Religion, State & Society

ISSN: 0963-7494 (Print) 1465-3974 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crss20

Islamic practice and state policies towards religion

in post-Soviet Russia

Bulat Akhmetkarimov

To cite this article: Bulat Akhmetkarimov (2019) Islamic practice and state policies
towards religion in post-Soviet Russia, Religion, State & Society, 47:2, 180-197, DOI:
10.1080/09637494.2019.1582209

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2019.1582209

Published online: 01 Mar 2019.

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RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY
2019, VOL. 47, NO. 2, 180–197
https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2019.1582209

ARTICLE

Islamic practice and state policies towards religion in

post-Soviet Russia
Bulat Akhmetkarimov
The Institute of International Relations, Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

What has the Russian state policy towards Islam been in the first Received 3 September 2018
two decades after the Soviet collapse, and how has it affected Accepted 10 February 2019
Islamic practice in the country? This study explores Russian state KEYWORDS
policies towards religion from 1990 to 2017 and discusses their Russia; Islam; state-Islam
impact on Islamic practice in the country. In the 1990s, relations relations; traditional Islam
between the Russian state and Islam (state-Islam relations) were
accommodationist: the state granted unrestricted access in the
Russian public sphere for all Muslim communities and allowed
a wide range of Islamic religious practices. State-Islam relations
in the 2000s became increasingly regulatory: the state assumed
a more active interventionist role in the affairs of the domestic
Islamic community in order to control religious practices of certain
Muslim factions and to ensure privileged access in the Russian
public sphere for state-approved ‘traditional’ religious organisa-
tions. This contribution reveals the dynamics of the Russian state’s
attitudes towards the largest minority religion in the country in
the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet state. It also
offers analytical insights on the dynamic nature of state-religion
relations in other secular states with religiously diverse
populations.

Introduction
The post-Soviet Islamic revival in Russia and the state’s reaction to this process have
recently become a topic of intense academic debate and public concern. Since the late
1990s, after a decade of a relatively liberal rule, human rights watch groups, concerned
with conditions of religious freedom in Russia, have become increasingly critical of the
state’s harsh measures against minority religious groups, particularly observant
Muslims.1
Post-Soviet Russian state attitudes towards religion and their meaning and significance in
the public eye can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, questioning official
policies and rhetoric may be perceived as a natural attribute of any democratising society.
On the other hand, usually there is a deep-rooted reason why particular policies are formally
adopted. The state has justified its restrictive actions concerning religious affairs as neces-
sary to maintain peace and stability, condemning the violent acts of Muslim extremists and

CONTACT Bulat Akhmetkarimov BGAhmetkarimov@kpfu.ru The Institute of International Relations, Kazan

Federal University, Kazan, Russia
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 181

the spread of militant religious ideologies (GOSDUMA 2015). Many analysts have described
various aspects of the relationship between Islam and the post-Soviet state (Dannreuther
and March 2010; Filatov 1998; Giuliano 2005). This study adopts a broader, more compre-
hensive approach towards state attitudes toward Islam over the first two and a half decades
after the breakup of the Soviet Union and discusses the impact of state policies on Islamic
practices in the country.

The background: Islam and post-Soviet religious revival in Russia

Unlike studies in western European politics, in Russia the question of Muslims has never
been limited to an issue of integrating immigrants. Despite the occasional protests by
some marginal Russian nationalist groups, there is a deep acknowledgement that
Russia’s Muslim population is indigenous and an indisputable part of Russian historical
heritage. For the Russian state, dealing with Islam today implies more than just
a population count because of qualitative transformations in the past two and a half
decades. The post-Soviet revival of Islam led to a profound social metamorphosis of the
society. The fact is that, for the past two decades, Russian state officials have had to
learn how to deal with religious demands, not of immigrants, but mainly of an indigen-
ous Muslim population that has reconnected with the faith after seven decades of
enforced atheism.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of its atheistic regime set off an extraordin-
ary religious revival in the country.2 As the iron curtain fell and the official communist
ideology was denounced, faithful Muslim citizens sought to return to their spiritual roots
and reconnect with fellow believers abroad. Increased mobility and improved means of
communication due to globalisation contributed to a much faster spread of ideas than
one could ever imagine. Foreign proselytising activities, practically non-existent during
the Soviet era, thrived as thousands of missionaries flew into the country from all over
the Muslim world and Islamic literature was widely distributed thanks to a religious
publishing boom.3 The number of mosques increased from about 160 in 1991 to several
thousand just within a decade, in part with the help of investors from Islamic states
(Akhunov 2017). During the same period, the number of students receiving Islamic
education in foreign Muslim universities, such as al-Azhar of Egypt and in the madrasas
of Southwest Asia and South Asia, increased from single digits to more than 1,800. More
than 22,000 of those students have returned to Russia and facilitated the revival of Islam
(Goble 2009). The annual quota of 20,500 people that Saudi authorities allocated to
Russia’s Muslims for performing Hajj in Mecca was easily filled and subsequently
increased to 25,000. The unofficial trip of another 15,000 pilgrims raised the question
of whether to increase the limit to 40,000 people.4

Religious freedom and Russian state control

The revival of Islam in Russia became possible, in part, due to major changes in the
Russian legal environment. The Gorbachev-era reformers embraced the high standards
of western legal norms which introduced new levels of religious freedom to the country.
In 1990, Russia’s laws on religion, which redefined the rights of religious communities,
established unprecedent favourable conditions for various Islamic religious practices in
182 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

