UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

SCHOOL OF LAW
BAR OPERATIONS

WARRIORS' NOTES
LABOR LAW
2 0 1 9

Researchers:
Ela Gaye Diole Perez
Christian Kong
Eunice Soriano Baliong
Prepared by: Johanna Anne Marie Wee
Labor Law Warrior Notes Team Kendrick Siao
Prabindranath Saludsod Polito

Senior Adviser: Proof Reader:

Atty. Jefferson M. Marquez Leana Rae D. Rondez

Junior Adviser: Layout:

Atty. Mark Lawrence C. Badayos
Karol Grace G. Oroceo
 Table of Contents
GENERAL PROVISIONS .................................................................................................................. 3

PRE-EMPLOYMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3

Recruitment and Placement of Local and Migrant Workers .......................................... 3

LABOR STANDARDS ....................................................................................................................... 4

WAGES ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Leaves ........................................................................................................................................ 4

SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION .................................................................................................... 5

SS Law ......................................................................................................................................... 5

Disability and Death Benefits................................................................................................... 5

Agrarian Reform ............................................................................................................................ 9

LABOR RELATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 11

Rights of Labor Organizations ............................................................................................... 11

POST-EMPLOYMENT ..................................................................................................................... 12

Employer-Employee Relationship ......................................................................................... 12

Termination by Employer ....................................................................................................... 15

Termination by Employee ...................................................................................................... 22

Reliefs from Illegal Dismissal ................................................................................................... 23

Retirement ............................................................................................................................... 24

MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.................................................................................................... 25

JURISDICTION AND RELIEFS ..................................................................................................... 25

Labor Arbiter ........................................................................................................................ 25

NLRC...................................................................................................................................... 26

Voluntary Arbitrator............................................................................................................. 27

