies (Braun, 2005).
At the micro-scale, in mountain districts located near two major dams in the project
area, low and high income households have already and are expected to experience an
income loss (Matete and Hassan, 2006). Yields are also declining due to over-exploitation
of the limited lands available (Hoover, undated). At the macro-scale, the manufacturing
sectors and the economies of both Lesotho and South Africa are estimated to experience
financial losses of R. 7.63 million and R. 8.66 million, respectively and R. 33.79 million
and R. 26.66 million, respectively (Matete and Hassan, 2006).
Economies of both countries are expected to suffer as a result of a loss of employment
due to the impact of lost ecological value. Since improper ecosystems functions affect
economic activity in both Lesotho and South Africa, the ecological impacts instream of the
LHWP “are likely to affect, not only those households directly linked to such projects, but
also the entire economies of and regions involved” (Matete and Hassan, 2006, p. 257).
Lesotho and South Africa is projected to lose R. 1.88 million and R. 1.91 million,
respectively. The unskilled labour force is projected to suffer the worst loss because this
includes small scale enterprises in the agricultural and horticultural sector (Matete and
Hassan, 2006). To date, Lesotho has received average annual revenues of US$ 18 million,
rather than the estimated US$ 55 million expected when the project was initially negotiated
due to reduced amounts of water available to transfer (Braun, 2005).
Since the LWHP was constructed in 1970s, three initial assumptions about the
benefits of the projects made by project authorities have been disproven based on an
environmental flow assessment conducted by the IUCN in 2003 (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Pre-project assumptions and post-project effects
Assumption Actual effect

1. Removal of 95 per cent of the flow The EFA showed there would be a
would have a relatively small impact significant hydrological, biophysical
on downstream rivers other than those and socio-economic impacts stretch-
close to the dams. ing to the Lesotho border.
2. People downstream of the proposed A complex relationship exists bet-

structures of the scheme have made ween the population at risk and the
limited use of the riparian and riverine river network.
resources.
3. Upstream communities who lost land The EFA demonstrates existing and
through the inundation by reservoirs potential future social and economic
would bear the brunt of the major affects to downstream communities
impacts of the dam. from the structures.
According to Hoover (undated) downstream impacts from the LHWP are already
deemed as “severe” which include the increase in pests, such as black flies. The black fly
is a cattle pest, as well as a poultry parasite, which affects the productivity of animal
husbandry. Further, severe effects arise from water flows in the reaches below Katse Dam;
the water in these reaches is considered too contaminated to drink, and local communities
have voiced concern that the water causes skin rashes after they pass through or swim in
the river. The low river flows have also resulted in higher algae levels in the river, which
creates conditions for disease-carrying snails that causes liver fluke disease. This disease
also affects livestock by decreasing their appetites and causing death. Further, since most
local people refuse to eat the meat of animals that has been affected by this disease, the
protein intake in the local diet is greatly reduced. Low river flows also reduce the
abundance of certain local wild vegetables that depend on higher river flows and cause
declines in fish stocks. Both vegetables and fish stocks are important nutrition and protein
sources for the local diet (Hoover, undated).
Aside from the possible adverse implications, some advantages of the LHWP have
also already been observed. On a macro-economic scale, the Government of Lesotho has
gained access to resources previously viewed to have no value or to be underutilized
(Braun, 2005). On a micro-economic scale, some villagers have been able to organize into
small agricultural groups and produce cash crops; as well as other income-generating
activities. Villagers working in small agricultural groups and as agriculturists have received
training in marketing and been able to work in local markets. The construction sector has
also experienced benefits, and tourism activities have flourished. The constructed road
network diversifies the variety of vegetables available in the market, creates employment
in the construction sector and opens access to tourists (Keketso, 2003). Overall, streamflows
downstream the LHWP dams provide substantial benefits of high importance to

sustaining riparian livelihoods (Matete and Hassan, 2006).
Further, since the construction of the LHWP, the regional political and economic
relationship between Lesotho and South Africa has strengthened. The collaboration
involves data sharing of streamflow and rainfall data and monitoring the health of basins
and the environment (Conely and Niekerk, 2000). Lesotho and South Africa also jointly
incurred the costs to research the project, thereby reducing costs and improving collabo-
rative efforts. In fact, the countries formed the Joint Permanent Technical Commission
(JPTC), which is comprised of delegates from both countries and jointly exercises moni-
toring and advisory powers and activities. The collaboration has been strengthened through
the institution of the 1986 LHWP Treaty. This treaty demonstrates the desire from both
countries for the project to provide mutual net benefits, to enter into a long term collabo-
rative relationship and to reduce conflicts (Towfique, 2002). Therefore, due to increase
openness in collaboration and support from legislation, previous mistrust between the
two countries has markedly decreased, thereby strengthening political, legal and institu-
tional support and infrastructure.
2.2.3 Europe
The Tagus-Segura Transfer is an inter-basin transfer in Spain that started in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. It involved drawing water from the Tajo basin in the Iberian System in
central Spain and transferring it to the Lorca valley in the Mediterranean Levant Zone in
southeastern Spain (WWF, 2003). The Lorca valley is semiarid with poor arable land
when unirrigated; yet, when irrigated, the soil becomes extremely fertile and thrives with
subtropical crops. That is, prior to the transfer, the crops in the valley relied on local wells,
small watercourses, and diversions from reservoirs in Valdeinfierno and Puenteshe
because average annual rainfall and potential evapotranspiration were 300 mm and
700 mm, respectively. Following implementation of the scheme, the average use of
irrigated surface and sub-surface water between 1980 and 2000 totaled 74 million m3
annually, of which 69 per cent is derived from groundwater wells and 13.5 per cent is from
the Tajo transfers (Ballestero, 2004).
Since its initial implementation, the water transfer has been attributed to have
significantly increased the intensity of crops in the region. Thus, by the end of the 1990s
the flows transferred from the Tajo basin provided relief to the area by mitigating surface
water scarcity. These water transfers coupled with excessive groundwater abstraction
from wells, enabled Lorca “… to maintain high but critical levels of irrigation” (Ballestero,
2004, p.80). However, the depletion of groundwater causes dramatic environmental
damage because extreme extractions are increasing dramatically. Ecologists and farmers
are highly concerned about the environmental implications of groundwater extractions, as
well as drastic declines in groundwater levels and saline water intrusion. Even the
parliament of Spain has declared a state of environmental destruction in the Lorca region
(Ballestero, 2004).
According to the WWF (2003), the Tagus-Segura water transfer is attributed to
causing adverse affects on the environment and socio-economic conditions of the
recipient and donor basins, as well as the benefiting region in four ways (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Environmental deteriorations caused by the Tagus-Segura water transfer project
Type of deterioration Description

1. Overexploitation There is a diversion of 6.5 million m3 from the
in the donor basin donor basin. Due to poor management upstream in
the Aranjuez village and a lack of respect to abide
by the legal minimum flow requirement (6 m3/sec),
not enough water is left at the source.
2. Sharpened water The water deficit in the recipient basin has grown
crisis in the recipient from 500 million m3 in the 1970s to approximately
regions 1,000 million m3 as a result of irrigation and tourism
needs.
3. Environmental Expansion of irrigation and water intensive urban

deterioration tourism has resulted in the destruction of protected
habitat areas and the sweetening and nitrate con-
tamination in the salty wetlands;
The transfer connects and mixes the Tagus river
water with the other four basin waters in the region;
it bring water to the Segura Basin, the Júcar Basin,
the Southern Basin and the Guadiana Basin (Tablas
de Damiel National Park), which blends the different
biophysical characteristics of these rivers and allows
alien species to transfer between them; and
The over-abstraction of water that is transferred
from the donor basin and, subsequently overexploited
by both basins has resulted in to the deterioration of
the river ecosystem and further contaminated water
in Toledo because the clean water in Tagus has absor-
bed the pollution from rivers coming from Madrid.
4. Creation of black The final destination of water is left uncontrolled

water markets based on the design of the distribution and transfer
network. The uncontrolled water results in water
that simply “disappears” (possibly to illegal tourist
activities, tourism resorts and golf courses); this
totaled approximately 113 million m3 between 1999
and 2001.
5. Increased socio- The transfer has not benefited traditional farmers

economic imbalances as it has diverted the most benefits to bigger agri-
in the regions business and construction enterprises; and
Not only are high levels of illegal labour reported
in southeastern Spain, but there is a high level of
exploitation of immigrants and illegal immigrants.
2.2.4 Central Asia
Perhaps the worst example of large scale IBT project implementation occurred in Aral sea,
which have culminated into the destruction of a very large aquatic ecosystem into a desert
(Calder and Lee, 1995; World Bank, 1998; Stone, 1999; UNEP, 2006). The Aral Sea Project
began in the 1920s, when Soviet planners decided that irrigating the vast plains of central
Asia could provide enough arable land to grow all the cotton needed by the new
super-state. To meet agricultural water needs, water from the nearby Amu Darya and
Syr Darya Rivers (tributaries of the Aral Sea) were diverted. The policy worked and the
project reaped dividends in its first thirty years of existence thereby meeting its main
purpose – to benefit agriculture. As a result, the Soviet Union soon joined China and the
United States as the world’s leading cotton exporters. Building on its success, the policy
was expanded in the early 1960s. However, it was about this time when some of the
ecological damage was first observed. Without water coming in from its feeder rivers, the
Aral Sea soon began to shrink (Stone, 1999).
Currently, the Aral Sea has lost over 80 per cent of its volume, exposing 3.6 million
hectares of seabed. Evaporation and agricultural runoff have left much of the Aral saltier
than the ocean; in turn fish catch had declined by over 75 per cent (Stone, 1999; World
Bank, 1998). Soil erosion has intensified to reduce agricultural productivity. The irrigation
process, that allowed farmers unlimited water for little to no charge, “… has raised the
water table, blocking drainage and clogging the fields with as much as 700 tons of salt
per hectare” (Stone, 1999). The rising water table has also tainted drinking water sup-
plies. Approximately 15 per cent of surface water supplies in the Aral Sea Basin are
polluted, severely affecting the human health and as well as ecological functions of many
reservoirs (UNEP, 2006). Rampant anemia and high infant mortality rates are abound. The
receding Aral Sea leaves behind chemical pesticides and natural salts which are blown
into noxious dust storms, seriously affecting the health of the local people. Pollution puts
further pressure on communities already stressed by water shortages and the loss of large
areas of valuable ecosystems (UNEP, 2006). Epidemiologist believed that proliferation
of such diseases might be due to increase of toxic dust storms that have increased from
one every five years in the 1950s, to about five per year now.
2.2.5 East Asia
The conceptual advancement of IBT in China took place as early as 1956 when the Yellow
River Commission (YRC) proposed construction of Danjiangkou reservoir. This proposal
had subsequently been culminated into plans of IBT regarding the east, middle and west
routes. In 1973, the diversion structure of the Danjiangkou reservoir was completed under
the aegis of the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR). The planning of the middle route
had been propelled by the occurrence of the severe droughts from 1978 to 1980. In 1994,
a feasibility study of the proposed large scale IBT along the middle route was completed;
and by 1995, the EIA report was also prepared. China provided a stamp of approval for the
project in 1996 to 1997. Meanwhile, the Chinese society started to accept structural changes
and market based economic activities, which eventually gave impetus for the research
community within China to seek evidence from past experiences and to challenge such
development paradigms on technological, geo-environmental, and economic grounds.
Yet, China had its first experience with the IBT of water in 1961, which allowed diver-
sion of the Yangtze water to Huaihe River at a rate of 470 m3/sec over a length of about 400 km.
Since 1964, the city of Hong Kong has had transferred water from the Dongjiang river
basin, with an annual capacity of a mere 0.62 km3. Following the first few encouraging
experiments of micro-scale IBT and observing them for about two decades, China
embarked on a new era of micro-level IBT projects in the 1980s. These five new projects
provide water in a rapidly changing urban mosaic. Early on, the new micro-scale IBT
projects showed early symptoms of causing adverse environmental impacts.
On a per capita basis, the water endowment of China is rather poor, accounting for
only a quarter with respect to annual global average (World Bank, 2002). According to
official statistics, the long term averaged total renewable water resource of China is
estimated at 2,812 km3 per year (MWREP, 1987), which accounts for only 6.6 per cent of
the mean value of renewable global water resources, estimated at 42,750 km3 per year
(Shiklomanov, 2000). However, spatial distribution of available resources is acute, lead-
ing to inter-regional disparities within the country. According to Qian and Zhang (2001),
the Northern Part of China (NPC) refers to an area including the Haihe, Huaihe, Huanghe
(Yellow River) basins and the northern part of the inland river basin, which is a water scarce
region of the country. The per capita annual renewable water resources in this area is only
700 m3, equating to just one third of that in the Changjiang (Yangtze River) basin, while the
population and total area of cropland in the NPC account for 37 and 45 per cent of the
national total, respectively. However, serious fluctuations in hydrological conditions, such
as sustained drought, also prevail in the NPC, which eventually gave the economic
impetus for China to contemplate a mega IBT project to divert water from water rich
southern rivers to water scarce northern rivers. This has initiated the birth of the
Mega-Project entitled the “Three Gorges Dam” project (Box 2.2), which has raised both
hope and concerns not only in China, but also globally.
Box 2.2 China’s Three Gorges Dam
The Three Gorges Dam (TGD) is being built on the China’s Yangtze River is the
world’s largest hydro-electric project in the world with eventual capacity of
22,500 MW. The size of the TGD is five times that of the Hoover Dam of the USA.
Scientists are favoring as well as opposing the TGD. Wu et al. (2003) argued that
construction of the dam presents a unique grand-scale natural experiment that
would create an opportunity for ecologists to address a range of critical
questions concerning the theory and practice of biodiversity conservation. Xie
and Shen (2004) opined that the TGD would also pose great challenges to the
ecosystem of its reservoir area. The project would affect livelihoods of at least
20 million in the areas upstream of the dam and another 300 million living in the
downstream. Resettlement of population displaced by the reservoir, especially
farmers, could emerge as presents a formidable obstacle (Jackson and Sleigh,
2000). Within a few years of commissioning, erosion and reservoir siltation may
impede navigation and in the longer term will reduce storage volume (Fearnside,
1988).
The Middle Route (MR) seems to be the centerpiece of environmental, as well as

ecological concerns. As the plan goes, a substantial amount of water will be diverted from
the Hanjiang River through the MR. A plethora of adverse effects might be expected from
such an intervention, as mentioned by Wang and Ma (1999), which includes the following:
Soil salinization as a result of the rise of groundwater table due to channel

leakage;
The settlement of ground surface in the coal mining area, as the project (middle
route) is likely to pass major coal mining area;
Liquefaction of sand and consequent environmental effects;
Drainage through the left bank of the canal;
Geological problem such as the slope instability of swelling clay and rock; and
Frozen heave problems in the dykes due to cold weather in the north.
Wang and Ma (1999) argued that, salinization and swampiness problems would
develop in a large area along the MR due to the fact that groundwater tables would rise
consequently upon its over-recharge by channel seepage. It is apprehended that, due to
the risks associated with earth-filling and potential leakage through weak points, some
sections might develop swamped land in their neighborhood or wetting belts along the
lower areas located alongside the channel (Wang and Ma, 1999).
In addition to these adverse environmental impacts, other issues have also been
flagged by various authors. For example, the Environmental Impacts Study of the
MR project suggested that, the large scale IBT from the Hanjiang River would cause a
reduction of the runoff in the downstream section of the River, which in turn would worsen
the prevailing eutrophication problem in the downstream reaches (Yin et al., 2001). It is
apprehended that stream eutrophication might result in excessive algal mats and oxygen
depletion, especially at times of decreased flow regimes (i.e., below 500 m3/sec), sluggish
flow velocity (below 0.8 m/sec) and higher temperature (10.5~12.8°C).
Yang et al. (2001) reported that the long term progradation rates of the tidal flats at the
Yangtze River mouth would be greatly slowed down with sharp decline in riverine sedi-
ment caused by the implementation of the Three Gorges project and the South-to-North
water transfer coinciding with the rapid relative sea-level rise. Wu and Wang (2002)
found that the time and distance of salt-water encroachment up the Yangtze River mouth
during the months of October through to December would be slightly higher as a conse-
quence of the operation of the two projects.
Not only would the MR project have environmental implications, the East Route (ER)
Plan of the South-to-North IBT might also result in serious adverse impacts. The issues of
aggravated water pollution, environmental implications of navigation channels and
detention lakes, secondary salinization, etc. have all been discussed (Shao et al., 2003).
Considering the trends of acute schistosomiasis infection observed by Li et al. (2000) and
expansion of snail habitat (as observed by Huang et al., 2000), it is anticipated that the IBT
through the ER might result in aggravation of health disorders, especially in the receiving
basin.
2.2.6 Latin America
The São Francisco River Basin Project is under investigation in the São Francisco River
Basin and its coastal zone in Brasilia, Brasil. The project objective is to make water
available for the neediest region of the country through the interlinking of basins. The
project starts from the São Francisco River and creates a network of canals that distributes
water for multiple uses. The aim is to contribute to the sustainable development of the
semiarid region (Domingues et al., 2003) by meeting rural water needs for human and
agricultural consumption, to promote urban and industrial development by sustaining
adequate water supplies and developing irrigated agriculture by producing high value
crops. As of 1998, the project was designed to transfer water at 64 m3/sec, including
48 m3/sec from the north and 16 m3/sec from the east axes. The conveyance systems extend
722 km, the canals extend 591 km and the pipelines extend 20 km. The twelve tunnels
constructed for the system total 22 km and there are 26 expected reservoirs to be inte-
grated into the system (Kemper et al., 2002).
The main purpose to transfer the water is for the provision of water for drinking and
irrigation. The project aims to improve water management practices in the region by
innovatively pricing the usage of water more accurately and accountably. Water allocation
will depend upon the willingness to pay for the transfer of water by the states and by
private investors for agricultural production. The full cost recovery principle will be
utilized and water will only be transferred if the total share of the cost is paid. For drinking
water regulation a tariff informed by the rate of water usage will be developed; while for
irrigation, the volume of water delivered will depend on how demand management
practices and water-saving technologies are implemented by the farmers. The rationale to
utilize this principle is to discourage the waste of water (Tortajada, 2006).
The main challenges and concerns for the system thus far include the conflicts that
may arise from the ten Brazilian states that are affected by the project, the consequences of
poorly defined water right and, the need to establish methods for political negotiation.
These concerns have arisen as a result of reports that discussions with government and
society have already been highly polarized. The economic and financial feasibility, as well
as the trade-offs of the project need to be better analyzed because the current proposal
focuses on increasing supply, while development of plans for demand management has
been poor. Other problems that may compound future possible social and biophysical
problems in the future are poorly drawn operation and maintenance plans, little support
from environmental organizations and NGOs for completed EIAs and so far, little partici-
pation from local affected communities that outline appropriate project and community
needs (Kemper et al., 2002).
Another interlinking water scheme that originates in Brazil is a project comprised of
two hydroelectric dams including in the Madeira River, a tributary feeding through the
Amazon; as well as, two dams enabling transport passage to upstream. This infrastructure
is to be constructed throughout Brazil, Bolivia and Peru hub and is known as the Initiative
for the Integration of South American Infrastructure (IIRSA). A main component of IIRSA
is to interconnect South America’s major river systems and creates a large inland canal that
links the Caribbean to the South Atlantic, through the Orinoco, Amazonas, Madeira,
Paraguay, and Paraná Rivers. Yet, similarly to the São Francisco River Basin Project to
transfer water, the interlinking water scheme through the Amazon is still undergoing
environmental and social impact analysis so as to understand the depth of its benefits and
consequences (IRN, undated).
2.2.7 South Asia
Some inter-basin water transfer projects have been implemented in India in the 19th and
20th century with a general aim to facilitate drought proofing, provide drinking water,
improve the biophysical environment, promote afforestation, encourage employment,
progress rehabilitation and development, project animal wealth and increase agricultural
production. Salient features of these projects are shown in Table 2.3. Among these projects,
Indira Gandhi Nahar (great canal) Pariyojana (IGNP) is both the largest IBT implemented in
Rajasthan State and actually one of the largest IBT projects in the world.
Table 2.3 Inter-basin water transfer projects in India
Project Features
1. Periyar Commissioned in 1895;
Transfers water from Periya basin to Vaigai basin,
South India; and
Comprised of a 1,740 m long tunnel with a dischar-
ging capacity of 40.75 m3/sec.
2. Parambikulam Aliyar Built during 1951–1961;

Transfers water from Chelakudi basin to Bharata-
puzha and Cauvery basins; and
Delivers water to drought prone areas in Coimbatore
district of Tamil Nadu and the Chittur area of
Kerala states.
3. Kurnool Cudappah A private company started this scheme in 1863; and

Canal Transfers 85 m3/sec water from Krishna basin to
Pennar basin though a 8.23 m high anicut and a
304 km long canal.
4. Telugu Ganga Delivers water to the city of Chennai (formerly

Madras); and
A inter-state cooperative project involving Maha-
rashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
5. Ravi-Beas-Sutlej At 649 km long, IGNP is one of the world’s biggest

Indira Gandhi Nahar canal projects;
Pariyojana (IGNP) Begins at the Sutlej River at Harike Barrage and
runs 204 km as a feeder canal before it enters
Rajasthan. Within Rajasthan, the canal is 445 km
long; and
IGNP covers seven districts of Rajasthan: Barmer,
Bikaner, Churu, Hanumangarh, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur,
and Sriganganagar.
The state of Rajasthan is divided into two geographical regions: the Aravali Range
hill system of northern India which traverses the state from northwest to southeast for
560 kilometers, acting as a sharp divide; the region west of Aravali is the extension of the
Thar Desert where the IGNP is implemented. This mostly arid and partly semiarid region of
the state (100 to 1020 mm annual rainfall) is sparsely populated (165 per sq. km); but the
density of livestock is very high (159 per sq. km), comprising 21 per cent of India’s total
livestock population. The crop yields are low and show sharp year-to-year variation. From
the southeast to the northwest in this region, the agro-climatic conditions become
progressively harsher. The IGNP was conceived to: halt the process of desertification;
develop agriculture in the command area; create human settlements in the sparsely
populated area; and provide drinking and industrial-use water to the inhabitants of the
project area and adjoining regions.
The IGNP is claimed to have generated tremendous socio-economic benefits and
miraculously changed the living standard and socio-economic conditions of the people in
the area. IGNP has eliminated drought conditions, provided power benefits, transformed
desert waste land into an agriculturally productive area by bringing irrigation and
vegetation to about two million hectare area, crop production has increased manifolds
and livestock survival has improved (NWDA, 2007). Since the introduction of canal
irrigation in 1958 been brought under irrigated farming with 179 per cent irrigation
intensity. The rainfed pearl millet, guar based cropping system has switched over to
highly profitable cotton wheat system (Ram and Chauhan, 2002). This has contributed to
increased agricultural production and benefit is estimated at R. 17,500 million (US$ 388
million) annually (NWDA, 2007).
The NWDA has not listed any adverse implications of the project. Yet, IGNP has
created a host of environmental problems including waterlogging, rising groundwater
table, changed water retention properties of the soil, emergence of malaria and changes
in biodiversity (Dwivedi and Sreenivas, 2002; Ram and Chauhan, 2002; Tyagi, 2004;
UNESCO, 2006; CGWB, 2007).
The Central Groundwater Board (CGWB) of India has estimated waterlogged area
at 51,300 hectares or 3 per cent of the command area of the project but has been projected
that 24 per cent of the project area is likely to be waterlogged if the rise of water level is
allowed at the present rate of one meter per year. In the severely waterlogged areas (for
example, Hanumangarh circle) no crops could be grown. In some waterlogged areas only
one crop paddy could be grown (CGWB, 2007). By analyzing satellite remote sensing
imageries, Dwivedi and Sreenivas (2002) found that the paleo-channel (old river course)
which supported very good crops in 1975 gradually became waterlogged in the next two
decades and thereby resulted in the extinction of croplands. As a result, a number of
village settlements are deserted and people have to move to nearby safer sites. In addi-
tion, the roads and canals are also abandoned. Levelling of sand dunes and total clear-
ance of shrubs and grasses from agricultural lands has enhanced wind erosion/deposition
hazard (Ram and Chauhan, 2002).
Tyagi (2004) has reported the emergence of malaria with repeated epidemics in the
Thar Desert area. He concluded that nearly all malaria epidemics in the Thar Desert have
come about with the progression of canal-irrigation work, particularly the massive IGNP.
Halfway through the project development, the number of locally transmitted malaria cases
has risen from a few thousand to 300,000 a year. The associated mosquito species
succession from Anopheles stephensi to A. culicifacies has resulted in intensified
transmission of infection, which has shifted from seasonal to perennial. Between 1980 and
1995, the proportion of Rajasthani malaria cases registered in the desert districts grew from
14.1 per cent to 53.3 per cent, and the share of Plasmodium falciparum cases (the most
virulent malaria parasite species) rose from 11.6 per cent to 62.5 per cent. Several factors
such as the change in crop pattern, retention of high surface moisture, and excessive
canalisation rife with mismanagement of irrigation water have attracted several anophelines,
including Anopheles culicifacies, which were earlier unknown in the desert (Tyagi, 2004).
Due to changed environment, important natural plant species have also vanished
(Ram and Chauhan, 2002; Prakash, 2001). Availability of water through the canal facilitated
introduction of invasive plant, insects and animal species and substantially changed the
desert landscape. Water hyacinth (E. crassipes) which never occurred in the region has
intensively encroached surface of the canal. Waterlogged areas are full of tall grasses such
as Aurndo, Typha, Phragmitis and others. High nutrient and availability of moisture
facilitated introduction of a large number of weeds (Saxena, 1991). It is estimated that about
40 weed species have invaded the desert through various means of transportation such as
soil and water, crop seed impurities, migration of birds and animals. Consolidation
of soil has posed imminent danger to the reptiles which inhabit extremely loose soil
(Prakash, 2001).
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Overall, ecological losses as a result of inter-basin water transfer projects can have
significant negative impacts on the riparians and to some extent, the general macro and
micro economies of the countries involved. It is important to quantify the instream
impacts of IBT, which should be included in IBT environmental impact assessments prior
to project implementation so as to account for potential losses and adverse implications
accurately. From this understanding there is a need to determine mitigation measures and
manners in which to compensate for potential losses so as to ensure that a reliable
instream flow benefits riparians. Mitigation and compensation measures for adverse
affects which arise from IBT may deter unintended negative ecological impacts to occur
and ensure long term sustainability of such projects (Matete and Hassan, 2006). The
involvement of multiple stakeholders within the communities that currently have IBT
projects, as well as those which have projects proposed must continuously be consulted.
The rationale for continuously re-evaluating the projects is because stakeholders can take
into account changing environments and conditions into IBT decision making that will
prove optimal for all stakeholders and the projects themselves.
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3
The Vital Links
SURESH PRABHU
Gange cha! Yamune chiava! Godavari! Sarasvati! Narmade! Sindhu! Kaveri! Jale asmin
sannidhim kuru!
In this water, I invoke the presence of holy waters from the rivers Ganga, Yamuna,
Godavari, Sarasvati, Narmada, Sindhu and Cauvery!
—Traditional Sanskrit Hymn
3.1 INTRODUCTION
India has always attributed divinity to her rivers. The sacred rivers like the Sarasvati, the
Ganga, the Cauvery, and the Narmada have knit national mythology and traditions for
centuries. The ancient Rig Veda1 mentions the mighty river Sarasvati, where in the story of
Indra’s slaying of the water-demon Vrtra, the river was dammed and subsequently
released. Even today pilgrims undertake the arduous trek to Gaumukh, the origin of the
Ganga/Bhagirathi, even though the glacier that gives rise to the river has receded eighteen
kilometers away from the Ganga temple that was built a millennia ago at the then source,
Gangotri in the Himalayas. Livelihoods, economy, religion and culture of Indians are
intertwined with the rivers from the time immemorial.
India is home to over one billion people already and is likely to earn the dubious
distinction of becoming the most populous country in the world by the year 2050,
according to some estimates (UN, 2006). There are various proponents of the population
growth theory. Some say people are a resource and the greater the number of people, the
greater the wealth, because the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increases. But such
proponents seldom consider the consequence that a population explosion will have on
supply of natural resources of a country. More people mean a larger demand on land, both
for housing and attendant facilities such as schools, health centers, etc. But even more
1
The RigVeda is a collection of over 1,000 hymns, which contain the mythology of the Hindu gods. It
is considered to be one of the foundations of the Hindu religion and was composed roughly between
1,700 to 1,100 BCE (the early Vedic period) in the Punjab (Sapta Sindhu) region of the Indian
subcontinent.
36 THE VITAL LINKS
importantly, the increase will likely cause a decrease in the per capita availability of
water, as the pressure on land means the possibility of encroachment of water-bodies. The
increased population also demands more agricultural production to feed more mouths
than before, which in turn calls for more water usage for agriculture. More people demand
more jobs calling for increased economic activity which again translates into more demand
for water. The Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) is proposed as one of the methods to meet
increasing demand by making water available to the needy population.
The idea of ILR is not new and could be as old as the idea of Indian nationhood itself.
Though it was called by different names, ILR was proposed by many people at different
times and its present consideration has made it a burning national and regional
eco-environmental debate. Many politicians, economists and literary figures referred to
this idea before, as well as, after India’s independence in 1947. However, the idea of ILR
was first put forth logically and in some detail by Dr K.L. Rao, an eminent engineer and
Minister of Water and Energy who served in both Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter
Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s Cabinets. Dr Rao’s plan was essentially to transfer water from the
perennial northern rivers to the seasonal and dry southern ones. Thus, it was popularly
known as the Ganga (northern Himalayan flowing River)–Cauvery (southern Indian River
in the Deccan plateau) Plan. Yet, the Ganga–Cauvery Plan envisaged to transfer of water
from one basin to another in a way that guzzled energy and would have probably
consumed more electricity than it would have generated.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the chronology of work conducted on the
feasibility of interlinking rivers in India as proposed by the National Water Development
Agency (NWDA).2 This agency prepared pre-feasibility studies on various water
linkages proposed in the National Perspective Plan (NPP) in 1982 during the last term in
office of Mrs. Gandhi. Under the NWDA, a Task Force of professionals was assembled
that aimed to define holistic approaches for ILR and complete a comprehensive study that
presented the overall impact of ILR projects. I was appointed Chairman of this Task Force
in 2002 by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and this chapter details
the accounts of the work of the Task Force, particularly my personal experiences within it.
3.2 INDIA: LOOKING AT 2050
India’s demand for water is bound to increase to formidable proportions by 2050 when
the population of India is expected to stabilize at around 1,640 million. As a result, gross per
capita water availability will decline from ~1,820 m3/yr in 2001 to as low as ~1,140 m3/yr
in 2050. Total water requirement of the country for various activities by 2050 has been
estimated to be 1,450 km3/yr. This is significantly higher than the current estimate of
utilizable water resource potential (1,122 km3/yr) that could be developed through
conventional strategies. Therefore, the present availability of water, ~500 km3/yr, needs to
be almost tripled to meet estimates for 2050 (Gupta and Deshpande, 2004). India’s neighbor
China is learning at great cost that despite phenomenal and unprecedented economic
success, the water crisis is likely to stall many of its ambitious schemes. In China, the
criticality ratio, an indicator of scarcity (the ratio of water withdrawal to total renewable
water), increases from 0.26 in 1995 to 0.33 in 2025 (IFPRI, 2002). Ignoring this scarcity
is at India’s own peril and, therefore, the country must plan strategies that account water as
2
The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1982 as a Society under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 to carry out the detailed studies and detailed surveys and
investigations and to prepare feasibility reports of the links under the National Perspective Plan.
SURESH PRABHU 37
precious resource. Overall, India’s economic as well as human development index (HDI)3
all depend upon the country’s ability to address this most burning problem, water.
The Indian water problem seemed to be an impossible conundrum. Due to the spatial
and temporal distribution of monsoon precipitation, the eastern, northeastern and some
northern parts of India faces devastating floods during the monsoon; while other parts of
the country reels under droughts. The land-locked north and particularly the northeast
(after the partition of India in 1947), require waterways (which are both environment friendly
and cost effective) to supplement road and rail transport. The country’s energy demand
has been spiraling. By 2020, India’s demand for commercial energy is expected to increase
by more than 2.5 times as a result of population and high economic growth, urbanization,
industrial production and transport demand (IEA, 2000). India also requires eco-friendly,
green energy that is generated from locally available resources (hydro, wind and solar
sources) unlike imported gas or oil. India also desperately needs expansion of irrigation to
rainfed agricultural lands (currently 68 per cent of the total net sown area) to reduce
dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon. The country has a per capita storage of
meager 200 m3/person water, unlike the US who possesses 5,000 m3/person or China who
provides 2,000 m3/person. To monsoon-proof India’s water requirement, the need for more
storage has to be urgently addressed.
Moreover, water is a very contentious political issue throughout India. It has
explosive political ramifications which often snowball into violence and riots. The Cauvery
water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is one such example. In this instance,
logical and reasonable management of water as a common resource became impossible
due to regionalism, sentimentality and emotions taking over the issue on hand. But,
questions over the equitable sharing of water commonly arise in India, making water
issues very controversial. Thus, the decision to decide on a technically feasible and
politically benign ILR project could prove difficult.
3.3 PREVIOUS INTERLINKING PROPOSALS
The main component of Dr Rao’s Proposal (1972) was a 2,640 kilometers (km) long link
canal to connect the Ganga and the Cauvery rivers and also involved large scale pumping
over a head of 550 m. The power requirement for lifting the water was huge, estimated to
be 5,000 to 7,000 MW, while the additional irrigated area was a mere 4 million hectares
(Mha). The scheme also did not have any flood control benefit. Dr Rao had estimated this
proposal to cost about R. 12,5000 million (R. 1,500,000 million at 2002 prices). The
Central Water Commission (CWC), which examined the proposal, found it to be grossly
underestimated and economically prohibitive (Rao, 1975; Iyer, 2002).
A few years later, Captain Dastur, an Airline Pilot proposed an alternative way to
accomplish the same objective through another scheme, which was later known as the
Garland Scheme (the sketch, when superimposed on India’s map, looked to the poetic eye
like a garland around India’s neck). There were many skeptics about this scheme, but few
were ready to examine this idea. Captain Dastur’s Proposal (1977) envisaged the con-
struction of two canals – the first was a 4,200 km long Himalayan Canal at the foot of
Himalayan slopes running from the Ravi in the west to the Brahmaputra and beyond in the
east; and the second was a 9,300 km Garland Canal covering the central and southern parts
3
The HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a
country in three basic dimensions of human development: along and healthy life, knowledge (adult
literacy) and a decent standard of living.
38 THE VITAL LINKS
of India, with both the canals integrated with numerous lakes and interconnected with
pipelines at two points, Delhi and Patna. The cost was estimated by Captain Dastur to be
R. 240,950 million. Two committees comprised of experts was assembled, including senior
engineers from the Central Water Commission (CWC), officials from state governments,
professors from the IIT (Indian Institute of Technology), Delhi and Roorkee University
(presently IIT, Roorkee) and scientists from the Geological Survey of India and Indian
Meteorological Department. These experts examined the proposal and found it to be
technically infeasible (NWDA, 2007). Therefore the idea was abandoned.
3.4 THE NEW INITIATIVE
The major role of the NWDA was to prepare pre-feasibility studies on various water
linkages proposed in the NPP. As per the provisions (in articles 246 and 262) of the
Constitution of India, water remains a subject administered by the various states and only
if the rivers are interstate is the central government able to play a role.
The Central Government eventually asked the NWDA to involve all the states
concerned and work out a mutually acceptable ILR scheme. The NWDA worked for almost
20 years to prepare the pre-feasibility reports. After, a writ Petition No. 724/1994 entitled
“and Quiet Flows the Maily Yamuna”, was filed in the Supreme Court in September 2002 by
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate (Amicus Curiae) quoting the speech of Honorable
President of India (dated 14th August 2002). The petition referenced the need for
networking the Indian rivers and asked for appropriate directions from the Court. On
October 31, 2002, Supreme Court directed to treat this issue as an independent Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) Writ Petition (Civil) No. 512 of 2002 with cause title: “Network-
ing of Rivers” and directed the central government and individual states to respond
(NWDA, 2007). The NDA Government responded by appointing a Task Force to examine
the issue of ILR in depth.
Since the NWDA had already examined the technical aspects of the concept; the
objective of the Task Force was to pursue a holistic approach and complete a comprehen-
sive study that presented the overall impact of ILR components. With this objective,
some dynamic people of eminence were co-opted as the members of the Task Force. I was
appointed Chairman of this Task Force by the NDA government. With the consent of the
then Prime Minister of India, I co-opted, along with various other professional members
that crossed all political lines. These professionals had expertise in ecology, environ-
ment, technology, administration, banking, finance, water issues, law, journalism and
public policy. A group of professional resource persons were also involved so as to guide
the Task Force on several key political and environmental issues. This group of profes-
sionals included former Ambassadors, NGOs, environmentalists, scientists, technologists,
sociologists, social activists, foresters, wild life experts, etc. The Task Force expected to
compose a detailed analysis of the work to be carried out by the NWDA. They were also
very keen to encourage and consider constructive criticism and understood that deci-
sions should be based on transparent scientific studies.
As mentioned earlier, we were dealing with the often revised concept of ILR, which
had been debated in India for decades. The final decision to implement the ILR was largely
based on a cost-benefit analysis. The calculated cost could not be just financial, but would
also include ecological and social costs of the project. The benefits had already been
projected by the NWDA and the Task Force wanted to quantify and evaluate these in a
comprehensive manner. Thus, even if the study was to be rejected, a rejection by the
central government needed to be based on a reflection of a detailed analysis. I traveled
SURESH PRABHU 39
through the length and breadth of India to assess the views of common people so that the
whole process and product did not become exclusively an academic exercise.
3.5 PROJECTED BENEFITS ASSESSED BY THE NWDA
To understand the projected benefits assessed by the NWDA, a review of the hydrometeo-
rological characteristics of India and its affects on human and natural systems is required.
The summer monsoon accounts for more than 75 to 80 per cent of the annual precipita-
tion that India receives (Nandargi et al., 2007). Precipitation in the country is not
uniformly distributed and there are large inter-seasonal, seasonal and yearly variations of
precipitation in both space and time. Large parts of Haryana, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu not only have deficits in
rainfall but these States are also subject to large variations in rainfall, which results in
floods and frequent droughts.
Excess rainfall during the monsoon season in some parts of the country often causes
floods and natural disasters. Nandargi (2007) identified the northeast and northern areas
as regions in India which experience floods on widespread scale. The northeast region
comprises the Brahmaputra basin and its tributaries and the north Indian region comprises
the Ganga basin and its tributaries. These two rivers together generate about 60 per cent of
total river flows of India. Flood damages, which were R. 645 million in the decade of
(1953 to 1963), have increase to R. 28,810 million between 1990 and 2000. These floods
substantially affected infrastructure and livelihoods in the States of Assam, Bihar, West
Bengal and Uttar Pradesh and caused unquantifiable human sufferings (Mohapatra and
Singh, 2003). On average, floods have affected the social and economic stability of about
33 million people between 1953 to 2000 (Mohapatra and Singh, 2003).
As much as 85 per cent of drought prone areas in India fall in these States. The water
availability even for drinking purposes becomes critical, particularly in the summer months
as rivers dry up and groundwater levels recede. Regional variations in rainfall lead to
situations when some parts of the country do not have enough water even for raising a
single crop. Droughts cause immense hardship to the population and enormous economic
loss. For example, in 2002, a drought in Rajasthan caused about one billion dollars in
economic loss (Table 3.1) (Rathore, 2005).
Irrigation using river water and groundwater has been the prime source of water to
raise food grain production in India. The production of food grains increased from
89.36 million tons in 1964 to 1965 to approximately 211.32 million tons in 2001 to 2002. This
has lead India to be self sufficient in food production (GoI, 2002); and expansion of
irrigation has played a major role in increased stability in food production. The area under
irrigation has increased from 22 to 95 Mha during this period. Since the population of India
is expected to increase to 1,400 to 1,900 million in the year 2050 (Figure 3.1) (UN, 2006),
about 450 million tons of food grains will be required to feed the country (Kumar, 1998).
To meet this requirement, it would be necessary to increase irrigation potential to 160 Mha
for all crops by 2050. The maximum irrigation potential of India if water is accessed
through conventional sources, has been assessed to be about 140 Mha (Dehadrai, 2003).
To attain a maximum potential of 160 Mha, other strategies need to be devised.
40
Table 3.1 Impact of drought in Rajasthan
Item 1988 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

THE VITAL LINKS
Village affected 36, 252 20,069 23,406 30,583 7,964 40,490

Population affected (million) 31.737 21.507 26.179 33.041 6.97 44.80
Cattle affected (million) 37.23 29.578 34.56 39.969 6.973 45.20
Crop damage area (million ha) 7.436 6.496 7.818 8.947 2.653 11.70
Value (million US$) 5.391 496.4 740.6 763.4 272.2 959.5
Rainfall deficiency − 45% − 3% −16% −29% − 5% − 64%
Hydropower generation
Deficiency (million Kwh) – – – – – 1,280.5
Drinking water supply cost (million US$)
Loss of land revenue (million US$) – – – – – 110.4
Loss in agriculture employment
93.4
(estimated) (million man-days)
3.876 3.386 4.075 4.663 1.383 6.098
Source: Government of Rajasthan, relief department, Jaipur. Adapted from; Rathore, 2005.
SURESH PRABHU 41
2.5
Low Variant
2 Medium Variant
Population (billion)
High Variant
1.5
0.5
0
1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
Year
Fig. 3.1 Future population of India projected by the UN (Source: UN, 2006).
One of the most effective ways to augment the irrigation potential so as to mitigate
floods and droughts and reduce regional imbalances in water availability through
Inter-Basin Water Transfer (IBWT). An IBWT transfers water from surplus rivers to deficit
areas. The Brahmaputra and Ganga, particularly their northern tributaries, as well as
Mahanadi, Godavari and west flowing Rivers originating from the Western Ghats are
found to be in surplus of water resources. If storage reservoirs are built on these rivers and
connected to other parts of the country, regional imbalances could be reduced signifi-
cantly. Many benefits by way of additional irrigation, domestic and industrial water
supply, hydropower generation, navigational facilities could also accrue. Overall, based
on the problems identified above, the NWDA argued for a general need in water resources
and justified the necessity of ILR; moreover, it claimed more tangible benefits.
The National Perspective Plan (NPP) would benefit by adding 25 Mha of irrigated
lands from surface waters and 10 Mha through increased groundwater use. In addition, the
Plan would provide 34,000 MW of hydropower. The likely incidental benefits to realize
irrigation potential include: the mitigation of droughts, flood control, domestic and
industrial water supply, navigational facilities, employment generation, fisheries, salinity
control, pollution control, recreation facilities, infrastructural development and socio-
economic development.
3.6 NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE PLAN: THE HIMALAYAN RIVERS

DEVELOPMENT AND PENINSULAR RIVERS DEVELOPMENT
The National Perspective Plan comprises two components viz. Himalayan Rivers
Development and Peninsular Rivers Development.
3.6.1 Himalayan Rivers Development
The Himalayan Rivers Development Component (Figure 3.2) envisages the construction
of storage reservoirs on the principal tributaries of Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers in India,
42 THE VITAL LINKS
Nepal and Bhutan. It also supports the interlinking of river systems to transfer surplus
flows of the eastern tributaries of the river Ganga to the west, apart from linking of the main
Brahmaputra and its tributaries with Ganga and linking Ganga with the river Mahanadi.
The rivers of the Himalayan proposed for water linkages include:
Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Ganga Link
Jogighopa-Tista-Farakka Link
Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha Link
Subernarekha-Mahanadi Link
Farakka-Sunderbans Link
Gandak-Ganga Link
Ghaghara-Yamuna Link
Sarda-Yamuna Link
Yamuna-Rajasthan Link
Rajasthan-Sabarmati Link
Chunar-SoneBarrage Link
Sone Dam-Southern Tributaries of Ganga Link
Kosi-Ghaghara Link
Kosi-Mechi Link.
GHAGRA
MANAS
DA
5
SAR
TISTA
GANDAK
6
SANKOSH
1
4
MECHI
YA
MU
KOSI
GA A
N
NG 3 2 UTR 11
A
A L A GHA
AHMAP
NI AMB GO GRA
GAN 10 BR
LU CH MT
I GA
AK
A
BAR
TW
MATI
K A LIS INDH
9
NE
BE
SO
KE
7 8 13
BAR
12
PA R
SU DA
SA
A 14 MO
MA D BE
RN DAR
B AT
NAR MA H A AR
NA EK
I
TAPI D HA
I

Fig. 3.2 The Himalayan Rivers Development Component (NWDA, 2007).

SURESH PRABHU 43
Out of the above 14 links, feasibility studies of only 2 links (Indian portion) are
complete. The completed feasibility studies include:
Ghaghara-Yamuna Link
Sarda-Yamuna Link.
3.6.2 Peninsular Rivers Development
Peninsular Rivers Development Component (Figure 3.3) is divided into four major
parts viz.
a. Interlinking of Mahanadi-Godavari-Krishna-Cauvery rivers and building

storages at potential sites in these basins: this part involves interlinking the
major river systems where surpluses from the Mahanadi and the Godavari are
intended to be transferred to areas in deficit in the south, through Krishna and
Cauvery rivers.
A
TR
GA APU
BA
L GO NGA HM
I GA BRA
LUN H AM MT NG
A
C I
11
K
RA
A
10
TW
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Fig. 3.3 The Peninsular Rivers Development Component (NWDA, 2007).

44 THE VITAL LINKS
b. Interlinking of west flowing rivers, north of Bombay and south of Tapi: this
scheme envisages construction of as many optimal storage as possible on these
streams and interlinking them to make available appreciable quantums of water
for transfer to areas where additional water is needed. The scheme allows for
extending the water supply canal to metropolitan areas of Mumbai; it also pro-
vides irrigation in the coastal areas in Maharashtra.
c. Interlinking of Ken-Chambal: the part of the scheme provides for a water grid
for Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh and interlinks a canal backed
by as many storage options as possible.
d. Diversion of other west flowing rivers: this part recognizes the high rainfall on
the western side of the Western Ghats, which runs down into numerous streams
and discharges into the Arabian Sea. The construction of an interlinking canal
system backed up by adequate storages could be planned to meet all require-
ments of Kerala and could also transfer some waters towards the east to meet the
needs of drought affected areas.
In the proposals of NPP, the transfer of water has been proposed mostly by gravity;
lifts were also kept minimal and confined to around 120 m. Further only surplus flood water
has been planned in foreseeable future for transfer to water deficit areas, but this water is
only usable if it meets all in-basin requirements.
In Peninsular Rivers Development component, the NWDA carried out in-depth water
balance studies on the various major river basins including Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna,
Pennar, Cauvery, Vaigai, west flowing rivers of Kerala, Karnataka, north of Bombay and
south of Tapi and southern tributaries of Yamuna. The aim of the water balance studies
was to establish water surplus and deficit regions. These studies indicated that while
Mahanadi and Godavari basins are water surplus, other basins in Peninsular India such as
Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery and Vaigai are water deficit. As the next step, pre-feasibility
studies for the following 16 probable links were carried out:
Kattalai-Vaigai-Gundar Link
Inchampalli-Nagarjunasagar Link
Inchampalli-Pulichintala Link
Polavaram-Vijayawada Link
Almatti-Pennar Link
Srisailam-Pennar Link
Mahanadi-Godavari Link
Somasila-Grand Anicut Link
Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal Link
Pamba-Anchankovil-Vaippar Link
Bedti-Varada Link
Netravati-Hemavati Link
Damanganga-Pinjal Link
Par-Tapi-Narmada Link
Ken-Betwa Link
Nagarjunasagar-Somasila Link.
SURESH PRABHU 45
Feasibility studies for all of these the links have been completed except for two,
namely Netravati-Hemavati and Bedti-Varda. These studies suggest that it is technically
possible and economically viable to transfer water from the surplus river basins to the
deficit ones. Consent from the Government of Karnataka was recently pursued so as to
undertake the preparatory work and complete feasibility reports for the two remaining
links. Further, only recently has the Government of Karnataka given consent to the NWDA
to undertake work on the Bedti-Varada link, which will eventually allow the NWDA to
prepare the feasibility report.
3.7 A HOLISTIC APPROACH
As a Task Force, we were assigned to independently evaluate the work of NWDA and to
ensure that all possible aspects are thoroughly addressed, To ensure comprehensive work
was conducted, we decided to use the services of experts in various fields to help guide
the research. However, real and updated studies were required and, as such, I decided to
have institutions of eminence carry these studies out.
If water is transferred from one basin to another, there could be a difference in quality
of water in one of these basins, thereby likely to create problems in the other basin.
Aquatic life could be adversely impacted as a result of this. There was a general fear that
such a transfer could pollute clean and pristine waters of other river systems. My intention
was to comprehensively gather scientific analyses on these and about 2,000 other similar
issues. Such a massive exercise had never before been carried out to assess the impacts of
any water project in India. Thus, I held consultations with the Ministry of Environment
and Forests and prepared an exhaustive list of issues that needed to be investigated to
conduct proper impact assessment studies. This list was again deliberated on with various
other experts and I, was also able to use all the expertise I had previously gained as a
Cabinet Minister of Environment and Forests.
All technical and scientific issues were referred to experts from various Indian
institutes known for their technical competence worldwide. The Indian Institute of
Management (IIM), Ahmedabad was appointed to look into all the organizational aspects
of ILR. We have seen in the past that corruption is normally associated with all irrigation
and water related projects and to avoid this, as well as to ensure timely completion of the
work, we appointed an expert group from Information Technology (IT) to ensure transpar-
ency in all technical, administrative, financial and others aspects. The new science of
GIS, remote sensing, geo-spatial, satellite imagery, etc. had to be undertaken diligently in
all the research and so an expert group was also assembled. Since, mathematical model-
ing and computer simulation can provide various alternative scenarios at the time of the
assessment of impact, we approached experts as well as the relevant institutes for this
purpose.
The rivers flowing from one state to another had several political dimensions.
I became personally responsibility to engage in a dialogue with as many political leaders
as possible. I met several chief ministers from all concerned states and held several meet-
ings with leaders of political parties. I addressed almost 5,000 small and large gatherings
of interested people. From meeting with the people, I realized that there was a lot of
opposition to this idea from various NGOs. I, then personally made it a point to meet a
number of NGOs in public forums, as well as having one on one talks. A website was
launched to disseminate as much information as possible. Following information mining
from different sources, I personally wrote a letter to the Minister for Water Resources
requesting him to put all of the information we had gathered on a website. It was my
46 THE VITAL LINKS
opinion that unless all the data was available for public scrutiny it would not inspire
confidence or encourage engagement.
Some of the rivers in India flow into the territories of our neighbors and sharing water
from these rivers has been subject to negotiations for many decades. I requested
Ambassador C. Dasgupta (former Ambassador of India to the European Union, Belgium
and Luxembourg), a very seasoned and competent diplomat, to look into the sensitive
issues around ILR and water sharing. We wanted to know what could be the reservations
of Bangladesh and how to address them effectively. Some of our members were in touch
with the Ambassador’s friends in Bangladesh to ascertain their views. Despite this, in
Bangladesh ILR became an emotive issue.
Ultimately, the NWDA had stated in their own submission, before the Supreme Court,
that the estimated cost of the ILR project would cost approximately US$ 125 billion. But
it was at best a guesstimate. A more realistic estimate could have been done only when the
Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) were prepared. We decided to prepare a model DPR, at
least for one link. We thus decided to work on the Ken-Betwa link as an independent link.
The DPR for this link would take into account all possible costs, including social, eco-
logical, etc. It would provide us with an opportunity to work out the real parameters to
calculate the overall cost. The challenge was to prepare a proper Terms of Reference
(TOR) for the DPR. If the TOR is not properly formulated, the correct answers to many
important questions cannot be addressed. We hired Engineers India Ltd (EIL) to conduct
the DPR for the Ken-Betwa Link. In addition, a group of experts from different fields were
solicited to assist them. When the TOR was finally completed, it was posted on the
internet for public scrutiny and comments and feedback in order to ensure the DPR was as
comprehensive as possible. The involvement of the EIL was a deliberate attempt to allay
any fears felt by the public. That is, the public may have been concerned that the analysis
of various government irrigation and water infrastructure projects is looked at only from
a civil engineering point of view and tends to overlook several other important environ-
mental and socio-economic aspects that the project should consider.
To comprehend some of the possible socio-economic implications our Task Force
took some crucial measures. We appointed ICICI, the biggest private sector bank and the
second largest bank of India, to look into all possible financing options. They presented a
good quality report which was attached as part of our Task Force report that was
eventually submitted to the Supreme Court. It was also necessary to examine the project’s
economic viability for the country besides its financial feasibility as a project. In a capital
deficient country like India, it is an imperative to know how capital is employed. If we
allocate resources for the ILR, it should not starve other important social sectors like
education, healthcare or other physical infrastructure projects. We thus appointed two
premier institutes to look at the project’s economic viability.
3.8 REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
Social issues are of great importance in any project but more so in a grand concept like the
ILR. Socially, did we need to implement this? In India since independence, our record of
rehabilitation of Project Affected People (PAP) is deplorable, to put it mildly. According
to a number of studies, including the WCD (World Commission on Dams) India Country
Study, at least 75 per cent of some 40 million people have been displaced and never been
resettled for large dam construction in India over the past five decades. I am personally
aware of several schemes where the Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) of the PAP’s
has not taken place. In fact, in one instance, as the Cabinet Minister of Power of the
SURESH PRABHU 47
Government of India, I had to personally intervene in the Resettlement and Rehabilitation

(R&R) work of Tehri dam.4 What tends to occur is that the R&R does not take place as
promised by the Project Implementing Agency (PIA). The PIA loses interest in the R&R as
it is not their principal task. In fact, the PIA only promises to complete the R&R only to
secure permission to commence work on the project because the normal pre-requisite to
undertake a project is to undertake an R&R. The other reason why schemes within the
R&R are poorly conducted is due to a lack of resources; R&R funds are initially provided
which are later diverted elsewhere. There is also a lack of local geographical and cultural
sensitivity on the part of the workers engaged in the work from the PIA. Ultimately, past
poor quality work on R&R compounds human tragedy. Based on this knowledge, I thought
to pursue a different and holistic approach. Thus, we approached a leading institute of
social sciences to investigate social concerns associated with ILR. We understood that in
a country like India, with such high population density, some amount of displacement is
inevitable when big projects are undertaken. But based on a thorough investigation on
social concerns, we planned to keep these quantities down to the barest minimum.
We had to be careful to avoid committing the same mistakes of any old R&R. I thought
of creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for each link separately, which would only be
for the purpose of carrying out R&R work; thus, to ensure time and attention was
dedicated specifically to the R&R work. The responsibility of the SPVs would be delegated
only to those NGOs who have a real commitment to the ILR cause. The R&R cost will be
ascertained by an independent body before the commencement of any project work and
the entire amount will be irreversibly transferred to the SPV. Execution of the project
work will start after funding was secured and transferred. I thought the creation of an
SPV would be a very novel way to address the problem of abruptly uprooting people from
their own surroundings and then leaving them high and dry.
Though humanity has made immense progress and addressed several issues in
international forums, in India we still don’t have a proper legal framework to address water
issues. In response, we organized a group of eminent lawyers to look at all of the possible
legal aspects, both domestically and internationally.
We also constituted a critical review group to receive alternate proposals (indepen-
dently devised of the NWDA). The review group was headed by Professor Subhash Chander
and Professor P.B.S. Sarma, both are highly respected professionals. This group, along
with independent experts group, was formed to look into all possible alternatives to the
already prepared proposals.
After identifying the possible barriers and following the formation of review groups,
the Task Force prepared two reports as mandated by our terms of reference and submitted
it to the authorities. However, in March 2004, I resigned as the Chairman of the Task Force
to contest my parliamentary seat for the fourth time. Subsequent to the election of the 14th
Lok Shava (the lower house of the Parliament), a change of government meant disbanding
and abandoning the work of the Task Force, as well as many of the previously formed
groups, selected partnering institutions, and collaborations with experts.
4
The Tehri Dam Project, one of the largest dams in India, consisting of Tehri and Koteshwar dams,
is under construction in the Ganga River basin for almost 25 years in the Northern Himalayan state
of Uttaranchal.
48 THE VITAL LINKS
3.9 URGENT NEED
India has only 2.2 per cent of the land mass of the world, while the share of freshwater
resources is only 4 per cent of the world. India’s population is presently 16 per cent of the
world population, but will become 18 per cent in next 40 to 45 years (UN, 2006). Thus,
worldwide, we have the greatest water resource challenge to address in the future and it
needs to be tackled through various means. The most important means to tackle this
problem is through demand side management. The agricultural sector accounts for
83 per cent of water consumption, so the water need in this sector is highest. Cropping
patterns also need to be scientifically planned to avoid cropping of cash crops in
unsuitable locations resulting in water wastage. Some of India’s hydraulic infrastructure
is very poorly maintained. Dr Vaidyanathan, an eminent agriculture economist, has
pointed out that the water application efficiency of several irrigation projects is
abysmally low at 20 per cent. Rain water harvesting also needs to behas not taken place.
In fact, in one instance, as the Cabinet Minister of Power of the encouraged.
While one looks at all possible means of addressing water problems we need to focus
on how irrigation, power generation, waterways, groundwater recharge, etc. can be looked
at in an integrated fashion. We have seen in India that such multipurpose projects are
never planned scientifically. Therefore, it has resulted in improper siting of projects, which
have caused environmental and other disasters. Placing projects in the wrong locations
has also happened because various states tend to stake claims on interstate water
resources, which has resulted in projects that defy any sound logic.
There is a lack of inter-agency cooperation in planning and implementation of water
projects in India. At least eight different departments of the central government alone, are
engaged in planning different projects on water all at one time. The Power Ministry plans
major projects on hydro electricity; the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy works on
mini and small hydro projects up to 50 MW; the Shipping Ministry works on inland
waterways; the Agriculture Ministry oversees irrigation works; the Rural Development
Ministry manages drinking water in rural areas, while the Urban Affairs Ministry oversees
drinking water in urban areas; the Environment Ministry is mandated to clean water; the
Health Ministry is mandated for safety and quality of water; the Planning Commission
monitors various schemes in water sector; and the Water Resources Ministry also
manages various areas and issues on water.
All of these branches of the same central government are all looking at the same
common resource, water. If the ILR is not planned holistically, resources will be wasted as
duplication of some issues and neglect for others could occur. As India is considered the
largest democracy in the world, questions are bound to be raised by people in rain-
deficient regions regarding the equitable distribution of available water resources in the
country. While, India has spent huge amounts of resources on flood and drought mitiga-
tion and management, but a permanent solution is still required for these problems.
3.10 A PAN-ASIAN OUTLOOK
Bangladesh, Bhutan China, India and Nepal share water as a common resource. They can
benefit immensely if they are able to work together. India buys power generated in Bhutan
resulting in Bhutanese per capita income being the highest in the region. But, can the other
countries not learn from this? Bramhaputra originates in China and as such Bangladesh
and India are both lower riparian and downstream states. It is therefore in the interest of all
of these countries to develop a proper water sharing formula and benefit from sharing
SURESH PRABHU 49
schemes. Regional cooperation is required to avoid and regulate floods. The Swedish
Government has already completed a study of four basins where water is shared by several
nations. I was personally called by the Swedish Government to offer my comments on the
study. Though Bramhaputra was not part of the study, I considered the Asian context and
how the co-basin states can work together. I further concluded that all of the states must
respect and honor the rights of the lower riparian states. But each one must also recognize
and accept the rights of upper riparian states as well. No one should have a veto to
obstruct any project which is the legitimate right of a sovereign nation, carried out within
the limits of international law. In fact, knowing the dynamics of these political powers, we
need to have a fresh look at the international water laws. Every issue should be codified to
avoid potential conflicts and a proper dispute settlement mechanism must be put in place.
Bangladesh was most concerned about conflict and dispute settlement. I think India
and the neighbouring nations must engage this historically good collaborator, friend and
neighbor into a constructive dialogue. There is so much suspicion on either side; and this
can be removed only by engaging in constant dialogue, sharing information on all issues
and working towards constructing projects which will benefit all parties. I am convinced
that the dialogue is the best form of resolving any such issue.
3.11 WE CANNOT STOP NOW
India’s eastern and northeastern states are a site where an agriculture revolution is
waiting to happen. The poverty in these states cannot be removed without growth in
agriculture and allied industry. Any program that will help to redress two of their main
problems, floods and the lack of scientific water management, will change the face of this
hitherto neglected, but potentially most prosperous part of India. A country like India
where almost 60 per cent of the population is supported by agricultural activity, has
260 million people who earn less than a dollar a day. If one considers the other definition
of poverty, those who live off less than 2 dollars a day, the number of poor will rise to
800 million. Meanwhile, 2006 to 2007 financial year, the services sector accounted
for 55.1 per cent of India’s GDP, manufacturing about 26.4 per cent and agriculture
18.5 per cent (MoF, 2007). Overall, 60 per cent of population shares 18.5 per cent of the
national income, and clearly this demonstrates the real cause of poverty.
Water is the basic resource to bring about growth in agriculture, to bring more land
under cultivation and to generate more financial resources for farmers. There are
innumerable studies completed about the causes of problems in the agriculture sector in
India and all these studies agree on one point: India needs to make more investments in
agriculture and more so, public investments. The farmers and their families, including
children, toil in the fields during the agriculture season. So obviously labor is not a scarce
resource when planning to promote growth in the sector. The only reason why we are
continually facing the problems with agriculture is due to paucity of public investments.
Farmers need better access to credit at reasonable rates, better prices for the produce,
good technological inputs, and assured insurance cover to cover risks to mitigate their
woes. But one really cannot ignore the vital role of public investment in infrastructure. For
example, the hydraulic infrastructure needs to be the responsibility of the state.
ILR raised several controversies, within and outside the country. One of the main
controversies was the government’s lack of willingness to share all of the information with
the people of India. I have yet to understand the logic of holding everything so close to
one’s chest that even the holder also can’t see what he/she is holding. Withholding
information has led to suspicions about the intentions of the government. As a result, this
50 THE VITAL LINKS
has led to misinformation provided by the government. The idea for ILR was always
considered by successive Indian governments since 1960’s, but more so since the 1980s,
when the issue was approached in a structured manner. Several bureaucrats, politicians,
technocrats, engineers in the government participated in the processes of working to
develop the idea of ILR. In my terms in the government, I had not heard any one opposing
the idea. On the contrary, as the government records reveal, government officials
supported and allowed work for the ILR to be continued. In fact, the periodic eruption of
interstate disputes arising out of sharing of water, between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, two
neighboring southern states of India, acted as a trigger for bringing the idea to center
stage. Acting as a referee to resolve this potentially volatile political volcano, the then
Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee wanted to bring the 20 year long process of
continual work of the NWDA, to be brought to a logical end. At the same time, the Supreme
Court asked the Government for the reasons for delays in implementation of the ILR. In
response, the then Honorable President of India, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam made an appeal to
the people of India in his public address. The purpose of this address to look at the ILR as
a means of realizing his vision to make India free from the scourge of poverty and
encourage the country to become a super power over the next 20 years. In response, some
people raised serious apprehensions over the idea of the ILR. But, in my opinion, if the
government had shared the work of NWDA with the people regularly there could have
been a more informed debate as access to information is essential for any new idea to be
implemented, but more so for a large project like the ILR.
The other flaw of the political process to support the ILR was the lack of a
multi-disciplinary approach of the NWDA’s work. Very essential elements of the project
appraisal, such as, environmental, social issues, hydrology, finance, modern sciences like
geo-spatial, political inputs should have been mainstreamed into the project plan and
works. In fact, the NWDA’s mandate was not even to make feasibility studies excluding
DPR’s; rather it was only to make pre-feasibility studies. If these essential elements were
provided to the people, much of the debate could have more meaningful and productive,
as was the basis on which the government was trying to move forward on this issue. If all
people were reacting to the same data, the information could have enriched the outcome
and avoided the resultant pitfalls. In response to these flaws, I launched a massive
awareness campaign to overcome this as a shortcoming.
Another set of objections to the project were technical. Project skeptics felt the
findings of the NWDA were not based on sound technical grounds. To quell any
suspicions, I set up various experts group to address any queries. In all my various
responsibilities with government as the Cabinet Minister of several portfolios, I am
convinced that no government can claim that they are the wisest people in the country. In
fact most of my knowledge and wisdom is drawn from my outside experience, rather than
within the government. It has thus always been my endeavor to involve as many people
into the process of decision making from outside the government. I adopted this same
approach to this project as well.
3.12 NOT BIG vs SMALL
There were some very basic objections to the ILR. There are people convinced that all big
projects are a bad idea. There are others who are convinced that such big ideas are meant
to make money for those who implement it. If one goes by past experience one will tend to
agree that corruption has been observed in many such programs. The challenge is to avoid it
through accountable and transparent systems. As explained earlier, I was trying to a
SURESH PRABHU 51
address any objections through a multitude of methods. The argument of big versus small
should not be a dogmatic approach but be a need based one. We in fact need both big and
small projects. Small is required to the extent that it is feasible and to the extent it can
satisfy all needs. For example, rain water harvesting has to be exploited fully, but one also
must assess its limitation. Rain water harvesting can satisfy drinking water, domestic as
well as small agriculture needs, but it cannot generate electricity or create waterways. If a
country can afford to live without electricity or waterways, that is fine, but if it is not
possible, infrastructure to support such projects are required.
As the Chairman of the Task Force, I was fully aware that we should never play with
nature, particularly in the water sector. But when the country has a huge population like
India, the country has to make some tough choices. Trade-offs have to be attained in a way
that minimize risks and maximize benefits. But all decision making must be done in the most
scientific and transparent manner. The absence of science and transparency only raises
serious questions about personal motives. I think we need to work in the short term to
increase the operating efficiency of all our existing projects and demand side management
must be given priority. While doing all this one must examine ideas like ILR in their
entirety – either to accept in part or even to reject the idea, if it is found that the costs
(all types) far out weigh the potential benefits. My campaign of taking the ILR idea closer to
the grassroots people has had one tangible result: Water has now become an issue at
the top of our national agenda and is an integral part of any national discourse. I don’t
think a less concerted effort by our Task Force could have attained making water a priority
in the agenda. As it remains currently, this account is the outcome of the ILR debate and
I hope it reaches its logical conclusion soon. Any delay will be only to the peril to the
nation of India.
REFERENCES
Dehadrai, P. V.: Irrigation in India. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 430, FAO, Rome, 2003,
pp. 59–69.
Government of India (GoI): 10th Five-Year Plan (2002 to 2007). Planning Commission, New Delhi,
2002.
Gupta, S.K. and Deshpande, R.D.: Water for India in 2050: First-Order Assessment of Available
Options. Current Science 86(9) (2004), pp. 1216–1224.
International Energy Agency (IEA): World Energy Outlook 2000. IEA, Vienna, 2000.
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI): World Water and Food to 2025: Dealing with
Scarcity. IFPRI, Washington, D.C., 2002.
Iyer, R.R.: Linking Rivers: Vision or Mirage? Frontline 19(25), December 7 to 20, 2002.
Kumar, P.: Food Demand and Supply Projections for India. Agricultural Economics Paper 98-01,
Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi, 1998.
Ministry of Finance (MoF): Union Budget 2007 to 2008. Ministry of Finance, Government of
India, New Delhi, 2007.
Mohapatra, P.K. and Singh, R.D.: Flood Management in India. In: Flood Problem and Management
in South Asia (M.M.Q. Mirza, A. Dixit and A. Nishat Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003, pp. 131–143.
Nandargi, S., Dhar, O.N., Mirza, M.M.Q., Enright, B. and Sheik, M.M.: Hydrometeorology of
Floods and Droughts in South Asia – A Brief Appraisal. In: Climate and Water Resources in
South Asia: Vulnerability and Adaptation (A. Muhammed, M.M.Q. Mirza and B.A. Stewart
Eds.), Asianics Agro Development Limited, Islamabad, 2007.
National Water Development Agency (NWDA): http://www.nwda.in, accessed in 2007.
52 THE VITAL LINKS
Rao, K.L.: India’s Water Wealth. Orient Longman, New Dehli, 1975.
Rathore, M.S.: State Level Analysis of Drought Policies and Impacts in Rajasthan, India. IWMI,
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2005.
Repetto, R. and Holmes, T.: The Role of Population in Resource Depletion in Developing
Countries. Population and Development Review 9(4) (1983), pp. 609–632.
United Nations (UN): World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. United Nations Population
Division, New York, USA, 2006.
4
The Interlinking of Indian Rivers: Questions

on the Scientific, Economic and Environmental
Dimensions of the Proposal
JAYANTA BANDYOPADHYAY
SHAMA PERVEEN
4.1 BACKGROUND
The availability of freshwater at various spots on the Earth’s terrestrial surface will
continue to be determined by the hydrological cycle, till such a time when technologies
like desalination of seawater is practiced on a reasonably extended scale. The rapid growth
in the demand of freshwater driven by growth in the global population and of the
economies, has led to this natural resource becoming scarce in many parts of the world. As
a result, the ratio between the number of people and the available water resource is
worsening day by day. By 2020, the global population is projected to be in the range of
7.3 to 7.9 billion, which is 50 per cent larger than that in 1990 (UN, 2006). Because of this
rapidly growing human population, the world may see more than a six-fold increase in the
number of people living in conditions of water stress - from 470 million today to 3 billion in
2025 (Postel, 1999).
In the global picture, India is identified as a country where water scarcity is expected
to grow considerably in the coming decades. Further, drought conditions resulting from
climatic variability cause considerable human suffering in many parts of the country, in the
form of scarcity of water for both satisfaction of domestic needs and for crop protection.
The project for interlinking of rivers of India emanates from a desire of the political
leadership of the country to bring a permanent solution to the negative impacts of drought
and water shortages in these parts (IWRS, 1996). Such a desire is, without question,
worthy of applause because satisfaction of domestic water needs should be considered as
a human right and be given the top priority.
The interlinking project is based on the National Perspective for Water Development
as framed by the Ministry of Water Resources in August 1980. The National Water
Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1982 to carry out detailed studies in the
context of the National Perspective. In late 2002, the proposals of the NWDA started to
receive great media attention after the Supreme Court of India passed an order in a Public
Interest Litigation, that the government should complete the construction of the interlinking
project by 2016. In response to this order of the Supreme Court, the Government of India
54 THE INTERLINKING OF INDIAN RIVERS: QUESTIONS
appointed a Task Force headed by Mr. Suresh Prabhu. The same order of the apex court
made the professionals interested in sustainable development of water resources in India
(see Chapter 3), to wake up to the realities and examine the techno-economic feasibility of
this project, which is perceived as the largest construction project in the world. It is
estimated that only the construction cost of the project may very well be of the order of
US$ 125 to 200 billion. One needs to add to this amount, the social, environmental as well
as the operational costs. Indeed, any country, whether developing or developed, large or
small, would surely take up diverse, strict and open assessments of the techno-economic
feasibility before investing in a project, the cost of which is of the order of its annual GDP.
Unfortunately, contrary to the above professional expectation, no technical details of
the interlinking project are available in the public domain. Excepting a few lines drawn on
the map of the country to indicate the rough location of the dams and the canals, nothing
is available to the open professional world to verify the justifiability and efficacy of the
various official claims of benefits from the project, which are also not substantiated by any
data. On 8 February 2003, in an open public debate held in New Delhi, organized for
discussing the interlinking project, Mr. Prabhu had appreciated the public request for
putting all technical information on the river interlinking project in the public domain,
through the web site of the National Water Development Agency (NWDA). Feasibility
Reports of 14 Peninsular components are available on but not the technical details.
In this background of the total non-availability of the technical details of the project
for interlinking of Indian rivers, it is not possible to take any clear position on the technical
feasibility or otherwise of the claims made by NWDA. Yet, it is not easy to turn a blind eye
to a proposal for such a large investment by the nation, which can also drastically alter the
hydrographic picture of the country.
As a result, in this chapter, a limited attempt has been made to analyze some crucial
policy issues related to the project on interlinking of rivers in India. In making this
analysis, the ongoing shift in the paradigm that is going on in the field of water resource
management the world over has been kept in mind. This process is of special significance
in the case of India, characterized by serious spatial and temporal variations in precipita-
tion, as has been stressed by Bandyopadhyay and Mallik (2003). Considering the reality
that the making of water policy in India has so far been guided by a conceptual frame-
work, characteristic of reductionist engineering, the arguments presented in this paper are
also indicative of the major generic conceptual problems in water resource management
in India.
4.1.1 Decision to interlink the rivers of India
Human societies have always tried to expand the spatial extent of availability of water by
the diversion of streams or rivers. The idea of drawing water from the rivers in eastern
India, which have larger runoff, in comparison to certain places in the peninsular region,
where the precipitation levels are much lower, can be seen as an extension of that practice.
The idea of linking the rivers of India has its roots in the thoughts of Visveswarya, the
stalwart engineer of yesteryears. The idea was further extended by Dr K.L. Rao,
the legendary irrigation minister of India (Rao, 1975), and Captain Dastur, a pilot. Dr Rao
and Captain Dastur thought of the Ganga-Cauvery Link Canal and the Garland Canals,
respectively. Dr Rao’s ideas were based on his identification of some river basins in the
country as ‘surplus’, and some others as ‘deficit’, and seeking solution to the problem of
water scarcity in many parts of the country by connecting them through a ‘National Water
Grid’ (NCIWRDP, 1999a: pp. 179–180). Captain Dastur proposed ‘an impressionistic scheme
JAYANTA BANDYOPADHYAY AND SHAMA PERVEEN 55
which became known as Garland Canal scheme’ to feed Himalayan waters to the peninsular
parts of the country by means of pipelines (for details of this proposal, see Chapter 1 and 3).
The National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP)
found this scheme prima facie impractical. Both the proposals were examined and were
not found worthy of being followed up.
The recent revival of the idea of interlinking of ‘surplus’ basins with ‘deficit’ basins
has been the result of work done by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA)
and bears a conceptual continuity with Dr Rao’s proposal. However, the recent hurry of
the government in the execution of the project is rooted in the order of 31 October 2002
by the Supreme Court of India, issued in connection with a Public Interest Litigation
(Writ Petition (Civil) No: 512/2002). Commenting on the long time period of 43 years as
identified by the NCIWRDP for the completion of the proposed interlinking project, the
Supreme Court ordered that:
It is difficult to appreciate that in this country with all the resources

available to it, there will be a further delay of 43 years for completion
of the project to which no State has objection and whose necessity and
desirability is recognized and acknowledged by the Union of
India … … We do expect that the programme drawn up would try and
ensure that the link projects are completed within a reasonable time of
not more than ten years.
The recent wider interest in the NWDA proposals for interlinking of rivers needs to be
seen in the background of the assessment by the Central Water Commission (CWC) of the
two earlier proposals by Dr Rao and Captain Dastur. It had mentioned specifically that
Dr Rao’s proposal was ‘grossly under-estimated’ and that the scheme ‘will also have no
flood control benefits’. Therefore the ‘proposal was not pursued as such’. Regarding the
proposal by Captain Dastur, the CWC and the associated experts were of the opinion that,
‘the proposal was technically unsound and economically prohibitive’ (MoWR, 2002).
Given the fact that the present proposal on interlinking supports the general idea of
transferring water from ‘surplus’ to deficit basins, these projects also need to be examined
through a rigorous and open professional assessment. It is in this background that the
present analysis is being undertaken.
4.2 WATER RESOURCES IN INDIA AND THE LOGIC