Russia.5 In many ways, such conditions were not available even under the reign of
Catherine the Great or the rule of Nicholas II, who issued Edicts of Toleration in 1773 and
1905, respectively (Avrutin 2006; Brower 1996; Bruess 1993). Muslim religious commu-
nities thrived as the state observed the new law, which not only gave much-needed
breathing room to the practice of religion in Russia after decades of an atheistic regime,
but also assumed equality among all faith groups, including Russian Orthodoxy. The
legislation mainly followed the stipulations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as other
European conventions (Shterin and Richardson 2000). The 1993 Russian Constitution
further reinforced the main principles of this law.
For almost a decade, under the new regime, religious communities enjoyed excep-
tional levels of freedom and mobility. Taking advantage of these opportunities, various
Muslim communities, often acting independently from the official Muslim establishment,
organised into groups, built mosques, founded publishing houses, and established
contacts with their fellow believers abroad. Religious life under the framework of
a modern secular democratising state seemed to acquire an irreversible momentum
unmatched by any of the previously known cycles in Russian religious history.
The euphoric spirit of early 1990s did not last long, however. Despite this seemingly
irrevocable transformation of state-society relations, the late 1990s and early 2000s
witnessed yet another change. Contrary to the essence of a democratic headway
made in the period of liberalisation (1990–1997), the state soon sought to return to
a top-down approach of regulating religious affairs. Under the pretext that, if left
unregulated by the state, newly emerging religious groups might abuse people’s rights,
the state attempted to restore its supremacy over religious life in the country. The war in
Chechnya and rising security concerns contributed to the development of a new policy
towards religion. Policies were guided by conservative hard-liners, who argued that
reliance on the ‘invisible hand’ of inter-confessional competition might lead to ‘many
troublesome problems’ (Shterin and Richardson 2000). A heated discussion about
whether Russia ever had a tradition of religious pluralism accompanied this argument.
In September 1997, the 1990 Law was replaced by a controversial new law that has
largely brought back the regulation of religious organisations to the state. Since then,
numerous policies regulating religious institutions and their activities have been
adopted in Russia and, as a result, religion, according to some experts, has become
nearly as tightly regulated as it was in Soviet times.6 Many state authorities still justify
this move by using their concern about security and responsibility to protect citizens
from extremist attacks.

The puzzle: a distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ Islam

With respect to Islam in particular, the state’s effort to regulate religion in the post-
1997 period has been reflected in the attempt to draw a distinction between ‘traditional’
and ‘non-traditional’ forms of Islam. Early debates within official circles on what ‘traditional
Islam’ for Russia is and how it might be strengthened and ‘defended from infiltration by
alien ideas’ took place in the mid-1990s (Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003). As a result of
these debates, in some of Russia’s regions clear attitudes have been adopted towards
‘alien’ Islams.7 The media and the press, discussed the dangers of Wahhabism and the use
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 183

of Islam by Wahhabists as a contemporary cover to propagate antagonistic and extremist

ideas. In the meantime, official Islamic clerics, encouraged by state officials in the regions,
started undertaking strategic restructurings of Islamic institutions – building a strict
administrative hierarchy for all Islamic organisations. In the following decade, the ‘official’
interpretation of Islam, backed by state-approved religious organisations, was strength-
ened vis-à-vis ‘non-traditional’ forms of religion, allegedly spread by autonomous religious
groups supported from abroad. This compartmentalisation of Islam, which gradually
penetrated into the official rhetoric, sowed the seeds of unrest among Russia’s indigenous
Muslim communities and fuelled broader social concerns about the confessional peace in
the country.8
The freedom that was granted to religious groups during the early 1990s – the period
of religious liberalisation (1990–1997) – and the reverse course over the following
decade and a half – the period of religious compartmentalisation (1997–2017) – pro-
duced a nebulous picture. As more than two decades have passed since the Soviet
collapse, contemporary state attitudes towards Islam can be described as nothing else
but a paradox. Despite strong allegations of unprecedented, in post-Soviet history,
suppression of Muslim religious groups in Russia, since the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the state has progressively supported the development of Islam in the country, both
materially and discursively. Thus, on the one hand, the list of banned Muslim groups and
Islamic literature has been significantly expanded over the past decade, anti-extremist
laws have been increasingly implemented against religious figures, and legal barriers
have been raised for the registration of new religious groups, among many other
regulatory measures. On the other hand, the state has invested in strengthening Islam
as one of the pillars of the Russian state. In 2007 alone, 800 million rubles (approx.
$25 million) were allocated to promotion of ‘traditional Islam’ in Russia. More than
400 million rubles (approx. $13 million) have been invested in Islamic education. Most
recently, nearly one billion rubles (more than $300 million) were granted for training of
Islamic history and culture specialists. ‘Senior presidential administration official Aleksei
Grishin announced the allocation of 800 million rubles for Islamic education in Russia at
a meeting in Kazan to mark the Spiritual Directorate’s tenth anniversary in
February 2008ʹ (Fagan 2009; Fayzullina and Mukhametzyanova-Duggal 2014).9 Partly
as a result of these efforts, the Bolgar Islamic Academy was inaugurated on
4 September 2017 in the city of Bolgar in Russia’s Tatarstan Region.10 ‘One of the
tasks of the Academy is to create an all-Russian Muslim theological platform for inter-
action of Russian Muslim organisations and develop common approaches to interpret-
ing sacred texts and organising the life of Muslims’, said Plenipotentiary Envoy of the
Russian Federation to Volga Federal District, Mikhail Babich, speaking at the opening
ceremony. These are only few examples of controversies that have recently been noted
by careful observers of religious life in Russia. The Islamic religious revival has not
stopped as a result of these measures, but its pace and character have changed.
This study suggests that relations between Islam and the Russian state in the post-
1997 period can be described neither as systematic repression nor as unconditional
support. Rather, the way in which they are connected could be characterised as
increased regulation. A more nuanced analysis of major policy debates indicates that
the state’s approach to issues concerning Muslim minorities in Russia varies both across
time and space.
184 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