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 2019 LABOR LAW SYLLABUS-BASED
WARRIORS NOTES
GENERAL PROVISIONS
PRE-EMPLOYMENT
Recruitment and Placement
of Local and Migrant Workers
1. When is illegal recruitment
considered to be committed in large
scale?
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. The elements of
the offense are: (a) the offender has no valid
license or authority to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) he undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of "recruitment
and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and (c) he
commits the same against three or more
persons, individually or as a group. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage.
(People v. Racho y Somera, G.R. No. 227505,
[October 2, 2017])
2. Can a person be convicted for both
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa?
Case law holds that the same pieces of
evidence that establish liability for illegal
recruitment in large scale confirm culpability
for Estafa.
3
In People v. Chua: We agree with the
appellate court that the same pieces of
evidence which establish appellant's liability
for illegal recruitment in large scale likewise
confirm her culpability for estafa. It is well
established in jurisprudence that a person
may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason
therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while
estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
(People v. Racho y Somera, G.R. No. 227505,
October 2, 2017)
3. What is the liability of corporate
directors and officers with the
recruitment/placement agency for
all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to OFWs?
Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended,
expressly provides for joint and solidary
liability of corporate directors and officers
with the recruitment/placement agency for
all money claims or damages that may be
awarded to Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs). While a corporate director, trustee,
or officer who entered into contracts in
behalf of the corporation generally cannot
be held personally liable for the liabilities of
the latter, in deference to the separate and
distinct legal personality of a corporation
from the persons composing it, personal
liability of such corporate director, trustee, or
officer, along (although not necessarily) with
the corporation, may validly attach when he
is made by a specific provision of law
personally answerable for his corporate
action, as in this case. Thus, in the recent
case of Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v. Dela
Torre, the Court had sustained the joint and
solidary liability of the manning agency, its
foreign principal and the manning agency's
President in accordance with Section 10 of
RA 8042, as amended.
Dohle Seafront is presumed to have
submitted a verified undertaking by its
officers and directors that they will be jointly
and severally liable with the company over
claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship when it applied for a license to
operate a seafarer's manning agency, as
required under the 2003 POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Seafarers (POEA Rules).
Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended, and
the pertinent POEA Rules are deemed
incorporated in petitioner's employment
contract with respondents. These provisions
are in line with the State's policy of affording
protection to labor and alleviating the
workers' plight, and are meant to assure
OFWs immediate and sufficient payment of
what is due them. Thus, as the law provides,
corporate directors and officers are
themselves solidarily liable with the
recruitment/placement agency for all
money claims or damages that may be
awarded to OFWs. Based on the foregoing
premises, the Court, therefore, finds Padiz
jointly and solidarily liable with Dohle Seafront
and Dohle Manning for the payment of the
income benefit arising from petitioner's
temporary total disability. (Gargallo v. Dohle
Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., G.R. No.
215551, August 17, 2016)
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LABOR STANDARDS
WAGES
1. Are “commissions” wages?
Yes. Sec 97(f) of the Labor Code reads:
"Wage" paid to any employee shall mean
the remuneration of earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in
terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis…” The aforesaid provision
explicitly includes commissions as part of
wages.
For while commissions are incentives or
forms of encouragement to inspire
employees to put a little more industry, they
are still direct renumeration for services.
(Toyota Pasig, Inc. v. De Peralta, G.R. No.
213488, November 7, 2016)
2. Who has the burden of proving
payment of wages or salaries?
It is a settled rule that once the employee
has set out with particularity in his complaint,
the labor standard benefits he is entitled to,
and which he alleged that the employer
failed to pay him, it becomes the employer's
burden to prove that it has paid these money
claims. One who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it, and even where the
employees must allege non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the
employer to prove payment, rather than on
the employees to prove non-payment.
(Toyota Pasig, Inc. v. De Peralta, G.R. No.
213488, November 7, 2016)
Leaves
3. Are company drivers entitled to
service incentive leave? What is
service incentive leave?
The Court has already held that
company drivers who are under the control
and supervision of management officers —
like respondent herein — are regular
employees entitled to benefits including
service incentive leave pay. "Service
incentive leave is a right which accrues to
every employee who has served 'within 12
months, whether continuous or broken,
reckoned from the date the employee
started working, including authorized
absences and paid regular holidays unless
the working days in the establishment as a
matter of practice or policy, or that provided
in the employment contracts, is less than 12
months, in which case said period shall be
considered as one [(1)] year.' It is also
commutable to its money equivalent if not
used or exhausted at the end of the year. In
other words, an employee who has served
for one (1) year is entitled to it. He may use it
as leave days or he may collect its monetary
value.” (HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. v. Villastique,
G.R. No. 219569, August 17, 2016)
SOCIAL WELFARE
LEGISLATION
SS Law
1. Is the entitlement to income benefit
applicable only to land-based
employees compulsorily registered
with SSS? Who has the obligation to
pay the same?
The Court cannot subscribe to
respondents' contention that entitlement to
income benefit is applicable only to land-
based employees compulsorily registered
with the Social Security System (SSS),
considering that the 2010 POEA-SEC accords
upon the manning agency/foreign principal
the duty to cover Filipino seafarers under the
SSS and other social protection government
agencies.
Neither is the Court persuaded by
respondents' argument that the obligation to
pay the same falls on the SSS in view of their
compliance with the above duty, because
the income benefit arising from a covered
employee's temporary total disability is to be
5
advanced by the employer, subject to
reimbursement by the SSS upon compliance
with the conditions set forth under Section 1,
Rule X of the Rules Implementing Title II, Book
IV of the Labor Code. Consequently, the
Court finds no reason to reverse or modify the
directive for respondents to jointly and
severally pay petitioner his income benefit for
194 days, save for the inclusion of Padiz as a
solidary debtor. (Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront
Crewing (Manila), Inc., G.R. No. 215551,
August 17, 2016.)
Disability and Death
Benefits
2. Is the list of occupational diseases
enumerated under POEA-SEC
exclusive?
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, "any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section
32-A of this Contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied" is deemed to be a "work-
related illness." On the other hand, Section
20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC declares that
"those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work
related." The legal presumption of work-
relatedness was borne out from the fact that
the said list cannot account for all known
and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be
associated with, caused or aggravated by
such working conditions, and that the
presumption is made in the law to signify that
the non-inclusion in the list of occupational
diseases does not translate to an absolute
exclusion from disability benefits. 33 Given
the legal presumption in favor of the
seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such
legal presumption to establish a fact in issue.
"The effect of a presumption upon the
burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima
facie case created, thereby which, if no
contrary proof is offered, will prevail."
(Atienza v. Orophil Shipping International
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 191049, August 7, 2017)
3. How to overturn the presumption of
work-relatedness of a non-listed
illness under POEA-SEC?
The legal presumption of work-
relatedness of a non-listed illness should be
overturned only when the employer's
refutation is found to be supported by
substantial evidence, which, as traditionally
defined, is "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient
to support a conclusion.” (Atienza v. Orophil
Shipping International Co., Inc., G.R. No.
191049, August 7, 2017)
4. What requisites must be complied
with in order for an occupational
disease, and the resulting disability or
death, to be compensable?
For an occupational disease and the
resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions
must be satisfied:
(1) The seafarer's work must involve the
risks described herein;
(2) The disease was contracted as a
result of the seafarer's exposure to the
described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a
period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence
on the part of the seafarer.
As differentiated from the matter of work-
relatedness, no legal presumption of
compensability is accorded in favor of the
seafarer. As such, he bears the burden of
proving that these conditions are met.
Similarly, in Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime
Management, Inc., it was explicated that the
disputable presumption does not signify an
automatic grant of compensation and/or
benefits claim, and that while the law
disputably presumes an illness not found in
Section 32-A to be also work-related, the
6
seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened
to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the
risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not
direct causal relation is required to establish
its compensability. (Atienza v. Orophil
Shipping International Co., Inc., G.R. No.
191049, August 7, 2017)
5. When is a seafarer entitled to death
benefits?
The provisions currently governing the
entitlement of the seafarer's beneficiaries to
death benefits are found in Section 20 of the
2000 POEA-SEC. Part A (1) thereof states that
the seafarer's beneficiaries may successfully
claim death benefits if they are able to
establish that the seafarer's death is (a) work-
related, and (b) had occurred during the
term of his employment contract. Part A (4)
thereof further complements it (1) by stating
the "other liabilities" of the employer to the
seafarer's beneficiaries if the seafarer dies (a)
as a result of work-related injury or illness, and
(b) during the term of his employment.
While the 2000 POEA-SEC does not
expressly de ne what a "work-related death"
means, it is palpable from Part A (4) that the
said term refers to the seafarer's death
resulting from a work-related injury or illness.
With respect to the second requirement, the
Court takes this opportunity to clarify that
while the general rule is that the seafarer's
death should occur during the term of his
employment, the seafarer's death occurring
after the termination of his employment due
to his medical repatriation on account of a
work- related injury or illness constitutes an
exception thereto (Canuel v Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation et al, G.R. No. 190161,
October 13, 2014).
6. Is the death of a seafarer after his
medical repatriation a bar to the
recovery of death benefits by his
beneficiaries?
While it is true that a medical repatriation
has the effect of terminating the seafarer's
contract of employment, it is, however,
enough that the work-related illness, which
eventually becomes the proximate cause of
death, occurred while the contract was
effective for recovery to be had.
Guided by this principle, the Court, in the
recent case of Canuel, recognized that a
medical repatriation case constitutes an
exception to the second requirement under
Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e.,
that the seafarer's death had occurred
during the term of his employment, in view of
the terminative consequences of a medical
repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same.
In essence, the Court held that under such
circumstance, the work-related death need
not precisely occur during the term of his
employment as it is enough that the
seafarer's work-related injury or illness which
eventually causes his death had occurred
during the term of his employment (Racelis v.
United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 198408,
November 12, 2014).
7. When is a seafarer entitled to
disability benefits?
The Court observes that respondent
