Nations and Nationalism 6 (I), 2000, 43-66.

0ASEN 2000

The ethnic dimension to bureaucratic

encounters in postcommunist
Europe: perceptions and experience
ASE B. GRODELAND, WILLIAM L. MILLER and
TATYANA Y. KOSHECHKINA
Department 05Politics, University 05Glasgow

ABSTRACT. In a survey of public opinion about the behaviour of officials in four

postcommunist countries - Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - we
found pervasive suspicions of ethnic bias. Although ethnic minorities themselves were
particularly suspicious of officials, there was a consensus across both ethnic majorities
and minorities that officials favoured their own ethnic group and discriminated
against others.
Suspicion may distort reality, however. Citizens’ own reports of dealing with
officials generally revealed much less ethnic discrimination in their personal experience
than in their suspicions, presumptions and perceptions. Either suspicion exaggerated
reality or general perceptions of bias focused on the most badly treated, rather than
the most numerous, minorities.
Ethnic minorities themselves behaved in different ways towards officials. Amongst
the ethnic minorities covered in this study, only Gypsies displayed the characteristics
of hopelessness and ‘exclusion’. Some minorities behaved much like the titular
nationality. But most compensated for their minority status by engaging more than
the titular nationality in a wide range of strategies to influence officials - including the
use of contacts, presents and bribes. Conversely, in areas where an ethnic minority
was concentrated locally, members of the titular nationality displayed a measurably
defensive reaction and a somewhat heightened degree of vigilance.
The paper is based on a total of 6,050 interviews made in the winter of 1997-8,
including representative country-wide samples and special additional samples in areas
where ethnic minorities were concentrated. It compares the four titular nationalities
with eight ethnic minorities.

This research was funded by the ODADFID (formerly Overseas Development Administration,
now Department for International Development) under grant R6445 to Miller and Koshech-
kina, and by the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) under grant R222474 to
Miller and Gredeland. Translation and fieldwork was carried out by OPW (Opinion Window)
of Prague and MVK of Bratislava both under the direction of Ladislav Koppl, CSD (Centre
for the Study of Democracy) of Sofia under the direction of Alexander Stoyanov, and GfK-
USM (Ukrainian Surveys and Market Research) of Kyiv under the direction of Tatyana
Koshechkina.
44 A.B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina
Introduction

At the start of the nineteenth century, Central and Eastern Europe was
ruled by imperial states characterised by ethnic diversity. The progressive
collapse of the Ottoman, Romanov and Hapsburg empires, the atrocities of
Nazi occupation, postwar ‘ethnic cleansing’ and revision of state borders,
followed by the break-up of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union in the 1990s, have combined to produce states that come much closer
to the model of a ‘nation state’,’ or, to use the more explicit terms favoured
by Todor Zhivkov’s regime, a ‘one-nation state’ or even a ‘single-nation
state’.* But despite all the upheavals, the states of Eastern Europe are still
not ‘single-nation states’. Poland and Hungary apart, there are substantial
minorities in most parts of Central and Eastern Europe who do not regard
their nationality and their citizenship as synonymous.
Any liberal democratic regime must aim to treat all its citizens fairly and
equally. In particular, an ethnically diverse liberal democracy must try to
ensure that citizens from different ethnic backgrounds are treated fairly and
equally - and not only as participants in political processes but also in their
personal dealings with state official^.^ Previous findings from our focus-
group discussions, in-depth interviews and surveys suggested that many
individual citizens throughout Central and Eastern Europe did not feel that
they could get fair treatment from state officials without the use of contacts,
presents and bribes (Miller, Koshechkina and Gradeland 1997; Gradeland,
Koshechkina and Miller 1997; Gradeland, Koshechkina and Miller 1998;
Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 1998). Sajo has recently complained
that ‘postcommunist societies fall prey to the label of corruption imposed
on them by the West. Western “experts” rely on anecdotes [and] hotel-lobby
chats with disgruntled businessmen which are frequently conducted by
journalists and “experts” who generally do not speak the local language’
(Sajo 1998: 43). ‘Exaggerating the problem and exploiting it for political
purposes has triggered inappropriate legal actions and moral crusades . . .
and it fosters a spiralling delegitimation of the new democracies’ (Sajo 1998:
37). Our own findings suggested that the people who lived in the countries
of Eastern Europe themselves ‘exaggerated the problem’ when they ‘relied
on anecdotes’, and they told a different story when they relied on personal
experience. But our evidence also indicated that there was a real problem
behind the exaggeration (Gradeland, Koshechkina and Miller 1997: 5 16-7;
Miller, Grerdeland and Koshechkina 1998: 278 and 289).
Here we use new data to consider the specifically ethnic, rather than the
purely individual, dimension to these complaints. In broad terms, we wish
to investigate the extent to which officials behaved differently towards
different ethnic groups. But this broad question immediately prompts a
number of supplementary questions. If people exaggerated the problems of
dealing with officials when gossiping rather than reporting personal
experience, the same might be true for the specifically ethnic dimension to
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 45

bureaucratic encounters. To what extent did people suspect that officials

would behave differently towards different ethnic groups? And how did that
compare with the extent to which different ethnic groups actually experi-
enced different treatment by officials?
Conversely, we are also interested in the extent to which different ethnic
groups behaved differently towards officials. And this too prompts a
supplementary question: ‘to what extent did a local concentration of an
ethnic minority affect the way that different ethnic groups behaved?’
Finally, it is all too easy to confuse ethnic differences with area effects.
There may be, for example, a Crimean rather than a Tatar perspective, a
Transcarpathian rather than a Rusyn perspective. So we also ask: ‘to what
extent were apparently “ethnic” effects merely “area” effects?’
Our findings are based on surveys in the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Bulgaria and Ukraine. In each country we surveyed a representative sample
of the adult population during the winter of 1997-8, with sample sizes
ranging from 1,003 in the Czech Republic to 1,519 in Bulgaria. But in three
of these countries we also commissioned a total of 1,272 additional
interviews in ethnic minority areas. These additional interviews were nor
restricted to the ethnic minority itself, however, because we were particularly
interested in the perceptions and behaviour of titular nationalities living
within ethnic minority areas. We interviewed an additional 325 in
‘Hungarian minority’ areas of Slovakia, 347 in ‘Turkish minority’ areas of
Bulgaria, 300 in Crimea and 300 in Transcarpathia (the ‘Zakarpatia’
O b l a ~ t )Combining
.~ these ‘ethnic minority area’ samples with our country-
wide samples gives a total of 6,050 interviews.
We have generally accepted each respondent’s own description of their
ethnic identity. Although ethnic self-descriptions can change rapidly in
response to events, they seem the most appropriate basis for a study of
discrimination. The only exception is that we have merged the few self-
described ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ with the much more numerous self-described
‘Turks’ to provide a larger ethnic minority sample, and to simplify the
analysis.
With the additional interviews in minority areas, the survey design
produced enough interviews to let us investigate the opinions and experience
of eight ethnic minorities and contrast them with the four titular
nationalities. Table 1 sets out the numbers of interviews with each of the
twelve ethnic groups in our study.