Theoretical framework
Building on the existing scholarship on the subject, this study takes a historical institutionalist
perspective to discuss the evolution of state policies towards Islam in Russia and describes its
impact on Islamic practice in the country. The contribution suggests that state policies
towards Islam were less regulatory in the early 1990s than in the 2000s. This policy shift, in
turn, has affected Islamic practices in the country. Who or what has triggered the change?
More importantly, what were the consequences of this shift for Russia’s practising Muslims?
In the first two and a half decades since the breakup of the Soviet Union, two distinct
state-religion regimes guided state policies towards Muslims and Islamic religion in Russia.
From this standpoint, neutral policies towards Islam in the 1990s were an outcome of
a passive secular regime.11 A commitment of the late Soviet and post-Soviet reformers to
western liberal norms and principles led them to transform key aspects of social and political
life in Russia, which resulted in the adoption of neutral/accommodationist policies towards
all faiths, including Islam. On the other hand, regulatory policies towards Islam in the 2000s
were an outcome of what I call ‘confessional collaboration regime’, according to which
certain religious communities have privileged access to the public sphere.12

Data sources and structure

This study uses data gathered from three main sources. Primarily it depends on primary
sources, such as political and legal documents. I examined the late Soviet and post-Soviet
era laws, relevant committee reports and meeting proceedings, documents of the Council
for Religious Affairs in Kazan and Ufa, and court decisions on the federal and regional
levels. In particular, I focused on the debates over and contents of the 1990 and 1997
Russian laws on religion. The research also extended to the memorandums and speeches
of politicians and senior members of the established clergy. I gathered these data through
archival research (e.g. National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan and Central Historical
Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan), online sources (e.g. the official website of the
President of Russia or the website of the Council of Russia’s Muftis), and anthologies (e.g.
Arapov 2011, Islam i Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo [Islam and the Soviet State], a collection of
documents related to the Soviet state policy towards Islam between 1944 and 1990). I also
surveyed newspapers and magazines using the largest Russian-language database of
national and regional newspapers (Integrum).
The second data source consists of anonymous elite interviews that I conducted between
2012 and 2014 during my field research in Russia (Moscow, Kazan, and Ufa) with academics,
politicians, bureaucrats, and religious leaders. The third source is books and articles (sec-
ondary literature) on the theory of state-religion regimes in general and the history of and
current debates on relations between the state and Islam in Russia in particular.
In what follows I will discuss key legal concepts that influence Islamic practice in
Russia and explain how ‘neutral’ policies towards Islam have transformed into ‘regula-
tory’ policies since the late 1990s. First, I will discuss and compare provisions of the 1990
Soviet Law on Religion and stipulations of Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience
and Religious Associations. The contribution will identify key advocates of these laws
and outline their main concerns at the time. Then I will discuss some of the effects of
religious laws on Islamic practices in Russia.
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 185

The legal framework: the 1990 Soviet law on religion and Russia’s 1997 law
on freedom of conscience and religious associations
Preparations for public celebrations of the Orthodox Millennium and the 1100th anni-
versary of the adoption of Islam by Volga Bolgars took place in 1988 in the context of
heated discussions about the Communist party’s diminishing claims to spiritual author-
ity. The adoption of laws on religion in October 1990, both in the USSR and the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), finally declared the Communist party’s
renouncement of atheism and laid the foundation of a new secular order, where the
religious marketplace would be competitive and no religion, including Russian
Orthodoxy and atheism, would benefit from state support.13 Many commentators uni-
versally agree that these laws have had a far-reaching impact on the religious revival in
post-Soviet Russia (Anderson 1994; Bourdeaux 1990). The laws marked a major transition
from a regime guided by an anti-religious ideology to a passive secularism, which
implied that the state would no longer intervene in religious affairs and allow the
visibility of religion in the public sphere. More importantly, this meant that the state
would recognise religious pluralism and provide equal access of all religious commu-
nities in the public sphere. For example, religious groups obtained permission to broad-
cast on radio and TV, and use school infrastructure, outside regular business hours for
the religious education of the population.14 No legal or administrative discrimination
could be made with regard to religious groups practising their religious liberty.
The language of the 1990 laws on religion, which gave a much-needed breathing
room to practice Islam in Russia, mainly followed stipulations of the UDHR, the ECHR, as
well as other European conventions (Shterin and Richardson 2000).15 Three aspects of
the RSFSR’s Law on religion were particularly important. One was the reduction of formal
procedures required to establish a religious group. A second was the abolishment of the
Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), which interfered in the internal life of religious bodies.
By 1990, religious dissidents, many public figures, and even some employees of the CRA
argued for the abolition of the institution on the grounds that in a free society religion
needs no regulation. The third and most important aspect was the freedom of all
religious communities to have access to the Russian public sphere.
In sum, the adoption of the laws in 1990 was a major departure from the Soviet-era
practice of regulation of religious affairs.16 It broke the ice and paved the way for
a gradual filling of a ‘religious vacuum.’17 Religion steadily returned to the public sphere.
According to Anderson, the state has eventually come to recognise that even opium has
its uses (Anderson 1991, 707). Throughout the 1990s, the federal government remained
committed to the norms of passive secularism spelled out in the 1990 RSFSR law.
Despite early warning signals about the politicisation and radicalisation of religious
groups as well as the emerging unintended consequences of religious liberalisation,
proponents of keeping the 1990 RSFSR Law on Religion intact relied on provisions of the
1993 Constitution and stipulations of international agreements in order to protect the
individual rights and liberties of the people.18
Contrary to the accommodationist attitude of the state in the early 1990s, state
policies towards religion since the late 1990s have become more interventionist. The
main argument for the adoption of a more regulatory approach towards religion was
that, if left unregulated by the state, new religious groups might infringe on people’s
186 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