executed his contract of employment on
July 17, 2000, incorporating therein the terms
and conditions of the 2000 POEA-SEC which
took effect on June 25, 2000. However, since
the implementation of 2000 POEA-SEC was
temporarily suspended by the Court on
September 11, 2000, the determination of
respondent's entitlement to the disability
benefits should be resolved under the
provisions of the 1996 POEA-SEC as it was,
effectively, the governing circular at the time
respondent's employment contract was
executed. The prevailing rule under Section
20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC on
compensation and benefits for injury or illness
was that an employer shall be liable for the
injury or illness suffered by a seafarer during
the term of his contract. There was no need
to show that such injury was work-related
except that it must be proven to have been
contracted during the term of the contract.
The rule, however, is not absolute and the
employer may be exempt from liability if he
7
can successfully prove that the cause of the
seaman's injury was directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act as provided under
Section 20 (D) thereof (INC Ship
management Inc et al, v. Moradas, G.R. No.
178564, Januay 15, 2014).
8. What do we mean by Total Disability?
A total disability does not require that the
employee be completely disabled, or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that the employee cannot
pursue his or her usual work and earn from it.
On the other hand, a total disability is
considered permanent if it lasts continuously
for more than 120 days. What is crucial is
whether the employee who suffers from
disability could still perform his work
notwithstanding the disability he incurred.
(Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., G.R. No.
223731, August 30, 2017)
9. When can a temporary disability
become permanent disability?
A temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when so declared by
the company physician within the periods he
is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of
the maximum 240-day medical treatment
period without a declaration of either fitness
to work or the existence of a permanent
disability. (Gargallo v. Dohle Seafront
Crewing (Manila), Inc., G.R. No. 215551,
August 17, 2016)
10. How do we declare a seafarer to be
under ‘temporary total disability’ or
‘permanent total disability’?
The Labor Code and the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation (AREC)
provide that the seafarer is declared to be
on temporary total disability during the 120-
day period within which the seafarer is
unable to work. However, a temporary total
disability lasting continuously for more than
120 days days, except as otherwise provided
in the Rules, is considered as a total and
permanent disability. The exception referred
to above pertains to a situation when the
sickness "still requires medical attendance
beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240
days," in which case the temporary total
disability period is extended up to a
maximum of 240 days. Note, however, that
for the company-designated physician to
avail of the extended 240-day period, he
must first perform some significant act to
justify an extension (e.g., that the illness still
requires medical attendance beyond the
initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days);
otherwise, the seafarer's disability shall be
conclusively presumed to be permanent
and total.
In sum, the following guidelines are
observed when a seafarer claims permanent
and total disability benefits:
(1) The company-designated physician
must issue a final medical assessment
on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the
time the seafarer reported to him;
(2) If the company-designated physician
fails to give his assessment within the
period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and
total;
(3) If the company-designated physician
fails to give his assessment within the
period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required
further medical treatment or seafarer
was uncooperative), then the period
of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The employer
has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the
period; and
(4) If the company-designated physician
still fails to give his assessment within
the extended period of 240 days,
then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total, regardless of
any justification. (Talaroc v. Arpaphil
8
Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 223731,
August 30, 2017)
11. What is the effect on a seafarer’s
claim for permanent disability
benefits if the seafarer fails to comply
with the procedure laid down under
Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-
SEC with regard to the joint
appointment by the parties of a third
doctor in case the seafarer's personal
doctor disagrees with the company-
designated physician's fit-to-work
assessment?
In Philippine Hammonia, the Court held
that the seafarer's non-compliance with the
said conflict-resolution procedure results in
the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification
of the company-designated physician, viz.:
The filing of the complaint constituted a
breach of [the seafarer's] contractual
obligation to have the conflicting
assessments of his disability referred to a third
doctor for a binding opinion. . . . Thus, the
complaint should have been dismissed, for
without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work
certification of the company-designated
physician stands . . . .
In fine, given that Hipe's permanent
disability was not established through
substantial evidence for the reasons above-
stated, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for
permanent disability benefits (Bahia Shipping
Services, Inc. v. Hipe, Jr., G.R. No. 204699,
November 12, 2014)
12. Who determines a seafarer’s work-
related illness or injury?
The [POEA-SEC] and the CBA clearly
provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-
related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be
determined by the company-designated
physician. If the physician appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the company-
designated physician's assessment, the
opinion of a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the
seafarer to be the decision final and binding
on them. Thus, while petitioner had the right
to seek a second and even a third opinion,
the final determination of whose decision
must prevail must be done in accordance
with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately,
the petitioner did not avail of this procedure;
hence, we have no option but to declare
that the company-designated doctor's
certification is the final determination that
must prevail.
Well-settled is the rule that the seafarer's
non-compliance with the mandated
conflict-resolution procedure under the
POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his
claims, and results in the affirmance of the fit-
to-work certification of the company-
designated physician. (Gargallo v. Dohle
Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., G.R. No.
215551, August 17, 2016)
13. Is the finding of an independent
physician of an inability to perform
any gainful employment for a
continuous period of 120 days
warrant the declaration of total and
permanent disability of a seafarer?
A judicious review of the records reveals
that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain
any gainful employment for more than 120
days after his repatriation; however, this fact
does not ipso facto render his disability total
and permanent. In Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc., the Court held that
the company-designated physician is given
a leeway of an additional 120 days, or a total
of 240 days from repatriation, to give the
seafarer further treatment and, thereafter,
make a declaration as to the nature of the
latter's disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse
of 240 days, or when so declared by the
company-designated physician, that a
seafarer may be deemed totally and
permanently disabled. (Ace Navigation Co.
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 207804, June 17, 2015)
9
14. If after the lapse of the 240-day
assessment period, the company
physician does not or fails to issue
any certification as to the true nature
of the seafarer’s disability, what is the
classification of the seafarer’s
disability?
Be that as it may, the CA is nevertheless
correct in holding that respondent is
deemed to be suffering from a permanent
total disability. Records reveal that after
respondent was repatriated on April 18, 2009,
he underwent continuous medical care from
the company-designated physician. He was
even given an interim disability rating of
Grade 7 (moderate residual or disorder) on
July 17, 2009, and thereafter, went through
further tests and procedures. However, after
October 12, 2009, respondent's treatment
stopped without him recovering from his
ailment. Notably, the company-designated
physician neither issued to respondent a fit-
to-work certification nor a final disability
rating on or before December 14, 2009, the
240th day since respondent's repatriation.
Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of
the 240-day period, the seafarer is still
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties
and the company-designated physician had
not yet declared him fit to work or
permanently disabled, whether total or
permanent, the conclusive presumption that
the seafarer is totally and permanently
disabled arises. Perforce, it is but proper to
hold that respondent was permanently and
totally disabled, and hence, entitled to the
corresponding benefits stated under the
CBA. (Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Flores,
Jr., G.R. No. 207639 (Resolution), July 1, 2015)
Agrarian Reform
1. What are the legal parameters of
Exemption and Retention in
Agrarian Reform?
The requisites for OLT coverage are: (a)
the land must be devoted to rice or corn
crops; and (b) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining
therein. If either requisite is absent, a
landowner may apply for exemption since
the land would not be considered as
covered under the OLT Program.
Accordingly, a landowner need not apply for
retention where his ownership over the entire
landholding is intact and undisturbed.
If the land is covered by the OLT Program,
which, hence, renders the right of retention
operable, the landowner who cultivates or
intends to cultivate an area of his tenanted
rice or corn land has the right to retain an
area of not more than seven (7) has. thereof,
on the condition that his aggregate
landholdings do not exceed 24 has. as of
October 21, 1972. Otherwise, his entire
landholdings are covered by the OLT
Program without him being entitled to any
retention right. Similarly, by virtue of LOI 474, if
the landowner, as of October 21, 1976,
owned less than 24 has. of tenanted rice or
corn lands, but additionally owned (a) other
agricultural lands of more than 7 has.,
whether tenanted or not, whether cultivated
or not, and regardless of the income derived
therefrom, or (b) lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes, from which he derives adequate
income to support himself and his family, his
entire landholdings shall be similarly placed
under OLT Program coverage, without any
right of retention (Vales, et. al v Galinato, et.
al, G.R. No. 180134, March 5, 2014).
2. When is there tenancy relationship?
For a tenancy relationship to exist
between the parties, the following essential
elements must be shown: (a) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (b) the
subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is
consent between the parties; (d) the
purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f)
there is sharing of the harvests between the
parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator
or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant entitled
to security of tenure under existing tenancy
laws. The burden of proof rests on the one
claiming to be a tenant to prove his
affirmative allegation by substantial
evidence. It bears stressing that the right to
hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by
law. Hence, the consent of the landowner
should be secured prior to the installation of
tenants (Quintos v. DAR, G.R. No. 185838,
February 10, 2014)
3. What is the rule in retroactively
applying the provisions of RA 6657 to
land acquired under PD 27 and EO
228?
Case law instructs that when the agrarian
reform process under PD 27 remains
incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657,
such as when the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, as in this
case, such just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded
under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228
applying only suppletorily.
As to the proper reckoning point, just
compensation should be determined at the
time of the property's taking or at the time
emancipation patents are issued by the
government. Since the emancipation
patents in this case had been issued
between the years 1994 and 1998, the just
compensation for the subject portion should
then be reckoned therefrom. On this score, it
must be emphasized that while the LBP is
charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under
the land reform, its valuation is considered
only as an initial determination and, thus, not
conclusive. Verily, it is the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, which should make
the final determination of just compensation
in the exercise of its judicial function (Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Lajom et al, G.R. No.
184982, August 20, 2014).