FOR THE INTERLINKING PROJECT
The country receives about 4,000 km3 of water as precipitation annually (NCIWRDP, 1999a:
p.23). However, unlike the precipitation patterns in the temperate regions of the world,
precipitation in India is characterized by acute variations in both space and time. A large
part of the total precipitation on the country is received in the Himalayan catchments of the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin (Figure 4.1). The distribution of precipitation
over India is predominantly governed by the Monsoon, as a result of which the northeastern
quarter of the country receives substantially larger precipitation, in comparison with the
northwestern, western and southern parts. For example, in the eastern parts of the GBM
basin, Cherrapunji receives an annual precipitation of about 11,000 mm, while Ajmer
just outside the western boundary of the GBM basin may receive only 200 mm of annual
rainfall. Though the west flowing rivers draining the western aspect of the Western Ghats
have substantial runoff, the spatial scope for their wider utilization is limited. For assessing
the water resources of India, the area of the country has been divided in 24 river-basins in
which the west flowing rivers from the Western Ghats have all been clubbed as one.
Fig. 4.1 The Ganges basin and Farakka Barrage. Boundaries of the Brahmaputra and Meghna
basins are also shown (Mirza, 2003).
The spatial and temporal variations in the precipitation over India often lead to human
sufferings through scarcity of drinking water, inundation of agricultural lands, failure of
crops, etc. There is no doubt that the satisfaction of the domestic needs of water should be
seen as a basic human right and should receive the highest priority in our water policy.
Further, protection of rainfed farm lands from variations in the climate, especially long
spells of droughts, should be an equally important and high priority objective in India’s
water policy. The logic behind the interlinking project is based on the view that there is
‘surplus’ water in some river basins or sub-basins, which, if transferred to the other
‘deficit’ river basins, would provide a permanent solution to the problem of human
sufferings from droughts and water scarcity. On the face of it, this is convincing enough
logic for undertaking the project for interlinking of India’s rivers.
On the basis of the National Perspective on water resource development, the
interlinking project has two components – the Himalayan and the Peninsular. The
Himalayan component includes construction of storage dams on the main tributaries of
Ganga and Brahmaputra to transfer ‘surplus’ water to the west. The Peninsular component
involves connecting rivers like Godavari and Mahanadi that have ‘surplus’ water with
rivers like Krishna and Cauvery. Thirty link canals are envisaged, of which 14 will be in
the Himalayan component and 16 in the Peninsular component (Figure 4.2). On the
whole, the interlinking project is aimed at providing large scale human-induced
connectivity for water flows in almost all parts of India. This, indeed, is the largest
construction project thought of in the world as of now.
FPO
Fig. 4.2 Links envisaged as per the national perspective plan.
4.2.1 Changing paradigm for water management
Over the past few years, concepts of water resource management all over the world have
been undergoing a clear paradigm shift and the need for new water professionals is being
heard from the highest international levels (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000; Matsura,
2003). It is indeed expected that the project on the interlinking of India’s rivers, which is
also the largest water related project of the world, would base itself on the emerging new
knowledge base, rather than the traditional one, which is beating a retreat each passing
day. However, such a professional analysis of the interlinking project is not possible, since
the necessary detailed technical information on the project has not been made openly
available. On that account, the very limited information that one can gather about the
project from open sources, does not even permit a good understanding of it, leave apart an
examination of the veracity of the proposed links and appurtenant structures. This leaves
one with the only option of examining the conceptual basis and policy approach for the
project.
The present estimates available for the construction cost alone of the interlinking
project hovers around an astronomical figure of US$ 125 to 200 billion. It needs to be
stressed here that no pre-feasibility or feasibility reports have been made available in the
public domain for an open professional assessment of the accuracy of this estimate. The
cost estimates may turn out to be far higher, if, as and when the detailed project reports
are prepared. The period of implementation for this gigantic project, as given in the
Supreme Court order, is a mere 10 years from now. However, there are various opinions on
the practicability of this time limit. On this point, Verghese (2002), an eminent writer on
water resources of India has commented that:
The notion that this ‘project’ can be ‘sanctioned’ and implemented in a

decade is simplistic in the extreme. … Interlinking of rivers is a highly
complex process with huge backward and forward and inter-sectoral
linkages that may be accomplished incrementally over the next 50 to
100 years.
Further, with the total pending cost for incomplete major, medium and minor irrigation
projects coming to R. 1.5 lakh crores1 (Jain, 2003) the logic behind taking up another such
a major projects does not seem convincing. Iyer (2002) further points out that, since plan
outlays are barely adequate even for the completion of on-going projects, there seems to
be little likelihood of finding massive resources for a major river linking undertaking.
What is equally surprising is that Mr. Bharat Singh, who chaired the ‘Working Group on
Inter-basin Transfer of Water’ of the Ministry of Water Resources (NCIWRDP, 1999b),
takes the position that, ‘… there really seems to be no convincing argument or
vital national interest which can justify taking up the river linking project in its entirety’
(Singh B., 2003). In this way, it is apparent that there are many important reasons for
exploring the logical basis and policy framework for this very costly project.
4.2.2 The concept of ‘surplus’ river basins
The starting point for the interlinking project is the subjective concept of the availability
of ‘surplus’ flows in some river basins. In the conceptual framework of reductionist
engineering it will be a win-win situation if one can simply utilize ‘… the water otherwise
going to waste in the surplus river basins’ (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.181). The official
methodology for working out whether a basin has any ‘surplus’ or not, is based on an
unpublished paper by Mohile et al. (1998). In this approach, the overall surface water
availability in a basin/sub-basin is assessed both at 75 per cent and 50 per cent
dependability’s. These are compared with the estimated water requirements for various
uses, viz; irrigation, domestic supplies, industrial requirements, hydropower and salinity
control, say by 2025. The process for the assessment of irrigation, domestic and industrial
needs are given in some details in the Report of the Working Group on Inter-basin Trans-
fer of Water (NCIWRDP, 1999b: p.30). Interestingly, there is no information in this Report
on how the assessment of the water need for salinity control or other water needs for
the continuation of diverse ecosystems services provided by water in the various parts of
the basin, would be made.
1
One lakh ⫽ 105; ten lakh ⫽ one million ⫽ 106; one crore ⫽ 10 million ⫽ 107.
This is quite expected, because from the viewpoint of reductionist engineering it is

not possible to recognize and assess the diverse ecosystem services performed by water
in all parts of the river basin, from the moment it gets precipitated to the moment it is
drained out into the sea. The arithmetical hydrology of reductionist water resource
engineering sees water purely from the point of storage, transfer and allocation for
supplies. It is, thus, unable to recognize that in all river basins, from a holistic perspective,
one does not see any ‘surplus’ water, because every drop performs some ecological
service all the time. The ecosystems evolve by making optimal use of all the water
available. If a decision is taken to move some amount of water away from a basin,
a proportional damage will be done to the ecosystem, depending on the service provided
by that amount of water. Thus, no amount of water in a river basin can be taken out
without causing some damage to the ecosystem services. In other words, there is no ‘free’
‘surplus’ water in a basin that can be taken away without a price.
In the narrow perspective of arithmetical hydrology, such perceptions are absent.
Hence, there is little difficulty in identifying river basins as ‘surplus’ and taking out, that
‘surplus’ water from the basin without seeing any harm in such an act (Singh R., 2003a). It
is so, because, otherwise, the reductionist view concludes that ‘surplus’ water as being
lost or wasted, as it flows down to the sea. Prabhu (2003) makes a more clear statement in
this regard when he claims that ‘… the (interlinking) project is about rationalization of
water that is lost to the sea’.
However, when the reductionist vision of arithmetic hydrology is replaced by the
holistic perspective of ecohydrology, the outflow of a river to the sea is no more seen as a
‘loss’, nor flood water is seen as a harmful ‘surplus’. In the ecohydrological perspective,
there is always some cost, known, unknown or perceived, associated with the transfer of
water from one basin to another, whether in small amounts or large. For example, flood
water in eastern India may appear to be a harmful surplus from the viewpoint of arithmetical
hydrology. Accordingly, the transfer of water from a ‘surplus’ basin in eastern India to a
drier one in another part of the country represents something of a win-win situation. On
the other hand, from the holistic ecohydrological viewpoint, flood water is seen as the
source of free minerals for the land, free recharge for the groundwater resources, free
medium for the growth and transportation of fish and conservation of biological diversity,
free bumper harvest for the humans, etc. At the macro-level, the flood flows flush the silt
from the riverbeds in the plains to the delta areas free of cost. They support the rich
fisheries in the estuaries and keep away the saline incursion from the sea. When flood
water is diverted away from a basin, the reductionist hydrology sees it as a ‘harmless’
transfer, which has all gains and no losses. From an ecohydrological perspective such
transfer of flows affects the processes of many ecosystem services. If any view of the
natural ecosystem is unable to recognize and accept the diverse ecosystems services
water performs or is incapable of understanding their scientific status, it is likely that the
narrow point of view would generate the false concept of ‘surplus’ flows in riparian
ecosystems or lakes.
Thus, from a holistic viewpoint, there are always costs, big or small, associated with
transfer of water from one basin to another, which results in loss to many ecosystem
services. One has only to look at the state of the ecology and economy of the Aral Sea
today, to find what economic damage can be done by water transfer projects that are not
ecologically informed. As a World Bank Report (1992) says:
This ecological disaster is the consequence of excessive extraction of

water for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which
feed the Aral Sea. Total river runoff into the sea fell from an average
55 cubic kilometers a year in the 1950s to zero in the early 1980s … …
If current trends continue unchecked, the sea will eventually shrink to
a saline lake one-sixth of its 1960 size.
As the paradigmatic transformation in water resource management advances, the old

practice of seeing ‘surplus’ water is also retreating. For example, the Murray-Darling Basin
Commission in Australia is seriously contemplating on extending financial encouragement
to farmers for saving on their allocation of irrigation water and to allow the savings to
remain instream. In another instance, Chile’s National Water Code of 1981 established a
system of water rights that are transferable and independent of land use and ownership.
The most frequent transaction in Chile’s water markets is the ‘renting’ of water between
neighbouring farmers with different water requirements (Gazmuri, 1992). In the USA today,
the country which started the old global trend of building large dams, ‘there is a new trend
to take out or decommission dams that either no longer serve a useful purpose or have
caused such egregious ecological impacts as to warrant removal. Nearly 500 dams in the
USA and elsewhere have already been removed and the movement towards river
restoration is accelerating’ (Gleick, 2000).
The expression of interest in the policy framework and technical details of the
interlinking project is not an expression of the opinion that rivers should never be linked.
The concern relates to the justifiability or otherwise of such a large national investment. In
this regard, even a memorandum has been sent by a group of concerned citizens to the
Prime Minister on 22 April 2003, asking for a more comprehensive assessment of the river
link proposal before it proceeds further. In that memorandum, it has been suggested that,
‘Where a river linking or long-distance water transfer proposal seems prima facie a good
option, (it will be good to) get a thorough, professional feasibility report prepared in a fully
interdisciplinary manner, internalizing not merely the techno-economic but also the
environmental, human, social, equity, “gender” and other relevant aspects and concerns
and put it through a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, rigorous and stringent process of
detailed examination, appraisal and approval’. The stand taken here is that if some rivers
need to be linked for some proven and unavoidable reasons, it should be undertaken with
full recognition of the serious ecological damages that may be caused by the interlinking,
and that the benefits would far outweigh these costs. The rapid improvements in the field
of ecological economics are making valuation of such damages increasingly accurate. By
adopting a holistic approach, projects like the interlinking of rivers can be exposed to a
more comprehensive and realistic assessment, thus offering a more mature tool for
decision making. Unfortunately, in the absence of any detailed technical information on
the proposed interlinking project, the type and extent of ecological damage to be caused
by its implementation can not be ascertained or assessed fully.
On the basis of such scanty technical details what can, however, be undertaken, is a
realistic review of the knowledge base and policy framework for the project and a general
examination whether it offers the most cost-effective option for generating the claimed
benefits of the project. These benefits are provision of domestic water supplies in dry
areas, food security for the country, water supplies for appropriate type of agriculture and
industries in the drier areas, flood control, improvement in water flows and navigation, etc.,
without causing major ecological damages to any part of the concerned river basins. While
these objectives are quite appreciable, whether the project actually can address these
problems and a construction cost of US$ 125 to 200 billion, the operational costs and the
cost of consequent environmental damages are justified or not, remains a big question. It
is in this background that, in this paper, the interlinking project will be examined through
raising the following questions:
Does the interlinking project offer the most cost-effective option for domestic
water security in drought-prone areas in India?
Is India’s food security critically dependent on the interlinking project?
Who will bridge the crucial knowledge gaps on the Himalayan Component?
Will the interlinking of rivers multiply the conflicts related to water?
4.3 DOES THE INTERLINKING PROJECT OFFER THE MOST

COST-EFFECTIVE OPTION FOR DOMESTIC WATER SECURITY
IN DROUGHT-PRONE AREAS IN INDIA?
One of the claimed benefits of the interlinking project is that it will provide drinking
water to large areas in the country facing drought and water scarcity. The task of provid-
ing domestic water supplies, including for sanitation, should obviously receive the
highest priority. Solution to this problem is of particular importance in the case of rural
India, where water for sanitation is still not available to many people. Domestic water
requirements are very important in terms of priority, but account for a very small part of
the total national water needs. The official process for the identification of river basins as
‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’ clubs together all water needs, and agricultural requirements domi-
nates that classification. If the domestic water needs are considered separately, and not
clubbed with their irrigational or industrial requirements, and compared with the water
availability over smaller watersheds and sub-basins, a completely different picture of
availability will surely emerge. In that picture, not many areas in India will come out as
water deficit in a water balance study.
With this assessment in mind, a few case studies had been undertaken by the UNICEF
and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) in a few areas of the country where scarcity of
water supplies during the pre-monsoon months becomes a problem. From the report that
emerged, it becomes clear that if the precipitation within the watersheds or sub-basins is
harvested and conserved properly, satisfaction of domestic water needs will not be a
problem in most parts of the country (Nigam et al., 1997). This observation is completely
in consonance with the result of numerous community initiatives for water harvesting,
whether in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal, or anywhere else in
the country. The Prime Minister’s call to promote water harvesting in India as a people’s
movement is directed to this immense potential of local level water harvesting and
conservation in providing domestic water security in the dry areas of India.
In contrast, the interlinking project tries to supply domestic water through collection
at far away points and distribution through long canals or existing riverbeds. However, no
cost estimate for the supply of drinking water from the related dams and canals is available.
As a result, a clear comparison of the cost of water supply from the interlinking project can
not be made with the small and localized community initiatives. Indications are however
quite clear that from the point of both the financial cost and the amount of water lost; the
centralized interlinking project will be much costlier than the decentralized ones. While the
whole country needed about 30 km3 of water for satisfying annual domestic needs in
1997 to 1998, India managed to lose 36 km3 of water in that year only through evaporation
from the reservoirs. By the year 2010, while the annual domestic requirements of India
would become 42 km3, an equal amount would be lost through evaporation (NCIWRDP,
1999a: p.69). Indeed, the centralized collection at far away points and long distance
distribution in the interlinking project is a very water wasteful way of supplying domes-
tic water needs. In the large rural areas, specially the arid and semiarid areas, the
economic efficacy and optimality of the proven technology of local level harvesting
and conservation in providing domestic water security, has not been disproved by any
analysis.
Through the popularization of the promises of the interlinking project, a policy
obsession has started to grow in the country that the ‘surplus’ basins have all the
solutions in store, for addressing the problem of water scarcity in the rest of the country.
One has only to wait for the US$ 125 to 200 billion project to be completed, to have all the
water scarcity problems solved. This has brought the country to such a situation of costly
sedation, that if Rajasthan receives rainfall above average, as a result of the integral
variability of climate, as has been the case in the summer of 2003, no serious governmental
steps for harvesting and conservation of the rainwater at the micro-level is noticed.
However, in many villages of Rajasthan, micro-level harvesting and conservation
structures have been built through non-governmental initiatives (for more details see
Chapter 15). In those villages people will probably enjoy security of domestic water
supplies, in the drier periods. In other places, their water security is flowing out with the
local runoff, making an unrealistic and artificial justification for dependence on long
distance transfers. This need for harvesting and conservation of water is equally true
whether it is in rain-scarce Ajmer (550 mm annually) or rain-covered Cherrapunji
(11,000 mm annually). In the words of Verghese (2003) the interlinking project:
is not a single stand-alone panacea for the country’s water problems

but the apex of a progression of integrated micro to mega measures in
an over all but unarticulated national water strategy.
There is a clear danger in believing that the interlinking project is the last word for
domestic water security all over the country.
The problem of providing domestic water supplies in areas away from the rivers will
largely remain unsolved, even if the interlinking project is completed. Moreover, as far as
only the domestic water needs are concerned, and not extraction for meeting the irrigation
requirements, the existing flows in the rivers may be enough in most locations near the
rivers. The interlinking will not have much effect on improving the supply situations in the
vast dry areas which are in the higher parts of the basins and away from the rivers to
be interlinked rivers, and hence, most critically dependent on local rain water. It needs to
be stressed that the poor and the vulnerable populations in arid regions usually reside in
the upper parts of the watersheds or basins, while the rich live on the water rich lands at
the lowest parts of the basins. The interlinking project, which will make more water flow
along the riverbeds, will have very marginal reach to these poorer populations. The
NCIWRDP (1999a: p.152) has given a clear indication that for secure domestic water
security local level arrangements worked out by popular participation needs to be pro-
moted. Local level harvesting and conservation has not only satisfied the domestic water
needs in many such arid and semiarid areas, in many cases, it has also provided protective
irrigation to rainfed farmlands.
Similarly, along the long coast-line of India, several technological options for sup-
ply of domestic water requirements are emerging in the form of desalination. Capacity for
desalinating water has increased globally from 1.5 million m3 per day to the current figure
of more than 20 million m3 per day. This has reduced the cost-price of desalinated water to
less than US$ 1.00/m3 for seawater and less than US$ 0.50/m3 for brackish water, largely by
cutting the energy requirements of desalination plants (Anon, 1999). As a result,
companies are now ready to market drinking water at a price of 5 paise (0.1 cent) per litre
(New Indian Express, 2003). The emerging technology of rapid spray evaporation (RSE) is
expected to further bring down the price level (Ellis, 2003). The interlinking project needs to
be examined from this point, otherwise, after all the huge construction in the name of
delivering water to the water scarce areas, it may soon prove to be not the most cost-
effective way of doing so. In short, in the absence of comparative cost figures, answers to
the questions related to the desirability or otherwise of this gigantic project for promoting
domestic water security in India can not be found. However, the primary importance in
this respect, of local level harvesting and conservation of rainwater remains unchallenged.
There is, however, a good case for long distance water transfer projects, whether inter-
basin, or otherwise, when large urban areas need to be supplied with adequate
domestic water. However, such transfer projects do not need a great amount of water, when
compared with irrigation. It will be wiser to address the issue of urban water security in
India as a priority issue, separate from irrigation. For the domestic water security of most of
the rural areas suffering from water scarcity, there is no alternative to intensive and
extensive promotion of local level harvesting of water. For these areas, the option of long
distance transfer should be the last one, not the first.
4.4 IS INDIA’S FOOD SECURITY CRITICALLY DEPENDENT

ON THE INTERLINKING PROJECT?
The growth in irrigated area, along with improvements in farming technologies and plant
genetics, has been responsible for the rapid growth in crop production over the last few
decades in our country. The total irrigation potential created till the 9th Plan period is about
107 million hectares (Mha) (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.79). Using an additional 173 billion cubic
meters (BCM) of water, the interlinking project plans to bring under irrigation an additional
34 Mha of land with the objective of meeting ‘the requirements of increasing food and fibre
production for a growing and increasingly prosperous population’ (Vaidyanathan, 2003).
Recent agricultural statistics reveal that we have achieved a record food grain
production of 209 million tons in 2005–2006 which is 11 million tonnes more than that
of the previous year (MoF, 2006). The data from the Food Corporation of India (FCI)
indicates that the national buffer stock stands at an all time high of 62 million tons. The
Government of India has issued a statement saying that there is no problem in the food
front. Food security is, however, not a matter of food production alone. Good production
and good distribution together can deliver food security. Despite the huge buffer stock of
food grains in India, an estimated 200 million people are underfed and 50 million are
reportedly cringing below starvation (Goyal, 2002).
Food security in India, accordingly, is as much a matter of access and distribution, as
production. The growth of the population in India is expected to flatten towards the
middle of the present century. There will be a consequent flattening of food requirements.
Food production is a matter of area under agriculture and yield. India has the largest
irrigation network and second largest arable area in the world. However, in spite of the
availability of good water and land, our agricultural productivity stands very low when
compared with other countries of the world. Our neighbouring country, China faces
problems similar to ours, in a more acute manner. It has a larger population to feed, with
much less arable land. However, as Swaminathan (1999: p.73) has pointed out, China
produces 13 per cent more food grains per capita than India. Data from the FAO (CWC,
1998: pp. 223–224) indicates that while the cereal yield for India stood at 2,134 kg per ha
in 1995, the same for China stood at 4,664 kg per ha (Figure 4.3).
Fig. 4.3 Country wise tield of cereals in kg per ha (Source: Water and related statistics, central water
commission, 1998).
Eminent agricultural scientists in India are foreseeing great technological breakthroughs

in agricultural productivity in the coming years. The NCIWRDP has pointed out that the
yield of wheat in experimental farms in India has already exceeded 6,000 kg per ha.
However, the calculations of India’s food production in the coming decades, made for
showing the interlinking project as an essential step for food security, are made with the
assumption that even after 50 years from now, India will attain yield levels only two-thirds
of what has already been achieved in the experimental farms. The NCIWRDP (1999a: p.57)
has taken yield levels of 4,000 kg per ha in irrigated land, as the basis for making projection
for food crop production in 2050. Similarly, in the rain fed land, NCIWRDP has projected
that the food crop yield is expected to grow from the present 1,000 kg per ha to 1,500 kg
per ha only in 2050.
The other important way to look at the justification or otherwise of the projected
essentiality of the interlinking project, is to look at food grain productivity per unit volume
of water. Singh (2003) takes the view that India is ‘already producing enough food;
production can be further increased by at least 25 per cent from existing irrigated area itself
by improved inputs and agricultural technology’. This view is reiterated by Carruthers
and Morrison (1994), when they say that ‘we do not anticipate or call for an increased rate
of capital intensive investment in irrigation infrastructure but we do need to see that more
is achieved with what is presently developed’. Thus, the justification for such a costly
physical expansion of irrigation based on macro-level collection and long distance transfer
of large volumes of water does not have universal support.
It is important to note that China, with only half as much arable land per capita as
India, today is not thinking in terms of drastically increasing the use of water in agriculture
but increasing the water use efficiency in the existing irrigated areas. Wang (2002: p.15
and p.110), the Water Resource Minister of China, writes that, ‘Irrigation is no longer
‘watering the land’ but supplying water for growth of crops … At present, the average
agricultural water use efficiency is 0.43 in China. If water saving irrigation is extended to
raise the figure up to 0.55 (some experts consider 0.6), food security can be guaranteed
when the population increases to 1.6 billion in 2030 without increase of total agricul-
tural water use’.
In the case of India, blessed with more arable land and more irrigation potential, while
similar figures for the improvement in the efficiency of the use of irrigation water (from 0.35
at present to 0.60 in 2050) are being projected (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.58), probably with a
weaker conviction, there is no clear policy perspective for achieving higher water use
efficiency and reach the declared targets. Thus, the perceived dependence of India’s food
security on the continued physical expansion of irrigation will remain inextricably linked
with the interlinking project. However, as Swaminathan (1999: p.93) has cautioned that:
the inefficient and negligent use of water in agriculture is one of the

most serious barriers to sustainable expansion of agricultural
production. Public policy regarding the cost of water supplied by
major irrigation projects and low-cost or free distribution of power
for pumping underground water aggravate the problem … … Water
consumption can be reduced radically, by as much as five-to-ten fold,
at the same time as significantly increasing crop yields.
Vaidyanathan (2003), who has examined the methodology and estimates in the
NCIWRDP Report, questions the very concept of this efficiency underlying the measures.
He says that:
the present available efficiency of surface irrigation, according to the

figures cited in the report, ranges between 30 and 50 per cent. … … The
concept of efficiency not being specified, their relation to projections
cannot be verified without comparable estimates of current and future
water balances and irrigation efficiencies overall for the two major
sources separately.
The World Bank Irrigation Sector Report on India takes a similar view on irrigation
and takes the position that ‘from the past heavy emphasis on physical expansion, effort now
needs to turn to a much greater emphasis on productivity enhancement’ (World Bank,
1999: p.11). It is clear that the view that physical expansion of irrigation is the best possible
and the most cost-effective option for India maintaining food security is open to scrutiny.
The above makes it clear that the line of linkage between the interlinking project and
India’s food security is not uniquely established. There are many other ways to sustain
food security and they need to be seriously explored. Hence, before such a gigantic and
expensive project is taken up, comparisons of the costs for maintaining food security
along all possible technological options, is a pre-requisite. Particular attention should be
given as to why, even after 50 long years, yield from India’s irrigated fields will not be
even two-thirds of the yield that has already been achieved in experimental farms
(6,000 kg per ha).
In addition to this, before the decision for further physical expansion of irrigation is
cleared, one needs to examine the use of the quantity and quality of the use of the irrigation
potential already created. Till the end of the 9th Plan, the irrigation potential created and
utilisation achieved in India was reported as 106.6 Mha and 93.4 Mha, respectively
(NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.79). The reasons for taking the figure of 77 Mha as the projected
irrigated cropped area as far away in future, as in 2010 needs to be examined from the point
whether it is a conservative figure. It is quite logical for the country to expect that the
irrigation potential already created be achieved with the projected high level of efficiency.
In such a situation, the need for the interlinking project would have to be reassessed.
In addition, the interlinking project envisages that 30 per cent of the irrigated area
would be used for the cultivation of non-food crops. Thus, it is very reasonable to expect
that the additional irrigation potential of 34 Mha to be created by the interlinking project
would actually mean some at most another 17 to 18 Mha for irrigated food crop cultivation.
Does the expenditure of US$ 125 to 200 billlion seem justified for such a limited return at the
national level? Of course, the ready availability additional water and absence of any legal
control on its use may encourage the growth of water intensive industries and commercial
crops in the dry areas, notwithstanding their natural limitations. This makes the case for
the ‘surplus’ basins supplying that water to ‘deficit’ basins to receive a good price for the
water, the use of which would make a good amount of value addition. In fact, inter-state
water markets can flourish and solve the problem without a huge national investment. In
fact, if such a market is established, there may be a beginning of mutually agreed inter
basin transfers, making the very expensive interlinking project redundant.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that though the main declared justification
of the interlinking project comes from its claim about providing additional 173 BCM of
water, reportedly for India’s food security, much less expensive options are possibly
available. It is imperative that comparative costs of all the possible paths to food security
like introduction of qualitative changes in agriculture, technological improvements
including more efficient use of water in irrigated areas, be assessed and only then
appropriate decision taken. Otherwise, as Postel (1999) has cautioned, ‘… it is not enough
to meet a short term goal of feeding the global population. If we do so by consuming so
much land and water that ecosystems cease to function, we will have, not a claim to
victory, but a recipe for economic and social decline’.
However, ignoring the serious questions raised above on the official justifications,
the interlinking project may still be pushed through without any open professional
assessment. In that event, several more serious questions will come to the fore. Part of
these questions relates to the lack an adequate knowledge base, and part, to the conflicts,
that are inherent in the project idea and will express themselves as and when the realization
of the project starts. In the following sections, these questions are being explained.
4.5 WHO WILL BRIDGE THE CRUCIAL KNOWLEDGE GAP

ON THE HIMALAYAN COMPONENT?
The mountains play a very significant role in providing the supplies of water the human
societies need (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1997). Like all major mountains, the Himalaya is the
source of many large rivers, like the Yangtse, Irrawadi, Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra,
Ganga, Indus, Amu Darya, etc. Indeed, the Himalaya can be called the ‘water tower
of Asia’. There is little surprise that the basic idea of the interlinking project in India is to
transfer water from Himalayan river basins to others. The interlinking project has a
Himalayan component that envisages construction of several dams on the Himalayan
rivers and 14 links. The complexity of the ecology of the Himalaya is well known and Ives
and Messerli (1989) have described quite well the uncertainty associated with taking a
mechanical and traditional view of Himalayan development. Bandyopadhyay and Gyawali
(1994) have presented a more detailed analysis of the ecological and political challenges
associated with the development of Himalayan waters. They have identified several
important gaps in knowledge in the conventional approach to development of the
Himalayan rivers based on dams and embankments. Bandyopadhyay (2002) has made a
detailed analysis of the problems associated with dams on the Himalayan rivers, in respect
of the Report of the World Commission on Dams. Of special significance in terms of the
safety of Himalayan dams is the knowledge about the seismic hazard, the gaps on which
have been articulated by Gaur (1993). Thus, the significant gaps in knowledge can be
summarized as on:
a) the mechanism of the generation and draining out of flood waters in the
Himalayan foothills and floodplains
b) the dynamics of the generation, transportation and deposition of sediments all
along the course of the Himalayan rivers
c) the nature of seismic risks associated with high dams in the Himalaya
d) the impacts of structural interventions in the Himalayan rivers, like embankments
e) the impact of the four points above on the economic feasibility of water devel-
opment projects.
Recognizing the seriousness of the gaps in knowledge mentioned above, the

NCIWRDP (1999a: p.187–188) took the wise view that:
the Himalayan component would require more detailed study using

systems analysis techniques. Actual implementation is unlikely to be
undertaken in the immediate coming decades.
The problem of the knowledge gap was not limited to theories or concepts alone. Even
as a National Commission, the NCIWRDP could not have access to data related to the
Himalayan component (NCIWRDP, 1999: p.187). Thus, a large part of water development
projects and the related knowledge will have to be accepted without any open profes-
sional assessment. It is not clear what are the reasons behind this non-availability of data
on the Himalayan rivers, in the absence of which it would become difficult to get an open
scientific picture of India’s huge water resources. Recognizing the urgent need for open
professional research on the Himalayan rivers, the NCIWRDP (1999: p.370) has further
stressed that, ‘hydrological data of all the basins need to be made available to the public
on demand’.
It was in this background, that the order from the Supreme Court was made directing
that all the construction activities related to the interlinking project needs to be completed
in the next 10 years. Does it mean that the order clears the path for investment in and
construction of the project without any dependable and open professional examination
based on detailed hydrological data and growing body of technical knowledge about the
Himalayan ecohydrology (Chalise and Khanal, 1996)? Will the proponents of the project
be correct in saying that the order of the Apex Court makes the need for a scientific and
technical examination of the project redundant? Or, otherwise, does the order mean that all
scientific and technical research related to Himalayan waters are to be completed within
the stipulated period? If so, is it possible to complete all the research studies within that
period? Or, in view of the confidentiality associated with hydrological data on the
Himalayan rivers, no such need for an open professional research and assessment is
envisaged?
This leaves one with the vital question that – in the event of the Himalayan component
being taken up for implementation, who would bridge the above knowledge gap? To any
professional involved in serious research on ecohydrology of the Himalayan rivers, it is
no news that only the development of systematic knowledge needed for making credible
impact assessment of the dams and canals proposed in the interlinking project would
need quite a long time. If such an exercise gets completed in an open and professional
manner, in all probability, many large projects may turn out to be technically and eco-
nomically unfeasible. One example of the significance of the knowledge gap is related to
the declared benefits of ‘flood control’ from the interlinking project. Floods in the Hima-
layan foothills and the adjoining plains are the result of a complex ecological process,
and much of it is not well understood. Simplistic engineering claims about projects that
will control floods in the Himalayan rivers are not new, and have been made over decades.
The only thing missing is a good scientific support to the claims; because the real life
observations do not substantiate the claims and floods in the Himalayan rivers have
certainly not declined over the years. There is a clear case for a transparent and profes-
sional examination of the claims of ‘flood control’ by the interlinking project.
In addition, it is clear to a layman that the realization of the Himalayan component
is critically dependent on the agreement of neighbouring countries of Nepal and Bhutan
to the proposed constructions, especially of dams, in their respective territories. Bangladesh,
as a downstream country, will be an affected party, and needs to be taken into confidence.
No progress has been made in the direction of officially informing the neighbouring
countries about the interlinking project. This is evident from a statement from the then
Nepalese Water Resource Secretary, Aryal (2003) or the recent writing of Vidal (2003).
The Himalayan component, thus, runs the risk of becoming a non-starter. In case there is
an attempt to give it an immediate push start, the genuine question by whom and how will
the crucial knowledge gap on the Himalayan rivers be bridged, will remain unanswered.
Can India afford to make huge investments in such a gigantic 21st century project on the
basis of an outdated knowledge base?
4.6 WILL THE INTERLINKING OF RIVERS MULTIPLY THE

CONFLICTS RELATED TO WATER?
India is known for major water related conflicts, whether it is between Haryana and
Punjab in the north, or between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in the south. More recently,
serious conflicts have emerged among the states sharing the Krishna river basin. Away
from the conflicts among the states, India has experienced a large number of water related
conflicts between the officials and the people. The lack of an easy access to information
about projects and the limited nature of the framework for project appraisal and approval
as used at present in India make such conflicts an inevitable part of project execution. It
is so because the calculation of benefits and cost of the projects are undertaken according
to some very old guidelines. For example, the recommendations of the Third Conference
of the State Irrigation Ministers held in 1977 is the latest contribution to the guidelines
(NCIWRDP, 1999b: p.165). Naturally, these guidelines are old and are unable to address the
present day scientific, social or environmental consciousness. If the administrative rules
are not keeping up with time, it is not surprising that conflicts are becoming inevitable.
As a result, the courts are increasingly taking up the administration of water resources
in India. On this basis, the interlinking project is seen to have the potential for generating
four distinct types of conflicts. They are:
over compensations for resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced,

over compensation for environmental damages from the project,
over sharing the benefits and costs of the project among the states of India, and
over cooperative management of the project in an international river basins.
4.6.1 Compensations for resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced
Conventionally, in making the benefit-cost analysis of developmental projects in India,

the social costs are invariably downplayed. Most significant of the social costs are the
costs suffered by the people from involuntary displacement. The burden of displacement
thus remains unaccounted for and relocation causes profound economic and cultural
disruption to the individuals affected as well as to the social fabric of local communities
(Cernea, 1988). In this context, Roy (1999) states that, ‘In India, fifty million people are
estimated to have been displaced in last five decades by the construction of dams, power
plants, highways and such other infrastructure development projects. Subsequently no
more than one-fourth of them could be assisted to regain their livelihoods’. Wolfensohn
(1995) rightly surmises the situation that, ‘Such social injustice can destroy economic
and political advances’.
In the case of the interlinking project, no official figure is available for the number
of people to be displaced. It is estimated that the network of canals extending to about
10,500 km would displace about 5.5 million people, who are mostly tribals and farmers
(Vombatkere, 2003). One has to add to it the people to be displaced by the various
reservoirs that may be built, in India or in the neighboring countries. In view of the fact
that the river interlinking proposal has been slotted as the largest construction project
ever in the world, the above-mentioned figure for the number displaced seems a probable
underestimation of the true picture. This gets compounded with the fact that the
government is yet to commit itself on a sound and clearly spelt out resettlement and
rehabilitation policy. If this crucial step is not completed the issue of the resettlement and
rehabilitation related to the interlinking project is sure to generate a great number of
protests and public interest litigation, the cost of which will be enormous.
4.6.2 Compensation for environmental damages from the project
As has been stressed earlier in this paper, the existence of ‘surplus’ water in one basin and
its transfer to another does not constitute a win-win situation. In correctly assessing the
environmental costs, as Vaidyanathan (2003) suggests, ‘One needs to know when, for
what duration and how much water can be drawn from each basin, for transfer to the next,
and how well it matches the irrigation requirements in the recipient basin’. The ruinous
results of ecologically un-informed economic development activities, like widespread
waterlogging, salinization and the resulting desertification in the command areas of
many large irrigation projects, can be cited. In the absence of an appropriate study for
determining the actual water needs in an area, the river link plan can similarly prove to be
ecologically disastrous.
Guided by the aspiration of rapid economic growth, quest for every drop of water
becomes the practice. There is little in the proposed interlinking project, for promoting
protection against drought. It plans to extend the conventional intensive irrigation to the
arid areas. The result is that heavily water-demanding crops start to be grown in arid areas.
One is aware that the roots of the conflict over the famous Cauvery waters were in the
adoption of water intensive cropping systems and the abandonment of many traditional
water harvesting structures. In this situation of increasing emphasis on the commercial-
ization of some crops at the cost of staple food grains, Athavale et al., (2003) fears that:
In irrigated areas, the provision of additional water from outside based

on questionable calculations of water-deficits, may weaken the
motivation for improving the efficiency of water-conveyance and
water-use, further encourage the recourse to water-intensive crops
and induce the repetition of some of the ills associated with the Green
Revolution approaches. In arid or drought-prone areas, it may even
lead to the introduction of irrigated agriculture of a kind more
appropriate to wet areas.
On the other hand, the experiences in the successful promotion of water harvesting
and resilience against drought in dry land farming systems, as gained from non-
governmental initiatives like the Pani Panchayat in Maharashtra, are almost externalized
from the interlinking project.
On 23 May 2003, the Ministry of Environment and Forests had put out a 23-point
concern about the environmental implications of the proposed interlinking project. These
included the submergence of forests and cultivable areas, displacement and resettlement
and serious implications in terms of bio-diversity loss (Hazarika, 2003). Bandyopadhyay
(2003) has raised the question ‘How are the environmental damages that may be caused
by the interlinking project identified and their financial costs estimated, if at all?’ Martin
(2003) warned that linking rivers like straight pipelines without looking at the ecological
impact could lead to serious repercussions. Factorization of environmental impacts into
project planning is an absolute necessity and more important are the monetized costs of
environmental impacts in evaluation approaches to develop prices for environmental
services and amenities. Decisions, which include these impacts, support sustainability.
Scientists are also skeptical of the fact that river diversion would bring in significant
changes in the physical and chemical compositions of the sediment load, river morphol-
ogy and the shape of the delta formed at the river mouth. All these downstream processes
have serious economic and livelihood implications, presently ignored by the project.
4.6.3 Sharing the benefits and costs of the project among the states of India
Whether it’s the erratic water supply forcing families to shift out of Chennai, or the
procession in Gujarat to protest against the lack in water supply or fights of the farmers
over opening of field channels in Haryana or Punjab, the ‘central conflict over water
resources revolves around the question of ownership, access and control over water’
(Upadhyay, 2001). In the last decade, there have been reports of violence and deaths on
account of conflicts over water rights between upstream and downstream areas in many
river basins in India – Narmada, Cauvery, Krishna, Godavari basins are some examples for
such incidents (Rajagopal, 2002).
States have always enjoyed right over water for apportionment and allocation. If
under the centralized scheme of river linking, the riparian rights of the states gets disturbed
and right over the same gets transferred, then the issue which emanates from the same
would also need to be resolved. Singh (2003b) the additional secretary in the MoWR has
empathetically enquired whether there are any hard and fast rules, conventions, best
practices, executive fiats, which require intra-basin disputes to be resolved first before
seeking to resolve inter-basin issues.
Two clear roots for new inter-state conflicts are seen in the interlinking project. The
first one is on the description of the total requirement of the states in the ‘surplus’ basins,
for example, Assam or West Bengal. While the arithmetical hydrology will be able to
calculate the obvious and supply oriented requirements and project them in both
space and time, the problem will arise on the requirements that arithmetical hydrology
can not recognize. Take for example, how would one scientifically arrive at the need for
minimum flow in Padma (the other name of the Ganges in Bangladesh) or Meghna or the
Hooghly-Bhagirathi for the sustainability of the livelihoods of the millions involved in
fishing in southern Bangladesh and the state of West Bengal? What will be the impact of
the diversion of the 10 per cent of the lean season flow from ‘surplus’ river basins on
the groundwater resources and saline incursion in the downstream areas? These estimates
are not easy to make.
However, it is also not easy to ignore them. In assessing the full requirements, the
states need to liberate themselves from the limits of arithmetical hydrology and use
ecohydrology as the knowledge base for the estimation of these water requirements.
Indeed, there will be a great conflict of worldviews when such claims would be put forward
by the ‘surplus’ states. The second part of the potential for conflict is related to the limits
that will be imposed on the ‘surplus’ states, if, as and when the interlinking project gets
realized. By virtue of the principle of prior extraction, the ‘deficit’ states would have the
luxury of promoting water intensive export oriented agriculture or polluting industries that
are not otherwise feasible or sustainable in those areas. Economic growth is good, when all
damages from the growth are paid according to the principle of full costing. What market
mechanism would be instituted for the ‘surplus’ states to receive the price for water that
would be used by the ‘deficit’ states commercially for large profits? If this is not sorted
out, the project is bound to face constant problems, as is seen in the case of Cauvery
waters today.
In this commotion, people of the country also deserve to know whether this central-
ized plan is a step for ‘nationalization’ for subsequent privatization of water. There have
been several articles put up in the print media both in support of and strongly critical of
the interlinking project. Athavale et al. (2003) says that:
Even if we assume that the conflict at one end (i.e., in a ‘water short’
river basin) is eased by the importation of external water, we may be
initiating a new conflict at the other end (the donor basin). The project
has already led to strong objections form several states and it now
appears that several new inter-state conflicts may arise because of this
project.
Singh (2003) points out that, ‘Looking at the on-going disputes between states,
inter-state agreements would be extremely difficult to achieve’.
4.6.4 Cooperative management of the project in international river basins
About half of the world’s terrestrial surface belongs to international river basins. A large
part of India also belongs to the two large international basins, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna (GBM) and the Indus. The interlinking project is fundamentally related to the
development and transfer of water, particularly within and from the GBM basin. Worldwide
shared water resources are covered by over 2,000 bilateral agreements on various aspects
of navigation, research, fishing, water quotas and flood control (McNeely, 1999). These
principles of international law have thus been developed to allocate water within a river
basin and to prevent or resolve international water disputes regarding the extent of
upstream and downstream use of water. Unfortunately, they rarely are easy to apply and
often are contradictory. Sharing river water is particularly difficult because the effects are
one-way, with upstream-downstream supply dispute being among the most common
(Kilgour and Dinar, 1995). Referring to the GBM basin, Gately (1995) has commented that:
A tussle is simmering in South Asia’s Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin, where

Bangladesh, India, and Nepal dispute the best uses of water. India and
Nepal want to exploit the basin’s huge water resources, whereas
Bangladesh wants the water managed in such a way as to minimize
flooding during monsoon months and water shortages during dry
months. Of equal concern are the water conflicts between states in
India that share river basins, such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu,
which border the Cauvery River.
The ideal way to address the development of water resources in an international river
basin is to recognize the ecological integrity of the basin, take a basin-wide approach and
involve all co-riparian countries in the process of conceptualization of a project. In the
case of the GBM basin, separate and bilateral agreements on smaller aspects exist between
India and the three other countries, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. Indeed, much of
the success of the Himalayan component depends on the ability of India to get these three
countries to endorse the interlinking project. As it appears now, no concrete and positive
steps have been taken so far in that direction. On the contrary, it appears from Vidal (2003)
that Bangladesh is thinking of taking the matter of the interlinking project up to the UN. For
India, the opening of the discussion with Nepal is even more difficult, in the background
of the present and serious political instability in that country. Thus, together with inter-
state conflicts, the interlinking project is sure to generate important inter-country
conflicts, reducing the political feasibility of the project. However, even if all the nego-
tiations are supposedly concluded successfully, the final battle at the financial front will
remain. As Rath (2003) has cautioned, the enormity of the financial requirement may be
the most useful tool for India to rethink giving the people too many ‘pie-in-the-sky’ type
of slogan for addressing the challenge of water resource development.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the above review and analysis made on the basis of whatever open
information is available on the project for interlinking the rivers in India, there appears a
great inconsistency in the declared claims of the project, and their feasibility. Indeed, the
confidentiality associated with the technical information on water resource projects comes
as a great obstacle to its transparent professional assessment. The first and foremost
commitment of a water project should be for providing domestic water supply. The
indicative policy assessment show that the approach based on dams and canals is not the
best choice for promoting domestic water security in India. Such a technology is wasteful
of water and of a low level of dependency. Domestic water security in drought-prone
rural areas can be better achieved through local level harvesting and conservation. There
is, however, a need for long distance transfers to provide large urban areas with domestic
water supplies.
Physical expansion of irrigation by 34 Mha is the main plank for the interlinking
project. The food security of India has been shown to be fully dependent on the interlinking
project. However, this dependence has not been clearly established. This choice of the
most effective approach to food security of India will depend on the nature of the progress
of Indian agriculture in the coming decades. Fifty years is a long period and in the next
50 years, the projected yield of food crops in both irrigated and rain fed lands may increase
substantially, deviating from the present low rate of growth. Similarly, if the agricultural
water use efficiency goes up from 0.35 at present to 0.60 in 2050, there may not be a great
increase in demand for irrigation water for producing these amounts of food crops.
However, as assumed by the NCIWRDP, if Indian agriculture does keep a very low profile
and maintains the present low growth of only 1 per cent per year over the next 5 decades,
then the projected yields in 2050 will be about 4,000 and 1,500 kg per ha, in irrigated and
rainfed lands. In such a scenario, if the water use efficiency remains low, the weaknesses of
agriculture will have to be made up by better utilization of the available potential as well as
physical expansion of irrigation. Whether that expansion will be achieved through the
interlinking project, or by giving greater stress on micro- and meso-level water harvesting
and conservation, will have to be decided on the basis of their economics. Thus, the
picture of the interlinking project as the only instrument for maintaining India’s food
security under a scenario of low agricultural development is not clearly established.
Accordingly, there is more reason for an open and professional assessment of the project
proposal.
The interlinking project, even to start with, will have to face many potential inter-state
conflicts. If the so called ‘surplus’ basin areas use ecohydrological arguments, and not be
guided by arithmetical hydrology, in calculating their maximum water demands, then there
will be quite a disagreement on what is the ‘surplus’ that can be transferred. The second
point of discontent will be on the sharing of the all-important flows in the pre-monsoon
period, when ‘surplus’ states cease to be so and need the water in the river as much as the
‘deficit’ basins. If the past is any indicator of the trends in future, and if the perception of
the water resource engineers remains unchanged, the interlinking project may lead to so
many water related conflicts, as a result of which, the Supreme Court may soon get fully
overburdened with them.
The interlinking project, as described now, looks like a set of linkages, developed
primarily for irrigation, but looking for diverse other justifications, of drought proofing,
drinking water supply, flood control, etc. Its idea of providing domestic water supply
to large urban areas in dry regions is very plausible. Other claims are not that convincing.
The Himalayan component is not based on any open and professionally assessed knowl-
edge base. This is a source of serious concern. In the interest of the people of India,
justifications put forward for such a gigantic project should be assessed in an open and
professional manner. There is a clear need for examining the presuppositions on
which the whole interlinking project has been put. The need to study the feasibility of the
independent links will arise only after the premises are found agreeable. If the old practice
of getting feasibility studies on water related projects conducted away from the public
view is continued, it will be against the expectations of the changing times of openness
and transparency.
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Chalise, S.R. and N.R. Khanal: Extended Abstracts: International Conference on Ecohydrology of
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Cosgrove, W. and F.R. Rijsberman: World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody’s Business.
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Ellis, C.: Hot Mist Strips Salt from the Sea. New Scientist 179(2403) (July 12, 2003), p. 15.
Gately, D.: Potential for International and National Water Conflicts is High in Coming Years
According to Research Organization. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington
D.C., USA (http://www.ifpri.org/pressrel/061495c.htm), June 1995.
Gaur, V.K. (ed.): Earthquake Hazard and Large Dams in the Himalaya. Indian National Trust for Art
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Gazmuri, R.: Chilean Water Policy Experience. Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Irrigation and
Drainage Seminar, Agriculture and Water Resources Department, World Bank, Washington
D.C., USA, 1992.
Gleick, P.H.: The World’s Water 2000 to 2001: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources.
Island Press, Washington D.C., USA, 2000.
Goyal, P.: Food Security in India. Online Edition (www.hinduonnet.com/the hindu/biz/ 2002/01/10/
stories/ 200201000440200.htm), January 2002.
Hazarika, S.: Climb-Down on River Linking. The Statesman, May 28, 2003.
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National Development: Problems and Perspectives. IWRS, 1996.
Ives, J.D. and B. Messerli: The Himalayan Dilemma. Routledge, London, 1989.
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Jain, S.: The River Sutra. Indian Express, New Delhi, March 2, 2003.
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Possible? Working Paper 1474, The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA, 1995.
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Delhi (http://www.narmada.org/sandrp/apr2003_1.doc), February 10, 2003.
Matsura, K.: Quoted in http://www.edie.net/news/Arch, 2003.
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www.iucn.org/bookstore/bulletin/1999/wc2/content/conflict.pdf), 1996.
Mohile, A.D.: India’s Water and Its Plausible Balance in Distant Future, 1998. Unpublished paper
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(http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/header8.htm), 2002.
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5
A Systems Approach to Interlinking Rivers

in India: An Examination of Viability
S.G. VOMBATKERE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Interlinking of rivers (ILR) is not simply a scheme to connect rivers by canals. It is a

complicated system to connect high-discharge, fast-flowing Himalayan rivers with the
seasonal rivers of peninsular India, transferring large quantities of water between river
basins. The main aim of the mega-project, as stated in the National Water Policy of 2002
(GoI, 2002)1 and reiterated frequently by many national leaders of India, is to transfer
surplus water from flood-prone river basins to deficit river basins to solve flood and
drought problems at the same time. This aim has been frequently repeated by former
President Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam in his doubtless well intentioned but untiring promotion
of ILR.
Since ILR is estimated (in 2002) to cost at least R. 5,600 billion (approximately US$
125 billion), occupy around 600,000 hectares of forest, agricultural and other land, and
displace hundreds of thousands of people in many states. ILR is probably the biggest
project of its kind in the world; it should have been discussed in the Lok Sabha (lower
house of the Parliament), but this has not happened. On the other hand, questions about
the project from concerned and informed citizens have been stone-walled and opposition
by potentially affected people, intellectuals, experts and activists has been criticized.
The website created by the Ministry of Water Resources to provide information con-
tained only the outlines of the ILR, but details were missing. Several feasibility studies
have been conducted but the Feasibility Reports (FRs) were made available only after
activists agitated the matter up to the level of the Supreme Court.
Any thinking person would wonder why there is so much calculated official opacity
for a project of such enormous magnitude that promises such obvious benefits like
solving flood and drought at the same time. Due to the lack of transparency on the part of
government, there is growing, deep distrust regarding the ILR project.
1
Article 19.1 of the National Water Policy (2002) of India states “Drought-prone areas should be made
less vulnerable to drought-associated problems through soil-moisture conservation measures, water
harvesting practices, minimization of evaporation losses, development of the groundwater potential
including including recharging and the transfer of surface water from surplus areas where feasible
and appropriate. Pastures, forestry or other modes of development which are relatively less water
demanding should be encouraged. In planning water resource development projects, the needs of
drought-prone areas should be given priority.”
78 A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTERLINKING RIVERS
Based on past evidence from the large scale water projects in India and elsewhere, it
is anticipated that ILR will have serious social, environmental and economic adverse
effects (discussed in other chapters of this book). Large scale social impacts will stem from
involuntary displacement of hundreds of thousands of project affected families (PAFs)
from the forest, rural and urban land to be acquired for dams and canals, roads and bridges,
and other connected structures. This assumes significance since governments have a
miserable track record of rehabilitation over the past six decades due to overbearing
and/or corrupt officials. Based on a survey of 54 projects, Roy (2000) estimated the people
displaced by large dams in India from 1947 to 1999 to be 33 million, and most of them were
not resettled (Roy, 2000). Though the present article focuses on the systems view of ILR
and its technical aspects, it does not in anyway dilute the seriousness of the social
problems that will accrue from forcible displacement of populations.
5.2 DESIGN OF THE ILR PROJECT
Any project of national interest is meant to benefit people, but it is undisputed that it also
affects some people adversely. A project that involves people, especially very large num-
bers, cannot be successfully designed, leave alone executed and operated, unless it takes
into account the benefits and costs to people. The benefit:cost (B:C) ratio2 is inherently
an inaccurate parameter because of the impossibility of quantifying intangibles (like
social and environmental costs) and for several other reasons, not the least important of
which is the fact that those who bear the cost by displacement and consequent loss of
land and livelihood are not those who benefit from the project. The inaccuracy of calcu-
lation and arbitrariness of the acceptable B:C ratio together go to make it a dehumanized
parameter, which however appears to be acceptable to engineers, economists and
bureaucrats.
The technical design of any system has to be based upon what are known as design
assumptions. The successful functioning of the completed system is only as good as the
design, which in turn depends upon the validity of the basic data which form the design
assumptions. For example, consider construction of a dam across a river – it is a geo-
technical system to impound a certain (designed) quantity of water. If the dam is designed
to withstand an earthquake of a certain assumed intensity (called the “design earth-
quake”), and it is subjected to an earthquake of much higher intensity, it may collapse
catastrophically. If the actual earthquake is only slightly more than the design earth-
quake, the dam may not collapse but may develop defects that may or may not be repair-
able but will reduce the functional effectiveness and life of the dam. This indicates the
importance of the initial assumptions in carrying out the design. Though the design
assumptions of individual dam-canals in the ILR project may be obtained from the FRs,
the design assumptions for the ILR project as a whole have not been defined.
The ILR system has three major flaws, and while it is true that every system has
drawbacks, the ILR system is different on account of scale. One, the system envisages
mass transfer of water during flood in the monsoon (July–September), when the water in
rivers carries a large load of sand and silt. The total measured flow of suspended sediment
in the tributaries to the Ganga is 488 ⫻ 106 tons/year, while the quantity of sediment moving
2
Different approaches for BCA have been evolved over time. Two principal approaches for BCA,
namely the UNIDO approach and Little-Mirlees approach have emerged in the seventies. Later,
various agencies and institutions have modified these approaches and institutions for their use in
appraisal and evaluation of projects. For environmental project evaluation, the valuation approach
has been used in recent years.
S.G. VOMBATKERE 79
in the Ganga at Farakka (18 kilometers from the Bangladesh border) is 729 ⫻ 106 tons/year
(Wasson, 2003). Goswami (1985) estimated 400 million tons of suspended sediment load
in the Brahmaputra during flood season at Pandu, Assam. The relation between discharge
and sediment load is shown in Figure 5.1 (Kale, 1998). The power function relationship
between flow and sediment transport in the river as shown on the sediment rating curve
indicates a high degree of correlation between the two. Any mass transfer of water will
therefore inevitably involve transfer of substantial volumes of sediment along with the
water. This will clog canals in a very short time, reducing the flow in the canal and making
it inefficient, necessitating heavy recurring expenditure to dredge the canals. Two, rivers
like Ganga and Brahmaputra shift their courses by up to one or two kilometers over a
period of a few years and are apt to leave the canal head works dry or with reduced
capacity for off-take of water. This necessitates expensive “river training” maintenance
works like groynes and spurs to be constructed almost every year so as to maintain supply
to the canal. The example of Farakka Barrage across Ganga is a case in point, where large
sums3 are being spent every year just to prevent the Ganga from by-passing the barrage,
making it useless. Mazumder (2004) discussed this issue in detail. Due to the meandering
tendency of the Ganga, the districts of Malda and Murshidabad in West Bengal have
been subjected to unprecedented erosion after construction of the barrage. And three,
water flowing in canals over very long distances involves heavy evaporation and seepage
losses of water, resulting in increased cost of water delivered. In the Ganga basin, two-
thirds of annual precipitation is lost to evaporation because of influence of high tempera-
ture and other meteorological factors.
MONSOON PERIOD
10 3
SUSPENDED SEDMENT (Q s) ha.m.
NON-MONSOON PERIOD
10 2 10
1
10 1 10 0
10 0 10
–1
10 3 10 4 10 5 10 3 10 4
DISCHARGE (Q) m3sec –1
Fig. 5.1 Power function relationship between flow (Q) and sediment transport (Qs) for the monsoon
(log Qs ⫽ 1.79*logQ-6296) and the non-monsoon (logQs ⫽ 2.018*logQ-7307). Kale, 1998.
3
To look into the excessive bank erosion in the districts of Malda and Murshidabad in West Bengal,
the Planning Commission of India set up an expert committee with Member (River Management),
Central Water Commission as its Chairman. The Commission recommended long and short term
measures costing R. 9,270 million (US$ 202 million) out of which short term measures would cost
R. 3,150 million (US$ 68 million) (MoWR, 2001).
In the prevailing situation of social and political unrest, deliberate interference with
any link canal or canal head works by one or more of several methods of sabotage to cause
system failure, cannot be ruled out. For example, a US$ 4.4 billion 336 mile (540 km) length
80 ft (24 m) top width, 16.5 ft (5 m) deep canal (The Central Arizona Project or the CAP
canal) from Lake Havasu which supplies about 44 billion gallons of water each year to
Tucson, USA, is fenced on both sides for its entire length, there is continuous land and air
patrolling, and electronic alarms at all key structures along the length. If similar security
levels are to be provided for the ILR system of about 14,000 km length to prevent
interference, the cost of security will add to the cost of water delivered at any point in the
system, making it uneconomical.
The recurring heavy cost of security, maintenance and water losses needs to be
considered in computing the economic viability of the system of link canals. There is no
evidence that this has been taken into consideration during design of the ILR system.
5.3 THE ILR PROJECT: SOME KEY QUESTIONS
The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) of MoWR has published a map
indicating the link canals, 14 in the Himalayan region and 16 in the Peninsular region, as
shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.4, respectively. For water to be transferred from a river, it is
necessary to construct structures for storage of water, i.e., a dam (or a barrage, if the river
is broad and sloping gently, like in the lower reaches of Ganga or Brahmaputra) to feed
water into a canal. The ILR project may involve construction of about 150 large dams,
but MoWR has not stated how many dams would be involved, though it proposes 30 large
canals.
An important consideration is the fact that out of 1,300 irrigation projects taken up
for implementation since 1951, only about 900 have been completed, while 400 are
incomplete, and on-going major and minor irrigation projects are languishing in various
stages of progress for want of funds to the extent of R. 800 billion. Over the years, the cost
of irrigation from large surface water irrigation projects has also increased significantly.
According to Government of India statistics (GoI, 1989), the cost per hectare of irrigation
(at 1970 to 1971 prices) rose from about R. 3,300 in the first plan to R. 5,400 in the seventh
plan period. The questions here, that MoWR is not about to answer, are:
a. Are the incomplete projects being abandoned or being integrated into the ILR
system?
b. If R. 800 billion are not available to complete the projects in progress, what is
the justification or financial-economic wisdom in incurring a fresh expenditure
of R. 5,600 billion (US$ 125 billion).
5.3.1 Relieving drought or flood?
Ganga in the Himalayan sub-system (Figure 5.2) has been identified as a “surplus basin”.
Considering that in many parts of the Ganga basin (especially in Bihar, from where a
canal is to divert water southwards to Subarnarekha) flood and drought occur simulta-
neously a mere couple of kilometers apart, the logic of assuming Ganga as a surplus basin
is questionable. Even so, the claim of relieving flood by diverting water needs to be
examined.
S.G. VOMBATKERE 81
GHAGRA
MANAS
DA
5
SAR
TISTA
GANDAK
6
SANKOSH
1
4
MECHI
YA
M
KOSI
UN
GA A
NG 3 2 UTR 11
A
AL MAP
A GH
AM
B GO AGRA BRAH
NI CH MT GAN 10
LU I GA
AK
A
BAR
TW
MATI
K A LIS INDH
NE 9
BE
SO
KE
7 8 13
BAR
12
PA R
SU DA
SA
A 14 MO
MA D BE
RN DAR
B AT
NAR MA H A AR
NA EK
I
TAPI D HA

Fig. 5.2 The Himalayan sub-system.
Ganga peak discharge is 55,415 cubic metres per second (cumecs) at Farakka during
the four monsoon months (Figure 5.3), while for technical reasons a 100 m wide 10 m
deep canal can divert at most 2,000 cumecs to provide 4 per cent relief, that too only
downstream of the off-take point. Likewise, Brahmaputra floods at over 60,000 cumecs,
and a similar canal can provide at best 3 per cent relief. However, for the balance 8 non-
monsoon months every year, Ganga flows at an average 5,280 cumecs, and diversion of
2,000 cumecs will deny Bihar 38 per cent of Ganga water when it is needed most, even if
the demand of lower riparian Bangladesh can be neglected. Thus, clearly, the claim of
relieving flood in Ganga or Brahmaputra by canals cannot make economic sense. The
diversion of 38 per cent of Ganga water in the dry season can only lead to the most
serious socio-economic consequences. The alternative of using the canal for the 4 mon-
soon months (to divert a mere 4 per cent) and keeping it idle for 8 months would, of
course, be economic nonsense. Based on the presented facts it is evident that ILR cannot
relieve flood in Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers.
It may be seen from the map showing the Peninsular sub-system (Figure 5.4), that
some canals draw water from rivers that are not flood-prone like their north and northeast
Indian counterparts. In the last century, major floods occurred in the Godavari only on five
occasions (1953, 1958, 1959, 1976, and 1986). The Krishna experienced major floods on two
occasions (1903 and 1964) (Kale, 1998). Links 2 and 3 start on upper Godavari in areas that
are actually drought-prone, and draw water for release into upper Krishna, while Link 4
takes water from lower Godavari to release it into lower Krishna. Also Links 5 and 6 draw
water from upper Krishna and deliver water to upper Pennar. Link 8 takes water from Pennar
to Cauvery. All these links do not serve the main purpose of ILR, namely, relieving flood
and drought. They are merely links that complicate management and interfere with the
existing stable ayacut4 system.
Fig. 5.3 Annual peak discharge (m3/sec) of the Ganges River at Farakka, West Bengal. The thick
horizontal line indicates average peak discharge value of 55,415 (m3/sec). Data source: UNESCO
1976. Peak discharge data after 1975 is not available.
5.3.2 Systems view of ILR
Mr. Suresh Prabhu in his capacity as Chairman of ILR Task Force (TF) stated that the ILR
project would be a network of canals linking 37 national rivers (for details see Chapter 3).
Emphasizing the necessity of the ILR project, he had compared the proposed network of
canals to the road, rail and electric power network in India; however, the fact is that water
in canals flows only in one direction not in both directions as in other utility networks.
Although, in a sense, Mr. Prabhu is correct if we substitute the word “system” for
“network”.
The success of the ILR scheme is based on functioning of a system of canals, in
which northern river basins supply water to river basins that are more to the south by link
canals forming a “chain of supply”. The Peninsular sub-system depends upon the Hima-
layan sub-system for Brahmaputra water to be transferred to Ganga, and Ganga water to
Subarnarekha, and so on southwards to Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar and Palar
to finally deliver water to Cauvery in Tamil Nadu. Apart from providing water for the
Peninsular sub-system, the Himalayan sub-system also supplies water to Rajasthan and
4
In earlier days, for example, in South India, there were thousands of ponds, lakes, and tanks. These
water bodies played a very important role in local agriculture. The technology was very
nature-friendly, and the management of these systems was done by the people themselves. They
have called this “Ayacut system”, where people themselves gathered around the lakes, and made
decisions about irrigation management. The command area for each “ayacut” was usually 50 hectares
or so. These systems are still functioning in South India.
S.G. VOMBATKERE 83
Gujarat through a series of links to transfer water from Kosi to Ghaghara, Gandak to
upstream Ganga (across Ghagahara and Gomti), upstream Ghaghara to Jamuna (across
Ganga), and from Sharada to Sabarmati (across Ganga, Jamuna and Luni). These links
may be seen in Figure 5.2. Barring Brahmaputra, which only supplies water but receives
none, the functioning of both sub-systems is dependent upon chain-supply of water, each
river basin donating water in exchange for water received from a river basin to its north.
The concept of donating water in exchange of water received, being the basic assump-
tion for the ILR system to function, is mentioned in the FRs.
A
TR
GA APU
BA
L GO NGA HM
NI GA BRA
LU H AM MT NG
A
C I
11
K
RA
A
10
TW
I
BA
KALISINDH
MAT
NE
BE
SO
KE
AR
DA
BARB
SU MO
ADA
AB
M BE DA
WAINGANGA
S NAR MAHAN
RN R
ATI
A AR
TAPI EK
HA
DI
12
PAR GO PENGAN
DA GA
13 VAR 1
MA I
NE
G
R D
O
3 AV
KR AR
IS 2 4 I
HN
A
14
6 7
ARABIAN PENN
AR BAY
SEA 15
OF
CA PA
UV
ER LA 8 BENGAL
Y R
16 9
VA
AI
VAIP
PAR
INDIAN OCEAN

Fig. 5.4 The proposed inter-basin water transfer links (The Pennisular sub-system).
Here we come up against an anomalous situation. Page 9 of Volume I of the Report of

the National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development states, “… The
Himalayan river linking data is not freely available, but on the basis of public
information, it appears that the Himalayan river linking component is not feasible for the
period of review up to 2050” (NCIWRD, 1999: p.9). From a system viewpoint therefore, this
statement of a national document raises the following important question:
If the Himalayan sub-system is not feasible, then what is the source

of water to feed Subarnarekha basin and onward to the river basins to
its south (Mahanadi, Godavari, and so on) for each basin to supply
water to the next basin in exchange of water received?
According to the “exchange concept”, if a (recipient) river basin does not receive
water from another (donor) river basin for any reason whatever, it will not be in a position
to feed water (as a donor) into the next link canal in the system. For water to reach Cauvery,
all the links have to function as a system, conveying water from North to South, and also
from West to East (the Bedti-Varada and Nethravathi-Hemavathi links) (Figure 5.4). But
even neglecting the absence of water supplied from the unfeasible Himalayan sub-system,
let us discuss the Peninsular sub-system. In his capacity as Chairman of the ILR Task
Force Mr. Suresh Prabhu assured that links not found feasible will not be constructed
(Thakkar, 2003). It is of course known that engineers are not above manipulating FRs and
B:C ratios to establish feasibility and obtain sanction for a project. But there are other
causes for any particular link canal not functioning adequately or not at all, such as
siltation of canals, canal breaching, political agitations against release of water, etc.
The following three links require 4,000 MW of dedicated electric power for lifting
water: Ganga-Subarnarekha 60 m, Subarnarekha-Mahanadi 48 m, and Godavari-Krishna
116 m. If any of the pumped lifts between Ganga and Krishna fail to function for any reason
whatever (equipment failure, power failure, etc.), the recipient basin will not only not
receive water, but there will also be severe flooding at the pump input point besides
disrupting systemic water flow.
In the Peninsular sub-system (Figure 5.4), supply to Cauvery is predicated on the
reliable and continuous operation of the chain of links to its north, that is, Subarnarekha-
Mahanadi-Godavari-Krishna-Pennar-Palar. Suppose, for example, that Krishna-Pennar
Links 5 and 6 fail to operate for some reason or are not found feasible and therefore not
constructed. In such circumstances, Cauvery at the tail end cannot receive the quantity of
water that it is supposed to receive, because farmers of the Pennar basin will certainly
interfere with release of water southward since it will directly and immediately reduce water
availability to them. Therefore the Peninsular sub-system of ILR cannot function without
water donated by the Himalayan sub-system.
Therefore, even neglecting the argument that canals cannot relieve flood in Ganga or
Brahmaputra as already demonstrated above, with the Himalayan links not being feasible,
there is no reason to take up the Peninsular links because water from Brahmaputra or
Ganga will not reach Mahanadi, and the system of water supply to Cauvery will
necessarily fail. The ILR system flow plan – if indeed MoWR engineers have prepared
one – indicating the design flow quantities has not been made public by ILR TF or
MoWR. The FRs consider each link separately and there is no evidence that NWDA or
ILR TF have considered all of them together to take a systems view of ILR. In sum, the
ILR system is delicate, failure-prone and subject to many if’s and but’s, mainly because it
is too complicated to be practical, and the risk of system failure is high. Thus, from a
system standpoint, the entire ILR scheme is unworkable.
5.3.3 Objections by states
Reference “Comments of various State Governments on Inter-Basin Water Transfer