constitutional rights. For many critics of Russia’s rapid liberalisation, the reliance on
the ‘invisible hand’ of the market forces could lead to many ‘troublesome problems’
(Shterin and Richardson 1998). Their attacks focused on newly emerging religious
movements, which were seen as bogus faiths. Reportedly, by the mid-1990s, some
6,000 totalitarian sects with 3 to 5 million participants operated in Russia (Shterin and
Richardson 2000). These ‘sects’ were accused of potentially threatening the people’s
psychological and physical health, social well-being, and national security. Therefore,
according to the supporters of regulatory measures, an assertive stance towards such
groups by the state was required.
Critics of an unregulated religious market also made a national-security argument.
Several meetings and conferences were organised under the auspices of political parties,
parliamentary and governmental organisations, which discussed possible changes to the
law on religion. In a letter to President Yeltsin the Duma declared the religious security
of Russia an important priority of national security, along with military, political, eco-
nomic, ecological, and social security.
Two arguments came from representatives and advocates of the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC). First, they argued that when in an open competition with other
religions, the ROC inevitably found itself in a materially disadvantageous situation
because of its past oppression during the Soviet period and because of the fact that
foreign religious organisations were much better off financially (Shterin and
Richardson 1998).19 Second, they argued that Orthodox Christianity was ‘the embodi-
ment of the Russian national tradition, the core of the Russian national identity, and
the guardian of the psychological well-being of the nation’ (Shterin and Richardson
1998, 321). As the pressure on the federal government to intervene in religious affairs
mounted from various segments of the society, including the ROC, the experiment
with ‘passive secularism’ rapidly drew to an end.
As a result, in 1997, the state authorities in Russia formally renounced the neutrality
that allowed equal access of all religious communities in the public sphere. In 1997,
a new Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations was adopted, which
allowed certain groups to enjoy privileges in the public sphere, while others faced
various administrative obstacles. The preamble of the Law has identified Orthodox
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism as inseparable parts of the historical heri-
tage of Russia’s peoples and in effect provided them with the status of ‘privileged’
religions (Preston 2001, 784).20 After a process of registration, religious organisations
representing these religions were guaranteed the right to have access in the Russian
public sphere. Those religious groups that did not belong to traditional religions or
were not willing to be associated with the established clergy of recognised religions
had to face administrative restrictions imposed by the secular state authorities and
thus were denied the access to the public sphere.21 The efforts to contain or even
forbid the activity of non-traditional religious groups became the main reason for the
development of the new law in 1997, which became the founding element of the so-
called ‘traditional religions’ paradigm.22
The established Muslim clergy also expressed its support for the adoption of restrictive
measures through the 1997 Law on religion. The Head of the Central Spiritual Board of
Muslims in Ufa, Talgat Tadzhuddin, has been a long-time advocate of introducing legisla-
tion for the regulation of the religious sphere. The Chair of the Council of Muftis of Russia,
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 187

Ravil Gainutdin, also described Russia’s 1997 Law on religion as a notable step towards
support for traditional religions, which recognised Islam, along with Orthodox Christianity,
Buddhism, and Judaism, as an inalienable part of the heritage of the Russian people.23
The principles introduced in the 1997 Law guided subsequent national and regional
legislation. The 2000 update of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
stated that ensuring national security included ‘countering the negative influence of foreign
religious organisations and missionaries.’24 In 2002, the Federal Law on Combating
Extremist Activity was adopted. This Law targeted some religious groups by criminalising
a broad spectrum of their activities. On top of that, in 2006, the government passed the Law
on Public Associations, which mandated new reporting requirements for religious organisa-
tions. The required reporting included information on ‘organised events and activities’ and
funds received from abroad. Failure to file such reports or to complete them adequately
could result in the eventual suspension of the organisation’s activities. Beyond the national
level, the adoption of the restrictive law in 1997, mentioned above, triggered a wave of local
legal initiatives that limited religious practice in the regions.25
In the meantime, specific Islamic religious terminology and the ‘traditional/non-
traditional’ dichotomy gradually made their way into Russian public debates, often in
vaguely defined or outright misleading forms. Although no formal or expert definitions
were provided, notions of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ Islam started widely circulat-
ing in public discourse and finally entered the country’s official state rhetoric.

Islamic practice under passive secularism and the ‘traditional religions’

paradigm
The adoption of the 1990 Soviet Law on Religion was of paramount importance to Russia’s
faithful Muslim community. For the established clergy, more than anything else, it implied
liberation from the tight supervision of the CRA and escaping the heavy financial dues to the
Peace Foundation [Sovetskii Fond Mira].26 For groups aspiring to challenge the Soviet-era
Islamic establishment, liberal reforms and the spirit of perestroika served unprecedented
opportunities in Russian history to form autonomous religious organisations. For Russia’s
Muslim laypeople, the liberalisation of religious policy, first and foremost, fulfilled their dearest
and deepest spiritual needs and desires, such as the ability to receive Islamic education, travel
to Mecca for Hajj, restore Islamic heritage at home, and reconnect with fellow Muslims abroad.
Although many had their own vision for the future of Islam in Russia, what united most of
Muslim believers was the desire to bring Islam back into the public sphere.
In the first decade after the Soviet collapse, the numbers of Muslim communities,
mosques, and Islamic schools in many Russian regions have substantially increased. An
especially notable increase was recorded in historically Muslim populated areas of the
country. Thus, with respect to Muslim communities, in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, for
example, a 25 and 39-fold increase was recorded respectively.27 In Dagestan, according
to Bobrovnikov (2006), over the same period, the number of Islamic congregations
increased from 27 to 1,557 (a 57-fold increase).28 Most of these communities sought
to open their own mosques. Overall across Russia, between 1990 and 1997, the number
of functioning mosques increased from 160 to over 7,000.29 Mosques were freely built
by various Islamic communities both in Muslim-majority and predominantly Russian
populated areas.30
188 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