10
4. What is the liability of a Corporation’s
President for failure of the Corporation
to remit the SSS contribution of its
employees?
Prompt remittance of SSS contributions
under the aforesaid provision is mandatory.
Any divergence from this rule subjects the
employer not only to monetary sanctions,
i.e., the payment of penalty of three percent
(3%) per month, but also to criminal
prosecution if the employer fails to: (a)
register its employees with the SSS; (b)
deduct monthly contributions from the
salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit
to the SSS its employees' SSS contributions
and/or loan payments after deducting the
same from their respective salaries/wages. In
this regard, Section 28 (f) of RA 8282 explicitly
provides that "if the act or omission penalized
by this Act be committed by an association,
partnership, corporation or any other
institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable to the penalties
provided in this Act for the offense." Notably,
the aforesaid punishable acts are
considered mala prohibita and, thus, the
defenses of good faith and lack of criminal
intent are rendered immaterial. (Navarra v.
People, G.R. No. 224943, March 20, 2017)
LABOR RELATIONS
Rights of Labor
Organizations
1. How do you resolve inconsistencies in
the Collective Bargaining
Agreement?
It is a fundamental doctrine in labor law
that the CBA is the law between the parties
and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions. If the provisions of the CBA seem
clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning
of their stipulations shall control. However,
when general and specific provisions of the
CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision
11
shall be paramount to and govern the
general provision.
The Court is in accord with the
ratiocination of the NLRC that the sweeping
statement "any matter affecting Company-
Union or Company-Worker relations shall be
considered a grievance" under Section 4,
Article XVII is general, as opposed to Section
13, Article XIV of the CBA, which is specific, as
it precisely refers to "what governs employee
disciplinary actions." (Visayan Electric
Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP and
Casmero Mahilum vs. Visayan Electric
Company, Inc. (VECO), G.R. No. 205575, July
22, 2015)
2. What is the legal basis of a union’s
right to collect “agency fees” from
non-union members?
While the collection of agency fees is
recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article
248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the
legal basis of the union's right to agency fees
is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-
contractual, deriving from the established
principle that non-union employees may not
unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the
bargaining union. (Peninsula Employees
Union v. Esquivel, G.R. No. 218454, December
1, 2016)
3. What are the documentary requisites
needed to justify a valid levy of
increased union dues?
Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and
(o) (formerly Article 241) of the Labor Code,
as amended, mandates the submission of:
(1) an authorization by a written
resolution of the majority of all the
members at the general membership
meeting duly called for the purpose;
(2) the secretary's record of the minutes
of the meeting, which shall include
the list of all members present, the
votes cast, the purpose of the special
 assessment or fees and the recipient
of such assessment or fees; and
(3) individual written authorizations for
check-off duly signed by the
employees concerned. (Peninsula
Employees Union v. Esquivel, G.R. No.
218454, December 1, 2016)
POST-EMPLOYMENT
Employer-Employee
Relationship
4. What proves the existence of
employer-employee relationship?
Based on case law, the presence of the
following elements evince the existence of
an employer-employee relationship: (a) the
power to hire, i.e., the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to
control the employee's conduct, or the so
called "control test." The control test is
commonly regarded as the most important
indicator of the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship. Under this
test, an employer-employee relationship
exists where the person for whom the services
are performed reserves the right to control
not only the end achieved, but also the
manner and means to be used in reaching
that end. (Century Properties, Inc. v.
Babiano, G.R. No. 220978, July 5, 2016)
5. What is the most significant
determinant of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship?
The power of the employer to control the
work of the employee is considered the most
significant determinant of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. This is the
so-called "control test," and is premised on
whether the person for whom the services
are performed reserves the right to control
both the end achieved and the manner and
means used to achieve that end.
12
It must, however, be stressed that the
"control test" merely calls for the existence of
the right to control, and not necessarily the
exercise thereof. To be clear, the test does
not require that the employer actually
supervises the performance of duties by the
employee, as it is sufficient that the former
has a right to wield the power (Felicilda v. Uy,
G.R. No. 221241, September 14, 2016).
6. What defines employment
relationship?
It was ruled that one's employment status
is defined and prescribed by law, and not by
what the parties say it should be, viz.:nIt is
axiomatic that the existence of an employer-
employee relationship cannot be negated
by expressly repudiating it in the
management contract and providing
therein that the "employee" is an
independent contractor when the terms of
the agreement clearly show otherwise. For,
the employment status of a person is defined
and prescribed by law and not by what the
parties say it should be. In determining the
status of the management contract, the
"four-fold test" on employment earlier
mentioned has to be applied. (Century
Properties, Inc. v. Babiano, G.R. No. 220978,
July 5, 2016)
7. If an employee is paid on a “per trip”
or “commission” basis, does that
negate employment relationship?
No. Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code
broadly defines the term "wage" as "the
remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in
terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of
calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or
unwritten contract of employment for work
done or to be done, or for services rendered
or to be rendered . . . ."
That petitioner was paid on a "per trip" or
commission basis is insignificant as this is
merely a method of computing
compensation and not a basis for
determining the existence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship (Felicilda v.
Uy, G.R. No. 221241, September 14, 2016)
8. What are the two (2) types of regular
employees under the Labor Code?
The primary standard, therefore, of
determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. The test is whether
the former is usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer.
The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of work performed
and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety. Also,
if the employee has been performing the job
for at least a year, even if the performance is
not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need
for its performance as sufficient evidence of
the necessity if not indispensability of that
activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular but only
with respect to such activity and while such
activity exists. (University of Santo Tomas v.
Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, G.R. No.
184262, April 24, 2017)
9. What makes one a project
employee?
According to jurisprudence, the principal
test for determining whether particular
employees are properly characterized as
"project employees" is whether or not the
employees were assigned to carry out a
"specific project or undertaking," the
duration (and scope) of which were
specified at the time they were engaged for
that project. The project could either be (1)
a particular job or undertaking that is within
the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct and separate,
and identifiable as such, from the company’s
other undertakings; or (2) a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular
business of the corporation. Employers
13
claiming that their workers are project
employees should not only prove that the
duration and scope of the employment was
specified at the time they were engaged,
but also that there was indeed a project.
Unlike regular employees who may only be
dismissed for just and/or authorized causes
under the Labor Code, "project employees"
may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of the project. While the
absence of a written contract does not
automatically confer regular status, it has
been construed by this Court as a red flag in
cases involving the question of whether the
workers are regular or project employees.
(Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, G.R. No.
199388, September 3, 2014)
10. For employee to be considered
project-based, the employer must
show compliance with two (2)
requisites, namely that: (a) the
employee was assigned to carry out
a specific project or undertaking; and
(b) the duration and scope of which
were specified at the time they were
engaged for such project. Is a
stipulation in the contract that the
employee’s employment is “co-
terminus with the project” compliant
with the second requirement?
As regards the second requisite, the CA
correctly stressed that "[t]he law and
jurisprudence dictate that 'the duration of
the undertaking begins and ends at
determined or determinable times'" while
clarifying that "[t]he phrase 'determinable
times' simply means capable of being
determined or fixed." In this case, Sykes Asia
substantially complied with this requisite
when it expressly indicated in petitioners'
employment contracts that their positions
were "co-terminus with the project." To the
mind of the Court, this caveat sufficiently
apprised petitioners that their security of
tenure with Sykes Asia would only last as long
as the Alltel Project was subsisting. In other
words, when the Alltel Project was
terminated, petitioners no longer had any
project to work on, and hence, Sykes Asia
may validly terminate them from
employment (Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., G.R.
No. 209499, January 28, 2015)
11. Will repeated and successive rehiring
convert project-based employees to
regular employees?
The repeated and successive rehiring of
project employees does not, by and of itself,
qualify them as regular employees. Case law
states that length of service (through rehiring)
is not the controlling determinant of the
employment tenure, but whether the
employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking, with its completion
having been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee. (Dacles v.
Millennium Erectors Corporation, G.R. No.
209822, July 8, 2015)
12. How does an employer regularize a
probationary employee?
It is not the probationary employee's job
description but the adequate performance
of his duties and responsibilities which
constitutes the inherent and implied
standard for regularization. The
communication of performance standards
should be perceived within the context of
the nature of the probationary employee's
duties and responsibilities (e.g. to a
probational managerial employee, it is
hardly possible for the employer, at the time
of the employee's engagement, to map into
technical indicators the quality standards by
which the latter should effectively manage
the department).
The determination of "adequate
performance" is not, in all cases, measurable
by quantitative specification, such as that of
a sales quota in Alcaraz's example. It is also
hinged on the qualitative assessment of the
employee's work; by its nature, this largely
rests on the reasonable exercise of the
employer's management prerogative.
(Abbott Laboratories, Philippines, et. al v.
Alcaraz, Resolution for Alcatraz’ Motion for
Reconsideration, G.R. No. 192571, April 22,
2014)
14
13. What are the indicators of a fixed-
term employment?
The Court laid down the following
indicators under which fixed-term
employment could not be construed as a
circumvention of the law on security of
tenure:
(1) The fixed period of employment was
knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties without any
force, duress, or improper pressure
being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent;
or
(2) It satisfactorily appears that the
employer and the employee dealt
with each other on more or less equal
terms with no moral dominance
exercised by the former or the latter.
Even if an employee is engaged to
perform activities that are necessary or
desirable in the usual trade or business of the
employer, the same does not preclude the
fixing of employment for a definite period.
The decisive determinant in fixed-term
employment should not be the activities that
the employee is called upon to perform, but
the day certain agreed upon by the parties
for the commencement and termination of
their employment relationship. (OKS
Designtech, Inc. v. Caccam, G.R. No.
211263, August 5, 2015)
14. What is the nature of a floating status?
Temporary "off-detail" or "floating status" is
the period of time when security guards are
in between assignments or when they are
made to wait after being relieved from a
previous post until they are transferred to a
new one. It takes place when the security
agency's clients decide not to renew their
contracts with the agency, resulting in a
situation where the available posts under its
existing contracts are less than the number of
guards in its roster. It also happens in
instances where contracts for security