Diverse minorities

In terms of history and status, the ethnic minorities in our analysis were
diverse, and their interactions with officials could be expected to reflect that
diversity. There is likely to be a difference, both in their treatment by
offickals and in the ethnic minority’s own behdviour, between a relatively
46 A. B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

Table 1. Sample design

Self-described Totdl number Number drawn from Number drawn from
ethnic group of the country-wide the minority-area
/ nationality interviews sample sample
N N N

Czech Republic
Czechs 866 866 0
Moravians 95 95 0
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 1,086 905 181
Hungarians 250 113 137
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 1,473 1,299 174
Turks 293 144 149
Gypsies 86 62 24
Ukraine
Ukrainians I ,08 1 88 I 200
Russians 358 258 100
Tatars 103 3 100
Rusyns 103 3 100
Hungarians 100 0 100

Notes
(i) Although all the interviews in the Czech Republic were drawn from a country-wide
representative sample, nearly all respondents who described themselves as ‘Moravian’ lived in
the two Moravian regions of the Republic.
(ii) 34 self-described ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ are included with the ‘Turks’ in Bulgaria.

wealthy minority and a desperately poor minority, between a respected

minority and a feared or despised minority, between a culturally similar
minority and a culturally alien minority.
Some minorities were regarded as ‘ex-imperial minorities’, formerly
dominant ethnic groups now left behind in the near-abroad by the shrinking
borders of Hungary, the Ottoman/Turkish state or Russia. Tatars and
Gypsies were regarded as alien although not ex-imperial in that sense. And
to many in the titular nationality, Moravians and Rusyns were regarded as
‘exotic’ variants of the titular nationality, bent on making a distinction
without a difference (Wilson 1997: 165).

Moravians in the Czech Republic

In our survey almost no one outside Moravia, and only a minority of 21 per
cent within it, described their ‘ethnic grouphationality’ as Moravian. A
majority of them claimed to speak ‘Moravian’ at home. They were more
likely than Czechs to live in a village, lack higher education, identify with
the Catholic Church and to claim that their income was ‘not enough to live
on’ - though the differences from Czechs were relatively small.
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 47

Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia

For some years after Slovakia’s independence, its leaders were continuously
troubled by the fears of Hungarian secession (Bacova, Homisinova and
Cooper 1994) and a liberal treaty with Hungary on the treatment of
minorities was offset by actions that ‘contradicted both the spirit and the
contents of the treaty’ (Fisher 1996: 30; Fisher 1997: 23-4). Ethnic
Hungarians in our survey were somewhat more likely than Slovaks to live in
a village and lack higher education - a pattern consistent with Gabzdilova
(1994). But the main differences were cultural and political: over 90 per cent
spoke Hungarian at home and 63 per cent preferred to vote for a Hungarian
nationalist party.

Turks in Bulgaria
Since independence from the Ottoman empire in 1878, policy towards the
Turkish/Muslim minority has been erratic. Governments have lurched
between policies of cultural pluralism and compulsory assimilation. Under
the postcommunist democratic regime, religious or ethnically based political
parties were officially banned but actually existed under the guise of parties
committed to the ‘rights and freedoms’ of individual citizens (Ganev 1997:
129-30; Krastev 1997). In our survey, Turks were more likely than ethnic
Bulgarians to live in a village. (Under the Ottomans, it was the ethnic
Bulgarians who lived in the villages.) Turks were also relatively poor,
unemployed and uneducated. Attempts in the 1980s to eradicate the Turkish
language were counter-productive (Eminov 1997: Chapters I, 4 and 5), and
almost all the Turks in our survey claimed to speak Turkish at home. In
religion, 94 per cent identified themselves as Muslims. Two-thirds preferred
to vote for a party that stood for the rights of ethnic minorities.

Gypsies in Bulgaria
At home, 71 per cent of Gypsies in our Bulgarian sample spoke Romany
and only 16 per cent Bulgarian. In religion, Gypsies divided fairly evenly
between Muslims, Orthodox and unspecified ‘Christians’. Although unem-
ployment was twice as high amongst Turks as amongst ethnic Bulgarians, it
was almost five times as high amongst Gypsies. And while 42 per cent of
ethnic Bulgarians and 54 per cent of Turks claimed their family income was
‘not enough to live on’, that figure rose to 88 per cent amongst Gypsies. The
extreme poverty of Gypsies was reflected in their voting preferences: only 18
per cent preferred a party representing ethnic minorities, but 29 per cent
preferred a socialist or communist party. Gypsies expressed unusually
strong opposition to restitution, and with good reason: 16 per cent of ethnic
Bulgarians, but none of the Gypsies in our survey, said their family had
benefited from the restitution process. In fact the Communist regime had
tried to end their nomadic ways by settling them on land seized from private
landowners, and in the postcommunist era ‘disputes between [ethnic]
Bulgarians and Gypsies often flared up in villages as ex-owners claimed
48 A. B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

their land back’ (Tomova 1992; Quoted in Eminov 1997: 118). In the 1990s
‘Gypsies have become even more marginalised than in the past, despised by
almost everybody regardless of whether they were Christians or Muslims’
(Eminov 1997: 119).

Russiuns in Ukraine
Early fears of major conflicts between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in an
independent Ukraine have not been realised. Ethnic Russians in Ukraine
are only a numerical rather than a psychological minority (Churilov and
Koshechkina 1996: 194), and empirical evidence suggests that ordinary
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians do not in fact feel very different from each
other (Miller, White and Heywood 1998: 276-9). Other ethnic conflicts in
Ukraine are more acute even if less potentially catastrophic. There has been
more pressure, and more progress, towards autonomy for Crimea and
Transcarpathia than for those mainland areas of southern and eastern
Ukraine where there are high concentrations of ethnic Russians (Wilson
1997: 163-168; Kuzio and Wilson 1994:191-202, 191-4, and 195-7).