Proposals of National Water Development Agency” as made available by NWDA, the
Government of Andhra Pradesh has raised the following objections with regard to the
S.G. VOMBATKERE 85
Peninsular sub-system: (1) Nagarjunasagar ayacut, now getting dependable Krishna

waters by gravity has to depend upon Godavari water pumped from Inchampalli Project
nearly 300 km away, (2) Srisailam and Nagarjunasagar Power Stations may have to be
shutdown, (3) Proposed Inchampalli and Polavaram Power Stations may not materialize
due to lack of flows, (4) Dependable flows will be diverted and instead Andhra Pradesh will
be made dependent on flood flows, and (5) Andhra Pradesh reiterated a number of times
that there is no balance water (out of dependable yield) in Godavari, after meeting the
requirements of basins States. Thus, in the balance, it would appear that Andhra Pradesh
stands to lose by becoming a part of the ILR system.
The Government of Orissa has questioned NWDA’s assumption that Mahanadi
(at Manibhadra) has surplus flow that can be transferred to Godavari, and has objected to
the submergence of productive lands by the proposed Polavaram dam on Godavari. There
are also various objections by state governments of Chhatisgarh, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh. Even Gujarat, one of the most vocal of ILR proponents that receives water from
Sharada in the Ganga basin, objects to parting with water from Damanganga for supplying
Mumbai with water (Link 13, Figure 5.2). Gujarat argues that transfer to surplus Pinjal basin
in Maharashtra is against the national policy since it “… diverts water from surplus basin
to surplus basin …” while “… (emphasizing) diversion of water from surplus to deficit
basin”. Whether the argument is valid or not, the truth is that Gujarat does not want to part
with water.
Kerala, despite its high annual rainfall, suffers from serious water shortage in the
non-monsoon months, and as far as ILR is concerned, is always only a donor state.
It has passed a resolution in the Legislative Assembly that it opposes ILR. Tamil Nadu,
which is always a recipient and has always been in favour of ILR, has objected to a dam
proposed on Pennar by (upstream) Andhra Pradesh, on the grounds that it will deplete
flow in Tamil Nadu – a simple case of wanting more! Thus it is clear that no state would
like to spare water even though every state is keen to receive water – such attitude is also
present at intra-state levels. In this general ambience of water demand, cobbling together
inter-state consensus regarding water sharing can only be a pipe dream. Orders by the
Supreme Court regarding water sharing will have to be implemented by state govern-
ments, but such orders are impractical since they can never be truly accepted at the
farmers’ level. If a Chief Minister is forced to share (release) water even when his own state
is running short, he will have to face the political consequences of such obedience to a
distant judicial power (the Supreme Court), as erstwhile Karnataka CM Mr. S.M. Krishna
did in the elections ensuing release of water to Tamil Nadu in the Cauvery water dispute
with Tamil Nadu in 2003.
In the well-known case of sharing water of the Cauvery basin (see Box 5.1), upper
riparian Karnataka and lower riparian Tamil Nadu have been at loggerheads for several
decades, Tamil Nadu demanding more water and Karnataka claiming that it is deficit of
water especially in the lower rainfall years. While adjudicating in accusations traded
between the two states of the same river basin, the Supreme Court had occasion to berate
Karnataka, saying that water should be shared in times of scarcity. Given the above few
examples of objections from states regarding ILR, it passes understanding how a
water sharing dispute between states of different river basins may be resolved by a similar
fiat of the Supreme Court, and what will be its local and national political cost. There is no
doubt that realistic agricultural policy can result in more effective and efficient use of
water, but the long term interests of any region or state with regard to water will not
change, even if Ministers or governments change.
Box 5.1 The Cauvery water dispute
Dispute over the Cauvery River water is 125 years old. This south Indian River
originates in the Brahmagiri ranges of Kodagu district and the basin is shared by
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry states. The dispute first erupted in
1883 when the Diwan of the Mysore Princely State launched a scheme to utilize
waters of the Cauvery River for irrigation. The Madras Presidency under the British
Raj resented the Diwan’s move. A 50-year agreement over sharing of the waters
reached between the two states in 1924. Under the Agreement, Mysore was
permitted to construct a dam in Kannambadi village to impound 44.8 thousand
million cubic (tmc) feet of water. Madras appropriated to itself the right to construct
a dam in Mettur in Selam district to impound 93.5 tmc ft. In 1959, Karnataka (former
Mysore) drew attention of Tamil Nadu to several clauses and suggested changes.
The plea was rejected by Tamil Nadu and said it would be contemplated only after
the expiry of the Agreement in 1974. To resolve the crisis, countless rounds of talks
have taken place without any success. The Cauvery Water Tribunal set up in 1991
in its interim award ordered that Karnataka release 205 tmc of water to Tamil Nadu
during one water year (May to June). It also stipulated a weekly quantum of flow.
The Karnataka felt betrayed and this led to large-scale violence against Tamils
living in Karnataka. On February 5, 2007 the Tribunal finally announced its ruling.
It awarded: 419 tmc ft for Tamil Nadu, 270 tmc ft for Karnataka, 30 tmc ft for Kerala
and 7 tmc ft for Pondicherry. The option for approaching the Supreme Court is open
to all parties.
Local farmers’ perceptions of water needs cannot be countered by calculations in

an engineer’s office, nor by an agreement or MOU signed between Chief Ministers. It
is common knowledge that politicians and bureaucrats can be induced to agree to almost
anything (in this case, sparing “surplus” water) by application of political pressures,
or offer of personal and/or party benefits, or threats of exposing past indiscretions, etc.
But finally, the will of the people must supervene. ILR cannot function as a system.
5.4 RISK AND CONSEQUENCES OF SYSTEM FAILURE
Any system can fail. The failure can be minor and dealt with easily, or major with serious
consequences. When a system fails there is some loss to people, immediate and/or distant
in both time and space. It is axiomatic that the consequences of system failure become
more serious as the system gets more complex. An airline operator takes insurance against
system failure (like say the crash of a passenger aircraft) to enable payment of compensa-
tion to survivors and next-of-kin, but strict inspections for airworthiness and safety pro-
cedures, etc., are a part of the insurer’s conditions. In this straightforward example, the
passengers were in the ill-fated aircraft by choice and the compensation is paid to the
victims of the failure. However, the ILR system is not only entirely different in nature but
is on a gargantuan scale compared to an aircraft.
The ILR project is an extremely complex system of dams, canals, appurtenant
structures and ancillary projects like power generation, bridges, buildings and roads. The
risk of failure of each sub-system like a dam is the equivalent of many passenger aircraft.
Physical failure of even a part of a sub-system has long range (in time and space) physical,
S.G. VOMBATKERE 87
social, environmental, economic and political consequences. Contemplating the effects

of systemic failure of the ILR project is unpleasant. Suppose for a moment that the
completed ILR project does not function because of an erroneous basic assumption such
as “water is surplus in the Ganga basin in Bihar”. In such a failure situation, all the money
spent would be a colossal waste, all the people who were displaced would have been
displaced in vain, the national debt would not be repaid because benefits would not
accrue from the project, India’s economic standing and credit in the international arena
would be lost, etc. This is the reason for people asking to know what are the basic assump-
tions on which the ILR project is based, and also questioning the assumptions that have
been put out, such as declaring a river basin as surplus, simultaneously relieving flood
and drought, generation of 30,000 MW of net electric power, etc. The risk that there may
be flaws in basic assumptions is too great to leave unquestioned. Hence the basic
assumptions and the performance criteria of the completed ILR project need to be spelt
out, and discussed transparently at district, state and national level.
The ILR project is a system with multi-dimensional uncertainties and whole vol-
umes of imponderables, that affect not only millions of people alive today but also
millions more as yet unborn, who will be willy-nilly affected by the ILR project, whether
they believe that it is a good project or not, whether they oppose it and it gets going
despite opposition, or even if they know nothing at all about it. They (especially future
generations) are not a party to the ILR project, never having been consulted and becom-
ing “beneficiaries” or “victims” of the project willy-nilly and not by choice. It does not
need amplification that if the ILR system should fail, the number of beneficiaries will
shrink to negligible numbers (though they also stand to lose in the long run as the
economy collapses under the weight of debt) and the number of victims will expand out
of all proportion. The ILR project cannot be insured and the victims of failure cannot be
identified, and therefore can never be compensated in case of system failure. Though the
risk of failure of the ILR project is essentially unassessable, it is clearly immense.
India has about 4,500 large dams and it is pertinent to mention here that to date, no
transparent review of the completed dam projects, each one a system in itself, has been
done to verify if it has met the technical and economic performance criteria that were
stipulated at the time the projects were designed and sanctioned. This opaque
technical-cum-administrative track record, combined with the unwholesome track record
of rehabilitation of about 40 million displaced families since 1947 naturally causes any
informed and socially sensitive citizen to question the basis and demand a risk assessment
of the ILR project. The risk of failure of the ILR system is of such magnitude and type that
no nation, leave alone a poor, developing one like India, can afford to take. The social risk
already taken by displacing about 40 million people (since 1950) is manifesting itself
in the display of heightened social tensions in both rural and urban contexts in the past
several years.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
Water is the “product” of the ILR project. Cost of water supplied will be determined by
the interest on borrowings and operation-maintenance costs. The economic feasibility of
a project can be determined only when there are comparisons of expected cost of the
product with present cost, considering affordability and present availability. The cost of
water based on alternative scheme(s) of watershed management needs to be compared,
but even without doing so, determination of economic feasibility of the ILR project as a
whole has not been carried out. The best planning can go awry if the end product is not
economical. Privatization in India’s electric power sector has demonstrated this adequately
by producing power at unaffordable cost, leading to breakdown of agreements, expensive
litigation and continuing shortage of the product (Godbole, 2002).
There is no doubt that India possesses the technical and management resources
necessary to construct all the dams and link canals planned in the ILR project, and that
financial resources can perhaps also be found. However, the matter at issue is not whether
ILR can be constructed, but whether it should be constructed and whether, if constructed,
it can perform what it is designed to perform. (India also has the scientific intellectual
resources to assess potential effects and side effects, and to decide whether it should be
done at all, but where is the evidence of that knowledge being deployed?). The accepted
planning method in which alternatives, such as watershed management in the instant case,
are considered and evaluated and the best alternative, or the best combination of available
alternatives, are evaluated environmentally, technically and economically, has not been
followed in the ILR project. Rather, a perverse, inverted planning method has been
followed by which ILR has been assumed as the solution and then a network of canals has
been prepared without consideration of the performance of the project as a system.
The ILR project is a system of dams and canals that is meant to operate by each river
basin supplying water to another river basin in exchange of water received from another
“surplus” river basin. The concept of “surplus” water is one on which different states
have different perceptions, and the quantification of “surplus” is even more contentious.
Thus the design basis of the ILR project is itself delightfully vague, while the functioning
of the system of canals cannot be ensured especially since the “source” of “surplus”
water, namely Brahmaputra and Ganga are in the Himalayan region where, by admission of
MoWR itself, ILR is not feasible. Entering into this R. 5,60,000 crores (US$ 125 billion)
project which is a colossal system design failure that cannot perform, can only end in
social, environmental, economic and political ruin for India.
As a final perspective, with the IPCC Report on global warming that threatens reduced
rainfall in peninsular India and speeding up of recession of Himalayan glaciers that feed
Ganga and Brahmaputra (IPCC, 2007), all calculations of river flow (and consequent
“surpluses”) are certain to go haywire, making the ILR system even more, not less, unviable.
India can be saved from very serious water shortages and consequent widespread unrest
if and only if
a. Immediate investment is made in local watershed management and rainwater

harvesting,
b. The ILR project is shelved permanently as being misconceived and unworkable,
and
c. The apparently limitless greed of industrial and commercial corporations and
individuals in power is curbed by democratic process.
S.G. VOMBATKERE 89
REFERENCES
Godbole, M.: Power Sector Reforms: If Wishes were Horses. Economic and Political Weekly
37(7) (2002), pp. 621–626.
Goswami, D.C.: Brahmaputra River, Assam, India: Physiography, Basin Denudation, and Channel
Aggradation. Water Resources Research 21(1985), pp. 959–978.
Government of India (GoI): Report of the Working Group on Major and Medium Projects for the
Eighth Plan (1990 to 1995). Government of India, New Delhi, 1989.
Government of India (GoI): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, Government of
India, New Delhi, 2002.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Asia (Chapter 10). In: Climate Change 2007:
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
Kale, V.: Monsoon Floods in India: A Hydro-Geomorphic Perspective. In: Flood Studies in India
(V.S. Kale Ed.), Geological Society of India, Bangalore, 1998, pp. 229–256.
Mazumder, S.K.: Role of Farakka Barrage on the Disastrous 1998 Flood in Malda (West Bengal). In:
The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (M.M.Q. Mirza Ed.),
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Annual Report 2001. MoWR, New Delhi, 2001.
National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development (NCIWRD): 1999.
Roy, A.: The Cost of Living. Frontline 15(3), February 5 to 8, 2000.
Thakkar, H.: Let’s Have Feet on Ground – Mr. Prabhu. Dams, Rivers and People 1(2–3) (2003),
pp. 5–6.
UNESCO: World Catalogue of Large Floods. UNESCO, Paris, 1976.
Wasson, R.J.: A Sediment Budget for the Ganga-Brahmaputra Catchment. Current Science 84(3)
(2003), pp. 1041–1047.
6
Impact of the Interlinking of Rivers on

Nepal: A Critical Analysis
DWARIKA N. DHUNGEL
SANTA B. PUN
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Following an order passed by the Supreme Court of India on 31 October 2002 in response
to an application filed by a senior advocate, Ranjit Kumar in a public interest litigation
on the basis of a reference made by President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam of India, in his speech
on the eve of India’s Independence Day, to the interlinking of rivers, the Government of
India (GoI) passed a resolution for such interlinking and formed an eight (three full-time
and five part-time)-member Task Force under the chairpersonship of Mr. Suresh Prabhu
(see Chapter 3) to get thirty-seven major rivers (Shankari, 2004) interlinked by 2016.
Basically, the scheme is ‘for transfer of water from surplus basins to water deficit basins for
optimum utilization of water resources.’ (Lok Sabha (India), Press Release on Linking of
Rivers, undated).
The current government, led by the Indian National Congress, has supported this
proposal, adopted by the previous government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Since the adoption of the resolution and formation of the Prabhu Task Force, the proposed
ambitious R. 5,600 billion (US$ 186 billion at 2002 price) Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Project,
with fourteen inter-basin water transfer links under the Himalayan rivers development
component and sixteen similar links under the Peninsular rivers development component,
has attracted much attention of water experts, environmentalists, economists, etc in India.
This has also become a subject of serious concern to the countries of South Asia, espe-
cially to the governments, professionals and non-government/civil societies of Nepal
and Bangladesh.
While the proposed links and their details of the Peninsular component are available,
no information on the Himalayan component is available. Nonetheless, the proposed
project also aims to transfer the Himalayan waters to the Peninsular south through the
Subarnarekha-Mahanadi-Godavari links. This reveals the grandiose nature of the plan. It
is the Himalayan component – the Brahmaputra-Ganga-Gandak and Kosi-Ghagra-Sarda-
Yamuna-Rajasthan-Sabarmati – that would have serious implications for both Nepal and
Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh has already opposed the proposed project
and has requested GoI not to go ahead with it as the project would have serious impli-
cations for her. His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMGN), however, is yet to come
92 IMPACTS OF INTERLINKING ON NEPAL
out with a stand on this matter. This chapter therefore, deals with the implications of the
proposed scheme for Nepal in the light of the contribution of the rivers flowing from Nepal
to the Ganges River, the existing treaty regime Nepal has with India and the implications of
the proposed scheme for Nepal.
6.2 FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY: WALK THROUGH HISTORY
As indicated above, the immediate cause that led to the filing of the public interest
litigation at India’s Supreme Court and on whose order, i.e. of 31 October 2002, the GoI
decided to go ahead with the ILR, was the speech of the President of India, A.P.J. Abdul
Kalam, who in his address of 2002 (14 August 2002) had stated:
‘Let us now look at a long term problem. It is paradoxical to see floods

in one part of our country while some other parts face drought. This
drought-flood phenomenon is a recurring feature. The need of the
hour is to have a water mission, which will enable availability of
water to the fields, villages, towns, and industries throughout the year,
even while maintaining environmental purity. One major part of the
water mission would be networking of our rivers. Technological and
project management capabilities of our country can rise to the occasion
and make this river networking a reality with long term planning and
proper investment … Such programmes should have large scale people
participation even at the conceptual and project planning stages. The
entire programme should revolve around economic viability, leading
to continued prosperity for our people with larger employment poten-
tial, environmental sustainability, grassroot-level motivation and ben-
efit sharing.’ (Quoted from Shankari, 2004).
But the history of the proposed project as a concept goes back to the time of the
British-India Government (Thakkar, 2003; Dixit, 2003). It was in the mid-nineteenth century
that Sir Arthur Cotton of the British-India Government, for the first time had proposed ‘the
possible links of river, he was concerned primarily with navigation though irrigation
[was] also a part of it’ (Dixit, 2003). In more recent times, ‘it was in 1972 that Dr K.L. Rao
came forward with the Ganga-Cauvery link proposal, which was dumped by the Ministry
of Water Resources after the Central Water Commission found it to be ‘grossly under
estimated’. Earlier, Captain Dastur had proposed a garland of canals connecting the
Himalayan rivers and the Peninsular rivers, which the Ministry of Water Resources
declared ‘technically unsound and economically prohibitive’ (Thakkar, 2003). GoI then
decided to prepare a National Water Master Plan with inter-basin water transfer, and in July
1982, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was created for carrying out
surveys and to prepare feasibility studies on river linking projects. The National Water
Policy, adopted in 1987, had proposed the interlinking of rivers as its prime goal. Similarly,
the revised 2002 National Water Policy of India reiterated this concept which iterates:
‘Water should be made available to water-short areas by transfer from

other areas, including transfers from one river basin to another, based
on a national perspective, after taking into account the requirements
of the areas/basins’ (GoI, 2002: p.3).
DWARIKA N. DHUNGEL AND SANTA B. PUN 93
‘NWDA has, after carrying out detailed studies, identified 30 links for preparation of
feasibility reports and has prepared feasibility study reports of such six links. The various
basin States have expressed divergent views about the studies and feasibility reports
prepared by NWDA’ (Ministry of Water Resources [GoI] 13 December 2002). Therefore,
pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court, GoI decided to form the Prabhu Task Force as
the latest in a series of efforts to translate the idea mooted by Sir Arthur Cotton more than
150 years ago. The purpose of the Task Force was to bring about consensus among the
states and to provide guidance on norms of appraisal of individual projects and modalities
for funding of the project, etc. (Box 6.1).
Box 6.1 Terms of reference of the Suresh Prabhu task force
1. Provide guidance on norms appraisal of individual projects in respect of

economic viability, soico-economic impacts, environmental impacts and
preparation of resettlement plans;
2. Devise suitable mechanism for brining about speedy consensus amongst
States; prioritize the different project components for preparation of detailed
project reports and implementation;
3. Propose suitable organizational structure for implementing the project;
4. Consider various modalities for project funding; and
5. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some project
components.
In fact, NWDA has by November 2006 completed feasibility studies of 13 of the

16 Peninsular components (Box 6.2). However, no information is available on the
14 Himalayan component links (Shankari, 2004). The feasibility studies of these 14 links
were expected to be completed by December 2005 (MoWR GoI).
Box 6.2 Completed feasibility studies of the Peninsular components
1. Feasibility Report of Ken-Betwa Link

2. Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal Link
3. Polavaram-Vijayawada Link
4. Damanganga-Pinjal Link
5. Mahanadi-Godavari Link
6. Inchampalli-Pulichintala Link
7. Inchampalli-Nagarjunasagar Link
8. Almatti-Pennar Link
9. Srisailam-Pennar Link
10. Nagarjunasagar-Somasila Link
11. Pennar-Palar-Cauvery Link
12. Cauvery-Vaigai-Gundar Link
13. Pamba-Achankovil-Vaippar Link
14. Par-Tapi-Narmada Link.
Source: NWDA, 2006.

6.3 DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF THE ILR
The proposed inter-basin water transfer links ‘Mostly envisage using existing storage
reservoirs or storage reservoirs proposed to be constructed by the States under their plan
proposals. Construction of storage reservoirs, as part of the project proposals, is also
envisaged wherever necessary’ (Lok Sabha (India), Press Release on Linking of Rivers,
undated).
With regard to the envisaged benefits from the proposed ILR, the Himalayan
component with 14 links, 9 big dams, and 6,099 kilometer (km) of canals, will provide
200 to 250 billion cubic metres (BCM) additional water and irrigation benefits to 22 million
hectares (Mha) of land, generate 30,000 megawatts (MW) of hydropower, and provide
1,120 cumecs of water to the Kolkata Port. Note that this quantum of water for the Kolkata
Port is equivalent to the original diversion plan through the feeder canal of Farakka
Barrage. The Peninsular component with 16 links, 27 big dams, 4,777 km (including
94 tunnels) would provide 84 BCM of additional water and irrigation to 13 Mha of land
and generate 4,000 MW of hydropower (Akhtar Hossain, 2004; India Today, 2003).
Of the 9 major dams under the Himalayan component, except the near complete
Tehri dam, other dams like Pancheshwar on the Mahakali (Sarda), Saptakosi on the Kosi,
the Chisapani on the Karnali and the Budhi Gandaki on the Gandak, are some of the
major dams under discussion between the two countries. Also Nepal and India have taken
up Bagmati and Kamala storage dams as well. This means that Nepal would, thus, have to
bear the brunt of this ILR.
6.3.1 Nepal-related links
Nepal, with a population of 26 million (2003 estimate), has a mere 13 per cent of the total
Ganga basin catchment area. But her large snow-fed Kosi, Gandak, Karnali and Mahakali
rivers contribute 47 per cent of the average annual flow of the Ganges. Of the 14 Himalayan
component links, the 5 mentioned below are Nepal-related links and would be of concern
to it as they envisage the use of the waters of the rivers flowing from Nepal in the following
manner:
i. Kosi-Mechi Link: This link, in all probability, will originate from the 269 metre
(mt) high Kosi High Dam with a live storage of 9.37 BCM (Comprehensive Plan
of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin, 1983) in Nepal and travel east to the
Indo-Nepal border river Mechi, catching the Kankai river enroute. The Mechi
river, like the Kankai, will hook up with Mahananda, which in turn will join the
Ganges ahead of the Farakka in West Bengal.
ii. Kosi-Ghagra (Karnali) Link: This link will probably also originate from the Kosi
High Dam in Nepal and appears to be the most ambitious link. The link travels
westwards, feeding major rivers enroute such as Kamala, Bagmati, Budhi Gandak
and Gandak. Technically, this link will in all likelihood replicate the existing
Ghagra/Girijapur-Saryu-Rapti/Laxmanpur barrage links. Ultimately, this link will
join the Ghagra in the district of Saran in Bihar just above Ghagra-Ganges junc-
tion near Chapra. It may be stated that the existing canals of the Kosi Barrage in
Nepal serve the state of Bihar extensively – as far west as Dharbhanga across the
Kamala towards Bagmati and in the east and south as far as Purnia and Katihar.
iii. Gandak-Ganga Link: This link appears to originate from the existing Gandak
Barrage on the Indo-Nepal border and flows west, feeding major rivers such as
Rapti, Ghagra, Gomati in the Ghagra-Saryu-Rapti Barrages link, in the same style
as mentioned above. The Gandak-Ganga link is envisaged to hook up with the
Ganga (tributary) just above their junction at Allahabad. Like the Kosi barrage, as
mentioned above, the existing Gandak barrage on the Indo-Nepal border serves the
states of both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP) from the Bagmati basin in the east to the
district of Saran in the south, plus the hinterlands of Rapti river basin in the west.
iv. Ghagra-Yamuna Link: This link appears to originate from the famed 270 mt high
Karnali/Chisapani dam, with a live storage of 16.2 BCM (Karnali/Chisapani
Multipurpose Project Feasibility Study Report, 1989), envisaged in Nepal since
the early 1960s. The link will travel west, again feeding the major rivers, Sarada
and Ganges, in the same Ghagra-Saryu-Rapti barrages style to ultimately hook
up with the Yamuna near the junction where the Chambal river from the south
joins the Yamuna river. The Girijapur barrage on the Karnali/Ghagra river
already links the Babai/Saryu and the Rapti rivers in the east and the Mahakali/
Sarada river in the west.
v. Sarada-Yamuna Link: This link with India’s 260.5 mt high Tehri Dam, with a live
storage of 2.6 BCM (Tehri Hydro Development Corporation, 2001), and Indo-
Nepal’s 315 mt high Pancheshwar Dam, with a live storage of 6.56 BCM
(Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report, 1995), augmented flows will again
travel west, feeding the Ganges and joining the Yamuna just near New Delhi, which
has a population of 13.8 million (Census of India, 2001). With the exception of the
Kosi-Mechi link, all the above 4 links push the waters from the east to the west, i.e.
from the ‘surplus basins to the deficit basins’ (Lok Sabha: India, Press Release).
In order to achieve this, the Kosi river is envisaged to serve the lower reaches of
the Gandak river basin through the Kosi-Ghagra link; the Gandak river through
the Gandak-Ganga link is envisaged to serve the lower reaches of the Ghagra river
basin; the Ghagra-Yamuna link has been similarly planned to serve the lower
reaches of the Ganga (tributary) river basin, thus making available the waters of
the Sarada and Yamuna rivers through the Sarada-Yamuna link, to be pushed to
the Luna and Sabarmati rivers in the semi-deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat.
6.4 MAJOR CONCERNS TO NEPAL
6.4.1 Nepal’s river flows
Table 6.1 indicates that the average annual discharge of the 9 large and medium rivers of
Nepal is 5,675 cumecs. The 1949 to 1985 average annual discharge of the Ganges at Farakka
is 12,323 cumecs (Figure 6.1) (Mirza, 1998) which means that the Nepalese rivers contribute
a significant 46 per cent of the annual average flow of the Ganges at Farakka. If one is to
again compare the average flows of the three lean months (March, April and May) of the
Nepal flows (1,442 cumecs) with that of the Farakka flows (1,917 cumecs), this gives an
astounding 75 per cent. This huge 75 per cent lean season contribution from Nepal is
mainly attributed to the heavy Ganges withdrawal in India for the rabi crops and the fact
that the Himalayan snowmelts have yet to impact the Farakka flows. That is why storage
projects in Nepal are very critical to Ganges augmentation and thus India’s proposed ILR.
96
Table 6.1 Average monthly and yearly flows (in cumecs) of the four major rivers and five medium rivers of Nepal
Average
Average
River name Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec discharge
years
(in cumecs)
Mahakali 167 156 149 182 266 560 1,579 1,332 1,489 577 227 198 658
Karnali ’62–’86 370 335 348 445 702 1,520 3,290 4,370 3,020 1,320 632 446 1,410
Babai ’67–’85 19 15 13 10 15 56 222 241 232 95 36 23 82
IMPACTS OF INTERLINKING ON NEPAL
West Rapti ’64–’85 28 23 18 14 15 93 298 388 355 147 57 33 123

Narayani ’63–’85 351 286 264 348 568 1,610 4,210 4,970 3,420 1,600 790 492 1,590
Bagmati ’65–’79 19 17 15 17 32 214 539 513 338 137 51 27 161
Kamala ’57–’69 7 5 4 3 8 46 130 160 102 45 17 11 45
Saptakoshi ’77–’85 364 315 318 424 705 1,660 4,110 4,340 3,460 1,460 795 501 1,550
Kankai ’72–’84 12 9 8 11 21 72 198 145 106 51 23 15 56
Total 1,170 1,005 988 1,272 2,066 5,271 12,997 15,127 11,033 4,855 2,401 1,548 5,675
Sources
HMGN, Hydrological Records of Nepal, Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, June 15, 1988; BB Thapa and BB Pradhan, Water
Resources Development Nepalese Perspectives, IIDS/Kathmandu 1995, Ajyaya Dixit, Resource Endowment and Associated Uncertainty of
Water Resources and NK Agrawal: Agriculture and Irrigation in BB Thapa and BB Pradhan, Water Resources Development Nepalese
Perspectives, IIDS/Kathmandu 1995.
Fig. 6.1 Annual mean discharge of the Ganges River at Farakka for the period 1949–1985. The
horizontal solid line indicates mean annual discharge of 12,323 cumecs (Mirza, 1998).
6.4.1.1 Schematic diagrams of existing Himalayan river links

in India and their canal capacity
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 illustrate that the Himalayan river links already do exist in
India. While the wetter Kosi/Gandak basins in Bihar have bare skeleton links, the drier
Ghagra/Sarada basins in UP already have in place more mature and extensive links. In
Bihar, the Kosi is already linked with the Kamala river. It is just the Bagmati river that
separates the waters of the Kosi river from that of the Gandak river. But in UP, the Sarada,
Ghagra, Saryu and Rapti rivers already have mature interlinks. The water of the Rapti and
that of the Gandak is in the process of being linked up.
The capacities of the canals emanating from the barrages on Kosi, Gandak, Girijapur
and Sarada are indicated in Table 6.2. It also displays the average dry season flows
(February, March and April) of those rivers. It is seen that the capacities of all the main
canals were over-designed to accommodate the lean season flows by over two to three
times. In other words, the main canals of these barrages were technically designed to deal
with the future augmented flows from the storage reservoirs upstream in Nepal. Thus,
it is evident, that without the creation of storage facilities in Nepal, India’s proposed
Himalayan ILR would not bear fruit.
But, so far, India has not informed Nepal officially about it. According to India’s
former Ambassador to Nepal, Shyam Saran, the ILR so far is merely a concept (Spotlight,
2004). However, recent bilateral talks on water resources have centered very much on the
storage projects at Pancheshwar, Saptakosi, Karnali/Chisapani, including those on Ka-
mala and Bagmati (Joint Statement, 2004). Observers note that, if the proposed ILR was
simply a concept, there was no necessity on the part of India to concentrate her attention
on these projects during the Nepal-India Joint Committee on water resources meeting at
New Delhi in October 2004.
98
IMPACTS OF INTERLINKING ON NEPAL
Fig. 6.2 Schematic diagrams of existing Himalayan river links in India and existing Kosi/Gandak linking (Mishra, 1990).
DWARIKA N. DHUNGEL AND SANTA B. PUN
Fig. 6.3 Existing Mahakali (Sarada)/Karnali (Ghagra)/Babai (Saryu)/Rapti linking in India (HPC, 1989).
99
Table 6.2 Main canal capacities of the existing barrages in India
Canal Capacity
Kosi Barrage Eastern canal: 425 cumecs
Canals1 Western canal: 241 cumecs
Total Kosi Barrage Canal flow capacity: 666 cumecs;
Kosi river’s lean season flow (February, March and
April) averages to 352 cumecs
Gandak Barrage Eastern canal: 443 cumecs

Canals1 Western canal: 510 cumecs
Total Gandak Barrage canal flow capacity: 953 cumecs,
Gandak river’s lean season flow (February, March and
April) averages to 299 cumecs.
Karnali/Girijapur Eastern link with Saryu/Rapti 360 cumecs
Barrage Canals2 Western link with Sarda/Mahakali: 480 cumecs
Total Karnali/Girijapur barrage canal: flow capacity
840 cumecs
Karnali river’s lean season flow (February, March and
April) averages to 376 cumecs
Mahakali/Sarda Total Sarda Banbasa canal flow capacity: 396 cumecs
Banbasa Barrage Mahakali river’s lean season flow (February, March
Canal2 and April) averages to 162 cumecs
Sources
1
Dinesh K. Misra, Badh Se Trasta-Sinchai Se Pasta: Uttar Bihar Ki Byatha Katha
(in Hindi), Patna, Samata Prakashan Pvt. Ltd., 1990.
2
HMGN, Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive
Summary, Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu,
December, 1989.
6.4.2 The Ganges augmentation efforts
In order to push the Ganges waters to the west, the Ganges needs precious augmentation.
So, when India diverted the Ganges water at Farakka for the Kolkata Port, Article IX of the
1977 Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka
stipulated that the two countries ‘shall carry out investigation and study of scheme
relating to the augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges, proposed or to be
proposed by either Government with a view to finding a solution which is economical and
feasible’ (Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Farakka 1977. Details of the Agreement can
be read in Mirza, 2004). Pursuant to the provision of this article, India and Bangladesh, in
May, 1979 decided to approach Nepal ‘for study/investigation of the projects in Nepal …
identify the specific areas where the cooperation of Nepal is necessary…’
Prior to the Nepal visit, there was clearly a major difference between India and
Bangladesh on the manner of approaching Nepal. India considered that it would be
adequate if Nepal could be requested to make available to the study team all relevant
information on various storage sites in Nepal and Nepal’s uses from these rivers and
assists the team in site inspections. Bangladesh, on the other hand, considered that to
ensure Nepal’s fullest cooperation for a thorough assessment of the augmentation
possibilities from storage projects in Nepal, a team of India, Nepal and Bangladesh should
jointly conduct the study. The Indo-Bangladesh study focus then was on the Bangladesh
initiated 13 large storage reservoirs on 3 major Nepalese rivers: (1) Karnali Basin: i. Chisapani,
ii. Lakarpata, iii. Surkhet, iv. Thapna (2) Gandak Basin: i. Devighat, ii. Kali Gandaki-I,
iii. Kali Gandaki-II, iv. Burhi Gandaki, v. Marsyangdi vi. Seti, (3) Kosi Basin: i. Kothar, ii.
Sunkosi High Dam, iii. Arun and Tamur.
It was only on 29 to 31 October 1986 that the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) from
India and Bangladesh finally visited Nepal to seek information and data needed for the
study of the possibility of augmenting the Ganges flow at Farakka through the construc-
tion of 7 storage projects in Nepal: i. Chisapani on Karnali river, ii. Kali Gandaki-I,
iii. Kali Gandaki-II, iv. Trisuliganga on Trisuli river, v. Seti on Seti river, vi. Sapta Kosi on
Kosi river, vii. Pancheshwar on Mahakali river. Table 6.3 indicates some of the more
salient features of the 3 large storage schemes: Pancheshwar, Saptakosi and Karnali/
Chisapani.
Table 6.3 Some salient features of the three major identified storage reservoirs on the
Mahakali, Karnali (Ghagra) and Kosi Rivers
River Mahakali1 Karnali2 Kosi3

Project name Pancheshwar Chisapani Sapta-Kosi
Catchment area (sq. km) 12,100 43,679 59,539
Average flow (cumecs) 582 1,410 1,550
Gross storage (BCM) 12.26 – 13.45
Live storage (BCM) 6.56 16.2 9.37
Dam height (m) 315 270 269
Installed capacity (MW) 6,480 10,800 3,000
Average energy (Gwh) 10,671 20,842 15,732
Note: These three storages alone would provide a live storage of 32.13 BCM of water
submerging Nepal’s valuable, fertile valleys with the infrastructures built with scarce
resources and displacing over a lack agricultural dependent Nepalese population.
Sources
1
HMGN, Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report: Executive Summary, Electricity
Development Centre, Kathmandu, 1995.
2
HMGN, Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive Sum-
mary, Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu, Decem-
ber, 1989.
3
GoI, Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin, Ganga Flood Control
Commission, Ministry of Irrigation, Patna, December, 1983.
Nepal expressed her dissatisfaction to the Indo-Bangladesh JCE when it became clear
to her at the meeting that while the JCE was interested to procure data from Nepal for the
Indo-Bangladesh projects, they were yet not willing to involve Nepal in the joint study
team. Nepal, therefore, clearly spelt out that the sharing of data was not a problem
provided that it was involved in the joint study from the very beginning so that its
interests would also be covered by the study. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Committee
expressed its inability to do this as this was not possible within the prescribed time limit
(the JCE was clearly not given the mandate to include Nepal in the study) and the committee’s
own term was to expire in November 1986. So the trilateral/regional approach of involving
Nepal in the Ganges augmentation schemes failed. While some in Nepal were dismayed
that Bangladesh surprisingly approached her in tandem with India, others in India have
wrongly construed this 1986 failure of talks as a result of the ‘quarrel’ that ensued
between Bangladesh and Nepal (ORF, 2004). The Ganges augmentation is stressed by
Article VIII of the 1996 Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at
Farakka thus: ‘The two Governments recognize the need to cooperate with each other in
finding a solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges
during the dry season.’
Subsequent to the devastating flood of 1988 in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bangladesh
jointly conducted a study and in November 1989 submitted a report on flood mitigation
measures and multipurpose use of water resources. The report pointed out that due to the
high water-holding capacity of monsoon flow in the potential reservoir sites of Nepal
(77 BCM, or about 68 per cent of total monsoon flow), creation of storage reservoirs could
be an effective measure for flood mitigation for downstream reaches. But it may not be
techno-economically very attractive, if the activity is considered only from the point of
view of flood mitigation. The report recommended that this needs to be looked into ‘from
wider perspective of finding durable solutions to the problems of floods and droughts
through multiple and optimal use of the water resources in hydro-electricity generation,
navigation and irrigation by means of flow regulation, including power systems inter-
connection and, therefore, calls for regional cooperation. For concrete programming of
this activity all the beneficiaries (Nepal, India and Bangladesh) should get together and
work in a common forum’ (Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Study Report, 1989). India, however,
was comfortable with the bilateral approach and believed that regional approach was a
‘… gang up of sorts on the part of Nepal and Bangladesh on the question of Ganga waters
and the construction of reservoirs in Nepal’ (ORF, 2004).
6.4.3 Protection of water rights
If one looks at the available quantum of water in the rivers of Nepal and factors it against
its consumptive uses, the country is not in an uncomfortable position at present. But water
is getting scarce day by day. Therefore, not only has Nepal to protect its right over this
dwindling resource but also safeguard its availability for its future generations. In other
words, Nepal’s major concern is how to protect its water use rights over the waters
available within its territory. So far, Nepal has signed three treaties with its southern
neighbour, India, on water resources. They are: the Kosi Treaty of 1954 (revised 1966), the
Gandak Treaty of 1959 (amended 1964) and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996.
The first two treaties guarantee Nepal the ‘right to withdraw for irrigation and for any
other purpose in Nepal water’ from the two rivers or their tributaries, as may be required
from time to time. The Gandak agreement, however, has the qualification that for
‘trans-valley uses of Gandak waters’, a separate agreement between the two governments
would be required for the use of water ‘in the months of February to April only’. While the
Kosi agreement is valid for a period of 199 years from 19 December 1966, the Gandak
agreement is for perpetuity as there is no mention of the validity period.
The more recent Mahakali agreement, valid for 75 years, does mention that ‘… water
requirements of Nepal shall be given prime consideration in the utilization of the waters of
the Mahakali River’. But another clause of the same agreement states ‘… equal entitlement
in the utilization of the waters of the Mahakali River without prejudice to their respective
existing consumptive uses of the waters of the Mahakali River.’ The Mahakali Treaty has,
thus, endorsed the concept of the protection of the existing consumptive uses. This ‘prior
use right’ claim made by India in the lower Sarada command area, which is 160 km
downstream of the Sarada Barrage has been one of the stumbling blocks in the finaliza-
tion of the detailed project report of the Pancheshwor Multipurpose Project to be devel-
oped on the Mahakali river (called Sarada river in India) as a bi-national project. On the
utilization of the waters of the ‘commonly shared rivers’ (Bhasin, 1994), India has been
stressing that this would need to be ‘subject to the protection of the existing uses on the
rivers’ (Bhasin, 1994). Furthermore, India has already built extensive canals all along the
borders with Nepal, as already indicated in the schematic chart above. It, thus, can claim
that it has already been using the waters flowing from Nepal. It is in this light that Nepal
sees India blocking the European Union funding to Nepal to develop the Babai/Sikta
project in the western Nepal. Although HMGN has yet to make its position clear on the
proposed ILR on the ground that it has not been officially informed by the GoI, the primary
concern for Nepal is to ensure that the ILR will not be prejudicial to its water rights both for
the present and for the future Nepalese generations.
6.4.4 Prior use claims and unilateral construction along the border
As per the proposed ILR, the Mahakali (Sarada) water would be diverted all the way to the
states of Rajasthan and Gujarat in western India. The main purpose of this ambitious ILR
is to divert the water for use during the critical lean season. Meeting this objective
pre-supposes the creation of infrastructure under both the components of the proposed
link. If the prior use claim for the lower Sarada is to be taken as a precedent, then, India will,
in all likelihood, make the claim over all the infrastructures developed to divert the water,
even if they were developed without the prior information/concurrence of Nepal. It may be
recalled that one of the major irritants in the Nepal-India relation on water resource has
been the infrastructures developed by India through unilateral action. These infrastruc-
tures have created adverse impact particularly inundation and flooding, in the bordering
Nepalese territories: Banke district in west Nepal due to Laxmanpur barrage on the Rapti
river, Kapilavastu district, west Nepal due to the construction of Mahali Sagar on the
Masai Nala, Koilabas in the district of Dang, west Nepal due to the construction of a dam
on the Dara Khola, Marchwar in Rupandehi, west Nepal due to the construction of em-
bankments from Kunauli to Rasiawalkhurd dam, constricting the drainage of Ghongi,
Danav and Kothi river, Gaur in Rautahat, central Nepal, constricting the drainage of
Lalbakaiya and Bagmati rivers, etc.
6.4.5 Submergence of Nepalese lands, but for what/whose benefit?
Five of the fourteen links of the proposed ILR, as indicated above, are related to the rivers
flowing from Nepal. From information available on them, the more suitable sites for storage
of waters on these rivers are in Nepal such as the Kosi high dam at Barahchhetra, Chisapani
high dam at Karnali and a number of medium ones on the Gandak. This means that, without
the consent of Nepal, India will not be able to undertake these five links of the Himalayan
component. In other words, without the consent or approval of Nepal, India would not be
able to achieve its principal objective of the Himalayan component of pushing the waters
to its western region. Furthermore, the authorization for the implementation of a
multipurpose project, such as the Karnali Multipurpose Project, with a dam height of
270 mt would displace 60,000 people in Nepal with substantial environmental impact,
according to the feasibility study report of 1989. Most of the benefits, especially the
irrigation and flood control benefits accruing from this project, would go to India,
especially to the state of Uttar Pradesh. According to this study, the irrigation potentiality
of the project is 3,000,000 ha of land of Saryu and Sarda Sahayak command area in India,
whereas for Nepal it would provide irrigation to only 191,000 ha of largely undeveloped
areas. There were major differences of opinion between the two countries on the method of
calculating the benefits accruing from the project (KCC, 1992). It is understood that on the
Pancheshwar project this difference of opinion has again cropped up between the two
countries when the Letters of Exchange of the Mahakali Treaty clearly mentions that
‘Irrigation benefit shall be assessed on the basis of incremental and additional benefits …’
Because of the historical legacy, especially the huge difference in irrigation benefits
enjoyed by Nepal and India from the Kosi and Gandak projects, the question that normally
comes in the minds of the Nepalese is why Nepal should allow a project that submerges
large tracts of its land for providing benefits to the people living across the border. In other
words, Nepal is very concerned as to why it should allow the submergence of large tracts
of its scarce fertile land, displace for perpetuity over hundreds of thousands of people
subsisting on agriculture and lose the valuable flora and fauna of the Himalayan region for
the benefit of downstream users. If Nepal is to endorse the proposed ILR of India, then it
would like to know before hand what it will exactly get in return. Power benefits alone, with
India striving to pull down the tariffs to abysmally low rates, from storage projects in Nepal
would not suffice.
6.5 BENEFIT OF WORKING TOGETHER ON THE

GANGA-BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN
Indeed, water has been one of the most sensitive issues in Nepal, especially due to the
legacy of the past treaties it has had with India. There is a general feeling among the
Nepalese that Nepal has not been fairly treated by the treaties it has, so far, signed with
India. No government and professionals can forget this when the use of water or
cooperation with it neighbours for the optimal use of this resource crops up. Therefore, the
primary concern for Nepal is to ensure that its right over water is protected. Because of the
fact that about 75 per cent of the average flow of the Ganges during the lean season is
contributed by the Nepalese rivers and the fact that Nepal has large storage potentials on
these rivers, Nepal believes that this resource could be an engine of economic growth for
the three countries of the sub-continent. But for this, there must be genuine willingness
among these countries to cooperate with each other. As indicated above, India has, so far,
pursued its policy of bilateralism on water issues, refusing to take them up as a subject of
trilateral cooperation. India needs to come out and address adequately Nepal’s fear that
the latter country will not be treated unfairly as in the past. Unless these fears are
addressed, the chances of fruitful cooperation on water resources between the three
countries are remote. Article VIII of the 1996 Indo-Bangladesh Ganges Treaty on finding a
solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganges would continue
to remain in paper only.
6.6 PROFESSIONAL COOPERATION ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS
A new era of cooperation in water resources will be possible only when India realizes the
importance of cooperation at the regional level, starts taking her neighbours into
confidence prior to taking any decision on the transboundary rivers, the people of Nepal
are assured that their interest and those of their future generations will not be compro-
mised, and they will receive adequate benefits/compensation for the loss of their liveli-
hood, lands, flora and fauna, etc. that might result from the storage projects in Nepal for
the ILR. For this, unlike the present system of having interaction programmes only when
issues crop up, we propose cooperation on a continuous basis among research and aca-
demic institutions of the three countries. For example, three institutions of the region,
Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), Kathmandu, the Bangladesh Unnayan
Parishad (BUP), Dhaka and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, have worked
together before on different issues. Such institutions could join hands with a view to
undertaking water-related studies, developing a store house of information on water-
related matters and above all monitoring the policies and programmes of the countries on
the subject and flag out issues.
Thus, one can conclude that India already has in place river links in one form or the other
from Kosi through Gandak, Karnali and Mahakali, picking up the medium Kamala, Bagmati,
Rapti, etc on the way. The canal capacities from these barrages were deliberately designed
oversize to cater to the future augmented flows from storage reservoirs upstream in Nepal.
Nepal cannot compromise the interests of its future generations. It needs to know what
social and environmental costs it would have to pay to accommodate in Nepal these large
storage projects for India’s ILR. Pancheshwar, Saptakosi and Karnali/Chisapani would
submerge, once and for all, the scarce fertile valleys of the mountainous and agricultural
dependent Nepal. Where would all the displaced and marginalized Nepalese go for their
livelihood? As it is, due to lack of employment opportunities and extreme poverty, over
800 thousand Nepalese have already been forced to go out of the country in search of
‘dirty and dangerous jobs’. Would the much-vaunted power sales to India more than
compensate the overall costs to Nepal? Nepal wants to know WHAT BENEFIT IT WILL
EXACTLY GET BEFORE THE STORAGE PROJECTS ARE BUILT!
REFERENCES
Akhtar Hossain, A.N.H.: The Indian River Linking Project and its Probable Impact on Bangladesh.
Third South Asia Water Forum, Dhaka, 2004.
Bhasin, A.S.: Nepal’s Relations with India and China (Documents 1947–1992) Siba. Exim. Pvt. Ltd.,
Delhi, 1994.
Census of India: (http://www.censusindia.net/), 2001.
Dixit, A.: Rivers of Collective Belonging. Himal 16(10) (October 2003).
Government of India (GoI): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi, 2002.
Government of India (GoI) and Government of UP: Tehri Hydro Development Corporation:
Profile, Tehri (Garahwal), August 2001.
—, Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin. Ganga Flood Control Commission,
Ministry of Irrigation, Patna, December, 1983.
HMGN: Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive Summary,
Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu, December 1989.
—, Ministry of Water Resources and Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of
Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control, Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Study Team Report
on Flood Mitigation Measures and Multipurpose Use of Water Resources, November 1989.
—, Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report: Executive Summary, Electricity Development
Centre, Kathmandu, 1995.
—, Revised Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India
on the Gandak Project, Ministry of Water and Power, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1975.
—, Revised Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India
on the Kosi Project, Ministry of Water and Power, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1975.
—, Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India Concerning
the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage
and Pancheswar Project, Kathmandu, ND.
Himalayan Power Consultants (HPC): Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project Report. Ministry
of Water Resources, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1989.
Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka. In: Politics of
Himalayan River Waters (B.C. Upreti), Nirala Series 32(November 5, 1977).
Joint Statement of the 7 to 8 October 2004 JCWR Meeting at New Delhi, Spotlight, October 15,
2004.
Lok Sabha: Press Release on Linking of Rivers, nd.
Minutes of Ninth Meeting, Karnali Coordination Committee (KCC), Kathmandu, March 12 to 14,
1992.
Mirza, M.M.Q.: Diversion of the Ganges Water at Farakka and Its Effects on Salinity in Bangladesh.
Environmental Management 22(1998).
Mirza, M.M.Q. (ed.): The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004.
Mishra, D.K.: Badh Se Trasht-Sinchai Se Pasta: Uttar Bihar Ki Byatha Katha (in Hindi). Samata
Publishing Pvt. Ltd, Patna, 1990.
National Water Development Agency (NWDA): NWDA Proposals (www.nwda.gov.in), 2006.
ORF: Nepal-India Relations: The Challenge Ahead, Rupa-Co in association with Observer Research
Foundation, New Delhi, 2004.
Shankari, U.: Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and Confrontations, South Asian Dialogue on
Ecological Democracy and Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, 2004.
Summary Record of Discussion of the Second Meeting of the Indo-Nepal Sub-Commission in Water
Resources held at New Delhi, April 15 to 18, 1991.
Thakkar, H.: Flood of Nonsense: How to Manufacture Consensus on River Linking. Himal South
Asia, Kathmandu, August 2003.
Thapa, B.B. and B.B. Pradhan: Water Resources Development Nepalese Perspective. Konark
Publishers Pvt. Ltd, Delhi, 1995.
Treaty Between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of the Peoples Republic
of Bangladesh on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, 1996.
NEWSPAPERS
Spotlight, July 16, 2004.

India Today, January 22, 2003.
http//:www.easdis.aml.gov/rivdis/STATIONS/TEXT/INDIA/883/SUMMARY.HTML.
7
Modeling the Interlinking of the Ganges River:

Simulated Changes in Flow
SHARON GOURDJI
CARRIE KNOWLTON
KOBI PLATT
MICHAEL J. WILEY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The Indian Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) proposal contains a total of 30 links, with 14 links in
the Himalayan component and 16 links in the Peninsular component. While many of the
links provide water for irrigation within a given basin, some of the links create inter-basin
transfers to augment flow in “water-deficit” regions. Although few engineering plans are
in the public domain, it is supposed that large storage reservoirs will collect excess water
during the monsoon season, particularly in the northern half of the country, and then
release it slowly during the longer dry season from October through May.
This chapter describes an application of the Hydrologic Engineering Center’s
Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS, version 2.2.2) in the Indian part of the Ganges
River basin (Figure 7.1). HEC-HMS is developed and maintained by a branch of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers and is freely available on the web with supporting
documentation (HEC, 2003). The model is calibrated using flow data at the Farakka
Barrage from 1965 to 1968 (before flow became classified information in 1973), and it is
then used to simulate both seasonal and annual changes in flow at Allahabad, Patna and
Farakka after construction of the Himalayan component of the ILR (Figure 7.2). This
relatively simple model could also be used for future simulations in the Ganges basin
when and if more detailed information about the proposed links becomes available or for
simulations related to climate change or other planned diversions within the basin.
Allahabad, Patna and Farakka are all situated relatively equidistant from each other
on the main-stem of the Ganges (Figure 7.3). Allahabad is a city at the confluence of the
Upper Ganges River and the Yamuna River, one of the largest tributaries of the Ganges,
while Patna is downstream of Allahabad, at the confluence with the Gandak River, and
after the confluences with three other major Himalayan and southern tributaries: the
Gomti, Sone and Ghaghara rivers. By examining changes in flow conditions at Allahabad
and Patna, particularly in the dry season, the model provides insights into how river
linking might impact the already poor water quality in these areas (water quality issues
have been further elaborated in Chapter 9).
108 INTERLINKING OF THE GANGES RIVER: SIMULATED CHANGES IN FLOW
Ganges Watershed in South Asia

AN
ST
NI
GA
N
AF
C H I N A
Lahore
PAKISTAN
Kathmandu
New Thimpu
Delhi NEPAL
BHUTAN
Patna BANGLADESH
Dhaka
Kolkata
I N D I A
Mumbai
Bay of Bengal
Chennai
Major cities
Ganges and major tributaries
South Asian countries
Ganges Watershed
0 250 500 kilometers
Fig. 7.1 The Ganges watershed in South Asia.
The Farakka Barrage, near the Ganges delta 18 km upstream of Bangladesh, is

downstream of both Allahabad and Patna. Since commissioning of the Farakka Barrage in
1975, saltwater intrusion in the Ganges delta has had negative impacts on drinking water
supplies, agricultural fertility and the large commercial fishery in the Sundarbans
mangrove ecosystem (Mirza, 1998). By analyzing predicted changes in flow at Farakka
after river linking, projections are made about India’s future ability to meet its flow
obligations towards Bangladesh and the probability of further saltwater intrusion in the
Ganges delta. Also discussed is whether the river linking plan would function effectively
SHARON GOURDJI ET AL. 109
as a flood control measure in the downstream areas of the Ganges during monsoon
season.
7.2 HYDROLOGY OF GANGES BASIN
The Ganges River originates in the Himalayas of northwest India and then flows southeast
across the Indo-Gangetic plain until it reaches Bangladesh, where it joins together with the
Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers and flows out into the Indian Ocean. Covering a total of
1,060,000 km2 in India, the Ganges drainage basin contains 26.3 per cent of India’s total
land area (Figure 7.1) and represents about 25 per cent of India’s water resources (Shiva
and Jalees, 2003). The average annual discharge of the Ganges River at Farakka is
13,159 m3/sec (Mirza, 2004).
GHAGRA
MANAS
DA
5
SAR
TISTA
GANDAK
6
SANKOSH
1
4
MECHI
YA
M
KOSI
UN
GA A
NG 3 2 UTR 11
A
L A GHA MAP
MB
A
GO GRA BRAH
NI CH
A MT GAN 10
LU I GA
AK
A
BAR
TW
MATI
K A LIS INDH
9
NE
BE
SO
KE
7 8 13
BAR
12
PA R
SU DA
SA
AD A 14 BE MO
ARM RN DAR
B AT
N MA H A AR
NA EK
I
TAPI D HA
I

Fig. 7.2 Proposed links in the Himalayan Component of the Indian Interlinking of Rivers (NWDA,
2004).
The Ganges is fed by eighteen major tributaries, seven originating in the Himalayas
and flowing into the Ganges from the north, six joining from the south, and five joining the
River Hooghly in the downstream reaches (Figure 7.3). The Hooghly distributary branches
off from the Ganges after Farakka and delivers water to Kolkata, a major Indian port city.
High slopes in the Himalayas leads to rapid surface runoff of precipitation, although much
of this precipitation falls as snow, or freezes into glaciers, which melt throughout the year.
Precipitation falling as rain in the plains south of the Himalayas tends to have slower
hydrologic pathways due to low slopes and deep alluvium which supports large ground-
water aquifers. Average watershed slope varies from about 22 per cent in the upper reaches
of the Ganges near Rishikesh in the Himalayas to about 0.2 per cent in the Gomti sub-
basin in the Indo-Gangetic plains (Table 7.1). Agriculture represents about 90 per cent of
the land cover in the alluvial plains near the main stem of the Ganges, while the
Himalayan headlands also contain forests, grass and shrublands (NIMA, 1997).
River Segments
Ganga Discharge Gages
Ganga Subbasins
Rain Gauges
N Major Cities
Yamuna
Ganga
New Delhi
Kos i
Kathmandu
Gha
gra
G
an
Go
da
l m
k
ba il
am
Ch
a
Dhasan
tw
Ganga Patna
Be
Farakka
ne
n
Ke
So
Allahabad Padm
a
Kolkata
0 135 270 540
kilometers
Fig. 7.3 Map of Ganges basin divided into 17 sub-basins used in HEC-HMS model. Map also
shows locations of large cities and rain and discharge gauges used in model.
About 85 per cent of yearly precipitation received in the Ganges basin arrives during
the four-month monsoon season from June to September (NOAA, 1991). In the eastern
half of the basin near the delta the monsoon lasts longer, from about May to October. For
example, Kolkata, near the Ganges delta, receives about 1,600 mm of rain per year on
average whereas Delhi on the western edge of the basin receives only 640 mm. At the end
of the dry season by May of each year, temperatures rise higher than 40°C across the
plains and the landscape is parched. Some of the same areas that flood during the
monsoon season suffer from drought before the monsoon arrives.
Table 7.1 Sub-basins and relevant parameters used in HEC-HMS model
Average Canopy Soil max.

Area SCS curve SCS time %
Sub-basin name watershed storage infiltration rate
(km2) number lag (hr) Impervious
slope (%) (mm) (mm/hr)
Upper Ganga – Himalayas 43,926 22.4 81 12 0 19 0.8

Gandak – Himalayas 40,738 21.45 74 17 0 15 3.3
Ghaghara – Himalayas 69,197 21.44 74 21 0 19 3
Yamuna – Himalayas 11,580 20.19 81 10 0.33 13 1
Kosi – Himalayas 64,496 16.61 74 29 0.03 10 3.3
Upper Sone 68,943 1.77 73 67 0 10 3.3
Lower Sone 73,507 1.35 73 133 0.33 13 9.5
Lower Chambal 110,404 0.89 78 121 0.14 13 0.6
Ken 37,651 0.87 74 127 0.05 13 1.7
Upper Chambal 33,641 0.8 85 115 0.35 10 0.5
Betwa – Dhasan 67,140 0.7 74 126 0.26 13 1.7
Ghaghara – Plains 66,785 0.43 75 280 0.2 13 1.7
Kosi – Plains 32,196 0.39 73 154 0.46 13 9.5
Upper Ganga – Plains 68,513 0.37 76 317 0.52 13 1.7
Yamuna – Plains 38,197 0.3 75 417 1.34 13 1.7
Gandak – Plains 22,730 0.29 79 137 0.33 13 19.1
Gomti 41,018 0.21 75 411 0.51 13 1.7
SHARON GOURDJI ET AL.
111
7.3 HEC-HMS GANGES MODEL: OVERVIEW, INITIAL

SETUP AND DATA INPUTS
Hydrologic river models attempt to describe the routing of water over time and space
as it moves through the landscape and is influenced by the natural hydrologic cycle
(Figure 7.4). Hydrologic models are used extensively as tools in water resource planning,
e.g. to forecast flooding in a watershed (in conjunction with hydraulic models), estimate
hydropower potential, simulate the response of a watershed to climate and land-use change
and predict the impact of various water development activities such as the building of
dams, levees and irrigation canals. Hydrologic river models can also be linked to hydraulic
models that track processes of sediment and pollutant transport in rivers, which may in
turn affect channel shape and water quality.
Precipitation
evaporation
evaporation
evaporation
transpiration
Stemflow & Land

Vegetation throughfall Water Body
Surface Flood
infiltration
capillary rise overland flow
Soil interflow Stream

channel
baseflow
percolation capillary rise
recharge
Groundwater
aquifer
Watershed
discharge
Fig. 7.4 Schematic of hydrologic cycle (HEC, 2000).
In the simulation process of a hydrologic model, uncertainty is introduced in the form

of measurement uncertainty of model parameters, inputs and calibration data, unknowns
about the processes represented in the model, and nonlinear interactions among compo-
nents of the model in a dynamic, complex system. In the case of India, further uncertainty
is introduced by the lack of high quality data inputs for hydrologic modeling, speci-
fically datasets related to flow, precipitation, evapotranspiration and soil hydraulic
conductivity.
HEC-HMS (version 2.2.2) is a flexible system that allows the user to choose
from a variety of methods for estimating the volume and timing of surface runoff and
baseflow in a stream channel. This flexibility also puts a strong burden on the model user
to choose methods appropriately, to define sub-basins and reaches for the watershed
under analysis, and to correctly parameterize the model using hydrologic characteristics
at sub-basin scales.
One major limitation of the version of HEC-HMS used here is the lack of a snow and
glacial melt method (although the subsequent release of version 3.0 in December 2005
incorporated a snowmelt method.) During the dry season, baseflow in the Ganges is fed
by a combination of groundwater inputs and snow and glacial melt in the Himalayas. Due
to a high number of days with freezing temperatures in the Himalayas, there should be little
snowmelt in the winter months from November to March. However, the model calculates
baseflow in an equal manner for every month of the year assuming that baseflow comes
entirely from groundwater aquifers. Therefore, it is likely that the timing of baseflow
contributed by the Himalayan sub-basins in the model presented here has some limita-
tions. Also, none of the existing diversions, dams and reservoirs in the Ganges basin was
accounted for in this model. Some of the water diverted for irrigation purposes returns to
the channel, but more is lost from the system by evapotranspiration.
For the Ganges watershed, seventeen sub-basins and thirty-seven reaches delivering
water up to the Farakka Barrage were defined in the basin model of HEC-HMS (Figures 7.3
and 7.5, Table 7.1). Sub-basins represent watersheds with relatively constant hydrologic
characteristics (e.g. climate, slope, soil type, etc.), and reaches represent channels with
significant storage capacity. The sub-basins defined in this model represent the major
tributaries of the Ganges, although the larger tributaries were split into upstream and
downstream sub-basins connected by one or more reaches. In the case of the Himalayan
tributaries, the upstream sub-basins represent flow originating in the Himalayas and the
downstream sub-basins represent flow originating in the Indo-Gangetic plains. Reaches
are also defined in the model along the main stem of the Ganges up to the Farakka Barrage.
Lower Yamuna Upper Yamuna

Ganga-Himalayas
Upper Chambal
Upper Ganga-Plains
Gomti
Yamuna Gange to Allahabad
Chambal
Juntion 2
Chambal to Upper Ghaghara
Betwa
Ghaghara
Betwa to Ken
Lower Chambal Allahabad Upper Gandak
Ken to Allahabad Allahabad to Gonti Gadak
Gomti to Ghagra
Sone Ghagra to Palna Lower Ghaghara
Ken Palna
Kosi
Belwa-Dhasan
Palna to Kosi Upper Kosi
Upper Sone
Lower Sone Lower Gandak
Kosi to
Farakka
Lower Kosi
Fig. 7.5 HEC-HMS basin model with sub-basins, reaches and junctions defined for the Ganges
basin.
Monthly precipitation data was obtained for the years 1965 to 1968 from the Global
Historical Climatology Network (Peterson and Vose, 1997), available from the National
Climatic Data Center of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(www.ncdc.noaa.gov). The years, 1965 to 1968 represented four years containing enough
precipitation data for which publicly available flow data also existed at Farakka (flow data
at Farakka is publicly available from 1949 to 1973, except for 1961 to 1964). The precipitation
dataset contains data at about five hundred rain gauges within the Ganges basin, although
not all gauges have data for all years. One precipitation data record was created per
sub-basin by averaging about ten gauges distributed evenly throughout the area.
Given that only monthly precipitation data was available for the Ganges basin from
1965 to 1968, daily variability was replicated using daily 2003 to 2004 precipitation
from the Global Surface Summary of the Day (FCC, 2003) scaled up or down for each
month by the average monthly totals from 1965 to 1968. For this scaling process, one
central gauge within each sub-basin was chosen from the daily dataset. Relatively accu-
rate daily precipitation variability is necessary in a daily hydrologic model, since the
alternative of dividing up monthly precipitation data to fall equally on each day of the
month allows almost all of the water time to percolate into groundwater reservoirs instead
of contributing to surface runoff, which poorly reproduces observed flow. No daily pre-
cipitation data was available from either source from 1965 to 1968.
Monthly evapotranspiration was estimated for each sub-basin from four seasonal
contour maps of evapotranspiration over the Indian sub-continent (Bruijnzeel and Bremmer,
1989). Since the values derived from these maps seemed to be unrealistically low
compared to evapotranspiration rates in other continents, the values were somewhat
arbitrarily multiplied by 10. These new values, which range from 35 mm per month in the
winter to 185 mm per month before the monsoon in May and June, better match an annual
evapotranspiration contour map published by Athavale (2003). All the pan coefficients
were set to 0.75, a somewhat arbitrary value reflecting the fact that actual evapotranspi-
ration is rarely as high as potential evapotranspiration.
7.4 MODEL METHODS AND PARAMETERIZATION
For each sub-basin in the model, HEC-HMS requires the definition of three methods to:
a. calculate the volume of surface runoff and baseflow and their relative allocation (Loss),
b. determine the timing of direct runoff to the channel (Transform), and c. determine the
timing of groundwater input to the channel (Baseflow). This model of the Ganges used Soil
Moisture Accounting (SMA) for Losses, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) Time to Peak
for the Transform, and the Linear Reservoir model for Baseflow. SMA is the only option for
a continuous hydrologic model that tracks water in between rainfall events. The SCS Time
to Peak is the most commonly used method for determining the rate of surface runoff, and
although the formulas for this method were derived empirically in North American
watersheds, the method is widely applied in India (Deshmukh et al., 2004). The Linear
Reservoir model works in conjunction with SMA. These same three methods were used
for all sub-basins in the model.
The SMA method conceptualizes storage as taking place in five vertical layers: the
canopy, surface, soil, and two layers of groundwater (Fleming and Neary, 2004; HEC,
2000). The model tracks water from when it first falls as precipitation and then as it moves
through each of the storage layers and eventually to the stream channel. A storage capac-
ity is defined for each layer and maximum infiltration and percolation rates describe the
movement of water into the soil and then to the groundwater reservoirs. When precipita-
tion is not occurring, evapotranspiration returns water to the atmosphere from the canopy,
surface and soil storage layers.
Since inland water bodies take up less than 1 per cent of the area of each sub-basin,
surface water storage was set to zero in this model. Canopy storage was estimated based
on land cover in each sub-basin, and ranged from zero for built-up land to one inch for
forested areas (Table 7.1). Soil storage and groundwater storage for both layers was ini-
tially set to 10 inches (25 cm) for every sub-basin in the model; however, during the
calibration process, soil storage was reduced to seven inches in order to increase surface
runoff.
Soil infiltration rates were estimated from published hydraulic conductivity tables for
the Green-Ampt infiltration method (Rawls et al., 1983) and soil texture data in the Ganges
basin (FAO-UNESCO, 1987). During calibration, the infiltration rates for sub-basins in the
Indo-Gangetic plains closest to the main stem of the Ganges (the “lower” half of the major
tributaries) were reduced to one half of their original estimated values. Reducing the
infiltration rates in the Indo-Gangetic plains reduced groundwater flow and increased the
volume of surface runoff, providing a better fit to observational flow data. Percolation
rates into the first and second groundwater layers were set equal to soil infiltration rates
for all sub-basins. Initially, the rate of deep percolation (or loss of water from the system)
was set equal to soil infiltration rates for each sub-basin, although this removed too much
water from the system before it could reach the channel. Therefore, the value for deep
percolation was reduced to 0.38 mm per hour for all sub-basins, slightly less than the
lowest soil infiltration rate in the model.
HEC-HMS determines the volume of surface runoff from the SMA method and then
calculates how fast the surface runoff reaches the channel with the SCS Time to Peak. The
SCS Time to Peak represents how many hours after a precipitation event observed flow in
a channel reaches its peak, and is calculated using the following equation (Bedient and
Huber, 1992):
l 0.8 ( S ⫹ 1)0.7
tp ⫽ (7.1)
1900 y 0.5
where
tp ⫽ lag time (hr)
l ⫽ channel length (ft)
y ⫽ average watershed slope (%)
S ⫽ (1000/SCS Curve Number) ⫺ 10 (inches)
Channel length and slope were determined from Geographic Information System
(GIS) data layers in the Ganges basin, while the SCS Curve Numbers were determined by
computing per cent area of various land cover (NIMA, 1997) and soil texture (FAO-UNESCO,
1987) combinations in each sub-basin, and then comparing these values to a published
table of curve numbers (Bedient and Huber, 1992). Curve numbers can range from 0 to 100,
with 100 representing a completely impervious surface with no soil moisture storage.
However, the lowest published value of an SCS Curve Number is 25 for forested land with
good cover and sandy soils. In the Ganges basin, SCS Curve Numbers were assigned
ranging from 73 to 85, where each of these values represented averages of land use and
soil texture across an entire sub-basin. The calculated values for the SCS Time to Peak
(Equation 7.1) ranged from a minimum of 10 hours in the Himalayan half of the Yamuna
sub-basin where slopes are high to 417 hours in the southern plains portion of the Yamuna
(Table 7.1).
For the SMA groundwater parameterization, a “ballpark” guess was made that
groundwater reaches the channel about twenty times more slowly than surface runoff, and
therefore the groundwater storage coefficients for each sub-basin (or the rate of inflow
and outflow for the two groundwater layers) were determined by multiplying the SCS
Time to Peak by twenty. The number of reservoirs in each groundwater layer was made
proportional to the area of each sub-basin. These parameters did not change during the
calibration process.
A routing method describing the movement and storage of water within a channel was
also defined for each reach in the model. The Muskingum-Cunge method (Cunge, 1969),
a relatively simple hydrologic routing method was chosen, where the required parameters
are channel length, channel slope, bottom width, side slope and a Manning’s roughness
coefficient, which describes resistance to flow on the channel bed. Channel length and
channel slope were estimated from a river network GIS layer and a Digital Elevation Model.
Bottom width was estimated from the inland water polygons of a land cover map (NIMA,
1997). Given the lack of empirical data for side slope and the Manning’s roughness
coefficient (n), side slope was estimated at 0.5 and Manning’s n at 0.04 for all reaches in
the model, with both of these values being in the middle of their possible ranges. Since
the Muskingum-Cunge method does not handle channel lengths longer than 175 km, the
larger tributaries and the main stem of the Ganges were divided into multiple reaches.
7.5 MODEL CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION
Model parameters were calibrated using precipitation and flow data from 1965 and
1966 and then the model was tested from 1967 to 1968. The model was calibrated using
monthly average observed flow data at the Farakka Barrage (Vorosmarty et al., 1998),
although the model was run at a daily time-step. At Patna and Allahabad, upstream of
Farakka, twelve monthly flow observations were available averaged across 1965 to 1981
for Patna and 1970 to 1981 for Allahabad (Ray, 1998); however, given the lack of year-
specific data at these sites, neither was used for calibration.
The calibration process involved a visual inspection of model results after each run,
and then a change of one parameter at a time for the next run. After adjusting soil storage,
evapotranspiration coefficients, soil infiltration rates, and the rate of deep percolation as
described previously, the model output began to match observed flow data fairly well.
Intermediate model outputs also showed good agreement with other published results.
For example, model output shows that yearly precipitation turns into about 23 per cent
evapotranspiration and 77 per cent runoff in the Himalayan half of the Kosi basin during
1965 and 1966, which compares favorably with the estimates of 30 and 70 per cent from
Sharma et al. (2000). Also, the model shows net annual recharge into the first groundwater
layer in the Yamuna plains near New Delhi of 79 mm per year, which compares favorably
with the 80 mm per year predicted by Rangarajan and Athavale’s (2000) regression
equations for estimating groundwater recharge in India. For the lower Kosi sub-basin, the
closest sub-basin in the model to Kolkata, the net annual recharge is 210 mm per year,
which also compares favorably with Rangarajan and Athavale’s (2000) estimate of
240 mm per year for Kolkata.
Overall, the timing and volume of water produced by model output agrees fairly well
with observed flow at Farakka, Patna and Allahabad. However, slight differences exist
within and between years. In 1965, the model overproduced water at Farakka compared to
the observed flow in March and April, but under produced water for the other months of
the year excluding October (Figure 7.6). The model output fit observed flow most closely
in 1966, when the model produced 111 per cent of the volume of water produced by
observations. Overall in 1965 and 1966, the model produced 98 per cent of the water
produced by observed flow over this two year period. In 1967 and 1968 (the testing
period), the model again overestimated baseflow and underestimated the peaks during the
monsoon season at Farakka as in 1965. The model also under produced the total amount
of water that actually flowed during the testing period.
1965 - 1968 Farakka Model vs. Observed Flow
50000 Model Output Observed Flow
45000
40000
Flow- M 3 / ec (cms)
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Mar-66
Mar-67
Mar-68
Sept-65
Sept-66
Sept-67
Sept-68
Mar-65
Nov-66
Nov-67
Jan-67
Jan-66
Jan-68
Jan-69
Jul-65
Nov-65
Jul-66
Jul-67
Jul-68
Nov-68
Jan-65
May-66
May-67
May-68
May-65
Fig. 7.6 HEC-HMS model output vs. monthly average observed flow (Vorosmarty et al., 1998) at
the Farakka Barrage from 1965 to 1968. The model produced 84 per cent of the annual observed
flow in 1965, 111 per cent in 1966, 95 per cent in 1967 and 91 per cent in 1968.
Model output from 1965 to 1968 in Patna and Allahabad follows the general pattern
and magnitude of observed (annually-averaged) monthly flow (Figures 7.7 and 7.8). It is
not clear if the Patna and Allahabad observed flow data were measured before or after the
confluences with the tributaries on which these cities are cited. Therefore, in Figures 7.7
and 7.8, flow is graphed before the confluence with the Gandak for Patna and after the
confluence with the Yamuna for Allahabad, since these model outputs provided a better
fit with observed flow. At Patna, model output seems to overestimate baseflow, and
possibly underestimate monsoon flow. From 1965 to 1968, model output produced 99
per cent of the water produced by average observed flow for four years. At Allahabad,
model output again tends to overestimate baseflow in January through April. Overall
from 1965 to 1968, the model produced 117 per cent of the water produced by average
observed flow at Allahabad for four years. The overestimation of water at Allahabad could
be influenced by the fact that this model does not account for existing diversions on the
Ganges, specifically the Upper Ganges Canal upstream of Allahabad constructed in the
19th century for irrigation purposes.
The model testing period from 1967 to 1968 at Farakka shows that the hydrologic
processes hypothesized in this HEC-HMS model of the Ganges basin do not fit physical
reality exactly. For example, the overestimation of baseflow at Farakka, Patna and Allahabad
is likely due to the lack of a snowmelt method in version 2.2.2 of HEC-HMS. Due to the
simplified nature of the parameterization and the large scale of the Ganges basin, this
model best hopes to capture the general timing and magnitude of high and low flow events
on a seasonal basis.
1965 - 1968 Patna Model vs. Observed Flow

Model Output Observed Flow
40000
35000
30000
Flow-(cms)
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Apr-65
Oct-65
Apr-66
Sept-66
Mar-67
Oct-67
Mar-68
Sept-68
Jan-66
Jan-65
Jul-65
Jul-66
Jan-67
Jul-67
Jan-68
Jul-68
Fig. 7.7 HEC-HMS model output from 1965 to 1968 at Patna before the confluence with the
Gandak vs. monthly average observed flow from 1965 to 1981 (Ray, 1998).
1965 - 1968 Allahabad Model vs. Observed Flow
Model Output Observed Flow

