Culture and Communalism

Author(s): K. N. Panikar
Source: Social Scientist , Mar. - Apr., 1993, Vol. 21, No. 3/4 (Mar. - Apr., 1993), pp. 24-31
Published by: Social Scientist

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517629

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K.N. PANIKAR*

Culture and Communalism**

The recent upsurge of Hindu communalism being generally viewed as a

political phenomenon, resistance to it is naturally sought in the terrain
of politics. The secular political formations-parties, voluntary groups
and organisations-have resorted to demonstrative political actions
like rallies, meetings and fasts to counter the communal challenge.
That Hindu communalism is bidding for political power and is active
in the political space are too obvious to be stated. Its perspective of
power, however, is not confined to electoral success. Electoral success is
envisaged as the end-product of the social acceptance of its cultural
and ideological hegemony. Culture, therefore, is central to Hindu
communalism, as a means of mobilisation as well as an integral part of
its political goal.
What constitutes culture is often differently conceptualised. The
number of its definitions is a legion. Hindu communalism too has con-
structed its own version which imparts to culture an all-comprehensive
character, embracing political, religious and social activities. In its
conception, therefore, culture is not one of the elements of national life,
but represents the totality of national life. Consequently, Hindu com-
munalism does not differentiate between culture and politics; in its
scheme culture is integral to politics.
The Hindu communal thought has articulated this integral charac-
ter in different ways on different occasions. The earliest and one of the
most unambiguous expositions was by Golwalkar in his writings span-
ning the 1930s and 40s. 'We have forgotten', he wrote, 'that politics is
only a part and parcel of the comprehensive life. Life is higher and
wider than politics. The vital component of life is not politics, but cul-
ture.' Establishing the primacy of culture was not Golwalkar's real
intention. In fact, he was using culture to bring religion to the centre-
stage. For, in India, he argued, religion and culture are synony-
mous: 'In Hindustan, religion is an all-absorbing entity ... and forms

Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

*This artide is based on a lecture delivered at Bombay as part of Anhad Garje, a festi-
val organised by Sahmat, on 18-20 February 1993.

Social Scientist, Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4, March-April, 1993

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 CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 25

its very soul. With us every action in life, individual, social or politi-
cal is a command of religion ... we are what our religion has made us . .
. and so with us culture is but a product of our all-comprehensive reli-
gion, a part of its body and not distinguishable from it.'
What logically follows in Golwalkar's analysis is the construction
of a national religion and national culture. The 'all-comprehensive
religion' of the Indian nation is Hinduism, of which the national cul-
ture is a product. Golwalkar affirmed this as follows: 'In Hindustan,
the land of the Hindu, lives and should live the Hindu nation ... con-
sequently only those movements are truly "national" as aim at rebuild-
ing, revitalising, and emancipating from its present stupor, the Hindu
nation.... All those posing to be partriots and wilfully indulging in a
course of action detrimental to the Hindu nation are traitors and ene-
mies, or to take a more charitable view . . . mere simpletons, misguided
ignorant fools.'
Golwalkar was laying down the 'true' character of a national
movement at a time when the anti-colonial national movement was
locked in a continuous struggle against British imperialism. Dismissing
anti-colonial nationalism as negative, Golwalkar sought to construct
the idea of Hindu cultural nationalism by tracing a 'logical' connection
between culture, religion and nation. Hindu communalism was not
known for anti-colonial patriotism; but was always eager for compro-
mise and collaboration with British imperialism. Not surprisingly,
therefore, anti-colonial nationalism, in Hindu communal discourse,
was nothing but pseudo-nationalism and its protagonists were pseudo-
nationalists. Incidentally, the first to earn this distinction was
Mahatma Gandhi who was so described by V.D. Savarkar, the high
priest of Hindu nationalism.
Golwalkar's effort to conceptualise a culturally specific nationalism
was ahistorical. Apart from the fallacy of treating religion and cul-
ture as synonymous (despite their connection they were quite distinct
from each other), he overlooked the dynamics of the historical evolu-
tion of Indian society and focused on the Hindu religion as the guiding
force of Indian nationhood. Predictably non-Hindus had no place in the
nation he envisaged: 'Non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either
adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold
in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorifi-
cation of the Hindu race and culture ... they must cease to be foreigners
or may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation,
claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential
treatment, not even citizen rights.' The lesson of the Jews of Germany
under Hitler that Golwalkar held out to non-Hindus was quite omi-
nous.