Tatars in Crimeu
In 1991 the Medzhlis (Tatar Assembly) claimed that ‘Crimea is the national
territory of the Crimean-Tatar people, on which they alone possess the
right of self-determination’ (Kuzio and Wilson 1994: 192). But by 1998
Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev complained, at a rally to mark the 54th
anniversary of their deportation under Stalin, that the 250,000 Tatars who
had returned faced ‘a disastrous situation without rights’ - many had no
jobs or housing and 70,000 had not even acquired Ukrainian citizenship, he
claimed. (RFE/RL 1998). In opposition to the locally dominant ethnic
Russians however, Tatars sometimes found themselves in an alliance of
convenience with the central Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv.

Rusyns and Hungurians in Transcarputhiu

Transcarpathia was added to Ukraine by the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of
1945, having previously been within the Hapsburg empire until 1918, and
within Czechoslovakia until 1938. In the 1990s, the originally anti-Hapsburg
‘Rusyn movement, thought dead and buried in 1945, has revived’ (Wilson
1997: 165), and ethnic identities have shifted. As many as half of those who
were once classified as ethnic Ukrainians in Transcarpathia now identify
themselves as wholly or partly Rusyn. The small minority of ethnic
Hungarians in Transcarpathia are concentrated along its western border. In
Wilson’s view, ‘Kiev has played divide-and-rule between Rusyns and
Hungarians in Transcarpathia, with some success’ (Wilson 1997: 166).

Despite their generally good inter-personal relations, there were Some

sharp cultural differences between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians within
Ukraine, notably on education, religion, and language. But the greatest
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 49

differences within Ukraine lay between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians on

the one hand, and Tatars, Rusyns and Hungarians on the other. A majority
within each group claimed to speak their own ethnic language at home,
though the Tatar and Hungarian languages clearly differed much more than
Russian or Rusyn from standard Ukrainian.5 A large minority of Rusyns
(28 per cent in our survey) identified themselves as Catholic, mainly ‘Greek
Catholic’, and remarkably few disclaimed any religious affiliation at all.
Similarly, most ethnic Hungarians also claimed a religious affiliation, though
they divided two-to-one between Catholics and Protestants, with very few
Orthodox. Moreover, Hungarian Catholics divided more evenly between the
Greek and Latin rites than Rusyn Catholics. Tatars were overwhelmingly
Muslim. In economic terms, Rusyns, and more especially Hungarians, felt
much more satisfied with their incomes than ethnic Ukrainians, while Tatars
felt much less satisfied. But Tatars, Rusyns and Hungarians were all far
more committed than ethnic Ukrainians to the principle of restitution,
though Tatars felt they had not yet gained much from it.

General suspicions of ethnic bias

Suspicions of ethnic discrimination would be important even if they did not

reflect reality. So, to what extent did people think that ethnicity would
affect the relationship between citizens and officials? And to what extent did
different ethnic groups have different views on this question?
We asked respondents whether they thought officials would treat a client
‘of the same nationality as the official, better or worse than they treat most
other people?’ Although some felt officials did not discriminate either way, a
very large majority in almost every ethnic group felt that officials treated
clients of their own nationality better than others. Typically, by a margin of
over 50 percent, people said officials treated their own nationality ‘better’
rather than ‘worse’. Amongst Gypsies the margin reached 66 per cent.
We repeated this question, focusing on how officials would treat clients
who were (i) Gypsies/Roma, and (ii) Jews?’ Speculation about the treatment
of Jewish clients was erratic, unclear and probably ill-informed. But very
large majorities in every ethnic group felt that officials treated Gypsy clients
worse than others. By margins of at least 42 per cent, and usually over 50
per cent, every ethnic group said Gypsy clients were treated worse than
others. In Bulgaria, the margin of suspicion ran at 50 per cent amongst
ethnic Bulgarians and 54 per cent amongst Turks, but reached 78 per cent
amongst Gypsies themselves.
Then we repeated the question again, now focusing on ethnic minorities
of particular significance within particular countries. Within the Czech
Republic we asked about the treatment of Slovak clients. Neither Czechs
nor Moravians thought officials discriminated much with respect to Slovak
clients, and the very few ethnic Slovaks that we interviewed in the Czech
50 A. B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

Table 2. Do officials treat clients of ‘their own nationality’ better or worse

than they treat most other people?
Treat same Treat same Treat same Treat same
nationality better nationality the nationality worse nationality (?A>better
than others same as others than others - YOworse)
Yo Yo Yo ‘%

Czech Republic
Czechs 59 35 7 +52
Moravians 40 45 15 +24
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 62 35 3 +59
Hungarians 61 32 6 +55
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 61 36 3 +58
Turks 61 31 7 +54
Gypsies 75 16 9 +66
Ukraine
Ukrainians 52 45 3 +49
Russians 48 45 7 +4 1
Tatars 50 46 4 +45
Rusyns 54 44 2 +52
Hungarians 60 39 1 +59
Average 57 37 6 +5 1

Table 3. Do officials treat Gypsies and Jews better or worse than they treat
most other clients?
Treat Gypsies Treat Jews
(“%Ibetter - YOworse) (% better - YOworse)
Czech Republic
Czechs - 47 +7
Moravians - 42 -1
Slovak Republic
Slovaks - 54 +8
Hungarians - 56 - 14
Bulgaria
Bulgarians - 50 +13
Turks - 54 - 14
Gypsies - 78 +29
Ukraine
Ukrainians - 58 -9
Russians - 55 - I9
Tatars - 58 -9
Rusyns -60 - 30
Hungarians - 58 - 15
Averuge - 56 -4
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 51