30000
25000
20000
Flow-(cms)
15000
10000
5000
0
Jan-65
Apr-65
Jul-65
Oct-65
Jan-66
Apr-66
Jul-66
Oct-66
Jan-67
Apr-67
Jul-67
Oct-67
Jan-68
Apr-68
Jul-68
Oct-68
Fig. 7.8 HEC-HMS model output from 1965 to 1968 at Allahabad after the confluence with the
Yamuna vs. monthly average observed flow from 1970 to 1981 (Ray, 1998).
7.6 RIVER LINKING SIMULATION
To account for inter-basin transfers proposed under the ILR, hypothetical water
diversions and inputs as proposed under the river linking plan were added into the
HEC-HMS basin model described earlier. Some of the links in the Himalayan component of
the plan would provide irrigation water within the basin and some of the links would
transfer water into and out of the Ganges basin (Figure 7.2). The main inter-basin transfer
into the Ganges is the Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Ganges (MSTG) link which would bring in
water from the Brahmaputra basin to the Ganges just upstream of the Farakka Barrage.
This water would be used to flush Kolkata port, with the remainder transferred south
towards the Mahanadi basin, eventually linking up with the Peninsular component of the
plan. Water would also be transferred west across multiple Himalayan tributaries of the
Ganges. Some of this water would be removed from the western part of the Ganges basin
and piped towards the desert areas in Rajasthan. However, the majority of the links in the
Himalayan component of the plan would provide irrigation to arid areas within the Ganges
basin during the dry season. This water is represented as lost to the Ganges in the simula-
tion described here.
Diagrams from the National Water Development Agency of India, collected by
Carrie Knowlton during a trip to India in summer 2004 (NWDA, 2004), were used in order
to simulate river linking flows. These diagrams contain yearly totals of water input,
transmission losses, irrigation use and output for the main linkages in the Himalayan
component of the plan. In the model, it was assumed that the river linking plan would
store “excess” water in reservoirs during the monsoon season, and then pipe this water
out through canals at a constant rate throughout the year. Therefore, diversions were
modeled as taking place primarily during the monsoon season, and the diversion of flow
was avoided during the dry season. This was not always possible; for example in the
Gandak and Ghaghara basins it was necessary to divert water throughout the year to
produce the requisite annual amount of water as called for in the river linking plan.
Diversion curves were constructed in HEC-HMS through trial and error until the river
linking simulation correctly diverted the total amount of water on an annual basis
(Table 7.2). Inputs to reaches were modeled as a constant flow throughout the year.
Nine diversions were added to the model removing water either for irrigation purposes
within the sub-basin or inter-basin transfer. Some of these diversions were lumped
together when they affected the same reach as defined in the model. The diversions in the
model represent the following links:
A total of 13,086 million cubic meters (MCM) per year removed in two separate
diversions from the Kosi River (Kosi-Mechi and Kosi-Ghaghara links).
32,746 MCM per year removed from the Gandak in the Gandak-Ganges link, only
about 25 per cent of which is returned to the Ganges upstream of Allahabad.
32,646 MCM per year removed from the Ghaghara as part of the Ghaghara-Yamuna
link, about 25 per cent of which is returned to the Yamuna.
11,680 MCM removed from the Sarda, a tributary of the Ghaghara, as part of the
Sarda-Yamuna link; this link would be augmented by a 2,248 MCM removal of
water from the Upper Ganges and then mostly transported out of the Ganges
basin towards Rajasthan.
2,512 MCM diverted from the Sone in the Sone-Southern Tributaries of the
Ganges link.
120
Table 7.2 Diversion curves for river linking simulation. HEC-HMS diverted water from reach flow at each model time-step by interpolation from these
curves in order to divert the correct amount of water on an annual basis for each diversion defined in the model. All values are in cubic feet per second
(cfs) where 35.3147 cfs ⫽ 1 cms
Ganga between
Ken Kosi Gandak Ghaghara Sone Yamuna & Ghaghara
(Chunar-Sone Link)
Flow Diversion Flow Diversion Flow Diversion Flow Diversion Flow Diversion Flow Diversion
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,000 100 2,000 500 1,000 1,000 5,000 2,000 1,000 0 1,000 0
5,000 500 5,000 2,500 2,000 2,000 10,000 5,000 2,000 200 2,000 0
10,000 1,400 10,000 7,500 5,000 5,000 50,000 45,000 5,000 2,500 5,000 0
75,000 7,000 15,000 11,250 10,000 10,000 75,000 75,000 25,000 10,000 10,000 2,500
100,000 75,000 20,000 20,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 40,000 100,000 8,000
500,000 375,000 35,000 35,000 500,000 500,000 400,000 160,000 300,000 8,000
INTERLINKING OF THE GANGES RIVER: SIMULATED CHANGES IN FLOW
40,000 40,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 500,000 8,000

100,000 100,000 1,000,000 8,000
400,000 400,000 1,500,000 8,000
4,988 MCM diverted from the Ganges between the Yamuna and the Ghaghara
as part of the Chunar-Sone link. The Chunar, a small tributary, was not repre-
sented in the model.
361 MCM lost from the Ken basin on a net basis as part of the Ken-Betwa link.
The links added to the model also contained two inflows:
7,386 MCM per year added to the Ganges upstream of Allahabad (originally
diverted from the Gandak as part of the Gandak- Ganges link) minus 2,248 MCM
per year diverted to the Sarda-Yamuna link canal (total inflow of 5,138 MCM).
7,769 MCM per year added to the Yamuna near the confluence with the Chambal
(originally diverted from the Ghaghara as part of the Ghaghara-Yamuna link).
The only planned link in the Ganges basin affecting the water balance that was not
represented in the model was the Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal link, given that no informa-
tion was available about the amount of water diverted by this link. The main Brahmaputra-
Ganges link canal (MSTG) was not represented in the model either, since all water
proposed to be added to the Ganges upstream of Farakka in the MSTG link (37,915 MCM
per year) will be removed at Farakka for transfer to the Peninsular component through the
Farakka-Sundarbans, Ganges-Damodar-Subernarekha and Subernarekha-Mahanadi links.
7.7 RIVER LINKING RESULTS
The model was run from 1965 to 1966 for the purposes of comparing model output pre- and
post-linking. Starting the run in 1965 allowed time for the model to get started and avoid
unusual results due to the initial storage quantities. However, model output for our three
chosen locations was only compared in 1966. Observed average annual discharge in 1966 at
Farakka was below long term averages from 1949 to 1973 by about 29 per cent; however,
the relative reduction or augmentation in flow under river linking shown here can more
generally be applied to any year.
Model results show a 4 per cent increase in total annual volume of water in 1966 at
Allahabad, a 22 per cent decrease at Patna and 34 per cent decrease at Farakka. The
reduction or augmentation of flow at each site also changes seasonally, as shown in
Figure 7.9 and Table 7.3. For example, at Allahabad, the linking scenario shows a 234
per cent increase in flow over pre-linking conditions in January, but a 6 per cent reduction
in flow in August during the monsoon season. In the dry season from October through
May, flow is augmented at Allahabad, on average, by 510 m3/sec, a 40 per cent increase
over pre-linking conditions, while flow is reduced slightly during the monsoon season.
This is due to the fact that inputs from the Gandak-Ganges and Ghaghara-Yamuna links
augment the flow at Allahabad at a constant rate throughout the year, but the Ken-Betwa
link removes water from the Yamuna upstream of Allahabad mostly during the monsoon
season.
Similarly at Patna, post-river linking flow is 27 per cent less in August, but 47 per cent
more in May compared to pre-linking conditions. Overall, in the dry season, flow is
reduced on average by 610 m3/sec or about 20 per cent relative to pre-linking conditions.
The diversion of the Gandak and Ghaghara rivers creates an especially large impact on
monsoon flow at Patna. From June to September, flow is reduced by 33 per cent on
average, or around 6,900 m3/sec. The model has to divert almost the entire flow of these
two tributaries in order to produce the required amount of water per the NWDA
documents. It seems unlikely that the river linking plan could divert all the water in the
Ghaghara and Gandak for inter-basin transfer considering the large number of people
living alongside these rivers that depend on the flow for their livelihoods. It is possible
that the model is under-producing flow for these sub-basins given that direct calibration
data is not available for either tributary, or that the NWDA has not yet realized the
implications of their planned diversions.
M 3 /SeC (CMS)
1000
⫺1000
Allahabad
⫺2000
M 3 /SeC (CMS)
⫺500
0
⫺1000
0
Patna
⫺1500
0
M 3 /SeC (CMS)
⫺500
0
⫺1000
0
Farakka
⫺1500
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Fig. 7.9 Results of river linking simulation: augmentation (⫹) or reduction (⫺) in flow due to river
linking diversions and inputs at Allahabad, Patna and Farraka.
Table 7.3 Average daily model output flow in pre-linking scenario and average daily change
from pre- to post-linking scenarios. All values in cms
Dry season (Oct–May) Monsoon season (June–Sept)

Pre-linking flow Change Pre-linking flow Change
Allahabad 1,250 510 12,660 –360
Patna 2,900 –610 20,830 –6,880
Farakka 3,510 –940 21,700 –7,840
At Farakka, flow is reduced in both the dry and monsoon seasons. Flow is 49 per cent
less in January under river linking but only 1 per cent less in May. On average, during the
dry season, flow is reduced by 27 per cent, or 940 m3/sec. During the monsoon season
from June to September, flow is reduced on average by 36 per cent.
7.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GANGES WATER SHARING TREATY
Currently, the Ganges is said to “… provide water to 37 per cent of the geographical area
of Bangladesh, over which one third of the population depends (Singh, 2003).” However,
the simulated reductions in flow at Farakka during the dry season strongly call into
question India’s commitment to meet its flow obligations towards Bangladesh under the
Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (in place until 2026) if river linking construction proceeds
as planned.
Water disputes between India and Bangladesh date back to 1951, when the overnment
of India announced the scheduled construction of a barrage at Farakka, just 18 km from
the Bangladesh border – which, at the time, was known as East Pakistan. Though the
plans were not immediately carried out, the announced plan sparked several years of
turmoil surrounding water sharing issues between the two countries. After nearly twenty
years of negotiations, stretching as far as the United Nations (UN), India acted to
unilaterally construct the Farakka Barrage and divert flow away from Bangladesh towards
the Hooghly River to distribute water to the Indian delta and the city of Kolkata.
After Bangladesh became established in 1971, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River
Commission (JRC) was formed. Then, in 1975, India did sign an initial agreement with
Bangladesh upon completion of the Farakka barrage that allowed for significantly less
3
diversion (311 to 454 m /sec) by the Indian government than originally planned. Next
two dry seasons water withdrawal continued without any bilateral agreement.
The first formal agreement between India and Bangladesh was signed in 1977 for a
period of five years and was extended on two separate occasions before it finally expired
in 1988. The next eight years were characterized by an escalating deadlock between the
two countries during which India withdrew water unilaterally. Various proposals were
devised, exchanged, evaluated and ignored until a political breakthrough, on 12 December
1996 when Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh and H.D. Deve Gowda of
India signed the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty.
The main features of the Treaty are (Chanda and Gupta, 2000):
Validity for thirty years (1996 to 2026) subject to review by the two govern-
ments at 5-year intervals or as desired by either signatory.
The schedule is based on the average 40-year flow data (1949 to 1988) to be
applied to the sharing formula which actually governs the treaty.
Either party can seek the first review after two years to assess the impact.
Sharing to be by 10-day periods from January 1 to May 31 every year.
Sharing will be on a 50:50 basis, if the availability at Farakka is less than 70,000
cubic feet of flow per second (cfs).
Bangladesh will get 35,000 cfs and India the balance of flow if the availability at
Farakka is between 70,000 and 75,000 cfs.
India will receive 40,000 cfs and Bangladesh the rest in case of availability of
75,000 cfs or more.
During the critical month (April) Bangladesh will get a guaranteed flow of
35,000 cfs in the first and last ten days of April, and 27,633 cfs during the period
11 to 20 of April.
If flow falls below 50,000 cfs in any 10-day period, the two governments will
enter into immediate consultations to make emergency adjustments.
Joint Committee of equal number of representatives to be formed for daily

monitoring of flows from January to May at the feeder canal and the navigation
lock in Farakka, India and at Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh and to submit annual
reports to the two governments.
Comparing model output from the pre- to post-linking scenario in 1966, the number of
days where flow is below 50,000 cfs rises from 12 to 55 in the January 1 to May 31 sharing
period between India and Bangladesh. Therefore, this projected reduction in dry season
flow under the river linking plan will most likely require a renegotiation of the Water
Sharing Treaty, if not compensatory action by the Indian government. It is unclear how,
and in what forum, the discrepancies between the ILR and the Ganges Water Sharing
Treaty will be resolved.
7.9 CONCLUSIONS
The river linking simulation shown here allows us to begin to make informed predictions
about the consequences of river linking as they relate to flooding, water quality and water
supply throughout the Ganges basin, saltwater intrusion in the Ganges delta, and impacts
on Bangladesh, India’s downstream riparian neighbor. Any reduction in baseflow in the
Ganges watershed during the dry season will have negative impacts on populations that
depend on river water for drinking, sanitation and irrigation. Therefore, agricultural areas
along the Ganges from Patna downstream that currently suffer water shortages during the
lean season will experience more severe shortages under river linking, according to the
results of this simulation. The model also shows that populations living along the Gandak
and Ghaghara rivers will be severely impacted year-round by the proposed diversions.
The reduction in flow at Farakka during the dry season would certainly create further
political tensions with Bangladesh and call into question India’s ability to meet its
obligations to Bangladesh per their latest water sharing treaty. It seems likely that Kolkata,
an Indian city downstream of Farakka, would be less impacted by the river linking plan
than Bangladesh, since one of the river links in the ILR (Farakka- Sundarbans link) plans to
bring water from the Brahmaputra-Ganges link to flush Kolkata port. This diversion from
the Brahmaputra through Indian territories will also reduce the amount of water flowing
from India into Bangladesh, further inflaming tensions. Less water in the Ganges delta,
downstream of Farakka, would worsen salinity intrusion into the channel and groundwater
aquifers which harms both drinking water supplies and agricultural production. Also,
reduced flow in the delta would negatively impact the Sundarbans, a mangrove ecosystem
highly sensitive to the relative balance of saltwater and freshwater inputs from upstream
(Wahid et al., 2007).
If the Himalayan reservoirs operate as planned, the diversion of water during
monsoon season and the consequent reduction in flow from June to August at Patna and
Farakka might indeed reduce catastrophic flooding in the downstream areas of the Ganges.
However, if river linking does take place and communities become accustomed to reduced
flow conditions by settling further within the floodplain, seasonal variability in river flow
could still create damage. As flow is reduced, sediments begin to settle out of the river,
which may lead to channel aggradations and/or channel migration, also possibly harming
populations living in the floodplain.
Impacts on water quality due to river linking would likely be different at different
points within the Ganges watershed. Increases in flow would dilute the existing load of
pollutants in the water, helping to reduce their toxic qualities and carry them out to sea,
while reductions in flow would have the opposite effect. Therefore, at Allahabad, the
predicted increase in baseflow might help to improve water quality during the dry season,
but the reduction at Patna could lead to a further deterioration of water quality in that area.
Also, many authors have pointed out that river linking may actually spread not only water,
but water pollution from fecal contamination and heavy metals throughout India (Misra
et al., 2007). For example, water diverted out of the Ganges basin may be linked with
relatively cleaner waters in the Peninsular component of the plan. However, within the
Ganges basin, the Himalayan component of the ILR mainly diverts water in relatively
pristine Himalayan upstream watersheds, and this would likely have a positive effect on
water quality near the confluence of the Upper Ganges and Yamuna rivers. Chapter 9
discusses changes in water quality due to the ILR in more detail.
The amount of water in the Ganges varies from year to year and will be affected by
climate change (see Chapter 12), land use change, and increasing water withdrawals in the
coming years. This particular hydrologic model and river linking simulation does not take
into account any of these factors. However, it should capture the general timing and
magnitude of discharge in the Ganges basin in the near future, and can be used as a
starting point for further simulations related to river linking or other alterations to the
hydrology of the Ganges basin.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The master’s project, upon which this work was based, received support from many people
and institutions. Dr Mike Wiley at the School of Natural Resources and Environment
(SNRE), University of Michigan served as faculty advisor for the project and provided
extensive academic support, scientific expertise and constructive criticism without which
the work would not have been possible. Also at the University of Michigan, Dr Mohammad
Omair, Shaw Lacy and the Map Library provided invaluable instruction, research advice,
personnel contacts, data and encouragement.
In India, Rakesh Jaiswal of EcoFriends in Kanpur and his family generously pro-
vided home base for preliminary research on the project. Also, Dr Ram Boojh at the
Centre for Environment Education (CEE) North in Lucknow (currently at UNESCO in
Delhi) was essential in organizing research activities and disseminating results.
The project received financial support from the Educational Foundation of America,
Rackham Discretionary Funds, the SNRE Travel Grant and the SNRE Alumni Incentive
Award. Diana Woodworth and Mary Martinowicz at SNRE helped to secure funds and
manage the budget.
Finally, this work was a contribution within the University of Michigan’s Ganga
River Partnership Project (http://rivers.snre.umich.edu/ganga/), established in 2002 by
Drs Wiley and Omair (University of Michigan), Dr Boojh (CEE-North, Lucknow and
UNESCO, Delhi) and Dr R.K. Sinha (Patna University, Science College).
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8
India’s Energy Future and Interlinking of Rivers
KOBI PLATT
SHARON GOURDJI
CARRIE KNOWLTON
MICHAEL J. WILEY
8.1 INTRODUCTION
As India’s economy surges forward, access to reliable and affordable energy becomes
evermore critical. India’s real GDP grew 8.5 per cent in 2006, expanding at an annual rate of
7.8 per cent between 2002 and 2006 (CIA, 2007). According to World Bank statistics for
2005, India’s economy was the10th largest in the world (World Bank, 2007). Economic
expansion, coupled with significant population growth, has led to rising energy demand in
nearly every sector of the economy. Still, with ever present limitations of the nation’s
energy supply, there are few signs that India will curb its growth anytime soon.
Of the various energy sources domestically available to fuel India’s economic growth,
hydropower has emerged as a leading option. Globally, hydropower is third behind
natural gas and coal when used to generate electricity. Regenerative characteristics of
hydropower, due to relative constancy of precipitation, have led to its classification as a
renewable (and carbon-free) energy resource. These characteristics contribute to the ris-
ing debate about the role of hydropower in the context of global climate change objec-
tives. In recent years, development of hydro resources in India has placed the India’s
Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) plan at the center stage.
If completed, the ILR is expected to provide some 34,000 MW of generation capac-
ity to India – or about a 25 per cent increase of the current domestic energy production.
At present, India’s energy supply mix is characterized by a large dependence on coal,
causing both comfort and concern for the county’s political leaders. Coal combustion, while
a source of cheap and reliable energy, is responsible for atmospheric emissions of many
harmful gases including carbon dioxide (CO2) and its concentration, the foremost cause of
global warming. Interestingly, emerging research indicates that net CO2 emissions from
hydropower reservoirs – those that include an account of the total pass-through of
methane (CH4 ) gas, with a high CO2 equivalent, based on alterations to the watershed – are
also significant. Indeed, a 1990 study performed by Philip Fearnside at that Brazilian
National Institute for Research showed that net equivalent CO2 emissions from the Tucurui
dam in Brazil were roughly 32 million tons (McCully, 2004). During the generation process
of hydropower methane is released when the water is discharged through the turbines
(McCully, 2004). Methane at the bottom of the reservoir becomes more soluble under the
130 INDIA’S ENERGY FUTURE
high pressure from the water above and condenses (McCully, 2004). When the water is
released through the spillway the pressure decreases and the methane is released (McCully,
2004). By comparison, methane has a much more potent global warming potential than CO2
(McCully, 2004). By comparison, Fearnside states, a natural gas combined cycle power
plant comparable to the Tucurui dam would produce only about 8.1 million tons of CO2
equivalent gas (McCully, 2004). In addition to the emerging science about greenhouse
gas emissions from hydro projects, many hydropower facilities have been linked to water
quality loss and habitat destruction that negatively affects both human and environmen-
tal health. In both cases, whether hydropower or coal combustion, the economic and
environmental trade-offs are extremely difficult to measure. For India specifically, under
developed transmission infrastructure and political inefficiencies only create further
complications toward securing a reliable future energy supply from the ILR.
This chapter provides a glimpse of the ILR in the context of India’s need for energy
development. The analysis begins with an overview of the supply and demand status in
India’s energy sector. The text includes an examination of the present and future challenges
associated with the role of energy and continued economic expansion, with emphasis on
the positive and negative attributes of the ILR. Close attention is paid to the political
infrastructure and the environmental concerns governing India’s options for energy
development. Finally, a brief summary of cost-benefit analysis of other high level water
development projects is included, the ILR is placed in a regional context, and broad concerns
are summarized.
8.2 BALANCING NEEDS: INDIA’S ENERGY SECTOR
India consumed roughly 15.417 quads1 of energy in 2005 (US EIA, 2007). Coal (53 per
cent) was the dominant fuel source, followed by petroleum (33 per cent) and natural gas
(8 per cent) (EIA, 2007). India’s total energy consumption ranked 5th in the world for
2005, behind the United States, China, Russia, and Japan (EIA, 2007). On a global scale,
experts at the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) predict that energy
consumption will rise by 57 per cent between 2002 and 2025 in attempt to keep pace
with economic growth (EIA, 2005). Energy generation from fossil fuels is expected to
increase, with oils, coals and other forms of biomass continuing to constitute the majority
of supply. The United Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that with
continued world economic growth (average 2.7 per cent per year) energy demand in 2020
will be roughly 50 per cent higher than it was in 1998 (UNDP, 2000). Furthermore, the
UNDP states that without major improvements in energy efficiency, demand over this
period could rise by 80 per cent (UNDP, 2000).
In addition to the tightening balance of overall resources, political and social
instability in the oil rich countries around the world will only serve to hinder the future
reliability of crude oil. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, questions about the
economic well-being of Russian oil development, and OPEC production skirting near
capacity, all suggest future price shocks are inevitable (Bangerjee, 2004). Disruptions of
this sort have a profound impact on consumers in the developing world where the ability
to keep pace with rising prices and adjust to changes in supply is not great. Thus, for
reasons related to reliability and access of supply, coal has re-emerged as the fossil fuel of
choice for many nations.
1
1 quad ⫽ 1 quadrillion BTU.
KOBI PLATT ET AL. 131
World coal consumption peaked in 1988, followed by a notable decline in the early
1990s when many of the world’s leading energy consumers shifted significant portions of
their production capital to natural gas (EIA, 2006). On the heels of supply limitations and
rising natural gas prices, however, reliance on coal has rebounded (EIA, 2004a). World coal
consumption has increased each year since. According to EIA, India possesses roughly
100 billion short tons of economically recoverable coal reserves. In 2004, India consumed
about 250 million short tons of coal and the demand for coal has steadily increased
at the rate of 6 per cent since 1992 to 1993 (EIA, 2004b). Assuming the current rate of
consumption holds, India’s coal reserves will be sustained for over 400 years.
Exploitative development practices and out-dated energy technologies continue to
threaten the health of India’s natural resources (e.g. water and arable land). The degree to
which India is able to stimulate future economic growth will be dependent on its ability
to obtain an affordable mix of sustainable energy resources. To that end, the ILR repre-
sents one of the most significant natural resource development plans on the Indian sub-
continent, both in its mission and scale. Outlined in its primary objectives, the plan
highlights increased electricity generation capacity of 34,000 megawatts (MW) from
newly constructed hydropower facilities. Presently, India makes use of roughly 20,000 MW
of installed electricity generating capacity, and plans to expand by 100,000 MW over the
coming decade (EIA, 2004).
Beyond India’s ambitious plans to develop new energy resources, the lack of
adequate transmission infrastructure means that new power supply may never connect
with consumer demand. Government records indicate that while 84 per cent of the 587,000
villages in India are served by power lines, only 55 per cent of the households in India
actually have access to electricity (Singh, 2006). Though coal makes up the largest share
of total energy consumption in India, the potential role of the ILR presents an opportunity
for India to diversify its energy portfolio that is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Also evident
is India’s energy deficit, shown here in Table 8.1. The shortage depicted has led to an
increased dependence on energy imports from around the world, and represents a growing
vulnerability to their burgeoning economy.
Table 8.1 India: Total primary energy production vs. Total primary energy consumption (Quads)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total primary 7.33 7.49 8.00 9.48 8.75 9.17 9.37 9.59 9.81 10.21 10.41
energy
production
Total primary 8.86 9.24 9.97 11.49 11.15 11.76 12.17 12.74 13.48 13.84 13.98
energy
consumption
Source: Lynch, 2002.
In a 2002 report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests that financial
shortcomings and technical deficiencies have created a tremendous need for policy reform
within India’s energy sector. Moreover, a 2003 collaborative analysis published by The
Energy Research Institute (TERI) in New Delhi and the Graduate School of Energy Science
in Kyoto, Japan showed a 9 per cent annual increase in energy demand in India over the
past decade – one of the highest rates observed worldwide (Mathur et al., 2003). In 1996
to 1997, for example, coal consumption by the utilities was 199.6 million tons (Mt),
increasing to approximately 250 Mt by 2000 to 2001. This number is expected to nearly
double in the next five years – official estimates by the Ministry of Coal estimate that
consumption by the utilities will reach 415 Mt by 2011 to 2012 (Mathur et al., 2003).
Yet, despite strong increases in the rate of consumption, the expansion of energy
capacity in India has not kept pace with rapid growth in demand. Indeed, an analysis of the
March 2002 energy demand by the Centre for Energy Studies at the Indian Institute of
Technology indicated 12.6 per cent peak energy deficit (Thakur et al., 2005). Figure 8.1
shows energy consumption across India’s economic sectors. While the residential sector
has emerged as the country’s most significant energy sink, the shift that India’s industrial
sector has made to captive power (because of a lack of reliability in the public sector) has
been incredibly dramatic. Peaking shortages – energy shortage during a period of peak
demand – reached a high of nearly 21 per cent in 1992 to 1993, while total energy
shortages leveled off in 1996 to 1997 at 11.7 per cent (Singh, 2006). In terms of power
capacity, India’s Ministry of Power estimates the need for an additional 10,000 MW each
year at a cost of US$ 10 billion per annum over the next 10 to 12 year time horizon to
meet demand at expected rates of growth (Thakur et al., 2005). Many of these scenarios
are based on the government’s publicized goal of providing nationwide power to all by
2012 (Thakur et al., 2005).
Fig. 8.1 India’s energy consumption by economic sector, 1990 and 1999 (IEA).
However, operational shortcomings within the political arena, including a lack of

accountability in the regulatory and financial framework, have contributed to large disparities
in the amount of electricity consumed and that which is actually billed. In short, barrier to
entry within the energy industry caused by this investment risk associated with billing
complications have caused a decline in overall growth of energy consumption relative to
the rise in economic output.
It [India’s electricity supply industry] is currently running a growing

risk of bankruptcy. This has created a serious impediment to
investments in the sector at a time when India desperately needs them.
This is reflected in the sharp decrease of the ratio of electricity
consumption growth to GDP growth in the 1990s. In otherwords, in
the past decade, electricity consumption growth did not follow
economic growth (IEA and OECD, 2002).
According to a report released by the India’s Ministry of Power in 2001, only

55 per cent of total electricity generated was billed and 41 per cent was paid with regularity.
Among rates that are being paid, prices reflect roughly 75 per cent of real average cost to
suppliers. In fact, “the recovery of average financial cost of supply through average
revenue realized has declined from 76.7 per cent in 1996 to 1997 to 68.6 per cent in
2001 to 2002” (Thakur et al., 2005: p.1). Similarly, in 1995 to 1996 nine out of nineteen State
Electricity Boards (SEB’s) reported financial losses, in 2001 to 2002 all of them did
(Thakur et al., 2005). These market conditions – including high taxes and unreliable
service have forced many industrial consumers to shift to captive power – power
produced on-site instead of purchased off the grid (Singh, 2006). The net effect has lost
SEBs their most valuable customers. Indeed, the agriculture and residential sectors’
dependence on government subsidies that have kept electricity prices reasonable, which
has long hindered the formulation of a natural pricing structure, is no longer fiscally
viable or politically sustainable (IEA and OECD, 2002; Singh, 2006). The result has
created a serious financial burden within the industry that has discouraged new
investment and slowed India’s economic growth potential.
8.3 POWER STRUCTURE: INDIA’S STATE ELECTRICITY BOARDS (SEBs)
The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) provides technical and economic assistance in the
evaluation of energy-related projects that call upon funding from agencies within India’s
central government (Dossani, 2004). However, the balance of responsibility to coordinate
the energy sector’s generation, transmission, distribution and pricing responsibilities
rests in the hands of SEBs. The Indian Constitution grants pricing and tariff rights to the
SEBs, not the central government. Thus, most of the nation’s capital assets – generation,
transmission and distribution – operate under state control. Efforts to keep pace with
economic growth, combined with the increasing popularization of energy market dereg-
ulation, led the central government to invite private investors into the utility market in
the early 1990s. In October 1991, the central government issued its first official policy
reform targeting the financial needs of the SEBs. The statement allowed “the private
sector to set up thermal [coal] projects, hydroelectric projects, and wind/solar energy
projects of any size” including 100 per cent foreign ownership that guaranteed a
16 per cent return on equity called a power purchase agreement (PPA) with exchange rate
protection (Dossani, 2004).
By 1996, however, the reform provisions put forth in 1991 had all but failed. Though
investment in privatized generating capacity had been adequately encouraged, privatization
in the distribution market was not pursued. This compromising detail within the reform
plan made potential investors wary of the financial health of the comprehensive energy
system. Given these shortcomings, the Ministry of Power once again proposed a new
approach to privatization called the Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power
(CMNAP). Among its many policy mechanisms, the plan called for the following points:
incorporation of SEBs beginning with reliance on public ownership, while pri-

vate investors were gradually phased in;
efficiency improvements for generation and distribution of SEBs;
creation of independent state electricity regulatory commissions (SERCs)
answering only to the state’s High Court.
Again, these policy prescriptions lacked the necessary integration with the distribu-
tion sector. Despite the change in the overall model intended to eventually make SEBs
private, potential investors remained concerned about the state’s financial health.
In attempting to offer some regulatory structure at the national level, the government
passed the Electricity Amendment Act that established the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission (CERC) in 1998. In addition, the legislation officially “… separated
transmission from distribution and created the national Power Grid Corporation to own
and operate inter-state transmission lines (Dossani, 2004: p.16).” In that same year, the
Ministry of Power took action with the SEBs and mandated that all states:
set up SERCs;
corporatize the SEB’s and unbundled the SEBs generation, transmission and
distribution activities; and
open transmission to the private sector (Dossani, 2004).
The states abided by the Ministry’s calls to reform, but change has been slow. Much
to the chagrin of the SEB’s, less than favorable market conditions related to political
corruption that created a multitude of financial obstacles continually discouraged
investment, particularly with regard to transmission and distribution. In fact, by March
2002, private investors held a scant 11 per cent of installed capacity (Thakur et al., 2005).
Between 1992 and 2002, private investors only added a scant 6,500 MW to 95,000 MW
generating capacity that existed prior to the opening of energy markets (Singh, 2006).
The most recent legislation governing India’s power supply is the Electricity Act of
2003. In sum, its purpose is:
“… to consolidate the laws relating to generation, transmission,

distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally for taking
measures conducive to development of electricity industry, promoting
competition therein, protecting interest of consumers and supply of
electricity to all areas …”. (Thakur et al., 2005: p.2).
Most importantly, the Act changes the long standing model that has traditionally
supported a single buyer. Ideally, the new policy would encourage multiple players to
engage at different stages within the power industry. One concrete illustration of this
approach to hasten private investment can be cited in the policy’s elimination of licensing
restrictions for traditional (coal) generation facilities.
At present, however, private markets remain small and have not yet been adequately
managed in conjunction within the public sector. As the implementation phase of the
Electricity Act’s provisions plays out, questions about the environmental implications of
the reform remain. The next section begins with a brief discussion of utility deregulation
and the development of private sector investment in developing countries like India.
Finally, the examination turns to the air quality and environmental concerns associated
with the primary pollutants in the combustion of coal.
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS: RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION
As a developing nation, transition toward deregulation of energy industry in India raises

several questions to the extent environmental considerations will be incorporated. While
much has been documented about the political success associated with clean technolo-
gies in places like the United Kingdom (UK), the focus has tended to be on independent
power producers (IPPs) (Perkins, 2005). For example, the UK has decreased air concentra-
tions of sulfur dioxide (the pollutant responsible for acid rain) from 179 ␮g/m3 to 14 ␮g/m3
since 1962 (UK Environment Agency, 2005). This improvement in air quality is largely due
to a combination of government regulation and private sector investment in pollution
control or clean energy technologies. “Most IPPs are private firms. Some of these are
large, transnational developers with projects in a number of different markets across the
world, while other independents are locally owned and operated (Perkins, 2005).” How-
ever, very little is actually known about the choices of IPPs in developing countries,
namely India, and how they may or may not differ from those in developed countries.
The India power sector has traditionally been dominated by state-

owned utilities producing electricity, for the most part, using coal in
relatively old, inefficient and polluting plants. As such, one might
expect IPP developers using modern, environment-efficient
generating technologies to reduce the pollution-intensity of electric-
ity production. Yet, on the other, a combination of weak environmental
regulations, abundant coal supplies and stringent cost pressures on
project developers might suggest that they will be reluctant to invest in
environmentally sound generating options, many of which are more
expensive an a capital-cost basis (Perkins, 2005).
Given the financial difficulties combined with shortcomings in supply, Perkins’

thesis seems entirely appropriate. In fact, a pervasive incentive for IPP’s to rely on proven
technologies that minimize risk and enhance cost-effectiveness is inherent in the
observations being made in the developing world (Torrens and Stenzel, 1998).
A significant amount of uncertainty still exists regarding future energy development
and the ability to meet demand in India strictly because of the lackluster investment within
the industry. As discussed in the section above, involvement of the private sector in
deregulated energy markets has been disappointing at best (Perkins, 2005). The lack of
investment has made it difficult to determine how the private sector would influence
certain environmental concerns related to energy production. Least-cost investment
often translates to a shortfall in what are deemed costly pollution controls. However, the
provision of incentives for pollution control technology within the private sector through
market-based regulation (emissions taxes or trading schemes) has bolstered innovation in
clean – or cleaner – energy. Historically, India has done little to combat emissions from its
predominantly coal-fired power industry, and no aspects of present political conditions –
including the 2003 Electricity Act – seem to be concerned with such factors (Thakur
et al., 2005). Given the likely perpetuation of unmitigated reliance on coal in India, it’s
appropriate at this point to turn to a discussion of coal as a fuel stock as well as the
emissions considerations associated with it.
8.5 DISCUSSION
Results of previous benefit-cost scenarios illuminate the difficulty of assessing many of

the uncertainties related to the spread of disease, degradation of water quality and species
loss associated with large water projects. In 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD)
revealed that the actual benefit cost ratios (BCR) of large scale water projects have been
lower than their projected values. The report goes on to state “direct agricultural benefits
fall short of costs” and that in six of nine projects analyzed, the economic rate of return
(ERR) was found to be less than 9 per cent – the cut-off recommended for approval of
irrigation projects (Rangachari et al., 2000).
In terms of the benefits associated with hydropower, the WCD study attributes large
gains mainly to the high cost of power to consumers in India and the relatively low
operating costs of hydropower facilities. For all projects evaluated in the WCD study, the
benefits “… alone cover the reported cost of the entire project (including canal costs) in
both the WB (World Bank) and SPIESR (Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social
Research) estimates”. Table 8.2 provides a demonstration of the disparity.
Table 8.2 Benefits and costs of hydropower (million R.)
SPIESR World bank analysis

Benefit 260,203 149,974
Cost 15,408 14,266
While these figures serve as a useful tool to evaluate the inclusion of hydropower in
a large scale water development project, further examination of empirical data would
enhance the reliability of these projections. Specifically, data that would be more helpful in
evaluating development decisions may include cost calculations of ecological service
parameters – nutrient cycling, erosion potential, and evapotransporation – both before
and after dam construction.
The most significant assumption made in this analysis is that the development of
hydropower will lead to decreased reliance on coal as an energy source. In all reality, it is
quite possible that India will simply bolster its energy production with the implementation
of hydropower, having no mitigating effect on the growing coal industry whatsoever. It
has also been noted by many critics of the ILR that the inter-basin transfer component of
the ILR will require significant energy inputs to lift water across basin boundaries. This
energy requirement could significantly reduce the net electricity generated by the hydro-
power component of the ILR. Finally, the calculations made in the above section could be
greatly enhanced with more detailed information on the degree to which emissions from
coal combustion contribute to air quality in specific locations. We know, for instance,
that India generates roughly 70 per cent of its electricity from coal and that there are
eleven coal-fired power plants supplying over 100 MW in Uttar Pradesh (Energy Manag-
ing, 2002). The share of the emissions of these individual units that contribute to local air
quality, and projected growth of the energy sector in any given region are unknowns.
It is also assumed that the transition from dependence on thermal (coal) power to
hydropower is seamless – or relatively so. In fact, a deeper analysis may attempt to
incorporate the burden on society brought about by a shift in infrastructure – including,
but not limited to power access and reliance, energy independence, biodiversity loss
associated with ecosystem alteration, and population displacement.
Bhutan serves as an excellent example of what other nations in South Asia are doing
to meet ambitious energy objectives. With an estimated hydropower potential of
30,000 MW, Bhutan expects all the citizens of their nation to have access to electricity by
the year 2020. At present, however, a mere 1.6 per cent of this potential capacity has been
tapped yet still constitutes roughly 45 per cent of the gross national revenue. Despite
lagging development, Bhutan has emerged as a net exporter of energy. Each year,
approximately 70 per cent of Bhutan’s present generation capacity, some 300 MW, is sold
to energy-deficient India. Not surprisingly, India was party to a bilateral agreement that
set the first major Bhutanese hydropower project into motion in 1974 (WEC, 2005). In
the event of further hydropower development in the region and international energy
import, India could become vulnerable to regional conflict or price fluctuation related to
their economic activities. Alternatively, the Indian government may choose to delay the
large infrastructural investment associated with the ILR’s hydropower project until a
better forecast of Bhutan’s capacity growth can be determined.
Bhutan’s electricity demand in 2003 was 105 MW, 99.5 per cent of which was provided
from hydropower resources. As transmission infrastructure expands, Bhutan will divert
more of its domestic generation to local consumers. As transmission capabilities improve,
the growth rate of generating capacity is expected to vastly outpace the growth in demand.
Government officials expect to bring 1,020 MW of new generation capacity online within
the next eighteen months. This event will mark the completion of their greatest hydro-
power project yet, and a significant step toward achieving the 20-year Master Plan of
national electricity supply by 2020 (Sharma, 2003).
Of course, the ILR is not the only way to quench India’s thirst for energy. Other than
coal, traditional energy resources such as natural gas provide opportunity for future
development. However, consensus estimates show that India only possess about
37 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves compared to roughly 200 Tcf of natural
gas reserves in the United States and about 1,700 Tcf of reserves in Russia (EIA, 2007).
In recent years the Indian government has attempted to broker a deal to construct $7.5
billion natural gas pipeline that would transport roughly 2 billion cubic feet per day
(bcf/d) into the country from Iran (Energy Daily, 2007). The proposed pipeline would run
through Pakistan, and so far progress toward an agreement has been slowed by negotia-
tions involving transportation tariffs. Though operation is expected to begin no earlier
than 2011, the pipeline would increase the volume of natural gas India consumed in 2005
by almost 60 per cent.
In addition to opportunities for fossil fuel based energy sources, India’s Ministry of
New and Renewable Energy estimates that the country’s technically recoverable wind
power potential is roughly 13,000 MW – gross potential is similarly estimated to be about
45,000 MW (MNES, 2007). The World Wind Energy Association ranked India fourth,
behind Germany, Spain and the United States, in terms of total installed wind capacity at
the end of 2005 (WWEA, 2006). The World Bank recently assisted in the installation of
about 50 MW of distributed or off-grid wind capacity (Martinot et al., 2001). Still, India’s
current wind power capacity utilizes about a third of the technically available resource
potential. Despite the marked increase of India’s windpower generation, the financial risk
and technical barriers associated with potential alternative energy development initia-
tives (particularly in rural parts of the country) has limited the necessary investment to
drive large scale growth.
While Bhutan’s seemingly successful hydro-development bodes well for India, and
the prospects of wind and natural gas development are promising, the scale of India’s
production need makes potential the impacts difficult to measure or compare. The
channeling, reservoir construction and water diversion proposed in the ILR is certainly
unlike any other hydro project that has been undertaken in the region. With the potential
to cause serious public health and environmental damage, organization and planning
associated with the ILR must include a careful examination of the cultural, political, social,
economic and engineering interests involved. If and when a global reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions is made a priority, the competition and political debate surrounding
India’s plans for coal, natural gas and hydropower will be fiercely contested. Apart from
any eventual climate change objectives, each of India’s energy development options is
coupled with a unique set of present and future challenges. In addition, a lack of billing
accountability, underinvestment, and a failing transmission infrastructure pose serious
problems that must be resolved regardless of how the energy is generated. Although the
ILR carries the promise of an affordable and reliable energy source, all of India’s energy
development projects must be combined with careful management and systematic
restructuring if they are going to fuel sustainable economic growth.
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9
Potential Public Health Implications of

Interlinking of Rivers in India
CARRIE KNOWLTON
SHARON GOURDJI
KOBI PLATT
MICHAEL J. WILEY
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In the quest to provide water and hydropower to populations in the developing world and
eradicate disease associated with malnutrition and poor sanitation, new epidemics known
as “diseases of development” associated with large scale water development projects are
emerging around the world. These include infectious and parasitic diseases such as
malaria, guinea worm, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), river blindness, and a variety of
diarrheal diseases, as well as numerous psychosocial and other indirect health effects. When
juxtaposed with the numerous health benefits that are incurred by increased access to
clean water, improved food security from irrigation projects and potential clean sources
of energy, the issues surrounding water development become increasingly complex. The
proposed Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) in India is no different, and while we do not have
enough technical information available to conduct thorough health impact assessments
and pinpoint what the exact benefits and costs might be, this chapter serves as an over-
view of other water development projects, in India and around the world, with particular
emphasis on the issue of community displacement, malaria, diarrheal diseases such as
cholera, and the emergence of parasitic diseases such as schistosomiasis. This overview
can hopefully serve as a starting point for conducting a more thorough health impact
assessment of the ILR as more information becomes available.
Increased storage capacity due to dams, reservoirs and irrigation channels as would
be associated with the ILR, by definition results in decreased flow velocity. This, in turn,
leads to accumulation of suspended loads, which favor eutrophication, reduced oxygen
concentrations and sedimentation. These conditions typically force a shift in ecological
community structure towards organisms that are tolerant of poor water quality with
reduced oxygen content: ideal conditions for important vectors of water-borne disease
including both snails and biting flies. While the benefits of hydropower, irrigation,
improved access to clean water, and improved transportation infrastructure are surely
arguments in favor of large dams, these benefits must be weighed against future costs,
some of which are more difficult to assess. The environmental consequences of dams
142 POTENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS
often have indirect effects on human health. Salinization and waterlogging of soils due to
over-irrigation, sedimentation and erosion, alteration of seasonal flow patterns (affecting
downstream users and ecology), damage to fisheries, deforestation, and increased use of
and exposure to pesticides with an increase in arable land area can all lead to adverse
impacts on human health.
The international health community has been slow to respond to the syndrome
created by water development projects – focusing instead on the eradication of single
diseases or finding a piecemeal technological, biomedical fix to repeated problems. In
the end, most remedies fail to address root causes. While environmental and social impact
assessments are often mandatory in the water resource development policies of many
countries, including India, health assessments are often not included, even though
health is related to both the environmental and social consequences of water resource
development. The World Health Organization (WHO) has encouraged the World Com-
mission on Dams to incorporate health assessment policies into its recommendations to
developing countries, but has no specific initiative of its own to mitigate the negative
health consequences of water resource development (WHO, 2000). India began to require
that all water development projects undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
in 1978, but no clear specifications describe how this must be accomplished. Frequently,
EIAs are undertaken after the project has already entered the construction phase, and
there are no institutions in place to enforce the improvements that are deemed necessary
in order to receive environmental clearance. As a result, while EIAs are mandatory in
India, they carry little weight while projects are in the construction phase (Rangachari
et al., 2000).
9.2 COMMUNITY RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN INDIA
After Independence from Britain in 1947, water resource development became a major
focus of the Indian government, which has constructed aproximately 4,000 dams in the last
60 years and more than half of them built between 1971 and 1989 (Rangachari et al., 2000).
Reservoirs behind such dams submerged land area of 37,500 square kilometers – almost
the size of Switzerland (IRN, 2007). In a country as densely populated as India, the
number of people displaced is enormous, on average 44,182 people per dam (Roy, 1999).
The focus of water development projects in India, especially in the 1960’s, was on
population relocation rather than rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods and prop-
erty. Rehabilitation schemes are often described as “crisis management” reactionary mea-
sures rather than coherent, thought-out policy, and had frequently disastrous consequences.
Resettlement packages can vary widely among groups. Landowners who invest their
compensation frequently can restore their standard of living to what it was prior to dis-
placement. Lower castes and tribal groups, who may occupy inundated land but not own
substantial amounts, frequently receive less glamorous packages, and are often forced
into migrant labor or to cities (Hemadri, 2000). Resettled communities are often prom-
ised, but rarely see the electricity provided by hydroelectric facilities, which is instead
usually directed to the urban upper and middle class. Compensation packages tend to
undervalue the actual financial costs to the displaced, much less the intangible social
and emotional impacts due to loss of community cohesion.
The people who are affected by the construction of dams and irrigation schemes can
be divided into three groups. The first group is the project affected people (PAPs). This
group consists of people forced to relocate because their former homes are to be
CARRIE KNOWLTON ET AL. 143
submerged by reservoirs or irrigation channels. In addition to compensation packages

offered by the government, they often see some benefits, such as irrigation canals for
agriculture or electricity, from the development project. Yet, the intangible costs are great.
Communities are typically not resettled as a unit, they are scattered among “host”
communities that are frequently not receptive, if not hostile, to the new residents. Loss of
sense of community is perhaps the largest and most intangible consequence of
displacement, and takes an untold toll on mental health. Increases in morbidity and
mortality, including an increase in malnutrition, have also been documented (Hemadri,
2000). These increases in morbidity and mortality can have obvious effects on mental
health as well, as stress levels increase among the survivors. Few epidemiological studies
on the effects of displacement on mental health have been carried out in India, but there are
numerous anecdotal accounts that belie the extreme stress that people undergo after being
removed from their homes and forcibly relocated. The India People’s Tribunal on the Bargi
Dam in Madhya Pradesh reported on a man whose family was relocated for whom “… fear
was a constant companion for he never knew when the flowing water would submerge his
home and carry away not only his meager belongings but also members of his family”
(Hemadri, 2000). Similarly, Arundathi Roy in her book The Cost of Living writes of a man
displaced by the Sardar Sarovar project:
The man’s mind was far away from the troubles of his sick baby. He was
making me a list of the fruit he used to pick in the forest. He counted
forty-eight kinds. He told me that he didn’t think he or his children
would ever be able to afford to eat any fruit again. Not unless he stole
it. I asked him what was wrong with his baby. He said it would be better
for the baby to die than to have to live like this. I asked what the
baby’s mother thought about that. She didn’t reply. She just stared
(Roy, 1999).
Outside of India, mental health consequences such as depression and increased sui-
cide rates associated with water development projects have been well-documented, pur-
portedly due to stress associated with adjusting to new surroundings. The indigenous
North American band of Cree, affected by the James Bay Project in Quebec, Canada, is one
such example of this. In this case, spousal abuse and suicide, as well as the incidence of
STDs increased after the project was implemented (Scudder, 1973). Cree elders attributed
these changes not only to stress, but to an erosion of Cree cultural values due to a loss of
community cohesion following relocation. Stress results not only from the need for the
displaced to adjust to new physical surroundings. In cases where the displaced are
relocated to already established communities, stress can also result from interactions
with established community members who may be opposed to the presence of outsiders
(Scudder, 1973).
The terms under which PAPs are relocated have been the source of much controversy
because the issue of relocation is seen as not merely a cost-benefit decision, but an issue
of human rights. In the Morse Report, an independent review undertaken for the World
Bank of the Sardar Sarovar project in Gujarat, the dilemma is posed: “It is not, however,
simply a question of weighing the numbers on each side, not simply a question of
statistical relativism, but a question of human rights” (Morse, 1993). The national
resettlement policy in India has been somewhat piecemeal in the making, with provisions
made as needed, with no pre-determined basis for coherent policy. In 1979, the Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), a judicial body constituted by the government of India
in October 1969 to resolve water disputes between four States of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra and Rajasthan, declared for the first time that displaced people were to be
awarded land for land and a chance at social and economic progress. Concurrently with
development of a national policy in India, the World Bank was developing its own policy
on funding projects that would physically disrupt communities, essentially stating that
the Bank would only assist in funding projects in which concrete resettlement plans that
restore the oustees to a standard of living at least equal to their previous standard are part
of the loan negotiations. It must be recognized that this is more of a challenge than
simply providing an amount of land equal in value to the amount originally owned.
In general, the less land owned by an oustee, the less they benefit from resettlement
packages, as the resources that they lose, such as loss of community structure and
access to public goods such as traditional fishing waters and forest land are not easy to
quantify or replace. Simple monetary compensation is insufficient, as expendable
resources do nothing to ensure future livelihoods when the previous source of subsis-
tence is gone.
The second group of people affected by water-development projects is those who are
affected by the dams, but are not forced to resettle because of them. These people tend to
suffer silently from dam development, compared to PAP’s, as they often do not receive
compensation for the negative impacts dams have on their communities, and usually
represent the poor and marginalized members of society who see little benefit from the
hydropower or irrigation systems that are often the driving force behind these huge dams.
In the case of the Sardar Sarovar project, this group included people who were displaced
by the irrigation canal portion of the project and were not covered under the resettlement
plan for those displaced by the dam reservoir. Those displaced by the canal system
informed the Independent Review of lost crops, wells, and community cohesion due to
canals rendering land unreachable except by distant bridges, but no compensation was
offered. Impacts on communities downstream of dam reservoirs that are not displaced can
be equally severe. Many traditional agricultural societies have developed along flood-
plains and depend on them for their livelihoods. Decreased flow and nutrient loads down-
stream can concentrate pollutants, decrease water quality, decrease agricultural and
fisheries productivity, and ultimately affect food security and public health. Lack of food
security has profound public health implications, as improper nutrition can cause and
exacerbate the effects of any number of diseases. Communicable diseases often increase,
as well, due to increased stress levels and overcrowding in cases where those who are
displaced are relocated to a site with a smaller physical area.
The third group of people that are affected by dams are the immigrants who relocate
to be near the dam site and have procured employment with the project in some way, either
in manual activities like construction or in higher level activities associated with planning
and implementing the project. While the previous two groups described tend to suffer,
this group usually tends to benefit the most. These people frequently out compete the
local population for resources and jobs, and, in many cases, can introduce urban health
problems into rural communities. With migrant worker populations often come increased
prostitution and multiple-partner sex, consequently adding HIV-AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases to the list of diseases brought on by development projects (Cernea,
1995).
9.3 WATER DEVELOPMENT AND DISEASE, POLLUTION

AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN INDIA
While displacement has been a major political issue in India, particularly surrounding
the Narmada Dam in Gujarat, little attention has been focused on the public health
consequences of dams. These must be taken into account when assessing the benefits
and costs of a project such as the ILR. Irrigation and hydropower may improve the
standard of living for some, but the increased incidence of infectious diseases may reduce
quality of life for others. Health benefits and disease outcomes are very difficult to
quantify, but a cost can be placed on disease control and treatment, and this can be
weighed against the potential benefits of hydropower, improved agricultural yield, and
even improvements in health for some because of access to clean water, better nutrition, or
increased availability of electricity. Trade-offs in public health are made all the time, in
developing as well as developed countries such as the United States, but from a human
rights perspective, the overall burden of disease should be minimized.
There are also engineering methods that reduce habitat for disease-carrying vectors
during dam and canal construction and operation. These methods can improve health
outcomes for communities living in proximity to large dams that should be considered if
the risk of disease associated with a particular project is great (Jobin, 1999). It should also be
noted that some positive health effects of large water development projects are also
possible. During the construction phase, new infrastructure such as roads and commu-
nication systems are often brought in. These roads can provide better access to hospitals and
health care, and improve the flow of information into a community. After the construction
project is completed, food security and access to safe drinking water can improve.
9.3.1 Malaria
Malaria is a parasitic infection transmitted by the Anopheles mosquito. Mosquito larvae

thrive in stagnant water, and increased incidence of malaria is often associated with
irrigation projects and dams in areas of seasonal malaria transmission (Klinkenberg, 2003).
Year-round standing water can lengthen the season of transmission and increase the
range of the vector by changing micro-climatic conditions, and create an endemic area
from an area previously affected only by sporadic epidemics (Jobin, 1999). In the case of
the Thar Desert in Rajasthan, malaria epidemics have been associated with construction
of the Indira Gandhi Nahar (Canal) Project (IGNP) for irrigation purposes. Reduced flow
due to sedimentation and plant growth in the irrigation canals creates an ideal breeding
ground for the mosquito vector, an abundance of pools of standing water along the canal
itself, and the initial delay in construction leading to stagnation of the water all have
contributed to the negative health consequences of this particular water development
project. Irrigation has increased the crop yields and relative incomes of people that may be
most at risk for malaria, therefore increasing their access to health care and treatment
options, but no studies have been conducted to assess the true cost of the increased
burden of disease (Tyagi, 2004) (also see Chapter 2).
The IGNP not the only irrigation project in India that has been associated with an
increase in incidence of mosquito-borne illnesses. Tungabahdra Dam in Karnataka,
Sriramsagar and Ukai all reported higher incidence of malaria after completion of the projects.
Communities around the Sardar Sarovar in Gujarat reported up to a six-fold increase in
incidence of malaria as project construction peaked. The Indian government has, to an
extent, recognized that this problem exists, and has included an analysis of potential
increase in vector-borne disease in 13 of the 67 dams examined in the World Commission
on Dams’ India Country Report (Rangachari et al., 2000). Even so, the Ministry of Health
is typically not involved in planning water development projects, and remedial measures
are usually proposed as solutions, rather than preventative measures to minimize amount
of standing water and maximize drainage. Remedial recommendations have included
establishment of Primary Health Centers to treat affected individuals or distribution of
insecticides to kill the mosquito larvae. These measures have their own associated costs.
The use of insecticides, in particular, has potentially negative health consequences
(WHO, 2006). Because malaria is only endemic at altitudes less thanextent, recognized that
this problem exists, and has included an analysis of potential increase in vector-borne
disease in 13 of the 67 dams examined in the World Commission on Dams’ India Country
Report (Rangachari et al., 2000). Even so, the Ministry of Health is typically not involved
in planning water development projects, and remedial measures are usually proposed as
solutions, rather than preventative measures to minimize amount of standing water and
maximize drainage. Remedial recommendations 2,000 meters, the Himalayan reservoirs
associated with the Ganga basin component of the ILR, assumed to be located at altitudes
prohibitive to the survival of the malaria parasite, are unlikely to increase risk of malaria.
However, irrigation canals and future waterlogged areas can increase the risk of malaria as
it has ocurred in the IGNP. The same cannot be assumed, however, of canals and reservoirs
located at lower altitudes in the Peninsular component of the ILR, and appropriate
engineering controls and precautions must be put in place to ensure that an increase in
malaria incidence does not negate any potential benefits of the project.
9.3.2 Schistosomiasis
Schistosomiasis, also known as bilharzia, is a parasitic illness transmitted by a snail

vector that thrives in slow-moving water. The parasite typically infects either the urinary
or intestinal tracts, and while one can live for years with no acute effects, the chronic
effects are crippling and often fatal. The illness is due to eggs released by the female worm
once lodged in the target organ of the body. The eggs can cause calcification of the
bladder, painful urination, blood in the urine, and, ultimately, damage to the urethra,
kidneys, bladder, and, in advanced cases, bladder cancer. In the intestine, eggs lodged in
the intestinal tissues can result in progressive enlargement of the liver and spleen, and
hypertension and bleeding in the abdominal blood vessels that can ultimately lead to
death. This disease has become tragically epidemic around large dams in much of the
developing world; in places such as the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Diama Dam on the
Senegal River, and the Three Gorges Dam in China. It has not, however, been recently
detected in India, but with increased water development, researchers have become
increasingly concerned about the possibility of establishing the disease. The low
prevalence of schistosomiasis in India as compared with neighboring China can be
partially explained by the high intensity of rainfall in India during the monsoon season. In
general, when mean annual rainfall is greater than 2,500 millimeters, the relative wetness
and high flows during the monsoon season will preclude the survival of some species of
parasite-carrying snail vectors (Jobin, 1999). However, three of the four snail species
capable of harboring the parasite are endemic in Indian water bodies. The most important
studies on schistosomiasis in India took place in Gimvi Village in Maharashtra State since
the 1950’s. In 1952, 205 people were reported to be infected with the parasite, in this area.
Further investigation indicated that the vector of the disease was the small snail species
Ferrissia tenuis (Southgate and Agarwal, 1990). This genus is not associated with the
parasite in other parts of India, nor in parts of Africa where both this genus and the
schistosome parasite are well established. However, parasite-host relationships evolve
quickly, and it would not be unusual for a parasite to adapt to a new vector or host in new
environs. Infected F. tenuis were detected in Gimvi as recently as 1983, but have not been
recently detected in Gimvi or elsewhere in India (Sathe and Renapurkar, 1983). To date, the
epidemiology of the Gimvi outbreak is poorly understood, but the fact that the disease has
been documented on the Indian sub-continent raises a red flag as to the possibility of
establishment of the disease. Continued monitoring of snail populations should inform
future water development decisions.
9.3.3 Cholera
Because of decreasing water quality and increased fecal coliform levels, cholera is
a serious risk in India. Cholera is a serious diarrheal illness caused by the bacteria Vibrio
cholera. Incidence of cholera has a cyclic relationship with the monsoon season in India.
Populations of Vibrio cholera have been shown to be regulated by bacterial viruses
known as phages. After periods of heavy rain or severe flooding, phage concentrations in
aquatic environments tend to be low, allowing the bacteria population to flourish (Faruqi,
2003). The cholera bacterium is also associated with various aquatic organisms, especially
zooplankton with chitinous skeletons, such as copepods (Lipp, 2002). As aquatic
ecosystems become more productive due to increased nutrient loads, it can sustain more
microorganisms including cholera bacteria. It has also been suggested by some studies in
the Ganga that some egg masses of the midge Chironomus (family Chironimidae) are able
to harbor the Vibrio cholera bacteria that causes cholera (Halpern, 2004). Members of the
family Chironimidae are found in a wide variety of habitats and water quality conditions.
However, in situations where flow has been reduced and oxygen levels decreased, as in
dam reservoirs or irrigation canals, other tax less tolerant of poor water quality (such as
members of the orders Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, and Trichoptera) are excluded, often
allowing Chironomus to flourish and reach exceptionally high numbers. In addition,
because Vibrio cholera is typically associated with moderately saline environments found
in coastal and estuarine water bodies, it is possible that the diversion of water from the
Ganga could increase saltwater intrusion into Bangladeshi estuaries and create an
environment favorable to a cholera outbreak (Colwell, 1996). No epidemiological studies
have been conducted to determine the correlation between abundance of chironomids,
cholera bacteria, and incidence of cholera in humans, but it is another reason to be
concerned about the proposed massive reconfiguration of the Indian river network.
9.4 WATER QUALITY
The Ganga River Basin already is struggling with water quality problems due to pollu-
tion from untreated sewage, industrial effluent, and urban and agricultural runoff. Pollu-
tion in the Ganga includes both domestic sewage and industrial effluents, and can come
from both point and non-point sources. Common biological pollutants include fecal
coliform and human pathogens discharged into the river from point sources, undiverted
wastewater drains and improperly functioning waste treatment plants. Chemical
pollutants include common products of organic decomposition, inorganic heavy metals
such as chromium emitted from industrial point sources, and phosphates and nitrates from
agricultural runoff, a non-point source.
There are tremendous public health consequences for the high pollution loads seen in
surface water so intimately intertwined with the livelihoods of many millions of people.
People in cities and towns that receive their water supplies directly from the Ganga suffer
from diarrheal diseases such as cholera as well as toxic effects from unregulated industrial
effluents. Inter-basin transfer, as in the ILR, can either augment or reduce the flow in a
given stretch of river, and contribute to the flushing or concentration of pollutants. Dams
themselves can have both positive and negative effects, and in some cases, such as
Gandhisagar dam in Madhya Pradesh, a positive effect on water quality has been reported.
In other instances, where flow is greatly reduced and pollution levels remain the same, the
water quality is sure to decline. This has been the case with the Tajewale barrage that
divides the Yamuna into the Upper and Lower Yamuna Canal. The flow in the Yamuna has
been seriously compromised, and downstream communities, especially those downstream
of New Delhi, are at risk (Rangachari et al., 2000).
Dams can negatively impact groundwater as well as surface water quality. In the
southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, “knock-knee” (Genu valgum), a crippling bone
disease due to increased consumption of fluoride, has been associated with the construction
of the Junasagar Dam. Seepage from reservoirs and irrigation channels increased sub-soil
water levels, increasing fluoride concentration in groundwater where fluoride was already
present. This syndrome has also been associated with at least two other dams in India:
Parambikulam in Columbatore and Hosptet dam in Karnataka (WHO, 2000). Incidence of
fluorosis has also been recorded in naturally waterlogged areas in Kanpur district, Uttar
Pradesh, and could conceivably increase with increased irrigation activities (Faruqi, 2003).
Conversely, some argue that when more surface water is available for human
consumption, the pressure on groundwater reserves will decrease, therefore avoiding the
consumption of naturally occurring contaminants such as fluoride and arsenic. This is the
argument put forth by proponents of the Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat, where fluorosis is
a major health problem in the arid Kutch region (Vyas, 2001). However, no actual decrease
in incidence of fluorosis or improvement in groundwater quality has been documented in
this region due to construction of the dam.
While we can only speculate on the possibility of increased incidence of malaria and
schistosomiasis in India due to the creation of irrigation canals and dam reservoirs,
hydrological models presented can give some indication as to how flow, and hence, water
quality will be affected by the ILR, and how this may affect human health in certain locations.
Following is a case study of one community on the Ganga that already suffers from poor
water quality.
9.4.1 Case study: Kanpur
Kanpur, a highly industrialized city of 2.5 million residents in the state of Uttar Pradesh, is an
excellent example of the problematic nature of water pollution in the Ganga River Basin.
Often called the “Manchester of the East” due to the huge number of industries that it
supports, Kanpur is home to approximately 300 leather tanneries concentrated mainly in
the Jajmau area, most of which release their effluent directly into the Ganga. Leather
industries produce a large amount of effluent concentrated with pollutants, particularly
the toxic heavy metal Chromium. In addition, the Jajmau tanneries produce about 400 tons
of solid waste daily, mostly consisting of crushed bark and nuts that are used as a natural
dye for the leather. This biodegradable waste is contaminated with toxins from the leather
making process and usually disposed of improperly. The total sewage generated in Kanpur is
around 360 MLD (million liters per day) out of which 160 MLD was proposed to be
diverted to sewage treatment plants under Phase I of the Ganga Action Plan (GAP). The
remaining sewage was to be treated in the second phase of GAP. The goal for these plants
was to treat this 160 MLD of domestic sewage and 9 MLD of tannery effluent and either
supply the treated wastewater to nearby villages to irrigate their farmlands or directly
discharge it into the Ganga. Four intermediate pumping stations were built along the
Ganga, and all wastewater drains, or nallas, were to be intercepted and diverted to the
pumping stations. The pumping stations were to release the wastewater into a common
waste-pipe leading to the main pumping station, which filters out solid waste and then
pumps the remaining wastewater into one of three sewage treatment plants (Jaiswal,
www.ecofriends.org).
Under the Ganga Action Plan, the larger tanneries were required to install Effluent
Treatment Plants, and Combined Effluent Treatment Plants were slated for construction to
process the effluent of tanneries that were too small to afford their own plants. These goals
were laudable, but difficult to achieve, and to date many of the tanneries have still not
removed the chromium from their effluent before diversion to the river or the waste
treatment plant. The chromium present in the raw sewage as well as Biological Oxygen
Demand (BOD) levels, an index of organic material in the water, exceed the capacity of
the treatment plants. In most cases, the water discharged to the river still exceeds the
appropriate levels (Tare, 2003).
There have been major development and diversion projects all along the river,
however, reducing the flow and decreasing the river’s capacity to dilute pollution levels.
Much of the dry weather flow is diverted to the Upper Ganga Canal at Haridwar, upstream
of Kanpur, and flow regenerated between Haridwar and Aligarh is again diverted to the
Lower Ganga Canal near Aligarh, downstream of Kanpur. As a result, the heavy inflow of
pollutants at Kanpur meets a river with highly reduced volume of water during the dry
season. The Ganga receives over 60 per cent of its water from the Yamuna, Ghagra, Kosi
and Gandak, tributaries all joining the mainstem at or at points below Allahabad, down-
stream of Kanpur. The Kanpur-Allahabad stretch is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to a
high pollution concentration due to lost diluting volume.
Fecal coliform levels due to large amounts of human waste discharged into the river
are also high in Kanpur. In order for water quality to meet the criteria for Class “B”
(bathing class), total coliform levels must be below 500 MPN/100 mL. Fecal coliform
itself is naturally found in the human digestive system and is not harmful to people, but
is found in association with fecal material, and is used as an indicator of the presence of
other, more harmful bacterial communities such as Vibrio cholera. Table 9.1 shows the
levels in 1987 and 1998 for two monitoring stations: Ranighat, upstream of the city, and
Jajmau pumping station, which is downstream of the city.
Table 9.1 Average fecal coliform levels (MPN/100 mL) for two sampling stations in Kanpur (Central
Pollution Control Board, 2001a)
1987 1998
Ranighat 5,551 149,941
Jajmau pumping station 2,629,641 1,500,037
In villages near the Jajmau area of Kanpur, poorly treated, chromium contaminated
effluent is piped directly to villages for irrigation purposes. This effluent is meant to be
treated by the GAP waste treatment facilities, but due to their poor performance, the people
who come into frequent contact with this water have shown skin lesions, stomach
problems, and the blackening of the fingernails common to people chronically exposed to
chromium. While no epidemiological studies have been performed on these populations,
but it seems probable that these health problems are strongly correlated with exposure to
toxic waste. There is also a fear that groundwater in the area is becoming contaminated by
surface water percolation into aquifers, leaving people with no viable source of safe and
clean water, as Ganga water is the source of drinking water for the majority of residents of
Kanpur.
9.5 HYDROLOGICAL MODELING AND WATER POLLUTION
Application of the HEC-HMS hydrological model for the ILR in India (see Chapter 7)
(Table 9.2), we can make speculations, if not predictions of precise concentrations of
pollutants. In general, water quality will be improved with increased volume and
subsequent dilution of pollutants. The Ganga HEC-HMS Model shows that at Allahabad
dry season flow will be augmented, while it will decrease at Patna and Farakka.
Table 9.2 Hydrological model flow predictions and current water quality status for Allahabad,
Patna and Farakka (Central Pollution Control Board, 2001b)
Predicted Current water Pollution

change quality status concentration
Allahabad (downstream) Increase flow D Likely decrease

Patna (downstream) Decrease flow D Likely increase
Farakka Decrease flow D Likely increase
In 2001, water at all three sites where a change in flow can be predicted with our
hydrological model, share the poor water quality rating of “D”. The Indian government’s
Central Pollution Control Board considers water of the “D” class to be suitable for the
propagation of fisheries and wildlife, but unsuitable for bathing (Class “B”), a major use of
the river Ganga. The critical parameter that prevents most sites on the Ganga from meeting
the standards of the B class are total coliform and BOD levels, largely due to the emission
of untreated sewage into the river. Water in Class D must have a pH level between
6.5 to 8.5, dissolved oxygen of 4 mg/L or more, and a nitrogen level of 2.2 mg/l or less, but
the total coliform levels are unspecified for classes below “C”. Class “C” requires that the
annual average total coliform levels must be less than 5,000 MPN/100 mL, while class “B”
requires that total coliform be below 500 MPN/100 mL, have a dissolved oxygen level of
5 mg/L, and BOD level of 3 mg or less. While we can make quantitative predictions at only
these three sites in our model, we can speculate that flow will generally be augmented in
the mid-section of the river (Allahabad), where water quality will improve, while water
quality will decrease where flow is decreased. Therefore, in terms of surface water quality
in the channel, the ILR can be seen as both a positive or negative development, depending
on the portion of the channel affected. It is worth noting that in Allahabad, where the flow
is augmented, it is to a lesser degree than the flow is decreased at Patna and Farakka. Water
quality will also be affected at the downstream stretch of the Ganga in Bangladesh. If only
these three points are taken into consideration, the ILR can be seen to have more of a
negative effect than a positive one overall. Regardless, the ideal solution would not be to
simply dilute pollution, but restore water quality by placing controls on the sources of
the pollution themselves.
9.6 CONCLUSION
Until details of the engineering aspect of the ILR are released, it will be difficult to make
predictions about public health changes related to the implementation of the project.
Potential water quality issues, as well as changes in patterns of vector-borne disease must
be considered with assessing the potential benefits and costs of a river linkage. Given the
ILR’s potential to improve drinking water and food security for some, and the possibility of
improved air quality due to hydropower, public health outcomes are extremely complex,
but critical to understand.
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Cernea, Michael: Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement: The State of
Knowledge in Resettlement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 1995, pp. 245–264.
Colwell, R.R.: Global Climate and Infectious Disease: The Cholera Paradigm. Science 274(1996),
pp. 2025–2031.
Faruqi, N.H.: In Abstracts: Workshop on Medical Geology. Geological Survey of India, Nagpur,
February 3 to 4, 2003.
Halpern, M.: Chironomid Egg Masses as a Natural Reservoir of Vibrio Cholera Non-O1 and
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Hemadri, R.: Dams, Displacement, Policy and Law in India. Contributing Paper to World Commis-
sion on Dams (http://www.dams.org), 2000.
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programs/india/), 2007.
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Jobin, W.: Dams and Disease: Ecological Design and Health Impacts of Large Dams, Canals, and
Irrigation Systems. E and FN Spon, New York, 1999.
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Lanka. IWMI Research Report 68(2003).
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Areas of the Thar Desert, India. Acta Trop 89(2004), p.227.
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Sanitation and Health Series, Geneva, January 2000.
10
Living in the Downstream: Development

in Peril
AHSAN UDDIN AHMED
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Living in the downstream, as a total of 140 million are living in Bangladesh, is not easy.
It is a part of the largest delta on Earth, created by the three mighty eastern Himalayan
Rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna (GBM) (Figure 10.1). The low-
lying delta has been created over millennia by the sediments carried by the water of the
GBM systems, the combined flow of which is the second largest after the Amazon River.
The monsoon circulation has generally brought moisture aplenty, while fertile lands
have given adequate food grains for consumption and wealth creation. No wonder, sev-
eral globe trotters have described the land the most prosperous country on Earth (Batuta,
1355). Simultaneously though, the happy going farming communities had to suffer
through frequent water-related hazards, mostly in the form of floods. Then came a particu-
lar time in human civilization, which witnessed an unprecedented exploitation of earthly
resources coupled with rapid growth in human population. As a by product of anthropo-
genic interference, the downstream areas of the GBM systems saw artificial obstacles to
natural flows, created for the benefit of quick transportation of goods, cultivation in the
lands that were designated as hazard-prone, and diversion of water from the river itself!
The latter appeared to bring in the ultimate horror: hydrological balance denied, ecosys-
tem destroyed, crop suitability perished, livelihoods at the brink of collapse and economy
doomed. It is of little relevance now to invest large sums of money and to engage state-of-
the-art technologies to strive for development, the fruit of such thoughtful steps can no
longer guarantee a quality living in Bangladesh. Safeguarding development processes
and results has become the foremost challenge to policymakers. Living in downstream of
GBM has already become a hazardous proposition to those hanging around.
Historically, Bangladesh has been dependent on the regional flows coming through
the GBM River systems. Although the country occupies only about 7 per cent of the total
catchment areas of the three rivers combined, it drains over 92 per cent of all surface flows
of the catchment areas to the sea (Rahman et al., 1990). Although on an average per capita
basis, water availability is one of the highest in the world, in effect over 80 per cent of all
surface waters are available only during the monsoon months: from June to September.
This precarious distribution of water on an annual scale has given rise to two distinct
features: (i) too much water in peak monsoon leading to inundation of low lying lands and
occurrence of floods, and (ii) too little water during the dry season leading to moisture
stress on top soils and ingress of salinity along the coastal rivers. The spatial distribution
154 LIVING IN THE DOWNSTREAM: DEVELOPMENT IN PERIL
of surface water is further complicated by spatial distribution of the resources: the eastern
part along with part of the coastal zone is much wetter than the dry western parts of the
country (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000).
Fig. 10.1 GBM basins spread over the eastern Himalayan region (Mirza, 2003).
Availability of water in right time and in right quantum, in the forms of rainfall, its
runoff along the streams, and stored underneath the ground, allows crop agriculture – the
source of livelihoods of majority of the population in Bangladesh. Water and land together
generally shape up household-based economy in Bangladesh (GED-PC, 2005). Water
availability creates natural conditions for a good harvest and ensures micro-level food
security of millions of marginal farmers. However, water often induces water-related
hazards: either in the form of too much water to cause flood or having too little to cause
both moisture stress and salinity intrusion – all having detrimental consequences. A few
of these water-related hazards assume disastrous proportions, devastate national economy,
cause deaths and destruction of livelihoods, inflict upon hunger and perpetuate poverty
(Ahmad and Ahmed, 2002).
If the above issues are placed in the backdrop of high population growth forecasts,
rapid urbanization, and further degradation of environmental quality, it would already be
frustrating for many people. However, to add to this dismal scenario, one has to deal with
future hazards such as the proposed Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) in India. The proposed
project has a total of 30 components, a few of which would deal with diversion of the
Brahmaputra flows to the southern parts of India. Unfortunately, this would certainly
jeopardize the hydrological scene of the GBM system and being the downstream country
in the GBM region, Bangladesh will have to face the brunt of such changes. This article
analyzes the complexities of such proposed diversion of flows from the regional rivers on
which the downstream country depends the most.
AHSAN UDDIN AHMED 155
10.2 WATER: A KEY DRIVER FOR BANGLADESH’S DEVELOPMENT
To an outsider, Bangladesh is a land of water, virtually floating on it. To a common