Muslim communities have also invested in developing Islamic education and publish-
ing, the halal food industry, and other aspects of Muslim lifestyle and culture. With respect
to Islamic schooling, for example, as of 1988, no formal Islamic education institutions
existed in Russia. The only two institutions on the territory of the Soviet Union that
provided such education, namely the Islamic madrasa Mir-Arab in Bukhara (est. 1945)
and the Islamic Institute in Tashkent (est. 1971), became remote and difficult to access
after the Soviet collapse. In 1988, the first Islamic school – madrasa Ismailiya – opened in
Moscow. Within a year, another two madrasas opened in Ufa and Kazan. In 1991, several
similar schools emerged in Dagestan and Chechnya. By the end of 1995, over 30 Islamic
schools were functioning in the country. Towards the end of the decade, such schools
were present in almost every city in Dagestan and in many other places across Russia.31
The quality of these schools and their faculty, however, remains to be seen.
Islamic broadcasting, media, and other means of mass communication, which were
practically non-existent in the Soviet period, also experienced a revival. Before 1989, the
only regular Islamic periodical in the Soviet Union was Muslims of the Soviet East (Sovet
Sharki Musulmonlari), the content of which was regulated by strict censorship rules.
Occasionally, relatively neutral articles on the Islamic faith appeared in the secular journal
Science and Religion (Nauka i Religiya). One of the earliest independent Islamic printed
publications that emerged on the eve of the Soviet collapse was the newspaper Tawhid. It
became known as an outlet of the newly emerging Party of the Islamic Revival. In 1990, the
Muslim Spiritual Board in Ufa resumed the publication of its old periodical Maglumat. The
first Islamic publishing house in post-Soviet Russia, Iman, opened in Kazan in 1991. After the
breakup of the Soviet-era central Muslim spiritual boards in Ufa and Dagestan, their multiple
successor organisations founded their own presses. Thus, in 1992 and 1994 the newspapers
Islam and Society and Islam Minbare were launched in Bashkortostan and Moscow respec-
tively. Within a few years, many newly established Muslim initiatives founded their own
newsletters and periodicals to publish religious articles and keep their communities up-to-
date on the latest news on their organisations, accomplishments, and meetings. About 40%
of these newspapers were published in the national languages of the respective Muslim
minorities. A large portion of the materials published in Russian language was translated
from Arabic.32 Although, the reach of these publications was relatively small – most issues
ran on a monthly basis and were distributed in a limited number of copies – they all
circulated freely across Russia’s regions, spreading Islamic religious messages.33
The development of the Islamic consumer market is directly related to the Russian
transition to market economy. A wide range of products, from halal groceries (religiously
acceptable according to Muslim law) to alcohol-free perfumes and Islamic women’s
clothing, became available for private consumption. Thus, some of the first halal butcher
shops in Russia emerged in Dagestan in 1990. They specialised on producing meat and
meat products as prescribed by Muslim law. With the growing demand for such
commodities, similar shops and cafes opened in other Russian regions. Over time,
many grocery items became available with self-proclaimed halal certification.34 Some
of the shops started to specialise exclusively on halal products.35 Soon tourism and
medical services with gender segregation became available.36 The possibility of Islamic
banking in Russia has become a topic of serious discussions.37 While both supply and
demand in the halal market increased, no attempt was made to centralise or supervise
this area in the early 1990s.
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 189

The visibility of Islam in the Russian public sphere also increased due to public celebra-
tions of religious holidays. After 1992, two major Islamic holidays, Uraza Bayram (Eid ul-Fitr)
and Kurban Bayram (Eid ul-Adha), were announced as public holidays in several Muslim-
majority Russian republics.38 Although these days were not regarded as national holidays on
the federal level, Muslims living in traditionally Russian populated areas celebrated these
days in their local communities. In daily life, Islamic religious symbols became increasingly
visible. Scripts in Arabic and Islamic calligraphy not only decorated the interior of mosques,
but also often adorned traditionally secular venues and art galleries. In addition, Islamic
religious themes were increasingly illustrated in the movies and theatres.
Moreover, some of the most active and ambitious members of Russia’s Muslim
community, such as Geidar Dzhemal, Muhammed Salakheddin, Shamil Sultanov,
Valiakhmet Sadur, and Mukaddas Bibarsov, went as far as to establish political move-
ments and religious parties. Thus, with the introduction of post-Soviet political liberal-
isation, Islamic political movements, such as the Party of Islamic Revival, Union of
Russia’s Muslims, Nur, Refakh, and several other movements emerged on the Russian
political scene.39 Until the enactment of the Federal Law on Political Parties of the
Russian Federation in 2001, technically, the creation of political parties on the grounds
of ethnic or religious affiliation was allowed.40
Hence, for several years Muslim communities thrived, regardless of their association
with official Islamic institutions or their doctrinal preferences. After surviving decades in
an atheistic Soviet regime, many Russian Muslims enjoyed a flowering of Islamic spirit,
education, and culture. Despite the growing concerns of communists and other ultra-
secularist groups about the proliferation of Islamic movements and sects, and the
worries of conservative members from the established Muslim clergy, who disliked the
competition of newly emerging Islamic authorities, the state did not intervene in
religious affairs. A diversity of Islamic communities thrived across the country. The
official discourse at the federal level in this period maintained a neutral tone with
respect to Islam and avoided making any deliberate distinctions between different
Islamic schools of thought or traditions.