Table 4. Do officials treat Slovaks, Hungarians and Turks better or worse

thaii they treat most other people?
~~~

Treat Slovaks Treat Hungarians Treat Turks

(% better - YOworse) (YObetter - YOworse) (% better - YOworse)
Czech Republic Slovak Republic Bulgaria
Czechs -3 Slovaks - 12 Bulgarians - 13
Moravians 0 Hungarians -40 Turks -11
Slovaks (+24) Gypsies - 20

Note: There were only 23 ethnic Slovaks in our sample of the Czech Republic.

Republic thought they were treated better than other clients. Within
Slovakia we found a consensus across ethnic groups that officials treated
Hungarian clients worse than others, but these perceptions of discrimination
varied in degree. By a margin of 40 per cent the Hungarian minority itself
thought Hungarians were treated worse than others. But amongst Slovaks
that margin fell to only 12 per cent. Within Bulgaria there was a consensus
across all ethnic groups that officials treated Turkish clients worse than
others, but the margins were small - only 13 per cent amongst ethnic
Bulgarians, and 11 per cent amongst Turks themselves, though rising to 20
per cent amongst Gypsies who seem to have projected some of their own
perceptions of ill-treatment onto Turkish clients.
Within Ukraine, there was a consensus across all ethnic groups that
officials treated Ukrainian and Russian clients better, and Tatar clients worse
than others. However, the margins varied both according to the ethnicity of
the client and the ethnicity of the observer. By a large margin, both
Russians and Ukrainians thought Ukrainians were treated better than
others. And by smaller margins, both ethnic groups thought Russians were
treated better than others.
Tatars had distinctive views. They were amongst the most likely to allege
that officials discriminated in favour of ethnic Ukrainians. More strikingly
still, they were by far the most likely to allege that officials discriminated in
favour of ethnic Russians (by a margin of 42 per cent). Indeed, Tatars were
the only ethnic group to allege more discrimination in favour of Russians
than in favour of Ukrainians - no doubt reflecting the tensions between
Tatars and the locally dominant Russians in Crimea. And, as might be
expected, Tatars were by far the most likely to allege that officials
discriminated against Tatars, though the remarkably high margin of 57 per
cent amongst Tatars, over twice as high as amongst any other ethnic group,
indicated a sharp polarisation of suspicion between Tatars and others about
the way officials treated Tatars.
We also asked whether arguing with an official, appealing to a higher
official or giving money and presents would be more effective ‘if the client
52 A. B. Grardeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

Table 5. Do officials treat Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars better or worst

than thej treat most other people?
Treat Russians Treat Ukrainians Treat Tatars
(% better - % worse) (% better - YOworse) (% better - %n worse)
~~ ~ ~~~

Ukraine
Ukrainians + 19 +36 -21
Russians +6 +24 - 27
Tatars +42 +38 - 57
Rusyns +1 +25 - 28
Hungarians + 12 +45 -24

were the same nationality (ethnic group) as the official’, or would

nationality ‘make no difference’?
Around two out of five respondents said ethnicity would make a
difference to the effectiveness of clients’ arguments or appeals. Moravians
excepted, all ethnic minorities were consistently more inclined than the
titular nationality to think that ethnicity would make a difference: 15 to 20
per cent more amongst ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, 12 to 13 per cent
amongst Turks, 29 to 32 per cent amongst Gypsies, and up to 29 per cent
more amongst ethnic minorities in Ukraine.
Rather fewer respondents thought ethnicity would make a difference to
the effectiveness of giving money and presents to officials. But again, ethnic
minorities were consistently more inclined than the titular nationality to
think that it would: 9 per cent more amongst ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia,
14 per cent amongst Turks, 27 per cent amongst Gypsies, and up to 34 per
cent more amongst ethnic minorities in Ukraine.

Actual ethnic experience

These findings indicate a very widespread suspicion of ethnic discrimination,

voiced particularly by ethnic minorities, but not only by them. Was this
suspicion upheld by experience? To what extent did people from different
ethnic groups actually report experience of different treatment at the hands
of officials?
Moravians, ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, and Turks were less likely
than the titular nationality to feel that they ‘knew their rights’ when they
met officials. But the Turks were as likely as the titular nationality to ‘know
someone in the office’ and both the Moravians and Hungarians more likely
to do so. Overall, their greater knowledge of officials offset their lack of
knowledge about their rights.
But Tatars, and more especially Gypsies, were not only less likely to
know their rights, they were also less likely to know an official in the office.
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 53

Table 6. ‘More effective if the person with the problem were the same
nationality (ethnic group) as the ofJicial?’
Argument Appeals Giving money
and presents
% % %
Czech Republic
Czechs 46 35 24
Moravians 33 23 26
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 44 38 24
Hungarians 59 58 33
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 45 44 22
Turks 58 56 36
Gypsies 74 76 49
Ukraine
Ukrainians 25 28 22
Russians 31 33 27
Tatars 29 40 23
Rusyns 31 44 39
Hungarians 43 57 56
Average 43 44 32

Table 7. Did you usually know your rights? Did you usually know anyone in
the office?
Usually knew rights Usually knew someone in office
YO %
Czech Republic
Czechs 52 31
Moravians 44 41
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 53 41
Hungarians 50 47
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 39 31
Turks 29 31
Gypsies 8 15
Ukraine
Ukrainians 46 40
Russians 40 40
Tatars 39 24
Rusyns 61 45
Hungarians 59 51
54 A.B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina
Gypsies, for example, were 31 per cent less likely than ethnic Bulgarians to
know their rights, and also 16 per cent less likely to know someone in the
office. These two minorities were unambiguously disadvantaged by lack of
knowledge.
Most people in all ethnic groups had at least some personal experience of
dealing with officials in the last few years. We asked about ‘your own or
your family’s personal experience of dealing with officials in the last few
years - approximately the last four or five years . . . Did these officials
usually, sometimes, rarely or never: (i) treat you and your family as equals?;
(ii) give you or your family fair treatment?’ It is important to note here that
the question about experience of equal treatment was not about equality
between citizens (which could not be answered from the personal experience
of an individual), but about equality of respect between citizen and official.
However, if answers to the question varied across different ethnic groups,
then this variation would indicate unequal treatment of different ethnic
groups.
There were some very obvious and important differences between
countries. But within countries, ethnic minorities nearly always complained
more than titular nationalities about the way officials had treated them. As
a simple index of good treatment, we can take the percentage who said they
had ‘usually’ been well treated minus the percentage who said they had
‘rarely or never’ been well treated. In terms of ‘equality of respect’, that