Bangladeshi, water is a resource which defines lives and livelihoods of people and simul-
taneously, it is both boon and bane. In one hand, water resources create conditions suit-
able for agricultural activities, while on the other, water in excess of drainage capacity of
rivers can induce flooding and deficit of water on topsoils can be detrimental for crop
growth.
Until recently, Bangladesh experienced an agrarian economy (Faruqee, 1998). During
the past three decades, the relative importance of agriculture has been gradually declining
while that for service and industrial sectors has been increasing. Agriculture sector is
providing for only 19.2 per cent of the GDP (2005 to 2006 fiscal year), while it was
contributing 47.1 per cent in 1970s. Despite such structural shift in relative contribution to
the economy of the country, the importance of agriculture, especially that of crop
agriculture is still very high. Despite the recent boom in Ready-Made Garments (RMG)
manufacturing sector, which primarily fuelled the shift in the structure of the economy,
agriculture sector is providing for about 51.7 per cent of the direct employment in the
country (MoF, 2005). Micro-level food security (at individual households) is totally
determined by own and local production, as revealed by a recent survey (Ahmed et al.,
2006). The importance of agriculture in the economy therefore cannot be overemphasized.
Interestingly, such an important activity is thoroughly dependent on timely avail-
ability of water and in adequate quantum. Aman and Boro are the two generic paddy
varieties which together occupy about 76 per cent of the net cultivable area (NCA) and
are grown in monsoon (i.e., Kharif-II) and dry (i.e., Rabi) seasons, respectively. Since
Aman is grown in monsoon, water requirement for its growth is mostly met by abundant
natural rainfall, supplemented by in stream flows and stored water bodies including
wetlands. The initial moisture deficit, which is observed only in November and Decem-
ber,1 is primarily met by water stored/available in surface water systems (wetlands, ponds,
rivulets, rivers etc.) and also by exploiting groundwater aquifers. Since Aman is depen-
dent on naturally available water, drier than average monsoon (as in 2006) and/or late
recession of flood waters (as in 1998) can adversely affect Aman production and inflict
upon micro-level food insecurity. On the other hand, any improvement towards contain-
ing floodwaters and/or facilitating drainage contributes to a good harvest and socio-
economic advancement (Ahmed, 2000).
In contrast, cultivation of Boro paddy is predominantly dependent on groundwater
sources as surface sources other than large rivers get almost dried up by March and acute
moisture deficit in the top soils is experienced due to increasing evapotranspiration.
Figure 10.2 graphically represents crop calendar and month wise soil moisture conditions
in terms of potential evapotranspiration as against monthly averaged rainfall and tem-
perature variability. Currently, groundwater based irrigation is applied in about 3.42 Mha
areas under Boro, which accounts for about 45 per cent of total irrigation potential in the
country.
In the dry season (i.e., November to mid-April), in addition to suffering from moisture
stress, the coastal lands also face ingress of salinity. With drastic fall in flow volume of
major rivers and diminishing winter rainfall, the coastal river system experiences salinity
ingress which automatically restricts surface irrigation potential. A combination of
1
By December, Aman is harvested. However, moisture stress in the top soil continues until April,
well into the Boro cropping season (Figure 10.2).
non-availability of rainfall and increasing desiccation from top soils due to capillary rise,
salinity of top soils along the coastal zones increases significantly and reduces potential
for crop production (Karim et al., 1990). In order to solve dry season water-related
problems, management of the scarce resource appears to be a critical factor, which again
contributes to socio-economic advancement profusely.
Fig. 10.2 Rice and wheat crop calendar in relation to seasonal flooding, rainfall and temperature.
It is perhaps needless to emphasize the importance of water for drinking purposes. In

recent years, the country achieved 97 per cent coverage of safe drinking water, owing to
sinking of millions of hand tube wells. However, high concentration of arsenic has been
found in tube well water which raised concerns over the health implications caused by
contaminated water. The southwestern parts of the country have been suffering from
non-availability of saline-free drinking water. A large number of hand tube wells reportedly
have become inoperable during peak flood season, while many other tube wells cannot
draw groundwater for drinking due to rapid draw down in the peak dry season. For all the
above reasons, the well being of general population is severely compromised due to lack
of quality drinking water. It is reported that over 70 per cent of all illness in the country is
related to water quality. Therefore, the importance of water is paramount considering

future development in health care in Bangladesh.
As indicated above, the importance of industrial sector in national GDP is increasing
gradually. It is believed that future employment potential can only be realized by a thriving
industrial sector, a glimpse of which has already been observed with the recent growth of
RMG sector. However, processing industries would most likely demand quality process
water, which can only be provided along the large rivers of the country. Since water levels
reach the lowest during the dry season, it is of paramount importance to have adequate
flow regime during the months of March and April when flows are at their respective
minimum in the major rivers.
Waterways play a vital role in the transportation sector of the country. Among all
forms of transportation for both freight and passengers, water transport is the cheapest
mode of transportation. However, the vast waterways in the monsoon can no longer
remain operational during the dry season for lack of draft, even complete choking of river
systems. The problem of decreasing water levels in navigational routes becomes acute
during March and April, particularly for larger vessels. For a thriving water transport
sector, maintenance of adequate flow regime during critical dry period is a prerequisite.
From the above discussions, it is evident that water plays a critical role in human
livelihoods and national’s development processes. The role of water towards shaping up
poor’s lives relative to other sections of the society is much higher, because poor’s food
security and livelihoods are inseparable from available water regime (Ahmad, 2003). Since
the poor constitute almost half the current population (of about 140 million), any major
change in water sector that might affect scenarios concerning water availability can have
serious implications on the country’s population. In the backdrop of above mentioned
realities, it is of great concern to understand how the proposed ILR, with its Himalayan
(i.e., non-peninsular) components, would change the already precarious water distribution
in the downstream – the low lying deltaic Bangladesh – which is striving to achieve
sustainable development with the highest population density on earth and dwindling
resource base.
10.3 LEARNING FROM THE PAST: THE GANGES WATER

DIVERSION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD
In the wake of such a mammoth project, there have been relentless concerns2 in the region
and beyond regarding the plausible implications of the project, as outlined unilaterally by
the Indian Government (Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 9). To many, it appears that the downstream
areas in both India and Bangladesh might be adversely affected due to changes in
hydraulic conditions and their consequences on landscape, peoples’ livelihoods and
economy (Parkar, 2004). However, the extent of such changes remains to be uncertain due
to vagueness in the outlines of the project and its sub-projects (particularly ones dealing
with Himalayan Rivers) and lack of information. Officially, there hasn’t been any
communication from the Government of India to its Bangladesh counterpart indicating
how much of water will be diverted from large rivers such as the Brahmaputra, the Teesta
and the Ganges, and more importantly, in which particular time of the year (also see
2
One may find large number articles that include newspaper articles (PTI, 2003; Indian Express,
2003; The New Sunday Express, 2003; Hindustan Times, 2003; Vidal, 2003 in the Guardian), dia-
logues in various fora and conferences (SCES, 2003; CPSS-SANDRP, 2003; Shankari, 2004a;
Singh, 2002; Ahmed et al., 2004; Patil, 2003), and academic/research-based papers (Iyer, 2003;
Shankari, 2004b; Mahanta, 2003; Singh and Srivastava, 2006).
Chapter 15). The latter information is extremely important, since both the abundance of
water in monsoon and scarcity of it in the dry season (i.e., winter and early summer) have
long been identified as causes of destruction of lives and livelihoods in Bangladesh. Since
the full information regarding the project is yet to be known, it is almost impossible to
assume how the effects will complicate hydrological aspects as well as people’s liveli-
hoods in the downstream. One can, therefore, only take resort to past similar changes and
learn from those experiences. The unilateral diversion of the Ganges waters by construct-
ing a barrage at Farakka – some 18 km upstream of the entry point of the river into
Bangladesh – has been giving rise enough evidence since its commissioning in 1975 on
how such a gigantic project might jeopardize hydrology of the Ganges Dependent Areas
(GDA) in Bangladesh and livelihoods of those living in GDA and/or out-migrating from
the GDA. The implications of the Farakka Barrage provide an open advertisement of the
potential adverse effects of the ILR and perhaps a rude awakening to the Indian proposal.
The Ganges River system in Bangladesh depends on upstream basins as the only
source of water. However, the importance of Ganges flows is high, as it provide freshwater
to one-third of the area of the country (Mirza, 2004). The relevance of the Ganges flow is
particularly high for the ecologically sensitive southwestern region (SW) of the country
which receives freshwater flows through the Gorai River – the major distributary
(Figure 10.1). Due to upstream withdrawal in the post-Farakka period it is found that
discharge in the Ganges system in Bangladesh has reduced significantly. As expected, the
dramatic change in flow regime has observed in the dry season, which accounts for almost
50 per cent reduction of pre-Farakka flow (Mirza, 2004). Statistical analysis of flow regime
during both pre- and post-Farakka periods suggest that flow regulation by the barrage has
induced non-homogeneity in the annual peak flow. Moreover, statistical tests found most
of the hydrological changes significant.
The Gorai River of course faced the brunt of such changes. The Gorai was practically
disconnected from its intake point during the dry seasons between 1990 and 1996,
a revealed by satellite imageries. The diversion also accelerated siltation of the Gorai
River, which in turn affected annual peak discharge capacity and increased flood vulner-
ability downstream areas of Gorai River. The most dramatic change that had been taken
place may be identified as the increase in instream salinity along the coastal distribu-
taries of the Ganges River those are fed by the flows of Gorai River. The following table
(Table 10.1) provides information on how such changes had been taken place at four
stations in the southwest region of the country.
It is intriguing to note that drastic increase in surface water salinity, as presented
above, reduced the potential for surface water based irrigation for all stations mentioned
above and for the entire Boro cropping season as the FAO recommended threshold of
salinity in irrigation water has been set at 750 micro-mhos/cm (FAO, 1976). Not only the
salinity of river water has been found to increase as a consequence of diversion of water
from the Ganges, similar trends have also been noticed with groundwater resource in
Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2000). Even the soil samples taken from the SW region
exhibited increased salinity during the months of March, April and May. Mirza and Hossain
(2004) reported that, in 1992 to 1993 the area affected due to increased salinity was
23,408 ha. The maximum yield loss was estimated to be about 86 per cent in case of HYV
Boro followed by L.T. Aman3 (71 per cent). The salinity ingress in the SW region has been
so critical that a large number of farmers (in Satkhira, Khulna and Bagerhat Districts) are
forced to forfeit Boro cropping and generally resort to low-value crops such as chillis.
3
Local Aman varieties which are generally transplanted.
Table 10.1 Pre- and post-Farakka monthly maximum salinity at four stations in the SW region
January February March April May

Period
Pre-F Post-F Pre-F Post-F Pre-F Post-F Pre-F Post-F Pre-F Post-F
Station
Salinity in micro-mhos/cm (measured at 25°C)
Khulna 293 1,254 371 3,396 467 8,305 1,626 12,149 1,508 11,208
Goalpara 340 515 397 1,303 750 4,422 1,320 7,422 786 5,456
Chalna 2,600 6,280 2,625 11,510 8,950 17,310 8,675 21,927 12,000 19,009
Mongla 2,300 5,200 3,900 7,880 7,500 11,075 11,800 17,150 13,500 17,100
Note: Pre-F and Post-F represent pre-Farakka and post-Farakka situations.

Source: Modified from Mirza and Sarker, 2004.
AHSAN UDDIN AHMED
159
Moreover, salinity wrecked havoc on the vegetation of the entire SW region, espe-
cially in the Sundarbans mangrove forest. Most of the common local tree species seen
elsewhere are no longer observed in the southern parts of the three Districts mentioned
above. The most affected ecosystem is the Sundarbans forest – a Global Heritage Site
declared by the UNESCO for its natural beauty and wealth of few endemic species –
where a distinct change is distribution of mangrove species has been correlated with
change in flow regime and salinity along the distributaries of the Ganges River
feeding the area (Karim, 2004). Swain (1996) reported an estimated loss of US$ 320 million
due to salinity induced damage to timber production from the forest.
Increasing salinity along the rivers in the SW region not only has devastated
agriculture potential of the area (Mirza and Hossain, 2004), it also adversely affected
industrial development potential of the area (Swain, 1996). The losses resulted from a
number of factors such as increased cost of freshwater importation from far away places,
increased corrosion of industrial equipments, frequent disruption of power supply etc.
Soon after the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage, IECO (1977) estimated that the
industrial losses during December 1975 to June 1976 at US$ 8 million due to hazards caused
by increasing salinity. Rahman et al. (2003) identified the issue of increasing salinity as a
consequence of the Farakka Barrage as a threat to human security for the SW region of
Bangladesh.
Perhaps the worst impact of water diversion from the Ganges River has been on poor
people living in the SW of Bangladesh. By decreasing crop production potential of the
area, the livelihoods of the poor have gradually been brought into a hopeless condition.
Poor people haven’t found adequate food to eat, hardly found any water potable due to
high salinity, and their dwelling units have perished earlier than expected due to
salinity induced corrosion. Continuous ingestion of high salinity often induced high blood
pressure and abortion of fetus, with high health and social cost on poor women (Ahmed
and Haque, 2006). Attendance of primary students in school has reduced since they are
forced to fetch drinking water with lesser salinity than that available in the neighbourhood
(Ahmed, 2004). Many poor families found no other option but to abandon their ancestral
houses and out-migrate to urban areas. The barrage at Farakka has initiated a human
tragedy in the SW region of Bangladesh.
10.4 RIVER INTERLINKING: BANGLADESH’S HYDRO-ENVIRONMENTAL

AND DEVELOPMENT SECURITY
In absence of any official information on actual diversion of water, an attempt has been
made in Bangladesh to assess average potential diversion. The assessment considered
2001 to 2002 hydrological year as the baseline, known to be a moderate monsoon year,
while the demand for irrigation at various dry regions of India (where the diverted water
will be delivered, as per ILR) has been estimated from available sources. The following
table (Table 10.2) provides month wise diversion of flows from the Himalayan Rivers.
10.4.1 Impacts on hydrology
On an average hydrological year, about 23 per cent of the landmass of Bangladesh is

flooded (Hofer, 1998). If Indian claim for diverting only the monsoon flow is taken for
granted, a significant proportion of flood-prone areas will be inundated to a much lesser
extent. However, in the same token a large proportion of shallow-flooded plains – the
famous wetlands of the country – will not at all be flooded, which might significantly
change the natural setting of the wetlands. Reduction of the Brahmaputra flow during
falling stage of flood flows (i.e., September to October) and recession period of dry season
would adversely affect the hydro-environmental setting in a number of different ways
(Chowdhury, 2003), which include the following:
Reduced recharge of groundwater through the wetlands;

Reduced water holding capacity of beels ecosystems in the northwest region;
Much reduced inflows to the major rivers such as the Ganges (at the confluence
with the Brahmaputra) and the Lower Meghna River and to the distributaries in
the north-central and south-central regions;
Consequently, reduced inflow to spill channels of the Lower Meghna in the
south-central region;
Severe changes in morphology due to aggravated erosion and deposition;
Tidal propagation in the Lower Meghna and the Ganges Rivers.
Table 10.2 Potential diversion of water
Potential diversion
Month Comment
of flow (in %)
June 0
July 15.11
August 3.25
September 47.17
October 34.38
November 0 Might require diversion of flow
December 0 in a ‘dry year’
Note: Modified from (Kamal et al., 2004).
However, the scheme involving diversion of the Brahmaputra River would also allow
diversion of the Teesta flows, perhaps at the same annual timeframe. A reduction of
instream flow of the Teesta and other rivers in the northwest region would adversely affect
a few hydro-environmental aspects as above: lack of groundwater recharge, drying up of
wetlands and reduced inflow into the Brahmaputra system. Due to lack of monsoon flows,
irrigation schemes based on surface flows of major rivers in the northwestern parts of
Bangladesh, namely Teesta, Dharala and Dundhkumar, cannot be kept operational.
Application of mathematical models on the above hypothetical withdrawal scenario
suggests that, with diversion of water towards the end of monsoon season would signifi-
cantly change river bed morphological dynamics of the two major rivers, the Ganges and
the Brahmaputra (Kamal et al., 2004). However, gradual rise in river bed level would in
turn increase flood susceptibility of the two rivers in the long run. Therefore, the early
lowering in flood susceptibility might not remain to be true in the long run.
There will be other simultaneous effects on hydrology of other rivers. With
substantial withdrawal of flows along the late flood season (as indicated in Table 10.2),
flood waters will recede faster than that observed currently. Lean flow regime will therefore
begin much earlier than expected. As a consequence, major distributaries of the main rivers
such as Baral, Gorai, Arial Khan, Dhaleswari, and Old Brahmaputra Rivers will reach lean
season flow much earlier than usual. These cascading effects on river systems of
Bangladesh will have detrimental effect on floodplain ecology and biodiversity depending
upon the floodplains.
As indicated above, the unilateral diversion of water from the Ganges River in the past
has significantly changed the hydrological and environmental conditions of the SW
region of Bangladesh. Consequently, the affected area has observed rapid ingress of
salinity along the coastal rivers, particularly in the dry season. There are reasons to fear
that withdrawal of already lean dry season flow from any major regional river would lead to
further degradation of environmental condition, which in turn would complicate social and
economic realities of large poverty ridden population of Bangladesh.
To maintain brackish water mixing zones in their current levels, the freshwater flow of
the Lower Meghna River (LMR) plays a key role. It is found from earlier studies that
approximately 70 per cent of the freshwater flow of March (i.e., part of the critical dry
period) to the LMR is contributed by the Brahmaputra River (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000). It is
also known that the about 40 per cent of the Lower Meghna flow goes to the south-central
(SC) region via a distributary system consisting of rivers such as Tetulia, Galachipa-Lohalia,
Burishwar, and Bishkhali, which essentially maintains the salinity limits in the estuary
when the flow of LMR is at the lowest (Chowdhury and Haque, 1989). The above facts
suggest that the flow of Brahmaputra River is critical for salinity control along the SC
estuarine rivers. It is intriguing to note that, if maintenance of flow of freshwater is the dry
season is the driving force towards opting for the ILR, it is almost certain that the dry
season flow of the Brahmaputra River will also be diverted in the lean season and its
consequences will have to be faced by downstream, Bangladesh.
Indeed, an attempt has been made to analyze the minimum freshwater flow that might
be required to prevent saline water intrusion in the SC region. For this analysis, 80 per cent
dependable flow condition and constraints on salinity on river water utilized for irrigation
have been considered, while a relationship between freshwater flow rate and saline has
been employed for the analysis. The results showed that, even a small withdrawal of water
at 1,000 m3/sec of flow would result in a decreased flow in 3 months of the dry season
below the minimum required flow regime to prevent saline water ingress along the SC
region (Chowdhury and Datta, 2004). If, however, the withdrawal is continued for two
months into the dry season, the decrease in flow volume could be 600 to 350 m3/sec below
compared to that for wet season transfer. Table 10.3 shows the results of predicted
Brahmaputra flow in relation to a hypothetical reduction of the same during first two
months of the dry season in Bangladesh. Of course, a large area in the SC region will be
affected by salinity if Brahmaputra water is diverted in the dry season.
Based on the potential flow withdrawal scenario mentioned above (Table 10.3), an
attempt has been made to analyze salinity ingress along the Bay of Bengal. It is found that
the sea water salinity would penetrate inland by about 80 km due to reduction in monsoon
flow (Kamal et al., 2004). The worst hit area would be the southwest region where the high
salinity currently observed during the critical dry season along the Passur-Gorai systems
would penetrate 50 km upstream. The 2 ppt isohaline line will shift inland by 15 and 30 km
towards west and east, respectively.
Table 10.3 Predicted flow of the Brahmaputra River at Bahadurabad by considering a flow
reduction of 1000 m3/s during September through December
80% Resultant flow

Reduction of flow
Month Dependable flow (as predicted)
(m3/sec)
November 9,215 1,000 7,571
December 5,869 1,000 3,990
January 4,335 No further reduction 2,572
February 3,687 No further reduction 2,029
March 3,709 No further reduction 2,610
Source: Chowdhury and Datta, 2004.
10.4.2 Adverse impacts on agriculture
The relationship between flow patterns in the river systems and crop agriculture clearly
suggests that crop agriculture – the most important source of livelihoods of millions of
people living in Bangladesh – will become extremely difficult if the ILR becomes
operational. The major Kharif crop, high yielding Aman paddy providing about 43 per cent
of total staple cereal for the country, would face the first blow as it would become extremely
difficult to meet water demand with decreasing flow regime in November and December –
the reproductive period for Aman. Irrigation schemes dependent upon flows of Teesta
(over 0.5 Mha), Chandpur and Meghna-Dhonagoda projects in southeast region, Bhola
and Barisal irrigation projects in the south-central region and Ganges-Kobadak project
in the southwest region will all face water scarcity for meeting water demands from
surface sources (Chowdhury, 2003).
The impact on crop agriculture would be even more dramatic during Rabi cropping
season, when Boro paddy is grown. The Rabi season is dominated by high yielding Boro
paddy which is almost entirely dependent on groundwater irrigation, as the rivers cannot
provide adequate surface water during lean period. Since the lean season will start early
and the recharge of groundwater sources would be reduced due to drying up of wetlands,
continued irrigation by exploiting groundwater sources would lead to mining from aquifer
system. It would have two socio-economic consequences: (a) draw-down of aquifers from
shallow levels would require increased energy and investment for maintaining irrigation
and growing Boro rice, which might appear to be impossible for marginal farmers and
share-croppers; and (b) long term sustainability of cropping-based livelihoods would be
at serious risk with dwindling groundwater resources. With decrease in piezometric
surface of the shallow aquifer system the low-cost pumping appliances such as low-lift
pumps and shallow rube-wells would become inoperable in many areas. Since the only
other alternative technology, the deep tube-well, requires high investments, maintaining
livelihoods by poor farmers would become nest to impossible. Currently, groundwater
resource is the lifeline for rural poor farmers. Any constraint imposed on this vital resource
will cause loss of livelihoods and trigger large scale pauperization.
The other major issue regarding crop agriculture is increase in salinity, especially
along the southwest and south-central regions. A large area in the southwestern region
has become saline affected due to diversion of the Ganges flows (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000).
Increased salinity has become a limiting factor for Boro and wheat cropping in the
southwestern parts of the country, especially along the western side of the Gorai River –
the major distributary of the Ganges River. The farmers cannot grow the two most preferred
crops as the reproductive stages of the crops coincide with the period when salinity in
surface water and soils surpass their respective thresholds for the crops. In anticipation of
certain crop loss, farmers either keep the land fallow or resort to crops of lesser economic/
livelihood importance. This reality may easily be considered as a prelude to an engi-
neered catastrophe if the salinity-affected area is extended further towards north and east
of current saline zone.
10.4.3 Adverse impacts on ecosystems
With the anticipated/modeled changes in hydrology, it may easily be inferred that the
wetland ecosystems of Bangladesh will be severely affected as a consequence of
implementation of the proposed ILR. Bangladesh has been known globally as a natural
habitat for a large number of freshwater species including fish, mollusks, reptiles, riverine
dolphins, plants etc. – a few of which are endemic species (Hussain and Acharya, 1994).
Early choking of smaller rivers would lead to fragmentation of freshwater habitat. With
decreasing wetland areas and early recession of monsoon flows, many wetland species
might find it difficult to maintain their lifecycles. With landward movement of brackish
water zone, spawning grounds for many species would shift, while increase in salinity
along coastal rivers during critical dry season would limit naturally available spawning
areas for freshwater fish species, which might be detrimental for fisheries diversity in
Bangladesh.
The effect of salinity ingress on the Sundarbans as a consequence of diversion of the
Ganges flows has been well understood (Karim, 2004). Any further decrease in flow regime
along the Gorai River during the critical dry period (i.e., March and April) might jeopardize
the ecosystem health of the unique mangrove forest, the Sundarbans. For example, the
vegetation succession processes in the forest are expected to change with increasing
salinity (Karim, 1994), which would result into gradual replacement of high value timber
species such as H. fomes to low value shrubs. With changing vegetation, one can only
anticipate simultaneous changes occurring in biodiversity which are dependent on the
forest species. The largest patch of productive mangrove forest, a pride possession of the
humanity where the majestic Bengal tiger (P. tigris) found its habitat, would be deterio-
rated completely.
The other interesting adverse effect would be on migratory species, which travel
thousands of kilometers to avoid harsh winter in the northwest and spend six to eight
weeks of ‘mild weather’ on the vast shallow wetlands of the Bengal delta, full of fish and
other aquatic species. Unfortunately, diversion of flows during September and October
and early recession of water from the wetlands would severely affect temporary habitats of
these migratory species.
10.4.4 Adverse impacts of industrial development
Bangladesh has been gradually developing its industrial sector. Over the past three
decades, contribution of industrial sector to GDP has increased from 14.6 per cent in the
1970s to about 16.6 per cent (Bayes et al., 1998; MoF, 2005). It has played its due role in
creation of employment opportunities and achieving GDP growth rate of around 5 per cent
over the past two decades. However, the increased salinity along the southwestern region
not only restricted industrial expansion, it has driven away industrial units requiring large
quantum of process water. The only state-operated newsprint processing industry in the
country is running on losses due to high operating costs for the collection of non-saline
water from 100 to 150 km north of its location along the bank of Passur River. In this
backdrop, it is anticipated that further industrial development in the southwestern and
south-central regions will be severely constrained due to increase in salinity.
In addition to salinity, choking of small rivers/rivulets and lowering of water levels in
many rivers would restrict expansion of industries in respective areas (Chowdhury, 2003).
The large industrial units currently located along major rivers that ensure year-round
process water might require reduction in production capacity according to availability of
water. The banks of Brahmaputra River will no longer be an automatic choice for large
industrial installations.
10.4.5 Adverse impacts on waterways and navigation
Inland waterways provide the cheapest mode of transportation of both commodities and
passenger freights. Living in a riverine country, Bangladeshi people have been accus-
tomed to use as well as enjoy waterways as an important mode of transportation. The
prerequisite for maintaining navigational routes and inland waterways is to have
adequate draft even during the lean period. Unfortunately, the implementation of the ILR
would choke many smaller channels and lower the available draft even in moderate-sized
rivers which would restrict passage through these rivers (Chowdhury, 2003).
10.4.6 Economic and social implications
As highlighted above, future potential for industrialization will be diminished as a

consequence of reduction in flow regime and subsequent salinization. Not only economy
will be deprived of their contributions, the consequent effect on employment would create
enormous social tension. The country has already witnessed the extent of out-migration
from the southwestern region and subsequent expansion of urban slums in Dhaka, Khulna
and Chittagong. The proposed ILR would only add to ongoing social problems.
About 51.7 per cent of all employment in the country is directly related to crop
agriculture (BBS, 2005). Over 18 million households find their livelihoods from crop
agriculture. A large proportion of these people are share-cropper too. Unfortunately, any
reduction in opportunities for Boro due to loss of irrigation potential might leave no room
for the marginal farmers to continue crop agriculture and maintain their subsistence economy.
It would have multi-dimensional effects on nation’s weak economy. Not only the nation’s
food security would be at high risk, a large proportion of its foreign exchange will have to
be spent on procuring food from international sources. This would have macroeconomic
implications.
Simultaneously, on micro-levels it would be extremely difficult to maintain food

security and livelihoods for households who are dependent on either share cropping or a
very small chunk of land. Loss of food security and lack of employment in rural areas
would drive out the marginal farmers to throng into urban areas and accept otherwise
unacceptable living conditions in urban slums. In the backdrop of ever increasing
population and growing inequality in the society, the social and economic implications of
the proposed ILR would further complicate the situation, which in turn would continue to
rupture the social fabric of the poverty ridden nation. Achieving Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) and ensuring a better life for all would remain a distant dream for the
lackluster population of Bangladesh.
In the backdrop of ever increasing population crowded together in a small landmass and
having a large poverty-stricken people, Bangladesh has been struggling hard to offer
minimum quality of life for its citizenry and maintain food self-sufficiency. In this pursuit,
water-related hazards and disasters have always pushed the country backward and denied
her strive towards development. On top, the unilateral withdrawal of water from the Ganges
River by India wrecked havoc to natural environment of the Ganges Dependent Areas in
Bangladesh, with huge economic and social adverse implications. Any new attempt to
jeopardize the region’s water resources scenario, even if it is to serve people elsewhere in
the region, would have devastating effects on geo-physical, biological and human aspects
of the most downstream country, Bangladesh. The proposed ILR would perhaps induce
the greatest human tragedy in the history. It is urged upon the current leadership in India
to carefully analyze the situation carefully and consider pragmatic win-win decisions. Let
the laws of nature prevail over the laws of human beings that denies river water reaching
its downstream and destroys potential for development.
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11
Assessment of the India River Linking Plan: A

Closer Look at the Ken-Betwa Pilot Link1
KELLI KRUEGER
FRANCES SEGOVIA
MONIQUE TOUBIA
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP) (Figure 11.1) – under the ILR, is one of the 30 river
links proposed by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) in the Bundelkhand
region of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, India. While no links have so far been
implemented, the KBLP is being pursued as the pilot project of the national program to
serve as a “litmus test” for the national ILR plan (The Hindu, 2005). Critics suggest that the
KBLP has been chosen as the premiere project as a result of its remote location, which
minimizes opportunity for controversy. Additionally, the physical construction required
for the KBLP is relatively minimal as a result of the close proximity of the Ken and Betwa
rivers to each other (Boojh, 2005).
This project involves connecting the Ken and Betwa rivers through the creation of a
string of dams, reservoirs, and canal to provide storage for excess rainfall during the
monsoon as a means to divert water for domestic and industrial consumptions and
irrigation purposes. To do this, a 73.8 m high dam called the Greater Gangau Dam (GGD),
is proposed on Ken River near Daudhan village, on the border of Chhatarpur and Panna
districts in Madhya Pradesh, 2.5 km upstream from the existing Gangau Weir. The water is to
be transferred to the Betwa River through a 231.45 km long concrete lined link canal,
which is to drop water upstream of the existing Barwasagar reservoir in Jhansi district in
Uttar Pradesh. While construction of five additional dams as a part of this project is
mentioned, their details have not been included in the Feasibility Report (FR). Therefore
the entire FR and our subsequent analysis are based off of the information provided on
this dam only.
The total cost of the project is estimated to be R. 19,890 million or US$ 452 million at
2006 prices. It is also stated that construction of the dam and reservoir will result in the
displacement of 900 families from 10 villages. The total number displaced is estimated at
8,550. Additionally, it is estimated that 6,400 hectares of the area to be submerged is
forested, with 4,500 hectares (approximately 70 per cent) of this area located in Panna
National Park and Tiger Reserve, a designated wildlife refuge.
1
Full document can be found at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50483.
170 KEN-BETWA PILOT LINK
Fig. 11.1 Layout of the Ken-Betwa Link Project illustrates the proposed plan for construction of
the dams, reservoirs, and canals.
The potential environmental impacts of the project are minimally discussed in its
Feasibility Report (FR), the only published information by the NWDA, Government of
India. Due to the general nature of the FR, there is insufficient evidence to determine if the
KBLP is the appropriate management policy for this area. Criticisms of the project cannot
be justified or disputed based solely on this document which warranted carrying out
further research to assess the feasibility of the KBLP. Using Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) analysis, literature reviews, and focus group interviews, this chapter
addresses three major issues of criticism surrounding the KBLP: hydrologic, wildlife, and
social impacts. The research presented here focuses on the construction of the Greater
Gangau Dam, as it is the only published information currently available for analysis. The
intention of addressing these impacts is to gain a better understanding of this pilot link
that if successfully implemented, will serve to influence the implementation of the ILR
nationwide.
11.2 POTENTIAL HYDROLOGIC IMPACTS
While the KBLP might provide benefits by developing water resources, it is equally
important to consider the potentially negative environmental impacts, including those that
could have long term consequences. There are many well-documented examples of such
unanticipated environmental consequences associated with dams including loss of
habitat, changes in downstream morphology, changes in downstream water quality, and
reduced of biodiversity (Goudie, 2000). In addition, potential negative impacts result from
the pattern of dam operation including changes in downstream hydrology such as
KELLI KRUEGER ET AL. 171
alterations in total and seasonal flows or extreme high and low flows. While these impacts
might not initially seem serious, elimination or alteration of natural floods can frequently
lead to a reduction in the larger floodplain habitat diversity (IDSN, 1998). Though
construction of dams has been a prevalent water management strategy in India, public
opposition to the ILR indicates that large dam projects like the KBLP will face tougher
scrutiny in future water development plans (Rangachari et al., 2000).
In this part of the analysis, we examine the potential environmental impacts of the
KBLP, specifically discussing potential hydrologic impacts using GIS. The GIS model
developed in this project was used for further analysis to identify areas within the Ken and
Betwa watersheds that are at risk of being impacted by the KBLP. The analysis is
undertaken by assessing the environmental factors that indicate vulnerability to hydro-
logic change. High-risk areas were identified based on vulnerability and mapped with an
objective that this information will enable NGOs, local communities, and other stake-
holders to visualize and understand in the future how environmental impacts are spatially
distributed throughout the area.
The FR for the KBLP was released by the Indian government and provided a very
basic description of current hydrological conditions. However, it dedicated only one
chapter to addressing environmental aspects of the project. The hydrologic conditions
considered in designing a dam and a canal complex that were cited in the report included
rainfall, water quantity, sedimentation rates, and sediment distribution. In some places of
the feasibility report, specifically Chapter 4: Surveys and Investigations, several data
sources were identified. Elsewhere in the report, collection of data available from 1901 to
1994 was generally completed by other government departments. Little explanation of data
collection methodology or overall data reliability was furnished, making it difficult to
assess the accuracy of the FR’s statements.
The FR cited environmental benefits of long term flood control measures and
increased production of fish from the creation of the reservoir and addressed some
potential environmental impacts to wildlife, seismic, or the regional climate. However, these
impacts were generally dismissed with little to no supportive evidence. Interestingly, the
report did not directly addressed impacts on water quality. Instead, they must be inferred
from descriptions on impacts on fish habitats and sedimentation. In terms of hydrologic
impacts, though the FR noted that the groundwater table was expected to rise due to the
impoundment and submerged area, it provided no data to support how this change in
water distribution would impact the area. The FR also described calculations to estimate
sedimentation and indicated that measures would be taken to minimize sedimentation, but
again provided neither detail of what these measures would be nor from what the sources
data for these calculations come.
There were clearly going to be difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of the
KBLP based solely on the Feasibility Report. Quantitative data such as stream flow data,
was either unavailable to the public or, like groundwater data, did not exist. Our study
therefore, utilized readily available data for use in GIS to characterize the current
environmental conditions of the area and assess the area’s vulnerability to potential
hydrologic impacts resulting from the construction of the KBLP by adopting the following
three steps.
First, topographic characteristics, watershed boundaries, and high flow accumula-
tion areas were derived from a Digital Elevation Model (DEM); Second, land cover
was classified from Landsat 7 ETM ⫹ imagery; and third, with the inclusion of soils
data obtained for two districts within the project area, this study identified specific
localities that were at risk of being impacted by the KBLP in three potential areas of
vulnerability: erosion, inundation, and surface water quality degradation. A Weighted
Linear Combination2 was used to assess vulnerability based on criteria derived from this
data, specifically, proximity to surface water, elevation, slope, proximity to developed land
cover, and erosion and drainage characteristics of soil type (Eastman et al., 1995a).
Vulnerability to potential impacts was determined by applying a weight to each of the
contributing criteria followed by a summation of the results to yield a vulnerability map.
The formula to determine this weight is:
V ⫽ ∑ wi xi
where V is vulnerability, wi is the weight of the criteria, and xi is the criterion score for
impact i (Eastman et al., 1995b). Specific terrain, soil, and land cover characteristics
derived from the data were used as the criteria to create a vulnerability value for three
impact factors: inundation, erosion, and surface water quality degradation. While this
process is explained in more detail in the complete document, the factors used for each
impact combination are outlined in Table 11.1. The analysis resulted in maps (Figures
11.2 to 11.6) illustrating the spatial distribution of vulnerability to the three potential
impacts, and from this assessment, high-risk areas were identified.3
Vulnerability maps for each of the three potential impacts suggested that the
proposed project site and areas downstream of the dam were particularly vulnerable to
inundation, erosion, and water quality degradation. Specifically with respect to inunda-
tion, the closer image showed that all of the villages designated to be submerged fall
within an area identified by the analysis as having high vulnerability to inundation. The
image for the entire extent of the analysis indicated that areas further downstream were
extremely vulnerable to inundation. While this could have justified the construction of
a dam for flood damage reduction purposes, there were also other factors that needed to
be considered. Land cover classification indicated the downstream area was primarily
agricultural. Seasonal flooding would be necessary for successful agricultural yields
(Adams, 1985). The impacts of dams and their likely failures in contributing to worse flood
damage conditions will be discussed later in this section.
Both the erosion combination and water quality combination exhibit vulnerability in
similar areas, this may be due to the fact that soils’ values were categorical and despite
being weighted, still had stronger influence in the combinations. In the closer images of
erosion and water quality, the portion of the Ken River upstream of the proposed dam site
was particularly vulnerable to both impacts. This raises concerns over the contribution of
this section of the Ken River to sedimentation and water quality degradation of the
reservoir. Additionally, the entire downstream portion of the Ken River and areas immedi-
ately adjacent to it appeared to be vulnerable to erosion and water quality degradation,
and changes in the hydrology of the area would amplify these vulnerabilities.
2
The weighted linear combination (WLC) technique is a decision rule for deriving composite maps
using GIS.
3
More information about the methods used in this assessment can be found in the complete version
of this research document at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50483.
Table 11.1 Vulnerability impacts and criteria factors
Potential impact
Criteria Surface Justification
Inundation Erosion water quality
Distance to surface Negative i
Negative Determines how much movement is req-
water uired to get the water into/out of surface
water bodies
Distance to Negative Determines how much movement is req-
developed land uired in the transport of runoff pollutants
cover
Elevation Negative Determines movement of water into/out
of surface water bodies
Slope Negative Positive Determines water flow, flooding, erosion,
soil depth, travel cost, and geology
Plan curvature Positive Determines topographic convergence
(high values) and divergence (low values)
Profile curvature Negative Determines rate of change of the potential
gradient which contributes to flow velocity
and sediment transport (negative values
indicate accelerated flow)
Drainage
r Negative i
Negative Determines the capacity of water to move
characteristics of through soil. Used as a surrogate for
soil permeability.
Erosion Positive Positive Determines erodibility of soil surface.
characteristics of soil
Note: Adapted from: Galant and Wilson (2000); Goudie (2000); and Goodchild et al., (1993). In
Table 11.1, the indicator “Positive Factor” means that as the values of the factor increase, the
vulnerability to a particular impact increases as well. The indicator “Negative Factor” means that
as the value of the factor increases, vulnerability to a particular impact will decease.
Although understanding vulnerability of the project area was important, more

information was needed about water quantities and surface and groundwater interactions
in order to evaluate the feasibility of the KBLP more thoroughly. For example, the
hydrologic regime of a lake or reservoir is strongly influenced by the regional groundwater
flow system in which it is located (USACE, 1999). The recharge of groundwater from
monsoon floods, current availability of groundwater, extraction of groundwater by the
local people, and the interactions between surface water bodies and surrounding
groundwater could potentially influence the maximum potential reservoir level and the
amount of water that can be captured and distributed by the KBLP. Ultimately, the changes
to these interactions through the construction of a dam and reservoir will also impact the
groundwater/surface water interaction in areas upstream and downstream of the dam.
The results indicated that it is important to collect more current data on the
availability, location, and movement of groundwater in the project area in order to take this
analysis further. A thorough understanding of current conditions could help determine
appropriateness of KBLP and could provide more information for anticipating hydrologic
changes that will result from the construction of such a project.
There is no argument that the development of water resources can provide
tremendous benefits such as minimizing flood damage and providing water for irrigation
and consumption purposes. However, with these benefits, significant risks of severe
impacts on the environment are associated. Ultimately, these impacts could outweigh the
integrity of the perceived benefits, as flood damage and the security of future water
supplies remain concerns in spite of the construction of the development project.

Discussion on the wildlife and social impacts supports the need for water management
practices, which do not merely rely on large scale construction projects but rather
consider conservation policies that are more suitable for the Ken-Betwa region.
High
Low
Dam
Submerged Villages
N
Inundation Vulnerability 1:1,000,000
Fig. 11.2 Results for inundation combination.
11.3 POTENTIAL IMPACTS TO WILDLIFE
Scientists generally agree that the most significant threat to biological diversity is loss of
habitat. Exotic species, pollution, and overexploitation are also important factors (Raven
and Berg, 2001). Habitat loss, the greatest threat of all, is occurring at an alarming rate as
the human population continues to grow. India is no exception, as it is one of the fastest
growing populations in the world, and its soaring demand for food, timber and housing
has contributed to the destruction of India’s natural wildlife habitats and its wildlife
heritage (Oza and Oza, 1998). In addition, numerous forest and wilderness areas, which
served as vital repositories of wildlife and biodiversity, have been severely reduced in
extent or completely lost to increasing agricultural and industrial expansion (Dwivedi,
2003). Unfortunately, this has led to India having 30 mammals placed on the threatened
species list in the Red Data Book of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and ranking
India number one in the world for having the largest number of threatened mammals (Oza
and Oza, 1998). The pressures of human population growth and the need for expansion
serve as a clear example of the constant competition between wildlife and humans for
survival in a limited resource environment. This dilemma is further exacerbated in India
as the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) attempts to address the pressing
issue of water availability by implementing the KBLP as a pilot project which has raised
concerns regarding wildlife. Other interlinking components will also impact wildlife.
Inundation Vulnerability
High
Low
Submerged Villages N
1:1,300,000
Dam
Fig. 11.3 Results for inundation combination, closer view of project site.
High
Low
Dam
Submerged Villages
N
Fig. 11.4 Results for erosion combination.
These concerns were derived from the claims made in the NWDA’s KBLP Feasibility
Report. According to this report, construction of the link would require submergence of
forested areas that include part of the Panna National Park and Tiger Reserve (PNPTR). In
an effort to raise awareness and understanding of the situation, this section provides
insight into the KBLP feasibility report as well as other ILR reports as they pertain to
wildlife.
Of particular relevance in the KBLP FR was the chapter entitled Environmental and
Ecological Aspects of the Project where it is stated that construction of the KBLP would
result in a total submergence area of 8,650 hectares, of which 6,400 hectares are forested
(approximately 74 per cent) (NWDA, 2005). These forested areas are home to various
species of carnivores, herbivores, birds, and reptiles that are commonly found in and
around the area to potentially be submerged for the KBLP, and provide some insight into
the rich variety of wildlife in the PNPTR (NIC, 2006) (NWDA, 2005).
High
Low
Dam
Submerged Villages
N
300,000
Erosion Vulnerability
Fig. 11.5 Results for erosion combination, closer view of project site.
Within the PNPTR, a number of endangered species listed in Schedule I of the

Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (WPA) which include the tiger, leopard, carcal, four-
horned antelope, Indian wolf, Pangolin, Rusty Spotted Cat, Sloth Bear and Gharial (NIC,
2006). As noted in the KBLP FR and listed in the WPA 1972, tiger is one species that is
found in and around the submergence area. Notably the tiger has been the target of many
conservation campaigns and for good reason, since it is considered one of the most
endangered species in the world. Madhya Pradesh (MP) has 19 per cent of India’s and
10 per cent of the world’s tiger population, with an estimated 710 in MP and 31 tigers in
the PNPTR (FD, 2007). Loss of habitat is one of the main reasons for the drastic decline in
the tiger population. Any further loss of forested areas due to submergence could be
catastrophic to the tiger population of the PNPTR.
High
Low
Dam
Submerged Villages
N
Fig. 11.6 Results of water quality degradation combination.
However, the KBLP FR stated that “… impact of the submergence on the wildlife of the
park will be nil, as the area coming under submergence is only about 9 per cent of the total
area of the national park and the wildlife has got its own natural characteristic of moving
to the interior forest” (p.120). However, this claim has neither supported by substantive
assessment of wildlife of the area or consideration given to existing research that
demonstrate the impacts of similar nature experienced in other water development projects
like the KBLP (Gubbi, 2004; McAllister et al., 2001; Rangachari et al., 2000; Rosenberg
et al., 2000). Similar statements regarding impacts to wildlife were made in other ILR
feasibility reports (fourteen in all) that were made available through the NWDA’s website.
Eleven of the fourteen reports provided information about wildlife impacts, as summarized
in Table 11.2.
Two important issues arose from a review of these reports, first, that the areas coming
under submergence were recognized as being inhabited by wildlife. Therefore, it could be
inferred that collectively the ILR would accelerate habitat loss throughout India, and
exacerbating a serious problem already threatening wildlife. Second, statements on the

potential wildlife impacts continuously ranged from “minimum” to “nil”, with no
supporting data from wildlife assessments of the areas.
High
Low
Dam N
1:1,000,000
Submerged Villages
Inundation Vulnerability
Fig. 11.7 Results of water quality degradation combination, a closer view of project site.
In addition to the loss of habitat through submergence, wildlife is threatened by the

lack of preventative measures from the NWDA to assist wildlife in coping with
development. The feasibility reports repeatedly note that wildlife would react instinctively
to development effects like submergence, by migrating to neighboring habitats. Indeed,
a final report prepared for the World Commission on Dams (WCD) regarding India’s
experience with large water projects expressed similar expectations (Rangachari et al.,
2000). The expressed expectations are considered to be inappropriate for two reasons.
First, because the areas where these animals would migrate to have their own complement
of wildlife and cannot be considered “vacant habitats” (Rangachari et al., 2000). Second,
wildlife does not always move down corridors of forest as the flood waters advance,
as they may not be aware of corridors, are rightly wary of leaving their own territory,
or become panic stricken when the waters roll in. In some cases, animals are nocturnal, or
roam during the day, or live underground, in trees, or in caves (Rangachari et al., 2000).
Table 11.2 Summary of the statements regarding the individual links impacts to wildlife.
Proposed
Links Impacts on flora and fauna
submergence
Ken-Betwa Link “Nil” 8,650 hectares; 6,400
hectares of forested area
Parbati-Kalisindh- “Very little” 17,308 hectares; 244

Chambal Link hectares of forested area
Polavaram-Vijayawada No statement made Number of hectares not

Link reported
Damanganga-Pingal “No significant impact is expected” 3,641 hectares; 1,624

Link hectares of forested area
Mahanadi-Godavari “The reservoir submergence will 63,000 hectares; 4,000

Link not effect the habitation of wildlife” hectares of forested area
Inchampalli-Pulichintala “The proposed dam site is the 92,555 hectares; 21,734

Link breeding area for a number of hectares of forested area
wildlife but at present no
information as to whether the area
fall under migration routes of
wildlife.”
Inchampalli-Nagarjuna- Same information as Inchampalli- 94,620 hectares; 30,170
Sagar Link Pulichinatla Link hectares of forested areas
Almatti-Pennar Link “Will partially effect wildlife” Number of hectares not

reported
Nagarjunasagar- “No adverse impact are expected” 895 hectares

Somasila Link
Pennar-Palar-Cauvery “No adverse impact are expected” 9,895 hectares; 1,025

Link hectares of forested area
Cauvery-Vaigai-Gundar “No adverse impact are expected” 3,174 hectares

Link
Par-Tapi-Narmada Link “Due to activities in forest, wild 7,599 hectares; 3,572

animals are likely to migrate to hectares of forest area
safer places”
Source: NWDA (2005).

The findings of the WCD report mirrored those in the KBLP as well as other feasibil-
ity reports, namely, that there would be “no adverse” impact, and like the KBLP report,
the studies in the WCD cited no hard data in support of these claims. Therefore, it was
concluded that there was a need to more closely examine the KBLP to truly understand the
implication of this project on wildlife.
Wildlife in India is considered one of the most threatened in the world, and the wildlife
in the KBLP area in particular, face many challenges for survival. In the Panna National
Park and Tiger Reserve, threats come from such sources as the growing population, illegal
grazing of domestic livestock and collection of natural resources and direct human-wildlife
interactions (Singh, 2006). The KBLP has the potential to contribute to these current
challenges through the submergence of forest areas, and further even greater loss of
forested areas is expected with the implementation of ILR nationwide.
The magnitude of the loss of India’s forests and the implications this entails might not
be fully appreciated and understood initially for two reasons. First, only after a thorough
review of the KBLP’s and other links’ feasibility reports, does it become clear that
submergence is the primary method for achieving the interlinking of rivers. This leads to
the second reason, that this focus on method omitted meaningful examination and analy-
sis into the potential impacts on the surrounding environment and species that inhabit he
area. For example, the KBLP feasibility report indicates that there is 6,400 hectares of
forest that will be submerged. This area might be considered relatively small, were it not
for a consideration of the much larger submergence connected with the construction of
the other links. Consequently, the combined submergence associated with the comple-
tion of the ILR could serve to accelerate habitat loss throughout India, and initiate an
unprecedented decline in biological diversity. It is important that the scale of the overall
project be considered when assessing the implications to wildlife, as the amount of
submerged forest increases throughout the country with each link. The loss of habitat that
will result from this project is an issue that should be addressed to help ensure that this
project does not deal with one problem, water management issues, and create another, the
extinction of India’s wildlife.
11.4 SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE KBLP
Seen as the answer to India’s potential future water crises, the KBLP is the pilot for the
much larger nationwide plan. It is important, therefore, to determine if the benefits and
burdens of this resource use would be evenly spread across different social groups as a
key question of environmental justice. Although there is a need for development in the
economically depressed and environmentally depredated Bundelkhand region, the KBLP
FR has not provided adequate information on the potential negative impacts to the already
marginalized project affected persons (PAPs) and the ecosystems on which they depend.
Nor has the FR adequately discussed the relocation of PAPs and long term livelihood
impacts on the general population. Given India’s history of low participation levels from
local communities, inadequate rehabilitation programs and negative impacts on fragile
ecosystems as a result of large scale development projects, there is risk of irreversible
damage to the region’s people and their land. This damage could adversely impact the
most vulnerable groups in the region if socio-economic factors are not properly addressed
by the implementing government agency.
In order to address the socio-economic gaps in the FR analysis, this research
synthesizes information gathered from existing quantitative information on the water needs
of the surplus region, anecdotal experience in several of the PAP villages and two interlinking
opponent activist meetings. This research provides a third party perspective of the social
justice movement that surrounds the controversy of the KBLP and river interlinking in
general. Thus far it appears as though the movements addressing the KBLP and river
linking are emotionally fueled on the activist side and politically motivated on the
government side. The overall aim of the discussion that follows is an attempt to synthesize
existing information on the project and to bring the activist and local views together in
order to identify gaps and highlight the need for better communication among all
concerned parties. Until this point, it appears as though communication has been limited
and that participation has been sparse or not very effective.
Madhya Pradesh (MP) is one of the poorest states in India with a per capita income of
only about $180 in 1998, and about 40 per cent of its 60 million people living below the
poverty line (ADB, 2001). In addition, MP ranks extremely low nationwide on all indicators
of human development indices, such as per capita state domestic product, life expectancy,
education levels, literacy, and infant mortality rates (GoMP, 2002). More than 80 per cent of
the poor live in rural areas, with high concentrations in the study area. The majority of the
rural population depends on agriculture and associated industries for their livelihood. Out
of this population, 20 per cent work as agricultural labors (GoMP, 2002). One third of the
population also belongs to socially and economically disadvantaged groups officially
designated as Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). Three villages
scheduled for submergence with the construction of the Daudhan reservoir were visited in
this study. The NWDA estimates that 17,650 hectares of the study area will be submerged
resulting in the relocation of 900 families and a currently unidentified number of people
from peripheral villages (NWDA, 2005). To ascertain regional differences, two additional
villages were visited in the study area to assess current water resource needs and
problems. All of the villages are located in the Chhatarpur district of MP.
To complement information collected from the villages, other segments of the Indian
society with a vested interest in the outcome of the KBLP were also asked for information
on their work with local populations in and around the study area and their opinions of the
KBLP. Given their familiarity with centrally planned water resource development in India,
they were also asked to comment on their level of participation in the planning process.
The participants from this group were generally employed by NGOs or local government
agencies, which are funded by relevant central and state government or international
agencies. Many poverty extension workers are involved in local watershed management
or establishing sustainable agriculture based on the revitalization of traditional methods.
One of the key findings from this research was that project affected persons were
indeed aware of the project, yet their water and livelihood needs and concerns were not
fully assessed in the FR. Therefore, these needs and concerns are not reflected in its
overall design. Even more surprising, participation by activists and local extension
workers in the project’s planning process was even less apparent. Moreover, results
indicated that the proposed KBLP might very well exacerbate existing water conflicts in
this impoverished region, given the problems local communities already faced with
interstate water sharing, making it very clear that the public was not integrally involved in
the decision making process.
Another issue that came up in the village visits was the problem of resource conflicts,
as the study area seemed to be full of antagonist’s such as the timber mafia and the forest
bandits. Submerging forestland is likely to intensify the harassment of the local popula-
tions by armed timber mafia, since already scarce timber resources would be further
impacted by the KBLP. These conflicts, when taken into consideration with the
impacts of relocation, would only exacerbate the vicious cycle of poverty for marginalized
populations. For the similar reasons forest bandits and other land encroachment conflicts
in and around the just out side the park, will also likely be intensified when that area is
submerged and new claims must be staked. Finally, these conflicts would further increase
the challenges to equitable water and forest resource access.
The visual assessment of the study area and the Ken river basin in general, did not
indicate the presence of surplus water. For instance, many of the regions reservoirs and
tanks remained low well into the monsoon season. While the participants in the
submergence focus groups did not complain about inadequate water levels, they did
mention that the rainfall has not been sufficient in the last few years and throughout the
surplus basin many towns and villages were facing severe water shortages. In many cases,
water trucks brought in water from elsewhere at a high cost to meet the needs of residents.
Perhaps one of the most telling anecdotes came from a town center that had absolutely no
water in nearby rivers or existing wells, and as a result had to have water trucked in.
Apparently the situation remained so critical that a man reportedly had to escort his
mother to the well with a gun. It is hard to imagine what would happen if the relocates were
forced to migrate to these situations.
Several notable consensuses emerged from the information gathered in meetings
conducted with local NGO representatives and activists. First that the Ken basin was not
a surplus, though this was supported by the participants’ personal experiences in the
region rather than through scientific analysis of relevant data. Secondly, that implemen-
tation of the KBLP would have negative impacts on the resource-based livelihoods in the
region. The people in the KBLP region were viewed as uninformed and in need of empow-
erment to advance the practice of bottom up decision making. Additionally, many par-
ticipants felt that the majority of the project’s benefits were likely to go to the wealthier
segments of the local community, with the poor and marginalized populations adversely
impacted by negative externalities. Thirdly, traditional water resource methodology should
be revived. It was very strongly felt that only these methods, in combination with affor-
estation programs and other holistic approaches to resource management, would solve
the water resource needs of the region. Finally, common strategies for moving forward
were suggested such as, to better inform local communities, present independent scien-
tific assessments conducted in rebuttal to the FR, and improve dialogue between the
various movements and the government. To date, there has been no indication that these
strategies have been pursued.
The major recommendation based on findings from this research is to integrate a
working participatory framework into the development plans for the entire KBLP
impacted region. The overall benefit of this approach would be identification of success-
ful water management practices, with a particular focus on the Betwa basin, through
discussions with the users and local managers themselves. Furthermore, it would be im-
portant to include NGO and activist groups in this participatory planning process. Not
only would government planners benefit from the knowledge such groups have of the
local communities, they would also satisfy concerns about transparency and account-
ability in the development process. Subsequent analyses of data collected within this
new participatory framework could assist in identifying any inequities of water distribu-
tion and other factors fueling water conflicts in the region. A holistic approach to water
management plans could then be developed based on clearer understanding of the needs
and practices of the water users. The results from this type of approach could have
far-reaching benefits for the KBLP, increasing its efficiency and effectiveness while
also enabling it to provide sustainable and equitable management of water resources in
the area.
Missing also from this research, and others similar to it, is an analysis of the Betwa
basin beneficiaries and their current water resource management and distribution
practices. Ignoring this important component could undermine the long term viability of
the project by failing to identify those factors and practices that contributed to the
designation of the Betwa basin as a deficit area.
11.5 CONCLUSION
The results from our study raised serious concerns about the suitability of the proposed
KBLP as a water management strategy for the Ken and Betwa region in India. The
Feasibility Report for the KBLP, the only official government document covering the project,
contains outdated, flawed and inadequate data, and failed to address substantive issues
in three critical areas: the potential hydrologic, wildlife, and social impacts of the project.
This research highlighted several important areas for future exploration as alternative or
complementary approaches to water resource management, which may provide more
efficient and sustainable results for India in the long run.
A common theme in our chapter, published critiques of the KBLP, and the FR itself, is
a continual focus on the Ken River and the project construction area as the scope for
arguments over the feasibility of the KBLP. However, it is important to consider that there
are presently over 24 dams in the Betwa basin on the Betwa River and its tributaries,
varying in size and function from small weirs to large hydropower and irrigation projects
(Thakkar, 2005). It would seem vitally important to determine why these dam and
reservoir projects have not met the needs of the Betwa region, since this could alter
significant details and dimensions in the proposed KBLP. If improvements in water
resource management could be shown to increase water availability in both the Betwa and
Ken river watersheds, the KBLP’s size and scope could be considerably reduced, thus
lessening its impacts on the people and environment.
Another theme that emerges from our chapter is the need for action at a smaller scale
to avoid creating negative impacts on the larger scale. For instance, our research has
already shown in discussions on the impact to wildlife, how actions taken at a local scale
will influence the national scale of ecosystems. If the KBLP is to be used as a “litmus test”
for future national ILR projects a more thorough and responsible approach must be taken
in developing an appropriate strategy for solving the water supply issues of the area.
Therefore, at the local level, data on surface and groundwater availability and true water
use patterns must be obtained and made public in order to determine the accuracy of
statements made in the FR and to ensure success of the water distribution capabilities of
the KBLP.
While alternative or complementary water management practices such as water
harvesting, conjunctive use management, participatory management, and educational
programs promoting efficient irrigation have been suggested earlier in this chapter, there
are also many other innovative approaches being considered by countries and organiza-
tions around the world. Some examples include: commodity water pricing, benefit shar-
ing, and recycling wastewater. All of these strategies too have related costs and benefits,
it is important to consider the full palate of alternatives to approaching water manage-
ment challenges (IWMI, 2007).
The ILR plan is only one of a myriad of possible solutions available and more
innovative and diverse management systems may be better choices to consider in solving
India’s water management challenges. As a nation with increasingly severe water
management issues, it is imperative that India look to diversify the range of solutions
it considers in addressing these issues. The vision of the Indian Government in water
management should extend beyond hard path solutions and look toward creative
strategies that promote efficient and sustainable water use and management.
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12
Implications of Climate Change in South Asia

on the Interlinking Project of Indian Rivers
MURARI LAL
12.1 INTRODUCTION
India is identified as a country where water scarcity is expected to grow considerably in

the coming decades due to increasing demand linked to population growth, agriculture
expansion and rapid industrialization. Further, droughts resulting from climatic variability
cause considerable human suffering in many parts of the country, in the form of scarcity of
water for both domestic needs and crop protection. The project for interlinking of rivers of
India emanates from a desire of the political leadership of the country to bring a permanent
solution to the negative impacts of drought and water shortages in these parts (NWDA,
2003). This project has been designed with the concept that it will improve the living status
of people in India, with growth in our economy. The completion of this project will result in
constant water supply for domestic use, agriculture and industries along with flood
control, improvement in water flow, navigation, food security, etc. Construction of dams,
canals, etc. and their maintenance will create opportunities for new jobs, which will check
the migration of people from villages to cities. The interlinking project is to bring an extra
34 million hectare (Mha) of land under irrigation using 173 billion cubic meters (BCM) of
additional water created in this project. Production of hydropower (34 gigawatts) in this
project is expected, which may be inexpensive and eco-friendly. However, several scien-
tists and others are concerned about river diversion, which would disturb the entire
hydrological cycle by stopping the rivers from performing their normal ecological func-
tions (Gurjar, 2003; Radhakrishna, 2003). It is therefore necessary that the ecological
damages that may be caused by interlinking rivers on top of the climate change be
assessed comprehensively and realistically before the project is implemented.
Even though blessed with abundance, India’s water resources are unevenly
distributed in space and time. While one part of the country is reeling under severe water
scarcity, floods are known to cause catastrophic damage in another part. In fact, India lies
between a distinct climate divide – droughts (stretching from Horn of Africa in the west to
Pakistan and west India) and floods (marching eastwards Bangladesh, Cambodia and
Vietnam). Almost 329 Mha of geographical area of India experiences climatic extremes
year after year including 40 Mha of flood prone areas and 51 Mha of drought prone areas
(CWC, 2001). Floods affect an average area of around 9 Mha. Water in the Brahmaputra
and Ganges basin located in northern and eastern India make up 60 per cent of the country’s
188 IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT
total resources. In contrast, water resources in Gujarat’s Sabarmati basin located in

western India account for only 0.2 per cent of India’s total resources. Hence the Brahmaputra
region is the most flood-prone region while Sabarmati the most drought-prone (CWC,
2001). Some rivers are perennially dry and some rivers discharge huge quantum of water
to the sea every year. Flood damages, which were of the order of R. 520 million (US$
13 million) in 1953, went up to R. 58,460 million (US $ 1,461.5 million) in 1998 with an
annual average of R. 13,430 million (US$ 335.75 million) (CWC, 2001), affecting mostly
agriculture and infrastructure in Assam, Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh besides
causing untold human sufferings. On the other hand, large areas in Rajasthan, Gujarat,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu face recurring droughts. In 2002, India
incurred a loss of R. 250 billion (US$ 6.25 billion) just on account of drought affected
crop loss (DES, 2003). Unlike floods, which are generally restricted to eastern India,
droughts persist over a much bigger geographical area (IMD, 2000 to 2003). As a result,
the impact on the economy because of lack of water is much more severe. With 22 per cent
of India’s GDP coming from agriculture, the 2002 drought year resulted in a 3.2 per cent
decline in agricultural GDP, a US$ 9 billion loss in agricultural income and the loss of a
staggering 1.3 billion person-days in rural employment due to shrinkage of agricultural
operations.
Most of the flow in practically all north Indian rivers occurs during the southwest
monsoon (June to September). The monsoon happens to be the season when rainfall in
the aggregate is adequate for crop growth. Of course in some regions, such as Rajasthan
and parts of Gujarat and the Deccan, even the kharif 1 rain is far too low and variable for
productive agriculture. Published data from official sources show that 90 per cent of the
flow in south Indian rivers occurs between May and November (MoWR, 1999). Data on
the Indo-Gangetic and Brahmaputra river basins are mostly classified although some
unclassified data is available from various sources. Being perennial, the proportion of
the total flow occurring during these months may be somewhat smaller. For instance, over
80 per cent of the annual flow in the Kosi is between May and November; and almost
three fourths between June and October (MoWR, 1999). Since the surplus occurs in the
rainy season and the demand is in the dry season, accurate and reliable information on the
water resource system is required for strategic management of the resource. Acquiring
quantified knowledge about the spatial and temporal distribution of the different compo-
nents of the local, regional and national hydrological cycle is vital to plan and develop
water resources of the country at different scales at the least cost to ecology and environ-
ment, social fabric and economy over the next half a century and beyond. These knowl-
edge systems are very vital for India’s Interlinking of Rivers Plan (ILR).
Inappropriate water-management decisions of such large scale as envisaged in river
interlinking project can have catastrophic environmental, physical, social and economic
impacts that would be widespread and pervasive. The experience of the Indira Gandhi
Canal is a stark example of the problems arising in the wake of bringing in vast amounts of
water without adequate understanding of and concern for its impact on the fragile desert
ecology. The river interlinking project, however, claims to involve multidisciplinary
considerations on hydrological, environmental, agricultural, socio-economic and politi-
cal aspects seemingly without bringing out in public a comprehensive assessment of its
feasibility, desirability and viability. It is not enough to merely transfer a quantum of water
through different link canals from one point to another. Large storages will be necessary
requiring the quantum of water to be stored, and the availability of potential sites of
appropriate scale, and their likely impact on environment and human displacement.
1
The kharif season in India coincides with the monsoon rains, extending from June to September.
MURARI LAL 189
The policymakers dealing with water management in India must be aware that the
fundamental question of whether more than 6 billion humans, by adding to the greenhouse
effect, have caused the world to warm up in recent decades, has already been answered in
the affirmative (IPCC, 2001). There is compelling scientific evidence that ongoing climate
change will pose serious challenges to the people of south Asia as complex impacts
affecting every sector of society, including, especially, the nation’s water resources, now
seem unavoidable (Lal et al., 2001a). The evidence suggests that certain aspects of our
water resources are very sensitive to projected climate variability and changes and to how
we choose to manage our complex water systems to the stresses imposed by growing
populations, industrialization, and land-use changes (Roy, 1990; Jha et al., 2000). This
paper summarizes the implications of both existing climate variability and future climate
change for India’s water resources. The findings reported here must be considered just a
snapshot in time, a summary of what we think we know, and would like to know at the
beginning of the 21st century. Also discusses possible implications of climate change on
the ILR.
12.2 AVAILABLE WATER RESOURCES IN INDIA
The two main sources of water in India are rainfall and the snowmelt of glaciers in the
Himalayas. Although reliable data on snow cover in India are not available, it is estimated
that some 5,000 glaciers cover about 43,000 km2 in the Himalayas with a total volume
of locked water estimated at 3,870 km3 (ICIMOD/UNEP, 2001). Considering that about
10,000 km2 are located in Indian territory, the total water yield from snowmelt contributing
to the river runoff in India may be of the order of 200 km3 per year (Mool et al., 2001).
Although snow and glaciers are poor producers of freshwater, they are good distributors
as they yield at the time of need, in the hot season. Indeed, about 80 per cent of the flow
of rivers in India occurs during the four months of the southwest monsoon season
(Kaul, 1999). The rivers of India can be classified into the following four groups:
the Himalayan rivers, which are formed by melting snow and glaciers and
therefore have a continuous flow throughout the year. As this region receives
very heavy rainfall during the monsoon period, the rivers swell and cause
frequent floods;
the rivers of the Deccan plateau, which are rainfed and fluctuate in volume, many
of them being non-perennial;
the coastal rivers, which, especially on the west coast, are short in length with
limited catchment areas, most of them being non-perennial;
the rivers of the inland drainage basin in western Rajasthan, which are ephemeral,
drain towards the silt lakes such as the Sambhar, or are lost in the sands.
The domination of the southwest monsoon in the making of India’s climate results in
wide spatial and temporal variations in the availability of the most critical resource –
water. About 75 per cent of the annual precipitation occurs during the monsoon months
(Shukla, 1987). The numbers of rainy days vary from about 5 in Rajasthan to about 150 in
northeastern India (Rao, 1976). Mean annual rainfall varies from 100 mm in west Rajasthan
to over 10,000 mm at Cherrapunji in Meghalaya (Shukla, 1987).
As presented in Table 12.1, the total surface flow, including regenerating flow from
groundwater and the flow from neighbouring countries, is estimated at 1,869 km3 per year,
of which only 690 km3 are considered as utilizable in view of the constraints of the present
technology for water storage and inter-state issues (CWC, 2001). A significant part
(647.2 km3 per year) of these estimated water resources comes from neighbouring
countries: 210.2 km3 per year from Nepal, 347 km3 per year from China (Chinese data) and
90 km3 per year from Bhutan. An important part of the surface water resources leaves the
country before it reaches the sea: 20 km3 per year to Myanmar, 181.37 km3 per year to
Pakistan (Pakistani information) and 1105.6 km3 per year to Bangladesh. A bare minimum
live storage of 385 km3 is estimated as needed to balance seasonal flows to achieve
~690 km3 per year estimated utilizable surface water (EUSW) for irrigation of 76 million
hectare (Mha). Sedimentation in reservoirs reduces utilizable resource. Replenishable
groundwater (RGW) resource is estimated to be ~432 km3 – RGW is the sum of natural
recharge from rainfall (342 km3) and potential due to recharge augmentation from canal
irrigation system (90 km3). The Central Water Commission estimates the groundwater
resources at 418.5 km3 per year (CWC, 2001). Part of this amount, estimated at 380 km3
per year, constitutes the base flow of the rivers. The total renewable water resources of
India are therefore estimated at 1907.8 km3 per year (CWC, 2001).
Table 12.1 India’s water resource at a glance
Resource Quantity Precipitation (%)

Annual precipitation (including snowfall) 4,000 km3 100
* 3
Evaporation + groundwater 2,131 km 53.3
3
Average annual potential flow in rivers 1,869 km 46.7
3
Per capita water availability (1997) 1,967 m –
3
Estimated utilizable water resources 1,122 km 28.1
3
Surface water 690 km 17.3
3**
Replenishable groundwater 432 km 10.8
(Source: MoWR, 1999).