Ascribing a negative character to anti-colonial nationalism,

Golwalkar indeed focused on a major weakness of the freedom struggle.
It had shied away, possibly for pragmatic reasons, from conceptualis-

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26 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

ing the cultural content of Indian nationalism. Also, its popular strug-
gles did not witness an integration of political and cultural struggles.
Therefore, what Indian nationalism represented beyond anti-
colonialism was left vague and uncertain. Despite this debility, anti-
colonial nationalism was not essentially negative, as argued by
Golwalkar. It had a modern political perspective comprehended
within its three important political ideas-democracy, secularism and
civil liberties. While rejecting anti-colonial nationalism, Golwalkar
was also rejecting these political principles.
The Hindutva movement has inherited, adopted and elaborated
these ideas of cultural nationalism as propounded by Golwalkar and
has sought to implement them as a political programme. The leaders
of the Sangh Parivar have articulated it in different ways both in
words and in action: cautiously by Advani, subtly by Vajpayee, crudely
by Uma Bharati and vulgarly by Ritambhara. While justifying the
BJP's attempts to integrate religion and politics, Vajpayee has
recently asked in his usual rhetoric-'Should politics be irreligious?'
In the vocabulary of the Sangh Parivar nation would easily substitute
for politics, thereby making Hindu rashtra a legitimate political
ideal.
Much before the BJP had made Hindu cultural nationalism its main
plank, its predecessors-the Hindu Maha Sabha and the Jana Sangh-
had adopted a similar political posture, though without success. They
has also patterned their political programme for the attainment of a
Hindu rashtra. Yet, they did not have the same success as the BJP in
appealing to the imagination of the people.
There are indeed several historical con)unctures which have made
the BJP's advance possible during the last few years. One of the deci-
sive factors, however, was the innovative invocation of cultural sym-
bols which helped to create a sense of identity among the Hindus with
the Hindutva programme and thus make them either participants or
supporters of communal politics.
Although appropriation of cultural symbols and their deployment
for political mobilisation has become particularly effective only in
the recent past, the members of the Sangh Parivar had initiated the
process much earlier. For instance, in 1963 the RSS took the initiative
to celebrate the birth centenary of Vivekananda and to build a memo-
rial for him at Kanyakumari. The Tamilnadu government had initia-
lly refused permission for the memorial, presumably due to the opposi-
tion of local Christians. The RSS was then able to project the memorial
as a 'national' cause and managed to get the support of 235 members of
parliament. These MPs, needless to say, did not subscribe to the ideo-
logy of the RSS; yet, given the place of Vivekananda in national life,
they had no option but to support the project. The Tamilnadu govern-
ment was eventually pressurised to give permission. The RSS went on
to build the memorial and a Vivekananda Kendra at Kanyakumari.

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 CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 27