index shows that every ethnic minority except Hungarians in Ukraine were
more likely than the titular nationality to complain - especially the Turks
(by 36 per cent) and Gypsies (by 72 per cent). And in terms of complaints
about ‘unfair’ treatment, the index shows that every ethnic minority except
Russians complained considerably more than the titular nationality -
especially the Turks (by 28 per cent) and Gypsies (by 58 per cent), but also
Tatars, Rusyns and Hungarians in Slovakia (by 20 per cent or more),
Hungarians in Ukraine (by 17 per cent), and even Moravians (by 14 per
cent).
Compared to the titular nationality, most ethnic minorities also reported
greater experience of extortion by officials explicitly or implicitly soliciting
bribes: Turks 14 per cent more than the titular nationality, Rusyns and
Hungarians in Ukraine over 20 per cent more, even Moravians 12 per cent
more than Czechs. But there were exceptions, most notably Gypsies who
were 23 per cent less likely than ethnic Bulgarians to report frequent
attempts at extortion by officials. Perhaps Gypsies were just too miserably
poor to tempt officials.

Ethnic behaviour towards officials

Did ethnicity also affect the behaviour of citizens towards officials? Even if
it is not ‘politically correct’ to do so, we must ask: did different ethnic
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 55

Table 8. Did officials treat you ‘as equals’, did officials treat you yairly’?
Were treated as equals Were treated fairly
usually rarely usually Difference usually rarely usually Difference
or never minus from or never minus from
rarely/ titular rarely/ titular
never nationality never nationality
% % YQ % YU %I Yo %
Czech Republic
Czechs 53 21 +32 - 68 I +61 -
Moravians 44 26 +I8 -14 55 8 +47 -14
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 33 30 +3 - 53 10 +43 -
Hungarians 26 35 -9 -12 40 17 +23 -20
Buigariu
Bulgarians 42 23 +I9 - 40 17 +23 -
Turks 23 40 -17 -36 26 31 -5 -28
Gypsies 9 62 -53 -72 16 51 -35 -58
Ukraine
Ukrainians 24 46 -22 - 19 38 -19 -
Russians 26 51 -25 -3 21 40 - I9 0
Tatars 26 51 -31 -9 13 54 -41 -22
Rusyns 17 48 -31 -9 6 47 -41 -22
Hungarians 22 40 -18 +4 3 39 -36 -17

groups have different moral standards? We asked two hypothetical,

scenario-style questions specifically focused on bribery. First: ‘If you had an
important problem, and an official asked you directly for money to solve it,
would you pay if you could afford it, or refuse to pay even if you could
afford it?’ Somewhat later in the interview we asked people to imagine
themselves in the official’s place: ‘Imagine you were an official on a low
salary, and a person who came to you with a problem offered you money or
a present. Would you be tempted to give better service, or be offended by
the offer? It could be argued that willingness to give bribes might be more a
matter of survival than of morals, a reaction to oppression rather than a
truly autonomous choice. But willingness to take bribes, even in a
hypothetical situation, indicates choice and preference more than submission
to forces beyond the individual’s control.
Again there were sharp and important differences between countries. But
within Bulgaria, Turks and Gypsies were between 25 and 29 per cent more
willing than the titular nationality to give bribes (if asked) and more
tempted to accept them (if offered). And all ethnic minorities, except for
Russians and Rusyns, were at least somewhat more willing than the titular
nationality both to give and to take.
What had they done in practice? Did different ethnic groups actually
report giving more or fewer bribes? And did they differ in terms of the
many other strategies that might be used to influence officials? Apart from
56 A. B. Grsdeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

Table 9. Willingness to g i v e money i f a s k e d ’ and ‘take money ifoflered’

Would Difference from Would Difference from
Pay titular be tempted titular
if asked nationality to accept nationality
Yb ‘YO ‘%, ‘Yo
~ ~~~~~~~

Czech Republic
Czechs 36 34
Moravians 44 49 +I5
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 55 44 -.

Hungarians 71 49 +5
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 55 - 35
Turks 84 +29 63 +28
Gypsies 80 +25 64 +29
Ukraine
Ukrainians 75 + 63
Russians 71 -4 60 -3
Tatars 87 +I2 71 +8
Rusyns 72 -3 49 - 14
Hungarians 84 +9 75 +12

the client passively ‘accepting what the official said though still dissatisfied’,
we asked about seven active strategies that had emerged in our earlier focus-
group discussions with postcommunist citizens: ‘Thinking over your
personal experiences of dealing with officials in the last few years, did you
or your family usually, sometimes, rarely, or never have to . . .
(i) behave more pleasantly than normal towards the official?
(ii) argue with the official, or keep going back to them?
(iii) appeal to a higher official?
(iv) appeal to an elected representative on a local council or in parliament?
(v) approach an official through a contact?
(vi) offer a small present?
(vii) offer money or an expensive present?
Across the seven strategies, every ethnic minority except Gypsies had
been at least as active as the titular nationality and usually more active,
typically by around 10 per cent. Ethnic minorities did not differ greatly
from titular nationalities in terms of passive acceptance, unusually ‘pleasant
behaviour’ or even propensity to argue, but there were more widespread
differences on recourse to appeals. Every ethnic minority except Gypsies
reported that they had appealed to higher officials more often than the
titular nationality - Moravians, ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, and both
Rusyns and Hungarians in Ukraine about 12 per cent more, and Tatars 18
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 57

Table 10. Strategies which respondents said they or their families had actually
used (at least ‘rarely’) in recent years
Were Argued Appealed Appealed Approached Gave Gave Average Difference
more to higher to elected official a money from
pleasant official represent- through a small or an titular
than ative contact present expensive nationality
usual present
% % % % % % % % %

Czech Republic
Czechs 66 78 35 14 39 23 10 38 -
Moravians 72 81 46 21 54 25 17 45 +7
Slovak Republic
Slovaks 80 77 37 17 65 53 28 51 -

Hungarians 86 85 48 27 73 69 48 62 +9
Bulgaria
Bulgarians 93 15 48 19 44 32 16 47 -
Turks 93 71 54 34 56 49 34 56 +9
Gypsies 87 65 30 9 21 28 a 36 -11
Ukruine
Ukrainians 86 78 54 26 60 58 37 57 -
Russians 88 78 60 33 60 59 31 59 +2
Tatars 99 94 72 42 73 65 32 68 +II
Rusyns 95 a9 66 22 77 62 41 65 +8
Hungarians 95 83 66 31 79 70 53 68 +I I

per cent more. But, unlike every other minority, Gypsies had appealed to
higher officials 18 per cent less than the titular nationality. Most ethnic
minorities had also appealed to their elected representatives more often than
the titular nationality, though Gypsies 10 per cent less.
Russians had used contacts to the same extent as Ukrainians, but other
ethnic minorities were up to 19 per cent more likely than the titular
nationality to have approached officials through a contact - except for
Gypsies who had used contacts 17 per cent less than the titular nationality.
Russians had also used small presents to the same extent as Ukrainians, but
other ethnic minorities had used them up to 17 per cent more often than the
titular nationality - except for Gypsies who had used them very slightly less.
Russians had also used bribes of money or expensive presents to the same
extent as Ukrainians, but other ethnic minorities had used them up to 20
per cent more than the titular nationality - except for Gypsies and Tatars