1 km3 ⫽ 109 m3 ⫽ 1 billion cubic meter (bcm) ⫽ 0.1 million ha m.
* About 10% of India’s GDP, 70% of its irrigated areas, 70 to 80% of its rural population and 70 to
80% of its farm output and incomes are linked to ground water.
** Natural recharge from rainfall (~342.4 km3) and potential due to recharge augmentation from canal
irrigation system (~89.5 km3).
As the annual per capita availability of water in India declined from around 5,177 cubic
meters in 1951 to 1,869 cubic meters in 2001 (Gupta and Deshpande, 2004), the country is
approaching a regime of water stress (Figure 12.1). This is because of increase in
population and changes in its consumption pattern. With an annual precipitation of about
4,000 cubic kilometers, India is a better endowed country for water. It has 2.45 per cent of
the Earth’s land mass, but it receives about 4 per cent of its water resources (Molden and
Fraiture, 2004). The scenario changes drastically when we consider that about 16 per cent
of the population of the planet lives in this country and depends on this 4 per cent share
of the world’s water (Postal, 1998). As water becomes increasingly scarce, attempts by all
stakeholders to gain control over larger and larger volumes of water can be expected. India
MURARI LAL 191
plans to address this challenge of evolving a more equitable and sustainable way of using
its water resources in the shaping of its social and economic future through the interlinking
of rivers project.
Various parts of India

are already water-stressed,
and things could get worse
Occasional
Water Problem
Water Stress
(<1700/cum/ca/anum)
Water Scarcity
(<1000/cum/ca/anum)
Absolute Scarcity
(<1000/cum/ca/anum)
“Cum/ca/anum” is a ratio of total water to total population
and stands for cubic meters of water availability per person per annum
Fig. 12.1 Spatial distribution of current water stress conditions in India.
The Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers has projected the population of India to
stabilize around 1,640 million by the year 2050 corresponding to the UN’ middle variant
(TF-ILR, 2003). For a population estimate of 1,800 million in 2050, the gross per capita water
availability (obtained by dividing the average annual potential river flow of ~1,869 km3
by the population estimate) will decline from ~1,820 m3 per year in 2001 to as low as ~1,140 m3.
Viewed in the international perspective of ‘⬍1,700 m3 per person per year as water-stressed’
and ‘⬍1000 m3 per person per year as water scarce’, India is water-stressed today and is
likely to be water-scarce by 2050. Total water requirement of the country for various
activities around the year 2050 has been assessed to 1450 km3 per year (TF-ILR, 2003). This
is significantly more than the current estimate of utilizable water resource potential
(1122 km3 per year) through conventional development strategies (Figure 12.2). The
estimate of utilizable water resource of 1,122 km3 per year (surface water ⫽ 690; ground-
water ⫽ 432) indicates the necessity to harness additional 475 to 950 km3 per year for the
range of population estimates over the present availability of ~500 km 3 per year
(Gupta and Deshpande, 2004).
1700
630 1450 Total
900
Irrigation %
83.3 78.3 72.0 66.7
100 Irrigation
100
GW % Domestic
36.6 35.6 36.0 35.2
Evaporation
Km 3 / year
Industry
50
Power
Ecology
Inland
0 Navigation
1998 2010 2025 2050
YEAR
Fig. 12.2 Anticipated sector-specific water requirement in India. The proportion of water used for
irrigation is expected to decline as requirement of all other sectors increases. Also, the proportion
of groundwater is expected to decrease. The total water requirement is expected to increase by
~120 per cent (Source: Gupta and Deshpande, 2004).
In India, by far, the largest user of harnessed water is agriculture. Water for domestic
use currently accounts for a mere 5 per cent of the total use of water harnessed through
canals, tanks, wells and tube-wells. In the next section, we briefly present a snapshot of the
importance of water in agricultural sector.
12.3 WATER AND INDIAN AGRICULTURE
Currently, more than 85 per cent of water from canals, tanks and wells and tube-wells is
used for irrigation. And yet, rainfed areas account for 70 per cent of the net cultivated area
in India (DES, 2003). About 30 per cent of this area is under dryland agriculture wherein the
annual rainfall is under 400 mm only (DES, 2003). The demand of water for irrigation is
growing and will continue to be, by far, the biggest claimant on available supplies. The
need for irrigation arises in regions and seasons when rainfall is inadequate for raising
crops and obtaining optimum yields. The summer monsoon rainfall meets to a large extent
crop water requirement in the kharif season over many parts of the country except in
Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, parts of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu – which need irrigation during the
kharif season. Irrigation is required practically everywhere between November and June
MURARI LAL 193
essentially to tide over inadequate soil moisture during dry spells. This requirement
continues to be met from stored monsoon surplus water and by exploiting groundwater.
In India, some 60 per cent of the irrigated food grain production now depends on
irrigation from groundwater wells (Mudrakartha, 1999). However, canal irrigated areas
suffering from waterlogging and salinization at 6 million in the early 1970s have
increased substantially. Aquifer pollution – from both point and non-point sources – is
also becoming extensive. In North Arcot district in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu,
coconut water was reported to contain 0.2 per cent of residual chromium derived from
chrome-tanning process-based tanneries that contaminated the groundwater (K. Sarabhai
in foreword to Mudrakartha 1999). In the State of Gujarat, groundwater pollution by
textile processing and the rapidly growing chemical industry earned such notoriety that,
in 1998, acting suo moto, the State’s High Court ordered an entire industrial estate –
housing over 1,200 manufacturing units, 70 per cent of them chemical – closed, pending
the establishment of a wastewater treatment and disposal system.
India has the largest irrigation network and second largest arable area in the world.
The total cultivable area in India is estimated at 183.95 Mha, or about 56 per cent of the
total area. The total cultivated area was estimated at 142.5 Mha in 1995. In the recent
past, the evolution of cultivated area has presented two distinct phases. From 1950 to
1970, the cultivated area rose by 18 per cent per year, while the cropping intensity
increased to 130 per cent (DES, 2003). The major cereals grown in India are bajra (spiked
millet), barley, jowar (great millet), common millet, maize, ragi, rice and wheat. The
average cereal yield increased from 522 kg/ha in 1950 to 1,457 kg/ha in 1992, i.e. an
average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent (MoA, 1996). About 56 per cent of total agricul-
tural production comes from irrigated agriculture, which is approximately 35 per cent of the
net sown area (MoA, 1996). Irrigation is mainly provided on wheat (84 per cent of the total
area sown with wheat is irrigated), rice (47 per cent) and sugar cane (88 per cent). Cotton
(33 per cent), pulses (10 per cent) and coarse cereals (10 per cent) are also irrigated to a
lesser extent. Trends show that irrigation has been used mainly for wheat (3 Mha irrigated
in 1950; 20 Mha in 1990) and rice (10 Mha in 1950, 20 Mha in 1993), while coarse
cereals and maize have not benefited much from irrigation (Figure 12.3). It may be worth-
while to note here that eminent agricultural scientist Swaminathan (1999) has cautioned
that “… the inefficient and negligent use of water in agriculture is one of the most serious
barriers to sustainable expansion of agricultural production in India. What India needs
more urgently is improvement in the efficiency of the use of irrigation water (from 0.35 at
present to 0.60 in 2050).”
12.4 SOUTHWEST MONSOON – THE PRIMARY SOURCE

OF WATER IN INDIA
The long term average annual rainfall for the country as a whole is 1,160 mm – the highest
for a land of comparable size in the world. But this rainfall is highly variable both in time
and space. The percentage aerial distribution of annual rainfall over India is given in
Table 12.2. The area-averaged, long term mean summer monsoon rainfall over India (based
on data for 1871 to 2004) is 890 mm, with a standard deviation of ⫾78 mm (coefficient
of variation is 9.3 per cent). The maximum rainfall occurs in July and August during the
southwest monsoon season (Rao, 1976). Significant interannual variations in the dates
of onset of monsoon rains and intraseasonal variability in the observed monsoon rainfall
are also displayed over the Indian sub-continent.
Fig. 12.3 Evolution of irrigated area in India during 1950 to 2000.
The summer monsoon rainfall oscillates between active spells with good monsoon
rains (above normal) and weak spells or the breaks in the monsoon when deficient to
scanty (ⱕ20 per cent) rain occur for a few days at a stretch (Nanjundiah et al., 1992).
Weak and active spells of the summer monsoon are determined by the position of the
monsoon trough extending from the northwestern end over the Rajasthan desert to the
head of the Bay of Bengal. The monsoon trough oscillates either south or north of
this normal position over the Gangetic plains. When the trough is to the south or close to
the normal position,active spells result and when it is near the foothills, weak monsoon
conditions prevail (Rao, 1976).
Table 12.2 Percentage a real distribution of annual rainfall over India
Mean annual rainfall Corresponding % area

0–750 mm 30%
750–1,250 mm 42%
1,250–2,000 mm 20%
>2,000 mm 8%
The spatial pattern in observed mean monsoon precipitation is, however, fairly
complex. The heaviest rains occur over the hilly states in the northeast and along the
mountainous west coast. Orissa, east Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and the northeastern
states of India, the western coast, and the Ghats receive more than 1,000 mm of rainfall
during the monsoon season. The submontane region extending from north Bihar to Jammu
also receives more than 1,000 mm. The heavy rainfalls in the northeastern states, west
coast, the Ghats, and the submontane regions are influenced by the orography. The pen-
insular India south of 15°N gets less than 500 mm rainfall (Rao, 1976). There is a sharp
MURARI LAL 195
gradient in monsoon rainfall from the west coast to the east coast over peninsular India.
The lowest rainfall is received in the extreme southeast portion of the peninsula. The west
and the northwest regions of the country receive about 500 mm of rain in the season. The
rainfall decreases rapidly to less than 100 mm in west Rajasthan. Regions above 500 mm in
the season are classified as wet and those less than 500 mm as dry parts of India.
The rainfall fluctuations in India have been largely random over a century, with no
systematic change detectable on either annual or seasonal scale. However, the linear
trends of monsoon rainfall during 1871 to 2001 at each of over 300 observing stations
spread over India show statistically significant trends in some broad contiguous areas
(Lal, 2003). The increasing trends in the seasonal rainfall have been observed over Punjab,
Delhi, Haryana, and Chandigarh, no significant change along the west coast, and the
decreasing trends over East Madhya Pradesh and the northeast states of India during
recent years (Kripalani et al., 2001). Intense deforestation activities have taken place along
the foothills of Himalayas and in the Assam region, and land use patterns have undergone
definite changes over parts of Rajasthan and Punjab (northwest India). Surface cooling
with significant increase in rainfall has also been observed in the peripheral regions of the
Rajasthan desert and it is believed that the increased area under irrigation is one of the
main casual factors. However, all India monsoon rainfall exhibits rather stable long term
characteristics, with extremes being a part of its natural variability.
The two monsoon seasons (the southwest monsoon during June to September and
the northeast monsoon during November to December) bring forth rains – often in
intensities and amounts sufficient to cause serious floods, creating hazardous (and often
disastrous) situations. Moreover, cyclonic storms in the pre-monsoon (April to May) and
the post-monsoon months (October to November) cause large scale inundation, destruc-
tion, and death. In fact, droughts, floods and cyclones are the key natural hazards that
visit India quite often (Webster et al., 1998). The adverse impacts of these two natural
hazards cannot be assessed merely in economic terms based on destruction of crops,
property, and infrastructure because the toll of human misery in the form of death, disease,
injury, loss of employment, psychological trauma, and above all the setback to
development is too difficult to evaluate (Khole and De, 2001). Moreover, the instances of
more frequent extreme weather events in India during the past decade point to an
unusually strong manifestation of a long term problem – global warming. The available
water resources in India in space and time could be severely impacted by likely changes in
the behaviour of monsoon characteristics including its intra-seasonal and inter-annual
variability due to climate change. The recent trends in climatic elements and plausible
climate change over the Indian sub-continent by the mid-21st century are discussed in
the following section.
12.5 OBSERVED AND PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IN INDIA
The scientific evidence that humans are changing the climate is increasingly compelling.
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations in
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and
rising global mean sea level. This is one of the major conclusions drawn in the Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC,
2007). The updated 100-year linear trend (1906 to 2005) of 0.74°C (0.56°C to 0.92°C) was
found to be larger than the corresponding trend of 0.6°C (0.4°C to 0.8°C) for 1901 to 2000
calculated in the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC. The AR4 further concluded
that most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th
century was very likely (>90 per cent probability of occurrence) due to the increase in
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. Recent observations indicate that the
year 2005 was the warmest since records began in the mid-19th century (NOAA, 2006).
The warming is accelerating and the IPCC Report projected 0.2°C per decade for the next
20 years for a range of SRES scenarios. Concomitant with this temperature increase,
global average sea level rose at an average rate of 1.8 [1.3 to 2.3] mm per year over 1961 to
2003. The rate was faster over 1993 to 2003 about 3.1 [2.4 to 3.8] mm per year. In the last
100 years, temperatures in the Arctic regions increased at a rate twice as the global
average. Satellite data since 1978 show that annual average arctic sea ice extent has
shrunk by 2.7 [2.1 to 3.3] per cent per decade, with larger decreases in summer of
7.4 [5.0 to 9.8] per cent per decade (IPCC, 2007). There has been an increase in the
frequency of heavy rainfall events. The global climate models project that global average
surface temperature will increase by 1.1 to 6.4°C by 2100 (Figure 12.4). Increases in the
amount of precipitation are very likely in high latitudes, while decreases are likely in most
subtropical land regions (Figure 12.5). Global mean sea level is projected to increase
between 0.18 to 0.59 m for a range of SRES scenarios (IPCC, 2007).
As shown in Table 12.3 below, all India annual mean surface temperature has
increased by about 0.8°C over the 1881 to 2002 period (Singh and Sontakke, 2001; Lal,
2003). This warming is mainly contributed by the post-monsoon and winter seasons
(Table 12.4). A relatively more pronounced trend in maximum day time temperatures has
been found compared to minimum night time temperatures (Roy and Balling, 2005). The
heat-related fatalities in the thousands during pre-monsoon season are no longer uncom-
mon. India has seen the number of deaths due to heat climb over the years as populations
have grown and temperatures have risen (De and Mukhopadhyay, 1998). The State of
Orissa has been reeling under contrasting extreme weather conditions for more than a
decade: from heat waves to cyclones and from droughts to floods. Since 1965, calamities
are not only becoming more frequent but also striking areas that never have been vulner-
able (De et al., 2004). A heat wave in 1998 killed around 1,500 people in coastal Orissa,
a region otherwise known for its moderate temperature (Pai et al., 2004). In May 2003,
peak temperatures of 45 to 49°C claimed over 1,600 lives throughout the country. In the
state of Andhra Pradesh alone, some 1,200 people died due the heat waves. A year earlier,
a one-week heat wave with temperatures topping 51°C took over 1,000 lives (IMD, 2000
to 2003). The death toll due to heat waves during March to May in Rajasthan, Punjab,
Gujarat, and Bihar is also on the rise in recent years (Kalsi and Pareek, 2001).
Extreme drought and flood events are also becoming increasingly common (in terms
of their spatial coverage and frequency) and severe (in terms of intensity) in India. The
Orissa drought in 2001 engulfed districts like Sundergarh and the Kendrapada, which
historically were drought-free. Since the great famine of 1866, 2001 was the first time that
drought affected 25 of the Orissa’s 30 districts. By February 2001, Orissa’s western
districts were reeling under a severe water crisis and people started migrating. The worst
affected districts like Kalahandi and Balangir reported 60 per cent less rainfall than normal
(De et al., 2005). The situation in nine western districts was severe as it was the second
consecutive drought. By May 2001, 61 starvation deaths had already been reported. The
state government put the economic loss due to crop damage at R. 64,289 billion
(US$ 1.71 billion). The Orissa drought in 2001 affected the lives of 11 million people. In
1994, monsoon rainfall was deficient (by between 20 and 43 per cent) in 10 of the 35
meteorological subdivisions of India. Gujarat, West Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala had
MURARI LAL 197
deficient monsoon rainfall during 1999 (Roy and Balling, 2004). In Gujarat, low monsoon
rainfall in 1999 and 2000 led to all the reservoirs containing only 50 per cent or less of
installed capacity. The drought in 2000 was the worst to hit Gujarat in the past 100 years.
Sixteen of its 27 districts and 26 of adjoining Rajasthan’s 32 districts were affected
(De et al., 2005). The situation was further aggravated because it followed the 1999 drought.
According to official sources, out of 143 dams and other reservoirs in Kutch, Saurashtra,
and North Gujarat, 107 had gone dry in the pre-monsoon months of 2001. In the year 2002,
rainfall deficiency for the country as a whole amounted to 19 per cent and drought
conditions (among the four major droughts of the century) impacted 29 per cent of India’s
geographical area. Failure of monsoon this year in Rajasthan saw all the 32 districts of this
state reeling under drought causing severe shortage of food, fodder, drinking water and
employment opportunities. Droughts in western and central India, as well as flooding in
eastern India and Bangladesh during 2004 impacted adversely the rice production.
A2
6.0 A1B
B1
Global surface warming ( C)
Year 2000 Constant

5.0 Concentrations
20th Century
4.0
A2
3.0
2.0 AB1
B1
1.0
0.0
A1F1
A1B
A1T
-1.0
B1
B2
A2
1900 2000 2100

Year
Fig. 12.4 Multi-model global averaging of surface warming (relative to 1980 to 1999) for SRES
scenarios A2, A1B and B1 shown as continuations of 20th century simulations. Also shown is the
best estimate and likely range assessed for these scenarios. Shading denotes X1 standard deviations
range of individual model annual averages. The grey bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid line
within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six SRES scenarios (Source: IPCC, 2007).
Fig. 12.5 Relative changes in precipitation (in per cent) for the period 2090 to 2099, relative to
1980 to 1999. Values are multi-model averages based on the SRES A1B scenario for December to
February (left) and June to August (right). White areas are where less than 66 per cent of the models
agree in the sign of the change and stippled areas are where more than 90 per cent of the models agree
in the sign of the change.
Table 12.3 Observed changes in temperature (oC) during different seasons in India
during 1901–2002
Period Mean Maximum Minimum

Annual 0.8 0.7 0.15
Winter 1.1 0.8 0.05
Pre-monsoon 0.6 0.4 0.05
Monsoon 0.5 0.3 –0.2
Post-monsoon 1.1 0.9 0.5
Table 12.4 Observed changes in temperature (oC) in different regions of India during
1901–2002
Period Maximum Minimum

Northwest 0.45 –0.35
North-central 0.75 –0.25
Northeast 1.05 –0.20
Interior peninsular 0.25 0.45
East coast 0.55 0.25
West coast 1.15 0.15
MURARI LAL 199
The monsoon-driven floods in the state of Andhra Pradesh left thousands homeless,
brought misery to millions, and damaged or destroyed large areas of crops in August 2000
leaving at least 165 people dead. Over 240 mm of rain were recorded in Hyderabad, the state
capital on 9 August – the highest amount in more than five decades. In coastal Orissa,
almost 490,000 hectares of fertile lands have been waterlogged, salinated, and sandcasted
by cyclones and floods in recent years (The Hindu, 2001). The devastating floods in 2001
(15 floods were reported between 8 July and 10 August 2001) induced crop failures worth
R. 150 billion (US$ 3.75 billion). The incessant rain for 40 days starting from the first week
of July 2001 was largely responsible for the worst ever flood recorded in the last century
(BBC News, 2001). The 2001 floods (more devastating than the 1982 floods) were deadly
because the Mahanadi, the Brahmani, and the Baitarani rivers, sharing a common delta,
flooded simultaneously. These floods inundated 25 of the 30 districts, including hilly areas
like Kalahandi and Phulbani, and affected one-third of their 30 million residents. About
2.12 million hectares of standing crops were also damaged. In Vidarbha (in the state of
Maharashtra), heavy downpours in August 2002 amounted to 800 mm of rainfall, compared
to 950 mm of normal seasonal rainfall. On 2 to 3 September, 250 mm of rainfall was recorded,
which lifted the water level of Sardar Sarovar dam along the Narmada River to 12 m above
its full capacity of 95 m, inundating hundreds of villages in the region (De et al., 2005). The
monsoon wreaked havoc in seven districts of Maharashtra from 1 to 3 September 2002,
claiming 35 lives and causing massive damage to crops and throwing normal life out of
gear. The Gujarat government issued a ‘high alert’ for 15 big and small dams after those
three days of incessant rains in the state. More than half of Assam State was flooded as
heavy rains burst dams and caused rivers to overflow, inundating more than 5,000 villages
and destroying hundreds of thousands of houses in July and August 2002 (De et al.,
2005). About 2.5 million people fled to take shelter on higher ground. Overwhelmed by
incessant monsoon rains and melting snow running down from the Himalaya, the
Indo-Gangetic plains of Northern India’s Bihar state was flooded and over 400,000 people
got stranded in July 2004. Such intense rainfall events have become more frequent in
recent years in many parts of India, Nepal, and Bangladesh.
Tropical cyclones are not part of the monsoons per se but they do cause devastating
floods in the coastal states of India. Severe tropical cyclones generally develop during
the pre-monsoon or post-monsoon seasons (generally the cyclone seasons are October to
November and March to June). The eastern coast of India along Bengal, Orissa, and
Andhra Pradesh is prone to such tropical cyclones. Observational records suggest that,
although the sea surface temperature over the Bay of Bengal has risen since 1951, the
numbers of monsoon depressions and tropical cyclones forming over the Bay of Bengal
and Arabian Sea have declined since 1970 (Figure 12.6). However, the intensity of tropi-
cal cyclones in Bay of Bengal seems to have increased in recent past (Srivastava et al.,
2000; Bhaskar Rao et al., 2001; Singh et al., 2001). On 6 November 1996, a deadly
cyclone with winds approaching 100 miles per hour and extremely heavy rains (8.8
inches in some areas) devastated India’s southeastern coast in the state of Andhra Pradesh.
At least 500 thousand homes were destroyed; 1.5 million acres of rice, sugar cane, cotton,
and tobacco were flooded (one-third of the entire agricultural output of Andhra Pradesh);
millions of banana plants, lime, and mango trees were uprooted; and countless cattle,
sheep, and chickens were killed. Crop and property damage was estimated at about
R. 60 billion (US$ 1.5 billion), more than the annual budget of the state government. The
tropical cyclone of 29 October 1999 hit the coast of Orissa with wind speed of 135 knots
(~260 mph) and heavy rains that caused severe floods. This was the worst cyclone to hit
the region in three decades and ranked highest in the damage caused in terms of both life
and property (Sridharan and Muthuchami, 2002). According to the official records,
9,885 people lost their lives; 2,142 people were injured; 370,297 head of cattle perished; and
1,617,000 hectares of paddy field and 33,000 hectares of other crops were damaged (BBC
News, 1999). Several villages had been completely wiped out and over a million made
homeless with storm surge of height 9 m above astronomical tide level at Paradip, which
penetrated 35 km inland. This ‘super cyclone’ was more or less stationary (with slight
southward drift) over the region after making landfall, and this led to excessive destruction
of the infrastructure. Today, coastal regions in India and Bangladesh are subjected to
stronger wind and flood damage because of storm surges associated with more intense
tropical storms (De et al., 2005). Frequent inundation of low-lying areas, drowning of
coastal marshes and wetlands, enhanced erosion of beaches, more flooding, and increased
salinity of rivers, bays, and aquifers in the coastal regions of India have occurred.
Fig. 12.6 Observed trends in number of monsoon depressions and cyclones in Indian Seas.
The area-averaged annual mean surface temperature rise over land regions of the
Indian sub-continent by the middle of 21st century is projected to range between 1.5 and
3.5oC (Lal et al., 2001b). An intensification of the summer monsoon and an enhancement in
precipitation variability with increased greenhouse gases has been projected in the IPCC
Third Assessment Report (Giorgi and Hewitson, 2001). The aerosols could weaken the
intensification of the mean rainfall, but the magnitude of the change would depend on the
size of the forcing. The effect of aerosols on Indian summer monsoon precipitation would
be to dampen the strength of the monsoon compared to that seen with greenhouse gases
only (Mitchell et al., 1995; Lal et al., 1995a; Hasselmann et al., 1995; Cubasch et al., 1996;
MURARI LAL 201
Roeckner et al., 1999). The overall effect of the combined forcing would be at least partly
dependent on the land/sea distribution of the aerosol forcing and if the indirect effect were
included as well as the direct effect.
A recent study suggests that anthropogenic perturbations of planetary albedo due to
changes in the concentrations of scattering aerosols and land-cover conversion could
trigger a transition to a summer monsoon regime over South Asia characterized by much
lower precipitation than today’s (Zickfeld et al., 2005). This finding acquires particular
relevance in the light of observational evidence revealing that a large cloud of anthropo-
genic haze spreads over south and southeast Asia (Lelieveld et al., 2001; Krishnan and
Ramanathan, 2002). It is likely that, after a partial suppression of the Asian summer
monsoon over the next decades, aerosol control policies (meant to mitigate intolerable
impacts on human health, food production and ecosystems) take effect, while global
economic growth pushes atmospheric CO2 concentrations to record levels. The latter
developments could reestablish the ‘wet monsoon’ mode – possibly at increased strength –
within a few years only. Such a dynamics would seriously challenge the adaptive capa-
bilities of the rural society in South Asia.
Several studies (Kattenberg et al., 1996; Kitoh et al., 1997; Lal et al., 2000; May, 2004a;
Giorgi and Bi, 2005) have confirmed an increase in the interannual variability of daily
precipitation in the Asian summer monsoon with increased anthropogenic forcings. The
primary cause for enhanced monsoon variability in the future has been attributed to
alterations in Walker circulation due to higher sea surface temperatures in the central and
eastern tropical Pacific (Vecchi et al., 2006). The study further suggests that, while the
warmer Indian Ocean would contribute to increases in summer monsoon precipitation over
South Asia (Lal et al., 2000), the warmer Pacific Ocean would weaken the monsoon flow
and reduce the monsoon precipitation (Meehl and Arblaster, 2003). An intensification of
the Asian summer monsoon with increased greenhouse gases has also been projected
(Meehl and Arblaster, 2003; May, 2004b). Large increases in rainfall intensity over northern
Pakistan, northwest India and Bangladesh are also projected (May, 2004a). However,
these projections are subject to choices in the future emission scenarios of greenhouse
gases and aerosols. None of these studies consider the likely changes in the aerosol
forcings.
The enhanced anomalous warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean in the
future has implications for increasing the likelihood of droughts and floods during summer.
A week Asian summer monsoon has been suggested following a strong wintertime El Niño
and increased spring and summer snow pack on the Tibetan Plateau (Krishnamurti and
Goswami, 2000; Kripalani et al., 2001; Shaman and Tziperman, 2005). Moreover, the state of
ENSO during Northern Hemispheric summer may influence monsoon rainfall more directly
via changes in circulation, temperature and subsidence patterns within the tropics. An
increased frequency of ENSO events and a shift in their seasonal cycle has been projected
in a warmer atmosphere: the maximum occurs between August and October rather than
around January as currently observed (Meehl and Arblaster, 1998; Collins, 1999). In many
of the South Asian countries, drought disasters are reported to be more frequent during
years following ENSO warm events than in normal years (Glantz, 2001; Goswami and
Xavier, 2005; Webster et al., 1998). The projected enhanced anomalous warming of the
eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean will have implications for the frequency of droughts and
floods during summer (Kripalani et al., 2003). Future seasonal precipitation extremes in
India associated with a given ENSO event are likely to be more intense (Ashrit et al., 2003;
Kharin and Zwiers, 2000; Kinter et al., 2002). India is already vulnerable to extreme climate
events and changes in climate could exacerbate these vulnerabilities.
The projected seasonal changes in surface air temperature and precipitation over
India under SRES A1FI (highest future emission trajectory) and B1 (lowest future emission
trajectory) pathways for two time slices, namely 2020s and 2050s as inferred from an
ensemble of results from five A-O GCM experiments, namely those of CCSR-NIES (Japan),
CSIRO (Australia), ECHAM4 (Germany), HADCM3 (UK) and NCAR-PCM (USA) are given
in Table 12.5.
Table 12.5 Projected changes in surface air temperature and precipitation in India under SRES
A1FI (highest future emission trajectory) and B1 (lowest future emission trajectory) pathways for two
time slices, namely 2020s and 2050s
2010 to 2039 2040 to 2069

Season o
Temperature, ( C) Precipitation, (%) Temperature, (oC) Precipitation, (%)
A1FI B1 A1FI B1 A1FI B1 A1FI B1
DJF 1.21 1.09 –5 –1 3.62 2.09 –17 –3
MAM 1.38 1.12 6 7 3.09 1.88 21 16
JJS 0.58 0.61 5 9 1.78 0.96 10 11
SON 0.81 0.87 1 4 2.47 1.64 9 6
It may be noted from Table 12.5 above that the projected increase in area-averaged
summer monsoon rainfall over India is within the currently observed range of interannual
variability which is sufficiently large to cause devastating floods or serious droughts.
During winter, South Asia may experience between 5 and 15 per cent decline in rainfall. The
decline in wintertime rainfall is likely to be significant and may lead to droughts during the
dry summer months. A change in drought or flood risks is one of the potential effects of
climate change which will have the greatest implications for the hydrological system and
water resources in India (NWDA, 2003).
Lal et al. (1995b) found no significant change in the number and intensity of monsoon
depressions (largely responsible for the observed interannual variability of rainfall in the
central plains of India) in the Bay of Bengal in a warmer climate. More recent studies
suggest that, while there is no evidence that tropical cyclone frequency may change
(Trenberth, 2005), a possible increase in cyclone intensity (including the near-storm
precipitation rates and destructive potential) of 8 to 16 per cent for a rise in sea surface
temperature of 2 to 4oC relative to the current threshold temperature is very likely (Emanuel,
1999; Emanuel, 2005; Knutson et al., 1998; Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; Lal, 2001; Roger
et al., 1998; Walsh, 2004). Amplification in storm surge heights should result from stronger
winds and low pressures associated with tropical storms. This could lead to higher storm
surges and an enhanced risk of coastal disasters along the Indian coastline.
Attempts have been made recently to generate climate change scenarios at local
scales using the data from climate change experiments attempted with high resolution
regional climate model (RCM) following rigorous mathematical/statistical procedures
(Lal et al., 1998; Lal, 2003). Some of the key characteristics of monsoon rainfall at selected
stations over India as simulated by the RCM nested in the CGCM for the present-day
atmosphere (1990s) and for the middle of 21st century (2050s) due to changes in
anthropogenic radiative forcing suggest the following: (i) for Bangalore (south India),
a marginal decline in total rainfall during monsoon is simulated for 2050s relative to
MURARI LAL 203
present-day conditions, with fewer wet days during the season and a decline in rainfall
intensity and reduced contribution of upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total
seasonal rainfall as inferred from the trends obtained in an analysis of 20 year mean data;
(ii) over Delhi (north India), the results suggest a reduction in total monsoon rainfall with
fewer wet days during the season, a marginal decline in rainfall intensity, and an increased
contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall;
(iii) for Jorhat (northeast India), an increase in total monsoon rainfall but fewer wet days
during the season and higher rainfall intensity with an increased contribution of the upper
10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall is simulated; (iv) the model
simulates an increase in total monsoon rainfall with more wet days during the season and
more intense daily rainfall but a lesser contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of
daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall over Srinagar in the Himalayan region; and (v) for
Udaipur (northwest India), a decrease in total monsoon rainfall but fewer wet days during
the season and more intense daily rainfall with a higher contribution of the upper
10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall is simulated. Using high
resolution (0.44o ⫻ 0.44o lat./long.) daily weather data simulated by the regional climate
model for the present-day (20-year period from 1981 to 2000) and for the future (20-year
period from 2041 to 2060), we have computed likely changes in water balance for major river
basins of the India which are summarized in Table 12.6. It is assumed in these preliminary
computations that there will be no major change in the land use pattern and in soil properties
over the period.
It is noteworthy from Table 12.6 that the impacts of climate change are different in the
selected river basins of India. An increase in rainfall over a river basin does not necessar-
ily translate into an increase in surface runoff and vice versa. For example, in Krishna and
Cauvery basins, surface runoff is projected to decline even through an increase in rainfall
is simulated. This is attributed to an increase in evapotranspiration as a consequence of
rise in surface temperature and increase in rainfall intensity. Similarly, in Tapti and Narmada
basins, surface runoff is projected to increase even through a decrease in rainfall is simu-
lated for the future. This is essentially a consequence of decline in number of wet days per
year in the region. The climate change induced change in annual surface runoff is pro-
jected to decline in Krishna, Cauvery, Pennar, Luni and Mahi river basins. This may lead
to more severe drought conditions in future in these river basins. The findings reported in
Table 12.6 also indicate that the annual mean surface flow in river basins in Krishna,
Pennar, Cauvery, Luni, Tapti, Narmada, Mahi and Sabarmati river basins will decline
implying that water resources in these river basins will become scarce due to enhanced
vulnerability by the mid-21st century. On the other hand, the annual surface flow in
Himalayan river basins is projected to increase due to climate change resulting in
enhanced probability of floods in this region. The increase in spring (dry summer months
of March to May) and monsoon (June to September) season surface flow is likely to be
more pronounced in eastern Himalayan river basins than in western Himalayan river
basins for two to three decades when a reversal in trend is expected such that the seasonal
surface runoff may decline. However, the increase in monsoon season surface runoff in
western Himalayan river basins is likely to continue unabated for the next 50 years during
the monsoon season contributing to increase in flood frequency in foothills of Himalaya.
It may be noted here that the likely future changes in annual surface flow projected here
provide only a gross picture in the catchment area. These findings also suggest serious
implications for the project on interlinking of Indian rivers.
Table 12.6 Plausible changes in water balance components and annual surface flow in major
river basins of India by the mid-21st century due to climate change as simulated by a high resolution
climate model
Major Change in Change in Change in Currently Likely change

river basins annual annual annual reported* in annual
(within India’s mean mean mean evapo- average Surface flow by
territorial rainfall/ surface transpiration surface flow mid-21st
border only) snowfall runoff (ET) BCM/year century
(mm) (mm) (mm) (%)
Indus +232 +114 – 28 73 17.6
Brahmaputra +148 +54 +35 586 8.4
Ganga +165 +83 +74 525 9.7
Mahanadi +217 +108 +49 67 11.1
Brahmani +216 +137 +82 28 14.8
Godavari +76 +42 +7 110 19.2
Krishna +64 –38 +24 78 – 6.3
Pennar –51 –27 –9 7 –4.9
Cauvery +43 –12 +39 21 – 2.8
Luni –124 –15 –94 15 –3.7
Tapti –52 +14 – 45 12 – 0.6
Narmada –229 +9 –22 46 –3.4
Mahi –118 – 36 –83 11 – 8.1
Sabarmati –212 –48 –126 4 –12.3
* Source: Data obtained from IWMI, Delhi.
In summary, the nature of expected climate change, as understood today, is likely to be

such that:
Global-average and all-India mean surface temperatures will continue to increase

above the historical levels unless there are substantial changes in international
energy and land-use patterns (very high confidence). As greenhouse gas
emissions continue into the future, the size of these temperature increases will
become larger over time.
The regional and seasonal pattern of temperature increases across the country
will vary (very high confidence; Figure 12.7a). We have medium confidence in
estimates of detailed regional/local scale anomalies in surface air temperatures
from the larger scale changes.
As atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations continue to rise, global average
precipitation will increase (very high confidence). There will be changes in the
timing and regional patterns of precipitation (medium confidence). We have
relatively low confidence in detailed projections for specific locations because of
rather large inter-model differences. Nonetheless, high resolution regional model
projections now available do provide us some valuable insights on the likely
changes in mean (Figure 12.7b) and variance in location specific rainfall over
Indian sub-continent.
MURARI LAL 205
Drought frequencies in some drought prone areas of India are likely to increase
(high confidence). The net risks to society from such changes have not yet been
evaluated and specific projections of where such changes will occur are rather
qualitative. Model projections, however, do suggest that the frequency and
severity of droughts in some areas would increase as a result of regional
decreases in winter and/or monsoon rainfall, more frequent dry spells, and higher
evaporation.
Fig. 12.7 Spatial distribution of likely changes in (a) annual mean surface temperature, and
(b) annual mean rainfall over the Indian sub-continent by the mid-21st century.
Climate change will enhance the frequency and intensity of the heavy
precipitation events in India (high confidence); tropical cyclones hitting the east
coast of India could be more severe in a warmer world. Projections on likely
changes in cyclone frequency needs more research, especially to address the
mismatch between the resolution of models and the scales at which extreme
events can occur.
Mean sea level has risen between 100 and 200 mm since the 1890s (very high
confidence). The average global rate of rise throughout the 20th century was
15.2 mm per decade. Satellite measurements show that sea levels have risen by
30 mm in the past decade.
Higher sea levels associated with thermal expansion of the oceans and increased
melting of glaciers will push salt water further inland in rivers, deltas, and coastal
aquifers (high confidence). It is well understood that such advances would
adversely affect the quality and quantity of freshwater supplies in many coastal
areas of India.
Water quality problems will worsen where rising temperatures are the
predominant climate change (high confidence). Where there are changes in
surface flow, complex positive and negative changes in water quality will occur.
Specific regional projections are still being established based on expected changes
in regional flows.
Preliminary results suggest that surface flow in river basins in Krishna, Pennar,
Cauvery, Luni, Tapti, Narmada, Mahi and Sabarmati river basins will decline by
mid-21st century and this will have implications for droughts and scarcity of
available water resources in these river basins.
The annual surface flow in Himalayan river basins is projected to increase due to
climate change (Figure 12.8) resulting in enhanced probability of floods in this
region.
Increased atmospheric carbon dioxide will affect the use of water by vegetation
(high confidence), the net effects of this and other competing influences on
future irrigation demand need yet to be worked out. Increasing CO2 concentra-
tions can increase plant growth, leading to a larger area of transpiring tissue and
a corresponding increase in transpiration. This in turn would tend to decrease
runoff since more water is returned directly to the atmosphere by such vegeta-
tion, allowing a smaller share of precipitation to reach streams or aquifers.
Aquatic ecosystems can be highly sensitive to hydro-climatic factors, particu-
larly water temperature, water quality, the probability of extreme events, and
flow volumes, rates, and timing. Determining the impacts on particular species
or ecosystems requires more extensive region-specific and ecosystem specific
research in India.
Climate change will produce a shift in species distributions northward, with
extinctions of temperate species at lower latitudes, and range expansion of
warm water species into northern latitudes in India.
Available literatures strongly suggest that current policies affecting water use,
management, and development in India are unresponsive to changing climate.
Information about how our summer monsoon will be affected due to climate change is
vitally important to better understand its impact on future water availability in India. It is
vital to better understand how climate changes might affect groundwater aquifers,
including quality, recharge rates, and flow dynamics. Furthermore, population growth,
MURARI LAL 207
changes in land use, restructuring of the industrial sector, and demands for ecosystem
protection and restoration are influencing the hydrological system and water resources in
India. In the absence of explicit efforts to address these issues, the societal costs of water
problems are likely to rise as competition for water grows and supply and demand
conditions change.
The ongoing climate change also has implications for retreat of glaciers in the
Himalaya-Hindukush region which provide water in north Indian rivers originating from
Himalayas during the lean dry periods. In the next section, we discuss the likely impacts
of climate change on the proposed interlinking project.
TAJIKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN INDIA
N
RIVER BASINS
Indus Basin In
73 (+17.6%) du
Ch s The numbers represent reported average
en
ab
surface flow in bcm/year and percent
change likely by mid 21st century
as
Be
PAKISTAN
TIBET
tra
pu
NEP ma )
ar AL r ah asin4.1%
m bh B B 8.
Sa BHUTAN 6 (+
r a 58
sin aput
i Ba Ganges Basin Branm
Lun 13.7%) l
( - ba 525 (+9.7%)
15
am
Ch Ganga
si
n
Manipur
BANGLADESH Ba Basin
Dam r ak
oda
r Ba
Ba
O s in
asin th
a da B er Kaladan
Narm6 (-3.4%) s Basin
4 a
O ang MYANMAR
Mahanadi th of G
Tapti Basin er
s Mouth (BURMA)
l
ha
12 (-0.6%) Basin Subarmarekha

mb
Pe 67 (-11.1%)
n ga Basin
God
ha
ava ng Brahmani Basin

a
fK
ri
28 (+14.8%)
lf o
Godavari Basin
Gu
Bh
im 110 (-19.2%)
a
Kr
ish
Sahyadri Basin Krishna Basin

n
a
Krishn
a
7 (-4.9%) 78 (-6.3%)
Bay of Bengal
Arabian Pennar
Sea Pennar Basin
7 (-4.9%)
Andaman a
Pulical
Palar
Lak
Ca Ponnaiyar Basin boundary

u
21 very
sh
Basin
Sub-basin boundary
a
dw
ee (-2 Ba
nd Nic
pS .8% si
ea ) n
o
b ar Is
Vembanad Palk Strait

Pe
Lakshadweep Va
lg
ri
al
ya
Islands
land
r
Gulf
s
of
Manar
SRILANKA
0 200 400 kilometres
INDIAN OCEAN
Fig. 12.8 Currently reported average surface flow (in BCM per year) in selected river basins of
India and projected percent change by the mid-21st century.
12.6 IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE

INTERLINKING PROJECT
The geomorphic and climatic factors result in the larger rivers of India originating from
the Himalaya and passing through the northern and eastern parts of the country. With
rapidly growing population, demands on water for domestic supplies, irrigation and
industry have continued to increase. On the other hand, there is little doubt that, the
glaciers of the Himalaya-Hindukush region are melting and that the melting is accompa-
nied by a long term increase of near-surface air temperature. The western Himalayas get
more snowfall than the eastern Himalaya during winter. During the monsoon season,
there is more rainfall in the eastern Himalaya and Nepal than in the western Himalaya
(Shrestha et al., 2000). Rising temperatures mean that not only will there be more rain and
less snow in the mountains, but also that snow will melt earlier in the year, resulting in
rivers and streams carrying more water, much earlier than normal (Borys et al., 2003). It
has been reported that the entire Himalaya-Hindukush ice mass (the third-largest on
earth) has shrinked in the last two decades due to less snow accumulation in the winter
and an earlier peak runoff in the spring (Dyurgerov and Meier, 2005; Fushimi, 1999;
Naithani et al., 2001). Furthermore, the rate of melting seems to be accelerating: a regres-
sion of the maximum spring stream flow period in the annual cycle by about 30 days and
an unprecedented increase in glacier melt runoff by 33 to 38 per cent in past decade has
been reported (Meier and Dyurgerov, 2002; Singh, 2003). The melting glaciers provide a
key source of water for the region in the summer months: as much as 70 per cent of the
summer flow in the Ganges and 50 to 60 per cent of the flow in other major rivers (Singh
and Bengtsson, 2004; Singh and Kumar, 1997; Singh and Jain, 2002). The Himalaya-
Hindukush region is the most critical region in which vanishing glaciers (example: the
Gangotri Glacier) will negatively affect water supply in the next few decades, because
of the region’s huge population (about 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s population) and
weak water infrastructure. All future plans for managing India’s water resources would
have to be looked into in the context of the now receding snowlines of the Himalaya
(Figure 12.9).
The joint interaction of clouds and aerosols represents one of the major challenges to
climate modelers today. Recent observational studies show that locally, over India, the
total aerosol effect (direct plus indirect) has been associated with a surface cooling of
0.3°C over the last three decades (Ramanthan et al., 2001; Krishnan and Ramanathan,
2002). This is close to the warming expected from greenhouse gases. However, the
aerosols are observed to be associated with warming in the lower to middle troposphere –
the regions inhabited by the glacier fields. In this case the aerosols may be enhancing the
direct temperature forcing by contributing to the melting of the high glaciers of the
Himalaya-Hindukush region. Aerosols are found to alter cloud physics in a manner that
reduces precipitation downstream from the pollution source (Rosenfeld, 1999; Rosenfeld,
2000). This also reduces the snow particle rime growth, resulting in lower snow water
equivalent, a result obtained from direct field measurements (Rosenfeld, 2000; Borys et al.,
2003; Givati and Rosenfeld, 2004). A common aerosol, black carbon, could decrease the
surface albedo, causing the snow/ice to absorb solar energy more readily and thereby melt
sooner. Proper inclusion of aerosols in global climate models will increase early melting of
snow packs and, especially, glaciers and sea ice (Hansen and Nazarenko, 2004).
MURARI LAL 209
Fig. 12.9 This composite image from the ASTER (Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and
Reflection Rediometer) instrument aboard NASA’s Terra satellite shows how the Gangotri Glacier
terminus has retracted since 1780 (courtesy of NASA EROS Data Center, September 9, 2001).
Some of the observed changes with the most relevance for hydrology and water
resources of India are summarized on the next page:
The Indian sub-continent has, on an average, warmed by two-thirds of a degree

Celsius since 1900 (very high confidence). Warming-induced changes to
evapotranspiration and surface runoff may affect regional water availability.
Mountain glaciers are currently melting at rates unprecedented in recorded
history (high confidence).
Temperature increase in mountainous areas such as Himalaya will lead to
increases in the ratio of rain to snow and decreases in the length of the snow
storage season (high confidence).
There is evidence of historical trends of both increasing and decreasing precipi-
tation in Himalayan region of the Indian sub-continent since 1870. The
intensity of precipitation here has increased for heavy and extreme precipita-
tion days.
Initial results suggest that flood frequencies in foothills of Himalaya would
increase, although the details on amount of increase for any given month and
season are yet to be explored.
The timing of runoff in snowmelt-dominated rivers in north India appears to be
changing, with a decrease in summer runoff and an increase in winter runoff.
The reductions in snowfall and earlier snowmelt and runoff would increase the
probability of flooding early in the year and reduce the runoff of water during
summer. The Indo-Gangetic Plains are particularly vulnerable to such shifts.
In view of above, it is prudent to take note of the following observations and

recommendations particular to the ILR:
Prudent planning requires that decisions about future long term water planning
and management be flexible, and that expensive and irreversible actions be
avoided in climate-sensitive areas.
Better methods of planning under climate uncertainty should be developed and
applied.
Decision makers at all levels should reevaluate technical and economic
approaches for managing water resources in the light of potential climate changes.
The government should ask all States managing national water systems to begin
assessing both climate impacts and the effectiveness of different operation and
management options.
Improvements in the efficiency of end uses and the intentional management of
water demands must now be considered major tools for meeting future water
needs, particularly in water-scarce regions. Water demand management and
institutional adaptation are the primary components for increasing system
flexibility to meet uncertainties of climate change.
Water managers should begin a systematic re-examination of engineering
designs, operating rules, contingency plans, and water allocation policies
under a wider range of climate conditions and extremes than have been used
traditionally. For example, the standard engineering practice of designing for the
worst case in the historical observational record may no longer be adequate.
Cooperation between water agencies and leading scientific organizations can
facilitate the exchange of information on the state-of-the-art thinking about
climate change and impacts on water resources.
MURARI LAL 211
The timely flows of information among the scientific global change community
and the water-management community are valuable. Such lines of communica-
tion need to be developed.
Traditional and alternative forms of water supply can play a role in addressing
changes in both demands and supplies caused by climate changes and
variability. Options to be considered include wastewater reclamation and reuse
and even limited desalination where less costly alternatives are not available.
None of these alternatives, however, is likely to alter the trend toward higher
water demand.
Prices and markets are increasingly important for balancing supply and demand.
Because new construction and projects can be expensive, environmentally
damaging, and politically controversial, the proper application of economics and
water management can provide incentives to use less and produce more. Among
the new tools that need to be explored are water banking and conjunctive use of
groundwater.
Even without climate change, efforts are needed to update and improve legal
tools for managing and allocating water resources. Water is managed in differ-
ent ways in different states around the country, leading to complex and often
conflicting water laws.
The impacts of climate change on India’s water resources also have the potential to
affect international relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan as international
agreements covering the shared waters do not include provisions for explicitly addressing
the risks of climate-induced changes in water availability or quality. A tussle is already
simmering in Ganges-Brahmaputra basins, where Bangladesh, India, and Nepal dispute
the best uses of water. India and Nepal want to exploit the basins’ huge, whereas Bangladesh
wants the water managed in such a way as to minimize flooding during monsoon months
and water shortages during dry months. Of equal concern are the water conflicts between
states in India that share river basins, such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, which border the
Cauvery River.
Apart from the uncertainties on the future availability of water in major river basins
under the projected climate change scenarios and its intra-seasonal or inter-annual
variability in space, it is also true that the river interlinking project would change the
composition of the sediment load, river morphology and the shape of the delta formed at
the river mouth. Moreover, construction of dams and canals will get villages dislocated,
flood towns and cut through millions of hectares of agricultural land. The large network of
dams and canals will also alter natural drainage such that occasional flooding and
waterlogging will inundate millions of hectares of agricultural land. Moulding of natural
flood water will reduce land fertility gradually and over the years the fertile land will change
into desert, affecting agricultural production. An increase in agricultural activities may
result in increase in nitrogen compounds and emission of methane further contributing to
the ongoing climate change.
None-the-less, to meet the growing requirements of water for various applications in
India, it is imperative not only to develop the new water sources but to conserve, recycle
and reuse water wherever possible. Various alternate options to intra- and inter-basin
transfer of water must be considered in quantitative terms as possible sources to augment
the anticipated deficit of available water. It has been shown that conservation of water
through rainwater harvesting and artificial groundwater recharge can generate about
125 km3 per year of additional water. Similarly, recycling of municipal and industrial
wastewater can regenerate additional ~177 km3 per year water. In the short term the
maximum amount of water can be generated locally through rainwater harvesting and
artificial groundwater recharge projects, wherein people and communities not only
participate due to the low level of technologies involved but are also the direct
beneficiaries. In recycling and reuse of wastewater, local bodies such as municipalities and
industries are required to carry out the development work. The gestation period for such
activities can be a couple of years as the required technology becomes more advanced and
the capital intensive. There is still untapped potential of almost 550 km3 per year
comprising groundwater and conventional run-of-the-river schemes. India has to initiate
action on all fronts for developing its water resources. The planning for both intra- and
inter-basin transfer of water has to clearly begin in a step-wise manner and based on
priorities and needs of the states (e.g., hydropower, inland navigation and ecological
considerations), because of the long gestation period involved due to the complex
political, technological and financial requirements. It needs to be ensured that the benefits
of intra- and inter-basin transfer of water outweigh the costs of implementation. Perhaps
the side effects of this mammoth project on the environment and human beings can be
avoided by proper scientific planning before its execution.
Available literatures strongly suggest that current policies affecting water use, manage-
ment, and development in India are unresponsive to changing climate. Information
about how Indian summer monsoon will be affected due to climate change is vitally
important to better understand its impact on future water availability. It is vital to better
understand how climate changes might affect groundwater aquifers, including
quality, recharge rates, and flow dynamics. Furthermore, population growth, changes in
land use, restructuring of the industrial sector, and demands for ecosystem protection and
restoration are influencing the hydrological system and water resources in India. In the
absence of explicit efforts to address these issues, the societal costs of water problems are
likely to rise as competition for water grows and supply and demand conditions change.
It is therefore necessary that a significant national effort be devoted to limit the popula-
tion growth. At the same time, it is also necessary that projections of population and
demand of water be reviewed at regular intervals so that corrective actions can be taken
in time. In the short term the maximum amount of water can be generated locally through
rainwater harvesting and artificial groundwater recharge projects, wherein people and
communities not only participate but are also the direct beneficiaries.
Another area of immediate emphasis has to be the recycling and reuse of water,
because it not only generates water for subsequent use but also prevents pollution and
ecological hazards. The impact of conservation, recycle and reuse is largely local but
widespread and is the only way to drought-proof the country. India has to initiate action
on all fronts for developing its water resources. The priority of action, however, must be for
rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge, followed by renovation and reuse of
wastewater and then inter-basin transfers. The planning for both intra- and inter-basin
transfer of water has to clearly begin now in a step-wise manner and based on priorities
and needs of the states (e.g., hydropower, inland navigation and ecological consider-
ations), because of the long gestation period involved due to the complex political,
technological and financial requirements.
Many uncertainties remain; indeed, we expect that uncertainties will always remain.
The nature and intensity of future greenhouse gas emissions depend upon future
MURARI LAL 213
decisions of governments and individuals, the speed of deployment of alternative energy

systems, population sizes and life styles, and many more factors. The global and regional
climate models that simulate the role of these greenhouse gases in our atmosphere are yet
imperfect. There are significant limitations in the ability of climate models to incorporate
and reproduce important aspects of the hydrologic cycle. Many fundamental hydrologic
processes, such as the formation and distribution of clouds and precipitation, occur on a
spatial scale smaller than most global climate models are able to resolve. All of the future
regional climate predictions still have uncertainties. In some cases, the uncertainties have
to do with the models’ inability to reproduce today’s climate, casting doubt on future
climate predictions. Predictions using regional, high-spatial-resolution models, of the type
needed for regional hydrological studies, are only now starting to come into their own
in the greenhouse arena, but they carry a whole set of problems in addition to those
associated with the coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (CGCMs).
However, such high-resolution regional models are essential for good quantitative
estimates of potential future water problems in the Himalaya – Hindu Kush region.
Even regional data on water availability and use are often poor. Tools for quantifying
many impacts are imperfect, at best. However, not everything is uncertain. The research
done to date provides us many details, both positive and negative, about how hydrology
and available water resources could be affected by climate variability and change. We
know much less about how the water cycle will change than we would like in order to make
appropriate decisions about how to plan, manage, and operate water systems. We still
need to learn about the vulnerability and sensitivity of water systems and management
practices, and we should explore the strengths and weaknesses of technologies and
policies that might help us cope with adverse impacts and take advantage of possible
beneficial effects.
It is vital that uncertainties not be used to delay or avoid taking certain kinds of action
now. Prudent planning requires that a strong national climate and water research program
be developed and maintained, that decisions about future water planning and
management be flexible, and that the risks and benefits of climate change be incorporated
into all long term water planning. Rigid, expensive, and irreversible actions in
climate-sensitive areas can increase vulnerability and long term costs. Water managers
and policymakers must start considering climate change as a factor in all decisions about
water investments and the operation of existing facilities and systems.
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13
Interlinking of Rivers in India: International

and Regional Legal Aspects
M. RAFIQUL ISLAM
SHAWKAT ALAM
13.1 INTRODUCTION
India is in the process of embarking on a project to interlink some of the rivers flowing
across its territory in a bid to overcome its chronic problem of floods during the Monsoon
and draught in the dry season. These rivers include some of the major international rivers
of the sub-continent with both upstream and downstream riparian states. The project
involves the diversion of water from and into the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers,
which draw massive amount of water from their tributaries originating from the upstream
Nepal and empty into the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh, the downstream riparian
state. Being in the downstream and at the delta of these two mighty international rivers,
Bangladesh bears the full brunt of Monsoon floods every year and draught during the dry
months. The ongoing operation of the Farakka Barrage in India for the diversion of the
Ganges water immediately before its entry into Bangladesh has but added to the problem
of too much and too little water in Bangladesh. The Farakka Barrage has been a bone
of contention between India and Bangladesh ever since the commission of the barrage
in 1975.
This new scheme for interlinking rivers in India has become a grave cause of concern
in Bangladesh and created new tensions with India. Bangladesh expressed its concerns
over the potential impact of India’s project on interlinking of transboundary rivers on the
economy and environment of Bangladesh.1 India has conceived the project unilaterally
without any consultation whatsoever with its upstream Nepal and downstream Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has diplomatic channels with India and instruments such as the
Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, which could have been used in the best
interest of all stakeholders in the project. The scientific feasibility, and economic and
environmental impact, studies on the project have not been made public. India has been
criticised by its own civil society for its failure to release any of the eight pre-feasibility
1
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS): National News Agency of Bangladesh, August 13, 2004,
http://www.bssnews.net.
220 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS: LEGAL ASPECTS
study reports on the project.2 Consequently, this project has become an important issue
in the discourse of the civil societies in both India and Bangladesh. Many are now
apprehensive of its viability and detrimental effects. The controversy surrounding the
project is steadily outgrowing the national arena of Bangladesh and India and gradually
attracting the interests and involvement of various groups representing expatriate
Bangladeshi and Indians.3
If the Farakka experience is any guide, it may not be difficult to surmise the potential
adverse consequences of such a huge upstream water diversion project on the economy,
ecology, the environment, biology and sustainable development of Bangladesh and the
morphology of its river-systems. These consequences call for special analytical attention
and constitute the subject-maters in other chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide an international legal analysis of the project. It examines the rights and obligations
of the riparian states in sharing and utilising their common water of international rivers. It
outlines the responsibility and liability of riparian states, such as India, for their action in
diverting the waters of international rivers causing serious detriment to the use and
rightful share of co-riparian states, such as Bangladesh. Since the project is still in its
planning stage, certain legal advises and viable options are offered for a just yet friendly
resolution of the dispute.
13.2 A BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT
The Supreme Court of India, in response to a writ petition (civil no. 512/2002)4 has
authorized the interlinking of Indian rivers with a view to the diversion of huge amount of
waters from the major internationally shared rivers, which includes among others the
Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers. There are two components of the project. Its first
component aims to link 14 Himalayan rivers in northern India. And the second component
would connect 16 peninsular rivers in southern India.5 The first component involves the
establishment of connection with the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, which is of special
interest to Bangladesh. India seeks to complete this ambitious project by 2016. The cost of
this mega project is estimated to be more than US$ 118 billion. Its primary objective is to
ensure adequate water supply for the domestic, industrial and agricultural use. The project
is thought to be improving the water flow, food security and navigation in India. It would
also create jobs for rural people and stop the migration of people from rural to urban areas.6
India reasons that the project would reduce flood and drought conditions in the
northern and southern parts of India in general and generate hydropower and irrigation in
particular. It is a bid for India to ensure its internal water security. This project, if completed
2
See Times of India: February 13, 2004, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com. See also Upendra Gautam,
“Blatant Unilateralism: India’s River Linking Project” Environment NEPAL 2, http://
www.environmentnepal.com accessed on June 4, 2004.
3
For details see Bangladesh Environment Network, http://www.ben-center.org. See also Shobha
Warrier, “NRIs Keen on River Linking Project” Sustainable Development Networking Programme
Bangladesh, http://www.sdnpbd.org.
4
See Record of Proceedings, Supreme Court of India, “In Re: Networking of Rivers,” October 31,
2002, http://www.riverlinksdialogue.org/html/supreme.htm.
5
This includes among others river basins of “Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, Vaigai,
West flowing rivers of Kerala, Karnataka, north of Bombay and south of Tapi and southern
tributaries of Yamuna.” See also Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers, http://www.riverlinks.nic.in.
6
See “About Interlinking Proposal: The Need” ibid.
M. RAFIQUL ISLAM AND SHAWKAT ALAM 221
successfully, is likely “to add 35 to 37 million hectares of irrigated land, generate 34,000
million kilowatt of electricity, control flood in the flood-prone states, and increase in
navigational efficiency”.7 However, India’s own record of past fifty years of dam building
shows that its drought prone areas have increased not decreased.8 This position appears
to contradict the wisdom inherent in the rationales behind the project. Better alterna-
tives, such as building watersheds and improving local water reservoir system, may be
relied upon to address the problem of flood and drought.
13.3 THE INTERESTS OF BANGLADESH AT STAKE IN THE PROJECT
Bangladesh confronts many pressing water resources related problems, which among
others include flood controls during wet and the scarcity of water in dry seasons. “Water
is central to the way of life in Bangladesh”9 and the protection of this important resource
is vital in maintaining the well being of the ever-growing large population of 120 million.
Increasing deterioration in salinity, water pollution, river sedimentation, outbreak of
arsenic are just the few to name of the insurmountable challenges that Bangladesh need
to confront with its very limited resources. The dilemma of Bangladesh is echoed in its
National Water Policy:
All of these have to be accomplished under severe constraints, such as

the lack of control over rivers originating outside the country’s
borders, the difficulty of managing the deltaic plain, and the virtual
absence of unsettled land for building water structures.10
Management of river basins serves as an important factor in national water

resource development. The efficient and better management of the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Meghna basins could bring plenty of economic opportunities for Bangladesh. It is
indeed critical for Bangladesh to find a lasting solution to the proposed rivers linking
project of India in order to ensure its due and equitable share in the common resources of
international rivers. This is extremely crucial for its much needed economic development
and arresting its delta from turning into a desert.
Recent studies on the proposed project seem to suggest the lack of its compliance
with sound economic policies and credible environmental principles. One of these studies
has identified a number of possible adverse effects of the project on Bangladesh. These
effects in the main include:11
Massive change in sediments transport due to reduction and redistribution of

water flow;
7
Upendra Gautam, above note 2, at 1.
8
Himanshu Thakkar, “Let’s Have Our Feet on Ground, Mr. Prabhu”, March to April (2003) 1: 2–3,
Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) 3, www.narmada.org/sandrp.
9
National Water Policy of Bangladesh, see Sustainable Development Networking Programme, http://
www.sdnpbd.org/river_basin/waterpolicy/water_policy_bangladesh.htm accessed on May 31, 2004.
10
Ibid.
11
Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, “India’s River Diversion Plan and Its Impact on Bangladesh”, Bangladesh
University of Engineering and Technology, NETWORK for Information, Response and
Preparedness Activities on Disaster, accessed on September 17, 2004, http://nirapad.org/care_nirapad/
Home/Interview/html/jan2004/India’s River Diversion Plan and Its Impact on Bangladesh.
Reduction of flow of the tributaries in the northwest region, and consequently

shrinking of wetlands in the region;
Reduction of inflow to the distributaries in the north-central, southwest and
south-central regions;
Advancement of tidal propagation further upstream;
Increase in the salinity intrusion into the Lower Meghna that would create risks
of salinity intrusion in the south-central and north-central regions; Increase in
the frequency of very large and very small floods;
Intensification of river bank erosion, silt up of river bed and extensive char
formation;
Increase in scarcity of water during dry season;
Decrease in the recharge to the wetlands and groundwater in the wet season;
Lowering of groundwater level;
Massive scale drain out of water from Beels in the northwest region and Haors in
the northeast region;
Release of water from the reservoirs of Brahmaputra during heavy rainfall would
increase the risk of high magnitude flood. In 2000, southwest region of
Bangladesh experienced such flood due to release from the reservoirs in West
Bengal.
An environment group conjectured that as a result of this project more than 7,800
square kilometers of land is likely to be flooded, displacing 3 million people off their land.12
Scientists estimate that even the barest minimum 10 to 20 per cent reduction in water flow
caused by the project would be enough to dry up the vast areas of Bangladesh,
threatening the livelihoods of more than 100 million people with its consequential
effects on economy, ecology, morphology and bio-diversity.13 Under the current proposal,
“India wants to divert 173 billion cubic meters of water per year from the Brahmaputra
amounting to 193,703 cubic feet per second which is greater than total flow in the
Brahmaputra during the lean season.”14 The Brahmaputra will lose its flow during the time
when the water is diverted, which is likely to threaten its very existence during the dry
season. It is likely to affect many irrigation projects dependant on the Brahmaputra for
their water supplies. The Brahmaputra helps controlling salinity because of its flow during
the dry seasons. The reduction of water in the Brahmaputra means the increase of salinity
during the dry season, with the possibility of leaving a totally dry river bed for Bangladesh.
In addition “due to change in the velocity and depth of water, seasonal flow variabil-
ity and nutrient flow in the river, fisheries resources are likely to be impacted adversely.”15
Fisheries, flora and fauna are intricately connected with the economic development in
Bangladesh. The fundamental objectives of the economy are poverty alleviation, genera-
tion of employment and sustainable development. These sectors will be seriously
affected due to the scarcity of water and salinity in the rivers as a result of the river linking
project.
12
Bangladesh Environment Network, above note 3.
13
John Vidal, “India’s Dream, Bangladesh’s Disaster.” The Guardian, July 24, 2003, accessed from
www.countercurrents.org on June 4, 2004. See also “India’s Mega Water Offensive” Editorial, The
Daily Star, August 22, 2003, www.thedailystar.net.
14
M. Khalequzzaman, “Historic Perspectives of the Indian River Linking Project” eMela, Inc,
www.e-mela.com/Bangladesh/River_Indian_History_Khalequzzaman20031108 accessed on
August 16, 2004.
15
Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, above note 11.
The natural environment of Bangladesh is closely linked to its water resources.

Continuous and consistent flow of water in the rivers is fundamental for the protection,
restoration and preservation of the environment and bio-diversity.16 Increased soil erosion,
sedimentation and salination would result in the loss of endangered species and coastal
zone habitat.17 The lack of enough waters in major river basins will severely affect natural
water bodies such as beels, haors, baors, which are linked to rivers through khals and
used for fish production and development. This situation will pose a threat to the survival
of many fishermen, who preserve in the dry season a significant portion of water and
provide a habitat for the aquatic flora. These water bodies also help transferring the wastes
discharged from the domestic sources through the khals into the river’s drainage system.18
Reduction in the flow of water in the rivers will dry them up destroying the natural
capture fisheries and aquatic environment and blocking the flow of wastes into the
drainage.
In the proposed plan, the Farakka-Sundarban is another link canal. It has been argued
“… that there is a possibility to withdraw water from the Ganges in the dry season in
addition to currently being diverted by Farakka Barrage to ensure the navigability of the
Kolkata Port India.”19 Should this apprehension eventuate, the southwestern region of
Bangladesh would suffer further from the loss of water diversion. The possible environ-
mental impacts of the river linking project would be the slow death of the Bangladeshi
segments of all successive international rivers that flow from India. This eventuality may
not be gain said in view of the Farakka Barrage experience. Immediate result of this
impact is that “about 17 per cent of the total Sundari trees of the Sundarbans, the world’s
largest estuarine swamp, have already prey to the top dying syndrome due to increased
salinity, according to forest department officials.”20 The Farakka-Sundarban would further
exacerbate the ongoing tree-dying syndrome, throwing coastal industries such as prawn
fisheries out of business.21 The intrusions of salinity would render the groundwater
contaminated and undrinkable causing scarcity in pure drinking water and a threat to
public health.
13.4 THE RIVERS INTERLINKING PROJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law governs the utilisation of common rivers in order to ensure the just and
equitable share of waters for all competing claimants and interests. It confers specific
rights and imposes definite obligations on riparian states so that their legitimate rights
are protected and the abusive exercise of right is prevented. Adherence to this orderly
normative regime of the rightful and proper utilisation of common water resources is
indispensable not only to ensure fairness and equity but also to avoid over exploitation.
Some of the international legal principles and normative standards relevant to the Indian
rivers linking project are highlighted and commented upon below.
16
See “Water for the Environment” in National Water Policy: Bangladesh, Paragraph 4.12, www.sdnpbd.
org accessed on May 31, 2004.
17
Ibid.
18
“Water for Preservation of Haors, Boars, and Beels”, Paragraph 4.13, ibid.
19
Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, above note 11.
20
Inam Ahmed and Aasha Mehreen Amin, “Bangladesh Waiting for a Miracle” 15:3 People and the
Planet, 2, 1996.
21
Ibid.
13.4.1 The nature and extent of territorial sovereignty over common waters
Three and a half centuries ago, a Dutch scholar in international law, Hugo Grotius,
articulated the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty on rivers, be they national or
international. He viewed “a river, … as a stream, is the property of the people through
whose territory it flows, or the ruler under whose sway that people is … to them all things
produced in the river belong.”22 This notion of sovereignty over international rivers
certainly favours upper riparian states more often than not at the expense of lower riparian
states. An upstream state can use its territorial water whatever way it deems necessary
without any consideration of the effects of such uses on the lower or co-riparian states.
This was precisely the legal opinion rendered by the US Attorney General Judson Harmon
as a justification for the diversion of the Rio Grande water in 1895 leaving hardly any
water for the downstream state Mexico.23 The Harmon doctrine was based on the notion of
absolute sovereignty of riparian states on the subject of sharing of water of international
rivers. Understandably this is the preferred position of upstream powerful riparian states,
such as the US, Austria and India in negotiations on river disputes. The US asserted this
absolute right in its disputes with Mexico over the sharing of Rio Grande and Colorado
waters, and with Canada over the Columbia water. Austria made a similar claim in rela-
tion to the sharing of the Rissbach river water with Bavaria.24 India pursued its absolute
claim as a justification for the construction of Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River in
1961. India maintained that “the construction of such a dam is ‘the natural right of any
country’, and that any water collected behind the dam belongs exclusively to the country
that collected it.” 25
This claim of absolute territorial sovereignty over common rivers is no more than
a legal myth and fiction, which has never been practised unconditionally even by its
proponents.26 The US compromised its position in resolving all disputes over the sharing
of common rivers with Mexico and Canada through the conclusion of international
agreements conceding the legitimate and rightful shares of co-riparian states.27 Austria
also resolved its dispute with Bavaria on the basis of mutual recognition of rights by
22
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, vol. 2, ch. 2, 12 (Kelsey trans., 7th ed. 1646) cited in Aaron
Schwabach, “Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International
Freshwater Law” (1996) 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 325.
23
This doctrine was originally proposed by the Attorney General of the US Judson Harmon in 1895
to justify the US position of allocating the water of the Rio Grande river between the US and Mexico.
(1895) 21 Opinion of Attorney-General, 274–83; J.B. Moore, “Diversion of Waters” (1906) 1 Digest
of International Law, 654.
24
Dr. Gieseke, the Director of the Institute of Water Rights at Bonn University made this claim, see
C. Eagleton, “The Use of the Waters of International Rivers” (1955) 33 Canadian Bar Rev, 1020.
25
Joseph W. Dellapenna, “The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the
International Law of Transboundary Waters”, (1996) 10 Brigham Young University Journal of Public
Law, 213, 230–31; cited in Scott L. Cunningham, “Do Brothers Divide Shares Forever? Obstacles to
the Effective Use of International Law in Euphrates River Basin Water Issues” (2000) 21 University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 145.
26
E. Arechaga, “International Legal Rules Governing Use of International Watercourses” 2
Inter-Am l Rev, 330, 1960.
27
For all these agreements, see UN Legislative Series: Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Con-
cerning the Utilisation of International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation, UN Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/12, 206, 232, 1963.
concluding a treaty in 1948.28 In a similar vein, India resolved its Indus river dispute with
Pakistan by concluding a treaty in 1960, which duly conceded the right of Pakistan in the
Indus water.29 The conclusion of the Farakka Barrage commissioning agreement in 1975
and subsequent agreements on the sharing of the Ganges water with Bangladesh in 1977,
1982, 1985 and 1996 may be cited to the same effect.
There is a qualitative difference between sovereignty over static and flowing
components within a territory. The former is perpetually stationary, whilst the latter is
constantly on the move. If uninterrupted, the flow of a river flows downstream auto-
matically in its natural course. The segment of international rivers waters which is under
the sovereignty of India flows into the sovereignty of Bangladesh and then beyond to
empty into the Bay of Bengal. It is more comparable with the migratory habit of flying
birds rather than with any static components under territorial sovereignty. It is therefore
erroneous, if not a distortion, to argue that a riparian state, regardless of its geographical
location, can enjoy absolute right to, and control over, the segment of international rivers
within its territory. The assertion of territorial sovereignty on international rivers, how-
ever widely and passionately asserted, must bend before the obligation to respect the
lawful right of co-riparians to the same water. This act of mutual respect for each other’s
right itself is a limitation on the exercise of sovereignty over international rivers. It is
possible to prepare an endless list of state practice of riparians, both upstream and down-
stream alike, repudiating the unilateral use of international rivers by any riparian to the
exclusion of co-riparians. The evidentiary value of this widespread uniform state practice is
clearly international law creating.
The international legal posture referred to militates against the right of India to
unilaterally interconnect the upstream segments of international rivers within its terri-
tory, which has the potential of depriving downstream Bangladesh of its rightful shares of
waters. The right and control of India over the segments of international rivers within its
territory is not unassailable but subject to the accommodation of legal rights and equi-
table shares of its co-riparian Bangladesh. This is what India followed in its Indus Water
Treaty in 1960 with Pakistan and successive agreements on the sharing of the Ganges
water with Bangladesh.
13.4.2 Principle of good neighbourliness
The UN recognises and fosters mutual respects among its members, particularly those
which are neighbours. To this end, the UN Charter embodies the general principle of good
neighbourliness, due account being given to the interests and well-being of the rest of the
world in social, economic, and commercial matters (Art. 74). This is precisely the objective of
international economic cooperation under Chapter IX (Art. 55) of the UN Charter. All UN
members “pledge” themselves in Article 56 of the UN Charter to attain this objective
through individual and collective efforts. The expression “pledge” entails precise legal
obligations for UN member states. Relying on this principle, it has been argued in a similar
situation that a lower riparian country like Bangladesh “may demand the continuation of
28
P. Sevette, “Legal Aspects of the Hydro-Electric Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common
Interests” UN Doc. E/ECE/136, 49, 1952.
29
F.J. Barber, “The Indus Water Dispute” (1957) 6 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, 46; for the
text of the treaty, see (1961) 55 Am J I L, 797.
the full flow of [water] from an upper riparian state, free from any diminution in quantity
or quality.”30
It is this spirit of mutual cooperation for each others interests and needs that India
has adhered to in its bilateral treaty with Bangladesh on the sharing of the Ganges water
in 1996 (preamble).31 In view of this principle, India in undertaking the project is
expected to take into account the living standards and conditions of economic and social
progress and development in Bangladesh. It would be a defiance of this principle should
the Indian project cause deterioration in living conditions and socio-economic develop-
ment in neighbouring Bangladesh.
13.4.3 Obligation not to cause injury to others
One of the fundamental principles of international law is that the holder of a right must
exercise it in a manner not injurious to others. It corresponds to the Roman law proverb
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas which means that “you use your own so as not to
injure another”. This obligation requires a state not to use its territory to the detriment of
another state. The Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses 1997 (hereafter the Convention on Non-navigational Watercourses)
embodies the principle of “no significant harm” in Article 7. This Article affirms the duty
of the watercourse states to take all appropriate measures while utilising international
watercourse in their territories to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse states. In addition, where such harm is caused to another state, the state that
causes this harm shall take appropriate measures in consultation with affected states to
eliminate such harm and to discuss the issue of compensation if necessary.
There exists a whole range of national and international judicial decisions and
arbitral awards in support of the principle that no state can use its territory to the
detriment of another. Some of these international and national judicial expositions of
the principle are explained below.
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute between Hungary and Slovakia in 1997,32 the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided important and significant guidelines in
relation to the use and ownership of shared water resources. The ICJ, in deciding the effect
of the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube, held that
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming jurisdiction over shared watercourse, deprived
Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources and
consequently failed to respect the principle of international law. In the French Nuclear
Test case between Australia and France in 1973, the ICJ in its interim order asked France
not to carry out its atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific in a manner that caused the
radio-active fall-out in the territory of Australia (and New Zealand).33 The ICJ in the
Corfu Channel case between Great Britain and Albania in 1949 held that “every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other States.”34
30
Aaron Schwabach, “Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International
Freshwater Law”, (1996) 14 Berkeley J. Int’ L. 290, 326.
31
Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, December 12, 1996, Bangla-India,
(1997) 36 ILM 523.
32
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo - Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 ICJ Rep 92 (order of
February 5).
33
1974 ICJ Rep 253.
34
Corfu Channel (UK vs. Alb.), 1949 ICJ Rep 22.
The Lac Lanoux Arbitration between Spain and France in 195735 has applied the
principles established by the Corfu Channel case and the Trail Smelter Arbitration
(below) to the issues relating to the navigation of international watercourses. It has stated
that
according to the rules of good faith, the upstream state is under the
obligation to take into consideration the various interests involved, to
seek to give them every satisfaction compatible with the pursuit of its
own interests, and to show that in this regard it is genuinely
concerned to reconcile the interests of the other riparian State with
its own.36
The Trail Smelter Arbitration between the US and Canada in 1941 decided that
“no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or person therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.”37
Relevant decisions of municipal courts may be cited to the same effect. Though
these decisions are not binding upon other states, they may be used as a source of inter-
national law as “the general principle of law” under Article 38(1c) of the Statute of the
ICJ. The US Supreme Court resorted to the rules and principles of international law of
rivers in deciding its inter-state river water sharing disputes.38 Some of these decisions
have dealt with the effects of river diversion and are “judicial decisions within the mean-
ing of the statute and are also evidence of state practice.”39
In the Donauversinkung case (Baden v. Wurttemberg), it was held that
When utilizing an international watercourse in its territory every State

is bound by the principle springing from the idea of the community of
nations based on international law: that it may not injure another
member of the international community. Due consideration must be
given to one another by the various States which have a watercourse
in common. No State may substantially impair the use of a water-
course, made possible by nature, by another state.40
35
Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain vs. Fr.), (1957) 12 RIAA 281; (1959) 53 Am J. Int’l L, 156.
36
Ibid, at 315.
37
Trail Smelter (US vs. Can.), 3 RIAA 1965; (1941) 35 Am J. Int’l L 684.
38
For example: Kansas vs. Colorado (1902) 185 US 143 and (1907) 206 US 46; Wyoming vs.
Colorado (1922) 159 US 419; North Dakota vs. Minnesota (1923) 263 US 365; Connecticut vs.
Massachusetts (1931) 282 US 660; New Jersey vs. New York (1931) 283 US 336; Arizona
vs. California (1931) 283 US 449; Nebraska vs. Wyoming (1945) 325 US 589; see also J. Austin,
‘Canada-US Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A Study of
the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine’ (1959) 37 Canadian Bar Review, 432-434; (1932)
13 British Yearbook of International Law, 189.
39
Above note 30 at 329.
40
Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses 366 (1984) at 434 cited in above note 30 at 329.
In Societe Energie Electrique, the Court stated that
international law recognizes the right of every riparian state to enjoy,

as a participant of a kind of partnership created by the river, all
the advantages deriving from it. A State cannot disregard the
international duty not to impede or to destroy the opportunity of the
other States to avail themselves of the flow of water for their own
national needs.41
The only inevitable conclusion one can draw from all these persuasive authorities is
plain and simple. An upper riparian may use waters of international rivers in whatever
way it pleases without interfering with the rights of the lower riparians to use the same
international rivers. India understands this legal principle and normative expectation,
which it has incorporated in its treaty with Bangladesh on the sharing of the Ganges water
in 1996 (Art. 9). The predictable effects of the Indian rivers linking project on Bangladesh
have already been briefly mentioned before. They are indeed too serious, distinct and
imminent warranting an urgent attention. The international legal obligation of India in
undertaking its rivers linking project now is to take appropriate measures not to cause
any significant harm to Bangladesh.
13.4.4 Principle of reasonable and equitable sharing
The International Law Association perceives that any denial by a basin state of the rights
of co-basin states to the equitable sharing of uses of water “conflicts with the community
of interests of all basin states”.42 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International
Rivers 1966 (herein after the Helsinki Rules) affirm that the right of a riparian state to its
international rivers is limited. It is limited to the extent that a riparian state has the right
“within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters
of an international drainage basin.”43 Article V of the Helsinki Rules specifies an inclu-
sive list of factors that need to be taken into account in determining what constitutes a
state’s “reasonable and equitable share”. These factors include climate, geography and
hydrology of the basin, past and present uses of the waters, economic and social needs of
each basin state, population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state, cost
of alternative means, availability of other resources, avoidance of unnecessary waste,
practicability of compensation to other co-basin states as a means of adjusting conflicts
among uses. The Helsinki Rules adopt a “substantial injury” test/standard in determining
whether the use of common water by a state is reasonable and equitable.44
41
Judgment of February 13, 1939, Corte cass. Italy, 64 Foro It. I 1036, 1046, digested in (1938 to
1939) 3 Dig. of Int’l L. 1050–1051 cited in above note 30 at 330.
42
International Law Association in its commentary to Article X of the Helsinki Rules see, Slavko
Bogdanovic, International Law of Water Resources, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, The
Netherlands, 2001, 114.
43
Helsinki Rules on the Use of the Waters of International Rivers, Art. IV, cmt. (a), (1966) 52 ILA
477, 486–487.
44
Art. V (2) (k), Helsinki Rules.
According to the Convention on Non-navigational Watercourses, one of the funda-

mental principles of non-navigational uses of transboundary waterways is the equitable
utilisation. Its Article 5 outlines this principle in the following manner:
Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and

protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to
utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and
development thereof, as provided in the present Convention.
Again what constitutes an equitable utilisation is determined by geographic, hydro-

graphic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors, social and economic needs
of watercourse states involved, population dependent on the watercourse of watercourse
states, effects of use of the watercourses in one watercourse state on other watercourse
states, existing and potential uses of the watercourse, conservation, and availability of
alternatives of comparable value to a particular planned or existing use.45
The unilateral assumption and commission of the Indian rivers linking project would
be an unfair and unjust approach to the development of common water resources. It
would certainly compromise the lawful rights and entitlements of Bangladesh to its inter-
national rivers. This “principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party” is the
essence of Article 9 of the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on the Sharing of the Ganges Water at
Farakka 1996. India is obliged under international law not to undertake and operate the
project in a manner that undermines the equitable shares of Bangladesh. The ongoing
Ganges water diversion at Farakka by India has already diluted the right of Bangladesh to
reasonable and fair share of its international rivers. The proposed project is fraught with
the possibility of eroding this right even further.
13.4.5 Principle of prior notice
There are some procedural principles and obligations in international law warranting a
riparian state desirous of undertaking a project in common rivers to comply with. These
include the duty to serve adequate prior notice of intention and the factual state of affairs,
to actively engage in consultation, negotiation and mediation and to suspend the pro-
posed project pending the peaceful settlement of the dispute.46 The Helsinki Rules in its
Article XXIX further obliges any state which is planning to develop construction or
installation that would alter the regime of the basin should furnish notice to the lower
riparian which is likely to be affected due to the change in the water system. The notice
would include essential facts which enable the recipient to make an assessment of the
probable effect of the proposed alteration.47 The Convention on Non-navigational Water-
courses contains specific provisions for such prior notification and information sharing.
Articles 11–17 require parties to exchange information on the possible effects of
45
Article 6, Ibid.
46
C.B. Bourne, “Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: Notice and
Exchange of Information” (1972) 22 Univ. Toronto L J, 172; for an analysis of this procedural
requirement, see M.R. Islam, Ganges Water Dispute: Its International Legal Aspects, The
University Press Limited, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1987, 62–101; M.R. Islam, “The Ganges Water Dis-
pute: An Appraisal of a Third Party Settlement” (1987) 27:8 Asian Survey, 918–934.
47
Art. XXIX, Helsinki Rules.
planned measures on the condition of an international watercourse, timely notification

accompanied by available technical data and information, of planned measures which
may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States.
India has carefully designed the rivers interconnection plan after carrying out
necessary surveys and preparing feasibility reports in 1987. India proposed to interlink
the Ganga and the Cauvery in 1972 followed by the creation of the National Water
Development Authority in 1982 with the primary objective of interlinking of national
rivers. After many unsuccessful attempts and scrutiny, the ruling National Democratic
Alliance of India formulated the National Water Policy in 2002. It appointed a Special
Task Force to supervise the interlinking of Indian rivers project in December 2002. India
has already approached various international financial institutions for funding the project.
Mr. Suresh Prabhu, Chairman of the Special Task Force, has visited the US and met with
Texas Governor Rick Perry to seek technical and financial assistance for the project.
Apparently, Texas agreed to be a partner in implementing the project. Mr. Suresh Prabhu
has reportedly been assured of the assistance for the project through USAID and the
World Bank.48 Notwithstanding all these developments, India is yet to serve any notice
or inform Bangladesh about the intention of building the proposed project. Should India
continue to pursue the project beyond the knowledge and consent of Bangladesh, it
would have the effect of contravening the established procedural rules of international
law that ensures the fairness of a development project in international rivers.
Bangladesh has no control over the flow of rivers entering into its borders from
upstream India. Bangladesh is constantly and consistently trying to solve its water
resource management problems through cooperation with other co-riparians including
India in exchanging information on aspects of hydrology, morphology, environmental
aspects on sharing common water sources. The National Water Policy of Bangladesh
emphasises this need to
work jointly with co-riparian countries to harness, develop, and share

the water resources of the international rivers to mitigate floods and
augment flows of water during the dry season.49
These collaborative efforts resulted in the 1996 Treaty on the sharing of the Ganges
Waters and a number of memoranda of understanding with India. These efforts are yet to
solve the disputes between them over the sharing of common international rivers. Past
bilateralism has not worked to benefit of Bangladesh. India has reaped the benefit of the
bilateral arrangement either by withdrawing more than it was entitled to or violating the
provisions of the bilateral treaties.50 Against this backdrop of bilateralism endeavours,
the proposed Indian river linking project is widely seen as yet another decisive means of
marginalising Bangladesh by its powerful neighbour by depriving the former of its right
and share in common river waters.
48
See Shobha Warrier, “NRIs Keen on River Linking Project” Sustainable Development Networking
Programme Bangladesh, http://www.sdnpbd.org/river_basin/persons_behind/nri_ready.htm.
49
Above note 9.
50
For an analysis of the Indo-Bangladesh bilateral process see generally, Joel McGregor, “The
Internationalisation of Disputes Over Water: The Case of Bangladesh and India.” Paper presented to
the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, ANU, Canberra, October 3 to 6, 2000.
13.4.6 The UN approach
The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 1972 recognises that states have
sovereign rights to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental

policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.51
Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio

Declaration) 1992 in Chapter 18 adopts an integrated approach to the management of
shared water resources. It emphasises that “long term development of global freshwater
requires holistic management of resources and a recognition of the interconnectedness of
the elements related to freshwater and freshwater quality.”52 It further explains the
interconnectedness and organic unity of the river system in the following words: “the
complex interconnectedness of freshwater systems demands that freshwater management
be holistic (taking a catchment management approach) and based on a balanced
consideration of the needs of people and the environment.”53 The Report of the UN Water
Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1977 emphasised that “it is necessary for States
to cooperate in the case of shared water resources in recognition of the growing eco-
nomic, environmental, and physical interdependencies across international frontiers.”54
The inseparable interdependence of any river system is aptly explained by James
Kraska:
International drainage basins link riparian states into a common and

interdependent freshwater system that connects the agriculture,
industry, energy, and transportation sectors into an integrated regional
unit. Action by one riparian may affect the quantity and quality of
river water available to neighbouring states, imposing direct costs on
other states in the basin. Basin nations share not just a river, but an
entire ecosphere. Consequently, the potential for conflict, and the
possibility of compromise and cooperation, exist side by side.55
Scientists predict that the Indian rivers linking project can upset the hydrological
cycle by changing their directions. This would change
the composition of the sediment load, river morphology and the shape
of the delta formed at the river mouth. Construction of dams and
canals will get villages dislocated, flood towns and cut through
51
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972 UN Doc. A/CONF.48/
14/Rev.1 (1972).
52
Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I–III) (1992), paragraph 18.35.
53
Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I–III) (1992), paragraph 18.36.
54
Report of the United Nations Water Conference; Mar del Plata, Argentina, 1977 UN Doc.
E/CONF.70/29, at 53 (1977).
55
James Kraska, “Sustainable Development Is Security: The Role of Transboundary River
Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South Asia” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L 481.
millions of hectares of agricultural land. The large network of dams

and canals will also alter natural drainage such that occasional
flooding and waterlogging will inundate millions of hectares of
agricultural land. Moulding of natural flood water will reduce land
fertility gradually and over the years the fertile land will change into
desert, affecting agricultural production.56
It is incumbent upon India to appreciate the fact that the river system in the
sub-continent is a physical and geographical unity and as such indivisible. Any develop-
ment project that artificially interrupts the physical unity and interdependence of the
river system must ascertain and address the possible damages to the basin and its
co-users.
13.5 CONCLUSION
Existing and available resources need to be developed for economic growth. In this
pursuit, the Indian rivers linkage project may not be seen as entirely unmerited. However,
the proposed development must be a sustainable one not only from the Indian economic
perspective but also from the economic standpoint of Bangladesh, which shares those
rivers under consideration for the project. The need for an increase in the flow of water
cannot be overstated for the maintenance of ecological balance and sustainable develop-
ment in Bangladesh. There is an increasing demand for freshwater to meet up the need for
growing population and the pursuit of economic and social development. Failure to
secure a fair and rightful share of water from its international rivers will expose the
economy, public health and industrial development of Bangladesh to uncertainty and
grave risk. Severe deforestation, soil salinisation and waterlogging, drought and flood-
ing, water pollution are some of the environmental impact that might follow from the
river linking project. This project may adversely affect the lives of hundreds of millions
of people with a detrimental effect on the whole economy of Bangladesh. Consequently
the quest for sustainable development may be quite elusive.
The economic justification for such a project in international rivers is not enough.
Its planning, construction and commissioning must comply with the rules, principles and
norms of international law governing the utilisation of international rivers. And a close
legal scrutiny of the Indian project in terms of applicable international law suggests that
the project so far suffers from a legitimacy crisis. Bangladesh, being the co-riparian of the
rivers involved, has an equitable share recognised in and protected by international law.
The current secretive and unilateral stand of India is seemingly not subsumable in inter-
national law and falls short of its obligation to respect the right of its co-riparian,
Bangladesh.
It is in the best interest of both India and Bangladesh that they avoid unilateralism
and resort to constructive bilateralism in exploiting their common water resources.
Mutual confidence and cooperation between the two co-riparians in managing their
transboundary river basins will help attain the goal of sustainable development and
bring regional peace and security. The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) can also play a crucial role not only ironing out the differences between India
56
Imran Ali, “Interlinking of Indian Rivers”, (2004) 86:4 Current Science, 499.
and Bangladesh on the project, but also assist in undertaking an integrated and compre-
hensive sub-regional common water resources management scheme for the greater ben-
efit of all SAARC countries. Adherence to such a collaborative approach would minimise,
if not overcome, various international legal issues and their implications arising out of
the project. Simultaneously it would maximise the optimum utilisation of sub-continental
water resources towards efficient flood management, irrigation, river system develop-
ment hydro-electric power generation for the well-being of poverty-stricken people in
both countries.
14
The Indigenous Knowledge Systems

of Water Management in India
RAJENDRA SINGH
14.1 THE TRADITIONAL TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN INDIA
In Indian tradition, the knowledge was transmitted through practical work under the
direction of respected elders and gurus. Thus the people engaged in practical work were
really the pupils of the indigenous knowledge system. The poor pupils, the prosperous
pupils, and the State joined hands for the conservation of water and the preservation of
knowledge. The prosperous pupils provided help to the poorest who were working for
water conservation, and the State provided only the land. It was a pupil-driven decentral-
ized water management, which is another name for indigenous water management.
This functional management of water had wisdom

of every drop of rain. These drops of rain were the
life of the Indian pupil. This indigenous knowledge
system respected the agro-ecological zone diversity,
and had developed a specific science, a relevant
engineering and a technology appropriate to each
and every part of the country.
Abhaneri Baori, Dausa

236 INDIGENOUS SYSTEMS OF WATER MANAGEMENT
The lowest rainfall in India is in the arid districts of Jaisalmer and Badmer. There the
people have a Tanka in every house for drinking and domestic use. They also have a pond
(Talab) for common use and drinking water for animals. They also use Kuinya, for har-
vesting drinking water present in the form of sand moisture in the sub-surface, where the
aquifer is brackish and separated from the layers above it by a layer of gypsum.
The ancient indigenous engineering was

not much documented in the modern
sense, because the technical aspects were
transmitted through practice and words of
mouth, and gradually perfected by tradi-
tion. But in some cases the legal and
administrative aspects were written, for
example in Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Trea-
tise of Administration written by Kautilya,
advisor and minister of the first Indian
emperor Chandragupta Maurya, 321-297
BC). One chapter of the Arthasastra gives
a testimony of very comprehensive and
detailed administrative rules, covering the
whole range of legal and economic impli-
cations of a decentralized community-
driven water management, facilitated by
the State.
Making a Kuinya Cross-section above
the gypsum layer
The ruler had to provide land, roads, trees and equipment

to those who participated to the construction of water-
works. Those who did not participate were made to pay a
contribution, but were not entitled to benefit directly from
the structure. The methods of ownership and maintenance
of new, ancient and repaired structures were described in
details. All users of irrigation facilities had to pay a tax,
even when they had their own waterworks. But exemp-
tion of tax was granted for a number of years to those
who build new structures. However, these administrative
rules were only safeguards and practical provisions for
the economic consequences of the implementation of
waterworks. The real motivation came from another side:
The participation to construction of community ponds,
tanks and waterworks was a matter of pride and of
religious devotion.
Gadhsisar Tank, Jaisalmer: The level of water is measured with the sculptures of different
animals, for an easy recognition of water level and its consequences.
In Bihar, the problem is not lack of water but excessive water. Every year,
devastating floods spread havoc in the state. The ancient indigenous knowledge had
developed a method which puts to use the excess water, called “Ahar-Pyne”, which is in
RAJENDRA SINGH 237
fact a “flood water harvesting system”. The excess water from the Ganges was driven by
channels called “pyne” deep inside the land, up to 30 to 40 km, to fill tanks called “ahar”.
This ensured a long-lasting retention of water throughout the year, and a better distribu-
tion of silt.
The local Indigenous Knowledge in India has always developed practical ways for
Society to live in a sustainable manner with Nature, in full respect with the diversity of
agro-ecological climatic zones, even those that seems the most difficult and inhospitable.
14.2 THE LOSS OF TRADITION, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The conservation of forest, water bodies and other natural resources in an extremely healthy
state over the past thousands of years even under difficult climatic and geographic condi-
tions and with a growing population and demand, was essentially due to an extremely
eco-friendly cultural traditions (dharma/parampara) of “live within what Nature
sustainability release, don’t be greedy”. The traditional knowledge and practices of every
area imbibed a thorough understanding of ecological balances and technologies to har-
ness natural resources in a sustainable and eco-friendly manner, though these had never
been documented.
For centuries, the line of thinking that soil, water, forest, wildlife and the whole
environment are the common asset of the local people bestowed by the almighty to be
managed as a “trust”, was the commonly accepted worldview.
This age-old balance has been disturbed at an accelerating pace in the last 200
years, and every revolution and counter-revolution has indeed increased the depth of the
fall: the industrial revolution, the education revolution, the agricultural “green” revolu-
tion, the “development” revolution, and now the “privatization” and “information tech-
nology” revolutions.
The European colonizers brought the idea that Nature was to be “exploited”, and
undermined the feeling of responsibility for Nature. The modern State (colonial or
independent) dispossessed the rural communities of their rights and responsibilities, and
in the name of common good and conservation, has been selling bit by bit the forests and
rivers, either legally (tree felling licenses, water rights) or illegally (corruption). The
education revolution convinced the people that traditions and oral knowledge were the
causes of poverty, the “development” and socialist “welfare” post-independence State
promoted the illusion that everything has to be taken care of only by an all-powerful
government, and now that the reality of its incompetence has become clear, the
capitalistic empires, Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and high-technologies
(IT, GMO, etc.) are called to the rescue, most likely to result in further and deeper
degradation.
To make things even more difficult, the language itself has become corrupted. For
example, the official jargon for the undisciplined water extraction technology is “ground-
water development”. And, when educated engineers seem to re-discover the ancient
tradition of responsible management of common resources, unfortunately they create
abstractions and awkward technologies, like “artificial groundwater recharge”, ignoring
the proved local traditions like Johads. Even when they begin to understand a traditional
technology like the Tanka, they feel compelled to “improve” it, like using cement instead
of lime, or Rainforest or Cement Concrete (RCC) slabs instead of brick domes, thus
degrading the tradition and its relevance, to the level of their limited understanding. The
natural methods are not only forgotten, their vestiges are day after day more deeply dug
into the ground.
To sum-up, the difficulties that we are facing can be categorized as such:
14.2.1 Paradigm change
Exploitation and disintegration has taken the place of “feeling together” and integration.
14.2.2 State takeover community functions
The State has dispossessed the Communities of their traditional rights and
responsibilities.
14.2.3 Syndrome of dependence
Wherever the State succeeded (even partially or for a short period) in implementing
modern amenities like water supply, sewage or power, the communities have lost their
initiative.
14.2.4 Neglect of traditional systems
Due to implementation or expectation of modern facilities, the traditional systems have

been neglected.
14.2.5 Disintegration of community institutions
The modern education and hollow dreams of modernity have disintegrated the Commu-
nity Institutions.
14.2.6 Inability to cope with increasing human and livestock population
The general degradation of natural and social conditions has led to the inability of
communities to face the problems created by a growing demand. The rural communities
have lost their food and livelihood security, their living conditions have become more
difficult, resulting in forced migration to big cities in search of survival in indecent and
exploitative conditions.
14.3 RE-AWAKENING THE INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE
14.3.1 Traditional water harvesting systems in India
There are various types of methods of Water Harvesting in India. The main common
features of all systems are:
Use of local resources and technology.

Community based operation.
Community driven de-centralized water management.
Sustainable conservation and use of natural resources.
RAJENDRA SINGH 239
14.3.2 Revival of systems using indigenous knowledge
Interventions understanding traditional systems and use of indigenous knowledge.

Mobilization of community around land, water, and forest.
Participation in rejuvenating old structures and construction of new structures.
Creation of new village level and river basin institutions.
14.3.3 How Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) has revived the tradition of Johad
On the night of 2 October 1985, when I got down at the last stop of the bus at Bheekampura,
with four of my friends, we only had a single agenda, which was “to fight injustice against
the people”. And we only knew one way to do it, by spreading literacy in the villages. So
we promptly started a literacy drive.
But the people suffered from a severe scarcity of water. The Region that once sus-
tained the eco-system of the “Aravalli” had become barren.
It was difficult to find young people in the villages, all of them had fled in search of
employment, women trudged long distances to fetch a mere pot full of water. Crops failed
regularly, lack of vegetation led to soil degradation; monsoon runoff washed away the
topsoil. I remember there was not a single blade of grass in the region and we often
stumbled on the carcass of cattle. Barely 3 per cent of cultivable area was irrigated. Life
was difficult and hardship endless.
One day, Mangu Patel, the wise old man of this village told me, “we do not want your
literacy, we want Water”. But where was the Water? I did not know anything about Water.
Mangu explained to me about the rich tradition existing in this region of building
“Johads”, which were a prime example of the ingenuity of inexpensive simple traditional
technology that was quite remarkable in terms of recharging groundwater of the entire
region. “Johads” are simple mud and concave shaped barriers built across the slope to
arrest the rainwater runoff with a high embankment on three sides while the fourth side is
left open for the water to enter.
The height of the embankment is such that the capacity of the “Johad” is more than
the volume of runoff coming from the catchment based on a rough estimation of maxi-
mum possible runoff that could come into it. Therefore the height varies from one “Johad”
to another, depending on the site, water flow, and pressure etc. In some cases to ease the
water pressure a masonry structure called “Afra” is also made for the outlet of excess
water. The water storage area varies from 2 hectares to a maximum of 100 hectares.
The Water collected in a “Johad” during monsoon penetrates into the sub-soil. This
recharges the groundwater and improves the soil moisture in vast areas, mostly down
stream. The groundwater can be drawn from traditional open wells, built and maintained
by the villagers themselves without any input from outside. As the percolation process
takes sometime, depending on the soil, depth of water etc. during this temporary period
(sometimes several months), the water in the Johad is directly used for irrigation,
drinking of animals, and other domestic purposes. The advantage of this structure is that
apart from arresting and storing rainwater, it checks the soil erosion, mitigates the floods,
and ensures water availability in wells even for several successive drought years, like we
had here in the last 5 years. Also, during the dry season when the water gradually recedes
in the Johad, the land inside the Johad itself becomes available for cultivation. This land
receives periodically good silt and moisture, and that allows growing crops without any
irrigation. So the Johad does not take away valuable arable land from cultivation. The
distinctiveness of this structure is that it is based on simple and cheap technology with
locally available resources, mostly labour and soil, and sometimes when necessary, stones,
sand, and lime, all locally available. All the estimations are based on the villagers experi-
ence and intuition, without any physical measurements.
When I went to Bheekampura in 1985, this unique traditional water management
system was still alive in the collective memory of the people remained alienated from the
global environment.
On the advice by Mangu Patel, we became a catalyst to building “Johads”, the local
authorities were dead against us as we by-passed all bureaucratic channels and dealt with
the people directly to fulfill their requirements in the manner they decided.
The first “Johad” took three years to build, in the fourth year we built 50 “Johads”, in
the fifth we built almost 100 in 2001 we built around 1,000 water structures and in total
we have built nearly 9,000 water harvesting structures in more than 1,000 villages. When
we started working, our area was classified by the government as “dark zone”, it means
with severe water shortage and the water level had receded to difficult depths. The same
area after 10 years was classified as “white zone”, which means underground water level
are satisfactory and it does not need attention from the government.
No Engineer was called for consultation; we were guided entirely by the traditional
wisdom of the people who have maintained the ecological balance for generations. These
water structures were built with the active participation of the community in its
construction from identification of the site to the designing of the structure and by
contribution in the cost of its construction and latter in its maintenance, which ensured
that all the structures were need based.
The construction of Johad is going on.

RAJENDRA SINGH 241
As a result, water became abundant; more water meant better crops, better conditions
of soil, time for the girls to go to schools, and rich community life. It helped forestation in
the area and development of wildlife.
Due to the Water Level, growing of veg-

etables without irrigation has become pos-
sible in the once barren land of Nimbi
Village (picture on the right).
Girls in a village school (in 1988).
Prosperity returned back to the

Groundwater level in wells of the
region, agriculture became pro-
village buja before and after Johad
ductive and due to availability
Total depth Water level of well of fodder cattle rearing started,
No. Water level after Johad, 1994
of well resulting in increased produc-
before Johad (in feet)
(in feet) 1988 tion of milk. Higher water lev-
1. 81.0 Dry completely 44.5 els also meant less money on the
2. 73.0 Dry completely 37.0 diesel for pump set.
3. 67.0 3 feet 40.5
4. 55.5 4 feet 27.0
(dry most of the time)
5. 81.0 10 feet 66.0

6. 69.0 20 feet 50.0
7. 43.0 15 feet 35.0
8. 83.0 20 feet 58.0
9. 80.5 19 feet 55.0
Source:
10. 66.5 Dry completely 25.0
Kishore (undated).
Small Inputs, Great Returns
4000 In 1985 only 20 per cent of the agri-

3500 cultural land was cultivated, now it is
3000
100 per cent, and villages started sell-
ing surplus grains in market for the
2500
first time. Studies have shown that an
2000
investment of R.100 per capita on a
1500 “Johad” raises the economic produc-
1000 tion in the village by as much as R.
500 400 per capita per annum.
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
(Rise in Annual Gross Village Product in Rs. Per Capita against Investment in Water Conserva-
tion Per Capita. Source: G.D. Agrawal, 1996).
As village mobilized themselves to improve their quality of life by contributing in

building “Johads”, this participation of the people promoted the community to become
self-reliant optimizing social cohesion and emotive bonding in the community. Since
people realized that members were responsible not only for individual but also collective
action, they became more aware of their rights taking on an activist stance to stop
employment of children in the carpet industry and fought a legal battle up to the Supreme
Court of India to stop indiscriminate mining on Forest Land.
An enlightened and active community also enforced self-discipline for the common
good of the village. They strictly enforced their own rules to stop deforestation, hunting
wildlife and consumption of liquor. The development of community participation through
the “Gram Sabha” or Village Assembly, gave each and everyone an opportunity to freely
discuss, decide and implement a common decision taken for the general benefit. This
process also made them reflects on the problems of others in there community and helps
each other in solving them. While the community became active in social and economic
change, the crime rate dropped in the villages as economic conditions improved of the
entire region.
This momentum in the community caused by the construction of “Johads”, has
encouraged the villagers to go further looking for innovative methods of Social Change.
Now the greatest challenge before them is to sustain those traditional values that started
this movement in the face of the transformation of the community due to progress and
prosperity.
RAJENDRA SINGH 243
14.3.4 The rebirth of Arvari River
From 1985 onwards we have been helping people to build Johads. These Johads are tradi-
tional earthen dams. These small scales, low cost structures do not look like very much,
but taken together in hundreds and thousands they have changed the face of our part of
India (Rajasthan). TBS has helped people to build more than 9,000 Johads, Check Dams,
and Anicuts for Harvesting the Rain Water. In 1996 we were amazed to find Arvari River
flowing even at the peak of summer.
River Goes Dry River is Flowing
Excess withdrawal of Groundwater. Increased Groundwater Recharge.

Less Groundwater Extraction.
Since then four more rivers, Sarsa, Ruparel, Bhagani and Jahajwali have become
perennial.
When there was plenty of water in Arvari, there was natural growth of fish, which
went on multiplying. Seeing that the government wanted to get hold of fish and brought
in a contractor. The people resisted and the Government had to cancel the contract. It is
not that the local people wanted control over the fish. Far from it. They are all vegetarians
and do not eat fish, but they realized that today it was fish tomorrow it would be water.
Since 1940s the Arvari River had

been degraded to a mere monsoon
drain, witnessing only brief and
strong flows of muddy water. We
had been building these structures
over the years without realizing that
we were in fact recharging the river
through percolation underground.
Now the water is clear and flows
gently throughout the year.
The same place, on 10 February 2005.
Since 1940s, the Arvari had become a mon-

soon drain (photo 1990) (to the right).
The changed face of Arvari.

Since 1996, the river is flowing again peren-
nially (above).
The government through the contractor was intruding into community’s domain, its
right over the use of water. Water as a resource was developed by them and they wanted to
have full control over it. If they had allowed that intrusion to succeed, the leadership
would have failed the community to protect its right over water. But since they resisted
and won, one can see the shift in the centre of power as far as’ control over use of Arvari
water is concerned.
Then there was fear that intrusion having taken place once could take place again.
Besides there were differences over sharing of Arvari waters within the community. This
led to the formation of Arvari Sansad (Parliament) representing 72 villages and it has
framed 11 rules for use of Arvari water. This Parliament meets 2 times a year.
In this example, you see community leadership in action in protecting a resource.
First people work on their priority i.e. water, and develop this resource through
rainwater harvesting.
Second when resource is fully developed there is an intrusion to demolish the
concept of people’s right over water.
RAJENDRA SINGH 245
Third community puts up a strong resistance and removes intrusion.

Fourth community consolidates and takes responsibility. It gets a mandate from
72 Villages.
Finally a lesson – the Community initiated work unites people and builds bonds of
cooperation between different constituent groups.
The restoration of the River Arvari to life is also the story of various watersheds
linked to each other. Contrary to the impractical engineer’s dream (or nightmare?) of
interlinking of rivers” (current project of massive inter-basin water transfer), it is a logical
conclusion of decades of water conservation work by the people, and a practical and
efficient step towards retrieving the link between the people and their river in a mean-
ingful and useful manner. The Arvari river is the lifeline of prosperity for 72 villages
situated along its bank, and the Arvari River Parliament acknowledges this fact and just
draws the logical conclusion: This river has to be taken care of, in a civilized, concerted
and responsible manner.
14.4 ARWARI RIVER PARLIAMENT
14.4.1 Need for Arwari Parliament
Why should people come together to form a parliament around natural resources is a big
question? It would have been impossible to think of river parliament without the TBS
intervention in formation of new institutions, such as, Village Water Council and Women
Self Help Groups (SHG), and construction of different kinds of water harnessing
structures directly benefiting the population. Rise in groundwater level and increase in
area under cultivation and irrigation tempted people to listen to the TBS idea of formation
of the River Parliament. The awareness built by various discussion, group meetings,
training’s, exposure trips etc. also contributed in mobilizing and sensitizing community
to form a group to address inter and intra village land, water and vegetation related issues
and to resolve conflicts if any. Also events, such as conflict between state and community
in reaping benefits of water stored and conflicting claims over ownership and control
over surface water harnessed through various structures triggered the idea of coming
together and protecting the interest of the community.1
14.4.2 Arwari parliament
The concept of river basin approach was applied to Arwari River Basin in Alwar district
of Rajasthan using community centre water management approach. On December 28,
1998 a River Parliament of 70 villages with the membership of 205 was formed in the
catchment area of Arwari River. The parliament meets twice a year at the interval of six
months. The Arwari Parliament met 14 times since its formation.
1
Water harnessing structure called Jabbar Sagar dam in Hamirpur village was constructed by Tarun
Bharat Sangh. The State Government tried to claim ownership and control over water by floating
tender for fishery activities in 1996. One fine morning a contractor came to collect fish from the
dam. The village community was taken by surprise as they were under the impression that water
belongs to them. The community fought with the State and finally won their claim over water and
fish resources.
The Arwari River Basin has got 46 micro watersheds. There are broadly two major
streams starting from the top of the basin and joining at the dam called Sainthal Sagar.
Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) – continuously constructing water harvesting structures in the
catchment area along with other watershed management activities. It resulted into rise in
groundwater table in the basin and increase in the longevity of flow in the Arwari River.
Holistic view in management of natural resources by undertaking land, water, vegetation
related activities was the objective of TBS. As the existing formal state structure i.e. the
different department of government, namely Forest, Irrigation, Groundwater and
Revenue department have almost failed to check the deteriorating condition of natural
resources, TBS tried to educate people on the NRM issues by forming a Village Water
Council in each village. The objective of this village institution was mainly to protect,
conserve and manage the natural resources in a sustainable way by community
participation. After long years of hard work these councils made a dent in natural
resource management by forming certain informal rules, acceptable to all the village
members. However, water and vegetation are common pool resource and do not belong to
only a single village as was contemplated while planning Arwari River Parliament. More
than one village had access to and use of forest and water resources. It was decided to
form a River Basin Parliament comprising of several micro watersheds. It was planned
that each Village Water Council (VWC) will be represented by nominating two or three
members in the parliament. A working group of 20 members including few co-opted
members from outside basin to guide the proceedings and activities of Arwari Parliament
was also proposed. It was planned to have at least two meetings of full house and more
than twice of the Management Committee or Working Group as and when needed. The
main goal of this parliament was to create a larger vision or perspective i.e. thinking
beyond a village, in management of common pool resources. The specific objectives
were:
1. Sustainable management of natural resources through Arwari Parliament;

2. Control usages of water by treating it a scarce resource;
3. Managing the soil fertility and checking land erosion by construction of anicuts,
mairbandi and johads;
4. Stopping illegal mining activity negatively affecting the land, water and
vegetation;
5. Generating self-employment and alternative livelihood options through better
management of land, water and forest resources;
6. Sensitizing and building awareness among women groups on water relates
issues and seek their active participation;
7. Increase agricultural productivity by growing water saving crops with local seeds
and manure.
In the first meeting of parliament certain guidelines were drawn to regulate the
behaviour of people, foresee future problems in management of NRM, resolve conflicts
if any related to access and use of resources, provide guidelines for conservation,
protection and management of resources, and treat water and forest as a community
resource rather than private property. The specific informal rules formulated are as
follows:
1. Ban on sale of fish produced in the water stored by anicuts or johad to contractor;
2. Ban on use of pumps to lift water from anicuts;
RAJENDRA SINGH 247
3. Not to sale land for mining or quarrying or industrial activity;

4. Encouraging people to grow water saving crops;
5. Restrict use of chemical fertilizer;
6. Limiting production of cotton and sugarcane crop only for self-consumption;
7. Construction of anicut, johad and mairbandi to check free flow of rainwater;
8. Construction of mairbandi to check degradation of farmlands;
9. The issues related to land, water and vegetation to be dealt by combined effort of
village community by ensuring maximum participation of households in a
village.
These informal rules are discussed in each parliament meeting to highlight practical
problems in their implementation and suggest new guidelines if needed. Suggestions if
any are also debated and discussed to see that the members agree to implement in their
respective villages. In the parliament meeting members report their efforts in
implementing the objectives of the parliament and seek guidance for resolving conflicts
if any. Most of the conflicts pertaining to access control and management of resources are
resolved in the meetings of Village Water Council.
14.4.3 The organization of parliament
The basin level institution created by TBS is expected to perform several roles such as:
1. To conserve water resources and emphasize on demand side management;

2. To ensure community control and management over water resources;
3. Equitable distribution of resources;
4. Provide equal access to all sections of the society;
5. Ensure sustainable use of water resource to protect interest of future generation;
6. To resolve conflict if any around water resources; and
7. To organize and empower people through natural resource management.
It was the part of the scheme to ensure equal participation of women on all its
activities and see that they too are empowered in the process. In the organization structure
it was planned to have both men and women representatives. Presently women are
actively participating in all the activities.
Being a very young organization and first of its kind it will take sometime to
understand and act. Different stakeholders are taking lot of time to understand the
concept of river parliament and get in practice. As it requires change in perception from
individual, private, narrow profit maximization approach to a broad, village and basin
level community approach to water resource management. People gradually understand
the benefits of coming together and managing natural resources. So far they were having
all the freedom to use land, water and forest resources to meet not only domestic
requirement but derive livelihood at the cost of complete degradation or deterioration of
the natural resource. The social sanctions approved by the parliament are adhered by
most of the villagers. It has made lot of dent on their behaviour pattern towards natural
resource management. Arwari Parliament has provided people a platform to address their
needs, prioritize them and design use patterns, which can maintain health of the resources.
It has also provided opportunity for young local leaders to come up and safeguard the
interest of the community. The discussion in meetings of Arwari Parliament is quite open
providing equal opportunity both for men and women to express their views. Despite all
these benefits there are objectives yet partially attended. It is not that people do not want
to address those issues but the process of evolution in any institution takes lot of time and
energy to arrive at major issues of equity and access in use of natural resources. There
were traditional norms for sharing of water from a well in case of joint ownership. These
are still in practice. The major problem attaining the objectives of equity and access is
the multiple and undefined nature of property regimes. The ownership and control rights
are loosely defined, rarely understood in a proper perspective and practiced. In case of
water, surface and groundwater is governed by different laws related to private property,
state property and community property. Groundwater is completely privately controlled
and managed. On the other hand surface water harnessed by construction of structures
both by state and community are legally owned by state. Also the water laws are directly
in favour of the state government and people are mostly unaware of these laws.
Groundwater is treated as private property and therefore used in a fashion to maximize
individual profits at the cost of over exploitation of the resource to the extent that has
negative environmental impact. However in case of forest resources ownership rights are
clear and therefore, better managed by community compare to water resources.
The community efforts in water resources are mostly in the form of harnessing of
rainwater by creation of different types of surface structures. Community participation is
ensured while construction of the structures right from the beginning and therefore people
show interest in Arwari Parliament.
14.4.4 Impact of Arwari Parliament
There are direct and indirect impact of Arwari Parliament. These can be categorized into
three broad aspects namely, Physical, Economic and Social. In category of Physical
impact, it is mostly the protection of water resources, increase in area under cultivation,
improvement in the quality of land and forest resources and most important of all is
physical community control over land, water, and forest resources.
Economic impact is largely manifested in change in livelihood pattern because of
improved access to water resources in general and groundwater specifically. Increase in
water availability has led to several commercial activities such as production of tomato
and other vegetables, increase in employment and trade activities. Because of increase in
agricultural production of both commercial and other nature, marketing in activities came
up in a big way, exporting produce from river basin to metropolitan cities, establishment
of commercial states and activities of middle men and other businessmen dealing with the
produce, transport activity, emergence of service such as agro service centres, commer-
cial shops, dhabas, tea stalls etc. This has also led to diversification in livelihood
activities. Several livelihood alternative came up which has engaged large number of
population and stop them migrating outside in search of jobs.
The social impacts, is quite significant as the Arwari parliament empowered people
to fight for their claims over resources, question state bureaucracy of their programmes
and plans, and better implementation of programmes at ground level. Further it also help
drawing plans for future use of natural resources. It is particularly the women who had no
chance to put forward their views and opinion in any of the policy matter or activities in
a village got platform to represent their case. Now they are participating in all the
activities organized at village or basin level. It is also important to note that the Self-Help
Groups formed by women are all active and doing well compare to the failure of groups
RAJENDRA SINGH 249
formed by men. Women SHG’s have changed status of women in the household activities
and decision making.
14.4.5 Challenges faced by the Arvari River Parliament
There is a lack of clarity regarding the Ownership and Responsibility for Water Harvest-
ing Structures and the resulting Water Resources. The Aravari Parliament attempts to
retrieve the ancient tradition of Community responsibility towards Common Resources,
in a difficult legal and administrative environment, with its impractical and counter-
productive provisions, which lets the so-called “owner” of a plot of land, do virtually
anything with the soil and water, including for example emptying the whole aquifer or
polluting the soil for ever, but which puts a lot of obstruction in the way of any initiative
for community-based management of the common resources. One of these obstructions
is the Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954, which does not recognize the indigenous water
management system.
In all this, workers of TBS function as facilitators with Gram Sabhas and their
leaders. But all this is possible when every member of Village Community has a feeling
of Ownership. This feeling of ownership is very important and is a product of one’s
contribution, participation, and sharing.
14.5 REVIVING THE INDIGENOUS TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE:

TARUN JAL VIDYAPEETH
After having run a 9-month training for its own volunteers for many years, Tarun Bharat
Sangh has started in 2005 a Professional School of Water: Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth.
The Vidyapeeth offers different courses open to all and specifically designed to fulfill the
needs of young village boys and girls. The course design process itself involves the
active participation of the students, to ensure a “need-based” course and their full com-
mitment and responsibility for the revival of the indigenous knowledge system of water
management.
14.6 THE USE OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN TBS WORK
Awareness in the Community
Awareness of various aspects of water management.

Respect for culture, traditions and historical practices.
Will to work together for community’s common interest.
Working Strategy
Constitution of Village Councils – Monthly meetings of all grown ups.

Maximum possible use of traditional technology with advice from engineers if
needed.
All decisions including technical (sitting, materials, design etc.) by Gram Sabha.
All decisions by consensus, and not majority.
Role of women in helping reach consensus.

Minimum of 30 per cent of total cost contribution is by the community – rest
from support agencies thru TBS.
Operation and Maintenance
Total responsibility assumed by the community.
A Gram Sabha (Village Council) in 2005.
Water Abstraction and Use Management
River Parliament (Arvari Sansad) with all 72 villages of Arvari Basin represented.
Responsible for planning and enforcing sustainable use of water, particularly in
agriculture.
A map of village Bhaonta-Kolyala at the upper ridge of Arvari River, showing the Johads, the
water streams, wells, habitations, mountains and forest.
RAJENDRA SINGH 251
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agarwal, A. and Narain, S.: Dying Wisdom, Center for Science and Environment. New Delhi, 1997.
Agrawal, G.D.: An Engineer’s Evaluation of Water Conservation Efforts of Tarun Bharat Sangh in
36 Villages of Alwar District, 1996 (unpublished).
Agrawal, G.D.: Turning th Odds into Advantages, How Tarun Bharat Sangh Overcame the Threat to
the River System of Rajasthan, 2004 (unpublished).
Kishore, A.: Taking Control of Their Lives, undated.
Mishra, A.: Aj bhi kare hai talab. Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1993.
Mishra, A.: Rajasthan ki rajat bunde (The radiant raindrops of Rajasthan). Gandhi Peace Foundation,
New Delhi, 1995.
Rathore, M.S.: Arvari River Parliament, 2003 (unpublished).
Singh, R.: Indian Water Management. Water Philosophy and Alternatives in Gandhiji’s Philosophy.
Singh, R.: Acceptance Speech for the Magsaysay Award, 2001 (unpublished).
Singh, R.: Paryavara astha ebong bharatiya parampara. Environmental Conservation and Indian
Consciousness, Jaipur, 2004.
15
Water-Based Cooperation in the GBM

Region with Particular Focus on Interlinking
of Rivers in India
QAZI KHOLIQUZZAMAN AHMAD
15.1 BACKGROUND
Nature has irrevocably destined the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
and Bhutan to be geographical neighbours and to share three mighty common river
systems, namely, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna (GBM) (Figure 15.1). It
stands to reason, therefore, that they work together within a mutually beneficial framework
to develop and manage the waters of these river systems and equitably share the benefits
in terms of direct uses of water (for example, in household, agriculture, industry, fishery,
and forestry) and the use of hydro-electricity generated as well as from improved flood
and drought management. The GBM region is endowed with huge water resources on an
annual basis as a result of heavy precipitation and the Himalayan snowmelt, but largely for
concentrated during the five monsoon months, June to September. This region, therefore,
suffers from floods during the monsoon, although some parts face drought even in this
season. But, there is widespread scarcity of water in the region during the dry months
from January to May, particularly in March and April.
In Bangladesh, over 80 per cent of the annual runoff is concentrated during the four
monsoon months from June to September. One myth may be dispelled quickly, which is
that some people talk about Bangladesh being endowed with so much water resources
that by storing monsoon waters it can solve its problem of water shortages during the dry
months. Topographically, Bangladesh is mostly flat and storing of monsoon waters of any
significance is not possible, and the monsoon flows that belt down furiously cannot even
be regulated, let alone storing water out of those flows even if the geographic scope
existed. Hence, any talk about storing monsoon waters to solve Bangladesh’s dry season
water scarcities reflects sheer ignorance about the reality. Of the huge runoff over
Bangladesh during the monsoon, 92 per cent or more enters the country from India, the
immediate upper riparian, to go down to the Bay of Bengal. Between 20 and 30 per cent
of the country is flooded every year and from time to time devastating floods occur
inundating up to two-thirds or even more of the country. Devastating floods have been
becoming increasingly frequent over the past 50 years. There was an interregnum of
19 years between the devastating floods occurring in 1955 and 1974, which declined to
14 years to the next devastating flood in 1988, to 10 years to the next one in 1998, and
to 3 years to the more recent one in 2007 (Figure 15.2). It is very likely that climate change
254 WATER-BASED COOPERATION IN THE GBM REGION
caused by global warming will lead to intensified precipitation and consequent devas-
tating floods in the region more frequently; and, with sea-level rise, also as a consequence
of global warming, these floods would be of longer duration, as water flows to the sea will
be impeded as a result. These floods usually cause large scale losses and damages involv-
ing crops, roperty, livestock, industry, infrastructure, and other sectors as well as wide-
spread human suffering due to breakdown of the livelihoods and health hazards arising
from vector- and water-borne diseases. Human lives are also lost (Ahmad et al., 2000).
Fig. 15.1 The Ganges basin and Farakka Barrage. Boundaries of the Brahmaputra and Meghna
basins are also shown (Mirza, 2003).
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1961
1971
1991
2001
1962
1972
1982
1992
2002
1955
1956
1960
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1980
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
1998
1999
2000
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Fig. 15.2 Flooded area from 1954 to 2007. Note: 2007 is estimated but not final.
Q.K. AHMAD 255
On the other hand, the shortages of water in the dry season has been causing serious
damages to agriculture, fishery, livestock, industry as well as other sectors of the economy,
particularly in the northwest and southwest of Bangladesh, significantly reducing the
sectoral productivities, economic benefits, and employment opportunities. Bangladesh,
therefore, has to find ways of managing floods more effectively on one hand and augment
its lean season water availability on the other in order to pursue the goals of increasing
economic growth, enhancing employment opportunities, and reducing poverty at
accelerated rates. The commitment to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Box 15.1),
particularly the goal of reducing poverty ratio to half by 2015 relative to 2002 (as modified
in the Bangladesh Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from the MDG base year of 1990) is
a challenge that cannot be met with any reasonable success unless the above mentioned
two serious water-related problems of floods and water shortages can be minimized.
Box 15.1 Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations
The Goals
1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2 Achieve universal primary education
3 Promote gender equality and empower women
4 Reduce child mortality
5 Improve maternal health
6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7 Ensure environmental sustainability
8 Develop a global partnership for development

15.2 GBM REGIONAL COOPERATION
In the context of finding the solution to both these water sectors problems, GBM regional
cooperation has a key role to play. Indeed, it has been shown by various studies that GBM
regional water-based cooperation is beneficial to all the co-riparians as cooperation will
enlarge the cake (in terms of augmentation of dry season water flows, minimization of flood
risks and impacts, hydro-electricity generation, irrigation opportunities, expanded
economic activity, improved productivities, expanded employment and income earning
opportunities, etc.) to be shared. There are very large win-win, water-based cooperation
prospects, which the regional countries can exploit for mutual benefit. Since the GBM
region is home to the largest concentration of the world’s poor (about 40 per cent or
480 million out of 1.2 billion poor people worldwide), there is a growing need for regional
cooperation to expand the economic activity, broaden the opportunities of employment
generation for the downtrodden and accelerate poverty reduction in all the co-riparians.
But, unfortunately, GBM regional cooperation has not even been taken up as a
serious project. Bilateralism is favoured by India. Indeed, there is merit to bilateralism for
solving bilateral problems such as the sharing of the existing flows of the common rivers.
But, there are regional issues such as augmentation of dry season flows of common rivers
running across several regional countries, which must be addressed regionally. A coop-
eration regime has, therefore, to be established in the GBM region, which will allow any
two neighbours to address bilateral issues between them and, also, several regional coun-
tries to come together when the concerned issues are regional. This proposition stands to
logic and I do not think anybody will disagree with the logic of this approach. Unfortu-
nately, this comprehensive approach is not acceptable to India, which continues to insist
on bilateralism only.
A set of basic principles of cooperation on common rivers has been outlined in both
the Mahakali (between India and Nepal) and Ganges (between Bangladesh and India)
Treaties, signed in January and December 1996, respectively. It has been agreed and set
out in the two Treaties that, in respect of any intervention on any common river, the
principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to other co-riparians will be adhered to. Given
this policy framework I do not see why the Water Resources Ministers of the GBM
regional countries cannot meet and produce a mutually beneficial cooperation framework,
involving both bilateral and regional water and related issues. Studies conducted during
the 1990s by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Dhaka; the Centre for Policy
Research (CPR), New Delhi; and the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS),
Kathmandu generated useful background material and analysis in respect of a number of
mutually beneficial potential areas of bilateral (between Bangladesh and India; and
between India and Nepal) and regional (involving all the three countries) cooperation.
There are also other studies conducted by the same group since then as well as by other
professional groups and, of course, there are materials available with the governments.
Thus, a strong information and analysis base exists to build on. It is possible to move
forward, given determined political will on the part of all co-riparians.
If necessary, the process may even begin with a meeting of the Heads of State or
Government to agree to build mutually beneficial water-based cooperation in the region
and then mandate the Water Resource Ministers of the countries to take up the matter with
earnestness and start showing results as quickly as possible. One major stumbling block
is the bureaucracy in all the countries. If a strong collective political will emerges in the
region to cooperate on water and related issues for mutual benefit, then bureaucracy
should be given a clear direction to find solutions and not remain cocooned in the old
Q.K. AHMAD 257
mindsets of non-cooperation. An ardent believer in regional cooperation, not only within

water sector but wherever potentials exist in other sectors, which can be tremendously
beneficial to all the regional countries, I hope that the political leaderships of the regional
countries will rise above narrow mindsets and resolve to move forward together, as this
makes sense in terms of larger economic and social benefits for all as well as for peaceful,
friendly co-existence.
15.3 INDIAN SCHEME OF INTERLINKING RIVERS
The proposed ILR consists of, broadly, two components: (i) the Himalayan Rivers Com-
ponent and (ii) Peninsular Rivers Component. The Himalayan component envisages a
number of links and the general idea is to transfer waters from ‘surplus’ eastern rivers to
central, western, and southern regions. The Peninsular component also involves a number
of links and the idea is to transfer the surpluses estimated to exist mainly in the Mahanadi
and the Godavari to the deficit southern basins, Cauvery and Vaigai. Other links in this
component include those that would transfer estimated surpluses from such rivers as Ken
Parbati, Tapi, Damanganga, etc. to various deficit southern basins (details discussed in
Chapter 3). I am told that it has been mentioned by Indian leaders/officials that India might
concentrate on the Peninsular component of the project, leaving aside the Himalayan
component. In so far as the Peninsular component is concerned, there may not be enough
surpluses available from the identified rivers for transfer to the southern basins for the
component to be operated usefully and profitably. This is, perhaps, why a link between the
Himalayan and the Peninsular components appears to have been envisaged, which is
Ganga-Damodar-Subarnarekha-Mahanadi. Therefore, even if only the Peninsular compo-
nent is implemented, this inter-component link may have to be constructed, which could
have adverse implications for Bangladesh. This observation may or may not be valid, but
it certainly calls for the facts to be jointly determined by Bangladesh and India so that, if
this view is not correct, it can be put to rest.
Following the Indian Supreme Court’s suggestion in October 2002 and the Indian
Government’s announcement soon thereafter that the ILR would go ahead, Bangladeshis
and the Government of Bangladesh became very concerned about its possible severe
consequences for Bangladesh through further reduction of the dry season river flows to
Bangladesh, and they started to voice their protests through seminars, writings, and
participation in international conferences. It is often complained by some of my Indian
friends and, perhaps, also by Indian government officials that the voices raised in
Bangladesh have been unreasonable and without any basis as the ILR is still only a
concept. But, the ILR has to be much more than just a concept for it to have instigated the
setting up of a high level civil society group in India with the purpose of understanding
and disseminating more fully the project’s magnitude and complexity, technical aspects,
financial and economic implications, social and equity implications and likely ecological
consequences. This group is headed by a former Indian Minister, Y. K. Alagh and includes
in its membership well-known water professionals, former secretaries to the Government
of India, and civil society leaders, among whom is a former UN Under Secretary General,
Nitin Desai. The members of the group have been drawn from among those who support
the project and those who oppose it.
It is also suggested by the protagonists of the project in India that the project is not
to divert dry season flows from the GBM river systems but to store flood waters during the
monsoon for transfer during the dry season, from which Bangladesh would in fact benefit
in terms of flood moderation while there would be no adverse impact on the dry season
river flows into Bangladesh. But, the people of Bangladesh have had a rather unpalatable
experience, given that the Farakka Barrage was constructed in the absence of proper
consultation. Of course, the construction of the Farakka Barrage was started when India
and Pakistan were not very friendly nations. But, when it was commissioned, Bangladesh
had already emerged as an independent country and it has to be gratefully recognized that
India played a very important role in the process of Bangladesh’s emergence by extending
all possible help to and participating in its War of Liberation. And, yet, although Farakka
Barrage was commissioned on agreement with Bangladesh for a 41-day trial-run in the dry
season of 1975, its operation continued for two more dry seasons without further
agreement. In November 1977, a five-year Ganges Water Sharing Agreement was signed,
followed by two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) for a total of five more years. Then
there was no understanding or agreement until the Ganges Treaty was signed in
December 1996.
The diversion of the Ganges waters at Farakka in India, by reducing the flows into
Bangladesh, has been a major reason behind the steep reduction of freshwater flows to
southwest Bangladesh, which constitutes one-third of the country and contains about
one-third of the total national population, during the dry season. This region of the
country has as a result encountered severe adverse environmental and socio-economic
consequences. The emotion that Bangladeshis have shown in response to the proposed
ILR, particularly to its Himalayan component, may be justified, given the Farakka
experience. Not only that Bangladesh and India should be very friendly countries but that
they have agreed to observe the principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to either
country in respect of any intervention on a common river. Hence, even if there was nothing
concrete to discuss when the Task Force on ILR was appointed, in the interest of good
neighbourly relations, Bangladesh should have been officially informed about the project
or “the concept” being studied and assured that consultations would be conducted as the
results of the relevant studies would be available. That would certainly have dispelled any
doubts in the minds of Bangladeshis, as they would as a result have been ensured that no
harm would come to Bangladesh through the ILR given that Bangladesh would have the
opportunity of discussing the pros and cons in so far as its interests are concerned. After
political change that took place in India in May 2004, both the Indian Prime Minister and
the Indian Water Resources Minister said that any sub-link project that could have
adverse implications for Bangladesh would not be undertaken and that, if necessary,
consultation with Bangladesh would be arranged at appropriate times. The announcement
of the Indian Prime Minister and the Indian Water Resources Minister are very positive but
what is necessary is adequate timely follow-through in terms of providing information to
and consultation with Bangladesh on a regular basis in order that neither country’s
interests are harmed in any way.
15.4 TEPAIMUKH AND SAPTA-KOSI HIGH DAMS
I would like to mention two other projects now being actively pursued by India. One is the
Tepaimukh High Dam on the Barak in Manipur. In fact, this project was proposed by
Bangladesh in 1972 to be initiated, constructed, and operated jointly by India and
Bangladesh. Unfortunately, there has been no progress on a joint approach to this project.
India is now ready to go ahead with the project but Bangladesh has not been consulted in
respect of its design and other relevant aspects. What would be its impact on Bangladesh
is not therefore known to Bangladesh authorities and civil society. In the absence of a joint
approach to this project on a common river, Bangladesh should be informed about the
Q.K. AHMAD 259
details and consulted in respect of its possible impact on Bangladesh. It is claimed that
Bangladesh would also benefit from the project in terms of flood moderation, improved
navigation, and, perhaps, a share of the electricity generated. These were the consider-
ations when Bangladesh proposed this project. Now Bangladesh does not know whether
or not, in its present design and location, the project would benefit or harm Bangladesh.
Harm could be in terms of waterlogging or flooding as a result of augmented lean season
flows. Why can’t an arrangement be made for the Indian and Bangladeshi experts and
decision makers to sit together and review the project design and determine the facts,
which makes perfect sense.
The Ganges Treaty, except for the initial teething problems and occasional blemishes
since then, has so far worked well in terms of availability of the stipulated flows of water to
Bangladesh. But, the dry season flow at Farakka is inadequate for the needs of both the
countries; and the needs are growing further as a result of expanding economic activity
and increasing population. It has been recognized in the Treaty that the two countries
would work together to augment the dry season Ganges flows. In this regard, in 1984
Bangladesh proposed the construction of seven high dams in Nepal. Of course, in
addition to the augmentation of the dry season Ganges flows, these dams would generate
other benefits, including electricity generation, flood moderation, and irrigation waters,
which could be shared by all the countries. This proposal did not go anywhere, just as the
Indian proposal of transferring water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges did not go
anywhere. However, recently India and Nepal have moved ahead together to prepare the
detailed project report (DPR) for the Sapta-Kosi High Dam. A project office has been set up
in Kathmandu and Indian and Nepali experts have been working. The project is one of the
seven dams proposed by Bangladesh in 1984. It is expected to generate 3,000 to 3,500 MW
of electricity and substantial augmentation (about 1,900 m3/sec during January to May
as shown by one study) of the dry season Ganges flows. And, of course, there would be
flood moderation and other benefits. But, Bangladesh has not been taken on board,
although the Sapta-Kosi is a tributary of the Ganges and, hence, a transboundary river, of
which Bangladesh is a co-riparian along with India and Nepal. According to the agreed
principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to other co-riparians, Bangladesh should be a
party to this project so that its concerns and interests find full expression in the project
development and design and, in due time, it has access to its legitimate share of the
benefits. Obviously, Bangladesh should bear the appropriate share of the costs. Further-
more, there are negotiations taking place between India and Nepal for Mahakali
(Pancheshwar) High Dam in Nepal. Also, Karnali High Dam in Nepal is being mentioned
for consideration. Both these projects are also among the seven high dams earlier pro-
posed by Bangladesh; and, indeed, given its co-riparian status, Bangladesh’s concerns
and interests should appropriately feature in the development and design of these projects
as well. It is, therefore, important for Bangladesh to seek its inclusion as an active partner
in the Sapta-Kosi High Dam project right away. It should also seek its participation in
Mahakali and Karnali projects as well as any other similar projects that may be taken up.
Obviously, inclusion of Bangladesh in these projects would make the projects regional,
which in fact is the geographical reality. In upholding the earlier mentioned agreed
principles and in the interest of promoting regional cooperation for mutual benefit, it is
important that the Indian position of only bilateralism is changed to regionalism when
the issues/projects are regional.
15.5 CONCLUSION
In concluding, let me suggest that the leaderships of the GBM regional countries need to
develop positive mindsets in favour of cooperation and adherence to the agreed principles
to move ahead with cooperation building in water and other sectors, bilateral and regional,
as dictated by the specificity of the issues to be addressed, for mutual benefit. Studies
have shown that cooperation in potential areas generate much larger benefits for each
country than when national approaches are adopted in such cases. The options before the
region are: continued self-abnegation through non-cooperation or a shift to a cooperative
regime for mutual benefit, progress, and peace. The choice is obvious. But, will sense and
logic prevail all round to overcome the persisting negative mindsets and generate the
political will in favour of cooperation in the region?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Q.K.: Indian Grand Scheme of Interlinking Rivers: Bangladesh Perspectives. The Daily Star,
Dhaka, September 22, 2004.
Ahmad, Q.K.: Potential for Sharing of Common Regional Resources in the Eastern Himalayan
Region: Focus on Sapta Kosi High Dama Project. Study Report of the Sustainable Environ-
mental Management Programme (SEMP), Component No. 1.1.4.1 conducted by BUP under
MoU with Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), Government of Bangladesh (GoB),
funded by UNDP Bangladesh, June 2004.
Ahmad, Q.K., Chowdhury, A.K.A., Iman, H. and Sarker, M. (eds.): Perspectives on Flood 1998,
University Press Limited, Dhaka.
Mirza, M.M.Q., A. Dixit and A. Nishat (eds.): Flood Problem and Management in South Asia.
Ramaswamy, R. Iyer: River Linking Project: Many Questions. In: River Linking: A Millennium
Folly (Medha Patkar Ed.), National Alliance of People’s Movements, Mumbai/Maharashtra,
India, 2004.
Verghese, B.G.: Cooperating to Live Together, unpublished, 2005.
16
Hydrological Impact on Bangladesh of

Chinese and Indian Plans on the Brahmaputra
STEPHEN BRICHIERI-COLOMBI
16.1 INTRODUCTION
The Brahmaputra is, in terms of annual discharge, one of the world’s largest rivers, with an
annual average flow at Bahadurabad (allowing for spill into the Old Brahmaputra channel)
of 20,000 m³/sec. To date, there are only two dams of significance on it, in China (Tibet),
and in Bhutan, both designed primarily for hydropower. With the current perceptions of a
world water crisis, and the demand of the fast developing countries of India and China for
cheaper energy in the face of rising competition for fossil fuels, it is likely that increasing
attention will be focused on ways to harness the resources of this great river. How, and by
whom, this is done, will have major consequences for Bangladesh, the lower riparian, both
in terms of attenuation of the peak monsoon flow, and the reduction or augmentation of the
dry season flow. This article summarizes what data is available in the public domain, and
what can be deduced from this and the few reports that have been published.
16.2 HYDROLOGY OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA
The Brahmaputra (Figure 16.1) rises in Tibet, where it is known as the TsangPo, and flows
several hundred kilometres eastwards in a wide, gently sloping valley that drains the
Tibetan plateau and the northern slopes of the Himalayas. At Nuxia, just below the
confluence with a major left bank tributary, the river starts its dramatic descent round
the Great Bend, a 270 degree clockwise turn around the 7,756 m high peak of Namche
Barwa, to flow south through the Himalayas, where it is known as the Dihang, into the
Assam valley. There it is joined by many other rivers draining both sides of the valley to
form the Brahmaputra, which flows southwest and then south into Bangladesh, spilling
some of its monsoon flow into the Old Brahmaputra channel. In Bangladesh, it is joined
by the Ganges (average flow arriving at Farakka 12,600 m³/sec) and the much smaller
Meghna (average flow for the two branches in Bangladesh, 1,100 m³/sec). Against the
rules of geographical nomenclature, it enters the sea through a channel referred to as the
Meghna Estuary.
On the plateau, annual precipitation (300 to 600 mm) and evaporation (⬍1,000 mm)
are both low, but both increase sharply in the Assam valley, and in the hills to the south
occur some of the highest annual rainfall totals (⬎10,000 mm) in the world.
262 HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH
Yellow
C H I N A
BHUTAN GREAT Yangt

Indus
BEND ze
TsangPo
Ga
ng
e
s
NEPAL
dyd
wa
Xi Jian
Ir ra
g
BURMA
I N D I A
en
Salwe
Myanmar
Mekong
0 400 800 kilometers
Fig. 16.1 Location map.
The flow is measured at three gauging stations in Tibet, Nugesha, Nangcun and
Nuxia, the last of these just before the descent from the plateau starts. It is further
measured at 29th Mile on the Dihang, and at Pandu on the main Brahmaputra, both
stations in India, and at Bahadurabad in Bangladesh. Figures obtained from various sources
as listed in Table 16.1 are plotted in Figure 16.2 to show how annual average discharge
increases with catchment area. Figure 16.3 shows the monthly flow hydrographs at Nangcun
(where the flow is more regular due to snowmelt), Pandu and Bahadurabad.
The hydrograph at Pandu is anomalous, with flows in the dry season that are
frequently above those at Bahadurabad. This anomaly was analyzed in studies for the
Joint Rivers Commission (BWBD, 1986), where it was shown from double mass plots of dry
season flows at Pandu that there is a sudden and unexplained change in the relationship
between the two stations in 1975. Statistical analysis show the pre- and post-1975 flows
at Pandu are extremely unlikely (probability ⬍0.001) to be from the same population.
Accordingly, in the analysis in this chapter, only the Bahadurabad station has been used.
The fall of 2,400 m around Namche Barwa in a distance of around 110 km makes this
one of the most powerful rivers in the world, as measured by indices of erosion (Finlayson
et al., 2002). The gorge of the river in this reach is believed to be the deepest and longest
in the world, measuring some 6,000 m from the mountaintop to riverbed level. It is also a
highly seismic region, marking the eastern end of the Indian plate that subducts under the
Himalayas.
Table 16.1 Sources of hydrological data
Station River Easting Northing Area (km2) Period Flows Source

Nugesha TsangPo 89.42 29.21 106,378 1956–1967 Annual 1
Yangcun TsangPo 91.58 29.18 153,191 1956–1967 Annual 1
Nuxia TsangPo 94.34 29.27 189,843 1956–1967 Annual 1
Nuxia TsangPo 94.34 29.27 189,843 1979–2001 Annual 1
29th Mile Dihang n/a n/a 249,000 n/a Annual 2
Farakka Ganges – – 951,600 1948–1985 Monthly 3
Hardinge Bridge Ganges – – 975,000 1948–1985 Monthly 3
Bahadurabad Jamuna 89.4 25.1 501,000 1968–1985 Monthly 3
Mymensingh Old Brahmaputra – – – 1964–1985 Monthly 3
Kanaighat Meghna (Surma) – – 700 1969–1985 Monthly 3
Sheola Meghna (Kushiyara) – – 26,000 1969–1985 Monthly 3
Yangcun TsangPo 91.58 29.18 153,191 1956–1982 Monthly 4
Pandu Bramaputra 91.70 26.13 405,000 1956–1979 Monthly 4
Bahadurabad Jamuna 89.40 25.10 501,000 1956–1985 Monthly 4
Source
1
Prof. Bernard Hallet, Quarternary Research Center and the Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington 98195, USA: Pers comm.
2
Office of the C.E. (P and D), Brahmaputra Board, Basistha, Guwahati – 781 029, Assam.
3
Expert Study Group, Bangladesh Water Development Board, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
4
Global Runoff Data Centre, Koblenz, Germany.
263
Brahmaputra average annual runoff v. area

25000
Bahadurabad
20000
Annual runoff, m3/s
Pandu
15000
10000
29th mile
5000
Yangcun
Nugesha Nuxia
0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
Area, km2
Fig. 16.2 Brahmaputra average annual runoff and area at six locations.
Hydrographs at Brahmaputra gauging stations