Since then Vivekananda has become a symbol of Hindu cultural

nationalism, appropriated and projected by the Parivar. It is not acci-
dental that the BJP has a substantial following in Kanyakumari, one
of the two places where its presence is felt in Tamilnadu.
The secularists who had earlier dismissed Vivekananda as a revi-
valist and an obscurantist have now woken up to recognise the influence
of Vivekananda in popular consciousness. The secular opinion today
abounds with Vivekananda's views on religion which contradict what
the Sangh Parivar attributes to Vivekananda. Unfortunately, secular-
ists are about thirty years late and Vivekananda has already passed
into communal mythology. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
retrieve him now.
Since 1963 Hindu communalism has experimented with many cul-
tural symbols, drawn from the Hindu religion and tradition. None of
them really succeeded in capturing the popular imagination till Ram
was brought to the centrestage in the last decade. What happened
after that has derailed the long-nourished democratic and secular
ethos of Indian society. It happened only because the Hindutva move-
ment took Ram to the people through symbols to which they could
easily relate. Beginning with Ram Sila Puja, the Parivar resorted to a
series of symbolic acts: Ram Jyotis, Ram Padukas, Ram Prasad, Ram
Pataka, Ram Gulal, and so on. Ram, Ayodhya and the mandir were
thus brought close to the social and cultural life of the people. In doing
so what the SanghParivar has achieved is to identify itself with the
cultural life of the Hindus and to project itself as the champion of
their religion.
The resurgence of Hindutva in the recent past, to a large measure,
drew upon the mobilising potential of religio-cultural symbols. But
then religious symbols have been invoked earlier also. Hindu commu-
nal political formations like the Hindu Maha Sabha and the Jana
Sangh had tried to exploit religion. Cultural nationalism was on their
agenda too. However, they did not enjoy the same success as the BJP
has reaped recently.
The invocation and appropriation of cultural symbols in themselves
would not ensure the communication of their message to the people.
Even if these symbols form part of the social consciousness their mes-
sage needs to be concretised and conveyed. What is essential for that is
an institutional infrastructure. The success of the BJP in making these
symbols meaningful and thus effecting communal mobilisation lies
precisely in the institutional support at its command. Through long and
sustained work it has succeeded in setting up a network of organisations
which practically embraces almost all walks of life, be it education,
media, music or the visual arts. One scholar has estimated the number
of such organisations at 600 with their branches spreading all over the
country. But for the support of these organisations the cultural symbols
invoked by Hindu communalism would not have reached the people

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28 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

and influenced their consciousness. But for them Ram Sila Puja would
not have acquired a mass character, the Rath Yatra would not have
become a 'national' event and the vandalism of December 6 at
Ayodhya would not have been possible.
The strategy of building up these front organisations has been
guided by local circumstances. For instance, in Kerala, where a large
number of village temples were in a stage of decay, renovation commit-
tees have been used as a ploy to attract the believers to the fold of the
Sangh Parivar. The meetings of these committees, accompanied by kir-
tans, religious discourses and semi-political speeches, were effective
platforms for the propaganda of Hindutva. Those who participated in
them for purely religious reasons were soon turned into supporters of
Hindu communal politics.
A major support base of Hindutva is the network of schools orga-
nised throughout the country. It is difficult to ascertain the exact num-
ber of these schools. For, in each state and region they have different
nomenclatures and controlling bodies. Some of the common names of the
schools are Saraswati Shishu Mandir, Vidya Bharati, Gyan Bharati
and Gita Vidyalaya. One recent estimate places the number of these
schools at 10,000, which may well be much below the actual mark.
The curriculum of these schools follows the guidelines laid down by
the education departments of each state. Yet, they have enough lee-
way to mould the attitude of the students through extracurricular
activities and additional readings for moral education. The Parivar's
publishing houses like Sanskar Bharati Prakashan and Bharatiya
Siksha Samiti produces books for these schools. In the schools of
Rajasthan two series of books are used-Sanskar Saurab and Naithik
Siksha. Much before the M.P. and U.P. governments took steps to
rewrite textbooks these books were in circulation, imparting to in young
minds Hindu religious consciousness and communal ideology. The focus
of these books is religious and their message communal. Extracts from
Hindu scriptures, stories from Hindu mythology and the heroism of
Hindu kings against Muslim rulers are their main content.
The front cover of Sanskar Saurab has a picture of greater India
with a goddess holding Bhagawat dwaja and leaning on a lion. At the
back is a particularly muscular Sri Ram with bow and arrow placed
above the proposed mandir at Ayodhya.
Inside the book there are several boxes highlighting extracts
designed to ensure the Hindu identity. One of them reads as follows-
'We are Hindus and Hindustan is ours. We are its original inhabitants
and we have been living here from the beginning. Earlier we used to
call it Aryavarth. Now it is Bharat. The people of Bharat are the
children of Bharat.'
In Sanskar Saurab no. 3, meant for students of class five, one of the
lessons is on the karseva of 30 October 1990. It narrates the martyrdom
of two youths from Rajasthan, the Kothari brothers, in the cause of the