who had used them less (despite Tatars being the most willing to give bribes
‘if asked’ and ‘if they could afford it’).
Gypsies were unique. They alone displayed the characteristics of hope-
lessness and ‘exclusion’. Most other ethnic minorities used a variety of
strategies significantly more than the titular nationality, and no other
minority ever used any strategy significantly less than the titular nationality.
But Gypsies were 10 per cent less likely than the titular nationality to have
58 A.B. Grodeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina
argued with an official or appealed to an elected representative, 18 per cent
less likely to have appealed to a higher official, 17 per cent less likely to
have approached an official through a contact, slightly less likely to have
given a small present and only half as likely as the titular nationality to
have given money or an expensive present. And the contrast between
Gypsies and Turks was even more dramatic.
Of course, many of those who had used contacts, presents and bribes only
admitted to doing so ‘rarely’ in recent years. If we restrict attention to those
who admitted using these strategies more than rarely, the numbers obviously
go down. But ethnic patterns remain broadly similar. Ethnic Russians were
indistinguishable from the titular nationality on all three strategies. In terms
of frequent use: Moravians, Hungarians (both in Slovakia and Ukraine) and
Turks used all three strategies more than the titular nationality. Rusyns used
contacts much more than the titular nationality but money and expensive
presents slightly less. And Tatars used contacts more than the titular
nationality, but both small and large presents slightly less. But only Gypsies
used all three strategies less than the titular nationality.

International perspectives

Ethnic minorities were more inclined than titular nationalities to claim that
officials in their country were ‘more corrupt than officials in most East
European countries’ - Moravians 13 per cent more, ethnic Hungarians in
Slovakia 18 per cent more, Tatars 12 per cent more and Rusyns 16 per cent
more. (Bulgarian citizens found the comparison with the rest of Eastern
Europe more difficult and unusually large numbers gave a ‘don’t know’
response.)
Conversely, ethnic minorities were generally less likely to regard interna-
tional pressure (including the suspension of international aid and invest-
ment) on their government to reduce corruption as ‘unacceptable
interference in their country’s internal affairs’ - Moravians 17 per cent less,
ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia 12 per cent less, Tatars 15 per cent less, and
ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine 10 per cent less. Only two ethnic minorities
(Russians and Rusyns) reacted against international pressure more strongly
than the titular nationality, and then only slightly more.

The impact of context on bureaucratic encounters

The design of our survey allows us to contrast the opinions and behaviour
of both ethnic Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia as a whole, with
their opinions and behaviour in ‘Hungarian minority areas’. Similarly we
can contrast the opinions and behaviour of both ethnic Bulgarians and
Turks in Bulgaria as a whole, with their opinions and behaviour in ‘Turkish
minority areas’.
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 59

Comparison is more difficult in the Czech Republic and Ukraine because

nearly all ethnic Moravians in our survey lived in Moravia, Tatars in
Crimea, Rusyns and Hungarians in Transcarpathia, and most ethnic
Russians in south and east Ukraine. But we can still look at the effects on
the titular nationalities of living in different contexts.
Context could affect our findings in various ways. First, and most
obviously, there is the ethnic context itself. In areas where an ethnic minority
was concentrated, even if they did not form a local majority, their local
concentration could affect the opinions, perceptions and behaviour of
individuals - both those drawn from the ethnic minority itself and those
drawn from the titular nationality.
But, in addition, ethnic minority areas sometimes differed from other
areas in ways that were only coincidentally (and thus misleadingly) related
to ethnicity. Pure area effects could then be mistaken for ethnic effects. We
can illustrate this with a very simple example. Regions close to state borders
brought people into closer and more frequent contact with customs and
passport officials, irrespective of ethnicity. Minorities with ‘friends across
the border’ - Turks in Bulgaria, Tatars in Ukraine, ethnic Hungarians in
Slovakia and Ukraine - dealt with customs and passport officials much
more than the titular nationality. But that overemphasises the significance
of ethnicity. Within Ukraine, 36 per cent of ethnic Hungarians compared to
only 12 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians had personally dealt with customs
officials in recent years. But within the border region of Transcarpathia,
where those ethnic Hungarians were concentrated, 28 per cent of ethnic
Ukrainians had also dealt with customs officials. So what appeared to be an
ethnic effect was, in large measure, simply an area effect in this example, the
result more of geographic than of ethnic proximity.

Context and suspicion

Some of the most interesting aspects of context concerned its effect upon
the titular nationality.
There was a recurrent tendency for the titular nationality to perceive less
discrimination against the minority if they themselves lived in a minority
area. Significantly, the ethnic minorities themselves did not concur. In
Slovakia as a whole, for example, ethnic Slovaks felt that officials treated
Hungarians worse than others (though larger numbers of ethnic Hungarians
felt so too). But within Hungarian minority areas, ethnic Slovaks did nof
feel that officials treated Hungarians worse than others - although ethnic
Hungarians did feel that. Thus, in Slovakia as a whole, ethnic Hungarians
were 24 per cent more likely than Slovaks to perceive official discrimination
against Hungarians, but within Hungarian areas ethnic Hungarians were 40
per cent more likely than Slovaks to perceive ethnic bias against
Hungarians. So, within ethnic minority areas, perceptions of discrimination
60 A.B. Gradeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina
by officials against Hungarians were much more polarised between the
ethnic minority and the titular nationality than in the rest of the country.
Similarly, in Bulgaria, both Turks -and Bulgarians felt that officials
treated Turks worse than others. But while ethnic Bulgarians in Bulgaria as
a whole were actually 3 per cent more likely to suspect officials of anti-
Turkish bias than were the Turks themselves, ethnic Bulgarians living in
Turkish areas were 9 per cent less likely than Turks to suspect officials of
ethnic discrimination against Turks.
In Ukraine as a whole, all ethnic groups felt that officials treated Tatars
worse than others. In particular, by a margin of 30 per cent, Russians in the
south and east of Ukraine suspected officials of discriminating against Tatars;
but within Crimea, that margin fell to only 11 per cent amongst ethnic
Russians. Similarly, by a margin of 24 per cent, ethnic Ukrainians in the
south and east of Ukraine alleged that officials discriminated against Tatars;
but within Crimea, ethnic Ukrainians felt that officials treated Tatar clients
no better or worse than others. So the difference between Ukrainian and
Tatar perceptions of anti-Tatar discrimination was 35 per cent in the south