The 1997 law and its consequences for Muslim religious practice
Regarded by many observers of religious life in Russia as a watershed event in post-Soviet
religious affairs, the adoption of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations opened a new era in state-religion relations in general and had a major
impact on state-Islam relations in particular. The law not only introduced a distinction
between traditional and non-traditional religions in Russia, but also added an additional
level of complexity to the intra-faith dispute within the indigenous Muslim community.
Upon adoption of the 1997 Law, religious groups were obliged to register with the
state in order to continue their activities in Russia. The doctrinal preferences of
particular Islamic communities and their relationship with the established clergy
often determined their ability to obtain legal status. In order to maintain a formal
status, Muslim communities had to join one of the state-approved umbrella organisa-
tions, which were predominantly identified with the Sunni branch of Islam and its
Hanafi legal school in the Volga-Ural region, and more broadly with the Shafii rites in
the Northern Caucasus.41
190 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

The ability to ‘comply’ with an ambiguous interpretation of a ‘traditional Islam’

increasingly became a criterion on whether Islamic groups could benefit from privileges
provided by the state or alternatively be discriminated against. While the Muslim clergy
and the expert community still debate what ‘traditional Islam’ means, policymakers both
at the regional and federal levels have put it to practical use. The concept was directly
referred to when denying certain Islamic organisations access in the public sphere and
even when persecuting groups that did not register with the state.
The change was primarily reflected in the adoption of new norms regarding religious
education and the accreditation of imams. Secular state authorities had long suspected
that foreign-educated Muslim clergymen had been spreading radical Islam in the
country. In light of growing concerns that ‘alien’ interpretations of Islam were gaining
a foothold in Russia, the state authorities initially revised the education curricula and
activities of several Islamic religious institutions, which in a number of cases led to
closures or mergers of the institutions.42 Moreover, the state actively engaged in the
establishment of new Islamic education institutions and the development of
a standardised religious curriculum.43 Some regions introduced regulatory measures
that required imams educated abroad to have their diploma certified by local authorities
before they could start preaching in Russia.44
I the midst of the 1990s, it became evident that the radicalisation of some indigenous
Muslims posed a threat to public safety. The war in Chechnya and the ‘Islamisation of
the conflict prompted Russia’s secular state leadership to develop a distinct approach
towards ‘non-traditional Islamic groups’, which were labelled as radical Islamist extre-
mists and Muslim sects (Yakupov 2003, 2004). The so-called ‘securitisation of Islam’ led
not only to the exclusion of these groups from the Russian public sphere but also served
as a basis on which to take repressive measures against them.
As a result of the legal measures that have been implemented in Russia since 1997,
individuals adhering to marginal Islamic factions, such as Nursists (followers of Said Nursi
and Fethullah Gulen) or Tablighi Jamaat, have been levelled with various allegations. People
suspected of participating in Hizb ut-Tahrir were charged under the Criminal Code Article
2822 for being a member in a banned organisation. In 2004, the Russian Ministry of Justice
started to compile a federal list of extremist literature. One of the first bans was issued in
April 2004 by the Savelovskii Court of Moscow which ruled that Mohammed Abdul-
Wahhab’s The Book of the Unity of God (Kitab at-Tawhid) was illegal in Russia. In May 2007,
the Koptevskiy Court of Moscow outlawed Russian translations of 14 Islamic religious texts
authored by the Turkish theologian Said Nursi. As of August 2014, according to the Russian
Ministry of Justice, there were 2,500 items on the list of banned extremist materials.45
At the same time, strengthening the ‘traditional religions’ paradigm brought about
increasing support for Russia’s established Muslim clergy, most notably through the
federal Fund for Islamic Culture and Education and the Interreligious Council,
a consultative body founded in January 1999. The Fund assisted the projects of traditional
Muslim religious organisations of Russia aimed at the development of Islamic culture and
education. Through these projects, ‘traditional’ Muslim religious organisations became
partners of the state in promoting religious tolerance, preventing Islamophobia, develop-
ing and strengthening social harmony and the spiritual and moral education of children
and youth, and empowering families in the Russian society.46
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 191

On 1 February 2013, President Putin reiterated the position of secular state authorities
towards ‘traditional religions’. He pointed out that

The Russian Orthodox Church and our other traditional faiths must have all the possibilities
for carrying out full and real service in important areas such as supporting families and
mothers, raising and educating children, youth policy, resolving the many social problems
we still face, and strengthening patriotic spirit in the Armed Forces. This is a response to
people’s vital need for moral support and spiritual guidance (Putin 2013).

Traditional religious organisations actively participate in state programmes aimed at