services stipulate that the client may request
the agency for the replacement of the
guards assigned to it even for want of cause,
such that the replaced security guard may
be placed on temporary "off-detail" if there
are no available posts under the agency's
existing contracts. During such time, the
security guard does not receive any salary or
any financial assistance provided by law. It
does not constitute a dismissal, as the
assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the security
agencies with third parties, so long as such
status does not continue beyond a
reasonable time. When such a "floating
status" lasts for more than six (6) months, the
employee may be considered to have been
constructively dismissed. (Tatel v. JLFP
Investigation Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No.
206942, February 25, 2015)
Termination by Employer
15. When should a claim for illegal
dismissal not be sustained? What
proof is required to show illegal
dismissal?
Case law states that "labor suits require
only substantial evidence to prove the
validity of the dismissal." Substantial evidence
is defined as such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
(Buenaflor Car Services, Inc. v. David, Jr., G.R.
No. 222730, November 7, 2016)
The Court likewise upholds the unanimous
conclusion of the lower tribunals that
respondent had not been dismissed at all.
Other than the latter's unsubstantiated
allegation of having been verbally
terminated from his work, no substantial
evidence was presented to show that he was
indeed dismissed or was prevented from
returning to his work. In the absence of any
showing of an overt or positive act proving
that petitioner had dismissed respondent, the
latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be
sustained, as such supposition would be self-
serving, conjectural, and of no probative
value.
15
Similarly, petitioner's claims of
respondent's voluntary resignation and/or
abandonment deserve scant consideration,
considering petitioner's failure to discharge
the burden of proving the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of respondent to resume his
employment without any intention of
returning. It was incumbent upon petitioner
to ascertain respondent's interest or non-
interest in the continuance of his
employment, but to no avail. Hence, since
there is no dismissal or abandonment to
speak of, the appropriate course of action is
to reinstate the employee (in this case, herein
respondent) without, however, the payment
of backwages. (HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. v.
Villastique, G.R. No. 219569, August 17, 2016)
16. Is just cause for termination required if
the contract of employment is silent
on its termination clause?
While said clause is silent on the
requirement of a legal cause for the same to
be operative, the fundamental principle is
that the law is read into every contract.
Hence, the contract's termination clause
should not be interpreted as a form of
blanket-license by which each of the parties
may just abdicate the contract at will.
Applicable laws form part of, and are read
into, contracts without need for any express
reference thereto; more so, when it pertains
to a labor contract which is imbued with
public interest. Each contract thus contains
not only what was explicitly stipulated
therein, but also the statutory provisions that
have any bearing on the matter. (Halili vs.
Justice for Children International, et al., G.R.
No. 194906, September 9, 2015)
17. What constitutes Constructive
Dismissal?
Constructive dismissal exists where there
is cessation of work, because 'continued
employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving
a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay'
and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in
disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but
made to appear as if it were not,
constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an
act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that
it could foreclose any choice by him except
to forego his continued employment.
(Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. Baya, G.R. No.
188269, April 17, 2017)
18. What is the Doctrine of Strained
Relations?
Anent the issue of reinstatement or
payment of separation pay, it must be
stressed that "reinstatement is a restoration to
a state from which one has been removed or
separated." However, "under the doctrine of
strained relations, the payment of separation
pay is considered an acceptable alternative
to reinstatement when the latter option is no
longer desirable or viable. On one hand,
such payment liberates the employee from
what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases
the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a
worker it could no longer trust." In this case,
while the LA and the CA did not discuss the
basis for awarding separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, the Court nonetheless deems
such award proper, considering that the
underlying circumstances which led to
respondent's unlawful termination, which
had certainly created an atmosphere of
animosity and antagonism between the
employer and the employee, and hence,
warrants the application of the doctrine of
strained relations. (Fabricator Philippines, Inc.
v. Estolas, G.R. Nos. 224308-09, September 27,
2017)
19. What happens if there was neither
dismissal by the employer nor
abandonment by the employee?
Therefore, since respondents were not
dismissed and that they were not considered
to have abandoned their jobs, it is only
proper for them to report back to work and
for petitioners to reinstate them to their
former positions or substantially-equivalent
positions. In this regard, jurisprudence
16
provides that in instances where there was
neither dismissal by the employer nor
abandonment by the employee, the proper
remedy is to reinstate the employee to his
former position, but without the award of
backwages. However, since reinstatement
was already impossible due to strained
relations between the parties, as found by
the NLRC, each of them must bear their own
loss, so as to place them on equal footing. At
this point, it is well to emphasize that "in a
case where the employee's failure to work
was occasioned neither by his
abandonment nor by a termination, the
burden of economic loss is not rightfully
shifted to the employer; each party must
bear his own loss.” (Borja v. Miñoza, G.R. No.
218384, July 3, 2017)
20. When is there abandonment of
employment?
For a valid finding of abandonment, two
(2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable cause; and (b) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the
more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts.
The Court elucidated that absence must
be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply
does not want to work anymore. Mere
absence or failure to report for work is not
tantamount to abandonment of work. The
employer has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment without
any intention of returning. (Fortunato Baron,
et al vs. EPE Transport, INC., G.R. No. 202645,
August 5, 2015 and Melvin P. Mallo vs.
Southeast Asian College Inc. and Enatsu,
G.R. No. 212861, October 14, 2015)
21. Who has the burden of proving that
an employees transfer or demotion
was for valid and legitimate grounds?
In case of a constructive dismissal, the
employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer and demotion of an employee are
for valid and legitimate grounds such as
genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a
transfer not to be considered a constructive
dismissal, the employer must be able to show
that such transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee;
nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of his salaries, privileges and other
benefits. Failure of the employer to
overcome this burden of proof, the
employee's demotion shall no doubt be
tantamount to unlawful constructive
dismissal. (Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. Baya,
G.R. No. 188269, April 17, 2017)
22. Who has the burden of proving that
dismissal was for a justifiable cause?
What proof is required?
Petitioners' participation in the pilferage
has been shown by substantial evidence. It is
settled that in employee termination disputes
such as the present case, the employer bears
the burden of proving that the employee's
dismissal was for a lawful cause. Equipoise is
not enough and the employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause. Although it is true that the
guilt of a party in administrative proceedings
need not be shown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, there must be substantial
evidence to support it. Substantial evidence
means that amount of relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise. In this case,
respondents dismissed petitioners on the
strength of circumstantial evidence which
did not establish their participation in the
pilferage. (Baclaan v. Beauty Lane Phils. Inc.,
G.R. No. 214186, August 3, 2016)
23. How do you terminate a probationary
employee?
A probationary employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of tenure.
However, the services of a probationary
employee may be terminated for any of the
17
following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized
cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer. The employer is made to comply
with two (2) requirements when dealing with
a probationary employee: first, the employer
must communicate the regularization
standards to the probationary employee;
and second, the employer must make such
communication at the time of the
probationary employee's engagement. If the
employer fails to comply with either, the
employee is deemed as a regular and not a
probationary employee.
Keeping with these rules, an employer is
deemed to have made known the standards
that would qualify a probationary employee
to be a regular employee when the
employee should sufficiently be made aware
of his probationary status as well as the
length of time of the probation. The
exception to the foregoing is when the job is
self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the
case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers.
(Abbott Laboratories, Philippines, et. al v.
Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013)
24. What requirements must be met for a
valid dismissal?
The rule is that the employer must comply
with both the substantive and procedural
due process requirements. Substantive due
process requires that the dismissal must be
pursuant to either a just or an authorized
cause under Articles 297, 298, and 299
(formerly Articles 282, 283 or 284) of the Labor
Code, as amended. Procedural due
process, on the other hand, mandates that
the employer must observe the twin
requirements of notice and hearing before a
dismissal can be effected (Felicilda v. Uy,
G.R. No. 221241, September 14, 2016).
25. What is the essence of Due Process in
Administrative Proceedings, more
specifically, in Labor Cases?
The observance of fairness in the
conduct of any investigation is at the very
heart of procedural due process. The
essence of due process is to be heard, and,
as applied to administrative proceedings,
this means a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense, for in the former a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure
are not strictly applied. The Court's
disquisition in Ledesma v. CA is instructive on
this matter, to wit:
Due process, as a constitutional precept,
does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v.
Puedan, Jr., G.R. No. 220617, January 30,
2017)
26. What notices are required before
termination?
Time and again, the Court has
repeatedly held that two (2) written notices
are required before termination of
employment can be legally effected,
namely: (1) the notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. The failure to inform an employee
of the charges against him deprives him of
due process. (Baclaan v. Beauty Lane Phils.,
Inc., G.R. No. 214186, August 3, 2016)
18
27. What is the effect when the employer
terminates an employee based on a
valid cause for termination without
complying with the proper
procedural requirements?
The rule is that when a valid cause for
termination exists, the procedural infirmity
attending the termination only warrants the
payment of nominal damages. This was the
principle laid down in the landmark cases of
Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon) and Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka). In
the assailed Decision, the Court actually
extended the application of the Agabon
and Jaka rulings to breaches of company
procedure, notwithstanding the employer's
compliance with the statutory requirements
under the Labor Code. Hence, although
Abbott did not comply with its own
termination procedure, its non-compliance
thereof would not detract from the finding
that there subsists a valid cause to terminate
Alcaraz's employment. Abbott, however,
was penalized for its contractual breach and
thereby ordered to pay nominal damages
(Abbott Laboratories, Philippines et al v
Alcaraz, Resolution for Alcatraz’ Motion for
Reconsideration, G.R. No. 192571, April 22,
2014).
28. Is the Union entitled to nominal
damages for violation of statutory
due process?
While PSC had an authorized ground to
terminate its employees by virtue of the
closure of its business, its failure to comply
with the proper procedure for termination
renders it liable to pay the employees
nominal damages for such omission. In
Business Services of the Future Today, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, which reiterated the ruling
in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court held that where the
dismissal is for an authorized cause, the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the
employee, in the form of nominal damages,
for the violation of his right to statutory due