and east of Ukraine as a whole, but soared to 59 per cent within Crimea.

Context and experience

But the personal experience of our respondents did not support the view
that ethnic bias varied according to context. Czechs were treated ‘fairly’ and
‘as equals’ to the same extent in Bohemia and Moravia. Hungarians
complained more than Slovaks about their treatment by officials, and Turks
more than ethnic Bulgarians - but, in each case, to the same extent within
ethnic minority areas as in the country as a whole. And ethnic Ukrainians
actually complained more about their treatment in Ukrainian areas than in
more Russian areas.
Moreover, there was an almost consistent tendency for the titular
nationality to report less attempted extortion in minority areas - the only
exception was Transcarpathia. In terms of their experience of extortion,
ethnic differences within minority areas were generally greater than in the
country as a whole and, paradoxically, it was the ethnic minorities which
seemed relatively disadvantaged in the very areas where they were most
numerous.
Thus, the fact that the titular nationality’s perception of anti-minority
discrimination Faded in ethnic minority areas probably reflected a psycholo-
gical reaction by the titular nationality, a less generous and more
apprehensive posture by them, rather than an accurate perception of more
favourable treatment of the ethnic minority.

Context and informat ion

There was no evidence that the titular nationality lacked knowledge of their
rights within minority areas, nor that they lacked useful contacts amongst
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 61

officials in these places. Indeed, if anything, the titular nationality seemed

better informed in minority areas than it did elsewhere. Perhaps, of course,
it was just more alert to its interests in minority areas. Ethnic Slovaks in
Slovakia as a whole claimed to ‘know their rights’ no more than ethnic
Hungarians, but within Hungarian minority areas 11 per cent more Slovaks
than Hungarians claimed to ‘know their rights’. Similarly, ethnic Slovaks in
Slovakia as a whole were 10 per cent less likely than ethnic Hungarians to
claim they usually knew ‘someone in the office’, but within Hungarian areas
Slovaks claimed to know ‘someone in the office’ more often than ethnic
Hungarians. Ethnic Bulgarians in Bulgaria as a whole were 9 per cent more
likely than Turks to claim they usually ‘knew their rights’, but within
Turkish areas they were 18 per cent more likely than Turks to claim such
knowledge. In Bulgaria as a whole Bulgarians claimed they usually knew
‘someone in the office’ slightly less often than Turks, but within Turkish
areas they claimed this knowledge 13 per cent more often than Turks.
In the more Russian areas of Ukraine, ethnic Ukrainians were a little
more likely than Russians to claim that they ‘knew their rights’. In Crimea,
the numbers of both Ukrainians and Russians who claimed to ‘know their
rights’ increased by over 10 per cent, and that put both of them ahead of
the Tatars. Transcarpathia was the sole exception: in Transcarpathia ethnic
Ukrainians felt relatively well informed about their rights compared to
Ukrainians in the rest of Ukraine, but they still did not feel as well informed
as Rusyns and Hungarians.

Context and behaviour

It was in Transcarpathia, however, that we observed the greatest influence
of context on behaviour. On every strategy, from pleasant behaviour
through arguments, appeals, contacts, presents and bribes, ethnic Ukrai-
nians in Ukraine as a whole were less likely than Rusyns or Hungarians to
report that they had used that strategy in their dealings with officials. But
ethnic Ukrainians living within Transcarpathia were slightly more likely
than Rusyns or Hungarians to do so. So in most respects, there was a
relatively active Transcarpathian style of dealing with officials, rather than a
specifically Rusyn or Hungarian style.

Discussion

We found pervasive suspicions of ethnic bias by officials against clients.

These suspicions were voiced particularly by ethnic minorities, but not only
by them. There was a general consensus across all ethnic groups that
officials discriminated in favour of their own nationality or ethnic group.
On the average, across all ethnic groups, minority or majority, 57 per cent
thought officials treated clients from their own ethnic group better than
62 A. B. Grndeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina

others - and a mere 6 per cent thought they treated them worse. There was,
in short, a pervasive general presumption of ethnic discrimination.
By themselves, such suspicions are not proof of discrimination. They tell
us about the psychology of the citizens, but not necessarily about the
behaviour of officials. Individuals are poorly placed to judge whether ethnic
discrimination actually occurs. A valid test requires comparison of the
actual experience of clients from different ethnic backgrounds.
It is not our intention to disparage or belittle perceptions of bias,
however, but rather to emphasise their autonomy and importance. Feelings
of discrimination are an extremely important fact in political life, irrespec-
tive of their objective basis. Even if they had no objective basis at all they
would be a political problem that required a solution. Politically, it is
important that ethnic justice is not only done but ‘seen to be done’, and a
widespread suspicion of ethnic discrimination is a real political problem in
itself.
Moreover, widespread perceptions of ethnic discrimination at least raise
a question that warrants carefully investigation. Perceptions may be
misleading. They may have no real basis in fact. But it would be counter-
intuitive, and even foolish, to assume without investigation that they have
no basis in fact.
To what extent was the pervasive suspicion of ethnic discrimination
justified? The answer is inevitably complicated by the diversity of ethnic
minorities. Our evidence suggests that there was discrimination against
clients from ethnic minorities but also that the degree or severity of ill-
treatment varied. Even the degree of suspicion expressed in answer to
hypothetical questions varied according to the ethnicity of the supposed
client as well as the ethnicity of the observer. There was, for example, no
consistent perception that Jews were treated better or worse than other
clients. But there was a strong consensus across all ethnic groups in all
countries that officials discriminated against Gypsies. Averaged across all
ethnic groups, the perception that officials discriminated against Gypsy
clients was as strong as the perception that they discriminated in favour of
their own ethnic group. But perceptions of discrimination against other
ethnic minorities - Hungarians in Slovakia, Turks in Bulgaria or Tatars in
Ukraine were much weaker. And officials were perceived as treating Slovaks
in the Czech Republic, and Russians in Ukraine, at least as well as if not
better than clients from the titular nationality.
Beyond the general cross-ethnic consensus that officials discriminated
against Gypsies, Tatars and ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, however, these
ethnic minorities themselves were far more likely than the titular nationality
to suspect official discrimination against their ethnic group.
Reports by respondents from different ethnic groups about their own
personal experience as individuals confirmed that officials had treated clients
from different ethnic groups differently. On average, ethnic minorities were
12 per cent less likely than the titular nationality to say they had ‘usually’
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 63