the preservation and restoration of important historical sites and monuments.
Moreover, the presence of the established religious clergy has significantly increased
in hospitals, homes for the aged and infirm, and military units. Many of these
activities occurred in the context of various mutual social partnership agreements
between state bodies and traditional religious organisations both at the federal and
provincial levels. As Nabiev describes, the role of traditional religious institutions in
contemporary Russia is no longer confined to spiritual matters; it is increasingly vital
to areas such as organisation of philanthropic activities, social work, and the upbring-
ing of youth (Nabiev 2014).
Yet, an important dilemma still exists with regard to the institutional infrastructure of
‘traditional Islam’ and the role that various Muslim Spiritual Boards play in contemporary
Russian society. Part of the difficulty is that members and the leadership of the estab-
lished Muslim clergy disagree on a number of issues. These have to do with the status of
Islam in Russia vis-à-vis the ROC, debates over the introduction of religious education, in
particular Orthodox Christianity, in the public school curriculum, or the federal law
project on military chaplains. Most importantly, there is an unresolved question of
representation, namely what constitutes the spheres of influence of Muslim Spiritual
Boards and who should and can speak on behalf of all Muslims in Russia.47 So far, Mufti
Ravil Gainutdin, Moscow-based head of the Russian Council of Muftis, and Mufti Talgat
Tadzhuddin, Ufa-based chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of
Russia, leaders of two of the three largest and competing Muslim Spiritual Boards in
Russia (the third one oversees the Caucasus), have not been able to reach an agreement.
While Mufti Gainutdin believes that the civil rights of Muslims in Russia need protection,
according to Tadzhuddin, ‘it is stupid and blasphemous to talk about suppression of
Islam in Russia’.48
Despite persisting internal disagreements within the established clergy, the overall
position of major state-approved Muslim organisations has significantly improved in
comparison to their presence in the 1990s. As Dannreuther has put it, ‘the official Muslim
establishment feels more secure than was the case during the Yeltsin period’ and ‘its
role as a recognized intermediary with the state has been confirmed’ (Dannreuther 2010,
120). Yet, the fact that state officials have supported the efforts of ‘traditional’ Islamic
organisations also makes these religious institutions and their leaders more vulnerable
to the accusation that they have been co-opted and corrupted by the state. Bitter
memories from the Soviet past, when the religious clergy was exploited by the com-
munist regime, continue to linger in the minds of believers.
According to long-time observers of religious freedom in the country, ambiguous
state policies may eventually engender resentment and misunderstandings among
192 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

Russia’s indigenous Muslim population. Experts argue that the Russian government’s
broad-brush approach towards religious groups, to say the least, is dubious, due to its
arbitrary application of ‘vague anti-extremism laws against religious adherents and
others who pose no credible threat to security’ (USCIRF 2011, Verkhovsky 2007a). With
that in mind, one might recall Aislu Yunusova’s observation, when she compared the
attempts to limit or even outlaw the activity of ‘non-traditional’ religious groups in the
late 1990s with the Soviet efforts to ban jazz, rock, and karate, which were also
considered harmful to Russian youth and society (Yunusova 1997).49

Conclusion
This contribution examined two distinct policy trends towards Islam in Russia between
1990 and 2017. The analysis of the transformation of neutral policies in the early 1990s
into regulatory policies in the 2000s suggests that the change has had a significant
impact on Muslim religious practices. Two different ethno-confessional regimes can be
observed: the persistence of the laissez faire attitudes of the Russian state towards Islam
between 1990 and 1997; and the state’s subsequent involvement with Islamic affairs
from 1997 onwards. They shed light on the dynamics of Islamic revival in post-Soviet
Russia. The reasons behind this transformation is a related but different subject, deser-
ving a separate discussion beyond the scope of this contribution.
Understanding the dynamics of change in Russian religious policy is important for
a number of reasons. State attitudes towards religion have a strong impact on the devel-
opment of systematic responses to confessional discords, the improvement of social inclu-
sion practices, and the strengthening of religious freedoms and human rights. Both the
Russian state leadership and many careful observers of Islam in the country acknowledge
that resolving these issues remains a priority for the country’s future. A deeper under-
standing of how secular states deal with religious pluralism may help overcome some of the
social challenges facing contemporary Russia to build better futures for its peoples.

Notes
1. Fagan (2012), Verkhovsky (2007a, 2012)), Annual reports of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom on Russia http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/russia#annual-
reports-chapters-summaries (Last accessed 28 August 2018).
2. For a broader discussion of resurgence of religion in Russia, see Juergensmeyer (2009) and
Stepaniants (2017).
3. No reliable statistics are available on this. However, for further discussion, see Goble (2009),
Akhunov (2017).
4. ‘Ochered’ za pyatym stolpom’ (2007), Goble (2009). Russia’s quota was increased from
20,500 people to 25,000 in 2007. This was interpreted as an effort to improve relations
between Russia and the Islamic world.
5. For a discussion of similarities and differences between the RSFSR and the USSR versions of
the law, see Berman (1998), Roth (1990).
6. For a broader critical assessment of the post-Soviet religious policy in Russia, see Fagan
(2012), Golovushkin (2010), annual reports of the SOVA Center on the use of ‘Anti-extremist
legislation’, Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova (2009), and the Annual reports of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom. Despite the claim that the Russian
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 193