process. Thus, PSC's violation of their
employees' right to statutory procedural due
process warrants the payment of indemnity
in the form of nominal damages. (PNCC
Skyway Corporation (PSC) v. SOLE, G.R. No.
196110, February 6, 2017)
29. What are the just causes for
termination of an employment?
Article 297 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his
work;
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
c) Fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and
e) (e) Other causes analogous to
the foregoing. (Buenaflor Car
Services, Inc. v. David, Jr., G.R. No.
222730, November 7, 2016)
30. Discuss “loss of trust and confidence”
as a just and valid cause of dismissal.
Loss of trust and confidence must be
based on willful breach of the trust reposed
in the employee by his employer. Such
breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable
excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on
substantial evidence and not on the
employer's whims or caprices or suspicions,
otherwise, the employee would eternally
remain at the mercy of the employer. In
19
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal,
the act complained of must be work-related
and show that the employee concerned is
unfit to continue working for the employer. In
addition, loss of confidence is premised on
the fact that the employee concerned holds
a position of responsibility, trust, and
confidence or that the employee
concerned is entrusted with confidence with
respect to delicate matters, such as handling
or care and protection of the property and
assets of the employer. The betrayal of this
trust is the essence of the offense for which an
employee is penalized (Visayan Electric
Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP and
Casmero Mahilum v. Visayan Electric
Company, Inc. (VECO), G.R. No. 205575, July
22, 2015)
31. What are the classes of positions of
trust?
It should be pointed out that while
Torrefiel was essentially a salesman, he did
not occupy a position of trust and
confidence, the loss of which is a just cause
for dismissal. To recall, there are two (2)
classes of positions of trust: the first class
consists of managerial employees or those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down management policies and to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees or effectively
recommend such managerial actions; the
second class consists of cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, and the like who, in the
normal and routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of money or property. Here,
respondents have not shown that Torrefiel
had access to their money or property. On
the contrary, Torrefiel maintained that he
merely took orders from clients but had no
access to the respondents' products which
are handled by warehouse supervisors and
sales assistants. At any rate, even assuming
that he regularly handled significant
amounts of money or property, he cannot be
dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence considering that the basis
therefor has not been established. It is settled
that for dismissal based on such ground to be
valid, the act that would justify the loss of trust
and confidence must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts which was not the case
here. (Baclaan v. Beauty Lane Phils., Inc.,
G.R. No. 214186, August 3, 2016)
32. What justifies termination on the
ground of serious misconduct?
To constitute a valid cause for the
dismissal within the text and meaning of
Article [297] of the Labor Code, the
employee's misconduct must be serious -
that is, of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct
must be related to the performance of the
employee's duties showing him to be unfit to
continue working for the employer. Further,
the act or conduct must have been
performed with wrongful intent. Thus, for
serious misconduct to be a just cause for
dismissal, the concurrence of the following
elements is required: (a) the misconduct
must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties
showing that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer;
and (c) it must have been performed with
wrongful intent. (Ting Trucking v. Makilan,
G.R. No. 216452, June 20, 2016)
33. Does serious misconduct require
direct evidence?
It bears stressing that while there may be
no direct evidence to prove that respondent
actually committed the offenses charged,
there was substantial proof of the existence
of the irregularities committed by him. It is well
to point out that substantial proof, and not
clear and convincing evidence or proof
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as
basis for the imposition of any disciplinary
action upon the employee. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position, as in
20
this case. (Ting Trucking v. Makilan, G.R. No.
216452, June 20, 2016)
34. What must concur for willful
disobedience or insubordination to
constitute a just cause for dismissal?
Necessitates the concurrence of at least
two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the employee's
assailed conduct must have been willful, that
is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (b) the order violated must
have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. (Sta. Isabel v. Perla Compañia De
Seguros, Inc., G.R. No. 219430, November 7,
2016)
35. As far as the second requisite for
insubordination or willful
disobedience is concerned, it is
required that there should exists a
rule, regulation or policy. What are
the requisites for validly of company
rules and regulations?
Among the employer's management
prerogatives is the right to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations necessary
or proper for the conduct of its business or
concern, to provide certain disciplinary
measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied
with. At the same time, the employee has the
corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules,
orders, and instructions of the employer; and
willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as
a general rule, justifies termination of the
contract of service and the dismissal of the
employee. Article 296 (formerly Article 282)
of the Labor Code provides:
Note that for an employee to be validly
dismissed on this ground, the employer's
orders, regulations, or instructions must be:
(1) Reasonable and lawful,
(2) Sufficiently known to the employee,
and
 (3) In connection with the duties which
the employee has been engaged to
discharge."(St. Luke's Medical Center,
Inc. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 212054,
March 11, 2015)
36. What is required to prove employees’
involvement in an alleged pilferage?
While proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required in dismissing an employee, the
employer must prove by substantial
evidence the facts and incidents upon
which the accusations are made.
Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations,
and conclusions of the employer, as in this
case, are not enough to justify an employee's
dismissal. The respondents failed to prove by
substantial evidence that petitioners were
the authors of or at least participated in the
alleged pilferage of the "Brazilian Blowout"
products. Unlike respondents' two (2) former
employees, namely, Romar Geroleo and
Cipriano Layco, who were caught red-
handed in an entrapment operation, no
direct evidence showing petitioners' guilt
was presented and respondents relied on
inconclusive circumstantial evidence in
determining who the perpetrators of the
pilferage are. (Baclaan v. Beauty Lane Phils.,
Inc., G.R. No. 214186, August 3, 2016)
37. Does the refusal of an employee to
comply with an order to issue a
written public apology constitute
willful disobedience, a just cause to
dismiss the non –complying
employee?
As culled from the records, aside from the
administrative complaint filed by Juan
against Montallana for his serious
misconduct, the former also filed a criminal
complaint for grave oral defamation for the
utterances he made arising from the same
incident before the Manila City Prosecutor's
Office. In the honest belief that issuing a letter
of apology would incriminate him in the said
criminal case — and upon the advice of his
own lawyer at that — Montallana wrote to
respondents and voluntarily communicated
21
that he was willing to issue the required
apology, but only had to defer the same in
view of his legal predicament. As the Court
sees it, the tenor of his letters, and the
circumstances under which they were taken,
at the very least, exhibited Montallana's
good faith in dealing with respondents. This,
therefore, negates the theory that his failure
to abide by respondents' directive to
apologize was attended by a "wrong and
perverse mental attitude rendering the
employee's act inconsistent with proper
subordination," which would warrant his
termination from employment (Montallana v.
La Consolacion College Manila, G.R. No.
208890, December 8, 2014)
38. What are the requirements for a valid
cessation of business operations?
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
three requirements are necessary for a valid
cessation of business operations: (a) service
of a written notice to the employees and to
the DOLE at least one month before the
intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of
business must be bona fide in character; and
(c) payment to the employees of termination
pay amounting to one month pay or at least
one-half month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
The required written notice under Article
283 of the Labor Code is to inform the
employees of the specific date of
termination or closure of business operations,
and must be served upon them at least one
(1) month before the date of effectivity to
give them sufficient time to make the
necessary arrangements. The purpose of this
requirement is to give employees time to
prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as
well as to give DOLE the opportunity to
ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause
of termination. Thus, considering that the
notices of termination were given merely
three (3) days before the cessation of the
PSC's operation, it defeats the very purpose
of the required notice and the mandate of
Article 283 of the Labor Code. (PNCC Skyway
Corporation (PSC) v. SOLE, G.R. No. 196110,
February 6, 2017)
39. Will the fact that a company (NPI, in
this case) who imposes minimum
Termination by
standards concerning sales, Employee
marketing, finance, and operations of
40. Resignation versus Constructive
its distributor (ODSI, in this case) give
Dismissal.
rise to labor-only contracting?
Resignation is the formal pronouncement
A closer examination of the
or relinquishment of a position or office. It is
Distributorship Agreement reveals that the
the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
relationship of NPI and ODSI is not that of a
situation where he believes that personal
principal and a contractor (regardless of
reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
whether labor-only or independent), but that
exigency of the service, and he has then no
of a seller and a buyer/re-seller. As stipulated
other choice but to disassociate himself from
in the Distributorship Agreement, NPI agreed
employment. The intent to relinquish must
to sell its products to ODSI at discounted
concur with the overt act of relinquishment;
prices, which in turn will be re-sold to
hence, the acts of the employee before and
identified customers, ensuring in the process
after the alleged resignation must be
the integrity and quality of the said products
considered in determining whether he in fact
based on the standards agreed upon by the
intended to terminate his employment. In
parties. The aforementioned stipulations in
illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule
the Distributorship Agreement hardly
that when an employer interposes the
demonstrate control on the part of NPI over
defense of resignation, on him necessarily
the means and methods by which ODSI
rests the burden to prove that the employee
performs its business, nor were they intended
indeed voluntarily resigned.
to dictate how ODSI shall conduct its business
as a distributor. Otherwise stated, the
In contrast, constructive dismissal exists
stipulations in the Distributorship Agreement
where there is cessation of work because
do not operate to control or fix the
continued employment is rendered
methodology on how ODSI should do its
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an
business as a distributor of NPI products, but
offer involving a demotion in rank or a
merely provide rules of conduct or guidelines
diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly
towards the achievement of a mutually
called a dismissal in disguise or an act
desired result — which in this case is the sale
amounting to dismissal but made to appear
of NPI products to the end consumer. The
as if it were not, constructive dismissal may,
imposition of minimum standards concerning
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
sales, marketing, finance and operations is
insensibility, or disdain by an employer
nothing more than an exercise of sound
becomes so unbearable on the part of the
business practice to increase sales and
employee that it could foreclose any choice
maximize profits for the benefit of both
by him except to forego his continued
Steelcase and its distributors. For as long as
employment. It must be noted, however,
these requirements do not impinge on a
that bare allegations of constructive
distributor's independence, then there is
dismissal, when uncorroborated by the
nothing wrong with placing reasonable
evidence on record, cannot be given
expectations on them. (Nestle Philippines,
credence. (Central Azucarera De Bais, INC.
Inc. v. Puedan, Jr., G.R. No. 220617, January
v. Siason, G.R. No. 215555, July 29, 2015)
30, 2017)