been treated fairly, and 11 per cent more likely than the titular nationality
to complain that they had ‘rarely or never’ been treated fairly. The scale of
ethnic discrimination revealed in these personal experiences was much less -
on average - than that implied by the pervasive suspicion of ethnic
discrimination. On the other hand, the scale of ethnic discrimination
revealed in these personal experiences varied from nothing amongst the
Russian minority in Ukraine to a very high level amongst Gypsies in
Bulgaria. Judged by reports of personal experience, the scale of discrimina-
tion actually experienced by Gypsies was consistent with pervasive suspi-
cions of ethnic discrimination; but the scale of discrimination actually
experienced by other ethnic minorities was not. We must conclude that
vague suspicions grossly exaggerated reality, or that they focused on ‘worst
case’ situations that involved only the most ‘alien’ and despised, rather than
the most numerous, minorities. The evidence from reports of actual
experience is that officials not only discriminated against ethnic minorities
but also discriminated sharply between ethnic minorities.
Different ethnic groups behaved differently towards officials. We looked
at a wide range of detailed strategies for dealing with officials. But more
important than the detail was whether different ethnic groups engaged more
or less actively in a whole range of strategies for influencing officials. In
broad terms, the strategic option was between activism and resignation or,
viewed from another perspective, between inclusion and exclusion. Despite
the diversity of ethnic minorities, most seemed more active than the titular
nationality. Ethnic Russians behaved much like ethnic Ukrainians, and
Moravians much like Czechs. But other ethnic minorities compensated for
their minority status by engaging more than the titular nationality in a wide
range of strategies to influence officials - unusually pleasant behaviour,
argument, appeals to higher officials or elected representatives, approaching
officials through contacts, or giving presents and bribes. And the titular
nationalities themselves echoed that broad strategy of compensatory
activism by paying special attention to their rights, and also to personal
contacts with officials, when they lived in ethnic minority areas. The only
exception was the Gypsies, who used every one of the strategies for dealing
with officials less, and often far less, than the titular nationality. Of all the
ethnic minorities, only Gypsies displayed the characteristics of hopelessness,
alienation and exclusion.
Context also affected perceptions and behaviour. Members of the titular
nationality were not only more vigilant about their rights when they lived in
a minority area, they also became less sympathetic to the treatment of
ethnic minorities. As a result, perceptions of ethnic discrimination tended to
be more polarised between ethnic minorities and the titular nationality
within ethnic minority areas than within the country as a whole. In addition,
we found evidence of purely local area effects, largely unrelated to ethnicity
but affecting a high proportion of ethnic groups that were concentrated in
these particular localities. Most notably, there seemed to be a particularly
64 A.B. Grardeland, W. L. Miller, T. Y. Koshechkina
active Transcarpathian style of dealing with officials which was more
characteristic of the area than of any particular ethnic group within it.
Did suspicions of ethnic discrimination, or even the experience of it,
really matter? They certainly seemed to influence attitudes towards officials,
towards reform, and towards international intervention. Ethnic minorities
were more inclined than titular nationalities to view officials in their country
as ‘more corrupt than officials in most East European countries’, and they
were generally less likely to regard international pressure on their govern-
ment to reduce corruption, including threats to suspend international aid or
investment, as ‘unacceptable interference in their country’s internal affairs’.
But, more important, fair and equal treatment by officials lies at the heart
of a truly democratic system. Political equality cannot be confined to the
ballot box without grievously lowering the standard of democracy. In The
Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1963: ch. 7) focused attention on the
twin pillars of a democratic system which they called ‘citizen competence’
and ‘subject competence’ - on the one hand, whether citizens could
collectively do something to change an unjust law, and, on the other,
whether citizens as individuals could expect serious consideration both in a
government office and from the police. Fair treatment by officials was as
important as the ability to influence the law-making process. In their view,
all citizens in a democracy had a right to fair and equal treatment by
officials. Ethnic discrimination by officials is only one aspect of unfair or
unequal treatment of citizens by officials in postcommunist Europe, but it is
an important one, and it is incompatible with the increasing focus, not so
much on a merely ‘consolidated’ democracy, as on a ‘complete’ democracy
in The Civic Culture sense.

Notes

I See Miller, White and Heywood (1998: 268-301) for more on this point. Harris (1993)
provides an ethnic breakdown of the new states according to official statistics. But changes in
the ideology of the regime and the fluidity of ethnic self-identification make all statistics on
Gypsies, Turks, Rusyns, Moravians and others a lot less rigid than one might suppose. The size
of an ethnic minority can, and did, increase or decrease quite rapidly without any change of
personnel.
2 ‘Comrades! The People’s Republic of Bulgaria is a one-nation state’ - Balev (1985) quoted in
Eminov (1997: 14).
3 The phrase in our title, ‘bureaucratic encounters’, is taken from the classic study of American
interactions between citizens and officials by Katz et ul. (1975).
4 In Slovakia the additional ethnic minority area sample was carried out with randomly
selected representative samples in areas where, according to the I99 I Census, ethnic Hungarians
were in the majority - the ‘okres’ of Dunajska Streda and Kornarno, or where the population
was divided about equally between Hungarians and Slovaks - Galanta, Nove Zamky, Levice,
Rimavska Sobota, and Trebisov. In Bulgaria the additional ethnic minority area sample was
carried out with randomly selected representative samples around Kurdzhali where the 1992
Census indicated 65 per cent were Turks, Razgrad (48 per cent Turks), Turgovishte (34 per cent
Turks), Slistra (33 per cent Turks), and Shournen (29 per cent Turks). Kurdzhali was the site of
Bureaucratic encounters in postcommunist Europe 65

two well-publicised Constitutional Court decisions over the election of a Turkish mayor in 1996
(Neuburger 1997: 11-12). In Ukraine the minority area sample consisted of quota samples with
100 ethnic Ukrainians, 100 Russians and 100 Tatars in Crimea; and with 100 Ukrainians, 100
Rusyns and 100 Hungarians in Transcarpathia.
5 No Ukrainian language speaker for example, would have great difficulty reading the Rusyn
language version of the ‘Declaration on the occasion of the celebratory announcement of the
codification of the Rusyn language in Slovakia’ - see Magocsi (1996b) p. x for the Rusyn
version, p. xi for the English and Slovak versions. Magocsi (1996a) provides a convenient and
balanced account of the twists and turns of the Rusyn language’s history - and there are many
- since the seventeenth century.

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