400
350
Yancun
Other Assamese tributaries
300
Annual runoff, m3/s
Brahmaputra
Pandu (not used)
250
200
150
100
50
0
Fig. 16.3 Hydrographs at Brahmaputra gauging stations.
Monsoon floods cause the Brahmaputra to overflow its banks almost every year. In
Assam, efforts to control them by the construction of embankments have largely been
abandoned. In Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra right embankment is a major work, which will
require an ongoing annual investment of many millions of dollars to improve and maintain
STEPHEN BRICHIERI-COLOMBI 265
to control westwards migration of the rivers, and protect the approaches to the bridge,
which spans it (BWDB, 1994).
Economic development in the basin of the Brahmaputra is low, with little demand
for industrial energy or water for irrigation. Low temperatures on the Tibetan plateau
constrain agricultural output, while in the Assam valley, good drainage is needed more
than irrigation. On the slopes of the Assam valley, particularly in Bhutan, there is a
shortage of agricultural land.
In the dry season, the flow of the Brahmaputra controls the position of the saline front
in the Meghna estuary. Various estimates have been made of the flow required to maintain
the front at a point where large islands in the estuary and south central region of
Bangladesh that depend on freshwater for irrigation of some 350,000 hectares would be
adversely affected by salinity. This flow is estimated to be 2,000 m³/sec and 3,000 m³/sec,
depending on the guidelines adopted for salt tolerance of crops (BWDB, 1986; Chowdhury
and Datta, 2004). The economic justification for reserving a large flow for this purpose
has been challenged (Brichieri-Colombi, 1999).
16.3 POSSIBLE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
In the spirit of the hydraulic mission, many proposals have been made to “harness the
resources” of the Brahmaputra in the region of the Great Bend by the riparian countries
(Figure 16.4).
China has considered proposals to regulate the flow of the TsangPo at Nuxia, to
generate hydropower by channelling the flow across the Great Bend, or to augment the
water stressed basin of the Yellow River 800 km away, generating hydropower en route, or
a combination of the two (Anderson, 1996; Verghese, 1999; Tibet Voice, 2003; Trin-Gyi-
Pho-Nya, 2003a and 2003b).
India has considered proposals to regulate the Dihang above 29th Mile, generating
hydropower and then diverting the water round or through Bangladesh to the Ganges at
Farakka and on to the Mahanadi, a distance of up to 1,100 km, as part of the Himalayan
component of India’s Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) scheme (Task Force on Interlinking of
Rivers, 2004). Further large dams on other major tributaries, such as the Subansiri, are also
under consideration (GOI, 1978).
Bhutan is already generating hydropower on the Sunkosh tributary and export-
ing energy to India. This provides a small benefit to Bangladesh, by augmenting dry
season flow.
Bangladesh has studied proposals for a barrage at Bahadurabad (WARPO, 2001) to
irrigate large areas on both banks, and generate hydropower in the dry season, but the
economics of this project are even less attractive than the proposed barrage on the Ganges,
which fails to meet criteria for investment (WARPO, 2002). It has also argued in favour of
flood control reservoirs in the upstream countries to attenuate the annual floods, which
inundate much of the country (BWDB, 1984 and 1986).
Whether these developments are implemented or not will, according to precedent,
depend more on the determination of national self-interest by the upper riparians than
considerations of international law or regional cooperation. None of the four upper riparians
has ever consulted with Bangladesh over the design or construction of dams and barrages
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. Discussions have taken place between India
and Bangladesh over operation of barrages on the Ganges at Farakka and on the Teesta
only after they have been constructed.
Link Canal
Nagong Dam
Nuxia Dam
Dihang Dam
Fig. 16.4 Possible projects in the Great Bend.
On the TsangPo, as on the other rivers flowing out of China such as the Salween
(flowing into Burma), the Mekong (into Burma and Laos) and the Ili (into Kazakhstan),
China is proceeding with dam construction without reference to the lower riparians. On
the Meghna, India is making decisions on the Tipaimukh dam without consultation with
Bangladesh, and has already conducted advanced studies on the Dihang and Subansiri
dams, and a link canal route around Bangladesh. There is little reason to suppose that this
attitude will change, especially as the reaction from Bangladesh to proposed develop-
ments is invariably negative.
While this attitude persists, Bangladesh is unlikely to be able to influence the
decisions to any great degree except by increasing public awareness of the social and
environmental implications of these projects. Examples of this include the organization of
the conference in Dhaka in December 2004 on the proposed ILR scheme, where partici-
pants from India and Nepal joined those from Bangladesh to express their concerns about
the scheme, hampered though they were by the dearth of information or feasibility
reports on the proposed links. The problem with this approach is that little attention is
given to alternatives, whether they be variants on the proposed schemes, or solutions
which approach the problem of satisfying demands for energy, water and food in a
completely different way. Politicians leave such meetings with the same problems they
came with, and no sense of which direction they should follow to resolve them.
Bangladesh may not be able to influence the decisions, but it would be wise to try to
understand to the maximum degree possible what impact they would have. The analysis
below uses the little information available to assess how the annual hydrograph of the
Brahmaputra in Bangladesh would be affected by the implementation of various
combinations of upstream projects.
16.4 HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The annual discharge of the TsangPo at Nuxia is available for a number of years, and
averages 1,867 m³/sec, but its monthly distribution is not. The distribution is therefore
assumed here to be the same as at the upstream station of Yangcun. To fully regulate this
flow, for diversion of hydropower, a large reservoir with a capacity of some 30 km³ live
storage would be required. Evaporation losses would exceed rainfall, so there would be
some net losses, and an allowance of 5 per cent is made for these losses, and unavoidable
spill. It is also assumed that a minimum release of 100 m³/sec (around 5 per cent of average
annual flow) would be made for recreational and environmental purposes.
The major tributary between Nuxia and the next gauging station, 29th Mile on the lower
Dihang, is the Nagong Chu or Po TsangPo, which joins the TsangPo on the northernmost
point of the Great Bend, but no flow records are available. It drains approximately half the
catchment area between Nuxia and 29th Mile, but although the average rainfall is much
higher at around 1,000 mm a year than that of the TsangPo, it is lower than the 2,500 mm on
the remainder of the Dihang catchment rainfall (UNESCO, 1978).
Thus the runoff from this catchment may be estimated at around 33 per cent of the
incremental flow at 29th Mile, or a little over 1,200 m³/sec. This could also be fully regulated
by a dam (referred to here as the Nagong) on the Po TsangPo with a lesser storage capacity
than the dam at Nuxia.
The Great Bend hydropower project would harness the 2,400 m fall from an altitude of
2,900 m at Nuxia, just above the bend, to 500 m on the Indian Border. The distance around
the bend is some 160 km, but the minimum straight line distance across the bend is about
30 km, and according to Chen (1998), the project would comprise a 15 km tunnel across the
bend, which would feed into one of the tributaries draining the southern flank of Namche
Barwa into the TsangPo. Here a cascade of turbines operating at 90 per cent efficiency
produce some 36,500 MW using conventional high-head turbine technology, and
generate up to 320 TWh/year of renewable energy, equal to 23 per cent of total Chinese
electrical production in the year 2000. There would, of course, be formidable obstacles
building the dam, tunnels and power stations in such an isolated area, in a seismically
active and rapidly eroding region, and very high (0.6 to 1.0 million volt) transmission lines
would be required to link the site to load centres, whether in China, Bangladesh or India.
However, the project would be likely to meet the criteria that have in the past justified
government investment in such works.
Hydropower could also be developed on the Nagong Chu, as it also drops into the
same gorge. No information is available on a dam site here, but the principle would be the
same, with retention a similar level, and a cascade of weirs down the gorge. Losses would
be fewer, as rainfall equals evaporation, and compensation flows would be smaller. Such a
dam could generate a further 25,000 MW, and bring the combined energy generated to
40 per cent of the 2,000 total.
If the Chinese River Linking (CRL) scheme went ahead, linking the Brahmaputra to the
Yellow River, the diversion would probably be from the Nagong Chu, as this would reduce
the canal length by approximately 100 km. For technical reasons, the maximum size of
diversion canal is unlikely to exceed 1,200 m³/sec, about the same as the annual flow of
the tributary. Since there is a large fall available between this point and the Yellow River,
water velocities could be kept high, perhaps as much as 4 m/sec if erosive sediment were
first settled out, reducing the canal water section area to some 300 m². A canal 55 m wide,
5 m deep, with a slope of 33 cm/km, could convey this flow with a friction loss of 230 m in
700 km. Where necessary, the canal could be passed through four parallel 10 m-diameter
tunnels. To minimise costs, the canal would be designed for round-the year operation, on
the assumption that the flows on the other rivers would be fully committed for hydropower
or other purposes.
The straight-line route to the closest point on the Yellow River would involve the
crossing the Salween (Nu), Mekong (Zachu) and Yangtze (Jinsha) rivers in a distance of
200 km. The problems of crossing the rivers themselves would be considerably facilitated
if dams were to be constructed on these rivers, and indeed there are such plans (13 are
envisaged on the Salween (Nu) alone (Yunnan Daily, 2004) and a 292 m dam is planned on
the Mekong (Lancing), for completion in 2013 (Tibet Voice, 2003). Water could be
channelled into each river in turn, and diverted from the reservoirs, at the same location,
or further downstream after passing through turbines at the proposed dam sites.
The problems of construction in such mountainous terrain would be formidable, so
much so that there has even been discussion of the use of nuclear explosives for
excavation (Horgan, 1996). However, there is a history of long distance water transfers in
China, and evidence of a great willingness to invest in them (Biswas et al., 1983).
Within China, the water could be used to generate hydropower en route to the Yellow
River, and from there to the sea, in the net fall of 2,650 m (altitude at departure point less
the friction and other losses in the canal of some 250 m). Natural losses in the river would
probably absorb at lease half of this head, but even with 1,000 m net head, 10,000 MW
could be generated. The water could also, with some loss of generation potential, be made
available for irrigation and municipal water supply in North China, a region of 550 million
people that is extremely short of water.
Given the current rate of economic expansion in China, it is unlikely that there would
be any shortage of demand for power or water made available, and it is thus likely that the
persistent stories that one or other of these projects, or a combination, would be under
active consideration.
It is far from clear that a water diversion from the Nagong Chu would, in fact, be
preferable to the generation of hydropower there. Water diversions, if needed, could be
made from the Salween, which is closer to the Yellow River. The loss of hydropower
generation on the Salween due to diversion from that river would compensated by the
hydropower generated from the Nagong Chu, and it would be cheaper to convey water
than electricity between the Nagong and Salween. However, since the diversion is
possible and has been discussed, and the adverse impacts on Bangladesh are far greater,
it is included in the scenario analysis below. In respect of Nagong Chu diversions, these
should therefore be considered “worst case” scenarios.
16.5 HYDROLOGICAL IMPACTS ON BANGLADESH
These projects will have impacts on the quantity of flow entering Bangladesh from the
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system.
For the period June to December, the Ganges inflow is assumed to be equal to the long
term average flow for each month as measured at Hardinge Bridge. For the period January
to May, the Ganges inflow is taken as the average release each month that would have
been made from Farakka under the GWT had it been in operation since 1948, corrected for
small downstream abstractions by India.
The gauges at Bahadurabad and Mymensingh together measure the flow of the Brah-
maputra, including the Teesta, Dharla and Dudkomar tributaries. The gauges at Sheola on
the Surma and Kanairghat on the Kushiyara together measure the inflow on the Meghna
(known as the Barak in India), which bifurcates at the Indo-Bangladeshi border to form
these two rivers. In addition, there are around 16 rivers, some gauged, others not, which
flow directly into the Sylhet basin from the surrounding hills and contribute to the flow of
the Meghna. Compared with the three major rivers, their flows are small and are excluded
from the analysis.
The impacts of these various developments on the annual quantity of flow entering
Bangladesh are assessed in Table 16.2.
Table 16.2 Scenarios and impacts
Scenario –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese

Chinese
All Base hydro, and Indian hydro, and Indian
Project hydro,
ganges case no river hydro, CRL, hydro,
with CRL
links CRL IRL CRL and IRL
Nuxia HE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Nagong HE No No Yes No No No No
Chinese River Link (CRL) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dihang HE No No No No Yes No Yes
Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) No No No No No Yes Yes
Bahadurabad
Maximum flow: 47,459 47,459 44,435 43,235 39,570 43,235 39,570
Dec-Apr average flow: 5,606 5,606 7,694 6,494 8,323 5,294 7,123
Maximum flow: 0% 0% –6% –9% –17% –9% –17%
Dec-Apr average flow: 0% 0% 37% 16% 48% –6% 27%
Major River Inflows
Annual volume: 33,742 32,534 32,438 31,238 31,238 30,038 30,038
Maximum flow: 90,180 86,771 79,073 77,873 75,374 76,673 74,174
Minimum flow: 6,599 5,244 7,418 6,218 8,251 5,018 7,051
Dec-Apr average flow: 8,410 7,459 9,546 8,346 10,175 7,146 8,975
Annual volume: 4% 0% 0% –4% –4% –8% –8%
Maximum flow: 4% 0% –9% –10% –13% –12% –15%
Minimum flow: 26% 0% 41% 19% 57% –4% 34%
Dec-Apr average flow: 13% 0% 28% 12% 36% –4% 20%
Four characteristics of the total flow are considered:
The average annual quantity of water entering the Bay of Bengal. A reduction of
this flow could alter the salinity balance in the Bay of Bengal (IWM, 2004).
The average maximum flow, which affects the water level in the Meghna estuary
and hence the flood level in the Meghna basin, which is subject to widespread
floods every year.
The average minimum flow, which affects the location of the saline front in the
Meghna Estuary and around Bhola Island.
The average flow in the dry season, which affects the quantity of water that
Bangladesh could abstract or divert into other rivers for a variety of uses such as
irrigation, navigation, salinity control and municipal supply, without adversely
affecting conditions in the Meghna estuary.
In addition, two impacts on the flow of the Brahmaputra at Bahadurabad are

estimated:
The average maximum flow, which affects the level of flooding in the northern
areas of the country.
The average flow in the dry season, which affects the navigability of the
Brahmaputra.
The way in which these flows change has been assessed by looking at the monthly
pattern of flows and reservoir operations under the following scenarios:
Scenario 0: This represents the base case, with no dams and no diversions from the
Brahmaputra, and the existing Ganges Water Treaty.
Scenario -1: This considers what would have been the case had the entire flow of the
Ganges, as measured at Farakka, entered Bangladesh, with no other
construction on the Brahmaputra. From Bangladesh’s viewpoint, this
represents the ideal case, although it probably never occurred, as
historically there was always some spill into the Hooghly and other
Indian distributaries. Flows at Bahadurabad are unchanged, but the
average dry season flow in the Meghna Estuary would have been
13 per cent higher than the base case. This provides a measure of the
upper limit of natural dry season flows.
Scenario 1: This shows the impact of the construction of dams at Nuxia and
Nagong, were they both to be operated for hydropower generation,
with no additional storage in India. The main impact is a 9 per cent
reduction in annual flood flows, and a 41 per cent increase in minimum
flow. The average dry season flow increases by 28 per cent, to a level
that compensates for reductions at Farakka by a substantial amount.
The sustained dry season flow would maintain the saline front in the
Meghna Estuary far further out than has ever occurred naturally, and
would probably bring about some environmental changes there.
Scenario 2: This examines the impact were Nuxia built for hydropower, and
Nagong for regulation and diversion of 1,200 m³/sec to the Yellow
River. There would be a small (4 per cent) reduction in annual volume,
and a 9 per cent reduction in flood flows at Bahadurabad. In the dry
season, the lowest flow would be increased by 19 per cent and the
average low flow by 12 per cent, creating a situation similar to that
prior to the construction of Farakka.
Scenario 3: This is similar to Scenario 2, but includes the effect of additional

regulation at Dihang for hydropower generation there. Maximum flows
at Bahadurabad are attenuated slightly more (17 per cent), but the main
effect is to augment dry season flows by a massive 57 per cent for the
lowest month, and by 36 per cent over the 5-month period. This might
well be enough to bring about substantial changes to the ecology of the
Lower Meghna.
Scenario 4: This is also similar to Scenario 2, but includes the effect of the ILR in the
absence of additional regulation at Dihang (or elsewhere in Assam). The
effect is to reduce the annual volume by 10 per cent, and the maximum
flows 9 per cent. In the dry season, the minimum flow is reduced by
4 per cent and the average flow also by 4 per cent, the full impact of
Indian abstraction being offset to some extent by regulation at Nuxia.
Scenario 5: This final scenario examines the impact of Scenario 2, with both regu-
lation at Dihang and the construction of the ILR. As with Scenario 4,
the annual volume is reduced by 8 per cent. Annual maximum flows at
Bahadurabad are reduced by 17 per cent. In the dry season, minimum
estuarial flows are increased by 34 per cent, and average flows by
20 per cent, while average flows on the Brahmaputra are increased by
27 per cent, useful to improve navigation. The results for this scenario
are compared with those of the base scenario in Figures 16.5 and 16.6.
Note that all these scenarios are based on average dry season flows, not reliable
(80 per cent dependable) flows, which are often used for the design of engineering works.
Since dependable flows are lower, and the augmentation would be similar, the percentage
increase on dependable flows would be greater than that shown above.
Brahmaputra below Teesta

(Scenario 5)
50000
45000
Natural flow
Monthly Average m3/s
40000
Modified
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Fig. 16.5 Brahmaputra below Teesta – Scenarios 0 and 5.
16.6 CONCLUSIONS
The rapid growth of both the Chinese and Indian economies are creating
unprecedented demands for energy, and both countries have been taking commercially
aggressive steps to secure energy sources of fossil fuels, putting upward pressure on oil
and gas prices. This will make major sources of sustainable hydropower, such as those on
the Brahmaputra, increasingly attractive.
Development of the region has been inhibited by boundary disputes in Aranchal
Pradesh, but there are indications that China and India are determined not to let such
disputes inhibit better relations and wider cooperation, and cooperation is evident in the
sharing of river data on the TsangPo (Bhattacharyya, 2003). China in particular has
demonstrated a willingness to invest in hydropower even where there are serious social
and environmental concerns, requiring the displacement of very large numbers of people,
such as on the Mekong dam project, where 39,000 will be displaced (PRC, 2003), and the
Three Gorges Dam, where 1.2 million people are being displaced (CNN, 1999). In the region
of the Great Bend dams, the low population density will limit the social impacts. In India,
such concerns have inhibited the development of major storage in the Dihang, but the
storage can be greatly reduced if China goes ahead with its projects. This observation
should not in any way be taken as endorsing the Great Bend projects, which are located in
an area of incredible scenic drama and environmental interest, but simply a recognition of
realpolitiks.
Fig. 16.6 Major River Inflows – Scenario 0 and 5.
Thus it seems likely that, if China starts dam construction, India will follow suit.
Equally, it would be far better from India’s viewpoint to act in concert with China, rather
than go ahead with a major dam at Dihang that could be quickly made redundant by
upstream developments. This may explain why India has indicated it is not immediately
proceeding with the Himalayan component of the ILR.
If China were to precede with hydropower at Nuxia and diversion at Nagong, and
India do nothing, Bangladesh would almost certainly benefit significantly, despite the
overall reduction in the annual flow volume on the Brahmaputra. If India went ahead with
a dam at Dihang with reduced storage, flood reduction benefits would be enhanced in
Bangladesh, and so would dry season flows. However, it is likely that India would want to
divert these flows to drier parts of peninsular India. Based on the impact on flows entering
the country, Bangladesh would find it difficult to object to such a proposal, since the
overall impacts are largely beneficial and reflect exactly the arguments Bangladesh has
previously used to justify dam building in Nepal (flood alleviation, power generation and
dry season augmentation).
Bangladesh would be able to object on the grounds that the works required to build
the link canal caused significant harm, should this be the case. High-level canal routes
from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges that go through the “chicken neck” between
Bangladesh and Nepal may well fall into this category. However, there appears to be a
route that uses the Brahmaputra-Ganges channel (Brichieri-Colombi, 1999; Brichieri-Colombi
and Bradnock, 2003), allowing both India and Bangladesh to benefit, and this would need
to be evaluated under a cooperative study. Refusal to engage in such studies would allow
India to legitimately claim it was forced to circum navigate Bangladesh because of a lack of
co-operation, and that any damages to Bangladesh were therefore self-inflicted.
In the event that all proposed works went ahead, minimum flows in the Lower Meghna
would rise from 5,250 to 5,850 m³/sec, well above the level needed to control salinity in the
estuary. Thus Bangladesh would be able to make significant abstractions for water supply,
irrigation, and salinity control in the southwest delta, the area of greatest concern.
The reduction in peak flow of 17 per cent on the Brahmaputra would be welcome, but
not make a major impact, as the relationship between flood flow and flood level is extremely
flat. The result might be to reduce flood levels by around 0.2 m. Since flooding is a major
source of recharge for the groundwater that supplies over half of Bangladesh’s total food
supply, care is needed to ensure managed flooding continues. A reduction in flood levels,
and increased dry season discharge, would both be welcome in the event that global
climate change leads to significant sea-level rise.
Thus it would appear that Bangladesh has much to gain from co-operation between
India and China in possible upstream investments on the Brahmaputra. It is unlikely that it
could influence the major decisions on the dams, but it could play a lesser role by offering
alignments for major power lines, access to Chittagong Port for construction materials and
equipment, and taking in return access to relatively low-cost energy when national gas
reserves dwindle. If India is determined to go ahead with its river linking scheme, Bangladesh
would be unable to prevent the project, but would have the option of either co-operating
to find a joint venture project bringing net benefits to both countries, or not co-operating
and managing alone any adverse impacts caused by the high level route.
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17
Could Bangladesh Benefit from the River

Linking Project?
17. 1 INTRODUCTION
The National Water Development Authority (NWDA) of India describes plans for
linking Indian Rivers, and states that the proposals essentially comprise three major links
(NWDA, 2004):
1. Southern Water Grid – interlinking Mahanadi, Godavari, Pennar, Cauvery and

Vaigai in Peninsular India,
2. Interlinking of Brahmaputra with Ganga, Subernarekha and Mahanadi, and
3. Interlinking Gandak, Ghaghara, Sarda and Yamuna to Rajasthan and Sabarmati.
The last two of these three links affect Bangladesh, as they would withdraw water
from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river system, which is shared by five
counties, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India and Nepal. The NWDA separates the GBM
into three river systems, labeling the Brahmaputra basin one of water surplus and the
Ganges as one of marginal surplus. The Meghna (Barak) is not categorised.
Diversions from the Ganges can be made entirely within Indian Territory, and the
concern for Bangladesh is that a minimum flow continues to enter the country. A treaty
covering flows for the five-month dry seasons has already been signed, and provided it
is respected, the treaty provides the necessary safeguards to Bangladesh. However,
proposals that include major upstream storage would reduce flows in the rest of the
year, and this could have adverse effects on Bangladesh. A treaty covering abstraction
throughout the year is therefore needed.
Diversions from the Brahmaputra would, according to the NWDA schematic, require
construction of a link canal that would cut across virtually all rivers draining into
northwest Bangladesh, and transfer water to the Ganges for onward distribution into
peninsular India (Figure 17.1). Except on the Ganges, there is no treaty between India and
Bangladesh concerning flows entering the country. Thus, this component of the river
linking plan gives rise to great concern in Bangladesh. Furthermore, a recent article
(BEN, 2004a) made the point that the transfer from the Brahmaputra is the lynchpin of the
Indian river linking scheme, as, apart from the Mahanadi and the Western Ghats, it is the
only basin with a significant surplus in the sub-continent.
276 COULD BANGLADESH BENEFIT FROM THE ILR?
Within Bangladesh, the Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) and its
predecessors have also made plans to divert water in the dry season from the main rivers
by means of barrages and canals into areas of apparent shortfall, in accordance with the
National Water Policy (GoB, 2000). Although geographically more limited because of the
size of the country, WARPO’s plans do not differ in principle from those of Indian
planners. The main rivers are seen as having surplus resources and the command areas as
deficit regions. The economic, social and environmental issues are fundamentally similar,
although on a smaller scale.
Fig. 17.1 Possible routes for Brahmaputra link.

Given this situation, a joint planning exercise would seem to be the natural way
forward. However, no such exercise appears to be underway. NWDA reports that feasibility
studies for various links have been initiated or completed, but only by Indian planners.
Thus, opportunities to examine options that might benefit both countries have been
missed. The purpose of this paper is to examine if there is a possible solution that meets
both countries’ objectives. If such a possibility can be demonstrated, then it is possible
that the leaders of the two countries would countenance co-operation in the pursuit of
shared goals.
17.2 LEGITIMATE SHARES
NWDA does not define what it means by surplus, or marginally surplus. In this paper, the
phrase is interpreted to mean that the water in the basin that can be economically managed
for human use, after a reserve is made to meet environmental needs, exceeds human
demands. The term “economically” means that the total cost of providing the water to the
different categories of users is less than the total benefits the water provides, irrespective
of who pays and who benefits. What is meant by human demands is addressed later in this
chapter.
Any riparian country making such assessment must consider the needs of the
other riparian countries and take into account each country’s legitimate share of the basin
water resources. What then is a legitimate share?
17.2.1 International law
The need for an international law for watercourses was recognised in 1970, when the
United Nations (UN) recommended that the International Law Commission (ILC) take up
the study of the law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN, 1999).
After 24 years, the ILC produced draft articles, which were submitted to the UN in
December 1994. On 21 May 1997, the Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses was adopted by the UN and opened for signature for a period of
three years.
The Convention sets out factors to consider when co-riparians are determining their
legitimate shares of international rivers, such as rainfall and population. However, these
factors are not amenable to a formulaic derivation of a legitimate share (Brichieri-Colombi,
1996). The key criteria are “equitable utilization” and the obligation that States may not
cause “significant harm” to other States. Neither of these terms can be operationalized,
and Waterbury (2002), in his study of the Nile, described the language as “inoperable pap”.
The Convention was to enter into force 90 days after 35 countries had signed, but by
the closing date, only 18 countries had done so. None were GMB riparians. There is, thus,
no international convention in force.
17.2.2 De facto arrangements
Most rules of international law come from one of two sources (McCaffrey, 1995 and
2001): the 2,000-odd treaties that have been signed between states, as listed by FAO
(1978), and international custom, as represented in interpretations of law by recognised
individuals and organizations. Dellapenna (1997) notes that custom is not prescriptive
but evolves from the process and the outcome of the process – that is, the corpus of
previous treaties. Thus, the only real source of law is this corpus.
On the GBM, this corpus consists at most of five international agreements (Ganges
Water Treaty (1996), India-Nepal Power Trade Agreement (1996), Mahakali Treaty for the
Pancheswar Dam (1996), India-Bhutan Agreement for the Tala Hydropower Project (1996)
and the tentative four-nation (India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh) agreement on
economic co-operation (1997)). The latter is included because it was seen by Bangladesh’s
Foreign Secretary as being centred on the shared rivers of the region.
The key feature common to both the Ganges Water Treaty and the Mahakali Treaty is
that, in each case, the two countries agree to share the flows of the rivers concerned
more-or-less equally. Neither treaty is concerned with a process to establish “equitable”
shares. Although no treaty has yet been signed on the Teesta, the indications are that both
sides are considering an equal entitlement.
This feature is probably advantageous for Bangladesh. Quite apart from the reality of
India’s greater economic strength, the factors in the UN Convention tend to favour a
greater share for India.
Custom and precedent suggest that the Brahmaputra and other transboundary rivers
would be shared equally by Indian and Bangladesh under any future treaty arrangements.
Such a solution has the added advantage that, in political terms, it is far easier to convey
the message that a fair and just solution has been found when two sovereign nations agree
to share a common resource equally.
The dry season (November to March) flows in the Brahmaputra average 3,700 m³/sec,
and in the Ganges, 1,700 m³/sec, a total of 5,400 m³/sec. Thus, following precedent, each
country would get 2,700 m³/sec.
17.3 ACCESS TO SHARES
Legal and political arrangements create an enabling framework in which to study

the technical options available for accessing river water. For instream demands –
environmental protection, fisheries, navigation, amenity, recreation and salinity control –
works of civil engineering may not be needed. For out-of-stream demands – municipal
and industrial water supply, and irrigation – major works are usually required to abstract
and distribute the water.
On large alluvial rivers such as the Ganges and Brahmaputra, relatively small quan-
tities can be abstracted by fixed or floating pump stations where permanent low-flow
channels cling close to the bank. One such example occurs at the Ganges-Kobadak fixed
pump station. This pump station has had a history of maintenance problems, however,
due to low intake water levels and siltation in the approach channel, even though the
quantities abstracted are relatively small.
For large abstractions, a barrage is usually constructed to raise dry season water
levels to the level of the maximum flood in a normal year. This level tends to be close to
bank-full level, allowing the water to be distributed into a canal from the barrage by gravity.
The Teesta and Farakka Barrages are examples of such works, and the latter, completed in
1970, demonstrates the feasibility of constructing a barrage on a river the size of the
Ganges. Since the size and cost of a barrage on an alluvial river is determined by the
amplitude of the annual maximum flood, and the floods on the Ganges and Brahmaputra are
of similar magnitudes, the indications are that further barrages similar to Farakka could
be built in the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra and Ganges. The Jamuna Bridge over the
Brahmaputra shows large scale construction is possible on this river, and pre-feasibility
studies have been completed for a bridge over the Padma (RPT, 1999).
Barrages in alluvial rivers also have maintenance problems, as shown by the

experience of Farakka. They are liable to silt accumulation at the gates, and, like bridges,
suffer from the consequences of, and may accelerate, bank erosion upstream and
downstream. They also create a backwater effect, raising flood levels marginally for many
tens of kilometres upstream. These effects, and measures to alleviate them, must be
considered in the design and projected maintenance costs and operations.
Large canals to distribute water are not difficult to construct with modern earthmoving
equipment, but can cause waterlogging and salinization of adjacent land and interrupt
overland drainage. There are considerable technical difficulties where they traverse large
rivers liable to spate flows. In soils that are liable to liquefaction, canals can be protected
against collapse in earthquakes using vertical sand drains, but only at high cost. In heavily
populated areas, they create many social problems and disrupt other transportation
infrastructure.
17.3.1 Bangladesh proposals for access
The Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has
at various times commissioned pre-feasibility studies for barrages and associated canals
at locations on both the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (MoWR, 1998). None of these
studies has attracted finance to go to full feasibility stage, so the costs and issues raised
must be considered only indicative.
These works would have led water into the north-central, northwest and southwest
areas of Bangladesh. In the latter case, short canals from the Ganges Barrage would lead
water into the moribund rivers of the delta, using them to distribute water for salinity
control in the Sundarbans, abstraction for domestic and industrial water supply, and
irrigation.
The study Options for the Ganges Dependant Area (OGDA) reviewed abstraction of
a total of 619 m³/sec from the Ganges from a barrage at Tagorbari, 26 km downstream of the
Paksey bridge, for distribution on both banks (Halcrow, 2002). It concluded that the cost
of the barrage could not be justified by the quantity and unit value of water abstracted.
17.3.2 Indian proposals for access
The technical problem for India to access Ganges flows has been resolved by the
construction of Farakka and the navigation canal to the Hooghly River. Despite operational
difficulties, the barrage serves the original stated purpose of diverting water to Calcutta.
Whether this has solved the problems of Calcutta is an issue beyond the scope of this
chapter.
NWDA states that it has completed pre-feasibility studies on links southwards from
the Ganges, through the Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha link and the Subernarekha-
Mahanadi link. It also states that it has completed similar studies for the Manas-Sankosh-
Tista-Ganga link, (around northwest Bangladesh) the Jogighopa-Tista-Farakka link (through
northwest Bangladesh), and the Farakka-Sundarbans link (into the mangrove forest that
straddles the border). All the three latter canals involve Bangladesh, but the studies were
conducted without its participation, and so they must be considered preliminary.
The Jogighopha-Farakka link was proposed by the Government of India (GoI) to
augment the Ganges at Farakka (GoI, 1983), and included storage dams in the Brahmaputra
and its tributaries and a barrage at Jogighopa. The proposal was examined and costed by
a GoB/International Consultants team, led by the author, which concluded that the link
was not feasible (MoWR, 1984). One major technical problem was that the soils through
which the canal was to be excavated were liable to liquefaction in earthquakes such as the
one in 1954 in Assam. The same problem would be encountered in excavating a major canal
through the piedmont soils in the gooseneck.
In 1999, the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), India, stated that the Assam-West
Bengal Link Canal is “no longer on the table” (CPR, 1999). The NWDA, unfortunately,
does not appear to have accepted CPR’s conclusion.
17.4 WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS
Although there has never been formal collaboration between planners from India and
Bangladesh, proposals have been made that would benefit both countries. Unfortunately,
to date nothing tangible has emerged.
Nehru suggested to Ayub Khan in 1961 that the countries build Farakka “in such a
way as to benefit both countries”, and Ayub Khan responded with a proposal for a joint
barrage on the Ganges at Lagola, where one bank is in India and the other in what is now
Bangladesh. The proposal would have allowed both countries to share the Ganges from a
single structure, but it was rejected as “considerable work has already been done of the
Farakka Barrage and the Indian Government did not intend to give it up” (Crow et al.,
1995).
The GoB also undertook studies what became to be known as the New Line, a proposal
to build barrages on the Brahmaputra and Ganges within Bangladesh, and link them with a
canal further south, which would avoid the soils liable to liquefaction (Crow et al., 1995).
The proposal would have allowed India access to all the waters of the Ganges, and
Bangladesh to all those of the Brahmaputra, under essentially a quid pro quo arrangement
that seems to have been, unofficially at least, acceptable to leaders of both countries when
originally proposed. This again foundered, for internal political reasons in Bangladesh.
The Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Complex (FPMC) of barrages, Figure 17.2, was suggested
by the author during the preparation of the National Water Management Plan (Brichieri-
Colombi, 2001; Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock, 2003). This proposal was designed to
allow both countries to abstract their legitimate share of water from the main rivers, while
avoiding some of the problems associated with previous proposals.
The FPMC proposal has been researched only in outline, with no funding from any
source, and therefore the conclusions must be regarded as very preliminary. However, it
does indicate that there is a win-win solution for both countries, should they choose to
co-operate with each other and share the dry season water resources of the two main rivers
equally.
The proposal includes a bridge-barrage complex at Mawa, a second one at Paksi, plus
the works necessary to distribute each country’s share from the main rivers to the loca-
tions where water is needed (Table 17.1). This would enable each country to use half the
combined flow, an average of 2,800 m³/sec each. Bangladesh would abstract 700 m³/sec
of its share (12 per cent more than the diversion envisaged by the Ganges Barrage), leaving
2000 m³/sec instream for salinity control in the Meghna Estuary. India would divert all its
share, either upstream of Farakka, or into the Hooghly, where some of it would be released
to the estuary through the port of Calcutta.
Fig. 17.2 Farakka-Paksi-Mawa complex.
17.4.1 Benefits
The net additional dry season flow made available by the FPMC project would be 22.5 km³
to India and 13.5 km³ to Bangladesh, a total of 39 km³. More could be made available if
storage were constructed in the Brahmaputra headwaters.
Bangladesh’s share would be distributed to the north-south, south-central and southeast
regions. It includes a flow of 300 m³/sec to Dhaka via the Dhaleswari, the subject of R. 693
crore taka (US$ 119 million) project now under study (BEN, 2004b). A regulator, built in
the context of the FPMC scheme, would be cheaper in both capital and operating costs.
India’s share would be distributed in accordance with NWDA’s plans, part via the
Paksi pond, and part via the Farakka pond. Paksi could probably command the Indian part
Table 17.1 Distribution of average dry season flows (m³/s)
Location Inflow Outflow Return Net Country
Mawa Pond 3,700 3,700 350 3,350

Brahmaputra 3,700
Dhaleswari to north-central region 350 250 100 Bangladesh
Gorai to southwest region 250 0 250 Bangladesh
Arial Khan to south-central region 250 100 150 Bangladesh
Pumping to Paksi 1,200 0 1,200 Recycled
Release to Estuary 1,650 0 1,650 Recycled
Paksi Pond 1,200 1,200 0 1,200
Pumping from Mawa 1,200 0 0 Recycled
Pumping to Farakka 200 0 200 Recycled
Matabangha to Sundarbans 800 0 800 India
Kobadak to Sundarbans 200 0 200 Bangladesh
Farakka Pond 1,900 1,900 0 1,900
Ganges 1,700
Pumping from Paksi 200 0 0 Recycled
Feeder Canal to Calcutta 300 0 300 India
Mahanandi to Peninsular 1,600 0 1,600 India
Estuary 2,000 2,000 0 2,000
Release from Mawa 1,650 0 Recycled
Return from Dhaleswari 250 0 Recycled
Return from Arial Khan 100 0 Recycled
Outflow to Bay of Bengal 2,000 2,000 Bangladesh
Total for Bangladesh 2,700 (of which 700 abstracted)
Total for India 2,700
of the Sundarbans via the Gorai river or other distributaries of the southwest delta,
obviating the need for the Farakka-Sundarbans link. Farakka would feed the
Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha link and points south.
India’s share of water from the Brahmaputra would have to be pumped 10 m up from
the Mawa pond to the Paksi pond.1 The water needed at Farakka would have to pump a
further 8 m up from the Paksi pond to the Farakka pond, a total lift of 18 m. This is low by
1
The Pump Station at Paksi would be large, consuming almost 150 MW. The technology would be
similar to the tidal power barrage at La Rance, in northern France. There, 24 low head (15 m) reversible
bulb turbines produce 10 MW each. Paksi could incorporate 15 Such units in a 200 m wide section,
more likely, all 74 sluice sections would incorporate smaller, 2 MW units, incorporated into caissons,
as proposed in 1986 for the Bahadurabad barrage. The 26 MW pump station at Farakka would be
much smaller.
comparison with other links: NWDA notes that “Brahmaputra water after reaching Ganga
has to be lifted by 60 m to reach Subernarekha and by about 48 m for further transfer to
Mahanadi-Godavari link.”
Large pump and generating stations would be required to pump the water, using
natural gas from Bangladesh. The large idle generating capacity in the wet season could be
used for agricultural drainage, which is likely to become an increasing problem if global
climate change results in increased sea and river levels.
The benefits associated with the FPMC may be summarised as:
For Bangladesh
Irrigation supply to areas short of groundwater in northwest and southwest

Salinity control in southwest and south-central areas
Bridges over Ganges and Padma
Freshwater to Sundarbans in Bangladesh
Water for Dhaka
Improved navigation on main rivers and around Dhaka
Erosion control in vicinity for barrages
Drainage pumping in wet season.
For India
Access to a 50 per cent share of the Brahmaputra for use in the peninsula
Freshwater to Sundarbans in India.
17.4.2 Costs and cost sharing
Total capital costs of the FPMC would be in the order of US$ 3.6 billion, after deducting
the cost of works associated with building bridges that are envisaged at Mawa and Paksi.
How these costs might be shared is discussed in the author’s 2003 paper, where it is
concluded that a reasonable formula would be around 80 per cent for India, 20 per cent for
Bangladesh. This would lead to average costs for Bangladesh of 0.7 ¢/m³ (US cents per
cubic meter), and for India, 2.5 ¢/m³. Costs for India are higher, because the water has to
be pumped, and because it appears that the value of water in the India economy is higher.
The value of water made available by the Ganges barrage can be estimated from the
OGDA study by dividing the tabulated annual benefit at full development of US$
76 million (excluding road transportation benefits) by the annual quantity of water
diverted at the barrage (619 m³/sec for 153 days, or 8,185 million m³), which comes to
0.9 ¢/m³. Thus the value of water in the economy exceeds the costs of making it available
under the FPMC scheme by a margin of over 20 per cent.2
Unfortunately, NWDA provide no comparative figures for the cost of water provided
under the river linking scheme. However, the alternative ways of supplying water from the
Brahmaputra river to the Ganges by the FPMC, and other barrage-canal schemes were
compared in the author’s technical paper (Brichieri-Colombi, 2001). The respective costs
were, for Bangladesh, 1.9 ¢/m³, and for India, 3.6 ¢/m³, excluding the costs of ameliorat-
ing social and environmental impacts that are included in the FPMC costs. In both cases,
2
As noted earlier, the OGDA report shows the Ganges barrage to be uneconomic with these
benefits. The FPMC scheme becomes economic because of the far larger volume of water made
available to the two countries from shared works.
water supplied under the FPMC is significantly less expensive than the alternatives
proposed previously.
17.4.3 Social and environmental issues
The use of the main river system to transfer water for India through Bangladesh avoids the
need major link canals, and the associated social and environmental costs. Barrages would
create problems wherever they are built, in Assam or in Bangladesh, but, unlike dams, they
do not displace large numbers of people, neither do they flood fertile farmland. However,
as experiences in the region have shown (bridges over the Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the
Meghna, and barrages over the Ganges (Farakka) and Teesta), works on major rivers do
bring about social and environmental problems that need to be addressed from the very
outset of any investigation.
The most affected social group will be char land dwellers who occupy seasonally
exposed chars (sandbanks) along the banks and in the river upstream of the barrages.
Seasonally flooded chars close to the barrage will be permanently under water, as dry
season water levels will be raised around 8 m, to close to normal maximum flood level. At
the Mawa barrage, the increase in water level would diminish to almost zero at Paksi, and
similarly, the effect upstream of Paksi barrage diminish to almost zero at Farakka. In the wet
season, the afflux caused by a barrage will increase flood levels by about a metre at the
barrage, reducing to almost zero some 50 km upstream. Of the estimated 1993 population of
4.3 million char dwellers (FAP 19, 1993) some 1.4 million on the Ganges, Padma and lower
Jamuna might be affected. This is a large number, and, although the impacts for many
would be small, a huge effort is required to assess the total effect.
Navigation locks would be provided through the barrages, and would permit the
passage of larger ships from the Meghna Estuary to the Ganges above Farakka. Increased
flows down the Dhaleswari would make navigation possible for large vessels in and around
Dhaka, and up to the Brahmaputra. In contrast, there would be problems for country boats
seeking to move between the river reaches, as they would have to use the locks.
Fish passes can mitigate impacts on fish breeding, but there would be unavoidable
negative impacts. The construction of Farakka had adverse effects on the movement of
Hilsha, which move from their spawning grounds in the lower Meghna estuary up the
main rivers. By contrast, there would be benefits to fisheries in rejuvenated rivers of the
southwest.
Bank erosion is already a major issue in Bangladesh, as, unlike seasonal flooding, it
destroys livelihoods and there are few coping mechanisms. Works to protect the barrages
would reduce the effects of erosion in the immediate vicinity, but erosion might increase
elsewhere. Barrages and bridges would need to be designed as an integral part of an
overall plan for bank protection works on the main rivers, as suggested in the National
Water Management Plan, rather than considered piecemeal.
17.5 RISKS FROM UPSTREAM DEVELOPMENT ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA
The review so far has considered only the natural flow of the Brahmaputra. However, in
addition to the ILR, other projects have been proposed upstream on the Brahmaputra that
could significantly alter the dry season flow arriving in Bangladesh. These include
hydroelectric and storage dams on the Dihang and Subansiri rivers, and in Tibet, on the
upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, where it is known as the TsangPo.
Just upstream of the so called Great Bend, proposals have been made to build storage
dams to regulate the flow of the TsangPo to a constant 1,700 m³/sec, and its tributary the
Po TsangPo to 1,200 m³/sec, and generate hydropower using the available head of around
2,400 m. Alternatively, a flow of around 1,200 m3/sec water could be diverted northeast from
one of these sites northeast in a Chinese River Linking scheme (CRL), transferring water
from the Brahmaputra to the Salween, Yangtze and HuangHe (Yellow River). The HuangHe
is a basin of 550 million people which is extremely short of water.
These proposals have been assessed by the author (Brichieri-Colombi, 2007), who
notes that the rapid expansion of the Chinese and Indian economies is driving their search
for increased water and energy supplies, so that projects that were previously thought to
be too expensive are being revisited. He also notes that their would be great benefits if
China and India went ahead, each with their own dams, maximising the use of storage and
transmission lines. The upper reservoirs would require a much smaller storage dam on the
Dihang than previously proposed, making the project more acceptable to local peoples in
India.
Although data is scanty, it was possible to estimate that, in the monsoon season,
retention of flows to fill the reservoirs could attenuate peak flows on the Brahmaputra in
Bangladesh by up to 15 per cent, reducing flood levels by around 0.2 m. This would reduce
flood damages with little likelihood of significantly reducing groundwater recharge. In the
dry season, the net effect of regulation at the three sites on the TsangPo, Po TsangPo and
Dihang would more than offset the impact of abstraction of 1,200 m³/sec each by China and
India. Minimum flows in the Lower Meghna Estuary would increase by around 600 m³/sec,
almost equal to Bangladesh’s requirement of 700 m³/sec estimated above. Thus, even with
the FPMC (which accommodates the ILR), the position of the saline front would be virtually
unchanged from the present conditions. If the dam on the Po TsangPo were operated for
hydropower rather than river diversion, which appears to be the more likely scenario, then
the augmentation would increase by a corresponding amount, and the saline front would
be pushed further out to sea.
Further detailed studies need to be done, but at first sight it appears that the risk from
upstream development is minimal, provided abstraction is accompanied by regulation
either in China or India. The main danger to Bangladesh would be that India would route
the ILR around Bangladesh, as currently proposed, with the attendant social and
environmental risks to Bangladesh.
17.6 MEETING WCD CRITERIA
The World Commission on Dams (Asmal, 2000) suggested that two tests be applied to
any proposal for the construction of high dams. These are equally applicable to the
components of the river linking scheme. Further tests are suggested, if and when a dam is
selected, but that is at a much later stage than considered in this chapter.
17.6.1 Needs assessment
The NWDA justifies the river linking project in terms of what others have described as the
hydraulic mission (Allan, 2000). In essence, this approach defines the objective in terms of
a pre-determined solution. To quote NWDA:
“The main objectives of the ILR programme are manifold. Benefits from
ILR are augmentation of irrigated agriculture (35 million hectares),
potable water for the rural and urban areas, industrial water-supply,
hydropower (34,000 MW), inland navigation, ecological up
gradation due to minimum flow guarantee in rivers, sizeable
employment generation, flood and drought mitigation, increased tree
farming and many other indirect benefits.
The Programme is likely to unite the Nation and the interdependence

of regions for the overall welfare will act like a catalyst in this regard.”
Under this “hydrocentric” approach (Brichieri-Colombi, 2004), rivers are seen as

resources to be exploited to meet the demands of societies, and dams and canals as the
means to do so. The approach is characterised by an excessive focus on water as the
solution to problems that can be solved by other means.
Augmentation of agricultural production is undoubtedly required to match the needs
of a growing population without excessive recourse to food imports. However, there are
many ways of achieving this, though expansion of agricultural area, improvements to
yields using hybrid and GM crops, and investment in rainfed agriculture, rainwater
harvesting, and better marketing and distribution.
Domestic and industrial water supplies need to be improved, but the problems are far
more to do with investment in treatment, distribution, management and cost recovery than
the availability of water on a large scale.
Energy is needed for a society that is urbanising fast, but hydropower is but one of
several ways of generating it. Dams can be built to generate hydropower, where they are
justified, but the river linking scheme would be a net user of energy, not a supplier of it.
Where hydropower dams are economic in comparison with alternative generation, there is
usually no problem in finding private-sector finance, provided adequate guarantees are
provided by government. However, there is scant evidence to date that the private sector
is willing to get involved in large scale hydropower generation in the GBM region.
In his paper on hydrocentricity, the author demonstrates that, for the GBM and Nile,
the expectations of the riparian countries up to the year 2030 can be met through a variety
of interventions in the broader economy without increasing overall abstraction from rivers
above the level of abstraction in the year 2000.
17.6.2 Selecting alternatives
The costs of alternative ways of supplying water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges
by the FPMC, and other barrage-canal schemes, are discussed above, where it is shown
that the FPMC is likely to be much less expensive. There is thus a prima facie case to
investigate the FPMC alternative.
However, these figures, even if confirmed by further study, would not justify the
FPMC scheme. If, as argued above, additional abstraction from rivers is not essential to
the riparian economies, then costs and impacts of the most favourable barrage-canal scheme
need to be compared with the costs and impacts of alternative interventions outside the
water sector, for both countries. As yet, no such studies appear to have been made.
17.7 CONCLUSION
Precedent and treaty suggest that India and Bangladesh would be prepared to share
the dry season flow of the GBM equally between them, and water resource planners in
both countries have, for many decades, envisaged abstracting water from the shared
system. Their planned projects to do this have generally differed, but their overall objectives
have been very similar.
Twice, very briefly, opportunities for co-operation have arisen (the Lagola barrage
and the New Line), but they have not been grasped. A third opportunity, the FPMC, has
been suggested, as yet with no reaction.
The outcome of these missed opportunities is that India has unilaterally constructed
a barrage at Farakka, which allows it to access its 50 per cent share of the Ganges, while
Bangladesh has been unable to construct works to access its 50 per cent. Neither country
has been able to access a share of the Brahmaputra, except the small proportion of the flow
represented by the Teesta, where both countries have built their own barrages. This outcome
is unsatisfactory for both countries, but particularly for Bangladesh, which has suffered
from the impacts of Farakka, and seen no benefits from decades of negotiation except a
treaty that protects it from further adverse impacts (Crow and Singh, 2000).
India’s Interlinking of Rivers Project (ILR) presents Bangladesh with an opportunity
to rethink its previous strategy with respect to development of the main rivers, which has
achieved so little to date. Whatever opportunities there might be to develop dams in the
upper reaches of these rivers, they are, de facto, likely to be realised by the upper riparians
without the involvement of Bangladesh. However, it appears that the developments under
consideration would, in hydrological terms, be highly favourable to Bangladesh. By
acknowledging India’s right to a share of the Brahmaputra, and facilitating access to that
share, Bangladesh could set the stage for a co-operative venture which enables both
countries to examine, jointly, a project that meets both their goals.
The cost of the FPMC project is large, but there appears to be in both countries
a willingness to commit large funds for water development and bridge construction.
17.7.1 Could Bangladesh benefit from the river linking project?
What then is the answer to the question posed by this chapter? If the Brahmaputra-
Ganges link passes through or around the northwest of the country, the answer, as
established by the 1980’s studies, is no, Bangladesh could not benefit. However, if the
main river system is the link, via barrages designed to provide access to dry season water
in both countries, then the answer is yes, Bangladesh could benefit.
Whether the FPMC or any other river linking project should be built is a question that,
in accordance with WCD criteria, can only be answered by undertaking studies:
to determine which is the most cost-effective solution to providing dry season

water, when all technical, economic, social and environmental issues have been
properly addressed.
to ascertain whether, in fact, there are cheaper alternative ways to meet emerging
needs without increasing the current level of water abstraction from rivers.
Neither study can be conducted alone by either country. Only through joint study
and co-operation can the questions be asked, and the right answers be discovered.
REFERENCES
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London, 2000.
Asmal, K.: Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making The Report of the
World Commission on Dams. Earthscan Publications, London, 2000.
BEN (2004a): Interlinking Rivers: More Than Meets The Eye. BEN Digest May 24 to 25, 2004
(2004–73) with source quoted as People’s Democracy (Weekly Organ of the Communist Party
of India (Marxist), Vol. XXVII, No. 11, March 16, 2003.
BEN (2004b): Buriganga Water Augmentation Project – Feasibility Report will be ready by July 2004.
BEN Digest July 1 to 3, 2004 (2004–107) with source quoted as New Age, July 3, 2004.
Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Equitable Use and the Sharing of the Nile. Proc. IV Nile 2002 Conference,
Kampala, Uganda, 1996.
Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Co-operative Development of the Lower GBM: Technical Outline of a
Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Barrage Complex. Asia Pacific Journal on Environment and Develop-
ment, BUP, Dhaka, December 2001.
Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Hydrocentricity: A Limited Approach to Achieving Food and Water
Security. Water International 9(3) (2004).
Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Hydrological Impact on Bangladesh of Chinese and Indian Plans on the
Brahmaputra. In: Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Waters: Impact of the Indian
River-Linking Project (Feroze Ahmed, Q.K. Ahmad, and Md. Khalequzzaman, Eds.),
Compilation of Conference Papers, Dhaka, December 2004, 2007.
Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A. and Bradnock, R.: The Politics of Sharing the GBM: Prospects for a
Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Complex. Geographical Journal, UK, March 2003.
Centre for Political Research (CPR): India Water Vision in Draft Conference Documents of a
Framework for Sustainable Development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM)
Region. Dhaka, New Dehli, India, December 4 to 5, 1999.
Crow, B. and Singh, N.: Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers: The Waters of South
Asia. World Development 28(11) (2000), pp. 1907–1925.
Crow, B., Lindquist, A. and Wilson, D.: Sharing the Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River
Development. Sage, New Delhi, 1995.
Dellapenna, C.J.: The Nile as Legal and Political Structure in Brans, H.J. The Scarcity of Water:
Emerging Legal and Political Issues, Kluwer International, London – The Hague, 1997.
FAO: Systematic Index of International Water Resource Treaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases by
Basin. Legislative Study No. 15, FAO, Rome, 1978.
FAP: Flood Action Plan Report No 19: Geographic Information System, Dhaka, 1995.
Government of Bangladesh (GoB): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, Dhaka,
August 2000.
Government of India (GoI): Proposal for the Augmentation of the Dry Season Flow of the Ganga.
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Irrigation, New Delhi, 1983.
Halcrow: Options for the Ganges Dependant Area. WARPO Bangladesh, 2002.
McCaffery, S.: The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and
Unanswered Questions. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Colorado, USA, 1995.
McCaffery, S.: International Water Law. OUP, Oxford, UK, 2001.
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Augmentation of the Dry Season Flows of the Ganges:
Vol II Indian Proposal for the Brahmaputra-Ganges Link Canal. Bangladesh Water Development
Board, Dhaka, 1984.
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): The Ganges: Water Sharing and the Resulting Opportunities.
Background Information for the International Seminar on Water Resources Management in
Bangladesh with a particular reference to the Ganges River, Dhaka, 1998.
National Water Development Authority (NWDA): Task Force Documentation (www.riverlinks.nic),
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RPT: Padma Bridge Study Phase I Final Report. Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority, Dhaka,
1999.
UN: UN Convention on Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 1999.
Waterbury, J.: National Determinants of Collective Action, Yale UP, New Haven, London, 2002.
Index
A
Adaptation 15, 51, 89, 166, 210, 215
Agriculture 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 25, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40, 48, 49, 51, 60, 63, 65, 66, 70,
71, 73, 74, 82, 96, 104, 110, 132, 133, 143, 151, 154, 155, 160, 163–168,
182, 187, 188, 192, 193, 216, 217, 231, 241, 250, 253, 255, 274, 286, 288
Ancient 14, 35, 236, 237, 249
Annual
– discharge 95, 97, 109, 121, 261, 267
– runoff 253, 264
Arabian 7, 44, 199
Arable 18, 21, 23, 25, 63–65, 131, 142, 193, 240
B
Bangladesh 3, 9, 10, 13–15, 46, 48, 49, 64, 68, 71, 72, 75, 79, 81, 91, 100–102, 104–106,
108, 109, 123, 124, 126, 127, 147, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160–168,
187, 190, 197, 199, 200, 201, 211, 219–223, 225, 226, 228–230, 232, 233,
253, 255–270, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278–285, 287, 288
Base flow 112–114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 190
Bhutan 11, 42, 48, 68, 72, 137, 138, 139, 190, 253, 261, 265, 275, 278
Bilharza 11, 141, 146
Brahmaputra 2, 5, 7, 10, 14, 15, 37, 39, 41, 42, 55, 56, 66, 72, 79, 80–84, 88, 89, 91, 104,
109, 119, 121, 124, 126, 153, 154, 157, 161–163, 165, 167, 187, 188, 204,
211, 219–222, 253, 254, 259, 261–268, 270–276, 278–288
C
Canal 3, 5–7, 9, 11, 14, 27–30, 32, 37, 38, 44, 54–56, 61, 68, 69, 73, 77–82, 84, 86, 88, 92,
94, 97, 98, 100, 103, 105, 112, 117, 119, 121, 124, 136, 143–149, 151, 169–171,
187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 211, 223, 231, 232, 266–268
Cauvery 7, 29, 35–37, 43, 44, 54, 56, 70–72, 82, 84–86, 92, 93, 180, 203, 204, 206, 211,
220, 230, 257, 275
China 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 25, 26, 32, 33, 36, 37, 48, 64, 65, 75, 105, 130, 146, 180, 190, 261,
265, 266–268, 272–275, 285
Chisapani 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 104–106
292 INDEX
Cholera 141, 147, 148, 149, 151

Climate change 12, 15, 89, 107, 125, 129, 138, 166, 187, 189, 195, 202–204, 207, 208,
210–217, 253, 273, 283
Climate variability 189, 213
Coliform 147, 149, 150
Cooperation
– regional 14, 15, 49, 102, 166, 167, 232, 256, 257, 259, 265, 274, 288
Cooperative management 69, 72
Cotton 5, 6, 25, 30, 92, 93, 193, 199, 247
Cultivable area 70, 155, 193, 239
Cultivated 21, 192, 193, 242
Cultural 18, 33, 47, 69, 74, 138, 237
Culture 35, 249
D
Dam (s)
Delhi 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 32, 38, 51, 54, 74–76, 89, 95, 97, 105, 106, 110, 116, 125–127,
131, 148, 151, 167, 168, 195, 203, 204, 214, 216, 217, 251, 256, 274, 288
Desert 25, 29–33, 95, 119, 145, 152, 188, 194, 195, 211, 221, 232
Development 1, 3–6, 11, 15–21, 26–28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 41–44, 48, 51–56, 67–69,
72–77, 80, 83, 84, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 101, 105, 106, 112, 119, 126,
129–131, 134–139, 141–147, 149–155, 157, 160, 165–169, 171,
173–175, 178, 179, 181–183, 185, 192, 195, 206, 212, 216, 217, 220–223,
225, 226, 229–233, 237, 241, 242, 255, 256, 259, 263, 265–267, 269,
272–275, 283–285, 287, 288
Dhaka 105, 165–168, 229, 256, 260, 263, 266, 273, 274, 281, 283, 284, 288, 289
Diarrheal diseases 141, 148
Discharge 10, 44, 77, 79, 81, 82, 95, 96, 97, 109, 110, 121, 125, 127, 149, 158, 188, 223,
261, 262, 267, 273
Downstream 10, 13, 14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 48, 68, 70–72, 81, 102–104, 107–109, 113, 124,
142, 144, 148–151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 162, 166, 170, 172, 173, 185, 208,
219, 224, 225, 268, 279
Drainage
– basin 109, 189, 228, 229, 231
– channel 4
– systems 21, 25, 27, 74, 103, 146, 155, 167, 172, 173, 211, 223, 232, 249, 265,
279, 283
Drought 3, 4, 6, 10, 14–16, 25, 26, 28-30, 37, 39–41, 44, 48, 51–53, 56, 61, 70, 73, 77,
80–82, 87, 92, 102, 110, 187, 188, 195–197, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 212, 220,
221, 232, 240, 253, 286
Dry season 10, 12, 14, 18, 81, 97, 100, 102, 107, 110, 113, 119, 121–125, 149, 150,
153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 188, 219, 221–223, 230, 240, 253,
255–259, 261, 262, 265, 269–276, 278, 280, 282, 284, 285, 287, 288
E
El Nino 201, 214–216
Empirical model 3, 114, 116, 136
INDEX 293
Energy
– demand 4–6, 11, 36, 37, 48, 51, 63, 101, 129, 130–139, 152, 163, 204, 208, 261, 265,
266, 271, 273, 286
– supply 4, 11, 36, 48, 51, 63, 101, 129–139, 141, 152, 163, 213, 265, 267, 271, 273,
285, 286
Environment 8, 11, 13–15, 19, 20, 23, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 45, 48, 70, 76, 125, 126, 135,
139, 147, 152, 166–168, 173, 175, 181, 184, 185, 188, 212, 219, 220, 222,
223, 231, 237, 240, 249, 251, 260, 274, 288
Environmental
– impacts 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 17–20, 22–24, 26–28, 30–33, 36, 38, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54,
60, 61, 68, 69, 70, 78, 87–89, 92, 93, 104–106, 126, 130, 134, 135, 138, 139,
141, 142, 154, 157, 160, 162, 167, 168, 170, 171, 176, 181, 185, 188, 215,
217, 219, 221, 223, 230–232, 248, 251, 255, 258, 260, 266, 272, 274, 276–
278, 283–285, 287
– pollution 10, 12, 24, 25, 27, 41, 61, 125, 134, 135, 145, 147–151, 174, 193, 208, 212,
221, 232
F
Farakka 13, 15, 42, 56, 79, 81, 82, 89, 94, 95, 97, 100–102, 106–109, 113, 116, 117, 119,
121–124, 126, 150, 151, 158–160, 219, 220, 223–226, 229, 254, 258, 259, 261,
263, 265, 268, 270, 274, 278–282, 284, 287, 288
Fauna 20, 104, 105, 180, 222
Fisheries 18, 41, 51, 59, 142, 144, 150, 164, 222, 223, 278, 284
Flood
– control 7, 37, 41, 55, 60, 68, 72, 73, 94, 101, 104, 106, 109, 167, 171, 187, 221,
265
– damage 4, 39, 172, 173, 188, 200, 285
– embankments 4, 67, 103, 264
– forecasting 112, 137, 154
– frequency 196, 201–203, 205, 206, 217, 222
– management 4, 10, 20, 48, 51, 57, 60, 75, 233, 253, 260
– mitigation 3, 10, 31, 41, 48, 102, 106, 286
– riverine 22, 27, 164, 165
– urban 4, 5, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 48, 63, 73, 78, 147, 165, 166, 220, 286
Flora 20, 104, 105, 180, 222, 223
Food
– production 9, 18, 28, 30, 36, 39, 63–65, 74, 124, 129, 155, 156, 160, 193, 197, 201,
211, 216, 223, 232, 241, 242, 246, 248, 286
– security 7, 9, 32, 60, 61, 63–66, 73, 74, 141, 144, 145, 151, 154, 155, 157, 165, 166,
187, 220, 238, 288
– supply 13, 51, 273
Forest 8, 45, 70, 75, 77, 78, 110, 143, 144, 160, 164, 175, 178, 180–183, 185, 216, 223,
237, 239, 242, 246–250, 260, 279
Freshwater 11–13, 17, 19, 20, 33, 48, 53, 74, 75, 124, 151, 158, 160, 162, 164, 189, 206,
224, 226, 231, 232, 258, 265, 283
294 INDEX
G
Gandak 14, 42, 83, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100–107, 111, 117–122, 124, 149, 275
Ganga 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 29, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 47, 54, 56, 66, 75, 78–85, 87–89, 91, 92, 94,
95, 101, 102, 104, 106, 111, 120, 125, 126, 146–152, 204, 226, 230, 257, 274,
275, 279, 282, 283, 288
Ganges
– river 6, 9, 14, 82, 92, 97, 107, 109, 158, 160–162, 164, 166, 168, 224, 288
– water treaty 225, 270, 278
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 4, 35, 49, 54, 129, 133, 155, 157, 165, 188, 190
Ghagra 14, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 149
Glacier 12, 35, 88, 109, 189, 206–210, 214–217
Global warming 88, 129, 130, 195, 215, 217, 254
Godavari 7, 35, 41, 43, 44, 56, 71, 81, 82, 84, 85, 91, 93, 180, 204, 220, 257, 275, 283
Government Policy 5, 19, 25, 38, 54, 56–58, 60, 62, 65, 69, 73, 77, 85, 92, 104, 105, 131,
133, 134, 142–144, 170, 221, 223, 230, 248, 256, 276, 280, 288
Groundwater 3, 14, 23, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41, 48, 59, 71, 77, 110, 113–116, 124, 126, 148, 150,
155, 156, 158, 161, 163, 171, 173, 184, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 206, 211, 212,
216, 222, 223, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 273, 283, 285
Gujarat 4, 39, 61, 70, 83, 85, 95, 103, 143–145, 148, 152, 188, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199
H
Health 11, 12, 23, 25, 27, 35, 48, 130, 131, 133, 134, 138, 141–146, 148, 150–152, 156,
157, 160, 164, 201, 223, 232, 237, 247, 254, 255
HEC 107, 110–115, 117–120, 126, 150
High Yielding Variety 5, 9, 163
Himalayas 2, 5, 35, 109, 110, 111, 113, 189, 195, 207, 208, 214, 261, 262, 274
Hydrologic cycle 112, 213
Hydrologic model 107, 112, 114, 125, 126
Hydrology 10, 14, 15, 50, 59, 71, 73, 96, 109, 125–127, 158, 160, 161, 164, 170, 172,
186, 209, 213, 228, 230, 261
Hydrometeorology 15, 39, 51
Hydropower 4, 11, 21, 40, 41, 58, 94, 112, 129–131, 136–139, 141, 144, 145, 151, 184,
187, 212, 220, 261, 265, 267, 268, 270, 272, 278, 285, 286
I
Impacts 9, 12–15, 17–22, 26, 27, 31, 33, 45, 52, 53, 60, 67, 70, 78, 89, 92, 93, 108, 124, 138,
142, 144, 151, 160, 163–165, 167, 170–174, 178–185, 187–189, 201, 203, 206,
207, 210, 211, 213, 215, 223, 248, 256, 268–270, 272, 273, 283, 284, 286, 287
India 1–16, 28–30, 32, 33, 35–39, 41, 43–82, 86–89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97–109, 112, 114,
116, 119, 123–127, 129–139, 141–148, 150–152, 154, 157, 158, 160, 166–171,
174, 175, 177–179, 181, 182, 184–217, 219–226, 228–232, 235–238, 242, 243,
251, 253, 256–262, 265–285
Indigenous 143, 235–239, 249
Indus
– river 1, 225
Industrial growth 4, 5, 20, 37, 71, 104, 129–133, 136–138, 145, 165, 232, 255, 271
INDEX 295
Industry 5, 10, 49, 132–136, 165, 193, 208, 231, 242, 253–255
Industrial water demand 12, 14, 27, 30, 37, 41, 58, 61, 74, 88, 165, 169, 265, 278, 279, 286
Infrastructure 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 20, 21, 23, 28, 39, 46, 48, 49, 51, 64, 69, 101, 103, 130,
131, 136–138, 141, 145, 188, 195, 200, 208, 254, 279
Inter-basin transfer 5, 6, 9, 13, 16–20, 23, 28, 29, 31–33, 41, 58, 63, 74, 75, 83, 84, 91, 92,
94, 107, 119, 122, 136, 148, 167, 168, 211, 212, 217, 245
Interlinking
– rivers 9, 17, 36, 77, 106, 168, 187, 219, 257, 260, 288
International 13–15, 32, 33, 47, 49, 51, 57, 69, 72, 74, 75, 87, 93, 126, 131, 137–139,
142, 151, 165–168, 182, 185, 191, 204, 211, 215, 217, 219–221, 223–233,
257, 265, 274, 277, 278, 279, 288, 289
IPCC 12, 15, 88, 89, 189, 195–197, 200, 214, 215
Irrigation 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 41, 44–46, 48, 51, 54, 58,
60, 62, 63–66, 68–70, 73–76, 80, 82, 86, 92, 94, 96, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107,
112, 113, 117, 119, 124, 136, 141–148, 150, 151, 155, 158, 160–163, 165,
167, 169, 173, 184, 187, 190, 192, 193, 195, 206, 208, 220, 222, 233, 236, 240,
241, 245, 246, 249, 256, 259, 265, 268, 269, 273, 274, 278, 279, 283, 288
K
Kanpur 125, 149–151
Karnali 94–97, 99–101, 104–106, 259
Ken-Betwa 7, 8, 13, 44, 46, 93, 121, 169, 170, 174, 180, 185, 186
Kharif 155, 163, 188, 192
Khulna 158, 159, 165, 166
Kosi 14, 42, 83, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100–106, 111, 116, 119, 120, 149, 188, 258–260
L
Land use 32, 60, 112, 115, 125, 126, 189, 195, 203, 204, 207, 212, 215
Legal 13, 23, 24, 47, 66, 75, 211, 219, 220, 223–225, 228, 229, 232, 233, 236, 242, 249,
278, 288
Litigation 6, 38, 53, 55, 69, 88, 91, 92
Low flow 117, 171, 270, 278
M
Mahanadi 7, 12, 41–44, 56, 82, 84, 85, 91, 93, 119, 121, 180, 199, 204, 220, 257, 265,
275, 279, 283
Malaria 11, 30, 33, 141, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 255
Mangroves 13, 108, 124, 127, 160, 164, 167, 279
Mean annual discharge 95, 97, 109, 121, 261, 267
Meghna 2, 15, 55, 56, 71, 72, 109, 153, 161–163, 167, 221, 222, 253, 254, 261, 263, 265,
266, 268–270, 273, 275, 280, 284, 285, 288
Monsoon 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 37, 39, 55, 61, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 85, 89, 102, 107, 109, 110, 114,
116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 124, 146, 147, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160–162, 164,
169, 173, 183, 188, 189, 192–203, 205, 206, 208, 211–219, 219, 239, 243,
253, 257, 261, 264, 285
Morphology 10, 70, 161, 170, 211, 220, 222, 230, 231
296 INDEX
N
Narmada 4, 7, 35, 44, 71, 75, 93, 143, 145, 180, 199, 203, 204, 206, 221
National Water Policy
– Bangladesh 221, 223, 230, 276, 288
– India 77, 89, 92, 105, 230
Nepal 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 42, 48, 68, 72, 74, 91, 92, 94–98, 100–106, 139, 190, 199, 208,
211, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 253, 256, 259, 266, 273, 275, 278
Non-structural 4
O
Occurrence 3, 25, 153, 196, 217
P
Peak discharge 81, 82, 158
Population 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29, 35–37, 39–41, 47–49, 51–53, 62–66,
74, 75, 78, 94, 95, 101, 123, 124, 129, 137, 141, 142, 144, 147, 150, 153, 154,
156, 157, 162, 166, 174, 175, 177, 181–183, 187, 189, 190–192, 196, 206,
208, 212, 213, 217, 221, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 245, 248, 258, 259, 262,
272, 277, 284, 286
Precipitation 1–3, 12, 37, 39, 54–56, 61, 79, 109, 110, 112–116, 129, 189, 190, 194, 196,
198, 200, 201, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210
Productivity 12, 14, 22, 25, 64, 65, 144, 246
R
Rabi 95, 155, 163
Rainfall 1–3, 23, 29, 39, 40, 44, 55, 62, 85, 88, 114, 146, 154–156, 169, 171, 183,
188–190, 192–197, 199–205, 208, 215–217, 222, 236, 261, 267, 277
Rajasthan 4, 7, 28–32, 39, 40, 42, 44, 52, 61, 62, 82, 91, 95, 103, 119, 144, 145, 188, 189,
192, 194–197, 243, 245, 251, 275
RCM (Regional Climate Model) 202, 203, 213–215
Recharge 3, 5, 27, 48, 59, 116, 161, 163, 173, 190, 206, 211, 212, 222, 237, 239, 243, 273, 285
Regional Cooperation 14, 15, 49, 102, 166, 167, 232, 256, 257, 259, 265, 274, 288
Rehabilitation 28, 46, 47, 69, 78, 87, 142, 181
Reservoir 3, 10, 11, 14, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 41, 61, 69, 94, 97, 101, 102, 105, 107, 113–115,
119, 124, 129, 138, 141–144, 146–148, 151, 169–173, 180, 182–184, 190,
197, 221, 222, 265, 267, 268, 270, 273, 285
Resettlement 18, 26, 32, 45, 47, 69, 70, 74, 93, 142–144, 151
Rice 9, 156, 163, 193, 197, 199
Risk 10, 16, 18, 22, 27, 49, 51, 67, 68, 84, 86, 87, 132, 133, 135, 137, 145–148, 151, 163,
165, 171–173, 181, 202, 205, 211, 213, 222, 232, 256, 284, 285
Runoff 2, 14, 21, 25, 27, 54, 55, 60, 62, 109, 112, 114–116, 126, 147, 154, 173, 189, 203,
204, 206, 208, 210, 217, 239, 253, 263, 264, 267
INDEX 297
S
Salinity 14, 41, 58, 106, 124, 126, 153–156, 158–160, 162, 164–168, 200, 221–223,
265, 269, 273, 278–280, 283
Salinization 27, 69, 142, 165, 193, 279
Schistosomiasis 11, 27, 32, 141, 146, 148, 151, 152
Sea water 13, 162
Sea level rise 27, 195, 196, 206, 254, 273
Sedimentation 141, 142, 145, 171, 172, 190, 221, 223
Semi-arid 9, 18, 19, 23, 27, 29, 62
Siltation 26, 84, 158, 278
Simulated 107, 123, 202–204, 215
Simulation 45, 107, 112, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 167, 197, 214–216
Socio-economic 8, 18, 22–24, 30, 32, 41, 46, 81, 155, 156, 163, 181, 188, 215, 226, 258
South Asia 4, 12, 14–17, 28, 51, 72, 75, 91, 105, 106, 108, 126, 137, 139, 167, 168, 187,
189, 201, 202, 213, 214, 216, 217, 231, 232, 253, 260, 288
SRES 196–198, 202
Sri Lanka 15, 52, 151
Summer monsoon 1, 39, 192–194, 200–202, 206, 212, 215–217
Sundarbans 108, 121, 124, 127, 160, 164, 167, 223, 279, 282, 283
Supply
– water 2, 6, 7, 9, 12–14, 18, 21, 40, 41, 44, 61–63, 65, 66, 70, 72–74, 82–85, 88, 124,
126, 184, 187, 207, 208, 211, 212, 220, 238, 268, 273, 278, 279, 283, 286
Surface water 3, 23, 25, 41, 58, 77, 80, 114, 148, 150, 153–155, 158, 163, 164, 168, 172,
173, 186, 190, 192, 245, 248
Sustainable 27, 32, 54, 65, 71, 74, 126, 131, 133, 138, 157, 166, 182–185, 191, 193,
220–222, 230–232, 237, 238, 246–247, 250, 260, 272, 288
Systems 2, 12, 15, 21, 28, 39, 42, 43, 45, 50, 67, 70, 74, 77, 78, 82–84, 102, 144, 145, 151,
153, 155, 157, 162, 163, 166, 168, 170, 184, 188, 189, 210, 213, 220, 231, 235,
238, 239, 253, 257, 275
T
Temperature 3, 27, 79, 110, 113, 126, 155, 156, 195, 196, 198–206, 208, 210, 217, 265
Temporal 3, 5, 32, 37, 54, 56, 151, 188, 189
Traditional 5, 21, 24, 35, 57, 67, 70, 134, 137, 144, 182, 183, 211, 235, 237–240, 242,
248, 249
W
Water balance 44, 61, 65, 121, 203, 204, 274
Water demand
– agriculture 70, 73, 77, 163
– industrial 85, 210, 211
Water levels 148, 157, 165, 183, 241, 278, 284
Water logging 30, 32, 69, 142, 193, 211, 232, 259, 279
Water management 14, 15, 28, 49, 57, 75, 167, 171, 174, 181, 183–185, 188, 189, 211,
235, 236, 238, 240, 245, 249, 251, 274, 280, 284
298 INDEX
Water quality 12, 20, 107, 112, 124, 125, 130, 136, 141, 144, 147–152, 157, 167, 168,
170–173, 178, 179, 206
Water sharing 15, 32, 46, 48, 85, 123, 124, 126, 182, 227, 258, 288
Wheat 1, 9, 30, 64, 156, 164, 193
Wildlife 13, 150, 168–171, 174–181, 184, 185, 237, 241, 242
World Bank 16, 25, 32, 33, 59, 65, 74–76, 129, 136–139, 143, 144, 230
Y
Yamuna 6, 9, 12, 14, 35, 38, 42–44, 91, 95, 107, 111, 115–121, 125, 148, 149, 220, 275

Interlinking of Rivers in India Internat

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Interlinking of Rivers in India Internat

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Interlinking of Rivers in India:

Issues and Concerns

M. Monirul Qader Mirza

M. Monirul Qader Mirza

Ahsan Uddin Ahmed

Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad

© 2008 Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK

Typeset by Charon Tec Ltd (A Macmillan Company), Chennai, India

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Interlinking of rivers in India: issues and concerns/edited by M. Monirul Qader Mirza,

Published by: CRC Press/Balkema

ISBN 13: 978-0-415-40469-3 (Hardback)

7.1 Introduction 107

8.1 Introduction 129

9.1 Introduction 141

10.1 Introduction 153

11.1 Introduction 169

12.1 Introduction 187

13.1 Introduction 219

14.1 The Traditional Transmission of Knowledge in India 235

15.1 Background 253

16.1 Introduction 261

17.1 Introduction 275

M. Monirul Qader Mirza

Dr M. Monirul Qader Mirza has extensively conducted research on hydrological and

Dr Qazi Kholiquzzanan Ahmad is a socio-economic specialist of international repute

Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad is the Chairman of the multidisciplinary research

Shawkat Alam is a lecturer in the Department of Law at Macquarie University, Sydney,

Stephen Brichieri-Colombi is currently a Research Fellow at King’s College, London

Sharon Gourdji is currently a PhD student in Environmental and Water Resources

M. Rafiqul Islam is a Professor, Division of Law, Macquarie University, Sydney,

Carrie Knowlton is currently posted at the US Environmental Protection Agency as an

M. Monirul Qader Mirza is an Adjunct Professor, Department of Physical and

Suresh Prabhu is presently a Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), India. A professional

Monique Toubia is currently assessing a Payment for Environmental Services (PES)

Michael J. Wiley is a Professor of Aquatic Ecology at the School of Natural Resources

BCM Billion Cubic Meters

JCE Joint Committee of Experts

Interlinking of Rivers in India:

M. MONIRUL QADER MIRZA

1.2 INDIA’S WATER RESOURCES AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

1.2.1 Water resources of India

Like the availability of water in India, precipitation in India is unevenly distributed in

Table 1.1 National water resources of India

Resource Quantity Precipitation (%)

Estimated utilizable water resources 1,122 km3 28.1

1.2.2 Water resources development: The major thrusts

independence, both structural and non-structural measures have been implemented to

1.3 GLOBALIZATION, RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1.4 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA

1.4.1 Past proposals

1.4.2 Present proposal

Table 1.2 Earlier interlinking proposals and their major features

Proposed by Year Features

Dr K.L. Rao 1972 Linking the northern Ganga (Ganges) River

1. Kosi - Mechi 8. Chunar - Sone Barrage * FR Completed

Fig. 1.2 Himalayan component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).

1. Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowislaiswaram) 9. Cauvery (Kattalai) - Veigai - Gunder*

Fig. 1.3 Peninsular component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).

1.5 ISSUES AND CONCERNS

1.5.1 Experiences from Inter-Basin Water Transfers (IBTs)

1.5.2 Growing food demand and irrigation

1.5.3 Hydrological implications

1.5.4 Risk and security