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 CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 29

mandir at Ayodhya, in language which makes out their death to be

one of the most heroic episodes in contemporary history. This lesson is
followed by an exercise, containing four questions: 1. What is karseva?
2. Why would 30 October 1990 be remembered? 3. Where would Ram
mandir be constructed? 4. Write in your own words the story of the mar
tyrdom of the Kothari brothers.
Given the perspective inherent in these books, their impact on chil-
dren at an impressionable age can hardly be overstated. Not surpri-
singly these schools have been very potent vehicles of Hindu religious,
cultural and communal propaganda. They have also been fertile ground
for recruitment of cadres for Hlindutva. Even if each school on an
average turn out fifty students every year the Parvar's gain of ideolo-
gically oriented supporters is substantial. The Parivar has obviously
struck a goldmine.
Another field the Sangh Parivar has effectively harnessed is the
media. It has a publication in every language, in some cases more than
one. It even controlled a vernacular language news service. In 1970 this
news service had 1000 correspondents spread over 24 news centres, most
of whom either overtly or covertly contributed to the dissemination of
communal ideology. Although this news service had to be disbanded
during the Emergency, the supporters of Hindu communalism have now
succeeded in having a substantial presence in almost all newspapers.
This is not accidental, but the result of a well-planned strategy. Conse-
quently, several newspapers now carry the Hindutva clamour without
any restraint and several others endeavour to strike a balance between
the secular and the communal. One suspects that the secular is increas-
ingly losing out in this struggle.
Several other examples of the Parivar's appropriation of the cul-
tural realm can be cited. In fact, there is no area of cultural activity in
which the Parivar has not established its foothold through effective
intervention. It has not only realised the mobilising potential of cul-
ture, but has also taken steps to carry to the people a communally con-
structed culture through a network of well-planned organisations. It is
not an effort to meet the immediate and the contingent, but an invest-
ment for the future.
So far the secular forces, despite their positive assertions in the
recent past, have not been able to stem the communal advance. There
are indeed several reasons for it. One of them is the divergence in the
basic assumptions of the contending forces: namely the secular and the
communal. Their notions of political principles and behaviour also
vary. In other words, they do not share a common ground rule. The
Hindu communal approach to nationalism, referred to earlier, in a
way, reflects this disparity. When Golwalkar and his present-day
disciples dismiss anti-colonial nationalism as negative and champion
Hindu cultural nationalism they are in fact rejecting some of the posi-
tive modern ideas generated by the anti-colonial movement-demo-