22
41. A letter was addressed to an
employee prompting him to tender
his resignation, otherwise there will be
a full-blown administrative trial, the
employee complies. Is there
constructive dismissal?
Taking into consideration Siason's long
tenure at CABI, as well as her close
relationship with Chan, the latter sent her the
October 3, 2011 letter asking her to resign
"rather than [to] force [his] hand" — which
should be construed as Chan telling Siason to
resign or be faced with an administrative
complaint. On October 4, 2011, Atty. Ner-
Tiangco sent Siason another letter, essentially
confirming if the latter was going to resign or
if she is subjecting herself to an administrative
investigation. Ultimately, Siason chose to
tender her resignation to save herself from
the trouble of besmirching her employment
record.
In sum, petitioners did not constructively
dismiss Siason; but rather, the latter voluntarily
resigned from her job in order to avoid a full-
blown administrative trial regarding her
misdeeds which could potentially result in her
termination for just cause. While it may be
said that she did not tender her resignation
wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own
making did not give her any other option but
to voluntarily do so. (Central Azucarera De
Bais, INC. v. Siason, G.R. No. 215555, July 29,
2015)
Reliefs from Illegal
Dismissal
42. When is the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement proper?
Properly speaking, liability for the
payment of separation pay is but a legal
consequence of illegal dismissal where
reinstatement is no longer viable or feasible.
As a relief granted in lieu of reinstatement, it
goes without saying that an award of
separation pay is inconsistent with a finding
that there was no illegal dismissal. This is
23
because an employee who had not been
dismissed, much less illegally dismissed,
cannot be reinstated. Moreover, as there is
no reinstatement to speak of, respondent
cannot invoke the doctrine of strained
relations to support the prayer for the award
of separation pay. In the case of Capili v.
NLRC, the Court explained that: The award
of separation pay cannot be justified solely
because of the existence of "strained
relations" between the employer and the
employee. It must be given to the employee
only as an alternative to reinstatement
emanating from illegal dismissal. When there
is no illegal dismissal, even if the relations are
strained, separation pay has no legal basis.
Besides, the doctrine on "strained relations"
cannot be applied indiscriminately since
every labor dispute almost invariably results in
"strained relations;" otherwise, reinstatement
can never be possible simply because some
hostility is engendered between the parties
as a result of their disagreement. That is
human nature. (HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. v.
Villastique, G.R. No. 219569, August 17, 2016)
43. What is the exception to the rule on
the grant of separation pay?
As an exception, case law instructs that
in certain circumstances, the grant of
separation pay or financial assistance to a
legally dismissed employee has been
allowed as a measure of social justice or on
grounds of equity. In Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. NLRC (PLDT), the Court laid
down the parameters in awarding
separation pay to dismissed employees
based on social justice: There should be no
question that where it comes to such valid
but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply
with work standards, the grant of separation
pay to the dismissed employee may be both
just and compassionate, particularly if he has
worked for some time with the company. x x
x It is not the employee's fault if he does not
have the necessary aptitude for his work but
on the other hand the company cannot be
required to maintain him just the same at the
expense of the efficiency of its operations. He
too may be validly replaced. Under these
and similar circumstances, however, the
award to the employee of separation pay
would be sustainable under the social justice
policy even if the separation is for cause.
We hold that henceforth separation pay
shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character. Where the reason for
the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations
with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or
whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice. (Security Bank
Savings, Corp. v. Singson, G.R. No. 214230,
February 10, 2016)
44. Can an employer who complied with
the amount of separation pay
required by law for termination for
authorized causes be compelled to
pay the higher amount of separation
pay as stated in the CBA?
Closure of business may be considered as
a reversal of an employer's fortune whereby
there is a complete cessation of business
operations and/or an actual locking-up of
the doors of the establishment, usually due to
financial losses. As a form of recompense, the
employer is required to pay its employees
separation benefits, except when the closure
is due to serious business losses. For a similar
exemption to obtain against a contract,
such as a CBA, the tenor of the parties'
agreement ought to be similar to the law's
tenor.
In this case, it is equally undisputed that
the employer agreed to and was thus
obligated under the CBA to pay its
employees who had been terminated
without any fault attributable to them
separation benefits at the rate of 19 days for
every year of service. The postulation that
Benson had closed its establishment and
ceased operations due to serious business
losses cannot be accepted as an excuse to
24
clear itself of any liability since the ground of
serious business losses is not, unlike Article 297
of the Labor Code, considered as an
exculpatory parameter under the
aforementioned CBA (Benson Industries
Employees Union-ALU-TUCP et al v. Benson
Industries Inc, G.R. No. 200746, August 6,
2014).
Retirement
45. May a claim for retirement pay be
made in the execution of a final and
executory judgment rendered by the
CA in an illegal dismissal case for
payment of salary differential plus
allowances and “other benefits”?
As the Court sees it, the "other benefits"
mentioned in these rulings cannot be
construed to include retirement pay for the
primary reason that they adjudged awards
relative to Villena's illegal dismissal complaint,
which remains barren of a specific cause of
action for retirement pay. In order for her
retirement pay claim to be considered,
Villena's complaint should have contained
substantial allegations which would show
that she (a) had applied for the same, and
(b) her application squares with the
requirements of entitlement under the terms
of the company's retirement plan, i.e., Policy
No. 03-003, which, in fact, was issued on
September 20, 2003, or after the August 31,
2001 CA Decision had already attained
finality. However, based on the records, what
she sought for in her illegal dismissal
complaint were the reliefs of reinstatement,
payment of salary differentials, all benefits
and allowances that she may have received
as Finance Manager, attorney's fees, and
damages. Thus, as the matter left for
determination is whether or not the aforesaid
rulings, when executed, should include
retirement pay and representation,
transportation, and cellular phone usage
allowances, the Court will harken back only
to the context of the illegal dismissal
complaint from which such awards of "other
benefits" stemmed from. (Villena v. Batangas
II Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 205735,
February 4, 2015)

MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE
JURISDICTION AND
RELIEFS
Labor Arbiter
46. What is the consequence of a Labor
Arbiter’s decision reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee?
Insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory,
even pending appeal. The employee shall
either be admitted back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement . . . . Verily, the employer is
duty-bound to reinstate the employee,
failing which, the employer is liable instead to
pay the dismissed employee's salary. (Manila
Doctors College v. Olores, G.R. No. 225044,
October 3, 2016)
However, in the event that the LA's
decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the
employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed
employee is effectively terminated. This
means that an employer is no longer obliged
to keep the employee in the actual service
or in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not
required to return the wages that he had
received prior to the reversal of the LA's
decision. Notwithstanding the reversal of the
finding of illegal dismissal, an employer, who,
despite the LA's order of reinstatement, did
not reinstate the employee during the
pendency of the appeal up to the reversal
by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for
the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the
unpaid salary accruing up to the time of the
reversal. By way of exception, an employee
may be barred from collecting the accrued
wages if shown that the delay in enforcing
the reinstatement pending appeal was
without fault on the part of the employer.
25
(Manila Doctors College v. Olores, G.R. No.
225044, October 3, 2016)
47. In a case where after the Labor
Arbiter renders a decision reinstating
the employee, and the employer
gives the employee the option to
receive separation pay or be
reinstated, and the employee failed
to choose a relief, is the employer
absolved of its responsibility to
reinstate?
No. The active duty to reinstate the
employee — either actually or in payroll —
devolves upon no other than the employer,
even pending appeal. Reinstatement should
have been done as soon as an order or
award of reinstatement is handed down by
the Labor Arbiter as the order is self-
executory…the dismissed employee need
not even apply for and the LA need not even
issue a writ of execution to trigger the
employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed
employee. (Manila Doctors College v.
Olores, G.R. No. 225044, October 3, 2016)
48. What happens if a dismissed
employee is a faculty in an
educational institution and the order
of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter
happens in the middle of the first
semester? Is the employer duty-
bound to reinstate in the middle of the
term?
The SC is aware of the peculiarity
attending educational institutions where the
engagement of faculty members and
assignment of teaching loads are done at
the commencement of each semester. In
the case of University of Santo Tomas v.
NLRC, while pronouncing that the dismissed
faculty members must be actually reinstated
during the pendency of the labor dispute
between the faculty union and the University,
took into account the fact that the return-to-
work order was given in the middle of the first
semester of the academic year, and that
any change of faculty members at such time
would adversely affect and prejudice the
students. Consequently, the Court ordered
that actual reinstatement take effect at the
start of the second semester, and adjudged
the faculty members as entitled to full wages,
backwages and other benefits prior to
reinstatement to their actual teaching loads.
Proceeding from the ruling in UST, as it
would be impracticable and detrimental to
students to change teachers in the middle of
the semester, employer should nonetheless
have given respondent his new teaching
load assignments and schedules at the
beginning of the succeeding semester,
whether or not respondent was present
during such assignment. (Manila Doctors
College v. Olores, G.R. No. 225044, October
3, 2016)
49. What is the significance of posting a
cash or surety bond when an
employer appeals a judgment of the
Labor Arbiter involvement a prescription of claims, and other similarly
monetary award?
For an appeal from the LA's ruling to the
NLRC to be perfected, Article 229 of the
Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or
surety bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed
from. While it has been settled that the
posting of a cash or surety bond is
indispensable to the perfection of an appeal
in cases involving monetary awards from the
decision of the LA, the NLRC Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless allows
the reduction of the bond upon a showing of
(a) the existence of a meritorious ground for
reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award. In this regard, it bears
stressing that the reduction of the bond
provided thereunder still lies within the sound
discretion of the NLRC. In McBurnie v.
Ganzon, the Court ruled that, "[f]or purposes
of compliance with [the bond requirement
under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure], a
motion shall be accompanied by the posting
of a provisional cash or surety bond
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
monetary award subject of the appeal,
exclusive of damages, and attorney's fees."
26
(Philippine Touristers, Inc. v. MAS Transit
Workers, G.R. No. 201237, September 3, 2014)
50. When can there be a reduction of
appeal bond?
The Rules — specifically Section 6, Rule VI
— thereof, allow the reduction of the appeal
bond upon a showing of: (a) the existence of
a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b)
the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award.
Case law has held that for purposes of
justifying the reduction of the appeal bond,
the merit referred to may pertain to (a) an
appellant's lack of financial capability to pay
the full amount of the bond, or (b) the merits
of the main appeal such as when there is a
valid claim that there was no illegal dismissal
to justify the award, the absence of an
employer-employee relationship,
valid issues that are raised in the appeal.
(Quantum Foods, Inc., v. Esloyo, G.R. No.
213696 December 9, 2015)
NLRC
51. Does an erroneous Resolution of the
NRLC become final if a motion for
reconsideration was filed but beyond
the 10-day reglementary period?
Time and again, this Court has been
emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing
of a motion for reconsideration within the 10-
day reglementary period following the
receipt by a party of any order, resolution or
decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory
requirement to forestall the finality of such
order, resolution or decision. The statutory
base for this is found in Article 223 48 of the
Labor Code and Section 14, Rule VII of the
New Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission. (Emphases
supplied)
"A definitive final judgment [— such as
the NLRC's March 24, 2008 Resolution —]
however erroneous, is no longer subject to
change or revision." Settled is the rule that
"[a] decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable. This
quality of immutability precludes the
modification of a final judgment, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law. (Michelin Asia
Pacific Application Support Center, Inc. v.
Ortiz, G.R. No. 189861 (Resolution), November
19, 2014)
52. In what instance may the Court
ascribe Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the part of Labor Arbiters or the NLRC?
Case law states that grave abuse of
discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, the character of which
being so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
"In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion
may be ascribed to the NLRC when its
findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence, which refers to that
amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's
ruling has basis in the evidence and the
applicable law and jurisprudence, then no
grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA
should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss
the petition."(University of Santo Tomas v.
Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, G.R. No.
184262, April 24, 2017)
53. When can the Supreme Court pass
upon questions of fact in a Labor
Dispute?
The exception, rather than the general
rule, applies in the present case. When the
findings of fact of the CA are contrary to
those of the NLRC, which findings also differ
from those of the LA, the Court retains its
authority to pass upon the evidence and,
perforce, make its own factual findings
based thereon. (Borja v. Miñoza, G.R. No.
218384, July 3, 2017)
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54. Can a party who has not appealed
obtain any affirmative relief other
than the one granted in the appealed
decision?
As a general rule, a party who has not
appealed cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than the one granted in the
appealed decision. However, jurisprudence
admits an exception to the said rule, such as
when strict adherence thereto shall result in
the impairment of the substantive rights of
the parties concerned. In Global Resource
for Outsourced Workers, Inc. v. Velasco:
Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal
from a judgment is deemed to have
acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than what was already granted
under said judgment. However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair
a substantive right, such as that of an illegally
dismissed employee to monetary
compensation as provided by law, then
equity dictates that the Court set aside the
rule to pave the way for a full and just
adjudication of the case. (Century
Properties, Inc. v. Babiano, G.R. No. 220978,
July 5, 2016)
Voluntary Arbitrator
55. Are the decisions of voluntary
arbitrators in a labor dispute final and
binding?
Voluntary arbitrators act in a quasi-
judicial capacity; hence, their judgments or
final orders which are declared final by law
are not so exempt from judicial review when
so warranted. Any agreement stipulating
that “the decision of the arbitrator shall be
final and unappealable” and “that no further
judicial recourse if either party disagrees with
the whole or any part of the arbitrator's
award may be availed of” cannot be held to
preclude in proper cases the power of
judicial review which is inherent in courts."
(Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. v.
Bacolod Sales Force Union-Congress of
Independent Organization-ALU, G.R. No.
220605, September 21, 2016)
56. What is the proper remedy to reverse
or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’
decision or award?

Appeal the award or decision by petition

for review before the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules on questions of fact, of law, mixed
questions of fact and law, or a mistake of
judgment.

However, in several cases, the Court

allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
from the VA's judgment to the CA under Rule
65 of the same Rules, where the VA was
averred to have acted without or in excess of
his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction (Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines,
Inc. v. Bacolod Sales Force Union-Congress
of Independent Organization-ALU, G.R. No.
220605, September 21, 2016).

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