government since the 2000s puts severe restrictions on religion, overall religious practice is
much more tolerated than it ever was in Soviet times.
7. For more details on this and Islamic movements of Ahmadiyya, Bahaism, and Wahhabism,
see Pilkington and Yemelianova (2003), and Valentine (2008).
8. For a detailed analysis of ‘establishment Islam’ and ‘parallel Islam’ in the Soviet Union, see
Ro’i (2000). This study does not argue that Islam is monolithic in its nature. It acknowledges
the historical existence and value of multiple theological interpretations of the Islamic faith.
It recognises that in the context of Russia, intra-faith debates took various forms depending
on geographical specificities, attitudes toward religious innovation, or even urban and rural
division. What the study emphasises is that the Russian state’s attitudes toward these
debates during the 1990s and the 2000s have not been the same.
9. The Fund for support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education is a non-profit charitable
foundation established in 2006. See http://www.islamfund.ru/ (Accessed 30 August 2018).
10. ‘Rustam Minnikhanov’, 4 September 2017.
11. In the context of this study, state-religion regime is a coherent set of principles, norms, and
rules that systematically regulates state policies toward religion. For a detailed discussion of
differences between various secular regimes, see Kuru (2009).
12. By access to the public sphere I mean the ability of religious groups to freely participate in
public affairs as a group and use public spaces for their services and other meetings.
13. For a detailed discussion of the differences between the USSR and RSFSR versions of the
1990 law, see Hirszowicz, 1990.
14. See the RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion.
15. For details, see the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
16. For more on religious policy of liberalisation under Gorbachev see Anderson (1994,
137–181), and Bourdeaux (1990).
17. For further discussion of the 1990 Law, see Shterin and Richardson (1998).
18. The Russian Constitution of 1993 reaffirmed central provisions of the 1990 RSFSR law by
providing guarantees of individual liberties. See Article 14 of the 1993 Russian Constitution.
Also, see Preston (2001, 783).
19. See also the letter of Patriarch Alexii II to Vyacheslav Polosin, Chairman of the Freedom of
Conscience Committee of the Supreme Council, 28 April 1993.
20. In addition, the document gave special recognition to the Orthodoxy, which ‘made
a special contribution to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development
of Russia’s spirituality and culture’ (Preston 2001, 784).
21. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses or Tablighi Jamaat. For a detailed discussion, see Fagan (2012).
22. The ‘traditional religions’ paradigm is a pattern of thought based on the assumption that
certain religions deserve special privileges because of their size, geographical range, as well
as the history of presence in Russia. For a detailed discussion of the 1997 Law and its
provisions, see Lekhel (1999, 167), Durham and Homer (1998, 101), Davis (1997), Shterin
and Richardson (1998, 2000)).
23. Reportedly, representatives of the Council of Muftis participated in the preparation of the
Law, where their opinion and proposals were carefully considered (Preston 2001).
24. The (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000) (Kontseptsiia Natsional’noi
Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii). Approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of
10 January 2000.
25. For example, see the 1998 Law on Religion in the Republic of Dagestan, the 1999 law ‘On
the ban of the Wahhabi and any other Extremist Activity on the Territory of the Republic of
Dagestan’, the 1999 Law on Religion in Tatarstan, the 2001 law banning extremist religious
activity in Kabardino-Balkaria. For details, see Yemelianova (1999, 2009)), Ware (2000,
2003)), Bobrovnikov (2011), and Fagan (2012, 161).
26. For a discussion of the structure and functions of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) see
Anderson (1991). For a brief discussion of the Soviet Peace Foundation, see Mukhetdinov
and Khabutdinov (2011).
194 B. AKHMETKARIMOV

27. See Mukhametshin (2009) and Sagitova (2009, 129).

28. Most of Islamic institutions in Dagestan, however, did not have state registration at the
time (Bobrovnikov 2006).
29. Testimony by Paul Goble at the public hearing before The Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. 17 December 2009.
30. Many of these mosques turned into local centres of Islamic education, some of which soon
developed into formal religious schools known as madrasas.
31. Silantyev (2008, 97).
32. See Silantyev (2008, 116–122). For an excellent analysis of the linguistic aspects of the post-
Soviet Islamic revival in Russia, see Bustanov and Kemper (2013).
33. At the time, Islamic TV, radio broadcasting, and the Internet could not contribute to the
process as much, largely due to financial, technical, and technological constraints.
34. Brands such as Zhineral and Albarakat, for instance, became very well known for their
alcohol-free perfumes and women’s clothing.
35. Apel’sin chain stores could be an example.
36. Companies such as Idel-Hajj, for example, specialised in organisation of tours to Saudi
Arabia for Hajj and Umrah.
37. For a discussion of the prospects of Islamic finance and banking in Russia, see Bekkin (2007, 2010).
38. For a brief commentary on the topic, see Kurban Bairam (2011).
39. Among these movements only Nur took part in the 1995 parliamentary elections indepen-
dently, barely winning 0.5% of the votes. Others, with a variety degree of success, entered
into coalition with other secular parties of Russia. See Silantyev (2008, 63–96).
40. Federal Law on Political Parties of the Russian Federation. Enacted by the State Duma on
21 June 2001. Approved by the Federation Council on 29 June 2001.
41. For a more detailed discussion on Islamic diversity in Russia, see Malashenko (2000),
Yarlykapov (2008) and Mukhametshin (2009).
42. For a discussion of cases related to the infamous Islamic madrasas Yoldyz and Al-Furqan,
see Silantyev (2008).
43. ‘Edinyj standart’ (2015).
44. In 2003, for example, the local Muslim spiritual board of the Republic of Tatarstan con-
ducted its own re-licensing programme. By 2004, about 800 of the 1,200 imams in the
Republic of Tatarstan passed the re-licensing programme. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/
print.php?act=news&id=17429 (Last access 30 August 2018).
45. http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials?field_extremist_content_value=&page=12
(Accessed 8 February 2019).
46. According to Dannreuther, much of the funding was directed ‘towards supporting the
official Islamic establishment and the promotion of a moderate Russian Islam’ (Dannreuther
2010, 120).
47. See, for example, the statement of Mufti Gainutdin on the position of the Council of Muftis
of Russia on the federal law project ‘On Military Priests.’ Moscow, 11 March 2006. Also see
Mufti Gainutdin’s statement on the proposals to introduce courses on Russian Orthodox
Culture at state schools in Gainutdin, Islam: Otvet na vyzovy vremeni (Moscow, 2011),
457–461. Also see Verkhovsky (2007b). On a polemic between Mufti Gainutdin and Mufti
Tadzhuddin, see ‘Prominent Muslim leader disagrees’ (2010).
48. ‘Prominent Muslim leader disagrees’ (2010).
49. Yunusova refers to the 1981 decree banning sports clubs that taught ‘ideologically danger-
ous’ activities, like karate. See Yunusova (1997).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 RELIGION, STATE & SOCIETY 195

Notes on contributor
Bulat Akhmetkarimov is Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, Kazan
Federal University, Russia. His research interests include religion and politics, nationalism, and
Islam in Russia.

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