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30 SOCIAL SCIENTIST

cracy, secularism anid civil liberties. The Hindu communal political

culture is devoid of these fundamental principles of modem polity
enshrined in the constitution and accepted by our society as central to
national life. In their place Hindutva has adopted and pursued coer-
cion, hatred and intolerance. In ordering their activities, the secular
forces do not seem to take cognizance of this reality. They appear to
assume that the Parivar would respect democratic norms. The recent
events amply prove that this belief is totally misplaced. Conse-
quently, the earlier methods of anti-communal struggle based on this
unfounded belief have become infructuous. Inevitably, the methods
have to be changed and changed fast.
In evolving alternate methods of struggle it would be useful to make
a distinction between the communally convinced and the communally
mobilised. All those who now support communalism are not necessarily
hardcore communalists. Many of them do not share the belief in the
political goal of Hindu Rashtra or even the coercive methods of
Hindutva. They positively disapprove of riots and killing of fellow
citizens. Yet, they share the cultural assumptions of communal argu-
ments and propaganda. Ihe communally mobilised are fast becoming
communally convinced, given the relentless communal endeavour to
transform their consciousness.
The secular offensive has necessarily to be two-pronged. First, to
stop the advance of the communally convinced, and second, to retrieve
the consciousness of the communally mobilised. The first calls for a
frontal confrontation with communalism, recognising that communal-
ism thrives on aggression and lies. It should involve a denial of free
space for communal politics and activities.
Bringing back to the secular fold the communally mobilised as well
as preserving the existing secular space is a far more urgent and chal-
lenging task. It involves a long-term strategy of retrieving and con-
structing the secular consciousness.
In pursuing this objective the possibilities inherent in the realm of
culture have not been fully realised so far. Given the communal con-
struction of cultural nationalism, the secular endeavour has to begin
with a conception of positive nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm's recent
argument that the basic characteristic of the modem nation and every-
thing connected with it is its modernity is a useful criterion to follow.
Although no modem nation can do without a reappraisal of tradition
and its place in society, a modem nation cannot be brought into exist-
ence by replicating the past. In India, therefore, the concept of nation
has to steer clear of Hindu cultural nationalism and take into account
the historical evolution of regional cultures and their relationship
with the national. More importantly, it should be sensitive to cultural
plurality within regions as well as within religions.
The secular offensive in the realm of culture, despite the good work
of a few organisations like Sahmat, Ekta and Sampradayakata

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 CULTURE AND COMMUNALISM 31

Virodhi Andolan and theatre groups like Jana Natya Manch and
Nishant, has not gone much beyond the projection of the composite cul-
ture of the past. Its impact has been very limited. What is immedi-
ately required is an all-out effort to expand the secular cultural space.
It can be achieved only through a vigorous movement which would
strive for a secular ethos through cultural endeavour, contending with
and seeking to replace the fast advancing communal ethos. The move-
ment should aim to organise, on a large scale, an institutional infras-
tructure of newspapers, audio-visual production centres, theatre
groups, music societies, local history associations, publishing houses,
environmental groups, literacy activity and so on. In other words, fora
for alternative secular activity should be made available to the
people. These organisations should be supplemented by a chain of local
cultural committees in villages, mohallas, districts, etc., which would
form the nodal points of dissemination of secular culture. These com-
mittees would be the media through which the secular cultural work
of organisations would reach out to the people.
The local cultural committees suggested above are distinct in pur-
pose and function from the defence and relief committees which have
sprung up in different parts of the country after 6 December. The latter
have either prevented riots as in Bhiwandi and Sonapur, or contained
violence as in Aligarh and in certain localities of Bombay. The former
is envisioned to discharge an entirely different function, namely, creat-
ing an alternate sphere of secular activity at the local level. It is
through local nuclei that Hindu communalism has built up its cultural
and ideological hegemony. Its political power is firmly rooted in the
undertakings of the local units of its cultural organisations. Contending
with communalism, therefore, has to begin at these grassroot levels.
The possible tendency of such a quest is to become reactive in character.
Instead it should grow independent of and distinct from the existing
communal endeavour. In other words, the vision of the activists of
local cultural committees should not be confined to anti-communalism,
but positive secularism.
The assumption behind this proposition is that secularism, to be
meaningful in a multi-religious society like India, has to be a social
reality and not purely a political principle. Yet, it cannot become so
without an organic connection between secular politics and secular cul-
ture. Hindutva has succeeded in establishing the connection between
communal politics and communally constructed culture. If 'the light of
knowledge is to be brought to this benighted land' and 'strike your
thunderbolt on the prison wall around Faith', to borrow Rabindranath
Tagore's eloquent words, the secular movement has to build a social
consciousness through the terrain of culture.

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